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
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Tros Tyriusque mihi nullo discrimine agetur.

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THE BRITISH ARMY.

RÉSUMÉ OF A CONVERSATION WITH FIELD-MARSHAL H. R. H. THE DUKE OF CAMBRIDGE, K. G., UPON THE TRANSVAAL WAR AND CONSIDERATIONS ARISING THEREFROM.

PREFATORY NOTE BY MR. G. LEVESON GOWER, FORMERLY COMPTROLLER OF HER MAJESTY'S HOUSEHOLD.

The following résumé embodies the opinions of H. R. H. the Duke of Cambridge, as the writer understood him to express them in a recent conversation.

His Royal Highness, who was born in the year 1819, and is of the same age as Her Majesty the Queen, has not allowed the cessation of his tenure of the post of Commander-in-Chief of Her Majesty's forces to lessen his interest in all that pertains to the Army.

This, as his speeches, no less than this conversation, testify, is as strong and as keen as ever.

At his advanced age, and at a time of life when one who had so long occupied so arduous and responsible a position might reasonably lay claim to repose, His Royal Highness shows no diminution of zeal or of concern for the well-being of the forces of which he so long held the supreme command.

G. LEVESON GOWER.

ONE of the most striking features of the present situation is the steadiness and freedom from panic shown, not only, as is natural,

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in military circles, but by the British public at large. This has been equally noticeable upon previous occasions when partial and preliminary reverses had occurred in the initial stages of a campaign.

Military students, of course, are aware that to meet with unchequered success in a contest with a brave and well-armed enemy is a piece of good fortune too good to be relied upon, for, in spite of the skill of commanders and the valor of troops, isolated checks and reverses are as probable in a military campaign as in the conduct of complicated business transactions. Especially must this be the case where troops are dependent upon a long line of communication in the presence of forces numerically their superior, and where relatively small bodies of men are operating over a field of vast extent and are necessarily occasionally isolated from each other.

This steadiness and freedom from panic upon the receipt of adverse news is akin to the spirit of the British troops of whom the French said in the Peninsular War, that they never understood when they were beaten. It is a gratifying fact that the British public are unwilling, in the event of a reverse, either to judge commanders hastily and without being in full possession of the facts of the case, or to lose heart because of some temporary and by no means irreparable check to our arms.

The same national characteristic of keeping a cool head in difficult and sometimes trying circumstances appeared during the long and anxious vicissitudes of the Peninsular campaign; although this was less remarkable then than now, inasmuch as there was then no telegraph to flash imperfect and exaggerated accounts of events before they had even had time to assume some definite and consistent shape. There were then no "special editions" transforming some minor skirmish into a "crushing defeat" or an "overwhelming victory," and seeking by every artifice to seize the attention of the passer-by. Nor at the clubs could men cluster, as they do now, round the tape as it momentarily records the successive phases of an engagement.

That the national nerves should be strong enough to stand such a constant series of electric shocks is a matter for congratulation. What was true of the calmness of the nation and of the army during the Peninsular War was also true at the time of the Crimea, in spite of the invention of the telegraph; and it remains

true now, notwithstanding the subsequent abnormal growth of a popular sensational and enterprising press.

Not but that the great services rendered to the country by the press in time of war must be fully admitted. Imperfect accounts are better than vague rumors; and sensational exaggeration is a less evil than paralyzing uncertainty and total absence of news. Now, at any rate, the friends and relatives of our gallant soldiers are not, as in the past, left for weeks and months without news of their whereabouts or their safety; and they have, at least, the melancholy satisfaction of knowing that in the event of those dear to them being killed or wounded they will be spared the strain of prolonged and agonizing incertitude.

Incidentally, of course, the testimony of able and trained war correspondents in the field enables a larger number of military students to follow the course and to profit by the lessons of the war.

This was notably the case in the American-Spanish War, than which no war has ever had cast upon it so fierce and full a light of contemporary description and criticism.

Americans were happily spared the distress of serious or even of partial reverses; but the recollection of how manfully they bore the news of those terribly anxious days before their final triumph at Santiago, shows that there is a kinship between America and Great Britain, not only of origin and of language, but of temperament and of traditions of quiet endurance and persistency.

It is a delicate matter to express an opinion not only, as is of course natural, upon the course of events and upon the strategy of the present campaign, but also upon the manner in which the short-service system, with its reservists, who in time of war can be called upon to rejoin the colors, had worked when subjected to the first really significant practical test upon a large scale which it has yet had to undergo.

The time has not yet arrived to express or even to form a judgment as to how this system works in time of war, and as to how it compares for effectiveness with the previous long-service system, with its smaller number of men, but longer and more continuous service.

Every carefully conceived and applied scheme of reform which, on mature consideration, seems likely to add to the strength and efficiency of the army should, of course, be welcomed and sup-

ported. But, without going into particulars, all changes are not reforms, and it is possible to have changes for the worse as well as changes for the better.

The practice of detailing separate companies of different regiments on special service, as was done in 1881 at Majuba with such disastrous results, is certainly undesirable. Occasionally this cannot be helped; but it is a practice which should be avoided as much as possible; and regiments should act, wherever practicable, as separate and undivided units under the command of their own officers. The same rule holds good as to the attaching of officers to other corps and regiments than their own. Sometimes this is inevitable, as the loss of officers in regiments which have been hotly engaged has to be made good from outside; but, generally speaking, it is a system to be deprecated as tending to weaken the intimate personal relationship between officers and their men, which is an invaluable factor in the serviceableness and cohesion of a regiment.

This solidarity of feeling in a regiment, which is at once the cause and the effect of long tradition and of a highly developed and carefully fostered *esprit de corps*, is of the utmost value to an army. It enhances and accentuates the general spirit of military devotion and discipline, and, while in no wise lessening the soldier's feeling that he is part and parcel of a vast organism, binds him by a sentiment of personal attachment to his regimental chiefs and regimental colors, and leads him jealously to guard the honor and to promote the glory of his own regiment, as something with which his own personal honor and reputation are indissolubly linked.

Hence, in large part, arises that eager emulation between different regiments upon the field of battle; that anxiety that their own regiment should be allotted the most dangerous position and the hardest task. Even regimental nicknames and *sobriquets* have, by the force of association, a curious power of evoking the soldier's affectionate devotion to the old corps to which he belongs and his attachment to the comrades who have served or who are serving with him.

Any changes tending to weaken or endanger this regimental *esprit de corps* should be regarded with disfavor.

Very useful lessons may be learnt from the present war as to the advantages of military ballooning; as to the effects of lyddite;

as to the adaptability to military purposes of Signor Marconi's wireless telegraphy; and, lastly, as to the way in which armored trains should be handled for reconnoissances, and as to the extent and limitations of their utility.

There is certainly urgent need, which has long since made itself felt, but which the present war has emphasized, of spending money judiciously, but much more liberally than at present, upon the army.

The British nation, especially within the last ten years, has recognized the paramount duty of providing, without stint or demur, whatever is requisite for the efficient service of the navy; both political parties are of one mind upon this policy, and act in harmony with each other in their determination to make the nation as strong as possible at sea; and this policy is heartily concurred in by the country.

It may fairly be contended that the army should be treated in the same liberal and far-seeing spirit as the navy, and that provision for its efficiency should be a matter equally outside of party politics and equally unaffected by party differences. Such a policy with respect to the army should, indeed, be looked upon as a question of national insurance.

It must be recognized that the British army can never and need never be kept in the same position of numerical and effective superiority with respect to other armies which it is necessary the British navy should hold with respect to the navies of the Continent. But, at the same time, a larger expenditure than is now allotted to the army is necessary to place it in a condition of absolute efficiency, and while it must always be limited as far as numbers go, it should be made as powerful and efficient a force of its size as money can make it; a state of affairs which is very far from being realized at present.

Of one thing one is happy to be able to speak with confidence, namely, that any changes of form or lapse of time have not impaired the zeal and devotion to duty, the strict discipline, the splendid gallantry, and the spirit of cheerful self-sacrifice of men and officers of all ranks and of all arms in Her Majesty's forces.

ORIGIN, DURATION AND OUTCOME OF THE WAR.

BY DR. W. J. LEYDS, EUROPEAN AGENT OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REPUBLIC.

[The official duties of Dr. Leyds are so exacting that he was obliged to decline the request of the Editor for a comprehensive article. He consented, however, to dictate answers to such questions as he might consider pertinent. These questions and answers follow.—EDITOR N. A. R.]

Q. How long do you think the war will last?

A. That depends upon many circumstances we cannot yet foresee. It may, however, be considered certain that should the real war be unsuccessful from the Boer point of view, guerilla warfare would ensue, which would last extremely long.

Q. Are the finances of the Republic in such a state as to permit of its carrying on war for a long time?

A. That again depends on what you mean by "a long" time. But I can vouch for the fact that the financial resources of the Republic are quite sufficient, in view of our (the Boer) estimation of the probable duration of the war.

Q. Will the negro natives of South Africa probably be drawn into the conflict before its end?

A. I will answer for the fact that the Boers will never provide the natives with arms to fight the English. The English, however, have armed the natives both at Mafeking and in Rhodesia, and the Republic has felt itself compelled to publicly protest against such a proceeding, which it deems a violation of international law.

Q. What truth is there in the statement that Boers are using the dumdum bullets?

A. The Boers do not manufacture dumdum bullets. If it has occurred that an isolated soldier has employed such murderous projectiles, it is probably because he has employed the rifle and

ammunition of some English trooper killed on the battle-field, which would only prove that such bullets are used by the British Army. We have no doubt that they are, and consider this as a special sign of bad faith, considering that, when the outbreak of hostilities occurred, the British Government solemnly pledged itself not to allow dumdummy bullets to be used.

Q. Have the Boer generals had a military education?

A. Excepting in the case of a few artillery officers, who have received their military education in Europe, the Boer generals have no military education, in the European sense of such a word. But they thoroughly know the country they are fighting in, and how to fight on such ground. They are full of experience—an experience they owe to Great Britain, through the struggles she has forced upon them.

Q. If the Boers are successful will they be satisfied with their present boundaries?

A. This is a question I prefer not answering.

Q. If the English are victorious, what will they do?

A. I have nothing to guide me on this point, except what every one knows and reads in the English papers, which are not in agreement as to what England would do in such a case.

Q. How will the appointment of Secretary Hay's son be received at Pretoria?

A. All foreign consuls have, in every circumstance, been received with great courtesy in the Transvaal, and every regard is paid to them. Such will certainly be the case with Mr. Hay's son; but I have no special *data* as to the meaning of his appointment.

Q. How do the Uitlanders feel about the war? Do they feel that it was undertaken really in their behalf, or that England has used them merely as a pretext?

A. That depends upon the character of the Uitlanders themselves. A great many are fighting in our ranks. Even among those who have withdrawn, those who are sincere confess that they are only the pretext of the war. We know this for an actual fact, from a letter emanating from Mr. Philipps, one of the principal leaders of the Uitlanders. That letter was seized by us on the occasion of the Jameson raid.

Mr. Philipps wrote on June 10th, 1894:

"I don't want to meddle in politics, and as to the franchise, I do not think many people worry about it."

And further:

"I have no desire for political rights, and believe as a whole that the community is not ambitious in this respect."

Q. Did the Boers think that any European country would intervene?

A. No.

Q. Do you think any such intervention likely at present?

A. It is impossible for me to answer such a question.

Q. Is it true that many Boer women have also taken up arms?

A. It is probable. But I have no precise information on the point.

Q. How could the war have been avoided?

A. England had acted in such a manner as to render it absolutely unavoidable. The Boers did to avoid it everything that it was humanly possible to do.

Q. Is it not likely that there will be a reaction in England against the war?

A. It appears likely to me. I hope so, not only in the interest of the South African Republics, but also in the interest of Great Britain herself.

Q. Can nothing be done to get news about the war from Boer sources?

A. Quite impossible by cable; and only with great difficulty by mail.

Q. What will probably be the rôle of the Afrikanders in the contest?

A. I think that the English newspapers are answering this question.

Q. Is it true that there was special legislation against the Uitlanders? If so, what was its nature?

A. There was no special legislation against the Uitlanders. There was special legislation regarding them in the matter of public education, and that was all in their favor.

In a general way, we made no difference between a foreigner and a burgher, save, of course, as regards the franchise. And every impartial and fair mind will understand that it was impossible for the South African Republic to grant political rights to foreigners. Why, the franchise in the Transvaal was denied to friendly foreigners of our own race—to the citizens of the Orange Free State. Why should we have granted it to Englishmen?

ENGLAND AND THE TRANSVAAL.

BY THE RT. HON. THE EARL GREY.

IN Burke's immortal speech on "Conciliation with America" (1775), there occurs a famous passage descriptive of the phenomenal growth of that country during the life of the first Lord Bathurst, then in the last year of his prolonged and distinguished career. The orator imagines the angel of Lord Bathurst to have appeared to him in 1704, when he was twenty years of age, and, drawing aside the curtain which concealed the rising glories of Great Britain, to have pointed out to him a little speck, scarce visible in the mass of the national interests—a small seminal principle rather than a formed body—and to have addressed him thus:

"Young man, there is America, which at this day serves for little more than to amuse you with stories of savage men and uncouth manners, yet shall, before you taste of death, show itself equal to the whole of that commerce which now attracts the envy of the world; whatever England has been growing to by a progressive increase of improvement brought in by varieties of people, by succession of civilizing conquests and civilizing settlements in a series of seventeen hundred years, you shall see as much added to her by America in the course of a single life!"

In much the same spirit Sir Bartle Frere, when Governor-General of the British possessions in South Africa, prophesied to the present writer, in a letter from Kimberley, dated 1880, that if the various States of South Africa had a fair chance given to them, and received the uninterrupted advantage of just and equal government, he would witness before he died, if he reached the allotted age of man, a development which would enable South Africa, from the River Zambesi to the Cape of Good Hope, to rival Australia and the United States of America as a home for educated Englishmen.

The development which has taken place in South Africa during the past twenty years has already done much to justify Sir Bartle Frere's forecast. If its progress has fallen far short of what it ought to have been—and would have been, had Sir Bartle Frere's postulate of fair treatment and good government been fulfilled—the explanation is to be found in the fact that over a large area, embracing gold-fields of phenomenal and surpassing richness, those principles of liberty and equal freedom which were imported into the United States in the "Mayflower," and which are the tap-root of its greatness, have been deliberately and persistently violated by the oligarchy ruling the Transvaal, who, in their selfish determination to administer the affairs of State for their own exclusive benefit, have resolutely withheld from the inhabitants, who supply nine-tenths of the public revenues, those common rights of citizenship which are the inseparable attributes of free men in every portion of the world.

A short statement of the events in South Africa which have preceded and culminated in the unfortunate war between Boer and Briton is almost indispensable to a correct understanding of the present situation.

Up to the beginning of the present century the number of European settlers in the Dutch colony of the Cape was insignificant. During the Napoleonic wars, at a time when Holland was a province of France, the colony was captured by British arms; and so well pleased were the Cape Dutchmen with the change of government, British rule being found by them to be less onerous and harassing than that of their own people, that, when the peace of 1814 was concluded, the colony became, with the general consent of its white inhabitants, a permanent possession of Great Britain.

For twenty years, 1814-34, the Dutch Boers remained fairly contented with British rule; but, even during this early period, an antagonism between the radically opposed ideals of the British and Dutch settlers began to assert itself, which resulted in the growing irritation and estrangement of the Dutch population.

It was a conviction, amounting almost to a religious belief, among the Cape Dutch that the black races had been created by God to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for them, and that they were justified by the direct teaching and authority of the Old Testament in reducing these races to submission by the

sternest methods. They had lived apart from the wave of humanitarianism which had swept over Europe at the end of the eighteenth century. They scarcely regarded a black man as a man at all, and were incapable of even conceiving any idea of equality of civil rights as between black and white.

They consequently were unable to comprehend the standpoint from which the British authorities regarded the native question.

The stern measures taken by the Government from time to time in the interests of the black population; the charges of ill-treatment of natives brought against the Boers by British missionaries; the enactment of laws restraining their authority over slaves; the recognition by the Government of the right of the Hottentots and other free colored people to stand on an equal footing with whites, as regards private civil rights—all helped to provoke the strongest resentment; and when the Negro Emancipation Act was passed in 1834, and the Boer farmers found themselves deprived of the slave labor on which they depended for the cultivation of their land, without receiving, unfortunately, any adequate compensation, then, outraged, indignant and smarting under a sense of intolerable injustice, they resolved to trek into the wilderness, wishing to separate themselves as far as possible from the vexations inseparable from British principles of administration. Thus was born the Afrikaner sentiment, which, stimulated and fostered by the antagonism between two irreconcilable ideals, has now grown to such formidable dimensions that a resort to arms has been found necessary to prevent it from becoming the dominating and paramount influence in the politics of South Africa. It is impossible for any Englishman to sympathize with a movement which had its origin in the desire of the Boers to be allowed to "wallop their own niggers." But it is also impossible to read the story of the Great Trek of 1836, in which young Paul Krüger, the present President of the Transvaal Republic, walked behind his father's wagon, and of the terrible struggle, the privations and the mortality which the seceding Boers encountered, without feeling great admiration for their sturdy spirit and for the steadfast faith with which they clung to their Old Testament ideals, as they sought their Promised Land in the wilderness of Central South Africa.

After undergoing ordeals which confirmed the characteristics,

and also the prejudices, of their race, the Boers succeeded in expelling the natives from the vast territories which lay between the Orange and Limpopo Rivers. But in the case of the Boers, as in that of the Mormons of Utah, the principles of civilized administration negatived the idea that a community which had once been incorporated with the British Commonwealth could secede from its allegiance and adopt for itself a position of independence. When, therefore, the Boers endeavored to set up for themselves a separate State in that part of Africa which is now known as the Orange Free State and Natal, British troops were sent against them in 1848 to reduce them to submission. The operations were successful and British sovereignty over the Boers was re-established. Subsequently, the difficulty of administering territories so far removed from the chief British centres of South Africa, with no facilities for rapid communication, made itself apparent, with the result that, in 1852, a Convention was concluded at Sand River with the Boers, by which the British Government guaranteed to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River the right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves according to their own laws, while the Boers pledged themselves in return that slavery should not be permitted or practised. This condition, as there was no means of enforcing it, proved absolutely useless; its only effect was to cause the word "apprentice" to be used instead of "slave."

"Children were kidnapped, trained to work in the fields, had their price, and were as little protected by the law as any other live stock on the farm. The 'apprenticeship' never came to an end. Wagon-loads of slaves, 'black-ivory' as they were called, passed through the country, and were put up to auction or were exchanged sometimes for money, and sometimes for a horse, or for a cow and a big pot." *

After a few years of self-government—years marked by a continual and unblushing disregard of the conditions which had been attached to its grant—the Transvaal Republic fell into a hopeless condition of lawlessness and insolvency. The Boers were unable to supply out of their own ranks men capable of carrying on the work of the Government over so vast a territory as the Transvaal; and to such an extent was this the case that Sir Bartle Frere was informed that, when the Republic collapsed in 1877, there was not a single man in high office who was a genuine Boer of the Transvaal.

* Martineau's "Life of Sir Bartle Frere." Vol. 2, p. 174.

Educated foreigners were, it is true, imported by President Burgers from Holland, but they failed to win the confidence of the Transvaal Boers. The antagonism which existed between the Hollander officials and the Boer farmers resulted in the complete paralysis of Government. The country was in a state bordering on anarchy and chaos. Taxes were refused; public contracts were broken, and salaries were unpaid. The gaols were thrown open, for there was no money to maintain the prisoners. For the same reason the interest due on the State debt could not be paid. Public credit was non-existent. A powerful native chief, Secocoeni, who had already defeated the Boers, was threatening invasion from the mountains on the northeast of their territory; and on their southeastern frontier, Cetywayo, with a highly disciplined army of 30,000 to 40,000 Zulus, hung like a permanent black cloud on their horizon, threatening to cover at any moment their entire sky with darkness. With this paralysis of Government within, and exposure to annihilation from without, the resources of the country were represented by a sum of less than four dollars in the Treasury! It was at this crisis that the British Government, alarmed lest a Zulu victory over the Boers, which appeared inevitable unless England came to their assistance, might plunge the whole of South Africa into war, sent their Commissioner, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, to confer with the President of the Transvaal, with authority to proclaim the re-annexation of the Transvaal to the British Empire, should the people of the Transvaal, in their unprotected and disordered condition, invite Her Majesty's Government to undertake the administration of their territory.

After three months' inquiry, Sir Theophilus Shepstone proclaimed the annexation, the Boer President, President Burgers, fully acquiescing in the necessity for the step, and most of the members of the Government expressing themselves anxious for it, although none of them had the courage to say so openly.

Before the proclamation was made public the British Commissioner submitted the draft to the Boer President, and embodied in it various alterations and conditions suggested by him. At the same time, however, that the President secretly agreed to the Proclamation of Annexation, he thought it necessary to issue a protest against it, as a means of preventing a possible disturbance on the part of a considerable number of Boers of the lowest and

most ignorant class, who were assembled in the neighborhood. To this protest the British Commissioner felt no very strong objection, regarding it, most unfortunately, as subsequent events have shown, as a method of overcoming a temporary difficulty, and unlikely to be attended by any permanent results.

In his letter to the Home Government, Sir Theophilus Shepstone said:*

"Nothing but annexation can or will save the State, and nothing else can save South Africa from the direst consequences. All thinking and intelligent people know this and will be thankful to be delivered from the thralldom of petty factions by which they are kept in a state of perpetual excitement and unrest, because the Government and everything connected with it is a thorough sham."

Sir Bartle Frere gave an additional reason for Shepstone's act of annexation. He said :

"The Boer President had sought alliance with Continental Powers; Germany, Belgium, and Portugal had all been approached, and Shepstone had no reason to doubt that, if England declined to interfere, Germany would be induced to undertake the protection of the Transvaal, which would have added infinitely to our troubles in South Africa." †

The broad result of the annexation was to save the Transvaal from political annihilation. Shepstone, when he issued the proclamation, sent a message to Cetywayo informing him that the Transvaal was now the territory of the Queen. Cetywayo replied: "I thank my father Somtseu [Shepstone] for his message. I am glad that he has sent it, because the Dutch have tired me out, and I intended to fight with them once, only once, and to drive them from the Vaal. Kabana, you see my *impis* are gathered. It was to fight the Dutch I called them together. Now I will send them back to their houses."

The assertion of British sovereignty over the Transvaal kept Cetywayo temporarily quiet; but the difficulties of the position were great.

The Zulus complained that Cetywayo's English cow (Shepstone) had neglected her own calf (the Zulus), and was giving milk to a strange calf (the Transvaal Boers).

The Boers, on the other hand, complained that we had not given them the protection we had promised.

Shepstone writes, December 25, 1877:

"The Boers are still flying, and I think by this time there must be

* April 11, 1877.

† April 22, 1881. Martineau's "Life of Sir Bartle Frere." Vol. 2, p. 183.

a belt of more than 100 miles long and 30 broad in which, with three insignificant exceptions, there is nothing but absolute desolation. This will give your Excellency some idea of the mischief which Cetywayo's conduct has caused."

In 1879 the power of Cetywayo and his Zulu army was so menacing to the subjects of the Queen, both in Natal and in the Transvaal, that it became necessary for the British Government to reduce them to subjection by arms, a result achieved at an enormous loss of life and treasure. Meanwhile, the British Government had committed many serious blunders in its administration of the Transvaal. Owing to a desire on its part to accomplish the federation of South Africa, then in contemplation, before a new constitution for the Transvaal was promulgated, there was a most unfortunate delay in fulfilling the pledges given at the time of the annexation as to the granting of local autonomy. The irritation justly felt by the Boers at the non-fulfilment of these pledges was still further increased by the unfortunate blunders made by the British Government in the selection of their officials. Military men were appointed whose methods were harsh, and who were wanting in sympathy with Boer prejudices and customs, and the Boers became consequently more and more restless under the British rule which had been re-established primarily for their protection.

The war against Cetywayo, which had been entailed upon England by the annexation of the Transvaal, had freed the Boers from the danger arising from the presence on their frontier of from 30,000 to 40,000 armed and disciplined Zulus, but left them under no sense of obligation. Unmindful of the benefits they had received, they availed themselves of the immunity which British arms had given them, to rebel against the Government which had saved them from annihilation, and caught at any pretext for reasserting their independence.

The history of that revolt is well known, because of the well-intentioned but pathetic attempt of Mr. Gladstone, to quote Lord Rosebery's language, to carry prematurely "into international policy the principle of the Gospel."

The Boer population rose and attacked at great advantage the scattered and surprised British troops, and after much inconclusive fighting gained a startling victory over the small detachment which General Colley had himself led up Majuba Hill to hold the pass through the Drakensberg Mountains.

Although the most positive assurances had been given on the part of Great Britain that the Queen's authority would never be withdrawn;* although on the strength of this assurance many had not hesitated to invest their capital and to incur the unpopularity of their Boer neighbors by their loyalty to the British flag; although fresh troops were arriving in Natal which would have enabled the British general to lead a force against the rebel Boers which they could not possibly have resisted; Mr. Gladstone, who had recently succeeded to the Premiership, decided to treat immediately with the Boers on the basis of the restoration to the Transvaal of its internal independence. With the full knowledge that he had victory in the hollow of his hand, but in the belief that "Great Britain could afford to do things, owing to her overpowering might and dominion, which other nations could not afford to do without a risk of misunderstanding,"† Mr. Gladstone resisted the temptation to re-establish British authority; and coming to the decision, after the defeat at Majuba Hill, that the obligations arising out of the annexation, sacred as they were, were overbalanced and outweighed by the yet more sacred obligations to the principle of political freedom—which requires that the fullest measure of self-government consistent with a due regard to imperial safety shall be given to every subject of the

*Sir Garnet Wolseley, now Viscount Wolseley, Commander-in-Chief, visited the Transvaal in 1879 as the representative of the Queen. "He made speeches in every village he visited declaring the Act of Annexation to be irrevocable, and afterward published a Proclamation to that effect. At Standerton, which is on the Vaal River, he told the people that the Vaal would flow backward through the **Drakensberg** before the British would be withdrawn from the Transvaal Territory." (Martineau's "**Life of Sir Bartle Frere**," Vol. 2, p. 361.)

Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, stated in the House of Lords, May, 1880: "After a careful consideration of the position we have come to the conclusion that we could not relinquish the Transvaal. Nothing could be more unfortunate than uncertainty in respect to such a matter."

On January 21, 1881, Mr. Gladstone said in the House of Commons ("**Hansard**," Vol. 257, page 1,141):

"To disapprove the annexation of a country is one thing; to abandon that annexation is another. Whatever we do, we must not blind ourselves to the legitimate consequences of facts. By the annexation of the Transvaal we contracted new obligations."

"I must look at the obligations entailed by the annexation; and if in my opinion, and in the opinion of many on this side of the House, wrong was done by the annexation itself, that would not warrant us in doing fresh, distinct and separate wrong, by a disregard of the obligations which that annexation entailed. Those obligations have been referred to in this debate, and have been mentioned in the compass of a single sentence. First, there was the obligation entailed toward the English and other settlers in the Transvaal, perhaps including a minority, though a very small minority, of the Dutch Boers themselves; secondly, there was the obligation toward the native races, an obligation which I may call an obligation of humanity and justice; and, thirdly, there was the political obligation we entailed upon ourselves in respect to the responsibility which was already incumbent on us, and which we, by the annexation, largely extended, for the future peace and tranquillity of South Africa. None of these obligations could we overlook."

†Lord Rosebery, at Bath, November, 1899.

Queen in every portion of her Empire—he resolved to treat with the Boers after the defeat of British troops in Her Majesty's territory, as if the British arms had suffered no reverse, and to concede to the inhabitants of the Transvaal complete self-government subject to the suzerainty of the British Crown.

The results of this well-intentioned action have been most unfortunate. The loyalists considered themselves betrayed, and the Dutch throughout South Africa, believing Mr. Gladstone's surrender to have been the result not of magnanimity but of cowardice, learned to look upon the British with contempt.

Interpreting the retrocession as an act of fear, and believing that cowardice and not magnanimity was the mainspring of the action of Great Britain, the Boers became intoxicated with the hope that the time was approaching when they would be able to realize their long-cherished dream of establishing a great paramount Afrikaner State in South Africa. That the Boers had been encouraged by the independence conferred upon them by the Sand River Convention in 1852 to look forward to the creation of a powerful Afrikaner State with anti-British sympathies is evident from a letter of Sir Bartle Frere, dated May 21, 1877, to Lord Carnarvon, Secretary of State for the Colonies, in which he points out that the proclamation annexing the Transvaal to the British Crown "has startled and alarmed both classes of the Dutch, the Afrikanders and the Neologians, who sympathized with Burgers in his dreams of a great anti-British South Africa."

The history of the Transvaal since the retrocession shows a steady and determined endeavor on the part of President Krüger to reach forward toward this aim. The letter of General Joubert, the Commander-General of the Transvaal, to Lobengula, the King of the Matabele, in March, 1882, supplies a characteristic bit of evidence as to the nature of Boer hopes and the view which they took of Mr. Gladstone's magnanimity. In this letter he points out how the English took away from the Boers their country in 1877, and how they "would not listen to our nice talk for four years; but when the shooting and fighting began, the English decided it would be better to give us back our country; *that England is like a monkey that has its hands full of pumpkin-seeds—if you don't beat him to death he will never let go;*" and General Joubert goes on to say that when they have succeeded in blowing away altogether "the stink which the English brought" into the Trans-

vaal, he will ride so far as to reach Lobengula and speak to him "with the pen upon paper."

The comparative ease with which the Boers regained their independence evidently led them to the conclusion that the extension of the boundaries of the Republic would be a matter easy of accomplishment. With that object in view they raided Bechuanaland in 1884, Zululand in 1884, Swaziland and Mashonaland in 1891. In two of these instances the armed intervention of the British Government was necessary. In 1884 Sir Charles Warren was sent up to Bechuanaland with a force of 1,000 men, at a cost of over a million to the Imperial Government, to force the raiders to withdraw. In 1891 Dr. Jameson, with a small force of police, induced the leaders of the Banyai Trek to disperse their followers at Rhodes Drift on the Limpopo. In both cases the raiders were thwarted without bloodshed by the prompt action of the British. In Tongaland, also, the Boers endeavored to gain a footing, but their object was defeated by the Queen Regent's acceptance of England's suzerainty in 1887.

In the negotiations which took place in 1881 it was decided that the government of the country should be vested, not in the hands of the Boers alone, but in the "*inhabitants* of the Transvaal." It was thoroughly understood, by both English and Boer negotiators, that no privileged class should be created, and that the non-Boer section of the population should be placed in a position of absolute political equality with the Boers. These promises were quickly forgotten. The principles of liberty, equality and fraternity, in deference to which Mr. Gladstone had retroceded the Transvaal, were cunningly and with set purpose violated by the successive encroachments of President Krüger, who, conscious that the Boers were unable to develop by their own capital, their own industry and their own enterprise the vast mineral wealth of the Transvaal, and perceiving the enormous advantages they could secure to themselves by the development of those resources by others, received with open arms the Uitlander population by whose brains and energy the Boers hoped to profit, but at the same time steadily plotted and planned to keep them in a position of civil and political inferiority.

The British Government, conscious of its own strength and occupied with other and, as it seemed at the time, more important matters, allowed these early violations to pass unnoticed, and

permitted matters to drift, until the attention of the whole civilized world was suddenly focused on the wrongs of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal, in the most sensational manner, by Dr. Jameson's futile rush to their assistance at the head of 500 or 600 men. This highly irregular and revolutionary proceeding forced upon the attention of the people of England the terrible wrongs of which the British subjects in the Transvaal were the unhappy victims. Repeated changes in the law had, contrary to the engagements of President Krüger at the time of retrocession, practically disfranchised the Uitlanders and converted them into political helots. Although they owned by purchase three-fifths of the land in the country, and contributed nine-tenths of the taxation; although they had by their energy and enterprise redeemed the country from a state of insolvency, and set it in a position of affluence; although they were a majority of the white population, yet in all matters affecting their lives, their liberties and their properties they had absolutely no voice. The great American principle of representative government on the basis of equal rights, in deference to which Mr. Gladstone had arrested the march of his army on the eve of victory and given the Transvaal back to the Boers, had been flagrantly violated and set aside. The Boer oligarchy, in their determination to retain a monopoly of power, and in their alarm at the growth of Johannesburg adopted menacing methods to keep down the increasing discontent.

The following passage, extracted from the manifesto issued by the Transvaal National Union before the revolt, shows that the policy of great armaments on which the Boer Government had embarked was not, as frequently supposed, a consequence, but was one of the causes, of the revolt:

"We now have openly the policy of force revealed to us: £250,000 is to be spent upon the completing of a fort at Pretoria, £100,000 is to be spent upon a fort to terrorize the inhabitants of Johannesburg. large orders are sent to Krupp's for big guns, Maxims have been ordered, and we are even told that German officers are coming out to drill the burghers. Are these things necessary, or are they calculated to irritate the feeling to breaking-point? What necessity is there for forts in peaceful inland towns? Why should the Government endeavor to keep us in subjection to unjust laws by the power of the sword, instead of making themselves live in the heart of the people by a broad policy of justice? What can be said of a policy which deliberately divides the two great sections of the people from each other, instead of uniting them under equal laws, or the policy which

keeps us in eternal turmoil with the neighboring States? What shall be said of the statecraft every act of which sows torments, discontent, or race hatred, and reveals a conception of Republicanism under which the only privilege of the majority of the people is to provide the revenue, and to bear insults, while only those are considered republicans who speak a certain language, and in greater or less degree share the prejudices of the ruling classes?"

The petition for franchise rights respectfully presented by the down-trodden Uitlanders to the Government of the Transvaal had been laughed to scorn by the members of the Dutch oligarchy, who answered them that they were not fit to be entrusted with votes, but should have big guns turned upon them to secure their good behavior. The people of Johannesburg, realizing that their only hope of securing the rights of free men lay in a resort to force, proceeded to prepare themselves for such efforts as might be necessary to enable them to win their own salvation. It is impossible for any fair-minded man to deny, in view of the intolerable grievances of which they were the victims, that the Uitlanders were perfectly justified in endeavoring to obtain by arms that redress which they had found it absolutely impossible to obtain by constitutional methods. Unfortunately their cause was put out of court for a time by the fatal blunder of Dr. Jameson's ill-starred intervention. While British sympathies would most undoubtedly have sided with a spontaneous insurrection, on the part of a large down-trodden population, against the oppression of a tyrannical oligarchy, they would have nothing to say to an insurrection improperly stimulated from without.

The men of Johannesburg were accordingly called upon by the High Commissioner of the Queen to lay down the arms on which they had depended for the assertion of their rights, to save the lives of Dr. Jameson and his men, and as a condition precedent to the interference of the British Government on their behalf. Her Majesty's Government, by requiring them to lay down their arms, deprived them of their only weapon of defense against misgovernment, namely, "the sacred right of insurrection," and thus incurred a responsibility of a most direct and binding character, which it would have been impossible to evade without dishonor.

It must be remembered, however, that before the surrender of their arms by the Johannesburg people President Krüger had promised redress. Encouraged by his assumption of a sympathetic attitude, Mr. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for the Colonies, and

Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, carefully abstained from taking any step, or pressing any demand upon President Krüger, which could reasonably be regarded by him and his advisers as in the slightest degree harsh or unnecessary.

But the result of this patience and forbearance was not satisfactory. Instead of giving to the Uitlanders the redress which he had promised, President Krüger, now that their arms had been given up, hardened his heart and mercilessly tightened the bonds of his tyranny.

The position of the Uitlanders, which was intolerable before the revolt, grew steadily worse and worse. The alterations which were made in the franchise laws, so far from meeting their most legitimate demands, increased the disabilities imposed upon them. The High Court was placed in complete subordination to the Executive, who frequently refused to abide by its decisions. The use of the English language both in the courts of law and Government offices was forbidden. In Government schools, paid for by the Uitlanders, the Dutch language was the sole medium of instruction for the older children. Even in municipal matters the inhabitants of Johannesburg were prevented from exercising any control, with the result that the number of deaths caused by neglect of the most elementary sanitary regulations was appalling; the police, composed of country Boers, were ignorant, brutal and corrupt, and a standing menace to the persons and property of the unarmed Uitlanders; the Government connivance at the sale of liquor to natives led to widespread demoralization in the mining centres, with consequent danger to the population and damage to the industry; concessions and monopolies were freely granted for the benefit, not of the State, but of private individuals; and the amounts wrung from the Uitlanders by taxation steadily increased without any corresponding benefit either through increased efficiency or construction of public works.

After nearly three years of fruitless representations, the apparently unprovoked murder of a British subject, named Edgar, in December, 1898, by a Boer policeman, and the action of the Government in condoning the crime, fired the smouldering discontent and indignation.* A petition praying Her Majesty to

*While £200 was all the bail demanded for the Boer policeman charged with the crime of murdering a British subject, £1,000 was the bail demanded from two Englishmen, Messrs. Dodd and Webb, who were arrested under the Public Meetings Act for having organized an illegal public meet-

extend to them her protection was signed by upward of 21,000 British subjects. This petition was received by Her Majesty, and Sir Alfred Milner was instructed to negotiate with President Krüger at Bloemfontein, with the hope of obtaining for the Uitlanders an immediate representation in the Volksraad, such as would enable them to press for the redress of their grievances, without enabling them to obtain a preponderating vote in that Assembly.

The story of the negotiations is fresh in the public memory. Suffice it to say that the demands presented by Sir Alfred Milner as the minimum of what he would recommend the Uitlanders to accept, were regarded by the common consent of the civilized world as most reasonable and just, and as erring, if they erred at all, on the side of moderation. To the surprise of all, except those who were well acquainted with President Krüger, these moderate demands were rejected. Repeated and dishonest attempts to throw dust in the eyes of the public by offering illusory concessions were made; and although the British negotiators persevered to the end in their efforts to reach a settlement which might be regarded on both sides as a fair compromise between the pretensions of the Boers and the claims of the Uitlanders, it was realized at length that their task from the first had been hopeless. Negotiations were finally brought to a close by President Krüger, who hurled in the face of Great Britain an insolent ultimatum, which was followed up by the invasion of British territories on three frontiers of the Transvaal, and by proclamations purporting to annex vast areas of the Queen's dominions to the Dutch Republics.

The evidence is now conclusive that Presidents Krüger and Steyn have been steadily and secretly preparing for years, by the importation of arms, ammunition, and of powerful artillery, and by the training of their burghers in artillery practice, to blow "the stink of the English" into the sea, on the first occasion when England might be hampered by foreign complications.

The President of the Free State has had German artillery officers diligently engaged for the last three years in training the Boers of the Free State to use the most scientific modern artillery; and in April last, before the Bloemfontein Conference took place, President Krüger placed an order on the Continent for the supply

ing in the market-place at Johannesburg, in support of the proposal to petition the Queen.

of 80,000 rifles and 20,000,000 rounds of ammunition; and it is significant that their delivery in the Transvaal preceded his ultimatum only by a few weeks.

What then is England fighting for? It is impossible to answer this question in better language than that used by Mr. Joseph Cowen, for many years the Radical member for Newcastle-on-Tyne:

"We are fighting to prevent men of British blood from being treated as 'helots' on British territory, by a sordid oligarchy which British arms saved from extinction and British generosity endowed with autonomy. We want racial equality. The Boers want racial ascendancy. That's the difference. We are at war for the purpose of preventing our brethren in South Africa from being taxed without representation; from being placed under the control of courts whose judges take their orders from a corrupt Executive; from being refused the right to carry arms, while their oppressors flourish theirs with insolent brutality; from being compelled to contribute to schools in which English is treated as a foreign tongue; in short, from being denied the elementary rights of self-government."

Let it be clearly understood what are the issues of the present struggle. Although the poor, unhappy Boer farmers may honestly believe that they are fighting not only for their independence, but for their hearths and homes, as the corrupt oligarchy, whose personal interests are involved in the maintenance of the present system, would have them believe, the truth is that they are fighting for the right to oppress the Uitlanders; and the British are fighting for the real independence of the Transvaal, under which Boer and Briton will have equal rights and stand toward each other on a footing of political equality. It is, indeed, melancholy that the desire to "put back the clock," to use Lord Rosebery's happy phrase, and to resist the application to their country of those principles and ideas which are the proud attributes of civilization, should deluge South Africa with so many streams of blood. The fact that England is fighting the battle of mankind, in her endeavor to carry the "charter of freedom to a fettered State," is the reason why she has been supported in this war for freedom by her liberty-loving sons who dwell on the fringes of her Empire.

It is the solidarity of feeling as to this principle which has secured for her this support, which has induced French-Canadians, and every section of the colonial subjects of the Queen, to give their best in aid of the common cause of liberty and freedom. The out-

burst of spontaneous enthusiasm which has been evoked is phenomenal and betokens a deep-seated cause.

An intuition thrills the Anglo-Saxon world that the federation of South Africa on the basis of equal rights to Boer and Briton, which will follow the war, is only the precursor of the federation of Canada, Australia and South Africa with the British Empire, and, in the fullness of time, of the federation of the whole English-speaking race.

GREY.

ENGLAND, THE TRANSVAAL AND THE EUROPEAN POWERS.

BY PROFESSOR HANS DELBRÜCK, LECTURER ON HISTORY IN THE
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A STRONG and even passionate feeling of resentment against England prevails at the present moment over the whole Continent of Europe. The successes of the Boers have been greeted with exultation, and further favorable news is awaited with eager suspense. This need not excite surprise, at any rate so far as the Russians are concerned, for they have long seen their greatest enemy in the English. France, until recently, had divided her dislike between the English and the Germans; but ever since Fashoda her desire for revenge for that humiliation has thrown her antagonism toward Germany into the background. Hence, the curious and characteristic feature in the political situation of Europe at this moment is that the people of Germany, the leading power of the Triple Alliance, are entirely in agreement with the members of the Dual Alliance, inasmuch as a sentiment of hate for England unites the whole Continent.

It is well known that a friendly feeling toward England has always existed in Germany. German Protestants have never been tired of emphasizing the community of creed between England and Germany; while German Liberals have seen their ideals realized in the Constitution of England, which they ultimately hoped to be able to attain for themselves. On the other hand, it must be admitted that German Conservatives have always inclined more toward Russia than toward England. To-day all German parties are united in rejoicing over English defeats. Public meetings censure the Government for not intervening in favor of the Boers and urge the Emperor not to carry out his intention of

going to England. Many, on the other hand, condemn the adoption of such resolutions at public meetings on the ground that it is not customary or proper to dictate his personal movements to an Emperor. But, in one main sentiment, the whole people, the whole press and all parties are united: they view the Emperor's journey with great displeasure, the more so as they feel that it will be interpreted throughout the world as a demonstration against the Boers.

The hatred which our forefathers felt for the French (at whose hands they had suffered so much from the time of Louis XIV. down to that of Napoleon) is gradually dying out. To-day, people in Germany are rather pleased than otherwise when they read of anything which is advantageous to the French. On the other hand, a certain apprehension of Russia exists in the minds of a cultivated and clear-sighted minority, to whom the despotism of the Czar is repugnant, and his power a constant menace. But, on the other hand, it is felt that any possible danger with which Russia might threaten Germany lies in the distant future. In fact, since Russia has retired from the Balkan Peninsula to concentrate her attention more and more on the Far East, we are on good terms with our Eastern neighbor, and every apprehension of the great war which Germany would have to wage with a double front to the east and west has passed away. In fact, Germany to-day might very well be friends with the world at large.

But a nation as well as an individual must seemingly either love or hate. If the multitude had no enemy to be the object of its hatred, it would take no part in foreign politics at all. So the German nation, which once celebrated with delight the memory of the *belle alliance* of Blücher and Wellington at Waterloo, has now directed its hate against England. England must have no illusions on this point; if it were announced to-morrow that Russia, France and Germany had concluded a Continental alliance against England, this news would be welcomed everywhere with joy by the people of these three nations.

If you ask the man in the street why he is imbued with such an unbounded ill-feeling toward England and such a sudden sympathy for the Boers, his reply would be that the Boers are of his own race, and are being visited with an unrighteous, even heinous, war on the part of the English. A few of the better classes are more moderate and reserved in their opinions; they

are not disposed to attach too much value to the question of affinity, since the English also, as Anglo-Saxons, are equally our cousins. They point out that the Boers, albeit Christians, are semi-barbarians, whereas the English are a people on the highest level of civilization. Neither do they take the judicial question of right and wrong to be so decisively clear as to preclude every doubt or difference of opinion. It cannot well be malice aforethought on the part of the English that caused the gold fields to be discovered on the territory of the Boers, and it is the gold fields which have produced the present conflict. The gold fields have led the Uitlanders into the country of the Boers, and the Uitlanders claimed an opportunity to take part in the Government, which the Boers refused. The English have interfered in this dispute.

It is obviously not true, as the English assert, that they are fighting for the equality of the white races; they are fighting for equal rights of the immigrants with the Dutch inhabitants. Nor can it be denied that there were good grounds for the English Government's formulating such a demand on President Krüger. The English Government was justified in this course—at least so say those who have followed the whole course of events with a desire to judge dispassionately. But even those who concede so much agree in the main with the judgment of the crowd; for they say that it is immaterial whether England's right of interference in the Transvaal is based upon the Convention or not; the real cause of the action of England is her claim to be the paramount power in South Africa. And the position of paramount power in South Africa is only the preliminary step toward the establishment of British rule from the Cape to the Nile. England insists on being the only great commercial and colonial power in the world, and is only willing to allow other nations the favor of owning small fragments as *enclaves* wedged in helplessly between her possessions. This it is which we neither can nor intend to tolerate. Once England has overcome the Boers, she will take the German possessions in Africa as her next booty. At present there is still Portuguese territory intervening; but Portugal, pressed by financial necessities, will soon be forced to part with it. Perhaps Germany and England will share it between them; but in every case the benefit will only be an illusory one for Germany, should England at the same time endeavor to up-

hold the position of paramount power toward Germany also. This is the reason why even the most peace-loving citizen, the best friend of England among the German people, looks upon the struggle of the Boers with England as though it were his own cause. We no longer feel inclined to accept the pretensions of England to Anglicize one continent of the world after another. The good things of this world belong to all civilized nations in common. As England is not expected to give way peaceably, and as her great naval power cannot be overwhelmed by any one single State, the best remedy would be the alliance against her of all her rivals together, especially of Russia, France and Germany.

There are some Germans, especially those of the old Bismarck school, who think that a Continental alliance against England would be a *fata morgana*, and for this reason, that France will never give up the idea of revenge for 1870, and, therefore, Germany never would be safe from treachery in any co-operation with that country, or when face to face with any great crisis. But even those who are most suspicious of France would agree and co-operate with her from the moment that our western neighbors gave any tangible guarantee for the sincerity of their change of mind. People remember that, for many years, Prince Bismarck himself fostered the idea of a final reconciliation between Germany and France. It was he who encouraged Jules Ferry to revive the colonial policy of France, and, backed by Germany, the Great Vanquished of 1870 has since found plentiful territorial compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine in her newly acquired colonies; witness Tunis, Cochin China, Siam, Madagascar and West Africa. It is also worth while noticing that France was never able to afford herself the luxury of becoming a colonial power, so long as she was solely bent on striving for the lost frontier of the Rhine. Louis XIV., as well as Napoleon I., the mightiest monarchs of their time, lost the sea against England because they had to fight on land at the same time against the German powers. A young German scholar of the Berlin University, Dr. Roloff, has published quite recently a book on the colonial policy of Napoleon I., and has shown from official documents, found by him in the archives of Paris, that the true inwardness of Napoleon's ambition was not to subdue the Continent of Europe, but to form a great French colonial power. His expedition to Egypt embodied the fundamental idea of his life, and

until the very last his mind was occupied with plans for an expedition to India. It came to nothing, because England had her allies on the Continent, and these grew more formidable in proportion to Napoleon's efforts to subdue them. It is now the first time in history that France, although vanquished on the Continent, has yet acquired huge colonial territories; indeed, she would have added even more to her dominions, if her statesmen had not been ceaselessly preoccupied and troubled in decisive moments by the memory of the lost provinces between the Rhine and the Moselle. We believe it to be a fact that when, four years ago, the Emperor William sent his congratulatory telegram to President Krüger, and England in a fit of wrath dispatched her flying squadron, the French Government offered England the support of France in case of complications. Fashoda became in due course the punishment for this diplomatic action; and, since this humiliation, it seems as between France and Germany only to be a question as to who will take the first step.

Such is the state of public opinion in Germany. There is only one person in the whole country who thinks otherwise, and that is the Kaiser. And in Germany foreign politics are shaped not by public opinion, but by the Kaiser. In America people think it the privilege of a free country to make her politics herself. In Germany we do not. The United States may be well satisfied with the results of their foreign relations in the one hundred and twenty-five years of their existence. But these relations always were very simple. In the Old World foreign politics are much more complicated and not so easily controlled by the whole nation. If France does not take so high a rank to-day among the great powers as formerly, it is not only the defeat of 1870, but her democratic Government, the constant change of her Foreign Ministers, which is responsible for the decline. "Secrecy is the soul of foreign politics," said Frederick the Great in his political testament. Who can entrust a secret to a diplomatist of the French Republic? The experience of history shows that in the long run monarchies have always overpowered democracies. Even the most successful examples of democracies in history, such as Athens, have not had a very long life. Rome, Venice and the Netherlands, which perhaps of all republics in the past may be said to have enjoyed the most prolonged prosperity, were more aristocratic than democratic in character.

Germany, therefore, leaves the direction of her foreign affairs to the Emperor and trusts that the sovereign will do the best he can, choose the most able counsellors he can find, and that he will be prompt as well as prudent. Since all he does for the nation he does also for himself, for his own greatness and glory, for the splendor of his family, and for the future of his children and posterity, all his interests depend upon and are included in the success of German policy and the welfare of Germany. The House of Hohenzollern never can be separated from the fortunes of the nation. Therefore the nation may safely confide its fortunes to the House of Hohenzollern; and even now, when public opinion has evidently taken quite a different view of things from that of the Emperor, or at least from that which he seems to hold, no public organ would propose, nor would the Reichstag itself wish, to alter the German constitution with regard to this particular point.

Perhaps here we might object that we have a great Social Democratic party in Germany, and that it is republican, and does not at all approve the direction of policy by a personal government. It is true that this is the meaning of the programme of this party; but in reality Social Democrats care very little for foreign politics, and though in general they have a certain sympathy with England in this struggle, there may be yet many who sympathize more with the Boers. The sturdy militia warfare waged by them against the mercenaries, the drilled soldiers, of England excites admiration. The Social Democrats are thus divided in their sympathies; and, besides being a minority, they will not in any way thwart the policy which the Kaiser determines to follow.

Now the Emperor is unquestionably proud and ambitious; he desires above all to preserve the position of his dynasty and that of the German nation among the great Powers; he would not willingly let his country become inferior to any other empire, kingdom or country in the world. But he also is a man of modern ideas. He detests the cruelty of war, and he will never engage in warfare as long as it is possible for Germany to avoid it. He knows that a great country which possesses a strong army and navy can secure success without bloodshed. In his eyes, the task for Germany is to preserve the balance between all her neighbors; to provide that the world shall never become either entirely English or Russian. A Continental Alliance against England would undoubtedly sooner or later mean a general war against her. This

war the Emperor wants to avoid, or at any rate not to provoke. So he looks for ways and means to make German policy run not against, but rather with, England as long as this is possible.

It is, perhaps, as well to bear in mind that the aim which the Kaiser strives for is essentially the same as that which public opinion in Germany has in view: to win for our race an assured future, not to allow England to rule alone in Africa. The only difference is in the ways and means. German public opinion would prefer a policy openly directed against England, by means of a Continental Alliance. This does not mean, indeed, to embark in hostilities toward England. Such a possibility is not even so much as contemplated. It is hoped and believed that the mere conclusion of the great alliance indicated would suffice to bring about the desired result. The Emperor, on the other hand, sees that such an alliance would be ineffectual unless it were indeed an alliance for war. Therefore, he has chosen the other alternative, and wishes to go hand in hand with England, as already stated, so long as this is possible.

The question now is how long this will be possible, and the answer depends on many contingencies. Although foreign affairs in Germany are directed by the Emperor and not by the nation, the Emperor, of course, is not out of touch with, much less antagonistic toward, the country. He can do what he likes, but he certainly will not act permanently against the sentiment of the people. To continue his own policy, he must from time to time prove to the country that he is moving in the right direction. He must be in a position to show results. At this very moment there comes the news of the treaty concerning Samoa. It was certainly very clever of the English Ministers to make a slight concession to German aspirations; perhaps there are more such things in the background. The Emperor will next pay a visit to his grandmother in England. Our German papers say that it is but a family visit, but in every English newspaper you can read that this visit will possess great political importance; and surely the English are right. A German Kaiser who pays a visit to England cannot be a party to an alliance against England; and as without Germany the other Powers cannot assume the offensive against England, the English are at liberty to deliberately concentrate all their force against the Transvaal. I should not be surprised to learn that this is an advantage acquired at a very low price. It is

noticeable that the title-deeds of England to Samoa are to be paid for by Germany by the cession of some other islands in the South Sea of much greater area than Samoa—besides territory in West Africa.

If the English, as seemed probable for a moment after the fight of Glencoe, had overrun the Boers without any great effort, I have little doubt that the Continental Alliance above referred to would have been very soon effected. English diplomacy, elated by the happy issue, would hardly have been inclined to appease all rivalry by pliability and moderation. So far, perhaps, the heroism of the Boers is a bit of good fortune for England.

If, after a long and tenacious struggle, England and the Transvaal should come to a convention for the peace of the world, this surely would be the best outcome of the situation. The hostile sentiments of the Continental nations, especially of the Germans, will be restrained, and the Kaiser will be able to continue his policy of peaceful moderation. If, however, England should not speedily prove to be strong enough to protect her own territories and to drive the Boers back into their own land, to enforce an honorable and suitable peace, if the war is to go on for more than a year, nobody can say to-day what the consequence will be for the politics of the world. In such a case, Russia and France would very likely endeavor to profit by the opportunity and extend their colonial influence. The Russian Emperor especially must be displeased at the fact that his great Congress of Peace at The Hague has been estimated so lightly by the English. Arbitration, which he wants to be employed instead of war, or at least before the peoples resolve to go to war, has not even come into question in the conflict between England and the Transvaal. Very likely Mr. Chamberlain has fomented the Transvaal trouble just at this time because the Russians are not yet ready with their Siberian Railway, which would at once enable them to bring their forces within a fortnight from Moscow to Peking. But if the Boer war should continue for months and months, Russia may find other points, perhaps in Persia, where she could make a great advance. The most ominous eventuality for England undoubtedly would be if Russia and France together should determine to bring up the Egyptian question. Egypt is by far the most important acquisition that England has made in our time, and she has no legal title under international law to remain there.

However, it is of little avail to pass in review the international questions which might be brought to the fore in consequence of the South African crisis. What I wanted to say is only that the feelings of the Continental nations of Europe at this moment are in an astonishing unison against England, and would greet with joy any measures that their Governments should happen to undertake against England. The man who restrains them all from common political action is the German Emperor, and no doubt he will continue to do so as long as English statesmen and the course of the South African war may render it possible for him.

HANS DELBRÜCK.

GREAT BRITAIN ON THE WAR-PATH.

BY VLADIMIR HOLMSTREM AND PRINCE OOKHTOMSKY.

IN 1896, when the English started on their famous Dongola expedition, on behalf of the defeated Italians caught in the British trap through Crispi's criminal ambition, I wrote a leading article in the St. Petersburg *Viedomosti*, under the English title, "The Robbers of Posterity." In it I endeavored to demonstrate that the expedition had nothing of the nature of strategical movement; that it was part of a far-reaching scheme which involved an advance into the very heart of Africa, intended to make the English masters of the whole course of the Nile, thus giving them in reality complete control of Eastern Africa, and rendering their pressure on the Mediterranean and the countries bordering on it quite formidable. The article in question called upon itself the attention of the *Times* of London, which charged me with a fondness for rhetoric and a penchant for loud-sounding phrases.

Circumstances, however, proved that I had not been so bad a prophet after all. Not only have the English, in the course of the last three years, acquired the whole of the Nile Valley, planting their flag in Khartoum, but, likewise, after bringing matters to the verge of war in connection with the Fashoda incident, they have extended their claims over regions far in the interior to the west of the Nile, acquiring by a convention forced on France Darfur and Kordofan, and lying in wait for an occasion of expanding their dominion in the eastern direction by the conquest of Abyssinia. The "Robbers of Posterity" have done their work pretty neatly. Nearly the whole of Eastern Africa has fallen into their lap.

The sinister significance of the British successes mentioned above lies in the fact that all these achievements of British diplo-

macy and military power are parts of a vast preconceived scheme. The present Transvaal war is but the realization of one of its details; and that it is unfairly and unscrupulously waged against a State whose political and international status is quite clearly defined only shows the extent to which the bad faith and mischievous purpose of England may go. Such is the Russian view of the present crisis in South Africa; and need I say that this view is fully justified by the facts of its history, as set forth by English writers themselves?

It is no secret that the greatness of the British Empire dates from the conquest of India; so much so that, through all the periods of English history, underlying all manifestations of English political thought and life, there passes, like a red thread, the idea of the preservation of England's great Asiatic possession. To develop communications between this vast dependency and the metropolis, to shorten the ways that lead to India, has been the chief preoccupation of generations of British statesmen. Such an idea is by no means in itself discreditable, but, unfortunately, England's greed has led her people to set no limits to their ambition and to fulfil their historic task with utter disregard of the vital interests of other nations and races. In her efforts to establish the security of India she has thrown a net over the States of Europe (as well as over alien races in other parts of the world, though injustice in this case does not count, according to the code of the Christian civilization of to-day), a net that is always tightening round the necks of other peoples, killing their energies, rendering them incapable of fulfilling their own mission or of attaining moral and spiritual perfection through the aid of noble deeds. A curse to mankind was and is the policy pursued by Great Britain for the last two centuries. Through blood and tears is she making her progress through the world; but, unfortunately, other European nations and the great American Republic have had until lately too much to do in their respective countries to admit of their paying attention to the fate of the people of India, Egypt, the Ottoman Empire, the British sections of Africa, China and Ireland. "Darkest England" has never been put before the world in her true character; her talk and pretense of furthering the cause of civilization and humanity having thrown a veil over British misdeeds. But Lord Beaconsfield's policy in Turkey, like that

of Mr. Chamberlain in the Transvaal, affords a striking example of the general character of Great Britain's doubtful services to civilization. With a view to opening a way to India through the countries in possession of the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain played a double game with the Sultans. On the one hand she gave them assistance in their suicidal policy of trampling upon, keeping under foot and massacring the Christian population of the Empire; and on the other, she called forth the righteous indignation of Europe against the Turks, thus holding the Ottoman Empire in her power and pocketing all she could take. The Armenians, the Cretans, the Egyptians, the Slav population of Turkey could all tell a sinister tale of their sufferings, which benefited only England. The general idea of British politicians was to shut in the Ottoman Empire, by the creation of independent States, against any one coming from the north, thereby leaving themselves a free hand for grasping Cyprus, Egypt and Arabia, the possession of which would render them masters of the Persian Gulf and the whole of the Indian Ocean.

"Study the maps!" Such was the advice tendered to his countrymen by Lord Salisbury in one of his speeches. "Study the maps," will I say to the great public in general, "if you wish to form a correct idea of the English designs."

By southern ways Great Britain is creeping to the north, making the English pressure irresistible. Mr. Chamberlain's policy in the Transvaal, which had the general approval of the members of Lord Salisbury's Cabinet, is a striking illustration of this fact. The tightening of the English grasp on South Africa, coming as it does after the conquest of the Soudan, gives England new strength on the Indian Ocean, brings the English nearer to India, to the Persian Gulf, to Arabia, to the Far East—in short, this is the English answer to Germany's colonial activity and to the taking by the United States of the Philippine Islands.

If in the algebraic problem presented by the English policy you were to put in the place of the unknown "*x*" England's move to the East, you should have solved the problem and got an answer to all the details of the question that are difficult at first to understand.

Such is exactly the course of the English policy which I predicted three years ago when I wrote the article on "The Robbers of Posterity." What was, therefore, my surprise, not only

when events had proved the correctness of my forecast, but when, at the beginning of the Transvaal war, I actually read in one of the London periodicals an article in which the author put forth exactly the same idea of the strengthening of the English dominion over the Indian Ocean, and, as a consequence, over the Persian Gulf. A clear indication that such is really the English aim is afforded by the vigorous campaign carried on lately by the Indian press against Russia's supposed designs on Bender-Abbas on the Persian Gulf.

But there is more in the present political movement of England than is apparent at first sight.

All I have described above regarding England's preoccupation about India shows by itself that the present display of British force is bound to be followed by others in various directions, and that the English have started on a career of military conquest. "*Qui a bu, boira!*" is the French saying; translated into English, *special* English in this case, it means: "*He who has drunk of blood, shall drink it again!*" It must not be forgotten that Mr. Chamberlain has been made the spokesman of the present Unionist ministry, thereby involving the majority of the Liberal-Unionists in responsibility for the deeds of the present Conservative Government, which is, in the case of the Transvaal, supported by the Liberal-Imperialists, led, actually though not nominally, by Lord Rosebery. But what was some years ago the chief aim of the present colonial minister? He sought to strengthen the ties binding the colonies to the mother country by creating a colonial Zollverein. Having, however, failed in this task, the British ministry turned their activity to arousing a special colonial patriotism in matters particularly English and having no concern with the colonies. This colonial patriotism was called *imperialism*, which was made so broad as to include the United States on the same grounds as Canada in the task of working for the achievement of a pan-British ideal. The "Anglo-Saxon" cry was also raised with the same aim.

It must be acknowledged that the English ministry are fighting against real dangers, although they do not realize that they are engaged in an attempt to oppose the force of events. The centre of political and commercial power, which was once located in London and Paris (England finally defeating France in the time of Napoleon), has shifted, under the pressure of events, to

the West and to the East—to America, where the United States are contending with the same England in the Canadian overcoat, and to the centres of the European Continent, Berlin and St. Petersburg, on which continent England tries to fight Russia with the aid of Germany. The struggle in each case must prove utterly futile, at all events in the future, as history unlooses the forces which underly the world's political structure; but the struggle may be rendered profitless in the present as well, if the nations interested realize the meaning of passing events and make it plain to England that the time of her undisputed dominion over the world has come to an end.

The present Transvaal war has the following meaning to the British Empire. Bearing in mind, on the one hand, that British political power is on the wane, and wishing, on the other hand, to infuse new blood into the Empire with the aid of its colonies, British politicians have started on a career of conquest, making out of the Transvaal an object lesson for their future exploits. The present Transvaal war is practically a step in the mobilization of all the forces of the British Empire, the colonial forces included. It imports, likewise, the denying to the colonies of a right to a separate life, to separate interests: all life, all interests must be sacrificed for the English ideal. It is notorious that for a number of years the leading English statesmen have persistently put forward the idea of the colonies co-operating in the defense of the Empire. I find the same thought expressed by Sir Charles Dilke in the October issue of this REVIEW. The Transvaal, in case of the success of British arms, is destined to be a second Alsace and Lorraine, which formed the cornerstone of the vast building of the German Empire; the Transvaal is a rallying point for the colonial forces.

"Qui a bu, boira!" As the Prussians, after the war with Denmark, fought the Austrians and then the French, so England, after fighting the Transvaal, will have a ready weapon to fight in any direction that may be thought necessary. The central power in London will simply turn the fighting energies of the colonies in the direction selected: to North Africa, to the Persian Gulf, to Arabia, to Abyssinia, to China, to Canada, to Nicaragua, etc. The English politicians will, with the greatest ease, bring pressure to bear on all points of the globe, when required.

So much for England, in case of her success in the campaign.

But the character and scope of this success will in the long run depend on the attitude of the world's Powers.

For the Continental Powers of Europe, as well as for the United States, the consequences of English success and of the strengthening of Great Britain are plain enough. The two crucial questions, for the present, are these: Will the Powers realize the full meaning of the present English move? and, Will they play the English game? While I would answer the first question in the affirmative, I would give a negative reply to the second, were I sure of the far-sightedness, as a rule, of the persons called diplomats. For the United States there would be no danger in the present political situation and its necessary political developments, if the interests of Canada and of the United States were not artificially divided, if the Dominion were not irretrievably under British influence, and if it were not profitable to England to keep alive an eternal antagonism between the countries of the American continent. As matters now stand, the attitude of the United States ought to be the reverse of that of the Dominion; such are, at any rate, the American traditions of liberty and independence. What of the success of England in trying to create an antagonism between Germany and Russia? I do not believe in it, and for the following reasons. Germany has nothing whatever to gain by an antagonistic policy toward Russia. All the efforts of the German Empire are directed toward gaining full access to the seas and increasing its naval power. By spreading to the north, in the direction of Holland, Germany comes into collision with the English, as she is sure to do in the south, if the Germans ventured to find open access to the Mediterranean. The independence of Holland has made it difficult for Germany to accomplish the first task, although lately there has been much talk in the German press about common interests with Holland, and after the visit of Queen Wilhelmina to Berlin the British Ambassador at The Hague has gone away to London for a prolonged stay. The second task, in the Mediterranean, is rendered impossible to Germany by England's little game with poor Italy. Well! Coupled with the Anglo-German commercial rivalry, this antagonism between the political aims of Great Britain and Germany goes a long way to explain the present situation and its future developments, and it also shows that unfriendly relations with Russia would not "pay" Germany.

The political aims of Russia and Germany are identical without coming anywhere into collision. The Russians and the Germans "seek the seas" in their own separate spheres. This antagonism of Russian and German aims to those of England must necessarily underlie the relations between Russia and Germany, whatever aspect these relations may at any time acquire for the moment. It is true that both countries, Germany and Russia, are capable of creating many difficulties for one another, but they will always have to reckon with their respective positions in Europe, and they are bound to keep an eye—ay, both eyes—on England. The events in the Far East offer an example of the position sketched above. England dared not answer to the seizure of Kiao-Tchao and the Emperor's speech at Kiel, because she feared that Russia supported Germany; on the other hand, English politicians would not adopt an openly aggressive attitude toward Russia in China, because they secretly believed in a probable rupture between Germany and Russia. The English were mistaken; nobody in Europe wishes to fight their battles.

Whatever, therefore, may be the compensation that England is ready to pay to Germany for her benevolent attitude in the present campaign, it is plain that by associating herself with England, Germany would be carrying on a suicidal policy; would weaken herself by aiding in their designs the English statesmen, who are directing the policy of a State far superior to Germany as a world-wide Empire. True, we read in the papers about an Anglo-German arrangement in the question of Samoa, about Togoland, Zanzibar and the Portuguese African colonies. But this is nothing else than a repetition of the fable of the robber who stole a cow and gave his comrade the milk-jug. Germany cannot rest satisfied with the milk-jug in the form of concessions in Zanzibar, when England takes to herself the cow of the fable, the whole of South Africa, thereby strengthening the English position in the Indian Ocean and rendering almost useless the German colonies in East Africa.

The question which now faces the European Powers is: Can the strengthening of England on the Indian Ocean leave them indifferent; can the balance of power in the vicinity of the Ottoman Empire and in the Far East be disturbed? And all the world Powers have likewise to answer another question: How

shall the putting forth by England of her colonial forces affect them?

The second question I have already answered, and it will aid me in replying to the first if I say that the Transvaal war, coming as it does after the Soudan campaign, gives unmistakable evidence that it is a career of conquest that they have begun in London. If the English were anxious about their commercial interests, they would not go to war, as all the principal ports and harbors of Africa are in their hands.

The first question as to the attitude likely to be assumed by the European Powers in the present struggle affords me the opportunity of stating that now is the moment when Russia, Germany and France, with their diplomacy, are brought simultaneously into prominence, and it is with them that the final answer rests. There can be no doubt about the attitude of Russia and France, the former having to secure her interests in the Persian Gulf and Abyssinia, and the latter, notwithstanding her possessions in Madagascar, Siam and Indo-China, not being even consulted by England before the commencement of the present war. There may be some doubt as to the final attitude of Germany, but the interests of the latter will bring her in the long run into line with the two former Powers, and the Potsdam interview of both Emperors, arranged according to Emperor William's desire, goes far to justify an optimistic view in this instance. Supposing, however, there were some doubts on this point, I think they would be disposed of if it were made clear to the minds of European diplomats that the question put before them is nothing else than the existence of France. In the sphere of colonial interests, the French Republic blocks the way to the expansion of the British Empire, and is met by the latter on every point of the globe. Were it not for France the British diplomats would not care a straw about Germany, so far have they surpassed her in the race for colonies. But having to fight France, the English are bound to conciliate Germany in the same manner as they lately pushed forward Italy in China. The existence of France is now at stake, the more so as Madagascar lies on the way from South Africa to the East; and we hope that Emperor William will not repeat the mistakes of Napoleon III. England is playing with Germany the same game as that played in the former days by Bismarck, who endeavored to lull

the suspicions of the French Emperor while the "Iron Chancellor" was at work in the north and in the south of Prussia building up an empire. Napoleon was so short-sighted that he even fought the battles of England against Russia in the Crimea and finally got his due. In the present case, England realizes plainly that an assault on France, bringing her within the sphere of English political combinations, would give the English new vigor and colonial possessions and restore to Great Britain the political power which, according to some, is shifting to the West and to the East. Such an assault on France, however, no responsible politician of Germany and Russia would tolerate. When I say assault I mean not only actual warfare, but an attempt to crush by political pressure the political power of France for English benefit as well. Were this to be allowed, the power of resistance of the European Continent to England's encroachments would be diminished, and, in consequence, Germany's power would also be on the wane; the great fleets of Germany are things of the distant future.

The immediate future holds a probability of some combination of Powers, when the idea gains ground that the balance of power is disturbed in the Indian Ocean and in the countries lying in its vicinity, and that the growth of the colonial military forces of Great Britain is a standing menace to the whole world. Nobody can tell in what direction the colonial regiments will be sent next time, especially when Great Britain is on the eve of developing her military resources at home.

At any rate, whatever the issue of the present campaign, whether it be favorable to England or not, all the attention of the world Powers must be centred now on the Indian Ocean. Some action is imperative in this direction. What form this action shall take is a matter of secondary interest.

As to the effect which the criminal campaign against the Transvaal may have on the English people themselves, I will say this: The good angel of England is flown away; Gladstone is dead, quite dead, and now his countrymen are in the act of driving new and heavy nails into his coffin in order to hold its lid well down.

VLADIMIR HOLMSTREM.

P. S.—I approve Mr. Holmstrem's ideas on the subject of which he treats.

PRINCE OOKHTOMSKY.

SOME BOER CHARACTERISTICS.

BY GEORGE LACY.

THE most fruitful, and certainly the most fascinating, study of mankind is man—not man as a physiological unit; but man as a human soul, as an individual in his social relations, and as a collective entity. An adequate study of him in these phases cannot be made at second hand, by reading books or listening to the narrative of travellers who have known him only as a fleeting phenomenon among many others encountered in a rapid journey. It may safely be said that no estimates are so erroneous, indeed worthless, as those of the globe-trotter concerning the peoples with whom he is transiently brought into contact. If the study is to be of any value, one must carry it on through long years; must take part with the man who is the object of the study in all his pursuits, become one with him in his home life, his public life, his work and his play—not so much to listen to what he says, for the tongue is an unruly and unreliable member, as to observe what he does, and to probe into the root motives that prompt him in doing it. More than this, one must be familiar with his history, the achievements and failures of his race, and with all the circumstances by which he has in the past been surrounded; for nothing is more certain than that man is what circumstances have made him.

Concerning the Boers, I may safely claim that I have fulfilled to their widest extent all these essentials, more especially in respect of the Boers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The application of the term “Boer” to the whole Dutch population of South Africa is, while racially correct, decidedly misleading in practice. The Boers of the Transvaal differ essentially from those of the Cape Colony; those of the Orange Free State lie, geographically and in the scale of civilization, between the

two; and the Boers of Natal are readily distinguishable from all the others. I shall confine my remarks to those of the Transvaal and the Free State.

It is a common error to suppose that the Boers are a Dutch race. They are, strictly speaking, Dutch neither in descent, language nor manner of life. Of the original Boer population, a very large proportion—I think more than one-fourth—were French Huguenots, and French names are as common in the Transvaal as those of unmistakably Dutch origin. General Joubert is French, not only in his descent, but also in appearance and demeanor; President Krüger's wife bore the distinctively French name of Du Plessis. Perhaps the three commonest names in South Africa are De Villiers, Du Toit and Viljoen—all manifestly French. Besides this, there is a much larger admixture of colored blood in the Transvaal than is commonly believed; in the northeastern districts especially, I have seen scores of Boers who were unmistakably of mongrel descent. The Griquas, who number many thousands, and live in communities of their own, are, as every one knows, the offspring of Boer men and Hottentot women; and the "Cape Boys" are the same, or the offspring of Boer men and Bantu women. It is not to these I allude, but to men who are accepted by their brother Boers as equals and compatriots, which the Griquas and "Cape Boys" are not.

The language of the Boers is polyglot, not Dutch, and no Hollander can at first understand it. From their mixed French descent, one might suppose that it partook largely of the French tongue, but as a matter of fact, there is scarcely a trace of that influence in it. As in recent years the Boers tried to stamp out the English language in the Transvaal, so in previous times they tried to stamp out the French tongue in the Cape Colony; and they succeeded so effectually that it became completely lost. The Boer language is an admixture of debased Dutch, corrupted English, and Kitchen Kaffir.

In their manner of life, no people are less Dutch than the Boers. The distinctive feature of Dutch life is cleanliness, both in person and in the conduct of the home; the distinctive feature of Boer life is dirt. Unless it be among the inhabitants of the colder and more remote districts of Russia, the Boers must assuredly be the dirtiest white people in the world. I cannot believe that any people, of any color whatsoever, can be dirtier in

their appearance and habits. In fact, the amount of grime they carry about them is absolutely inconceivable to those accustomed to some of the minor refinements of life. In the days when the vast plains of the States swarmed with animal life, and the Boer was constantly killing, he was, indeed, a sight to see. He was usually a little above the middle height, but lanky, raw-boned and awkwardly put together, and his head, under the grease-saturated, broad-brimmed hat, was crowned with a tangled mass of matted hair which, perchance, had never known the attentions of a comb. In the midst of a dirt-streaked face his eyes looked at you bleared and shifty, and, below, the lips, caked with dry tobacco-juice, stood out from a tangle of hair to which streaks of tobacco-juice gave a parti-colored aspect. His short coat, waistcoat and trousers, even his unbleached calico shirt, were covered throughout with stains and blotches of blood, which were also to be observed caked upon his hands and upon his home-made *veldtschoens*, while his sockless ankles were not distinguishable from the soil of his farm. Since the great herds of game have been killed off, these bloodstains are of course absent; but the improvement in cleanliness is, it is to be feared, more apparent than real. Other kinds of dirt have taken the place of the clotted blood. There was but little difference to be seen between those who possessed fairly large flocks and herds—the only form of wealth known to the Boers prior to the gold era—and those who were the most poverty-stricken.

The other sex were no less unclean in their persons, but the subject is really too unsavory to be dwelt upon. Neither men nor women ever washed themselves, as we understand it, the extent of their ablutions being each morning to pour a pint or so of water into a tin basin and with the help of a foul rag daub their faces with it, all the inhabitants of the house using the same water. On Saturday nights, a small tub was brought in, with a little water in it, and in this water, unchanged throughout, the same perfunctory operation was performed upon the feet, though this function was often omitted for weeks.

In their home life the same characteristics obtained. The Netherlands housewife, accustomed to her sweet-smelling rooms and snowy linen, would upon entering a Boer tenement start back in dismay at the offensive atmosphere which assailed her. Although so used to the healthy, open-air life of the wagon, Boers

in their houses abjure the blessings of ventilation, and exist in an atmosphere which might be compared to that of a common lodging-house. At night, the men remove only their coats and waistcoats, and the women their cotton dresses, if even these. The houses of the less well-to-do, who of course were a large majority, often consisted of only one room, rarely indeed of three. In these houses there were frequently a dozen or more people. When there was only one room, the married couples occupied one end, cut off by a hanging screen of cotton material. The rest slept in a row upon the ground; first the young men above sixteen years of age, then the young women, and then the guests, the younger children huddling together in a corner. It would be quixotic to look for modesty or morality under such circumstances. No doubt, globe-trotters who have passed an hour or so in a few Boer houses of the better class since the influx of wealth to the Transvaal, will say this is an overdrawn picture; but, alas, the pigments are laid on with a hand so light that they do not depict the reality. The reality would not bear presentation.

Men of Mr. Stead's class, whose knowledge is apparently derived from a superfluous stock of sentimentality, try to persuade their readers and hearers that the Boers are a clean-living race, puritanical in their morals, and worthy on those grounds alone of our highest respect and admiration. It is not true. Immoral relations with their colored female dependents—whether they call them slaves, indentured apprentices, or hired servants—whatever they may be now, were but a few years ago so common as to be practically universal. I am not speaking at haphazard. My knowledge is derived from years of observation in many scores, nay, hundreds, of Boer houses. Apart from these immoralities, it must be said that the home life of the Boer was fairly pleasant. He had his differences with his wife; who has not? but, personally, I never saw these differences carried on any further than a wordy argument, conducted on both sides in high, shrill, falsetto voices. The women, in fact, accept the position of inferior mortals to their spouses. So far is this carried that they do not even eat together, the wife meekly waiting on her lord, and taking her own meal when he has finished. There does not appear to be much affection between them. They marry very young; but, after the first few months of wedlock, the unions look much more like affairs of convenience than

of affection. Nor have they much apparent affection for their offspring. The women are careful enough in rearing them until they can toddle about by themselves, after which they are in receipt of more cuffs and shrill anathemas than demonstrations of affection. The men take scarcely any notice of their children until the boys are old enough to be of use, when they are speedily initiated into all that pertains to cattle, horses and wagons. Formerly, the lads learned to shoot almost before anything else; but, with the disappearance of the game that has become a thing of the past, the modern Boer lad knows little more about the use of firearms than does the London lad. Neither lad nor girl has any education. In many of the well-to-do houses there was to be found a schoolmaster, who was invariably an Englishman or Hollander who had failed in every other pursuit—generally, indeed, a broken-down drunkard; but the great majority were taught neither to read nor write, and of the adults of the Transvaal to-day I should be surprised to find that twenty per cent. can do so. The younger generation are no doubt better looked after.

Among themselves, Boers are quarrelsome to the last degree. No expedition or transaction was ever undertaken by them in which the leaders did not sooner or later break out into rancorous recriminations. From the time when, in Natal in 1838, Hendrik Potgieter quarrelled with the other leaders, Pieter Retief and Gert Maritz, and in the face of the enemy withdrew his commando from the operations against the Zulus, and when a year or two later, two, if not three, separate governments were set up by rival factions, it has been ever thus. In the hunting-field, quarrels as to the rightful ownership of animals killed are constant, and I have often seen them come to blows.

In their intercourse with strangers other than fellow-Boers, they are extremely overbearing. In my rides in the Transvaal and Orange Free State in connection with the acquisition of farms back in the sixties, during which I visited more Boer houses than I can reckon up, I often had to submit to language and manners that made my blood boil. Their standard of civility is a graduated one. The man with a wagon or two would always receive outward consideration; the man on horseback was tolerated; but the unfortunate on foot received the shortest possible shrift. This raises the question of their oft-asserted hospitality. Yes, they are hospitable in their own way; but of what people

living on farms widely apart, as they do, cannot the same thing be said? I have travelled as much as most men, throughout nearly every one of the Southern Colonies of Great Britain, in several European countries, and in remote districts of the British Isles, but I cannot call to mind meeting with absolute inhospitality anywhere, except from natives of what is now German East Africa, and, in lesser degree, in Gazaland. Will any one who knows both South Africa and Australia maintain that the Boers would for one moment tolerate the "sundowner," and erect special buildings for his reception, as the squatters do? The Boer is, in a way, a sociable creature, and a terrible gossip, and he is always glad of an opportunity of letting his tongue go, when he can do so without loss to what he considers his self-respect. A traveller who stops for an hour or two to rest his animals can always reckon on a cup of coffee and a good flow of words, or even a meal, if it should happen to be meal-time. Indeed, if he arrive in the evening he will be given a blanket and allowed to lie on the floor with the rest, if he is not with a wagon; but where in the world would such accommodation be refused? What a Boer will not do is to offer food at any other time than at the regular hour for a meal. I was once twenty-four hours without food through arriving at two houses after the meals had been cleared away. Leaving the first at daylight, I arrived at another about ten o'clock, and, explaining the matter to the owner, asked him to break the rule and allow me to have something to eat, as I was on a special mission, and could not wait for the mid-day meal. He went to his orchard, and picking off the ground, where they lay thick under the trees, a couple of peaches, placed them on a plate before me. I do not think he meant to be churlish, but "hospitality" is not quite the right word to apply to his act.

Lord Wolseley recently laid stress upon the honesty of the Boers. I do not know precisely what he meant, but in the matter of *meum* and *tuum* in respect of portable articles the reverse is the truth. I spent quite two years going about from farm to farm with wagon-loads of miscellaneous goods, bartering them for ostrich-feathers, ivory, hides, wool, live stock, or whatever I could get. I have elsewhere related my experiences on one of these expeditions, and must here confine myself to saying that I scarcely ever exposed samples of my goods at any farm without attempts being made to purloin articles that could be readily concealed.

All took part in this, old and young, male and female; and constant watch had to be kept. I once detected a young girl, the daughter of a Boer who was then, and long afterward, a prominent member of the Free State Volksraad, trying to secrete a case of watches under her apron. No shame is evinced on detection; the matter is treated as a good subject for laughter. In purchasing horses and cattle, the greatest care has to be exercised. No London horse-coper could compete with the average Boer in the art of passing off broken-winded horses or sand-cracked trek oxen as sound animals. Dishonesty extends further still than to matters of this kind. A Boer, whose name is well known to the world, many years ago, when acting as President of a Land Commission for apportioning out farms in the Leydenberg District, "did" my partner out of 36,000 acres of land by as barefaced a piece of knavery as could well be conceived. Dishonesty and untruthfulness are twin brothers, and both are prominent features in the Boer character. He who relies upon the unsupported testimony of a Boer will most assuredly come to grief. It is not merely that the habit of exaggeration is a second nature to him, but that he has actually no conception of the nature of truth. He will say exactly what he conceives will best serve his ends in the matter he has in hand, without any reference whatever to what may happen to be the actual facts. Indeed, it is doubtful if his mind is able to take in the facts as they are. It is of that character that it colors the facts in accordance with his own desires and beliefs. The Boer has a habit of calling every defeat a great victory, and his doing so is not so much a deliberate attempt at deceiving, as it is the expression of a *bona fide* belief. He is so saturated with the conviction that he cannot be defeated that he is quite unable to appraise the facts at their true value. The conviction overrides all else, and in a mind capable of containing only one or two leading ideas, that of defeat can find no place. When he sees his dead and wounded strewn about the field, the sight does not convey to him any sense of disaster, for he is convinced that the loss on the other side must necessarily be three times as great.

I do not think there is any feature in the Boer character quite so distinctive as this ingrained disregard of truth, this absolute incapacity to understand the meaning of straightforwardness. It enters into their every transaction in life, from the smallest to the greatest. Whether it is in relating an experience in the hunt-

ing-field, in selling a horse, a wagon or a farm, in giving evidence in a court of law, or in an affair of state, it is always present, and always glaringly obvious to the outsider. In their statecraft these traits must be clear to the most careless reader. The recent Blue Books afford ample evidence of them, but in Mr. Fitzpatrick's "Transvaal from Within" they are revealed to a degree that comes probably as a revelation to those who thought they had a fair knowledge of the Boer mind and method, but which to the sentimental Boerophile who knows nothing of them must be absolutely crushing.

We hear a great deal about the Boers' love for their country, and their willingness to shed the last drop of their blood in its defence. Those who talk thus know nothing whatever about the matter. The Boer has no country. He does not know the meaning of patriotism. He is a nomad by nature. One country is as good to him as another, if it serve his requirements. He is seldom on his farm for long, and is more happy when he takes his stock away to some distant winterveldt, and lives in his wagon, than when at home. If he is assured of getting better country for his stock on easier terms, or preferably on no terms at all, he is as ready to desert his own for good and all as he is to eat his breakfast. What he is fighting for is liberty, and he interprets liberty as did Cicero: "The essence of liberty is to do exactly as one chooses." The limitations to liberty he cannot understand. "The like liberty of all" is to him a meaningless string of words. That is his patriotism. The present war cannot properly be called a Boer-made war; it is a Krüger-made war, and a Hollander-made war. The average Boer hates the Britisher with lasting hatred; he despises him or, at all events, has persuaded himself that he despises him; but he is much too lazy and enervated a creature to deliberately set to work to drive the Britisher out of the country. All that has been driven into his weak mind by ambitious and designing men.

I must now come to one more leading feature in the Boer character, and one most disagreeable to dwell upon. The Boer is absolutely callous to suffering, whether in animals or in human beings. When we remember that, until a few years ago, the whole male population was constantly engaged in killing animals and skinning and cutting them up—were, in fact, practically a vast community of professional butchers—one can scarcely be sur-

prised that animal suffering raises no sentiment within them; but their cruelties to their fellow-creatures cannot but be regarded with astonishment. One can find in many books descriptions of their terrible savagery in the conduct of their wars with native tribes; but it is in the home life that they are seen at the worst, for there their cruelties are committed in cold blood. I have over and again seen slaves—they call them “indentured apprentices” when the Britisher makes inept inquiries—thrashed with hippopotamus-hide *sjamboks* with a degree of severity and savagery that would do no discredit to a Dervish, and that for the most trifling offences. They were usually spread-eagled to a wagon-wheel to receive this punishment, and sometimes the Boer would thrash until he could thrash no longer. White prisoners, especially if they should happen to be British, too, have often come into this kind of treatment. In 1866, I was eye-witness to a very bad case. It was in the Pongolo Bush. An English sawyer was charged with stealing a hatchet from a Boer. There was a field-cornet there, and this man, after hearing the Boer’s complaint, caused the sawyer to be seized, had him fastened to a wagon-wheel, and ordered him to be given fifty lashes. The sawyer was then bound to a horse with his head on the rump, as we see in the pictures of Mazeppa, and sent in that position thirty miles through a blazing sun, to Wakkerstroom to be tried! I was shooting at the time, and was the only other Englishman in the district, and was powerless to prevent it.

The last Boer trait to which I can refer within the limits of this article is their alleged character as a deeply religious people. This is a very difficult matter to deal with in a few words. Not being what is called a religious man myself, I am a little in doubt as to what is meant by the claim made. The Boer I take to be a Deist more than a Christian. His Predikant in the churches may hold forth to him the Christian doctrines, but away from them his God is an anthropomorphic God. He is in the first place the God of War, and in the second, God the Protector. The belief that the first and most acceptable, if not the only, business God has is to look after the interests of the Boer, I take to be absolutely sincere. Whether these fanatical persuasions can rightly be called beliefs is a question into which I cannot enter, beyond stating my own conviction that they are more hysterical in their nature than grounded on thought or reason. Hysterical or not,

the Boer acts up to his belief. His God teaches him neither ethics nor morals; He is God the Warrior and God the Protector, and nothing more. He is the God of the Pentateuch, and therefore the Boer ethic is the ethic of the Jews in the Wilderness, supplemented by additions resulting from his peculiar life in the midst of wild animals and wilder men. How far his fanatical belief that he is God's special favorite enters into his life, apart from making him arrogant, is not easy to determine. He is regular in his observances of the forms of worship which his circumstances have created for him; but except in times of peril the influence of his religious belief is not otherwise traceable. His method of worship is lugubrious in the extreme. To the eye there is neither reverence, cheerfulness nor devotion in it. It is a thing of the lips, and full of dolefulness and gloom. When I have attended their Sabbath Bible readings—which are almost entirely confined to the Mosaic records—and psalm-singsings in their own houses, I have always found myself getting depressed and moody, and have had to pinch myself to rouse myself to a realization of its unreality. It is like a nightmare. The solemnity is so stolid, the tone so monotonous, sing-song and gruesome, and the whole function so lifeless and soulless, that it is impossible to believe that there is any real feeling in it.

And what has made these strange people what they are? Consider their history. They are by nature a dissatisfied people. They left their original European homes because the conditions forced upon them were distasteful to them, and they left the Cape Colony because they could not endure the restraints advancing civilization imposed upon them. They entered a strange country, full of strange animals and stranger men. The men were hostile, savage and ruthless, and they had to be ever on the alert—in the protection of their own lives. Completely cut off from the world, they wandered about in their wagons for years upon years, homeless and friendless, and forever fighting the savage foes who occupied the country. Their horror of these foes grew upon them until they gradually came to regard them not as human beings, but as vermin to be exterminated on every opportune occasion. They had no consolations but their Old Testaments, and they read and reread these (for the overtrekkers were better educated than their offspring) until the similarity between the Jews in the Wilderness and themselves so impressed them that they slowly

confounded the one with the other, and eventually became honestly convinced that it was they themselves who were God's chosen people. And thus they lived for decades, every family deprived of some of its members in the fight, and practically without any government or emblem of consolidation. They had no literature, no art, no music but a stray fiddle or harmonium, absolutely none of the requirements of existence. Their life became a sordid fight against their environments. They intermarried until the whole state became one vast family, and with this intermarriage their intellects grew debased. And thus they gradually lost much that makes man manly and attractive.

That with good government and under more civilized conditions, they are capable of better things is undoubted. Among the Boers of Natal (especially in the Umvoti District), of the Cape Colony, and even of certain districts of the Free State, I have met many Boers, who, though of a rather low order of intellect, and incapable of any achievements in the higher departments of our mental life, were in all other respects as high-toned, upright and courteous gentlemen as anyone would desire to meet. Rid the Transvaal of the incubus of its corrupt and incapable government, give it a well-considered constitution and supervision, and the Boer, though he can never rise very high among white races, will in the next generation be a very different man from what his circumstances have hitherto made him.

GEORGE LACY.

A FILIPINO APPEAL TO THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES.

BY APOLINARIO MABINI, FORMERLY PRIME MINISTER IN AGUINALDO'S CABINET.

ON the ninth of last May I ceased to participate in the government of my native land, because the National Assembly had deemed it expedient that others should take my place, in the hope that some compromise might thereby be arrived at which would put an end to the war between the United States and the Philippines in a manner friendly and honorable to both sides. The representatives of the American Government had previously found me at President Aguinaldo's side, at the head of the public business of the Philippines, in the capacity of Privy Councillor from June of last year, and as Prime Minister of the Cabinet provided by the Constitution from January of the present year. For this reason, and because I belong to the pure native race and have never been away from my country since my infancy, I know not only all the facts concerning the events which have taken place in the Philippines since the destruction of the Spanish fleet by Admiral Dewey, but also the real feelings of my people toward the people of the United States.

I am impelled to write, on the one hand, by the ardent desire to let the American people know the whole truth, which has perhaps been distorted by interested parties, and which alone can render complete justice to the Filipino people; and, on the other hand, by a no less urgent wish, inspired by feelings of humanity, to bring the present war to a close, and end the mutual destruction of two peoples who ought to make common cause in contributing to the consolidation of civilization and the progress of the world.

Before Admiral Dewey came to the Philippines with his fleet, he had a conference with General Aguinaldo; and after having assured the latter that the feelings of the American people were of the most friendly character, since the purpose of his Government was to aid the Filipinos, if they for their part would help in the war waged against the Spaniards for the independence of Cuba, he asked whether Aguinaldo considered himself strong enough to maintain order in the whole archipelago after the Spaniards were expelled. General Aguinaldo replied that he would answer not only for order and for his people, but also that the war should be carried on in accordance with the practice of civilized nations if he were provided with arms. On receiving this reply, the Admiral promised that Aguinaldo should be supplied with arms. He then started for Manila, in whose waters he gained a complete victory and destroyed the Spanish fleet.

After the victory, the Admiral discovered that all the Spanish land forces were concentrated in very considerable numbers and entrenched in Manila, Cavite, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Bataan and Panpanga, without counting small garrisons in other provinces; and he perceived the necessity of a respectable army to rout the Spaniards and occupy Manila and Cavite. For this reason he had to send the cruiser "McCullough" to Hong Kong for Aguinaldo, at the same time that he asked his Government for troops. Aguinaldo was received with the honors of a general by the Admiral, who renewed his former promises and delivered to him ninety-six rifles which were found in the arsenal at Cavite, authorizing him to establish himself in that port and to exercise authority over what he found there, with the exception of the arsenal, which was occupied by a small American force that had been landed. Aguinaldo found the houses in the port uninhabited and in ruins, and there was no one to keep order or look after the safety and interests of the citizens. Hence he was obliged to call upon the inhabitants to return and establish a local government under his supervision—which did not include the territory of the arsenal—and he then issued a manifesto to the people of the Philippines.

The Filipinos, who had been undecided, because they did not know whether the Americans were friends or enemies, welcomed the manifesto with joy, and, recognizing Aguinaldo as their in-

disputable chief, each province began to overcome and capture the Spanish forces within its jurisdiction. This movement began at the end of May, 1898; and by the end of the following June the struggle was localized in the capitals of Manila, Batangas, Tayabas, Laguna, Morong, Bulacan, Pamanga and Tarlac, the Spanish forces occupying these towns being besieged in them. They were soon obliged to surrender to the Filipino forces and become their prisoners, the only exception being the garrison of Manila. Meanwhile, the Admiral congratulated Aguinaldo on his victories, allowed the landing of two thousand rifles which had been bought for the Filipinos with Hong Kong funds, permitted the Filipino vessels to sail with Filipino flags on Manila Bay, let Aguinaldo govern not only the reconquered provinces, but also the port of Cavite itself except the arsenal, handed over to him Spanish prisoners made by the American ships, and, lastly, referred to him the claims filed by Spanish merchants in regard to certain vessels captured from the Spaniards by the Filipinos.

Shortly after this, Anderson's brigade arrived at the Philippines. On landing at the port of Cavite, General Anderson notified Aguinaldo that he was the provisional chief of the American army until the arrival of General Merritt, and made in the name of his Government new protestations of friendship and aid in favor of the liberty of the Filipinos. But soon, under pretense that it was necessary to clean the streets and houses of the port so that the American soldiers then on the way might be decently lodged, and to prevent trouble and friction between the American and the Filipino soldiers, he took charge of the government of the port, and prohibited the Filipinos from going armed about the streets, while drunken Americans committed all sorts of assaults on the citizens. Aguinaldo, desirous of saving trouble and avoiding a rupture, moved on to Bacood, leaving a small force at the port, the command of which was entrusted to a general, whose orders were to avoid all conflict with the Americans and to advise the citizens to keep calm and cultivate feelings of concord and friendship. No sooner had General Anderson become aware of this than he seized a warehouse of naval stores, the property of a rich merchant in Cavite, which Aguinaldo had been entrusted to hold subject to the owner's orders.

After this General Merritt arrived, who in notifying Aguinaldo that he had come as Governor-General of the Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the American Army, asked for firewood, carts, oxen and horses for his soldiers. Having issued a proclamation to the people of the Philippines, in which he reiterated the promises of friendship and assistance on the faith of a free people, he landed forces in Parañaque, a town held by the Filipinos, without informing Aguinaldo. There the American forces constructed a very extensive trench in the rear of the Filipinos to serve as a basis of operations, stationed themselves along the line through Maytubig, and seized many trenches constructed and occupied by the Filipinos.

Meanwhile, General Merritt was parleying, behind the backs of the Filipinos, with the Spanish garrison of Manila to induce them to surrender. The Spaniards, shut in on the land side by the Filipinos and threatened from the sea by the American ships, agreed to surrender on the first attack from Maytubig, provided the fleet would not bombard the city. Then General Merritt ordered his troops to attack by way of Maytubig without informing Aguinaldo.

Nevertheless, when the Filipino troops became aware of the aggressive action of the Americans, they moved forward in line with the advance guard to help those whom they believed to be their friends and allies. The Spaniards, who were also ignorant of the agreement made by their general, offered a furious resistance to the attack and directed their fire against the American troops, whom they hated more even than they hated the Filipinos. The Americans, perceiving that they were the targets for the Spanish bullets, fell in behind the Filipinos, whom they then allowed to advance. When the Spaniards saw that they would have to engage the Filipinos, they abandoned their positions, thinking, perhaps, and rightly, that if they had to give up the islands, the best they could do would be to give them up to their inhabitants, and that consequently further bloodshed was useless. Then the Americans advanced, seized the positions taken by the Filipinos and hoisted the American flag in the place of the Filipino banner. These manœuvres were repeated several times, until the American and Filipino advance guards reached the suburb of Hermita, when it became known that the capitulation had been signed.

It was here that General Aguinaldo's tremendous prestige with the Filipinos was abundantly shown; for if it had not been for his peremptory order to avoid all conflict with the American troops, the Filipino army would not have suffered such injustice and the strife between them would have broken out then and there. But Aguinaldo, and with him the Filipino people, believed in the promises of friendship and liberty proclaimed by the American generals in the name of their Government and on the good faith of a free people.

To that effect General Aguinaldo wrote to General Merritt, complaining in friendly terms of the conduct observed toward the Filipinos. He remarked at the same time that it was not right for the Americans alone to profit by the victory, since most of the credit belonged to the Filipinos, who had shut in the Spainards. If it had not been for this blockade on the land side, he added, the Americans might have destroyed the city, but they could not have obliged the Spanish troops to surrender, because they could in the end have retreated to the interior of the island. I may say now that, thanks to that surrender, President McKinley succeeded in obtaining the cession of the Philippines by the treaty of Paris. Merritt's only reply was to ask for the withdrawal of the Filipino forces who had reached Hermita, Paco and Malate during the attack from Maytubig, which he did by sending Consul Williams as a semi-official emissary to tell Aguinaldo that General Merritt was furious at him for not having placed himself under the orders of the American generals according to agreement.

Finally, General Merritt departed and General Otis took his place. Immediately upon taking charge, the latter demanded the evacuation by the Filipino forces, not only of Hermita, Paco and Malate, but also of Pandacan, which is a town not comprised in the municipality of Manila, giving as a reason that these places were included in the capitulation of Manila and its defenses. Aguinaldo yielded to these demands, sacrificing everything to maintain friendly relations; and, believing that he would obtain justice from the American Government, he sent to Washington, as his envoy, Don Felipe Agoncillo, with instructions to lay before President McKinley the grievances of the Filipinos and to ask for the recognition of the independence of the Philippines, in fulfilment of the promises made by the

American generals. Agoncillo was not received by the President, nor heard by the American Commission in Paris.

In the meantime Admiral Dewey seized the Filipino launches in Manila Bay, the very launches that he had permitted to sail under the Filipino flag. In the waters of Batangas he also captured the steamer "Abbey," which had been bought by the Filipinos for the transportation of arms. This was the steamer that had landed at Cavite the two thousand rifles on its first expedition. When Aguinaldo sent a commissioner to ask for an explanation of these captures, the Admiral became very angry, refused to give any explanation whatever, and dismissed the Filipino commissioner like a servant who had committed great faults. Even Mayor Bell, who had accompanied the commissioner, went away greatly disgusted with so strange a reception.

What did Aguinaldo do then? In order to avoid a conflict which was becoming inevitable, in view of the more and more incomprehensible conduct of the American commanders, he appointed a commission to draw up a *modus vivendi* with General Otis pending the conclusion of the treaty of Paris and the decision of the American Congress as to the fate of the Philippines.

Seeing that Agoncillo had not been successful in his endeavors, Aguinaldo sent to America another commission, composed of Agoncillo, General Riego de Diós, Luna, Lozada and others. The first commission had been without result, as the one appointed by General Otis to meet it expressed itself very vaguely and alleged that it had not received any authority from Washington and could not therefore accept any of the propositions of the Filipino commissioners. The second commission had hardly set foot on American soil when the conflict broke out, which we had tried to avoid by the sacrifice of many rights and at the cost of great humiliation.

The Americans say that the Filipinos provoked the hostilities, an assertion which the facts I have related clearly disprove. If the Filipinos had wished hostilities, they could have begun immediately after the capitulation of Manila, because at that time their troops occupied the suburbs of Hermita, Malate and Paco, the town of Pandacan and a part of the suburb of Tondo. Besides, there were very few American troops in Manila. Moreover, the Filipino commissioners in America must have known something of our intentions, and we would not have made it

necessary for them to leave that country like escaped criminals, for we would not have had the heart to expose them to the wrath of the American Government and its agents. Finally, General Ricarte, who commanded the Filipino troops that occupied the outskirts of Manila, was at Malolos conferring with General Aguinaldo on the night when the conflict broke out.

The truth is that the Filipino people have never felt disposed to measure their strength with powerful America, otherwise Aguinaldo could not have put up with so many infamous actions at the hands of the American generals. They have always considered themselves little and insignificant beside the American people, and hence they never thought of provoking the Americans, for they have always been aware that, even if they should gain a few victories, the fortunes of war would necessarily change as soon as reinforcements arrived from America.

And it is still more true that the Filipino people, educated by long sufferings during the protracted dominion of Spain, have learned to reflect and to judge things calmly, even in the midst of great excitement. They know that, no matter how great and civilized a people may be, it contains bad men as well as good men; and, therefore, they do not condemn all. For the same reason, they admire the bravery shown by the American army in the recent fights; they still entertain, unalterably, that friendship toward the American people which places them above all other nations; they trust that the popular Government of America will not sink to the level of the theocratic Government of Spain, and that the spirit of justice, now obscured by ambition, will again shine in their firmament, as the civic virtues of their ancestors shine in their history and traditions.

The Filipino people are struggling in defense of their liberties and independence with the same tenacity and perseverance as they have shown in their sufferings. They are animated by an unalterable faith in the justice of their cause, and they know that if the American people will not grant them justice, there is a Providence which punishes the crimes of nations as well as of individuals.

APOLINARIO MABINI.

THE LETTERS OF ROBERT LOUIS STEVENSON.

BY HENRY JAMES.

It was the happy fortune of Robert Louis Stevenson to have created, beyond any man of his craft in our day, a body of readers inspired with the feelings that we, for the most part, place at the service only of those for whom our affection is personal. There was no one who knew the man, one may safely assert, who was not also devoted to the writer; conforming in this respect to a general law—if law it be—that shows us many exceptions: but, naturally and not inconveniently, it had to remain far from true that all devotees of the writer were able to approach the man. The case was, nevertheless, that the man, somehow, approached *them*, and that to read him—certainly to read him with the full sense of his charm—came, for many people, to mean much the same as to “meet” him. It was as if he wrote himself altogether, rose straight to the surface of his prose, and still more of his happiest verse; so that these things gave out, besides whatever else, his look and his voice, showed his life and manners, his affairs and his very secrets. In short, we grew to possess him entire; and the example is the more curious and beautiful, as he neither made a business of “confession” nor cultivated most those forms through which the *ego* shines. His great successes were supposititious histories of persons quite different from himself, and the objective, as we have learned to call it, was the ideal to which he oftenest sacrificed.

The effect of it all, none the less, was such that his Correspondence has only seemed to administer, delightfully, a further push to a door already half open and through which we enter with an extraordinary absence of the sense of intrusion. We feel, indeed, that we are living with him; but what is that but what we were doing before? Through his Correspondence, indeed, the

ego does, magnificently, shine—which is much the best thing that, in any correspondence, it can ever do. But even the “Vailima Letters,” published by Mr. Sidney Colvin in 1895, had already both established that and allayed our diffidence.

“It came over me the other day suddenly that this diary of mine to you would make good pickings after I am dead, and a man could make some kind of book out of it without much trouble. So, for God’s sake, don’t lose them.”

Being on these terms with our author, and feeling as if we had always been, we profit by freedoms that seem but the consecration of intimacy. Not only have we no sense of intrusion, but we are so prepared to penetrate further that when we come to limits we quite feel as if the story were mutilated and the copy not complete. There it is precisely that we seize the secret of our tie. Of course, it was personal, for how did it operate, in any connection whatever, but to make us live with him? We had lived with him in “Treasure Island,” in “Kidnapped” and in “Catriona,” just as we do, by the light of these posthumous volumes, in the South Seas and at Vailima; and our present confidence comes from the fact of a particularly charming continuity. It is not that his novels were “subjective,” but that his life was romantic, and in the very same degree in which his own conception, his own presentation, of that element touches and thrills. If we want to know even more, it is because we are always, everywhere, in the story.

To this absorbing extension of the story, then, the two volumes of Letters* now published by Mr. Sidney Colvin beautifully contribute. The shelf of our library that contains our best letter-writers is considerably furnished, but not overcrowded; and its glory is not too great to keep Stevenson from finding there a place with the very first. He will not figure among the writers—those to whom we are apt to give, in this line, precedence—to whom only small things happen, and who fascinate us by making the most of them; he belongs to the class who have both matter and manner, whom life carries swiftly before it, and who communicate and signal as they go. He lived to the topmost pulse; and the last thing that was to happen was that he should find himself, on any occasion, with nothing to recount. Of all that he may have

* “The Letters of Robert Louis Stevenson to his Family and Friends. Selected and Edited, with Notes and Introduction, by Sidney Colvin.” New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1899.

uttered on certain occasions, we are, inevitably, not here possessed—a fact that, as I have hinted above, affects us, perversely, as an inexcusable gap in the story; but he never fails of the thing that we most love letters for, the full expression of the moment and the mood, the actual good or bad or middling, the thing in his head, his heart or his house. Mr. Colvin has given us an admirable “Introduction”—a characterization of his friend so founded at once on knowledge and on judgment that the whole sense of the man strikes us as extracted in it. He has elucidated each group or period with notes that leave nothing to be desired; and nothing remains, that I can think of, to thank him for, unless the intimation that we may yet look for another volume—which, however much more free it might make us of the author’s history, we should accept, I repeat, with the same absence of scruple. Nothing comes up oftener to-day than the question of the rights of privacy; of our warrant, or want of warrant, for getting behind, by the aid of editors or other retailers, certain appearances of distinction; and the general knot in the business is, indeed, a hard one to untie; yet it strikes me as a matter regarding which such publications as Mr. Colvin’s have much to suggest.

There is no absolute privacy—save, of course, when the deceased may have wished or endeavored positively to constitute it; and things too sacred are often only things that are not, in that degree, anything else that is superior. One may hold both that people—that artists perhaps in particular—are well advised to cover their tracks, and yet that our having gone, or not, behind, in a particular case, may be a small affair compared with our having really found something. Personal records of the type before us can, at any rate, obviously, be but the reverse of a deterrent to the pushing inquirer. They are too happy an instance—they positively make for revelations. Stevenson never covered his tracks, and the tracks prove, perhaps, to be what most attaches us. We follow them here, from year to year and from stage to stage, with the same charmed sense with which he has made us follow one of his hunted heroes in the heather. Life and fate and an early catastrophe were ever at his heels, and when he at last falls fighting, sinks down in the very act of valor, the “happy ending,” as he calls it for some of his correspondents, is, though precipitated and not conventional, assuredly there.

His descent and his origin all contribute to the picture, which,

it seems to me, could scarce—since we speak of “endings”—have had a better beginning had he himself prearranged it. Without his having prearranged it, indeed, it was such a matter as could never be wasted on him, one of the innumerable things, Scotch and other, that helped to fill his romantic consciousness. Edinburgh, in the first place, the “romantic town,” was as much his “own” as it ever was the great precursor’s whom, in “Weir of Hermiston” as well as elsewhere, he presses so hard; and this even in spite of continual absence—in virtue of a constant, imaginative reference and an intense, intellectual possession. The immediate background formed by the profession of his family—the charge of the lights on northern coasts—was a setting that he could not have seen his way to better; while no less happy a condition was met by his being all lonely in his father’s house—the more that the father, admirably commemorated by the son and in his way as strongly marked, was antique and strenuous, and that the son, a genius to be, and delicate, was (in the words of the charming anecdote of an Edinburgh lady retailed in one of these volumes), if not exactly what could be called bonny, “pale, penetrating and interesting.” The poet in him had, from the first, to be pacified—temporarily, that is, and from hand to mouth, as is the way for poets; so that, with friction and tension playing their part, with the filial relation quite classically troubled, with breaks of tradition and lapses from faith, with restless excursions and sombre returns, with the love of life at large mixed, in his heart, with every sort of local piety and passion, and the unjustified artist fermenting, on top of all, in the recusant engineer, he was as well started as possible toward the character he was to keep.

All this, obviously, however, was the sort of thing that the story, as most generally approved, would have had at heart to represent as the mere wild oats of a slightly uncanny cleverness—as handsomely reconciled, in time, to the usual scheme and crowned, after an amusing fling or two, with young wedded love and civic responsibility. The actual story, alas, was to transcend the conventional one, for it happened to be a case of a hero of too long a wind and too well turned out for his part. Everything was right for the discipline of Alan Fairford, but that the youth *was*, after all, a phoenix. As soon as it became a case of justifying himself for straying—as in the enchanting “Inland Voyage” and “Travels with a Donkey”—how was he to escape doing so with

supreme felicity? The fascination in him, from the first, is the mixture, and the extraordinary charm of his letters is that they are always showing this. It is the proportions, moreover, that are so admirable—the quantity of each different thing that he fitted to each other one, and to the whole. The free life would have been all his dream, if so large a part of it had not been that love of letters, of expression and form, which is but another name for the life of service. Almost the last word about him, by the same law, would be that he had, at any rate, supremely written, were it not that he seems still better characterized by his having at any rate supremely lived.

Perpetually and exquisitely amusing as he was, his ambiguities and compatibilities yielded, for all the wear and tear of them, endless “fun” even to himself; and no one knew so well with what linked diversities he was saddled, or—to put it the other way—how many horses he had to drive at once. It took his own delightful talk to show how more than absurd it might be, and, if convenient, how very obscurely so, that such an incurable rover should have been complicated both with such an incurable scribbler and such an incurable invalid, and that a man should find himself such an anomaly as a drenched yachtsman haunted with “style,” a shameless Bohemian haunted with duty, and a victim at once of the personal hunger and instinct for adventure and of the critical, constructive, sedentary view of it. He had everything all round—adventure most of all; to feel which we have only to turn from the beautiful flush of it in his text to the scarce less beautiful vision of the great hilltop in Pacific seas to which, after death, he was borne by islanders and chiefs. Fate, as if to distinguish him as handsomely as possible, seemed to be ever treating him to some chance for an act or a course that had almost nothing in its favor but its inordinate difficulty. If the difficulty was, in these cases, not *all* the beauty for him, it at least never prevented his finding in it—or our finding, at any rate, as observers—so much beauty as comes from a great risk accepted either for an idea or for simple joy. The joy of risks, the more personal the better, was never far from him, any more than the excitement of ideas. The most important step in his life was a signal instance of this, as we may discern in the light of “The Amateur Emigrant” and “Across the Plains,” the picture of the conditions in which he fared from England to California to be married. Here, as always, the great

note is the heroic mixture—the thing he *saw*, morally as well as imaginatively; action and performance, at any cost, and the cost made immense by want of health and want of money, illness and anxiety of the extremest kind, and by unsparing sensibilities and perceptions. He had been launched into the world for a fighter with the organism of, say, a “composer,” though, also, it must be added, with a beautiful saving sanity.

It is doubtless after his settlement in Samoa that his letters have most to give, but there are things they throw off from the first that strike the note above all characteristic, show his imagination always at play, for drollery or philosophy, with his circumstances. The difficulty in writing of him under the personal impression is to suggest enough how directly his being the genius that he was, kept counting in it. In 1879 he writes from Monterey to Mr. Edmund Gosse, in reference to certain grave symptoms of illness:

“I may be wrong, but . . . I believe I must go. . . . But death is no bad friend; a few aches and gasps, and we are done; like the truant child, I am beginning to grow weary and timid in this big, jostling city, and could run to my nurse, even although she should have to whip me before putting me to bed.”

This charming renunciation expresses itself at the very time his talent was growing finer; he was so fond of the sense of youth and the idea of play that he saw whatever happened to him in images and figures, in the terms, almost, of the sports of childhood.

“Are you coming over again to see me some day soon? I keep returning, and now hand over fist, from the realms of Hades. I saw that gentleman between the eyes, and fear him less after each visit. Only Charon and his rough boatmanship I somewhat fear.”

This fear remained with him, sometimes greater, sometimes less, during the first years after his marriage, those spent abroad and in England in health resorts, and it marks constantly, as one may say, one end of the range of his humor—the humor always busy at the other end with the impatience of timidities and precautions, and the vision and invention of essentially open-air situations. It was the possibility of the open-air situation that at last appealed to him as the cast worth staking all for—as to which, as usual, in his admirable rashnesses, he was extraordinarily justified.

“No man but myself knew all my bitterness in those days. Remember that, the next time you think I regret my exile. . . . Remember the pallid brute that lived in Skerryvore like a weevil in a biscuit.”

He found, after a wonderful, adventurous quest, the treasure island, the climatic paradise that met, that enhanced, his possibilities; and with this discovery was ushered in his completely full and rich period, the time in which—as the wondrous whimsicality and spontaneity of his correspondence testify—his genius and his character most overflowed. He had done as well for himself in his appropriation of Samoa as if he had done it for the hero of a novel, only with the complications and braveries actual and palpable. “I have no more hope in anything”—and this in the midst of magnificent production—“than a dead frog; I go into everything with a composed despair, and don’t mind—just as I always go to sea with the conviction I am to be drowned, and like it before all other pleasures.” He could go to sea as often as he liked and not be spared such hours as one of these pages vividly evokes—those of the joy of fictitious composition in an otherwise prostrating storm, amid the crash of the elements and with his grasp of his subject, but too needfully sacrificed, it might have appeared, to his clutch of seat and inkstand.

“If only I could secure a violent death, what a fine success! I wish to die in my boots; no more Land of Counterpane for me. To be drowned, to be shot, to be thrown from a horse—aye, to be hanged, rather than pass again through that slow dissolution.”

He speaks in one of the “Vailima Letters,” Mr. Colvin’s publication of 1895, to which it is one of the offices of these volumes promptly to make us return, of one of his fictions as a “long, tough yarn with some pictures of the manners of to-day in the greater world—not the shoddy, sham world of cities, clubs and colleges, but the world where men still live a man’s life.” That is distinct, and in the same letter he throws off a summary of all that, in his final phase, satisfied and bribed him, which is as significant as it is racy. His correspondent, as was inevitable now and then for his friends at home, appears to have indulged in one of those harmless pointings of the moral—as to the distant dangers he *would* court—by which we all were more or less moved to relieve ourselves of the depressed consciousness that he could do beautifully without us, and that our collective tameness was far (which indeed was distinctly the case) from forming his proper element. There is no romantic life for which something amiable has not to be sweepingly sacrificed, and of *us*, in our inevitable category, the sweep, practically, was clean.

"Your letter had the most wonderful 'I told you so' I ever heard in the course of my life. Why, you madman, I wouldn't change my present installation for any post, dignity, honor, or advantage conceivable to me. It fills the bill; I have the loveliest time. And as for wars and rumors of wars, you surely know enough of me to be aware that I like that also a thousand times better than decrepit peace in Middlesex. I do not quite like politics. I am too aristocratic, I fear, for that. God knows I don't care who I chum with; perhaps like sailors best; but to go round and sue and sneak to keep a crowd together—never."

His categories satisfied him; he had got hold of "the world where men still live a man's life"—which was not, as we have just seen, that of "cities, clubs and colleges." He was supremely suited, in short, at last—at the cost, of course, of simplifications of view that, intellectually, he failed quite exactly (it was one of his few limitations) to measure; but in a way that ministered to his rare capacity for growth, and placed in supreme relief his affinity with the universal romantic. It was not that anything could ever be, for him, plain sailing, but that, at forty, he had been able to turn his life into the fairy tale of achieving, in a climate that he somewhere describes as "an expurgated heaven," such a happy physical consciousness as he had never known. This enlarged, in every way, his career, opening the door still wider to that real puss-in-the-corner game of opposites by which we have, critically, the interest of seeing him perpetually agitated. Let me repeat that these new volumes, from the date of his definite expatriation, direct us, for the details of the picture, constantly to the "Vailima Letters;" with as constant an effect of our thanking our fortune—to say nothing of his own—that he should have had in these years a correspondent and a confidant who so beautifully drew him out. If he possessed in Mr. Sidney Colvin his literary *chargé d'affaires* at home, the ideal friend and *alter ego* on whom he could unlimitedly rest, this is a proof the more—with the general rarity of such cases—of what it was in his nature to make people wish to do for him. To Mr. Colvin he is more familiar than to any one, more whimsical and natural and, frequently, more inimitable—of all of which a just notion can be given only by abundant citation. And yet citation itself is embarrassed, with nothing to guide it but his perpetual spirits, perpetual acuteness and felicity, play of fancy and of wisdom. These things make him jump from pole to pole and fairly hum, at times, among the objects and subjects that filled his air, as a charged bee among flowers.

He is never more delightful than when he is most egotistic, most consciously charmed with something he has done.

"And the papers are some of them up to dick, and no mistake. I agree with you, the lights seem a little turned down."

When we learn that the articles alluded to are those collected in "Across the Plains," we quite assent to this impression made by them after a troubled interval, and envy the author who, in a far Pacific isle, could see "The Lantern Bearers," "A Letter to a Young Gentleman" and "*Pulvis et Umbra*" float back to him as a guarantee of his faculty and between covers constituting the book that is really to live. Stevenson's masculine wisdom, moreover, his remarkable final sanity, is always—and it was not what made least in him for happy intercourse—close to his comedy and next door to his slang.

"And however low the lights are, the stuff is true, and I believe the more effective; after all, what I wish to fight is the best fought by a rather cheerless presentation of the truth. The world must return some day to the word 'duty,' and be done with the word 'reward.' There are no rewards, and plenty duties. And the sooner a man sees that and acts upon it, like a gentleman or a fine old barbarian, the better for himself."

It would, perhaps, be difficult to quote a single paragraph giving more than this of the whole of him. But there is abundance of him in this too:

"How do journalists fetch up their drivel? . . . It has taken me two months to write 45,500 words; and, be damned to my wicked prowess, I am proud of the exploit! . . . A respectable little five-bob volume, to bloom unread in shop windows. After that I'll have a spank at fiction. And rest? I shall rest in the grave, or when I come to Italy. If only the public will continue to support me! I lost my chance not dying; there seems blooming little fear of it now. I worked close on five hours this morning; the day before, close on nine; and unless I finish myself off with this letter I'll have another hour and a half, or *aiblins twa*, before dinner. Poor man, how you must envy me as you hear of these orgies of work, and you scarce able for a letter. But Lord! Colvin, how lucky the situations are not reversed, for I have no situation, nor am fit for any. Life is a steigh brae. Here, have at Knappe, and no more clavers!"

If he talked profusely—and this is perfect talk—if he loved to talk, above all, of his work in hand, it was because, though perpetually frail, he was never inert, and did a thing, if he did it at all, with passion. He was not fit, he says, for a situation, but a situation overtook him inexorably at Vailima, and doubtless at

last, indeed, swallowed him up. His position, with differences, comparing, in some respects, smaller things to greater, and with fewer differences, after all, than likenesses, his position resembles that of Scott at Abbotsford, just as, sound, sensible and strong, on each side, in spite of the immense gift of dramatic and poetic vision, the earlier and the later man had something of a common nature. Life became bigger, for each, than the answering effort could meet, and in their death they were not divided. Stevenson's late emancipation was, after all, a fairy tale only because he himself was, in his manner, a magician. He liked to touch many matters and to shrink from none; nothing can exceed the impression we get of the things that, in these years, he dealt with, from day to day, as they came up, and the things that, as well, almost without order or relief, he planned and invented, took up and talked of and dropped, took up and talked of and carried through. Had I space to treat myself to a clue for selection from the whole record, there is nothing I should better like it to be than a tracking of his "literary opinions" and literary projects, the scattered swarm of his views, sympathies, antipathies, *obiter dicta*, as an artist—his flurries and fancies, imaginations, evocations, quick infatuations, as a teller of possible tales. Here is a whole little circle of discussion; but this is a circle in which to engage one's self at all is to be too much engulfed.

His overflow on such matters is, meanwhile, amusing enough as mere spirits and sport—interesting as it would yet be to catch as we might, at different moments, the congruity between the manner of his feeling a fable in the germ and that of his afterward handling it. There are passages, again and again, that light, strikingly, what I should call his general conscious method in his relation, were I not more tempted to call it his conscious—for that is what it seems to come to—want of method. A whole delightful letter (to Mr. Colvin, February 1, 1892) is a vivid type. - (This letter, I may mention, is independently notable for the drollery of its allusion to a sense of scandal—of all things in the world—excited in some editorial breast by "The Beach of Falesà," which leads him to the eminently pertinent remark that "this is a poison bad world for the romancer, this Anglo-Saxon world; I usually get out of it by not having any women in it at all." Then he remembers he had "The Treasure of Franchard" refused as unfit for a family magazine and feels—as well he may—"despair weigh

upon his wrists." The despair haunts him and comes out on another occasion. "Five more chapters of David. . . . All love affair; seems pretty good to me. Will it do for the young person? I don't know: since the Beach, I know nothing except that men are fools and hypocrites, and I know less of them than I was fond enough to fancy.") A part of his physiognomy, always, is the particularly salient play of his shades of feeling, the way his spirits are set off by his melancholy, and his brave conclusions by his rueful doubts.

He communicates, to his confidant, with the eagerness of a boy, in holidays, confabulating over a Christmas charade; but I remember no instance of his expressing a subject, as one may say, as a subject—hinting at what novelists mainly know, I imagine, as the determinant thing in it, the idea out of which it springs. The form, the envelope, is there with him, headforemost, as the idea; titles, names, that is, chapters, sequences, orders, while we are still asking ourselves how it was that he primarily put to his own mind what it was all to be about. He simply *felt* this, evidently, and it is always the one dumb sound, the only inarticulate thing, in all his contagious candor. He finds, none the less, in the letter to which I refer, one of the problems of the wonderful projected "*Sophia Scarlet*" "exactly a Balzac one, and I wish I had his fist—for I have already a better method—the kinetic—whereas he continually allowed himself to be led into the static." There we have him—Stevenson, not Balzac—at his most overflowing; and, after all, radiantly capable of conceiving at another moment that his "better method" would have been none at all for Balzac's vision of a subject—least of all, of *the* subject, the whole of life. Balzac's method was adapted to his notion of presentation—which we may accept, it strikes me, under the protection of what he presents. Were it not, in fine, as I may repeat, to embark in a bigger boat than would here turn round, I might note further that Stevenson has elsewhere—was disposed in general to have—too short a way with this master. There is an interesting passage in which he charges him with having never known what to leave out, a passage which has its bearing on condition of being read with due remembrance of the class of performance to which "*Le Colonel Chabert*," for instance, "*Le Curé de Tours*," "*L'Interdiction*," "*La Messe de l'Athée*" (to name but a few brief masterpieces) belong.

These, however, are comparatively small questions; *the* impression, for the reader of the later letters, is simply one of singular beauty—of deepening talent, of happier and richer expression, and, above all, of a sort of ironic, desperate gallantry, burning away, with a finer and finer fire, in a strange, alien air and only the more touching to us from his own resolute consumption, as it were, of the smoke. He had incurred great charges, he sailed a ship loaded to the brim, so that the strain under which he lived and wrought was immense; but the very grimness of it all is sunny, slangy, funny, familiar; there is as little of the effusive in his twinges of melancholy as of the priggish in his moments of moralizing. His wisdom on matters of art had sometimes, I think, its lapses, but on matters of life was really winged and inspired. He has a soundness, in this quarter, a soundness all liberal and easy and born of the manly experience, that it is a luxury to touch. There are no compunctions, nor real impatiences, for he had, in a singular degree, got what he wanted, the life absolutely discockneyfied, the situation as romantically “swagger” as if it had been an imagination made real; but his practical anxieties necessarily spin themselves finer, and it is just this production of the thing imagined that has more and more to meet them. It all hung, the situation, by *that* beautiful, golden thread, the swinging of which in the wind, as he spins it in alternate doubt and elation, we watch with much of the suspense and pity with which we sit at the serious drama. It is serious in the extreme; yet the forcing of production, in the case of a faculty so beautiful and delicate, affects us almost as the straining of a nerve or the distortion of a limb.

“I sometimes sit and yearn for anything in the nature of an income that would come in—mine has all got to be gone and fished for with the immortal mind of man. What I want is the income that really comes in of itself, while all you have to do is just to blossom and exist and sit on chairs. . . . I should probably amuse myself with works that would make your hair curl, if you had any left.”

To read over some of his happiest things, to renew one’s sense of the extraordinarily fine temper of his imagination, is to say to one’s self, “What a horse to have to ride every week to market!” We must all go to market, but the most fortunate of us, surely, are those who may drive thither, and on days not too frequent, nor by a road too rough, a ruder and homelier animal. He touches in

more than one place—and with notable beauty and real authority in that little mine of felicities, the “Letter to a Young Gentleman”—on the conscience for “frugality” which should be the artist’s finest point of honor; so that one of his complications here was, doubtless, the sense that, on this score, his position had inevitably become somewhat false. The literary romantic is by no means necessarily expensive; but of the many ways in which the practical, the active, has to be paid for, this departure from frugality would be, it is easy to conceive, not the least. And we perceive his recognizing this as he recognized everything—if not in time, then out of it; accepting inconsistency, as he always did, with the gayety of a man of courage—not being, that is, however intelligent, priggish for logic and the grocer’s book any more than for anything else. Only everything made for keeping it up; and it was a great deal to keep up; though when he throws off “The Ebb-Tide” and rises to “Catriona,” and then again to “Weir of Hermiston,” as if he could rise to almost anything, we breathe anew and look longingly forward. The latest of these letters contain such admirable things, testify so to the reach of his intelligence and vibrate so, in short, with genius and charm, that we feel him at moments not only unexhausted but replenished, and capable, perhaps, for all we know to the contrary, of new experiments and deeper notes. The intelligence is so great that he loses nothing; not a gossamer thread of the “thought of the time” that, wafted to him on the other side of the globe, may not be caught in a branch and played with; he puts such a soul into nature and such human meanings, for comedy and tragedy, into what surrounds him, however shabby or short, that he really lives in society by living in his own perceptions and generousities, or, as we say nowadays, his own atmosphere. In this atmosphere—which seems to have had the gift of abounding the more it was breathed by others—these pages somehow prompt us to see almost every object on his tropic isle bathed and refreshed.

So far, at any rate, from growing thin for want of London, he can transmit to London, or to its neighborhood, communications such as it would scarce know otherwise where to seek. A letter to his cousin, Mr. R. A. M. Stevenson, of September, 1894, touches so on all things, and, as he would himself have said, so adorns them, brimming over with its happy extravagance of thought, that, far from our feeling Vailima, in the light of it, to be out of the

world, it strikes us that the world has moved for the time to Vailima. There is world enough everywhere, he quite unconsciously shows, for the individual, the right one, to be what we call a man of it. He has, like every one not inconvenienced with the pleasant back-door of stupidity, to make his account with seeing and facing more things, seeing and facing everything, with the unrest of new impressions and ideas, the loss of the fond complacencies of youth.

"But as I go on in life, day by day, I become more of a bewildered child; I cannot get used to this world, to procreation, to heredity, to sight, to hearing; the commonest things are a burthen. The prim obliterated polite face of life, and the broad, bawdy and orgiastic—or mænadic—foundations, form a spectacle to which no habit reconciles me; and 'I could wish my days to be bound each to each' by the same open-mouthed wonder. They *are* anyway, and whether I wish it or not. . . . I remember very well your attitude to life—this conventional surface of it. You have none of that curiosity for the social stage directions, the trivial *fleccles* of the business; it is simian; but that is how the wild youth of man is captured."

The whole letter is enchanting.

"But no doubt there is something great in the half success that has attended the effort of turning into an emotional region Bald Conduct without any appeal, or almost none, to the figurative, mysterious and constitutive facts of life. Not that conduct is not constitutive, but dear! it's dreary! On the whole, conduct is better dealt with on the cast-iron 'gentleman' and duty formula, with as little fervor and poetry as possible; stoical and short."

The last letter of all, it will have been abundantly noted, has, with one of those characteristically thrown-out references to himself that were always half a whim, half a truth, and all a picture, a remarkable premonition. It is addressed to Mr. Edmund Gosse:

"It is all very well to talk of renunciation, and of course it has to be done. But for my part, give me a roaring toothache! I do like to be deceived and to dream, but I have very little use for either watching or meditation. I was not born for age. . . . I am a childless, rather bitter, very clear-eyed, blighted youth. I have, in fact, lost the path that makes it easy and natural for you to descend the hill. I am going at it straight. And where I have to go down it is a precipice. . . . You can never write another dedication that can give the same pleasure to the vanished Tusitala."

Two days later he met his end in the happiest form, by the straight, swift bolt of the gods. It was, as all his readers know, with an admirable, unfinished thing in hand, scarce a quarter written—a composition as to which his hopes were, presumably

with much justice and as they were by no means always, of the highest. Nothing is more interesting than the rich way in which, in "Weir of Hermiston" and "Catriona," the predominant imaginative Scot reasserts himself after gaps and lapses, distractions and deflections superficially extreme. There are few backward jumps, in this order, surely, more joyous and à *pieds joints*, or of a kind more interesting to a critic. The imaginative vision is hungry and tender just in proportion as the actual is otherwise beset; so that we must sigh always in vain for the quality that this purified flame, as we call it, would have been able to give the metal. And how many things, to the critic, the case suggests—how many possible reflections cluster about it and seem to take light from it! It was "romance" indeed, "Weir of Hermiston," we feel, as we see it only grow in assurance and ease as the reach to it, across all the spaces, becomes more positively artificial. The case is *literary*, with intensity, and, given the nature of the talent, only thereby the more beautiful: he embroiders in silk and silver—in defiance of climate and nature, of near every aspect, and with such another antique needle as was nowhere, least of all in those latitudes, to be bought—in the intervals of wondrous international and insular politics and of fifty material cares and complications. His special stock of association, most personal style and most unteachable trick fly away again to him like so many strayed birds to nest, each with the flutter, in its beak, of some scrap of document or legend, some fragment of picture or story, to be retouched, revarnished and reframed.

These things he does with a gusto, moreover, for which, after all, his literary treatment of the islands and the island life had ever vainly waited. Curious enough that his years of the tropics and his fraternity with the natives never drew from him any such "rendered" view as might have been looked for in advance. For the absent and vanished Scotland he *has* the image—within the limits (too narrow ones, we may perhaps judge) admitted by his particular poetic; but the law of these things, in him, was, as of many others, amusingly, conscientiously perverse. The Pacific, in which he materially delighted, made him, "descriptively," serious and even rather dry; with his own country, on the other hand, materially impossible, he was ready infinitely to play. He easily sends us back again here to our vision of his mixture. There was only one thing on earth that he loved as much as literature—which was

the total absence of it; and to the present, the immediate, whatever it was, he always made the latter offering. Samoa was susceptible of no "style"—none of that, above all, with which he was most conscious of an affinity—save the demonstration of its rightness for life; and this left the field abundantly clear for the Border, the Great North Road and the eighteenth century. I have been reading over "Catriona" and "Weir" with the purest pleasure with which we can follow a man of genius—that of seeing him abound in his own sense. In "Weir" especially, like an improvising pianist, he superabounds and revels, and his own sense, by a happy stroke, appeared likely never more fully and brightly to justify him; to have become even in some degree a new sense, with new chords and possibilities. It is the "old game," but it is the old game that he exquisitely understands. The figure of Hermiston is creative work of the highest order, those of the two Kirsties, especially that of the elder, scarce less so; and we ache for the loss of a thing which could give out such touches as the quick joy, at finding herself in falsehood, of the enamored girl whose brooding elder brother has told her that as soon as she has a lover she will begin to lie ("Will I have gotten my jo now?" she thought with secret rapture"); or a passage so richly charged with imagination as that in which the young lover recalls her as he has first seen and desired her, seated at gray of evening on an old tomb in the moorland, and unconsciously making him think, by her scrap of song, both of his mother, who sang it and whom he has lost, and

"of their common ancestors now dead, of their rude wars composed, their weapons buried with them, and of these strange changelings, their descendants, who lingered a little in their places and would soon be gone also, and perhaps sung of by others at the gloaming hour. By one of the unconscious arts of tenderness the two women were enshrined together in his memory. Tears, in that hour of sensibility, came into his eyes indifferently at the thought of either; and the girl, from being something merely bright and shapely, was caught up into the zone of things serious as life and death and his dead mother. So that, in all ways and on either side, Fate played his game artfully with this poor pair of children. The generations were prepared, the pangs were made ready, before the curtain rose on the dark drama."

It is not a tribute that Stevenson would have appreciated, but I may not forbear noting how closely such a page recalls many another in the tenderest manner of Pierre Loti. There would not, compared, be a pin to choose between them. How, we at all

events ask ourselves as we consider "Weir," could he have kept it up?—while the reason for which he didn't, reads itself back into his text as a kind of beautiful, rash divination in him that he needn't. Among prose fragments it stands quite alone, with the particular grace and sanctity of mutilation worn by the marble morsels of masterwork in another art. This and the other things, of his best, he left; but these things, lovely as, on rereading many of them at the suggestion of his Correspondence, they are, are not the whole, or more than the half, of his abiding charm. The finest papers in "Across the Plains," in "Memories and Portraits," in "*Virginibus Puerisque*," stout of substance and supremely silver of speech, have both a nobleness and a nearness that place them, for perfection and roundness, above his fictions, and that also may well remind a vulgarized generation of what, even under its nose, English prose can be. But it is bound up with his name, for our wonder and reflection, that he is something other than the author of this or that particular beautiful thing, or of all such things together. It has been his fortune (whether or no the greatest that can befall a man of letters) to have had to consent to become, by a process not purely mystic and not wholly untraceable—what shall we call it?—a Figure. Tracing is needless now, for the personality has acted and the incarnation is full. There he is—he has passed ineffaceably into happy legend. This case of the figure is of the rarest, and the honor surely of the greatest. In all our literature we can count them, sometimes with the work and sometimes without. The work has often been great and yet the figure *nil*. Johnson was one, and Goldsmith and Byron; and the two former, moreover, not in any degree, like Stevenson, in virtue of the element of grace. Was it this element that settled the business even for Byron? It seems doubtful; and the list, at all events, as we approach our own day, shortens and stops. Stevenson has it at present—may we not say?—pretty well to himself, and it is not one of the scrolls in which he least will live.

HENRY JAMES.

CONGRESS AND PARLIAMENT: A CONTRAST.

BY SYDNEY BROOKS.

AN Englishman who listened too guilelessly to the counsels of his friends in New York would never visit Congress at all. For the cultivated Easterner it seems to be part of the spice of life to run down the national legislature and scare strangers away from the enjoyment of it with gibes on its manners, intelligence and general tone; and anyone who has not been long enough in America to know that New York is its most provincial city and rarely sees beyond the Palisades, may quite easily be taken in. In this case, however, New York is more or less in line with the rest of the country. One finds its attitude of humorous contempt reproduced in almost all the States, under milder forms and from different causes, but with equal insincerity. I know of nothing more delightful in its way than the incontinent sigh of relief sent up from all parts of the United States when Congress adjourns. Hardly more flattering are the greetings which herald in the opening of a new session. "Congress will meet," I read in a Texas paper the other day, "and it will pass laws which the members hope will send each of them back to Congress. Among the members will be those who will object on the supposition that their constituents will send them back to Congress for objecting. That is about all there is to it. As the poor man is greater in numbers than the rich man, the poor man will come in for more consideration than the rich man; but all in all it is a play from the beginning of Congress to the end of it for each member to get back and draw his salary." There may, for all I know, be something in the local conditions of Galveston to give point to this outburst of acrid Asiatic mirth; but I rather suspect it of being just the expression, somewhat franker than is usual, of that merry and imperturbable cynicism which, mingling oddly with the altruism of

the race, colors the American view of politics and politicians. I was advised, if I still wished to keep my faith whole in the American brand of democracy, not to go near Washington. I was told that I should only be disappointed, that the heroic days of Congress had passed, that the great men and the great orators were gone—Tom Reed was the last of them, said everyone—and lawyers who lived on politics, and queer people from the West, and saloonkeepers who called themselves “salesmen” in the official Directory, made up the bulk of the House now-a-days.

It wanted at least the courage of one’s incredulity to persevere against such forebodings. But the reward in sheer human interest was just as great as I had hoped for. Nothing in America is quite so American as Congress, and it was the notion of spying out upon legislative Americanisms and comparing these with what I knew of the personnel and customs of the House of Commons that chiefly took me to Washington. I did not expect to find much ceremonial dignity in the House or Senate, and should indeed have been disappointed if, instead of the bare, business-like proceedings I actually watched, there had been some characterless imitation of European pomp. Nor did I look for the presence of great men or great orators, knowing that by the theory of American politics, a national legislature should be composed not of the wisest or most solid or most experienced men in the country, but simply of one’s next-door neighbor, the average citizen; knowing, too, that the committee system has virtually stifled Congress as an effective organ of debate. What I hoped to come across was the distinctive flavor of America showing itself in the smaller details of Congressional manners, bearing and procedure; and in this I was in no way disappointed.

Nevertheless, as I sat in the gallery just above the Speaker’s chair and watched the Fifty-sixth Congress assembling for its opening day’s work, it came upon me with a sort of shock that of all those three hundred and seventy legislators who were crowding the floor and gangways below me, there were barely half a dozen whom I knew even by name, and not one whom a stranger would inevitably ask to have pointed out to him. In the Senate it was different. At least a score of the members of the Upper House were men with whose careers and personalities even a casual follower of American politics could not help being familiar, and whom one was anxious to have identified. But in the House

I felt as lost as an average New Yorker would feel if you suddenly asked him to name, say, four of the thirty-four Congressmen who represent his State at Washington. And when I inquired after the real notabilities of the House, I was directed to one gentleman who had achieved fame by refusing, as I understood the matter, to wear a dress suit at the White House, and to another with the more pronounced distinction of possessing three wives. One tired after a while of studying even the heroes of these exploits, and I readily fell in with the tactful suggestion that the House was perhaps more interesting *en bloc*, than in its individual members.

The opening of a new session and the manner of choosing its presiding officer show with some accuracy how far an assembly is moved by respect for forms and usages. In England the ceremony, if not always dignified, has a certain picturesque absurdity. The Queen for some years past has given up the practice of opening Parliament in person and handed over the duty to a Royal Commission. The Commissioners in all the grace of cocked hats, scarlet and ermine robes seat themselves on a bench between the throne and the woosack in the House of Lords. A messenger is sent to the House of Commons summoning them to hear the Royal Proclamation. The messenger is an elaborately dressed official in black silk knee-breeches and the coat and ruffles of other days. "Black Rod" is his title. The door-keeper of the House seeing him approach immediately bars the door, to emphasize the fact that the Sovereign, who is supposed to be present in the person of Black Rod, has no constitutional right to demand admission to the House. Black Rod knocks three times and is allowed to enter. The door-keeper announces his arrival, and at the word all business in the House is suspended and members uncover as Black Rod advances toward the Speaker's chair, bowing thrice. The message is delivered and such members of the House as care to go—there is not room for many—follow the Chief Clerk to the bar of the Lords. The Royal Commission is read and the Commons directed to return whence they came and elect a Speaker for Her Majesty's consideration. The faithful Commons reassemble in their hall and a prearranged programme is gone through. The Chief Clerk points three fingers at the member selected to propose the Speaker, who rises and briefly nominates the man agreed upon. The Chief Clerk points again at the seconder, whose speech is equally short. The motion is put and, if there is no opposition,

and there rarely is, declared carried. The proposer and seconder escort the Speaker-elect to the chair and the House rises as its presiding officer, standing under the canopy of the chair, with one foot on the dais and the other on the topmost step leading to it, returns thanks for the honor done him. The Sergeant-at-Arms puts the mace on the table and the Leader of the House offers his congratulations, before an adjournment is made till twelve o'clock.

The ceremony is not yet quite complete. The Speaker-elect has still to receive the Queen's approval, and his chrysalis state is marked by his appearance at noon in ordinary court dress, instead of the full-bosomed wig and flowing robe that grace the perfected Speaker. Once more Black Rod summons the Commons to the Lords, there to be greeted by the Lord Chancellor and four other Lords in their robes of state. The Speaker-elect "presents himself with all humility for Her Majesty's gracious approbation." The Lord Chancellor announces that "Her Majesty does most readily approve and confirm you as their Speaker." The Speaker then makes the time-honored claim for access at all times to Her Majesty, liberty of speech in debate and freedom from arrest. A few minutes later he reappears in the House of Commons, heralded through the lobbies by official cries of "Mr. Speaker"—a cry which brings every hat off its wearer's head—and takes the chair, a duly confirmed Speaker. The business of swearing-in members is set about forthwith. The members bring with them certificates of election and hand them to the Chief Clerk. The oath is administered in batches of four or five—by the Clerk, not, as in Congress, by the Speaker—and each man after repeating it, kisses the Bible, signs the roll of Parliament and passes on to shake hands with the Speaker, becoming from that moment an indisputable M. P. It is a wearisome, unsystematic proceeding, compared with the swift dispatch of the same ceremony in Congress, and often lasts over into the second or third day of the session.

There is another function, thoroughly English in its genesis and execution, which never fails to precede by a few hours the ceremonial opening of Parliament. That is the search through the vaults of the two Houses for any would-be assassins and other maliciously disposed persons who may be lurking there. The Lord Chamberlain, one of the highest of English dignitaries, the Deputy Sergeant-at-Arms, an inspector of police, the Clerk of the Works, and four of Her Majesty's Guard of Yeomen—the latter

armed to the teeth and carrying lanterns—march solemnly through the waste of vaults, peering into every alcove and man-hole, seeking what they may find. Nothing of course ever is found, but something was found three hundred odd years ago—Guy Fawkes and his brother conspirators with their barrels of gunpowder, preparing a surprise for James I. Since then no Parliament has thought of beginning its deliberations without a rigid inspection of its underground cellars. The ceremony is gone through before each session with all possible gravity and punctiliousness. In one particular only has the ritual been changed. In the old days when the report had been received at the Lord Chamberlain's office, a horseman dashed off to Windsor or Whitehall with the assurance that the Sovereign's safety would not be endangered if Parliament were opened in person. Now the good news is sent to the Queen by telegraph.

These things may be ridiculous in themselves, but they stand for a good deal that is worth preserving. It is the absence of such usages, with their air of stateliness and ancientry, the bonds they lay upon a man to live up to the dignity of old traditions, that makes the atmospheric differences of Congress and Parliament. At the Capitol the note of unmitigated modernity is struck on the very threshold. Any one can enter who cares to, without reference to age, color or sex, present condition of clothing or previous condition of servitude. No one is on guard at the doors to inquire after your business or challenge your right to admission. Millionaire or tramp, white or black, the Capitol is yours to roam in at will, and if you can find a vacant seat in the public galleries from which to listen to the debates, you are welcome to it. No tickets, passes or credentials of any sort are asked for; you just walk straight in and sit down. Liberty can go no further. It seemed to me eminently consonant with all I had seen of America that this should be so; and if one's English notions were occasionally startled by the sight of some ragged shuffle of a man, whom no second-rate hotel would have allowed to enter its lobby, lounging about in the precincts of the national legislature, there was the feeling that his presence was more than compensated for by the system that made it possible.

Something of this infectious unrestraint had passed into the House itself, and the floor and galleries gave evidence of it. The galleries were in a particularly democratic mood. They hummed

with chat and comment—three-fourths of the occupants were women—and whenever anything on the floor seemed to strike their fancy they joined in the laughter and applause unchecked. The new Speaker received as hearty a round of hand-clapping and handkerchief-waving from the galleries as could be wished for; and there were moments in the Roberts debate when feminine sentiment on the general question of a man's owning three wives got beyond the point of passivity. The disposition of the onlookers, so far as I could gauge it, was not in the least toward reverence of the House, its members or its ways of doing things, nor yet toward irreverence—rather was it that of play-goers in a theatre, one of curiosity and pleasurable expectation—and there were several things on the floor to encourage this sense of *camaraderie* and make every one feel quite at home. As viewed from behind the Speaker's chair, the House cannot honestly be called impressive. Honorable members are seated not as in the House of Commons, along parallel lines of benches, but in curved, concentric rows, facing the Speaker. Each member has a revolving arm-chair with a spacious desk in front of it, where he can write letters and busy himself among his papers in a way that must be horribly disconcerting to an opponent in debate. Behind the chairs runs a railing hung with drapery, and between the railing and the wall is a passageway opening on to smoking-rooms, where members by simply leaving the door open, can enjoy their cigar and listen to the speeches and propagate throughout the House a pleasing odor of tobacco. Further to the right is a barber's shop, through the glass doors of which it was possible from where I sat to catch a glimpse of members under the razor. When business was dull the colored barber did not disdain to open one of the doors and, standing half in and half out of his shop, watch the proceedings of the House till they bored him.

An even more home-like feeling was encouraged by the sight of several small boys, the sons of Congressmen, sitting on their father's knees during the debates. The colored member, I was glad to see, brought his little piccaninny along. Some of these infants, tiring of the paternal lap, would climb into the nearest seat, and there explore and test to the uttermost its rotary mechanism; and the Congressman to whom the seat belonged—brimming over as all Americans are with absolute kindness toward children—would make no effort to expel the intruder, but

walk off into the smoking-room for a cigar. One urchin, I noticed, came up with his father to be sworn in, held up his little fist and took the oath of allegiance to the Constitution. Nothing in Congress fascinated me quite so much as this, except perhaps the exquisitely condescending manner in which the pages of the House led the applause at the finish of the new Speaker's address—giving him just that "friendly support" for which he had appealed to the House. These pages are a feature peculiar to Congress. In the House of Commons no one but members, the clerks at the table and the Sergeant-at-Arms is allowed to cross the bar. Messages and telegrams are handed to the nearest member and passed along the benches until they reach the member for whom they are meant. The habit of using the House as a writing room—a habit impossible in the House of Commons, where there are no desks, and forbidden anyway—makes a corps of messenger boys an obvious corollary. A member who wants a letter mailed or a message taken to a friend in the Senate, or a book fetched from the library, claps his hands as a signal, and three or four pages dart along the gangways to his seat, in eager emulation to run his errands. How much of the noise and seeming disorder of Congress is due to the banging of desk-lids and the summoning of these messenger boys, it would be hard to say. I should hazard about three-fourths.

In personal appearance Congress struck me as falling short of the high average maintained by the House of Commons, which, taken as a whole, is probably the best-dressed assembly in the world. The House of Representatives faithfully reflects the ordinary American man's carelessness of externals. I observed very closely, but could only find two members who came up to the Fifth Avenue standard; and it takes an exceptionally built man to look imposing in the ordinary Congressional costume of loose frock-coat, low cut vest, a turned-down collar with a white bow, and a derby hat. In the Senate more attention seems to be paid to these details of deportment and manners. I saw no member of the Upper House enjoying the luxury of what is known as a "dry smoke," whereas I counted at one time not less than thirteen Congressmen chewing cigars in unrestrained comfort. Nor while in the Senate had I any reason to wish, as I often had in the House of Representatives, that the New York Board of Health regulations relative to the use of the floors of cable cars and elevated trains, might be extended to the Capitol. These are small things,

but they indicate a certain laxity which no public assembly can long afford to leave unrebuked. I noticed, for instance, in the House perpetual violations of the law which forbids a man to pass between the Speaker and the member who is addressing the House. The House of Commons is punctilious to what some think an absurd degree in the observance of such points of order. If a member moves about the House with his hat on or puts even a toe beyond the line on the floor which no man may cross while speaking, cries of "Order! Order!" are heard on every side. And this is very wholesome. It may seem trivial in a given solitary instance, but it is only by ceaseless stringency in the small points of decorum that the intimacies of daily strife in a contentious and excitable body can be kept on a high plane.

I was told that as a rule the House is a disheartening place to speak in, and I could easily imagine it to be so. At the beginning of a session, when members are keen in their work, and before the novelty has worn off, I had little chance of judging what it would be like later on. But there are some obvious disadvantages in its structure and the habits of its members which must chill the most earnest orator. The House, to begin with, is an enormous hall, far larger than the House of Commons, which though it contains six hundred and seventy members, has sitting accommodation for only about three hundred. It would take a powerful voice to fill it, even if the completest silence were enforced, but one cannot be in the House long without getting the impression that even comparative quiet is hard to come at. The buzz in the galleries, the calling for the pages, who scurry up and down the aisles at top speed, the clatter of the desks and the repeated thumps of the Speaker's gavel, make up a fretful and ceaseless clamor which even the strongest lungs would contend against in vain. If it is true, as I heard charged, that Congressional oratory is tinged with extravagance, the explanation lies to hand. No man can argue at the top of his voice. A speaker who has to strain his larynx to make himself heard is certain to strain his phrases. A good deal of the effectiveness of the House of Commons as a debating organ is due to the fact that members of the two parties sit opposite to one another and within easy range. Moreover, the presence of desks and the habits they encourage are serious handicaps on the orator who desires the attention of the whole House. You cannot thunder successfully at an honorable gentleman who

is too busily engaged lolling in his seat or writing a letter, or reading a newspaper to turn round and look at you.

During the debates on the Roberts case I saw little of the state of things which I was given to understand was the ordinary condition of the House in mid-session. Members were keenly interested and gave a quiet and courteous hearing to all that was said. The speeches struck me as being rather above the level of average addresses heard in the House of Commons. They were well formed, in style and matter, and well delivered. Mr. Roberts, considering that he was speaking for the first time in a strange hall, and with the chilling sense of having three-quarters of the House against him, did remarkably well. But the interest of Congress is only half contained in the Capitol, and the visitor who wishes to see the real machinery of politics at work must make the round of the Washington hotel lobbies. It was my good fortune to be staying at the same hotel with several famous bosses, powerful beyond the dreams of Kaiser or Czar, and among them one whom I venture to call the Greatest Boss of All. Very fascinating it was to watch the great man pass from the dining-room to the lobby with his tall hat well on the back of his head, a toothpick in one corner of his mouth and an unlighted cigar in the other, settle himself comfortably in an armchair and there hold a levee of politicians and office-seekers from all over the country. Men did deference unto him as to power personified, and all the little boys in the neighborhood who had been told that if they behaved well they too might grow up to be great bosses and govern millions from the security of a hotel lobby, stood round the walls and gaped at the monarch on his throne. Nothing could be more austere democratic. And accidentally as I passed behind the Great Man's chair I heard some one remark, "He don't like it. I was there when he said it." "Was you?" asked the Great Man.

And so, leaving Republicanism to flourish as it pleased in Washington, I returned with many mingled feelings to the absolute despotism of New York.

SYDNEY BROOKS.

THE PRESENT CRISIS IN THE CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND ITS BEARINGS ON CHURCH UNITY.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR CHARLES A. BRIGGS, D.D.

THERE can be no doubt that there is a crisis in the Church of England at this time; but it is altogether probable that this crisis is not so serious as it appears to be from the statements of extreme men. This crisis, like all similar crises, has been forced to a head by rash partisans, who, without commission or qualification, except their own conceit and presumption, constituted themselves the champions of orthodoxy; but the crisis could not have come to a head if there had not been a situation of real difficulty in the Church of England. It is distressing to see the peace disturbed, and human passions rage, about the doctrine and worship of Christ's Church; but the experience of history teaches us that such crises are necessary for the advancement of the Church. It is the only way in which the attention of the whole Church can be concentrated upon a bad situation and its energy aroused and put forth for reformation. The present crisis is an inevitable result of the Oxford movement, as that was an inevitable resultant of the evolution of the Anglo-Catholic party of the Church of England since the Reformation.

The questions brought before the Anglican Archbishops for their decision, namely, the use of incense in worship, the ceremonial use of lights in processions, and the reservation of the Holy Sacrament for the sick and dying, are three questions, selected from many others, which serve the purpose of testing the whole situation, as to the use of ornaments in public worship, and as to the limitation of the use of the Holy Sacrament to the time of the celebration. They are the advanced guard of much

more serious questions which are involved in the great movement of the Anglo-Catholic party toward the restoration of the doctrine and worship of the Catholic Church of England prior to the Reformation, and thus toward reunion with the Church of Rome.

It is unfair to that party to accuse them of being Romanists in disguise, or of seeking in an underhanded and unlawful way to bring the Church of England under the dominion of the Pope. The cry "No Popery" is therefore a dishonest appeal to popular prejudice. If they were really Romanists and ready to submit to the authority of Rome, they could not possibly remain in the Church of England. Their own consciences would compel them to do as Newman and Manning did and withdraw from the Church of England and submit to the Church of Rome.

The position and aims of the Anglo-Catholic party cannot be doubted. They seek so far as possible to recover the ancient Catholic doctrines and ceremonies of the Church of England, which were put aside and discredited at the Reformation, because of certain abuses and superstitions connected with them; while they would retain all that they think good and right in the Reformation itself. They do not aim to bring the Church of England to submission to the Roman Church, but they work in the hope that both the Church of England and the Church of Rome may be reformed, by going back to the truly Catholic position of the Church before the Reformation, that they may be reunited in a truly Catholic and a truly Reformed Church.

There can be no doubt that this Anglo-Catholic party has been in the Church of England since the Reformation, and that it can claim no less names than Queen Elizabeth and Charles I., Archbishops Bancroft and Laud, and the leading prelates of the Restoration. This party has its historic right in the Church of England since the Reformation, whatever any one may say as to its present positions and claims. And the Puritan party has no call to make them uncomfortable in the Church, or to force them to choose between Catholicism and Protestantism.

The several Acts of Uniformity were made in the interests of maintaining the unity of the Church of England and of destroying every kind of schism. They were used against the Roman Catholics with great severity, because Roman Catholics recognized the supremacy of the Pope in ecclesiastical affairs. But the Anglo-Catholics during the sixteenth, seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries maintained the Supremacy of the Crown in ecclesiastical affairs, and were therefore indulged by the Crown and the prelates and were not strictly held to the Acts of Uniformity. Throughout the history of the Church of England, the standing complaint of the Puritan party has been against the crypto-Romanism which was allowed and even favored in the Church of England. At the Restoration, the Presbyterian divines of the Conference of Savoy called the attention of the bishops to many of these ceremonies, which had been tolerated and encouraged; but the prelates gave them scarcely a decent hearing. They did not attempt to put a check upon the Anglo-Catholics; they exhausted themselves in persecuting the Puritans.

There is much to be said, therefore, in favor of the plea just put forth by such divines as Gore, Scott Holland, Moberly and others, against the decision of the Archbishops as to the ceremonial use of incense and lights. They say:

"We are nevertheless compelled to regard with the gravest anxiety the rigid interpretation given in that ruling to the Act of Uniformity of 1559, and continued in 1662, an interpretation which would, we fear, go beyond the matter immediately under decision, and which does make even so minute an usage as the saying of 'Glory be to Thee, O Lord,' before the Gospel, in the strict sense, illegal.

"We humbly submit (1) that neither the Elizabethan, Jacobean, nor yet the Caroline Bishops, whether before or after 1662, considered themselves to be thus stringently confined.

"(2) That there were many important details given, which were afterward specified by rubrics in 1662, which were continuously practised, and in some cases enforced, without any rubrical direction, under the Elizabethan act.

"(3) That the common law and usage of the Church should be always considered in its place by the side of the statute law. And we most earnestly plead that, in view of the complete change of circumstances which has taken place since the passing of the Acts, and in justice to the Church engaged in an immense and many-sided work, which is bound to depend largely on enterprise and experiment, the interpretation given to the rubrics should be as wide and free as their language will reasonably permit; and that a stringent uniformity, however impartially enforced, is the last thing which the needs of the day require."*

There can be no doubt that the Crown and the prelates in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries did not pretend to enforce the Acts of Uniformity against the Anglo-Catholic party. It is a question, therefore, how far common law and usage may go as

* *Appeal to the Archbishops*, signed, by Gore, Scott Holland, Moberly and others, *Guardian*, Oct. 11, 1899, p. 1390.

over against statute law; how far the neglect to enforce a law may give rights under the law.

It seems evident that the Archbishops in their decision of July 31, 1899, have given the correct interpretation of the statute law. It is impossible to give any other decision on the grounds of law and history. All the arguments on the other side submitted before the Archbishops, and made by Canon MacColl in his book "Reformation Settlement," and by Dr. Sanday in "The Catholic Movement and the Archbishops' Decision," and others, are ingenious, plausible on the surface, fine examples of special pleading, but altogether invalid. The Archbishops weighed these arguments with the utmost care. It appears that they would have been glad to reach a less rigid interpretation of the law; but they could do no other as the chief pastors of the Church of England, when called upon by the whole Church to interpret the law. The argument that the common law of the Church should weigh over against the statute law is not a valid argument. The Church has no common law. The only law any Church has is statute law. All ecclesiastical law is canon law. Those who make this argument are misled by the usages of civil law and depart from the history of ecclesiastical law. The argument that the non-enforcement of a law against a party in the Church excuses that party for a continuance in disobedience is invalid. As Sir William Harcourt in his article in the *Times* shows, that is simply an evidence of "lawlessness in the National Church." The bishops have not used their prerogative, they have not enforced the law. As Harcourt puts it:

"They have for years shut the gates of ecclesiastical justice; they have deprived the laity of the protection which the law had provided; they have guaranteed the clergy against any penalty for any and every offense against the law of the Church, and they call this comprehension."

This is strong language; but it is substantially true. It has been a tradition among the prelates since the Reformation not to enforce the law against the Anglo-Catholic party. They did this, not in the interests of comprehension, but in the interests of the party which was always eager for the prerogatives of bishop and Crown. A change came about in modern times in the interests of comprehension. The bishops ceased to enforce the law against the Puritan party, because they saw that such enforcement was ruinous to the Church. Historically, the Acts of

Uniformity have been goads in the hands of the prelates to torment the Puritan party. As a recent writer in the *Guardian* says, they were made against the enemies of the Church, not against churchmen. But he, as others, identifies his party with the Church, and claims that the Puritan party are not true churchmen. This is not historically right. The Puritan party has as good a right in the Church as the Anglo-Catholic. However, the writer is plausibly correct, for the Acts of Uniformity have ever been used against the Puritan party. It is one of the revenges of history that, after the Puritan party had gained the same recognition from the bishops as the Anglo-Catholic party, in the interests of comprehension, the Act of Uniformity should now be turned against the Anglo-Catholic party, through an agitation promoted by extreme and self-appointed champions of Puritanism. Ever since the Act of Uniformity of Elizabeth until the close of the eighteenth century, the Puritan or Protestant party in the Church has been tormented by the Acts of Uniformity. One body after another has been compelled to abandon the Church of England, the Church of their fathers, by these Acts of Uniformity, interpreted loosely toward the Anglo-Catholics, but with rigidity and strictness toward the Protestant party. And so, as the result of these partisan interpretations, the greater part of the British nation has been excluded from the great Mother Church, and the Church of England and her daughters have become the Church of a minority of the English-speaking people. And yet a great section of the Puritan party remained in the Church of England to the present day, suffering all manner of hardships and wrongs rather than abandon the Church of their fathers. It is well, therefore, that the bishops learned to be as generous toward the Puritans as toward the Anglo-Catholics, and refrained from enforcing the law. It was disorderly, it produced a condition of lawlessness; but it was infinitely preferable to the rigorous enforcement of a bad law which for centuries had proved a constant peril to the Church.

As the Anglo-Catholic party has aimed at a reunion with Rome, the Puritan party has ever aimed at a reunion with the Protestant Churches of the Continent of Europe, with the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, and with the Non-Conforming bodies in Great Britain. This, then, has been the agonizing struggle of the Church of England: the effort (1.) to maintain the unity

of all Christians in England in the Church of England; (2.) of the Anglo-Catholic party to unite with the Church of Rome; (3.) of the Protestant party to unite with the Presbyterian and Non-Conforming communions. This struggle has increased in intensity in our times. It is involved in the tide that sweeps on toward a Reunion of Christendom. And so the crisis is upon us.

What, then, is to be the end of this struggle? Is the Act of Uniformity to be used in our generation to force a section of the Anglo-Catholic party out of the Church? Is it to be used to destroy the Church of England as a National Church and to break it up into several denominations representing the several parties? There are some who think it and who hope it, and who are striving to bring it about.

None of these things is likely to happen. The leaders and scholars of the Church of England recognize the great mistakes of the past; the mistakes of Archbishop Laud, who, in the interests of the Anglo-Catholic party, succeeded in alienating the Scottish nation from the Church of England; and of the prelates in dealing so cavalierly with the representative Presbyterian divines at the Restoration, when they had the opportunity, by reasonable concessions, to maintain the unity of the Church of England. In seeking to maintain the unity of the Church by an Act of Uniformity rigidly interpreted, they forced more than two thousand learned and pious parish ministers out of the Church of England, and became responsible for all those evils which have resulted from the separation of the Presbyterian denominations since that time. So, in the next century, it was the intolerance of the bishops which brought about the separation of the great Methodist bodies and the alienation of the Welsh nation from the Church. The leaders of the Church are not likely at this late date to reverse the policy of centuries, and at the dictation of a few ultra-Protestants, limit the comprehension of the Church on the Catholic side. It seems evident, from the statements of representative men of both the Anglo-Catholic and Puritan parties, that neither party desires to pursue the policy of exclusion. They both seek comprehension so far as it is possible. It has now become evident to all that the Act of Uniformity, strictly interpreted, makes comprehension impossible. A sufficiently lax interpretation involves lawlessness and the disorderly situation that every parish priest, if bold enough, may

do what is right in his own eyes. The Act of Uniformity is used to pinch the Anglo-Catholics to-day. But there are already signs that the extreme men among them are demanding that equal justice should be done to the Puritan party. In a few months we shall hear all manner of complaints from the Puritan party when the Act of Uniformity is applied to their irregularities also. The quicker this comes the better, for it is necessary that all parties should as soon as possible agree to a repeal of the Act of Uniformity, which has been for more than three hundred years the curse of the British nation.

It is an enormous gain that the leaders of the Anglo-Catholic party have come over to the same attitude toward the Act of Uniformity as was maintained by the great representatives of Puritanism in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. One may almost hear a Puritan Father speaking in these words of Lord Halifax:*

"What indeed is the position of the Church of England under this latest addition to her burdens? She finds herself bound hand and foot by Acts of Parliament of the reign of Elizabeth, by canons of the reign of James I., and by rubrics which have not been revised since the days of Charles II. She is imperfectly represented by a convocation which the State authorities will not allow to be reformed, and which can do nothing without legislative sanction of a Parliament which includes Jews, Quakers, Socinians, Presbyterians, Non-Conformists of every description, Agnostics and others who are hostile to the Church. She has had courts imposed upon her for the decision of questions of discipline by the sole authority of Parliament, without her consent. Her Bishops, Deans, Canons and ecclesiastical Professors are nominated by the Prime Minister, and the Church has no voice in their appointment. Every effort she makes to reform herself, or supply her needs, is thwarted by a powerful party in Parliament, on grounds avowedly hostile to the Church's well being. The opinion of the Archbishops is but a new band around the old bottles, bursting as they are with the revived life of the Church."

One cannot believe that the Puritan party in the Church of England will take any very different position from this. With the combined force of both parties, there ought to be no difficulty in doing away with the Act of Uniformity altogether, and in gaining for the Church of England the same autonomy that was won for the Church of Scotland after the British Revolution. It is quite significant that Canon Gore and others are working for a reorganization of the Church, so as to prepare it for self-government, and that they are looking for help partly to the Presbyterian

*Address before English Church Union, *Guardian*, Oct. 11, 1899, p. 1380.

Church of Scotland, and partly to the American Protestant Episcopal Church. The Protestant Episcopal Church has adopted many of the best features of Presbyterianism. The Presbyterian divines who composed the Westminster Confession and Form of Government would find the Protestant Episcopal Church, in many respects, a better type of Presbyterianism than the American Presbyterian Churches. There is, in fact, no way in which the Church of England can gain her independence save by organizing herself into representative synods. It is thus another of the revenges of history that the Anglo-Catholic party, which refused the plan proposed by Archbishop Usher and adopted by the Presbyterians at the Restoration as their proposal for accommodation with the Anglo-Catholic party, namely, the "Reduction of Episcopacy into the form of Synodical Government," should now in their most representative leaders propose this very thing themselves. What a pity it has taken two hundred years to bring this about! Baxter rightly said in 1691:

"O how little would it have cost your churchmen in 1660 and 1661 to have prevented the calamitous and dangerous divisions of this land and our common danger thereby, and the hurt that many thousand souls have received by it. And how little would it cost them yet to prevent a continuance of it?"*

Some are so perverse-minded as to suppose that the Puritan party and Presbyterians will gratify a revengeful spirit, and will obstruct the efforts of the Church of England to win autonomy under a synodical form of government. This is impossible. The Puritan party will not be like a dog in the manger. They will not go back on their own history. Whether the Puritan party is in the Church, or without it in Non-Conforming religious bodies, it matters little; they will welcome the effort of the Church of England to undo the wrongs of the past, and to remove the obstructions to Christian fellowship. The Presbyterians of Scotland, Wales and Ireland will rejoice in this movement and aid it in every way in their power. And especially will earnest, godly men in all Christian religious bodies, who are weary, as Baxter was, with the evils of disunion, be filled with holy joy and courage when they see the Church of England adopting all the essential things in government for which their Puritan fathers contended, when they see her assimilating herself to the govern-

* *Penitent Confession*, 1691.

ment of the Reformed Churches of the Continent and of Scotland. It inevitably raises the question to them, which cannot be put down, why they should not accept the historic episcopate, the then only remaining barrier on the side of Church government to the reunion of Protestants, and so at last effect the organic reunion of the Reformed Churches, the ideal of the irenic party in all the national churches since the Reformation.

It may be said that a reunion based on agreement as to Church government and discipline can hardly be effective so long as there are such serious discords as to doctrine and worship. This is quite true. But, on the other hand, it is just in these departments that the history of the Church of England has been so instructive. So far as doctrine is concerned, there is practically no difficulty in the Church of England at the present time in the way of comprehension. There are theologians who hold, maintain and freely proclaim, on the one side, all the essential doctrines of the Catholic Church before the Reformation, only rejecting ancient abuses and the supremacy of the Pope, and the dogmas proclaimed since the Reformation in the Church of Rome. It is true that they have no legal right so to do. The Articles of Religion exclude, and were designed to exclude, these very things. And yet they manage by unnatural interpretation of the Articles, or by an assertion of the superiority of Catholic tradition to the Articles, to maintain these opinions, and no bishop attempts to interfere with them. On the other hand, Protestant doctrines are held, maintained and advocated with equal freedom, even in such extreme forms as would have been regarded as unsound by the Protestant reformers. Calvinistic, Lutheran and Arminian doctrines are equally at home in the Church of England. Right or wrong, legally, historically or ideally, from whatever point of view you may regard it, that is the situation; and it is impossible at the present time to change it. From the point of view of Christian irenics, this is a wholesome situation. If there is ever to be a reunion of Christendom, comprehension in doctrine must be fully as wide as this. In this respect the Church of England is the beacon, the hope and the joy of the movement for the reunion of Christendom.

Now, it is just this situation as to doctrine that makes it practically impossible to enforce the Act of Uniformity as to worship and its ornaments and ceremonies. Those who hold the Catholic doctrine of the mass must express that doctrine in ap-

propriate ceremonies, with appropriate ornaments. Those who hold the Lutheran doctrine will also insist upon somewhat different ceremonies from those who hold the Calvinistic view. The toleration of the doctrine, the recognition of the right to hold the doctrine, necessarily involves the toleration and recognition of the right to the ceremony and ornaments which express the doctrine. On the other hand, those who hold the Calvinistic doctrine must also express that doctrine by the simplicity of the service of the Holy Communion, and by the exclusion of all but the simplest kind of ceremony and ornament. There ought to be little doubt that, historically, the Church of England is committed in its Articles and in its Book of Common Prayer to the Calvinistic view of the Holy Communion; and yet, in the ritual and the ceremonies and the ornaments, certain things are retained which are not altogether in accord with the Calvinistic view, and to these the Puritan party have objected from the beginning, and to them many object at present, although in usage they have come to have a different meaning to the children of the Puritans from what they originally had.

It is evident, therefore, that there is at present a considerable difference of usage in the Church, and still more, a great difference of interpretation of the common usage. The rigid enforcement of the Act of Uniformity would strike both parties with well-nigh equal severity. The Archbishops have interpreted the law. Will they enforce it? It is probable that there will be a general submission to it so far as the matters decided for the present, but only for the present, are concerned. It is quite possible that the law may be enforced against any who may aggressively and doggedly violate it. But certainly any and every possible excuse will be taken not to enforce the law.

And so, after the excitement has died away, the usage which has been declared unlawful will again gradually come into use; in the meanwhile the whole Church is aroused to get rid of an intolerable situation, and it will do so. So soon as the Church of England knows her own mind, Parliament will give her her will in the government and worship of the Church. The Non-Conformists of England, and the Presbyterians of Scotland and Wales, and the Roman Catholics of Ireland may take advantage of the situation to demand the redress of certain grievances. They are entitled to such redress. It is a shame that these wrongs

have so long continued. These redresses will, doubtless, be the price the Church of England will have to pay for her liberty. The Church of Wales will probably be disestablished for the same reason that the Church of Ireland was disestablished. But it is improbable that the Church of England will be disestablished. The Church of England will not be broken up into sects. It is quite true that many of the Anglo-Catholic party would prefer disestablishment to the long continuance of the present intolerable situation. The Puritan party and the great middle party will be forced to choose between disestablishment and liberty of worship to the Anglo-Catholics. There is little doubt that the liberty will be given and the establishment will be continued. It is probable that the bishops will have to pay their price and give up their seats in the House of Lords. That might be, on the whole, a blessing to the Church of England and a gain to parliamentary government in England. Every one of these things counts on the side of liberty, of comprehension, of reconciliation, and of reunion. The inevitable result of this crisis is much greater freedom, elasticity and comprehension in the worship of the Church of England. The American Church has led the way, and it may guide and help the mother Church still further in this direction. No nobler position has ever been taken than that of the House of Bishops at Chicago, when they stated the third article of the quadrilateral of Church Unity: "The two sacraments ordained by Christ himself—Baptism and the Supper of the Lord—ministered with unfailing use of Christ's words of Institution, and of the elements ordained by Him;" supplemented as it was by the statement in the Declaration "that in all things of human ordering or human choice relating to modes of worship and discipline or to traditional customs, this Church is ready in the spirit of love and humility, to forego all preferences of her own."

This ideal has been endorsed by the Lambeth Conference, and is the common platform of the Anglican Church for reunion. This platform has reconciled many to the Anglican Communion. If it is used not as a merely theoretical ideal, but as a practical working ideal, then they should endeavor to make the Church itself correspond with that ideal. Then all the difficulties of British Christianity will be solved, all the parties will be reconciled, and Catholic and Protestant, Lutheran and Calvinist,

Arminian and Scholastic, will partake together of the one holy sacrifice; and, while each will have his freedom in his own parish to use such ceremonies and ornaments and liturgy as will best express his own doctrine, he will not be offended when he partakes with his brethren in the use of other ceremonies, ornaments and liturgies. It is very desirable that the unity and peace of the Church may be realized in some such comprehensive position.

The rigid interpretation of the Act of Uniformity by the Archbishops seems to raise an insuperable obstacle in the way of Church Unity, and to threaten the rupture of the Church rather than to promise its reunion with other Churches. But it really opens the eyes of the Church of England to see the perils of the situation, and therefore initiates movements which will be fruitful in unity and peace.

CHARLES A. BRIGGS.

THE CENSUS OF 1900.

BY WILLIAM B. MERRIAM, DIRECTOR OF THE TWELFTH CENSUS.

WHILE it is undeniable that the average American citizen is enthusiastic concerning the future growth and prosperity of his country and is at times apt to indulge in more or less patriotic endeavor in this direction, it is seriously to be questioned whether the United States Marshals who took the first census of the United States, in the year 1790, had the slightest conception of what a great enumeration would mean at the approach of the dawn of the Twentieth Century. Primarily, the object of the census was to ascertain the population for the purpose of arranging an apportionment for representation in Congress. But, as the years have gone on, from a mere count of inhabitants the census has developed into a vast industrial and sociological undertaking.

For the first ten decades the census work was in charge of the head of the State Department, the United States Marshals arranging all the details and sending in the returns. In the year 1810 an attempt was made to ascertain the extent of the manufacturing industries of the country, but the results were so unsatisfactory that the inquiry was of little value. In the year 1850, however, a distinct change was made in the plan for doing the census work. The Secretary of the Interior was given charge of the whole undertaking, and a census board, consisting of the Secretary of State, the Attorney-General and the Postmaster-General, was instructed to prepare such schedules as might be necessary. The Board was further instructed to collect statistics in regard to mines, manufacturing establishments, agriculture, etc. From that date up to the present time the scope of each census has been enlarged. The most marked departure in the arrangements for collecting the manufacturing statistics was made by Gen. Francis A. Walker, one of the most eminent men

ever connected with census work. He originated the plan of withdrawing the manufacturing schedules from the enumerators in the largest cities of the Union, and of appointing special agents to gather the information required concerning manufacturing establishments in such cities. This plan resulted in securing by far the best statistics concerning industrial institutions ever before procured.

The legislation provided for the taking of the Eleventh Census involved a tremendous amount of work, more than most people appreciate; and the results, in view of the difficulties presented and the obstacles encountered, were remarkable. Mr. Porter was not appointed Superintendent until over two months after the passage of the Act, and he was pushed from the start on all sides. Congress submitted amendments to the Act just previous to the date fixed for the enumeration; and this materially added to the already overburdened schedules, and delayed their full tabulation and presentation. There were many obstacles that operated to block the project, and, in view of the numerous irritating conditions that arose, it was a miracle that the final outcome was so creditable. It is much easier to stand afar off and criticise, without a knowledge of the facts, than it is to accomplish the desired results. Mr. Porter burdened himself with a gigantic undertaking, and he is entitled to much consideration and commendation from his fellow-citizens.

The law of 1899 is a wide departure from any previous census legislation. The indications are that, in the decades that are past, as the time approached for making the required enumeration, the plan for doing the census work was always hastily devised, and thus a temporary and spasmodic atmosphere was given to the whole enterprise. It seems to have been the idea of those who shaped the census legislation in the past that the work did not need any well-defined plan, but that a large temporary force could be gathered together, and the information concerning population, agriculture and manufacturing industries and other subjects collected and reported to the country within a short space of time. The results, however, were extremely unsatisfactory to all who are really interested in a creditable piece of work. The Act under which the Twelfth Census is being operated is decidedly the best law that has ever been enacted for taking a census. The executive and statistical branches of the work are so sharply defined that it

is possible to make the individual in charge of each inquiry responsible for lack of method or tardiness in securing results.

The Director has general charge of the administration, and under him is an Assistant Director, who is a trained statistician, and to whom is assigned the general oversight of the various statisticians employed by the Bureau. Five Chief Statisticians are provided for, and a certain line of inquiry has been assigned to each one, and he is to be held responsible for his particular branch of the work. Each Chief Statistician has been selected for his well-known ability in handling the particular subject assigned him, each one having a reputation for capacity and thoroughness in his special line of inquiry. The Act creating the Bureau, for the first time in the history of census legislation, prescribes absolutely a limited time in which to finish certain branches of work. Two years have been allowed for gathering, tabulating, printing and binding the statistics relating to the four most important subjects with which the census deals, namely, population, vital statistics, agriculture, and manufacturing industries. The time required for completing and publishing the Census Reports of 1890 was something like seven years. It seems a herculean undertaking to accomplish in two years a task which required seven years in the last census. However, if it is a possible thing, it will be done within the time prescribed.

It is estimated that, for the purpose of transferring the enumerators' sheets to cards, and of counting the same by means of the Hollerith machines, at least twenty-eight hundred people will be employed at one time. To secure a clerical force capable of doing the work, a system of examination was inaugurated in Washington during the early part of the year, and has been in operation up to the present date, and is likely to continue for some months to come; part of the examinations are being held in Washington and part in various sections of the country. The examinations are largely in subjects intimately connected with the census work. Thus far about one-half of the people applying have failed to pass the prescribed examination. There has been more or less criticism, upon the part of different papers throughout the country, in regard to this plan of selecting the clerical force. The indications at this time are that the persons who have been appointed from an eligible list made up in this manner will prove to be excellent clerks. The plan of competitive examinations

has not been adopted, as it was not deemed practicable to examine the large number who would naturally desire to be considered if competitive examinations were held; and the Bureau has not the necessary machinery at hand, nor would it be of any special advantage, to undertake to collect the clerical force in this way.

The plan heretofore in use for making the enumeration by means of supervisors will be pursued in this census. Nearly three hundred supervisors, the number allotted by law, have been selected to take charge of the work in the various census districts throughout the country, and to designate suitable persons to act as enumerators and make the proper returns to the Census Office. Much of the work of the office will depend upon the Supervisors and the promptness with which they make returns. It is hoped that by appointing them early there will be ample time to instruct them in their duties, and to give them the fullest insight into the labors that will be required of them. They are expected to submit to this office lists of the enumerators who will be required in their respective districts; the total number needed to do the work will be about fifty thousand men. This office will endeavor, through the Supervisors, to instruct the enumerators in their immediate line of work, so as to secure the most reliable returns. It is the great weakness in census work that the Director is compelled to collect men to do important service who are to be only temporarily employed. Useful and capable men are not willing to leave places of a permanent character to accept positions that will last but a few days.

In order to complete the work within the allotted time and in a proper manner, it was deemed absolutely necessary to secure a building large enough to accommodate the enormous force which will be employed. It has been the plan, heretofore, in taking the census, to do the work in different buildings, and in some cases the work was done away from Washington, thus making it impossible to handle efficiently the large number of people required. The Superintendent of the last census was compelled to scatter his force among nine or ten buildings, which made it impossible to obtain the best results. The Census Office, after all, is nothing but a great statistical bureau, and in the employment of so large a force it is necessary to pursue the same general tactics of administration as are usually observed in industrial institutions. From the best possible *data*, it was determined that at least 2,800

to 3,000 clerks, messengers and other employees would be required to do the preliminary work, and to complete and finish the undertaking within the two years prescribed by law. It was determined, therefore, to make arrangements with some of the capitalists of the city of Washington to provide a building such as the necessities warranted. It may be stated, in passing, that it was thought essential to have not only an administrative building, which might be set aside for the Director, the Assistant Director and the various members of the official staff, but also that there should be large rooms which would contain space enough for the clerks who are to tabulate the returns.

The executive or administrative portion of the building will be two stories high. The main building will contain space for the clerks, vaults for storing the schedules, engine rooms, and printing department.

The large space in the single-story part of the building has been divided into two separate rooms; each of these rooms will hold about one thousand clerks. Between these two rooms will be the fire-proof vault above referred to, and also a room for storing the cards which are to be used in connection with the tabulating machine. There will be about 100,000,000 of these cards. It is proposed to employ about one thousand clerks in transferring *data* from enumerators' sheets to cards about three by six inches in size. This is done by first preparing a card for each person enumerated, showing all the characteristics of such person. The cards used for this purpose are printed with letters and symbols so arranged that by punching holes in the proper spaces we get the following information regarding each individual—race, sex, color, age, conjugal condition, birth-place of person, of father, mother, years in the United States, occupation, school attendance, etc. These cards, though only 7-1000 of an inch in thickness, would form a stack, if piled one on another, about nine miles high, and they will weigh about two hundred tons.

This transcript from the original returns of the enumerator to the punched card will be done with small machines, something like typewriters, called keyboard punchers. About one thousand of these will be used, and the entire work of transcribing the 75,000,000 or more individual records will be done in about one hundred working days, or nearly four months.

These punched record cards are then counted, or tabulated, in

the electrical tabulating machines. These machines are provided with a circuit-closing device, into which the cards are rapidly fed one by one. The holes in the card control the electric circuits through a number of counters, which will, as desired, count the simple facts as to the number of males; females, etc., or the most complicated combination which the statistician may ask for. After the cards for a given district are thus passed through the tabulating machine, we know the number of native-born, white males of voting age, the number of white children under five years of age born in this country with both parents native-born, or the number of such children with one or both parents foreign-born, or any other information contained in the enumerators' sheet which the statistician desires tabulated. In short, it is only necessary for the statistician to decide upon the information wanted, and for the electrician to make the proper connection from the counters and relays to the circuit-controlling device into which the cards are fed. The methods employed for checking the proper workings of the machines are ingenious and interesting. If the card is not completely punched, or not properly fed to the machine, or is placed upside down, or if some item has been overlooked, or, in fact, if everything is not all right, the machine refuses to work, and the card is rejected. Neither will the machine work if the circuit-controlling device is operated without a card in place. Such a machine also has the advantage that it will not make mistakes because it is tired or does not feel well, or because the weather is warm, or by reason of the thousand and one causes which will upset the human machine.

At least eight hundred clerks and messengers will be employed to tabulate properly the results derived from the punching machines. There will be, in addition, about five hundred clerks employed by the various statisticians and by the Appointment and Disbursing Division. The purpose now is to move into the new building soon after the first of January. The administrative portion of the building only will be occupied at that time. The main body of the clerks will not be put into service until about July 1, 1900, when the whole force will be marshalled for the work expected of it.

The printing office will also require quite a large force. The absolute necessity of having no delay with the printing and binding of the volumes necessary in order to carry out the general plan,

makes it requisite that the Bureau should have its own printing office, and it is confidently believed that facilities of this kind will result in materially hastening the publication of the results. Very few have the slightest idea of the enormous amount of material and printing required for the preliminary work in connection with the Census Bureau. Recently an order was given for the paper on which to print the documents for the Agricultural, Population and Manufacturing Division schedules. It was found that there would be needed for these particular branches more than 8,500,000 schedules. For the entire work 25,000,000 will be required. All of these schedules will have to be printed at the Government Printing Office, and be ready for packing so as to be forwarded to the Supervisors early in the coming year.

Such is, briefly, the plan outlined for carrying on what is called the administrative branch of the work.

The general scheme for the collection of the statistical information will be the important part of the inquiry, and it is being prepared more particularly under the staff of statisticians provided for in the Census Act. Statisticians, like physicians, do not always agree upon methods, and, while it is believed that the men who are selected for this work are the very best that can be obtained anywhere in this or any other country, there will probably be more or less criticism, upon the part of theoretical statisticians in different parts of the United States, on the plans adopted for obtaining the desired results. It is believed, however, that the methods which will be finally agreed upon will meet with the approval of the great number of men who give thoughtful attention to this particular branch of this great undertaking.

One of the chief difficulties in census work is the fact that the office has been merely temporary in character. At the close of each census the entire force has been relieved from service and scattered over the country. With the enactment of each law the Superintendent has had to select, in a short time, an entirely new and untrained force, with the exception, perhaps, of a few chiefs of division who had obtained employment in other departments of the Government, after severing their connection with the Census Bureau. This is the condition of affairs which confronts the officials in charge of the Twelfth Census, and it is one of the most serious obstacles with which we have to contend. It is impossible to obtain experienced help in the short time that is

allowed for testing the merits of each individual. Men are selected, as a rule, to do important work by reason of ability and long experience, and organization is of slow growth. We are compelled, in making up this force, to take hundreds of people about whose character, temperament and ability we have but very slight knowledge. Increased expense is incurred by reason of the rapidity with which the force is gathered. It would seem that if a permanent Census Bureau, or a Bureau of Statistics, were authorized, it would prevent these difficulties. Comparisons of the results of one census with those of another can only be satisfactorily obtained by having a uniform practice or plan of taking each particular census.

Under the Act creating the Twelfth Census Bureau, as remarked above, the four chief subjects, population, vital statistics, agriculture, and manufactures, will have to be completed within two years from June, 1900, and these will be known as the "Census Reports." As soon as the statistics under these heads have been completed, the Bureau is required to take up a great variety of special subjects, among which are the following—the insane, feeble-minded, deaf, dumb and blind; crimes, pauperism and benevolence, social statistics of cities; public indebtedness, valuation, and expenditure; electric light and power, telephone, and telegraph business, transportation by water, express business, and street railway, and mines and mining. These, when published, will be denominated "Special Census Reports."

The average American is, of course, very much interested in the number of our population, and especially so if he lives in a new town in the West, where growing cities offer inducements to new settlers and enhance the sale of town lots. It is not improbable that many of our citizens will be doomed to disappointment when the figures are announced. The distinguished statistician, Mr. Mulhall, in an interesting article in the October number of the REVIEW, estimates our population at 77,300,000. It is possible that he is correct, but it would seem by reason of the decrease in immigration, more particularly since 1893, that we shall hardly obtain the figure that he named. I should say that from seventy-three to seventy-four million is the utmost that we can reasonably expect. Let us trust, however, that Mr. Mulhall is right in his assumption.

While it is interesting to us to know that our country has

increased in population, a very important feature of this census will be the results of the inquiries concerning the agricultural and manufacturing industries of the country; and our commercial importance, as far as the other nations of the earth are concerned, must be judged by the information obtained concerning these sources of national wealth. It is confidently expected that the coming enumeration in these two important fields will show enormous growth, and will astonish, by their magnitude, the great trading nations of the civilized world. Over one hundred years of constitutional government finds the nation in the highest industrial condition known in its history.

The census, taken at the dawn of the Twentieth Century, marks the greatest epoch in our national life. The age of iron has come to a climax with a force almost dynamic. The world has witnessed the golden age of Augustus, the silver age of Elizabeth, the era of great wars and of wonderful progress in the arts and sciences; but as the Nineteenth Century culminates, behold! the age of iron and steam and electricity, telegraphs, sewing machines, telephones, automobiles; an age which is devoted to material development, to the accumulation of wealth and the up-building of vast enterprises, and which hails the advent of the uncrowned king of commerce, the consolidation of great corporate interests. High-water mark in our commercial and industrial life has been attained, and to that fact the vast enumeration to be taken next year will add its testimony. The work of the Twelfth Census will mark the industrial growth of the nation and be another mile-post in its marvelous history.

We contemplate with great content the evidence of material prosperity, and we pardon the good-natured and hopeful patriot who, in his civic pride, waxes enthusiastic over the substantial acquisitions to the wealth of the Republic. But there are some further inquiries to be made by the Census Bureau, which, when the figures are finally tabulated, may cause us to reflect whether, in our desire for "bigness," we are not rather losing than gaining in the higher attributes of national life, which, after all has been said and done, are the chief corner-stones upon which the fabric of the Government, if it is to last, must rest. In the enthusiasm incident to the wonderful commercial advancement that is likely to be shown as the century closes, ought we not to remember that there is much in our national existence which ought to receive

the thoughtful consideration of all patriotic citizens? Will, or will not, the special inquiries into the subjects more nearly related to our moral and intellectual life reveal tendencies that are detrimental to a loftier national existence? I do not pretend to answer that question, but it is well worth a serious thought. In the mad scramble for wealth, are the duties of citizenship neglected and a less pronounced interest shown in the establishing of a high standard of public service? Will the *data* concerning religious bodies show a marked increase in the number interested in church organizations? Will the inquiry concerning benevolent and charitable institutions demonstrate increasing solicitude for suffering humanity, which seems to be ever present in its most accentuated form as daily good fortune is nearest at hand? Tables will be printed showing our educational status, as indicated by our public school system and by our large universities. Undoubtedly, the end of the century will show extraordinary facilities for obtaining what we call an education, and the further fact that the number accepting the generous gifts of the State in this regard is on the increase. But will there be any evidence that the extraordinary opportunities offered to the young of the nation have furthered our advancement in public morals and set a higher standard of citizenship? We have much to reckon with connected with our method of life as a nation, as we approach the portals of the Twentieth Century; and, while congratulating ourselves that the most generous gifts have been vouchsafed to us, it is well to remember that a grand and enduring citizenship must rest upon something besides mere wealth. It must rest, if it is to endure, upon the moral and intellectual character of the masses as its corner-stone; and the real lover of his country is he who realizes and practises those virtues which result in a higher standard of national life.

May the great count of 1900 surpass all its predecessors, not only in exhibiting the magnitude of our earthly possessions, but in demonstrating as well that we have eclipsed all former periods in our history in attaining the higher moral standard absolutely essential to the permanency of the Republic.

WILLIAM R. MERRIAM.

SIR REDVERS BULLER:

A CHARACTER STUDY.

BY EDMUND GOSSE.

THERE is no stronger man in the British Empire to-day than the illustrious soldier to whom has been given the charge of our forces in South Africa. Strength is popular among us, and roughness is looked at by the majority of men as the necessary appanage of strength. Around the name of Sir Redvers Buller, accordingly, a persistent legend has arisen, encouraged by certain superficial qualities of his own, which represents him as a martinet, "rough and tough," like Major Joey Bagstock, a mere iron instrument of warfare, from whom it would be extravagant to expect any of the agreeable virtues. To read the complacent descriptions of him in a hundred newspapers, one would imagine him to be something between a bull and a battering-ram; "a silent, saturnine, bloodthirsty man," one of his admirers calls him. A second remarks that "one never thinks of Buller apart from his profession." A third, ardently appreciating his genius, sighs that "it is a pity that he does not succeed in attracting as much affection as he does respect and admiration." To one who has the privilege of knowing Sir Redvers Buller in a strictly non-official capacity, there is something preposterous in these exaggerations of his decisive manner, his forthrightness, his abrupt and blunt address. One is tempted to combat this blood-and-iron legend, and to portray the man as he seems to his friends.

Those who can "never think of Buller apart from his profession" cannot be aware that, with the exception of Lord Wolseley, not one of our great living soldiers has so much to interest him outside his military work as Sir Redvers Buller has. Most of our leading generals cannot be thought of, detached from the army. But if Lord Wolseley had never become a soldier he might

very well to-day have been Regius Professor of History at Oxford or Cambridge; while Sir Redvers Buller would certainly have been a very active county magistrate, and probably Minister for Agriculture in a Unionist Cabinet. After 1881, when he was disgusted with the action of Mr. Gladstone, Buller could hardly be dissuaded from throwing up his commission. To a friend who used with him the argument that, if he did so, his occupation would be gone, he replied: "No; I have other things to look to when I cease to be a soldier. You forget how many interests I have." This is a side of his character which is little known, and it is to this that I desire to draw attention.

In the first place, then, those who regard Sir Redvers Buller as a sort of mechanical engine of war, with no thought in his head but of fighting, should be told that this typical soldier springs from an entirely unmilitary family. He is the Squire of Downes, and, as his ancestors have been in a long line, the head of a large Cornish and Devonshire clan of landed gentlemen, identified for centuries with West-country farming and sport. His father, Mr. James Wentworth Buller, was a prominent figure in his day, a man universally respected in the County of Devonshire, which he long represented in Parliament, and in which he spent his whole life in the midst of his tenants. Mr. Buller was a distinguished scholar of Oxford, no sportsman, devoted to literature and art, but, above all, to his civic duties as a country gentleman and a magistrate. He married the daughter of Lord Henry Howard, and Mrs. Buller shared his cultivated tastes, read the same books as he, diffused over the same circle a kindred influence of refinement. This couple, who lived at Downes in a sort of patriarchal state, were the parents of fourteen children, eight sons and six daughters, Sir Redvers being the second son.

From this couple sprang in the next generation a family of strong, sport-loving, farm-loving sons, of whom Sir Redvers was the only soldier. With him the army instinct is not hereditary, but quite individual. He was born to be a leader of fighting men, as others are born to be poets or astronomers. Moreover, until, in 1876, his eldest brother died, he had the salutary position of a cadet in the family. Conscious of immense force and ambition, he was obliged by circumstances to look around for the best mode of developing his powers. Had he been the eldest son of Mr. J. W. Buller, it is extremely unlikely that he would have

found his business in war at all. And it is important to point out that, while the personal element in his genius is, of course, predominant to-day—while, that is to say, it would be an affectation to speak of him as anything but pre-eminently a soldier—the element of his old life in Devonshire still remains at the base of Sir Redvers Buller's experience and shapes the non-official part of his character. To show in what way they act will be the object of these pages. I wish to emphasize that this "silent, saturnine, bloodthirsty" soldier of the Jingo legend is really a genial county gentleman and a man of refined intellectual culture. In the South African war the Zulus had various names for Sir Redvers Buller; they called him "the Steam Engine," because he was always rushing out of unexpected places, and "the Brother of the Devil," because he led to so much bereavement in their families. These names are good enough for Zulus, and perhaps for a large portion of the English public, but they cannot satisfy Sir Redvers's personal friends.

Those who only know Sir Redvers Buller in his capacity as a soldier must form an incomplete conception of him. He is a very different person in Devonshire and in Pall-Mall. On his Downes estate there is not a blade of grass that he has not watched, not a cottage that he has not planned, not a laborer whom he has not known from a boy. What Sir Redvers really enjoys most, next to starting off upon a campaign at short notice, is the life of a country squire. As a lad he was always in the open air, neglecting his books a good deal, but learning steadily and eagerly in the classes of the *école buissonnière*. He spent his early days at Downes among the farm-laborers, with the woodman, the blacksmith and the carpenter, and before he went to Eton he had managed to pick up a knowledge of many technical things, connected with these occupations, so thorough that it has remained with him ever since. Mingled with this and in complete harmony with it was a passion for hunting, always in those days of a rough and provincial kind. But it was with the Tremlett hounds that Sir Redvers Buller learned that firm seat in the saddle which has served him so well in his wild campaigns. His soldiers have often expressed surprise at his practical knowledge. For instance, in the Zulu War a gun-wagon got jambed in being taken through a deep defile. When the manœuvre seemed hopeless, Sir Redvers got down and showed how the thing was to be done. The men

could not help expressing amazement. "Oh!" replied the General, "it is only a knack. I learned it from watching the woodmen in the Devonshire lanes when I was a boy."

Sir Redvers Buller's life in the West, of which we never hear anything in London, would be enough to exhaust the energy of some ambitious men. He is untiring in his efforts to improve his land and he does not disdain to be the chief citizen of his little ancient borough of Crediton. He takes an astonishing interest in the affairs of the town. He is Chairman of its School Board, one of the twelve Governors of its Church, and administrator of most of its local charities. When he was extremely busy as Adjutant-General of the British Army, he always made time to go down west to important town-meetings. In consequence he is regarded with great respect and affection in Crediton, while his popularity is unbounded. It is based on his reputation for sympathy and justice, on the long experience of his straightforwardness. The townspeople know that he will never promise to do more than he can perform, and they realize that he is one of themselves, that he thoroughly understands them. Crediton is almost comically proud of Sir Redvers. A mild old man loitering about the church-porch the other day was asked if the Squire was a favorite. "A favorite here? Well, all I can tell you is that if any fellow were to say a word in Crediton against the General, we should rise like one man, and knock him down."

All this dates further back than Sir Redvers's connection with the army. He was sent very early to a hard, rough school in Devonshire, where, as he sometimes says, he "was grounded, at the butt end of a whip, in the Bible," but where he gained little else that was worth learning. And then followed Eton, where he was happy, but with his own pursuits, and where he specially distinguished himself neither in games nor lessons. It was at Eton, and toward the end of his school life, that he determined quite independently to go into the army. But just before joining his regiment he very nearly put an end to everything. He was up in a tree in the woods at Downes, lopping, when he cut his right leg so severely that the Devonshire doctor declared it must be amputated or else he would die. Redvers Buller stoutly replied that he would rather die with two legs than live with one, and he was eventually cured. It has, however, slightly hampered his movements and made him a little less agile than he would otherwise be.

With this exception, Sir Redvers Buller has (so far) lived a charmed life; with all his reckless daring in so many most dangerous campaigns, he has never been seriously wounded.

His eminence as a soldier and the entrancing nature of his military responsibilities have never killed or even scotched the country gentleman in Sir Redvers. He has always been a good cross-country rider, and he hunts still. He was out with the hounds last winter, and he is as fond of hunting and goes as well as ever he did. His keenness for every kind of sport is as remarkable as ever; he seems to palpitate with it. He used to be very fond of racing, and although I fancy that he has given this up, he never fails to be present at the Derby, and he is careful to fit in with his innumerable engagements as many race-meetings as he can. Everybody in the West admits that he is a first-rate judge of a horse. Until lately he was a prominent exhibitor of Red Devon cattle at Smithfield, and very successful. Although, for some reason, he seems to show no longer, he continues to take the greatest interest in his cattle. His fruit-houses and orchards occupy a great deal of his attention. He is eloquent about pines, positively boastful about melons. His special fad is apples; there is a new orchard at Downes, entirely stocked by him with selected apple trees imported from France. That this is no trivial interest may be shown by the fact that the whole of the money awarded to him for his successes in the Zulu War was spent on the improvement of his fruit-houses and orchards.

So much for the natural activities of the man who "can scarcely be thought of apart from his profession as a soldier." I proceed, with some diffidence, to describe what one observes of his mental interests.

In the first place, although Sir Redvers Buller is pre-eminently a man of action, one notes in him that instinctive respect for the life of thought and study which sits so gracefully on a great soldier. This attitude of deference to the intellectual life is, I doubt not, a heritage from the traditions of the family life at Downes, where scholarship and the harmony of books were held in high respect. It is obvious that he himself has never had leisure for any very close or consecutive reading. But I have observed that he has the knack of tearing the heart out of anything that he does read, and in an amazingly short space of time. He is certainly a good instinctive judge of literature, and if he has

not had opportunity to cultivate his judgment with a very wide selection, where his mind does alight is almost always on the purest and richest writers. For poetry he has, perhaps, no particular aptitude. When he was a boy he must have learned Scott's verse-romances by heart, for he retains pages of them still. But in prose Sir Redvers's tastes are definite. Two English classics travel about with him in miniature editions; he never starts on a campaign without Bacon's "Essays" and the "Essays of Elia."

An interesting feature of Sir Redvers Buller's attitude to literature is his special interest in the expression of the individual character of the author. One would suppose that he would read entirely for the matter, but I have been surprised to notice that it always seems to be the manner that attracts him. Among the moderns he has, I think, three prime favorites, Ruskin, Matthew Arnold and George Meredith, and in each he is particularly observant of the style. The penchant of Sir Redvers for Ruskin is so marked as to be quite a feature of his mental life. He was induced to read "Modern Painters" when he was very young, and he has preserved a lively enthusiasm for this author. The only trace of anything like bibliomania to be met with in Sir Redvers Buller's library is the care with which he has brought together a rather large collection of the early editions of Ruskin. He is not a great novel-reader, and I have heard him say that he always begins at the end. He is not, as one might suppose, attracted by hairbreadth adventures and a boisterous plot, but he prefers delicate ingenuities of psychology and a scrupulous style. He has even a certain weakness for sentiment in a story.

At Downes there exists a fine library, originally collected by a Buller of a hundred and fifty years ago, and continued by successive squires, particularly Mr. J. W. Buller. In this library Sir Redvers has from youth taken a peculiar interest, and has added to it all its most modern ornaments. Whenever he can find time, he is to be discovered inspecting and rearranging the volumes, and searching for gaps, which are to be promptly filled. The annex, in which all the recent books are, was constructed by himself out of a dining-room, and while he was making this part of his library he placed all the shelves and arranged the books with his own hands. As I have said, his own tastes lie in the direction of the higher class of *belles-lettres*, but there were left to Downes the scientific and philosophical books of a younger brother, a bequest

which greatly added to the value of the collection. This brother, who never recovered from being half-eaten by a tiger in India, was a man of very remarkable intellectual powers. There can be no question that Sir Redvers possesses, in a marked degree, the love of books, although his life has been too full of action to permit him to indulge it.

The fine arts have always attracted Sir Redvers Buller. He was an early lover of the Barbizon School, and has been abreast of the wave of taste on several occasions. He soon picks up the elements of any order of connoisseurship, and has, at one time or another, been a collector himself. In this kind of occupation, certain qualities make themselves emphatically felt. Sir Redvers would not be the great general that he is, if his eye were not exquisitely trained to observe. He declares that this is the result in him of patient labor, that he had to learn to see. But the faculty of close and keen observation must have been native with him. Those who think of him only as "the stern, grim soldier" may be diverted to know that on social occasions his eye misses nothing, and disdains not to describe, if necessary, the details of a woman's dress. I have observed him to be particularly sensitive to color. This faculty is but one manipulation of a mind the genius of which lies in great part in its orderly arrangement, its absolute sureness of movement. He is very fond of urging on young men the cultivation of the eye, which he thinks can be deliberately studied and mastered even when there is no natural gift for it. This may, however, be doubted. In all Sir Redvers's personal tastes, I think that a leaning to the great style may be traced. In literature he prefers the masters of language; in music his predilections are classical; among modern artists, while he valued the conversation of Millais and Boehm, his most intimate friend was Leighton, in whose attitude toward art and life he seemed to find particular satisfaction.

It is in his social relations that Sir Redvers Buller has been, as it seems to his friends, most oddly misconceived. This "silent, saturnine man" is not silent at all in company that he likes, and his geniality is often radiant. He is certainly formidable in approach, but those who are bold enough to advance discover that the lions are chained. He can be very trenchant and even fierce, but the blunt mood passes in a moment, and it leaves no wound behind it. Sir Redvers Buller is full of good humor, and, under-

neath a sort of truculence or roughness, there are funds of kindly nature. His reputation for silence arises, perhaps, from his disinclination to be floated on the stream of disconnected chat which so often passes for conversation. He likes to concentrate his mind, and certainly he appears to the best advantage as a talker when he is called upon to give a definite opinion on a particular subject. I think I have noticed that he likes to be so directly appealed to. His advice is always clear and fresh, practical in its bearing, and illuminated by a twinkling humor. On matters of conduct he is just and yet indulgent, often extremely severe, but never either crabbed or vindictive.

He has a singular art in telling his friends their faults without grieving them, and without seeming to take upon himself the rôle of a censor. This I regard as one of the most remarkable of his minor qualities. Without inflicting the least offense, he gives other people a window through which they look and perceive their own defects. One of the most eminent of living generals, a very old friend, is in the habit of saying, "Buller's company is very good for me; he tells me my faults, and I keep near him, just as the old ladies like to live near a cemetery, that I may remember my latter end."

This humor, which pervades his whole attitude of spirit, carries him over all conversational difficulties of this kind. What might else be taken as a reproof is put in such a pithy form that the victim must be a fool indeed if he does not receive it in good part.

All through his life, Buller's first idea has been to do thoroughly whatever he had in hand to do. This has given him the reputation which he possesses of a glutton for work, in and out of season. But this legend he repels, and to people who reproach him with it, he is in the habit of saying: "I do not slave half as much at my work as you do at your play." With this intense concentration on his business, he yet is delightfully lazy. "Oh!" he said only the other day, "I can loaf, on occasion, with the best of you!" It is sometimes noticed that after a spell of exceptionally heavy responsibility Sir Redvers Buller is entirely lazy for a little while; sitting gazing into the fire in winter or lying on the grass in summer. But these intervals never last long. He has lately become a fisherman, and after his close work at the War Office a year or two ago, he gave himself up keenly to salmon

fishng in Sutherlandshire, and talks of returning to it season by season.

The physical endurance of Sir Redvers is proverbial. As I write these words he is on the point of entering his sixty-first year, yet in mind and body alike he has all the elasticity of youth. No one would dream of calling him an elderly man. This youthfulness of spirit makes him a pleasant companion; and friends much younger in years are encouraged to be natural in his presence. I think that the discordant accounts of Sir Redvers Buller's behavior in the society of men—some representing him as bluff and taciturn, others as singularly genial and open in speech—may be accounted for by a simple formula. He has a fellow-feeling with, and will come out to and meet half way, any man who is interested in doing definite things. He does not demand tastes similar to his own, but he must have reality of some sort. If he fails to find it, he is silent and perhaps harsh. He is really—for all his character as a "martinet"—very indulgent; I have heard him contradict people, but never snub them. Young men who have the advantage of his company in the country, in hunting or shooting with him, always find him geniality itself. And he has another very human side. He feels the infection of youth. He will enter, heart and soul, into a party of young people, marshal their entertainments for them, and even take a world of pains in coaching them for private theatricals. On these occasions he seems to have no other aim in life; he becomes the most juvenile of the juvenile.

There is no doubt that his extraordinary prestige in the English army comes not merely from the illustrious courage and skill of Sir Redvers Buller, but from an almost superstitious confidence which he awakens. Even those who have never seen him believe in him from almost every point of view. He has contrived to make people consider him infallible. Mr. Leveson Gower once asked Lord Welby, with anxiety, "Who superintends the wine cellar of Grillon's Club?" "Why, Buller," was the reply. "Well," said Mr. Leveson Gower, with a gesture of relief, "I don't know anything about military matters, but I am quite sure that Buller must be a real judge of wine." This was but an expression of the instinct which made the demoralized and hunted soldiers in the Soudan smile with satisfaction when they heard he was coming. "There's — old Buller," they said. "Now we shall be all right

again." He gains this reputation, which now amounts almost to that of a fetish, by the serene determination with which he sets about his work. In "The Tragic Comedians" Mr. George Meredith has a phrase literally hammered out to fit Sir Redvers Buller: "The sense of power in him was leonine enough to promise the forcing of a way, whithersoever the path." Sir Redvers has been known to admit, with a little touch of remorse, that it is a fault with him that when he thinks a thing ought to be done he admits no obstacle in the way of its completion.

Once, at a dinner party, a discussion arose as to the relative merits of the Biblical military heroes and of modern generals. Some one, who took the antique side, quoted Joshua as an instance of a soldier the like of whom could not be matched in modern history. Mr. Gladstone, in his vehement way, took this up at once. "Joshua! Joshua!" he exclaimed. "Why, Joshua couldn't hold a candle to Redvers Buller as a leader of men!" This was the more valuable a tribute, in that Sir Redvers was never a supporter or much of an admirer of Mr. Gladstone. But this is the impression the general makes with his imperturbable and cheery force. Just after the bad Fenian times in Ireland, the Government sent him over to Kerry, where everything was being dissolved into anarchy. He found the police force utterly demoralized, without a leader, without loyalty, without a plan. Within a single fortnight they had all rallied round him, and one man expressed the general feeling in declaring, "There's not a policeman in the County of Kerry who would not lay down his life for Sir Redvers." This was the quality which struck General Hawley at the end of the ten years when Redvers Buller had no active service, after the Chinese War. Hawley was miserable with the idea that for want of opportunity such an astounding gift of leadership might be lost to the British army. It is, in fact, not generally known that, toward the end of this time, just as Wolseley, struck with his usefulness, was determining to employ him in the Red River Expedition, Sir Redvers had almost made up his mind to send in his papers and take up the career of a backwoodsman in the wilds of Canada. From this misfortune, at least, the frontier troubles saved the unconscious English nation.

If, finally, one is to try to define what strikes one as the central feature of Sir Redvers Buller's individuality, one is tempted to

say that it is his keen appreciation of life in all its bearings. There is no more highly organized creature to be found in the range of the seven seas. One is reminded of what Ruskin says of the really well-equipped man: "A gentleman's first characteristic is that fineness of structure in the body which renders it capable of the most delicate sensation; and of structure in the mind which renders it capable of the most delicate sympathies—one may say, simply, 'fineness of nature.' This is, of course, compatible with heroic bodily strength and mental firmness; in fact, heroic strength is not conceivable without such delicacy." There is not a facet of experience that Sir Redvers Buller has not touched; one would conjecture that from every encounter with life he had come back conquering and to conquer. He sometimes says, "The only thing to do is to keep right on," and this march forward is an instinctive movement which makes him admired by many, and perhaps dreaded by not a few. He is never in a state of real quiescence. Somebody said once to him, immediately after his arrival after long perambulation, "I believe that if the truth were known, you would like to start off again to-morrow." "You are quite mistaken," Sir Redvers replied; "I should like to start off to-night." He likes color and light and form, and perceives them with an apprehension that is extraordinarily quick.

It is impossible to describe him as he appears to his friends without touching, however lightly, on sides of character which are too essential to be left unmentioned, and yet too private to be emphasized. But those who know this "saturnine, bloodthirsty martinet" best will certainly think a portrait of him incomplete which does not suggest his sensitive refinement, his chivalrous feeling for women, his deep religious humility. A friend, who understands him as few do, says to me: "Whatever you omit, you must say how tender he is, only you must explain that he never lets you lean upon him, but only stands by you and teaches you to support yourself." The legends of his brusquerie, we shall all be agreed in declaring, start in the first instance from a certain shyness never entirely conquered. When he first came back in glory from the Zulu War, the people in Exeter could not spare him the kind infliction of a banquet. Somebody who saw him at it said that he looked like a captive, suffering agonies of nostalgia, while his exuberant captors were triumphing and drinking deep. "Not here, O Apollo, are haunts meet for thee," we may say to him

with justice; or we might prove the propriety of his presence at that feast, by quoting against him another of his own familiar dicta: "If there are two courses of action open to you, always choose the disagreeable. It is sure to be the right one."

In this brief attempt at a portrait of our famous general in mufti, I have avoided, of course, the repetition of those public features in him which are like the scarlet coat, the plume, the belted sword. In these days, when he is the central figure of our living history, upon which a million eyes are anxiously fixed, there is no need for me to dwell upon what every one is repeating and what I am particularly ill-fitted to describe. For recapitulations of Sir Redvers Buller's campaigns and prowess in the field, I shall certainly not be called upon. Nor, if he were in England and at peace, or if his fame were not now so transcendent that he has become the broadest public property, should I venture to discuss in any form or any place a man who takes so little pleasure in every species of publicity. But the occasion is exceptional, and I am weary of seeing one side only, and that the most superficial, of his multiform character presented to the world. This is my excuse for attempting a sketch of *Monsieur le généralissime intime*—of Sir Redvers Buller as he appears to his friends.

One word more. The foregoing pages have been read by Lady Audrey Buller, without whose encouragement and co-operation I could not have dared to compose them. But these last lines she will not see until they are published, and I must seize the opportunity they offer me by reminding my readers of what England owes to her also. While her husband leads our armies in South Africa, she sits, not in her country home, but in the midst of the soldiers at Aldershot, superintending the administration of the fund for the widows and orphans. There, in my judgment, she presents as sympathetic a figure as the events of to-day supply to us—the centre of a benevolent activity which finds its reward, I hope, in removing her thoughts from her own anxieties. And I believe that our American friends will hold the devoted philanthropy of the wife scarcely less interesting than the heroism of the husband. "They also serve who only stand and wait."

EDMUND GOSSE.

THE ERIE CANAL AND TRANSPORTATION.

BY EDWARD P. NORTH, MEMBER OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF
CIVIL ENGINEERS.

TRANSPORTATION in its great service to mankind, and as administered in this country, may be regarded as the most successful of all applications of labor-saving machinery, one which eliminates as far as possible the disadvantages of position, and so reduces the cost of exchanging property as to give the largest reward to the producer and the maximum product to the consumer, with the result that both, having greater net gains, can increase the capital necessary for further labor-saving machinery.

The most beneficent labor-saving appliances and the greatest contributors to increased capital and the improved condition of mankind, since the power of steam has been employed in production, have been the canal and railway developments in England and, later, the relatively free railroad building, with the improvement of toll-free waterways, in this country.

Unfortunately, a full conviction of the great truths of classical political economy carries with it a necessity of obscuring the fact that the entire cost of transportation must be distributed in some ratio between the producer and consumer. This fact could not be enunciated as among those immediately and intuitively known by the best minds, or the plan for enriching the world by transporting its raw produce to one locality for manufacture and bringing the finished product back would be seen to have less potentiality of wealth than a perpetual motion machine.

Under the necessities of science, the mediæval theory that transportation was only valuable for the tolls that could be exacted has not received the disapprobation from our best thought that it merits; and great statesmen and publicists are still more profoundly impressed by the wealth of Tadmor than by the industrial history of Holland in the seventeenth century, of England in the first half, and of the United States and Germany in the last half of this century.

In spite of well-established theories, it is now seen that the advantages of transportation, either to the public at large or to particular localities, do not lie in the amount of tolls that can be pinched from passing merchandise, but in the fact that the relative cheapness of assembling the raw materials for manufacture and distributing the finished products determines the position of great industries, wealth and world power, though wealth leaves a country more slowly than its industries. Cheap transportation also presents the additional advantage that it encourages the production of bulky and low valued goods which would be prohibited by high freight rates.

The power of Holland, which enabled her to drain Philip's gold and divert the carrying trade of Portugal, was based on the cheap transportation afforded by the mouths of the Rhine and Maas. Thiers said that it took only fifty years, Louis XIV. and Cromwell's Navigation Act, to debase this power. At the commencement of this century, England was better served per square mile by canals than this country was by railroads in 1850; and, up to about 1870, she had the cheapest internal transportation of any country. At that time, the great industrial powers were England, France and the United States, and few thought it possible she could lose her supremacy. But England has not materially reduced freight rates since she adopted free trade. It is said to cost more per mile to get a charter through Parliament than to build a mile of prairie railroad. Every canal, navigable water course and harbor is in the hands of a corporation or trust, and tolls are charged. Her manufacturers now pay a higher rate for assembling their raw materials than the manufacturers of any other country; and, according to Lionel B. Wells, only 18.5 per cent. of her freight is foreign. In 1870 our freight rates were falling below England's, and we took the first place as the world's servant. Now England is fighting with Germany, which is enlarging its waterways, to retain the second place, with a fight with Russia for the third place in sight; for the power of invested capital in England is too strong to allow her to build either larger and toll-free canals or competing railways.*

It was, doubtless, a full mental adhesion to the older com-

* Mulhall gives the following as the average freight rates in cents in the countries mentioned; viz:

United States.....	0.8	Holland.....	1.58	Belgium.....	1.60
Germany.....	1.64	France.....	2.20	Russia.....	2.40
Italy.....	2.50	United Kingdom.....	2.80		

mercial theory that inspired two substantially identical replies to the circular letter of the Committee on Canals of New York State, asking the probable effect of a ship canal on the commerce of New York: one from a moulder of the youthful mind in a neighboring institution of higher education, the other from a purveyor of convictions to those of more mature age, viz.: "A ship canal would put an end to the transshipment of goods at New York and lessen, rather than increase, the commerce of the metropolis. . . . I should suppose the interests of the State would be injured rather than benefited by a ship canal;" and, "It would seem that such a canal could not be expected to be of any special advantage to the port of New York, since vessels going through it could readily pass on through that port to their further destination." It should be noted that the ship canal proposed would carry 24,000,000 tons, while the present canal contributes some 3,000,000 tons to our commerce.

The canals of New York have been of great service to the City and the State of New York and to the country. When the Erie Canal was opened for through traffic, in 1825, boats of sixty tons superseded wagons of one to one and a quarter tons. The cost of freight between Buffalo and Albany fell from \$100 to \$10 per ton. The consequent increase in traffic and wealth justified an enlargement, commenced in 1836, whereby boats of 240 tons burden replaced those of 60 tons, and canal freights fell to three dollars per ton; it also developed the commercial confidence necessary for the construction of the New York Central line and the Erie Railroad.

Transportation by the canals of the State was so relatively cheap that the State was able to collect tolls aggregating nearly \$135,000,000 on the merchandise transported, or about 1.5 per cent. on its value. In addition to direct income, which more than returned the cost of the canals, they developed along their banks manufacturing centres and the richest and most intelligent rural population in the world, encouraged emigration and brought the produce of the West to the docks of New York, making that city, with the aid of its natural advantages, the largest exporting and importing port of the country. And they so concentrated the main lines of railroads on the Bay of New York that it has become the cheapest point in the world for assembling the raw materials for manufacture and distributing the finished products. There is

no other place that has equalled it, either in the value of goods produced or in wages paid.

Although boats of more than 240 tons capacity cannot yet pass through the Erie Canal, it carried nearly its maximum tonnage until about 1880. Up to 1850 or 1855, the maximum through train load on the New York Central was 200 tons, or less than a canal boat load. Now trains carrying over 2,000 tons, or more than eight boat loads, do not call for newspaper notice, and no one can safely say that train loads of 3,000 tons are not probable. Until 1880 the canal was the great director of heavy freight traffic; express freight and passengers followed its line. At the last mentioned date, freight-train loads began to approximate 1,000 tons, and the decline in the value of the canal as a freight carrier was rapid. Canal freights have shrunk to about half of what they then were. The Erie Canal cannot be called an efficient director of freights at present. It teases rather than controls railroad freights, and any quotation of statements made by the late Albert Fink as to the influence of the canal on freight rates, however pertinent to the conditions of 1880, are now misleading; they do, however, apply to the opening of lake traffic.

In 1865, Dean Richmond, then President of the New York Central Railroad, refused to co-operate in a raid on the canal, saying that he would rather help to make it two feet deeper, since it was an aid to the railroad. Now an authority not prominently connected with railroads advises that the Erie Canal should be closed. An expenditure for repairs and lock tending of nearly six and a half million dollars, or 21.74 cents per ton moved, during the seven years ending with 1896—an expenditure under which the canals so deteriorated that they were likely to become closed in ten years—may justify the advice, unless the Erie Canal can be restored to public service, by so increasing its capacity that boats carrying at least twice as much as any probable railroad train, can navigate it with speed and convenience.

It is desirable, not only for the city and State of New York, but for all countries consuming either raw or manufactured products, that we should have through the present centres of population, production and consumption in New York a channel of distribution so ample and convenient that, as far as sound judgment can foresee, the minimum freight rates shall be charged

and, generally, the resistance to transportation shall be less on it than on any other conceivable route between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic.

This can be done only by a canal of such cross section as to pass readily the largest boats navigating or likely to navigate the lakes. It would give every farmer in the West two or three cents more for his grain and increase his purchases from New York city. It would restore the central part of the State to the relative prosperity of fifty years ago, triple if not quadruple the traffic of the port of New York, and perpetuate its supremacy as a manufacturing and commercial centre.

Elevator interests oppose to such a contribution to the wealth of the country, a scheme analogous to what the people of Buffalo and New York, forty-five years ago, were denouncing as the Erie "pie shop" policy, because that Pennsylvania town insisted on a break of gauge that it might realize transfer profits.

The decline in the service rendered by water courses of small or shallow cross-section is not peculiar to the State of New York. Both in this country and in Europe, small water courses are being abandoned or disused; but any reference to this fact not including the relation between the capacity of the boats usable on such waterways and that of competing railroad trains evinces either ignorance of the governing factor in the case or carelessness in statement. Von Regierungs und Baurath Sympher shows the influence of large and small waterways on traffic in a late paper on the increase of traffic on German waterways. During the twenty years ending with 1895, the traffic on the smaller waterways has increased by 36 per cent.; on the seven large ones by 236 per cent. In the same time the traffic on the French waterways has increased by 92 per cent. The larger German waterways carry boats of about 800 tons, and the French interior navigation is limited, except on the Seine and Rhone, to boats of 300 tons. The largest German traffic is on the Rhine between Kehl and the frontier of Holland. The improvement of the Main between Frankfort and Mainz is of interest, both because it is an example of sound German engineering and it has added materially to the traffic of the Rhine. The low water depth of the Main was two and a half feet, and its traffic was decreasing until 1883, when its depth was increased to seven and a quarter feet, although the governing depth of the Rhine below its mouth was

only six feet. The result has been an increase in the annual tonnage from about 150,000 to 1,500,000 tons. Concurrently the railroad freight of Frankfort has almost doubled.

Deepening the St. Lawrence below Montreal from eleven to twenty-seven and a half feet, combined with present operations to secure thirty-five feet, has resulted in increasing the tonnage of the port by 750 per cent. since 1853.

Our St. Mary's Falls Canal, generally called the "Soo," connecting Lake Superior with the Lower Lakes, has added greatly to the comfort and convenience of mankind. It was opened in 1855 under a State charter, having two lift docks, with eleven and a half feet on their mitre sills; tolls were charged at an average rate of four cents per registered ton until 1880, when its traffic was 1,734,890 tons. In 1881, a single lift lock with seventeen feet in its mitre sills was opened by the general Government, and the canal was free from tolls. Three years later, when 2,997,837 tons passed, 89 per cent. of the traffic was carried in vessels of too great draft for the old locks.

In 1890 the tonnage through this canal exceeded that through the Suez, which carries the traffic between the Pacific coasts of Asia and Africa on the one hand, and Europe and the Atlantic coast on the other. Since 1895 the tonnage passing the Soo has been more than double that through the Suez Canal.

In 1895 the Canadian lock, with twenty feet, and in 1896 another American lock, with twenty-one feet on its mitre sills, were opened. This is called the Poe lock, after the late General O. M. Poe, who, in spite of the protests of those owning what with larger channels would become small boats, successfully advocated the larger lock, and the twenty-foot channel through the lakes. From 1855 to the present time the lake channels have been deepened from nine and a half to twenty feet.

For the last twelve years the Government engineers in charge of the canal have, with the kindly co-operation of the Canadian authorities, kept statistics of the tonnage, value, distance transported, and cost of transportation, of the freight carried past the Soo. The figures for the twelve years are: 144,077,891 tons, valued at \$1,705,009,823, carried an average distance of 827 miles, at a cost of \$133,838,729, or an average rate of 1.123 mills per ton mile. The average value of the freight, which has varied by years from \$13.83 to \$10.59, was \$11.14, and the lake carriers

received 7.85 per cent. of this value for transportation. The yearly rates have varied from 2.3 mills per ton mile in 1887 to .79 of a mill for 1898. As the Canadian lock was not opened until September 9, 1895, it will be satisfactory to state that the average of the rates for the nine years ending with 1895 was 1.89 mills, as against .87 of a mill for the three succeeding years.

During the time under consideration, railroad freights have been higher than lake freights, and have not fallen so fast; and the cost of an equal amount of ton-mileage at railroad rates would have been over one thousand million dollars, or 60.32 per cent. of the value of the goods transported; a percentage which would have prevented the production of three-quarters of the freight marketed. The difference between the two sums, \$894,596,789, is not the full measure of the beneficence bestowed on the people of this country by that improved waterway. It is to be measured by the value of this freightage when prepared for consumption, which would much more than double the last figures.

For the three years since the deeper locks have been in use, the average assumed difference between lake and railroad costs has been \$117,115,262, which is equivalent to an annual dividend of 36.5 per cent. on the total appropriations by the Government for all improvements of rivers and harbors. It has been objected to such benefits as accrue from public improvements of our waterways, that they cause us to look on the Government as a giver of gifts, but it will immediately appear that a Government which has no higher aspirations than to conserve the sordid holdings of those too selfish to put their capital into productive enterprises, has no excuse for existence.

In this place it may be said of the Nicaragua Canal, that no one, even to convince himself, can seriously argue that the traffic between the Atlantic and Gulf coasts of this country and its ports on the Pacific can be measured by that out of Lake Superior, or even by the forty million tons of freight that passed Detroit in 1898, or that the saving per unit of freight would be less. The Nicaragua Canal, as giving us the shortest practicable water route, should be built by the United States and maintained free from toll.* The great traffic through that canal will be a coasting traffic and under our flag, as is 98 per cent. of that through

* For the three years ending with 1897 the tolls collected on the Suez Canal have averaged \$1.92 per net registered ton passing. The yearly average is nearly \$16,000,000

the Soo. And where Americans conduct the traffic, the service will be performed at the minimum cost. The wisdom of depriving American interests of three or four hundred million dollars a year for an indefinite period on the plea that ten per cent. on half of this sum may possibly be saved in the original outlay is at least questionable.

As our parasitic class thinks it does a service to the capital invested in railroads by denouncing river and harbor bills, an effort has been made to discover the effect of the low lake-freight rates on both the tributary roads and those which at the same time are fed by them and compete with them. The result is as shown in the accompanying table. Too much labor was involved in an effort to trace the capital, net earnings, etc., of the roads northwest of Chicago, so only the mileage is given, and its relation to the total mileage in the country. For the trunk lines it has been possible to present the necessary figures since 1870. As Mr. John P. Meany, the editor of "Poor's Manual," has been kind enough to either check or furnish the figures employed, the table may be accepted as free from errors, due either to ignorance or an excessive trust in a theory.

	Net registered tonnage through the Soo.	Miles of railroad in Mich- igan, Wisconsin and Minnesota.	Percentage of total.	Miles in Dakota, Montana and Idaho.	Percentage of total.	Stocks and bonds of N. Y. & H. R., L. S. & M. S. M. C. Erie, Penn., & P. Ft. W. & C. R. Rds.	Per cent. of net earnings.	Ton mileage.	Freight earnings.	Average ton mile rate. Cents.
							1 = 1,000,000			
1855	105,296	757	3.5							
1870	690,826	4,235	7.9							
1881	2,082,757	11,117	10.6	2,136	2.0	\$436,523,095	6.93	3,798.2	\$60,542,437	1.59
1898	18,622,754	20,733	11.1	9,617	5.2	663,637,725	7.35	12,199.3	93,958,750	0.78
						1,054,922,566	5.22	23,777.9	128,911,069	0.54

It will be seen that neither in Michigan nor in any State west of it has the water traffic injured railroad building. Nor has the healthy development of capital by the trunk lines been arrested. The ton mile rate has fallen, so that one dollar which in 1870 would transport a ton 62.9 miles would carry it 128.2 miles in 1881, and 185.2 miles in 1898. In other words, about 66 cents out of each dollar expended for freight in 1870 remains to

be divided between producer and consumer in 1898, or the length of haul may be three times as long.

These rates have been forced down partly by the competition of the water route, and partly by the larger volume of freight offered through the increased wealth and production due to the lower rates. But it would be as fallacious to say that the freight earnings for 1898 would have been four hundred and sixty-seven, instead of one hundred and twenty-nine, million dollars if the rate of 1870 had been maintained, as to claim that, if our railroads had collected the rates current in England, they would have earned over three thousand million, instead of less than nine hundred million dollars, as they did. Notwithstanding its great wealth, the country is not rich enough to pay the British rate for transportation. It cannot, however, be disputed that, during the twenty-nine years mentioned, the interest on capital invested in railroads has fallen, and though the study is not as exhaustive as desirable, it shows that the fall has not been as great as in other businesses, and it will probably be thought sufficient to clear the river and harbor bills from any more serious charge in the interest of capital invested in railroads than causing some trouble to railroad managers. This is different from the generally received view, but that is based on a failure to notice that bankrupt roads generally do not have their traffic developed by ample waterways.

Inadequate water courses are now losing traffic or being abandoned. Ship canals are being built and planned, and in this country, Germany, Russia and France the cross-sections of navigable ways are increased, that wealth may be augmented by cheaper transportation. And though no other traffic route concentrates as great a trade as that of Detroit River, namely, 40,000,000 tons—two-thirds of which, it is estimated, is raw material on its way to an increase of value through the expenditure of further labor—a large party in the State of New York insists, with a former Superintendent of Public Works, that: "It is clearly evident that the duty of the Legislature will be to provide the means for the construction of the largest possible canal, intended for the navigation of boats of such construction as will be able to navigate the inland waters of this State, discharging and receiving their cargoes at Buffalo and New York, or the other intermediate points."

This has been the practice for seventy-three years. Two transfers, one at Buffalo and the other at New York, have been maintained. In a report made in 1896 by a board of Government engineers, it is stated that "the cost of once unloading and reloading a cargo of coal would carry it, at the rates of 1894, 291 miles on the Erie Canal, or 946 miles on the lakes." This is about equal to the distance between Chicago and Buffalo for the lakes, and would land eastbound freight half way between Little Falls and Schenectady for the canals. Of course, such transfer charges prohibit the vast volume of freight passing Detroit entering this State for manufacture. In the meantime, the farming lands in the centre of the State are being depopulated through the lack of local markets, and in the twenty years ending with 1890 the population of Rochester, Syracuse, Rome and Utica, cities on a waterway of small cross-section, increased by only 93.5 per cent., while that of Buffalo, Cleveland, Detroit and Chicago, cities on a waterway of large cross-sections, increased by 209 per cent. And the heads of Seneca and Cayuga lakes, which are as near to one-half of the coal produced in Pennsylvania as Erie, and as near to 60 per cent. of this coal as Cleveland, could be made great manufacturing and shipping points in the service of Lake Ontario and St. Lawrence ports, as well as of this country, but are now undisturbed by prosperity.

The provision that boats shall receive and discharge their cargoes at Buffalo and New York shuts all but three out of the forty million tons passing Detroit from access to New York by water carriage; it decreases the value of all raw material produced west of Buffalo, without increasing the value of that produced east of that point; it increases the cost of finished products to all who are reached by our commerce; it impedes the investment of capital and employment of labor in the State, thereby diminishing its resources, and it does not help the railroads. The continued maintenance of two toll gates in this State, that the few may receive large gains from handling the minimum amount of merchandise, to the loss of the many, is a commercial outrage, and we have to go back to the revenue reforms of the Rhine barons for an analogue.

Public attention has never been effectively called to the relations between manufacturing and commerce at the port of New York. The following figures are given to the nearest

million dollars. The census of 1890 shows that the value of manufactured products in the old City of New York was \$777. In Greater New York, with Jersey City, Hoboken and Newark, it was \$1,201, and the wages paid in manufacturing in the above cities was \$335. For the fiscal year 1890, the foreign commerce of this country was \$1,647; exports, \$858; imports, \$789. For the port of New York, exports were \$348, imports \$516; total, \$864. It will be seen that the value of manufactures produced on what may be called the Bay of New York was about three-quarters of that of the total foreign commerce of the country, and the wages paid nearly equalled the value of exports from the port.

This spring the Hon. Joseph Nimmo, Jr., estimated the value of manufactured products in the old City of New York at \$1,000, and if this estimate is correct and industry has increased proportionately over the whole area, the value of manufactured products must be for this year \$1,546, and the payment of wages \$431, or decidedly greater than the value of imports received at this port in 1898. If, as economists say, commodities exchange for commodities, the factories on the Bay of New York are worth more to the farmers of this country than the markets of the whole world outside of the United States.

The relation between the factories in the area mentioned and the commerce of the port or the country is not so easily obtained, but a valuable approximation can be reached. The total foreign trade of the United States for the fiscal year of 1898, the figures representing the nearest million as before, was \$1,847, viz.: Imports \$616, domestic exports \$1,210, foreign exports \$21. Of the exports of domestic merchandise \$921, or 24.1 per cent., were classed as manufactures. The foreign commerce of this port was \$848, viz.: Imports \$402; domestic exports \$437, foreign exports \$8. Neither the exports nor imports are classified by ports, but through the kindness of Collector Bidwell and the statistical staff at the Custom House, it may be said that the value of articles in classes "B" and "C," viz., "articles in crude condition, which enter into the various processes of domestic industry," and "articles wholly or partially manufactured for use as materials in the manufactures and mechanics arts," imported in 1898, was \$149, or 37 per cent. of the port's imports. If the \$28 worth of various cloths, which generally have a further increase of value given them before use, is added, we will have 44

per cent. as the proportion of the port's imports dependent on manufactures.

The value of articles of domestic make exported from this port in 1898, which appear to be fairly included in classes "B" and "C," was \$155, or 35.5 per cent. of total domestic exports. The value of all breadstuffs, \$100, or 22.8 per cent., and the value of grain \$74, or 17 per cent. of the exports. Thus it seems that approximately, \$333, or 39.6 per cent., of the foreign trade of the port of New York was directly contributed by local and tributary manufacturing industries.

Efforts to maintain the present stricture between the 40,000,-000 tons of freight passing Detroit and the probable 70,000,000 tons of shipping, domestic and foreign, in the harbor of New York, as well as efforts to have any improvement limited to such size as will require a continuance of transfers, are not only inimical to the interests of the State, which could and should manufacture as much per mile front of a competent canal as is manufactured on an equal frontage on the Sound in Connecticut and Rhode Island, but are inimical to the largest and most productive interests of the city and its neighborhood. The influence of allied capital, which is making money, over public and legislative opinion is illustrated by the fact that although State Engineer Sweet read a widely discussed paper before the American Society of Civil Engineers in 1884, advocating a radical enlargement of the Erie Canal, the State has not yet appropriated one cent to establish the probable cost of such an addition to its wealth.

Lately a Deep Waterways Commission has been appointed to report on routes between the Great Lakes and the Atlantic. As the Venetians joined the Turks in the sixteenth century to oppose the exhibition of Portuguese Christianity in the Orient, that their profits on an expensive trade route might be retained, some power has joined the Canadians in enacting that the people of the United States shall pay for surveys and a report that, as far as it is effective, cuts out from the advantage of an improved waterway the two hundred and fifteen miles between Tonawanda and Rome, the Commission not feeling at liberty to ride over this portion of the canal in a steam launch offered by the State Engineer, and offers the commerce that sweeps by Detroit the advantages of an easy descent to Montreal, or the necessity of

locking up one hundred and sixty feet from Lake Ontario to Rome. Instead of a canal fed from Lake Erie, descending continuously to the Hudson and discharging a copious supply of water into that stream, it is proposed to construct an aqueduct to feed the Rome level. The realization of this scheme would require the rearrangement and reconstruction of all trunk lines south of the St. Lawrence. The Senators and Representatives of the State of New York seem to be holding the garments of those engaged in the transaction.

Considering the growing tendency on the part of State Railroad Commissioners to restrict competitive railroad building, it is quite possible that the City of New York may find a differential on package freight, as well as on grain, enforced against its commerce with no possibility of redress, or effective threat of retaliation by building a competing road.

Some assertions made by advocates of the present state of canal transportation may be noticed:

I. "The cost will be prohibitive." The most obstructive estimate of cost known is \$250,000,000. This is five and three-quarter cents out of every dollar of assessed value in the State. A forty-year bond at 3 or even $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on this proportion of our wealth should not permanently enfeeble the State.

II. "Traffic can be conducted at less cost in a small or shallow canal than in one of greater size." Acceptance of this thesis requires that one should believe that the smaller the channel the less is the friction. Nor is it true that small boats in a tow are as objectionable as weak cars in a freight train. Small and large boats are towed together without injury on all streams of large traffic.

III. "Steamers cannot be successfully used both on the ocean and lakes." The assertion is ventured that it would be impossible to find a steamship builder in the world who would stand up before three of his fellows and say that he could not build a successful boat for service in both shallow and deep, in fresh and salt water.

EDWARD P. NORTH.

THE IMPERIAL GALLERY OF THE HERMITAGE.

III.

BY CLAUDE PHILLIPS.

NOT the least sensible loss sustained by England when the Walpole collection was carried off by Russia was that of the unique series of seven finished sketches in oils, all from Rubens's own brush, giving the designs for the triumphal arches and temporary decorations erected upon the solemn entry into Antwerp of the Cardinal-Infant, Don Fernando de Austria, only brother of Philip IV. of Spain, after the victory over the Swedes at Nordlingen. The remaining sketches belonging to the same series are to be found in English and other private collections, and in the Museum of Antwerp. Nowhere is the wonderful facility and decision, the inexhaustible fertility of the master, more victoriously displayed. But to return for a moment to the domain of sacred art, in which several things of importance remain to be noticed. In many ways the most beautiful of all Rubens's Madonnas is the "Virgin and Child" (painted about 1515), which was acquired from the Crozat collection. Both in this piece, and in a similar but much inferior "Virgin and Child" which subsequently entered the Hermitage from the Galitzyne collection, the model is Isabelle Brant, as later on it will almost invariably be Hélène Fourment. The Crozat picture shows the Madonna in a brilliant red robe with a blue mantle lined with mauve-pink. The picture is marked by an unusual tenderness and naïveté throughout, especially beautiful being the caressing and trustful action of the fair-haired child Christ as He affectionately strokes the cheek of the Virgin. Somewhat unusual for this period is the little shirt of white linen in which He is clothed, and this suggests that the work may have originally been destined for nuns.

"The Virgin Presenting a Cope to St. Ildefonso" is the sketch, or rather the finished design, for one of the most famous works of Rubens—the great altarpiece painted in or about 1632, at the command of the Archduchess Isabella Clara Eugenia, for the chapel of St. Ildefonso in the Church of St. Jacques at Brussels, and now one of the chief glories of the Imperial Gallery at Vienna. Here, much as in the remarkable sketch for the "Elevation of the Cross," in the collection of Captain Holford at Dorchester House, we find the artist painting on one unbroken surface the composition of which he will subsequently, with the inevitable alterations and suppressions, make a triptych. The "Head of a Franciscan Monk" serves to recall one of the most genuine inspirations of Rubens, the "St. Francis Receiving the Stigmata" of the Cologne Museum—a picture which would enjoy a much higher celebrity were it placed in a gallery more frequented by the ordinary traveller. The St. Petersburg head is evidently—as M. de Somof points out in his catalogue—a life-study for the figure of the saint in ecstasy in the great canvas just mentioned. A quieter but a more penetrating pathos informs those works of Rubens which illustrate the legend of the gentle St. Francis than is discoverable in the flamboyant and splendid pages, in which, with a passion genuine and ardent of its kind, yet for all that superficial, he has depicted the Passion of Christ. His "Death of St. Francis" in the Antwerp Gallery is in many important respects his master-work in the domain of sacred art. A Walpole picture is also the sumptuous full-length of Hélène Fourment, the exceeding beauty of the execution in which entitles it to be considered one of the very finest—if not, indeed, the finest—of all the avowed portraits of Rubens's second spouse. The already exuberant charms of the youthful lady, the worship of whose very earthly loveliness filled too great a place in the last ten years of his life, are much more reticently displayed than in such portrait-studies—of extraordinary *intimité*—as the "Hélène Fourment in a Pelisse" of the Vienna Gallery and the wholly undraped "Andromeda" which from the Blenheim collection has passed to Berlin. As in the portraits at The Hague and Munich, as well as in the two renowned canvases which, coming from Blenheim, now occupy places of honor in Baron Alphonse de Rothschild's Paris residence, Hélène stands forth the Flemish lady of well-defined position, attired with exceeding mag-

nificence, yet with a certain moderation controlling splendor. She has evidently been trained by her illustrious consort to support by her dress and demeanor his own artistic and official dignity, while displaying to the utmost advantage the beauty of which he is to be to the very end the willing slave. Apt as are all women in such matters, she has, moreover, learnt her lesson well.

Some of Van Dyck's very finest work is at the Hermitage, and it may safely be said that nowhere is the exquisite accomplishment in every successive phase of his technique, or the aristocratic charm of his manner, more convincingly impressed upon the beholder. In thus acknowledging the unsurpassed beauty of the group of Van Dycks at the Hermitage, one need not be unmindful of the noble series of portraits to be found both at Munich and at Cassel, of the altarpieces and works of sacred art at Antwerp and elsewhere in Flanders, of the magnificent portraits and pieces in several styles at Madrid, of the vast riches in this direction of the Louvre, or of the Van Dyck Gallery at Windsor, which in its full illustration of the English period must be deemed unique. Let it not be forgotten, moreover, that no survey of the art of Rubens's greatest pupil would be complete without the most careful study of Prince Liechtenstein's gallery at Vienna, of Earl Cowper's pictures at Panshanger, of the Wallace Collection at Hertford House, of the Van Dycks at Wilton House, at Petworth, at Althorp, at Dorchester House, and in many another English collection. Monsieur de Somof is to be applauded for boldly cataloguing as a Van Dyck—in accordance with the opinions of Dr. Bode, of Berlin—the splendid "Isabelle Brant," which so long passed as a Rubens and even now, by M. Max Rooses, the biographer-in-chief of the great painter, is strenuously claimed for him and denied to his pupil. The deep yet ardent note of the coloring, the characteristic exaggeration in the rendering of mouth, nostrils, and eyes, the brown flesh tints—all these things point to the initial stage of Van Dyck's career, when, before riding away to Italy to mature his art, but to temper and abate under outside influences the fiery ardor of his genius, he did work of a promise which not even the perfect achievements of the later time quite carried out. We must class with this portrait the superb group "*Suzanne Fourment et sa Fille Catherine*," which, as the title indicates, represents an elder sister of Rubens's spouse, Hélène, whom we see

also in the famous "*Chapeau de Paille*" (or Poil?) of the National Gallery, as well as in a half-length in the Louvre. The likeness to the plumper and more blonde sister is unmistakable, but there is a marked resemblance to Rubens's first wife, Isabella Brant, who, be it remembered, was the aunt of the two younger ladies. The right name was first given to the sister by M. Max Rooses, who, nevertheless, claims for this canvas, as for the "Isabelle Brant," the authorship of Sir Peter Paul himself, and deems that the master is here seen completing the work of a pupil. The attribution to the youthful Van Dyck is in this instance still further confirmed by a comparison with the pair of beautiful portraits, unquestionably belonging to his first time, which adorn the Stroganoff collection in the rococo palace of that name on the Newski Prospect at St. Petersburg. These represent, in two companion canvases, personages who are supposed to be Nicholas Rockox, his wife and children. They show the same firmness of accent, the same crisp, feverish touch, the same strong impasto in certain passages which are to be noted in the "Isabelle Brant" and the "Suzanne Fourment" of the Hermitage. There will be, as the writer imagines, a general assent to the opinion that the large *Vierge aux Perdrix*," or "*Vierge à la Fronde d'Ange*" (Walpole collection), is the most beautiful of all Van Dyck's sacred subjects. It shows with a happy grace and naïveté which the painter has well known how to combine with dignity and a reverent spirit, the Virgin seated under a fruit-tree and holding the little Christ on her knees. The little St. John and seven boy angels dance joyfully in a ring, smiling to the answering smile of the infant Saviour. Overhead affrighted partridges take wing—a minor yet distinctive peculiarity from which the picture has been named. The reminiscence of Titian, the influence of his large, gracious manner in sacred art, is so evident as to require no emphasizing. All the same, the "*Vierge aux Perdrix*" is too unmistakably Flemish and too unmistakably the master's own to be placed in the special class of the Italian Van Dyck avowedly imitated from the splendid Venetian. It was done for one of the Princes of Orange, and must belong to the time immediately following upon the return of the youthful master to Antwerp at the close of his fruitful journey through Italy. Of the four extant repetitions, or copies, by far the best is one, of considerably smaller dimensions, which hangs in the Pitti Palace, and just be-

cause it is there, is better known to the picture-lover than the original. This, though it is much weaker in execution than the Hermitage picture, may indeed be the earlier version, since the conception is far more Titianesque. In the Suermondt Gallery at Aix-la-Chapelle is an original sketch which, from internal evidence, proves itself to be a preliminary study for a portion of the picture.

The "Portrait of Lazarus Maharkysus, a physician of Antwerp," though it must have been painted in Flanders, still shows the deep, rich, solemn color and the poetry of conception which mark the portraiture of the Italian period. Very interesting, as bearing the signature of the artist and the date 1629, are the pendant portraits, "Adriaan Stevens" and "An Aged Lady." It is with considerable surprise that one finds the learned director stating in the catalogue of 1895 that the "Portrait of Van Dyck in Youth" is not from the hand of the artist, but the free copy of a lost original. The St. Petersburg picture, which bears a resemblance, by no means, however, amounting to identity, to the auto-portraits at Munich, in the Academy of Fine Arts at Vienna, and in the collection of the Duke of Grafton, is unquestionably an original painted with great ease and breadth, though without much solidity, and giving a more realistic version of the young painter's individuality than he generally favored the world with. It is only fair to M. de Somof to add that it is his intention—verbally expressed to the writer—to restore this portrait to Sir Anthony in the next edition of his catalogue. The Van Dycks which came to Russia with the Walpole collection are not all of equal value. For instance, in the stately full-length "Henry Danvers, Earl of Danby," the treatment of the head is hard and cold, very little recalling the artist's usual manner. In the full-length "Sir Thomas Wharton"—a good though not a very interesting *portrait d'apparat*—the hand of Van Dyck's best pupil, Dobson, is very apparent. The two pendant full-lengths, "Charles I." and "Henrietta Maria"—the Stuart King being in armor and his queen *par exception* in a robe of crimson satin—are again not as absolutely first-rate, or as exclusively Van Dyck's own, as the best portraits of his royal patron and his family usually were. These portraits are all of the same exceptional interest, if only because they appear in the famous list of pictures not paid for, sent in by Van Dyck to the King in

1639, when he was already in financial straits, and by Charles considerably cut down before he satisfied his favorite artist's claim. The Hermitage full-lengths appear respectively as "*Le Roi en armes, donné au Baron Warts*" (Lord Wharton) and "*La Reine au dit Baron.*" They were charged £50 apiece, but the King, in a fit of parsimony or pique, took £10 off the price of each picture.

The "Portrait of Inigo Jones" (Walpole Collection), is a work which Englishmen might legitimately desire to see in the National Portrait Gallery. Painted with the utmost solidity and care, it yet suggests somehow that the brilliant Antwerper was but moderately interested in the personality of his accomplished sitter, the greatest of English architects, with the sole exception of his successor, Sir Christopher Wren. The most beautiful portrait by Van Dyck in the Hermitage, and one of the most popular of all his works of this class, is the three-quarter length "Lord Philip Wharton" (Walpole collection), painted in 1632, when the sitter was some nineteen years of age. He appears here in a landscape, richly yet simply dressed in a steel-gray doublet, with a mantle of dark yellow falling from his right shoulder, the background being partly filled by a drapery of rich, dark green. The delicate, sensitive beauty of the youthful face has in it nothing effeminate, though there is—as in the likenesses of Van Dyck himself, and in those of so many among the youthful sitters in whom he delighted—excess of sensibility. Here is a veritable cavalier of those who so willingly gave up lands and laid down life for the King. Remembering even the "Lord John and Lord Bernard Stuart" in Earl Cowper's collection at Panshanger and that essentially different portrait—a group of the same young noblemen in the Earl of Darnley's collection at Cobham—remembering, too, the "Prince Maurice and Prince Rupert" of the Louvre—the writer still ventures to record his opinion that the "Lord Philip Wharton" is Van Dyck's most exquisite creation in a phase of portraiture in which he has never been surpassed. To find a presentment as exquisite in sensitiveness and feeling, as accomplished in the portrayal of aristocratic youth at that the interesting moment between adolescence and manhood, one must go back to Giorgione and Titian, conjuring up the "Young Man" of the former in the Berlin Gallery and the Giorgionesque "*Jeune Homme au Gant*" of the latter in the Louvre; or one must recall, as a type of youth more haughty and

resolute, the so-called "*Portrait d'un Sculpteur*" by Angelo Bronzino, in the last-named gallery. To a later time in the English period must belong the hardly less delightful picture, "William II. Prince of Nassau," showing Charles I.'s son-in-law at the age of twelve years or thereabouts.

Adrian Brouwer is fairly but not splendidly represented at the Hermitage by four originals, of which one is the repetition of a picture in the incomparably fine collection of the artist's works to be found in the Alte Pinakothek at Munich. This ardent realist, who often surpassed Teniers himself in passionate truth to nature, as in richness of color-harmony, is not as yet represented in the National Gallery of England. Fortunately both the Wallace collection and the Dulwich Gallery contain first-rate examples of his powers. We cannot pause on the present occasion to notice the works of Gonzales Coques, of Craesbeeck, of Gaspard de Crayer, or even of Jordaens, though the intensely vigorous and exuberantly fleshy art of this Fleming, who was never actually Rubens's pupil, as has been generally assumed, is represented by a number of important examples. Let us pass on to David Teniers the younger, who is represented here as he is in no other collection in the world. No less than forty-three specimens of his wonderful craftsmanship hang in a section specially set aside for them of the gallery devoted to the later Netherlandish schools. If the truth must be told, the brilliant executant does not pass unscathed through such an ordeal as this. He by no means consults Nature on every occasion at first hand, but contents himself too often with skillfully dishing up, with insufficient variety if with unfailing technical charm and power, a number of well-worn types, incidents, and landscapes. One example there is of transcendent beauty and quite exceptional character, to find a parallel for which it is necessary to recall the greatest triumphs of Netherlandish art dealing with the corporate and municipal life of the cities. This is the large and elaborate composition, "*Les Arquebusiers et les Membres des Corporations d'Anvers*," painted originally from the Archers of St. Sébastien d'Anvers. It was before the Napoleonic wars in the collection of the Landgrave of Hesse at Cassel, and passed next into the gallery of the Malmaison, whence, with a great number of works of price, chiefly by Netherlandish masters, it was sold by the Empress Josephine

to the Emperor of Russia. Teniers, putting aside for the occasion his humor—generally thinner and more forced in quality than that of the true Dutchman—assumes here without effort the superb gravity which all Netherlanders alike were seemingly able to put on when they approached a subject like this one, which, outwardly prosaic as it might seem to the casual observer of to-day, was eminently calculated to recall the national struggles and the national glories. Teniers here rivals on a smaller scale, and with a finish for which the Haarlem master rarely strove, the sharpness and brilliancy, combined with solidity, of Frans Hals. One of the most interesting features is the background with an elaborate representation of the *Grande Place* of Antwerp in front of the Hôtel de Ville.

The greatest attraction of the Imperial Gallery, the one in virtue of which it can claim a certain uniqueness, even among the finest museums of Europe, is after all the unparalleled group formed by its Rembrandts. The mere mention of the Hermitage at once sets the Rembrandt student, as well as the connoisseur with wider views, longing to see its extended series of examples by the Leyden master, among which are included some of his finest works. M. de Somof's catalogue shows forty paintings classed as his, irrespective of the "Christ and the Woman of Samaria," quite recently discovered by him. Making the fullest allowance for a scepticism well founded in a very few instances, we may put the number of authentic Rembrandts at the Hermitage at thirty-six or thirty-seven, while the Stroganoff, Youssoupoff and Davidoff collections in the Russian capital contain, in addition, between them six or seven first-rate examples. Cassel and Paris come next in order, but lag far behind in point of numbers. After these galleries precedence belongs about equally to Berlin, the British National Gallery, and Dresden. Munich and Vienna, the Liechtenstein Gallery in the latter city, Buckingham Palace and the Wallace collection in London, and, last but not least, the series brought together of late years by M. Rodolfe Kann, of Paris—all these are notable gatherings of famous works by the master who is just now occupying the whole world. It has been thought best to keep quite separate in this enumeration the Ryks Museum of Amsterdam, with its two world-famous pieces, "The Company of Captain Frans Banning Cocq (The Night Watch)" and "The Syndics." The Her-

mitage, splendidly, unsurpassedly representative as it is, a little lacks those Rembrandts to which all our sympathy as well as all our admiration is given. It has nothing that quite answers to "The Pilgrim at Emmaus" and "The Good Samaritan" of the Louvre, to "The Vision of Daniel" of the Berlin Gallery, the "Hannah and Samuel" of the Bridgewater Gallery, the "Jacob Blessing the Children of Joseph," at Cassel, or to that pearl among Rembrandt's landscapes, "The Mill," at the Marquis of Lansdowne's seat of Bowood. Still, take it all in all, the St. Petersburg pictures constitute the most remarkable group of the master's works to be found in any permanent collection. This is not the place to enumerate them one by one, or to discuss critically the one or two canvases in respect of which some doubt has arisen. The "Descent from the Cross" of 1634 equals in grandeur and intensity, while it far surpasses in completeness, the smaller but entirely similar picture painted in the preceding year (1633) for Prince Frederick Henry of the Netherlands, and now at Munich. "The Incredulity of St. Thomas" of 1634 shows the violence, allied to a certain vulgarity of expression, which we find not infrequently in the ultra-dramatic works of the earlier time. Famous is the so-called "Jewish Bride" of this same year, which has been very generally—though not with the assent of Dr. Bode, one of the highest authorities on the subject—identified as Saskia, the much-loved wife of the master. The Duke of Buccleugh possesses a very similar, yet in the composition and working out, quite different "Jewish Bride" or "Saskia," dated 1633, which artistically may claim to take even higher rank. But the masterpiece of the earlier time, and one of the masterpieces of painting, is the wonderful "Danaë," which Dr. Bode, relying on the technique, dates as early as 1636. The unique strength and delicacy of the tone—the charming chord of color, composed of pallid flesh, silvery gray and infinite variety, and the greenish gold of a portentous *barocco* state-bed—the nervous vigor, combined with high finish, of the execution, make of the "Danaë" one of the greatest things in art. Rembrandt triumphs here, for once, not by any overwhelming pathos, not by any divining power laying bare the secrets of humanity, but purely and simply as a supreme master of the brush. No element in the picture, apart from the wonderful tone and color, is in itself beauty—certainly not the sickly and repellent Danaë, certainly not the wondrously contorted bed,

with its tasteless excess of ornamentation. Yet the outcome is that beauty which results from sovereign accomplishment, and it is of the kind that no lover of painting proper can or need resist. Another masterpiece of nearly the same time (1637) is the fanciful portrait once known as "John III. Sobieski, King of Poland," a designation which the date of the warrior-king's birth—1624—at once proves to be absurd; for this truculent personage is at least thirty-five. Instead of casting about us for some Polish *grand seigneur* whom to identify with the striking swash-buckler in theatrically splendid attire who here delights us, we should perhaps do well to look upon it as a fanciful study based to a certain extent upon the artist's own features, but in which he has not been desirous of letting the world recognize as a matter of course his portrait. The maturity of Rembrandt's second manner is splendidly illustrated by the "Portrait of an Old Man," No. 820 (1645), which was formerly, on too slender grounds, identified as that of his friend, the learned rabbi of Amsterdam, Manasseh-ben-Israel. The lofty pathos which the painter so naturally evolves from his representations of patient and dignified old age is in but few works of the middle or later time more finely or convincingly expressed than here. The splendid study, or fantasy, of an armed figure (1650), called "Pallas," is the finest example of this type of glorified studio-exercise, in which an adequate excuse has been sought and found for the rendering of darkly gleaming arms and armor of a specially picturesque type. This "Pallas" is of the same class as, yet infinitely superior to, the Glasgow "Achilles" (or "Portrait of a Warrior"), which is an undoubted original, yet in many ways a superficial example of Rembrandt's later style in bravura. No less than three pathetic portraits of the same old woman, once erroneously described as "The Mother of Rembrandt," belong to the exceptionally prolific year, 1654; they bear the numbers 804, 805 and 806 in the catalogue of 1895. Of exactly the same period is again the richly toned and expressive "Potiphar's Wife Accusing Joseph" (1654). This is inferior in some respects to the Berlin example of the repellent subject, which came from Sir John Neeld's collection, and dates from the succeeding year, 1655. The latter is, perhaps, Rembrandt's greatest achievement in the domain of profound, jewel-like color. There are considerable differences

of design and expression between the two canvases. One of the most unusual and the most refined likenesses of women executed by the artist is the "Portrait of a Young Lady" (1656). A year or two anterior to these last-named pictures—Dr. Bode places it in or about the years 1650—is a sublime "Abraham Entertaining the Three Angels," one of those representations of biblical subjects which in their naïve simplicity, in their peculiarly human quality indefinably touched with the divine, are not to be paralleled outside the life-work of Rembrandt. Passing inevitably over a vast number of fine things of the later time, which, under other circumstances, would deserve careful examination, we come to the vast "Prodigal Son," which belongs to the painter's very last years, and well, if not with such absolute authority as is revealed in some other canvases of the same period, illustrates the width of view, the sympathetic power, the summarizing breadth of execution, of that moment. This most human and moving of subjects was only a less great favorite with Rembrandt than the "Good Samaritan" itself. It is through etchings and drawings, however, and much less through paintings, that he has in this particular instance expressed himself.

Elsewhere than in the Hermitage the representation of the greatest Netherlandish master of the seventeenth century, after Rembrandt—the reference is, of course, to Frans Hals—would appear more than adequate. In this collection, somehow, the Haarlem master, sharing with Rembrandt the same not very imposing gallery, makes but a feeble fight of it with his four canvases. The battle is, let it be borne in mind, not a fair one, and the great contemporaries must be more fairly matched before any comparison can be established—if, indeed, any master of the North, and of the same century, even this supreme craftsman, his contemporary, can for a moment be compared to Rembrandt.

CLAUDE PHILLIPS.

(To be continued.)

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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY LIEUTENANT-GENERAL JOHN F. OWEN, R. A.

So completely was the military situation in South Africa controlled, prior to the outbreak of hostilities, by political considerations, and so seriously have they affected our strategy since then, that it is absolutely necessary to refer to them in the first place.

Broadly speaking, from a British point of view, the state of things which existed in the summer of 1899 in the South African Republic was as follows:

A great number of the subjects of our Empire, both from Great Britain and her self-governing colonies, had been attracted to the Transvaal by the starting of a great gold-mining industry there and by the commercial enterprises following in its train. They had so increased that they practically outnumbered the Boer inhabitants. By the investment of their capital, by their enterprise, skill and labor, all of which were heavily taxed, the revenue of the Republic had been prodigiously augmented. They constituted a busy, useful and, on the whole, a highly civilized community and had created a great commercial city, Johannesburg.

But, although they contributed the greatest portion of the State revenue, they were allowed no voice in its expenditure. They were practically deprived of voting rights (though the conventions of 1881 and 1884 guaranteed all civil rights), nor even

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allowed to constitute a municipality for carrying out necessary work in the city they had created. They were prevented from educating their children in their own tongue in State-aided schools and were continually treated with much contumely. Scant justice was obtained by them, the Boer judges, magistrates and juries being usually prejudiced against them, and very flagrant cases of injustice often occurred. The "Uitlanders," as they were termed, were treated, in many ways, as mere helots.

The Boer officials and the Pretorian Government itself had notoriously become more and more corrupt, and, while immense sums out of the revenue were spent for other purposes, the streets of Johannesburg were allowed to become a danger and a disgrace to any civilized State, an indication of what was meted out of the revenue to the despised Uitlanders.

Her subjects had constantly appealed to the Government of Great Britain for redress of their wrongs, and our ministers had addressed frequent expostulations to the Government of Pretoria and carried out negotiations for making their position more tolerable. But, hampered as we were by the effects of the ill-starred Jameson Raid, in 1894, these had not for several years been pressed home with much force. In 1899, however, the raid seemed sufficiently expiated, and the murder in that year of a harmless British subject by a Boer policeman (who got off scot-free), and further petitions made in consequence, brought matters to a head. Our High Commissioner and the Home Government became convinced of the immediate necessity for entering into serious negotiations and for insisting upon justice and redress. No great Empire could longer brook, with any self-respect, such continuous ill treatment of a large number of her subjects by a small and but partially civilized Republic. It was evident that the only permanent remedy was to endow the Uitlanders with sufficient voting power to protect themselves and their interests constitutionally, by representation in the Volksraad, in some such manner as in the Cape Colony, Natal, and the Orange Free State, where Afrikaner (Dutch and English) and Uitlander alike had equal rights. At the same time it was quite recognized that the voting power should be so arranged, in the first place, as not to overpower the Burgher vote. On these bases negotiations were commenced.

The people of Great Britain and her Colonies had, by this

time, as the truth came out, become more thoroughly aroused to their countrymen's wrongs and were determined that these should be redressed, but they were neither anxious for war nor did they expect it, believing that, if sufficient political pressure were exercised, the Pretorian Government would yield. Nor was it generally supposed that the Orange Free State, although sympathizing with the Transvaal Boers, being closely allied to them by blood, was otherwise than friendly to us.

Public opinion, usually not well informed, remained doubtful on many points, until President Krüger showed his real hand toward the end of the negotiations. There was, and is still, much sympathy in England with those Boers who deem they are fighting for their country alone. And at first the British public took somewhat negligently the despicable tyranny of the Pretorian Oligarchy, so far away, and its ambitious hopes of destroying the British domination in South Africa—both of which are now sufficiently patent—viewing them with a good-natured but mistaken contempt.

Had the British Government sent out sufficient forces to South Africa to secure our own territory against attack, or if it had in the early part of these negotiations made the military preparations necessary, they would have been accused, it is alleged, of putting an unfair and unjustifiable pressure on the Boer Government, and their difficulties in arriving at a satisfactory solution, which they hoped to secure by diplomatic pressure, would have been much increased.

Political considerations thus prevented the necessary military preparations, on a large scale, being made against the possible contingency of our being forced into war; and, when that contingency suddenly arose, the military situation was, in consequence, most seriously jeopardized. Whether the political reasons mentioned were sufficiently valid reasons for such neglect, whether there were other more urgent ones, or whether, in reality, mistaken motives of economy had to do with it, are not matters for discussion here. We have merely to observe how they affected the military situation in fact.

The British Government had been fully aware that, for many years past, a great portion of the large revenue, mainly drawn from the pockets of the Uitlanders, had been spent by the Transvaal Government in building forts, in providing arms and mili-

tary equipment, in payment of mercenaries, and, generally, in preparing for war—nominally, for the purpose of defense against such a raid as Jameson's or against an Uitlander rising, but in reality on a very much greater scale than could possibly be necessary for such a purpose.

The actual number of available Burghers and of their mercenaries was known, and the nature and amount of the armament. It was also known that a great reserve of rifles and ammunition had been bought—beyond those required for the whole of the Transvaal and Free State Burghers—for the purpose of arming Afrikaner sympathizers in our own Colonies, and that immense sums (as much as £3,000,000 in a single year) had been spent in pushing forward a Boer propaganda in those Colonies and elsewhere. Our Government was further well acquainted with the treaty between the two Republics. Yet, knowing all this, if they had plainly stated, to begin with, that the Pretorian Government was preparing, at a convenient season, with the aid of the Orange Free State (which had always been regarded as most friendly to us), and with the assistance of rebel sympathizers in our Colonies, to overturn British supremacy in South Africa, and to replace it by a Boer dominion, they would have been laughed at as alarmists raising a cry to cover political ends.

From time to time, within the last few years, the handful of our troops in Cape Colony and Natal had been sparingly increased, but only in a sort of tentative way. The Afrikaner Bund party was in power in Cape Colony, and was inimical even to the small increase. It was not desired to offend their susceptibilities; and for political reasons, therefore, the imperial forces in South Africa were so few in number as to be totally insufficient to protect our Colonies from attack of anything but a small force. In Cape Colony there were 4,000, in Natal 8,000, not to mention small bodies of armed police spread over the great areas of Rhodesia and Bechuanaland, or a total of about 12,000, with some 5,000 Colonial troops, to be relied upon as immediately available.

The political conditions in Natal were different from those in Cape Colony. There was no Bund Ministry there, and the inhabitants were for the most part thoroughly loyal. Fearing a sudden raid, her Ministers urgently requested that our forces there should be so increased as to safeguard Natal from an attack, unless made in great force. In consequence, a body of 8,000 British troops

was in August ordered from India, under Brigadier-General Symons. This force brought up the number of troops in Natal to about 16,000 regular and some 4,000 of the local colonial forces. A few battalions of infantry from our coaling stations were also ordered to Natal, and General Sir G. White was sent out to assume command, arriving there early in October.

President Krüger first made fair promises and proposals and then drew back with the usual Boer shiftiness, taking away with one hand what he apparently gave with the other; until, at last, it became so evident that he had no real intention of granting substantial voting power to the Uitlanders, nor of redressing their manifest wrongs, that the negotiations were broken off. The President was informed that the English Government would formulate its own proposals. Tardy preparations were made by our Government for the arbitrament of arms, if it should come to that; and, shortly afterward, the world was astonished by the rude and imperious ultimatum issued from Pretoria.

President Krüger's ultimatum of the 9th of October (its term to expire on the 11th) was received in London on the 10th, and on the latter date President Steyn threw the Free State into the balance against us. But it was only on the 7th of October that our Army Reserves were called out, to the number of 25,000, and that the definite organization for the field of an army corps of 52,000* men was set in action. On the 18th further steps were taken as to the embodiment of militia and calling out of Militia Reserves, but the embarkation of the army corps did not commence until the 20th. As the voyage of the transports would occupy approximately twenty days, and as it was proposed that the troops should embark at the rate of 9,000 a day, the whole of the army corps could not arrive at Cape Town until the middle of November, thus giving the Boers, who were mobilized and at or over the border on the 11th of October, a long start, of at least five weeks, before our reinforcements were even landed. As a matter of fact, the whole of our army corps was not landed until December.

The military situation when hostilities actually began, on the 11th of October, was as follows:

*The dates and numbers of troops given must be taken generally as only approximate, though sufficiently so for practical purposes. Nor does the number of troops mentioned, in any case, necessarily denote the number available for the fighting line; a very large proportion must usually be deducted for men employed on lines of communication in supply, transport, medical aid, etc., for meeting the thousand needs of large bodies of troops in the field. A percentage also must be deducted for men temporarily sick.

To the east in Natal we held Ladysmith, with a force of about 9,000 men, having a detached post of 3,000 at Glencoe Junction, 42 miles to the right front, covering Dundee. At Pietermaritzburg and at the base at Durban were small bodies of troops, while a few posts, feebly garrisoned, existed on the line of railway communication.

The "Bund Ministry," in power in Cape Colony, showed themselves very lukewarm in making provisions for defense, and they did not call out for service any of the volunteer force until the 26th of October, and then only a small portion. Nor were the Cape Mounted Rifles, their permanently organized military force, permitted to take any active share in the defense of the Colony until long afterward. The regular forces available were sent up to the most important strategic points covering the three main railway lines and the branches connecting them.

Into Kimberley (647 miles from Cape Town and 486 from Port Elizabeth) were thrown about 400 regulars. Various local corps and small bodies of Protectorate Police and others brought up the total garrison to some 2,000. This place offered great facilities for defense, the great mounds of rubbish from the mine workings giving good positions for guns and earthworks. Mr. Rhodes had thrown in his lot with the town he is so thoroughly identified with, and his presence made the Boers doubly anxious to take it.

Mafeking, over 220 miles north of Kimberley (870 miles from Cape Town by rail), was garrisoned by Protectorate and other armed police, and by colonial corps to the number of about 600, under Colonel Baden-Powell, assisted by a few other British officers.

Far away in Rhodesia, a small force of mounted police at Fort Tuli protected the borders on the north of the Transvaal.

Altogether, with the exception of Sir G. White's small army, our forces in South Africa consisted of mere handfuls of men scattered over a vast area, in posts and unfortified towns hastily prepared for defense.

The first military operations of much importance after hostilities began took place in Natal, and were intimately connected with Ladysmith, which is a small town, with a railway station, lying on the northern bank of the Klip River, 189 miles from our sea base at Durban. It lies on high ground (3,200 feet), and the

situation is a very healthy one. For many years past our troops in Natal had carried out their training and exercises on a large area of land in its immediate neighborhood, which was very suitable for the purpose. Musketry and artillery ranges had been established, barracks built and considerable depots of military stores collected there. Strategically, the position is an excellent one, covering, as it does, the junction of the two railway lines leading into Natal, from the Free State and from Pretoria, respectively. But, unless held by a very large force, it was not tactically a good position for defense, there being many high, isolated hills, at from 4,000 to 8,000 yards' distance, commanding Ladysmith in every direction. Unless the whole perimeter of these hills could be held, they offered excellent positions to the enemy, as we know to our cost. The communication by rail was a long one, passing through a country intersected by rivers, broken by mountains, and much more adapted to the movements of mobile mounted Boers than to those of our troops. Forty-two miles to the northeast lay the coal fields of Dundee, with a short branch to the main line at Glencoe Junction. Their possession was of much value to Natal.

The Government of Natal was anxious that as small a portion as possible of the Colony should be overrun by the enemy, and supposing that, should the Boers invade, they would not dare to advance south with a strong British force left in their rear, it seemed most desirable that Ladysmith should be held in force, with a strong post at Dundee in front. These considerations seem to have finally determined the holding of Ladysmith as our main strategic position for the defense of Natal.*

When Sir G. White arrived, even had political considerations permitted his retiring his force to a better position more to the south, he was already committed to Ladysmith, for the Boer advance was developing rapidly and the difficulties of withdrawing the great stores of ammunition, provisions, etc., were quite insuperable. The Boers, who were on their borders on the 11th of October, advanced into Natal slowly at first, the Transvaalers from the north through Newcastle, and the Free Staters through the passes of the Drakenbergs on the west. Our advanced post at Glencoe, under General Symons, was considerably strengthened (to some 3,000 men in all), Sir G. White having about 9,000 at Ladysmith.

* The weakness of lengthy communications by a single line of railway does not seem to have been sufficiently considered.

On the 19th the enemy cut the communications between the two forces and established themselves at Elandslaagte Station, fifteen miles north of Ladysmith. General Joubert had arranged for a combined attack on Symons on the 20th, a commando of 4,000 men, under Lucas Meyer, coming from the eastward, to be met by one of 9,000 under Erasmus from the north. Meyer's commando took up position on the night of the 19th on Talana Hill, overlooking General Symons's position, and commenced the attack at daybreak. After a fierce combat, General Symons succeeded in driving the Boers headlong from their strong position just as Erasmus's commando was approaching, too late, apparently, to render any assistance—it retired, indeed, as soon as its advance guard came under fire of our artillery. Meyer's flying commando was pursued, but in the pursuit a portion of our cavalry and mounted troops were drawn on too far in the dark and were captured. General Symons had been mortally wounded in the afternoon. The loss on both sides was considerable; Meyer's commando was completely broken up.

Joubert's arrangements were excellent, though there is always a danger of such a combination as he had devised failing, as it did in this case. If Erasmus had carried out his instructions, it seems that nothing could have saved our small force from destruction or capture.

To re-establish communication, Sir G. White ordered an attack on the enemy at Elandslaagte on the 21st. This was most successfully carried out by General French, with about 4,000 men; the Boer position was stormed and a number of prisoners taken. But the situation of our force at Glencoe was so perilous that General Yule, who had assumed command, left his camp in the early morning of the 23d, and, marching by road, reached Ladysmith on the 26th. To cover Yule's retreat Sir G. White engaged the enemy, threatening his flank from the west, on the 24th, at Rietfontein, and achieved that object without coming to close quarters.

The Boers closed in on the north and east of Ladysmith, gradually increasing in numbers and establishing guns in position on the neighboring hills. On the 29th Sir G. White made a strong attempt to destroy new batteries that were being established to the north at Farquhar's Farm, with the view, also, if an action were brought on, of piercing the enemy's centre. The night before a small force, a mountain battery and two battalions, was sent some

miles westward to Nicholson's Nek to protect his left flank. Sir G. White did not succeed in his main engagement, the Boers retreating their right and centre and so strengthening their left as to enfilade his right flank, and he was forced to retire. The detachment at Nicholson's Nek was attacked in force and captured, the mules, with guns and rifle ammunition, having been stampeded during the night march.

On the 2d of November the Boers closed in on the west and south of Ladysmith, cutting the communications and completely investing it. Just before this was done reinforcements had arrived, among them, fortunately, a naval brigade with some heavy naval guns capable of coping with the Boer guns of position. The total force was then about 8,000 men, with supplies of food and ammunition sufficient for three months.

General Sir Redvers Buller, who had been selected as Commander-in-Chief of our Army, landed at the Cape on the 31st of October. Before he left England the strategical plan of campaign had been decided on, the main feature being, no doubt, an advance of his army corps into the Orange Free State, three separate columns starting from the several sea bases—Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and East London—using the railways running northward from those ports, and converging on the southern border (the Orange River) of the Free State, Sir G. White's field force in Natal, to the east, and the garrisons of Kimberley and Mafeking being left to take care of themselves for the time.

This seems sound strategy—to strike at the heart of the enemy's country, and to trust to the effect of the blow for the relief of our far-away flanks, already committed, by the enforced withdrawal of the enemy's commandoes attacking them. How far it would have succeeded must ever remain in doubt, for it was not carried out.

The supposed Boer plan of campaign is said to have been drawn up by a strategist of European reputation.

Offensive measures were to be adopted in Natal, and the Boers were to proceed by successive stages of enveloping (by cutting into its line of communication) the inferior British force, until they had driven it into the sea. In the Orange Free State they were to adopt a defensive policy based on the strategical advantage derived from its position on the flank of the railway north of De Aar Junction. It was assumed that—its bridges having been blown

up and the railway line beyond it to Bloemfontein destroyed—the obstacle of the Orange River would so retard a direct attack from the Dordrecht-Middelburg base, that the invaders, to save time, would transfer their base to Kimberley for an advance on Bloemfontein, or further north still to Mafeking, to move against Pretoria.

In neither case were the Boers to oppose the movement in its earlier stages, but to operate on the long line of communications, De Aar to Kimberley (150 miles) and Kimberley to Mafeking (250 miles), as the case might be.

The forces presumed to be at their disposal were 27,000 Transvaal Boers and 20,000 Free Staters, a total of 47,000, of which number about 22,000 would be available in Natal. These numbers are no doubt approximately correct; but, unfortunately, we must add to them a large number, probably several thousand, of rebel sympathizers from parts of Cape Colony, and some even from Natal.

Whether the statement as to its origin is true or not, some such strategical plan the Boers have, with few exceptions, carried out, so far as applicable to our strategical moves, and up to this time with much success.

Between the date of Sir R. Buller's departure from England and his arrival at Cape Town the momentous events described had occurred in Natal; Mafeking and Kimberley had been invested, and, by the 2d of November, Sir G. White and his field force had been shut up in Ladysmith. The first phase of the war had ended with this event.

After spending some days in Cape Colony in visiting the three sea bases and the advanced posts which had been arranged for our strategic advance, and in learning exactly how matters stood there and in Natal, Sir R. Buller took a new departure and abandoned, at least for the time, the original plan of campaign. Whether he did this on his own initiative as Commander-in-Chief, looking to the new conditions existing and to difficulties in carrying out that plan, or from political pressure, or moved by instructions from higher authorities, we cannot yet tell.

The new plan adopted was to carry out the relief of our beleaguered garrisons at Ladysmith and Kimberley directly, by separate forces, instead of by the pressure of a single army of great strength entering the enemy's country. The line of ad-

vanced posts in Cape Colony already described was, however, still to be held and preparations continued at the several sea bases.

With the adoption of the new plan the second phase of the war was commenced. On the 9th of November the troops of the First Division of Buller's army corps began to move by sea from Cape Colony to Natal. Lieutenant-General Sir F. Clery was sent there, and shortly afterward Sir Redvers Buller himself arrived and took command. By the 22d of November our forces in Natal had been increased by about 15,000 men, principally of the First Division.*

A large force began also to assemble about the 10th of November on our extreme left strategic flank, under Lieutenant-General Lord Methuen, at Orange River Station, the most westerly of our advanced posts, for the relief of Kimberley, and by the 22d of November he had there a column of about 8,000 men.

Orders were given in England on the 9th of November for the mobilization of a fifth infantry division, apparently then meant to replace in Cape Colony the division diverted to Natal.

We will follow briefly the fortunes of the two separate campaigns, the theatres of which are some 300 miles apart. It may be remarked that both our armies consisted principally of infantry, both were singularly short of cavalry and artillery and so weak in transport as to be practically tied to their railway communications, which, in each case, consisted of a single line. In Natal the Boers, advancing south of Ladysmith and establishing a heavy battery north of Colenso (sixteen miles south of Ladysmith), drove out our garrison, which retired to Estcourt, seventeen miles southward, on the 7th of November. The Boers then occupied Frere, thirty-one miles south of Ladysmith, where the railway crosses the Blaauwkranz River. Our garrison at Estcourt had been increased to about 2,000, with two naval guns and six field guns. But the Boers, continuing their advance, gradually enveloped it, and established themselves on the 19th at Highlands, on the railway line, twenty-three miles south of Estcourt, isolating it from Mooi River, our next post, thirty-one miles south. About the 20th the Boers were on the long line, Courton on the west to Weenen on the east, and rapidly advancing south, on both flanks of the railway, threatening to envelop Mooi River and then Pietermaritzburg, the capital of Natal, to which they approached within twen-

* Reasons of detail, as to where the several units were when the new plan was adopted, necessitated many changes in the Army Corps in its organization and distribution.

ty-five miles, looting the country as they advanced and enlisting rebel sympathizers.

On the 23d and 24th our advanced brigade, cut off at Estcourt, engaged the enemy in their rear, and cleared the way for our main body, which moved to Estcourt on the 29th, the advanced guard going on to Frere, thirty-two miles south of Ladysmith and seventeen miles from Colenso. There Buller began organizing his relief column, and by the 10th of December he had at his disposal in Natal some 22,000 regulars and probably 3,000 to 4,000 irregulars and colonial troops. Seeing our rapidly increasing strength and fearing for their communications, the Boers had hurriedly retired, carrying with them their loot, and concentrated to the north of the Tugela, where they now are, extending and strengthening the formidable positions there.

On the 14th of December Buller established a brigade in advance at Chieveley, five miles north of Frere, and on the 15th attacked the Boers, who held the north bank of the Tugela and also an entrenched position on our right flank upon its south side. His movement was apparently meant as a reconnaissance in force. As frequently happens, however, a portion of his troops, attempting the passage of the Tugela, committed him to a general action, in which our forces were repulsed, with much loss. Ten guns of our artillery supporting the fighting line and brought incautiously too near the Boers under cover were captured. The troops of the Fifth Division, under Sir C. Warren, commenced to reach Cape Town on the 16th, but, in view of this reverse, they were, excepting one or two infantry battalions, diverted to Natal, where they have all now arrived. More colonial irregulars have also been raised and Buller's forces in Natal must now amount to about 30,000 fighting men, with sixty to seventy guns, including those of the Naval Brigade. But in mounted troops and transport he is still sadly deficient. A cavalry regiment and two batteries of the Royal Horse Artillery (twelve guns), from India, should reach him within a few days' time, and also other reinforcements. If the position of things at Ladysmith will allow, he may well wait for these and form a strong flying column for a wide turning movement to coincide with his next attack.

At Ladysmith the enemy have attempted two assaults—on the 9th of November, when they were repulsed with much loss, and on the 6th of January, 1900, when, after a fierce struggle, during

which portions of our defenses were taken and retaken, the Boers were eventually repulsed, with severe loss, the fighting commencing about 2.30 in the morning and continuing until 7.30 in the evening. Sir Redvers Buller was, during part of the struggle, in communication by heliograph and made a demonstration in force against the enemy in his front, but found them too much on the alert to permit of an attack.* Small sorties have been made by our force, and recently two of the Boer heavy guns in position were taken and destroyed. The investment lines are not very close, nor has the continual bombardment inflicted severe loss. Provisions and ammunition exist for at least a month to come, and the garrison are much elated at their recent success.

Lord Methuen advanced from Orange River Station on the 22d of November with about 8,000 men. On the 23d he attacked the Boers in position at Belmont, twenty-one miles north, and drove them out with loss. Pushing on seven miles to Enslin, where the Boers had again entrenched themselves on broken hills, he was once more victorious. Advancing twenty-eight miles further to Modder River (twenty-five miles south of Kimberley), where the Boers were strongly entrenched, he fought on the 28th a fierce and prolonged battle for the passage of the river. This was so far indecisive that the troops remained on the field that evening, but during the night the Boers withdrew to a new position, about ten miles to the north, on a range of hills at Magersfontein. Lord Methuen's losses were heavy, but he had been previously reinforced and had still some 10,000 fighting men available after the battle. He remained at Modder River until the 9th of December to recruit his men (who had fought three actions in five days), to replenish supplies and to repair the railway bridge over the river. During this period he received considerable reinforcements, and his force, from Orange River northward, was brought up to about 12,000 men, with thirty or forty guns, a certain number being, however, taken up in the protection of his communications to Orange River. On the 9th a reconnaissance was made of the Boer position, and on the 10th it was severely bombarded. On the night of the 10th Methuen moved out his troops, who bivouacked near the Boer position, and in the dark the next morning attacked it.

The Highland Brigade, which was to have delivered the main

* The attack on Ladysmith was largely reinforced during the fight from the Boer force in front of Buller.

assault, was caught in close column by the enemy's fire, having got close to their trenches without being aware of it. They suffered terrible loss, and their surprise probably sealed the fate of the day. Though the attack was hotly pressed while daylight lasted and our troops slept on the field of battle, the enemy showed so bold a front the next morning that Lord Methuen retired to Modder River, where he still remains.

He has been further reinforced, and probably has with him some 10,000 fighting men, but he is exceedingly weak in cavalry (though his mounted troops have been increased by Australian and Canadian contingents), and the transport is still tied very much to the railway line. Though in communication, by searchlight, with Kimberley and only twenty-five miles from that town, he is unable at present to relieve it. His railway communications seem secure, but, unless able to become more mobile, his army must either remain inert, attack directly a position stronger than ever or retire along the railway line, which he cannot leave. A curious "*impasse*" for the present! The Boers also have been largely reinforced, and are supposed now to number 13,000; they are entrenching more and more on the flanks, which tend toward enveloping Methuen's position. Until our new plan of campaign was entered upon, the Free State Boers, expecting our attack on the Orange River side, contented themselves with destroying the bridges over the river, or preparing them for destruction, and also the railway line south of Bloemfontein; but, seeing our weakness, they became bolder and have encroached some fifty miles upon Cape Colony territory—apparently to the number of 6,000 to 8,000, including rebels joining them locally. About half the number oppose Gatacre, and the remainder are opposite French.

The advanced line of base, under the original plan, is held to the east by Lieutenant-General Gatacre, with about 3,000 men, about Sterkstroom. This officer attempted a surprise by night of the position of the Boers opposing him at Stormberg, but his force was attacked on the march, being itself surprised, suffered severely and lost three guns. The country he has to work in is a difficult one, and without a large increase, especially in mounted men, he cannot do more than hold his own.

Naaupoort, more to the west, covering the Port Elizabeth line, is held by General French, with a small body of troops, well supplied with cavalry, horse artillery and mounted infantry, for

the movement of which arms the country in front is fairly adapted. By constantly threatening their communications, he is gradually driving back to the Orange River the commandoes opposed to him. If he completes his operations successfully, the remaining Boers south of the border will be awkwardly situated.

Kimberley is closely invested, but the proximity of Methuen's force probably relieves the pressure of the enemy.

Mafeking, after its long investment, is, it is feared, in bad straits. All that soldiers could do has been done by the garrison and its skillful commander, Colonel Baden-Powell.

As to our troops in the field and further provisions made for carrying on the war, Natal was reinforced in August. A day or two before Krüger's ultimatum was received (on the 10th of October) steps were taken to mobilize an army corps (52,000 men), but their embarkation only began on the 20th of October, nor was their landing in South Africa completed until December, the transports on the whole making slow passage. Offers of contingents from Canada and Australia of some 2,000 men were also accepted. On the 9th of November, when it was determined to change our plan of campaign, the Government decided to mobilize a fifth infantry division (say, 10,000 men); troops were also forwarded to replace those captured at Nicholson's Nek on the 30th of October, and authority was given to hasten on the recruiting and arming of irregular mounted corps in Natal and Cape Colony. Preliminary arrangements were ordered for the mobilization of a second army corps. The Fifth Division commenced to embark in November; the whole had reached Africa by the 30th of December and were diverted to Natal.

About the 4th of December, after Methuen had sustained serious losses, the mobilization of a sixth division (say, 10,000 men) was ordered. Its embarkation commenced about the 16th of December. Its troops are now beginning to arrive at Cape Town and they should all be landed there by the end of this month.

When the news was received of Sir Redvers Buller's serious reverse at the Tugela River, following closely upon Lord Methuen's repulse on the 11th and on the reverse experienced by General Gatacre in Cape Colony, public opinion was deeply stirred, and the Government took energetic steps, some of which constitute a complete and serious departure from our Organization for National Defense up to this time.

A new Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, was appointed, (Sir Redvers Buller retaining command in Natal), with Lord Kitchener as Chief of Staff. A seventh infantry division (say, 10,000) was ordered to mobilize. The further contingents offered by Canada and Australasia (this time all mounted) were accepted. And it was decided, further, to form, from our yeomanry, an imperial force of horse of some 8,000 men, to send seven militia battalions volunteering for active service (about 5,000 men), and a large body of our volunteer force—300 mounted infantry, a battery of artillery (four guns) and about 6,000 infantry, all picked rifle-shots, volunteering for active service—so that a portion of our forces, never before used in actual war, will soon embark to take part in the campaign. This step will have results of a far-reaching nature in the future of our Empire and on the organization of our forces.

Including the seventh division, which commenced to embark on the 1st, about 33,000 men will be shipped by the 20th and reach South Africa before the end of February, when (exclusive of the garrisons now beleaguered) we should have about 120,000 men for the fighting line (including South African Colonists) under the British flag in the theatre of war. An eighth division is prepared for mobilization, a large number of batteries and artillery (about 100 guns, including guns of position), will be shortly sent on, and other measures taken.

To take the place of our regular troops in garrisons at home and abroad, where required, a sufficient number of militia battalions have been embodied. It will be seen how the military situation stands to-day and what efforts Great Britain has made, relying entirely upon her own subjects. Considering that men, horses and material have, for the most part, to be transported 4,600 miles and more by sea from the real base, our own shores or those of our Colonies,* the task is really a prodigious one. Should more strenuous efforts still be required, however, the shoulders of the British Empire will be found broad enough to bear their strain.

Having rapidly reviewed the sequence of events and the military situation of to-day, what conclusions are we to draw as to British and Boer strategy, tactics and troops, and how is the British ill-success so far to be accounted for? What will be the effects

* Curiously enough, Australia, Canada and England are approximately equidistant from the Cape of Good Hope.

of the war, when terminated, on the organization of the British military forces—now ruled at our War Office by a civil head, responsible, under the Government, for the national defense—and what will be the result upon the British Empire, from a military point of view?

The Boer strategy has been excellent, carrying out, on the whole, the plan of campaign described. Their advance into Natal, after the complete investment of Ladysmith, lacked dash and determination and little was gained by it. Fortunately for us, they also departed from their plan when Methuen advanced; had they carried it out, his column might have been dangerously compromised. Based, as their strategy has been, on their extreme mobility, as an army of horsemen, able easily to outflank us and to cut our communications—our want of mounted troops debars us from preventing them from doing so, or from threatening their communications—it has succeeded admirably. In military intelligence they have shown first-rate organization. They have been greatly aided by the sympathizers of their kin in our Colonies and by lavish expenditure in organizing it elsewhere.

Tactically, their mobility—and our want of it—has given them immense advantage. When driven from entrenched positions, they have been able to retreat with impunity and usually without pursuit. On the field of battle, as at Farquhar's Farm, they could rapidly retire one flank and reinforce the other and baffle our infantry on foot. In field entrenchments they have shown themselves masters, under skilled alien instruction. Intimately acquainted with the terrain, their leaders have shown much skill in choosing positions. Their ordinary mode of life makes them imitable scouts. Excellent shots and furnished with long-range, rapid-firing rifles, of the most modern pattern (with smokeless powder), their rifle-fire is most formidable. Their guns, of the usual type employed in the field, are very good, outranging our own. They have taught us a lesson in the use of heavy guns of position, which they move with comparative rapidity in the field. Rapid-firing guns of small calibre, of most recent pattern, are largely used, often with terrible effect. Their artillery has been well handled, mostly by their mercenaries, but the ammunition used has been very defective.

In attack they are very cautious, always taking advantage of their mobility in the field to outflank us. Against entrenched

positions they are equally prudent, employing a long artillery preparation and making most skillful use of cover. Fighting, as individual citizens, they are very careful of their lives.* No bonds of discipline, as with regular troops, tend to make them face death almost carelessly. They are certainly better in defense than in attack, partly, no doubt, for that reason.

It is difficult to judge of our strategy (as to the plan of campaign) without knowing the exact reasons dictating departure from the original plan; but it seems to us, not knowing them, that it would have been better to have carried out the first plan at all costs, though one Army Corps would not have sufficed.

Otherwise, our strategy in the several theatres of war has been much dominated by that of the enemy, owing to their long start in time, and dreadfully hampered by our immense inferiority to them in mounted troops, by the distance to our bases and by our lack of transport, which compels our generals to advance along the railway lines to which they are of necessity glued, and has prevented them from threatening the enemy's lines of communication. General French, in the minor operations about Colesburg, having a mobile force, with many mounted troops, has been able to strike at the enemy's communications with excellent results. If our larger columns had had the same proportions as he has, their strategy would have been very different. As it is, they have been compelled to undertake frontal attacks whether they would or not, from want of mobility and of mounted troops.

Our Intelligence Department in South Africa has not been successful, and our commanders have been led on, at times, by false information and treacherous guides into dangerous positions, but their difficulties have been great from the number of Boer sympathizers in our Colonies; and the Kafirs, fearing more the summary treatment of the Boers than our milder methods, serve them better, and will continue to do so until they are certain that ours will be the winning side. Our tactics have been in many ways indifferent, but in them, as in our strategy, our paucity of mobile troops in the face of an enemy, for the most part mounted, must be considered, as must the nature of the country so eminently suited for defense.

Such mounted troops as we have, have been very well employed;

* They would not comeur in the truth of the lines:
 "Theirs not to reason why;
 Theirs but to do and die."

but, except the colonial contingents,* their scouting has been defective. Our field artillery has been admirably served, but our guns are outranged by those of the enemy. Our infantry rifles are inferior to those of the enemy in range, accuracy and rapidity of fire. Our infantry do not shoot as well as the enemy, though their shooting has been much improved of recent years, while the conditions of the clear air and peculiarities of color and form of country new to them have told against their shooting; their fire discipline has proved very good; when opportunity allowed of their using the bayonet, they have shown the *élan* and stubborn determination not to be denied, which have always distinguished the British soldier; they are not skillful in taking advantage of cover, but as they get more used to a country and conditions strange to them, they show, in that way, a rapid improvement. Taking them individually, as fighting men, they have proved splendid material, cool, brave and dashing when necessary; they have nobly sustained the best traditions of the British Army.

Our tactical formations, suitable for contending with ordinary troops, are, when approaching the present enemy, probably much too close. Direct attack, tactically, has been forced upon us in general by the same conditions, already explained, as have compelled us, strategically, to have recourse to it. Serious errors have been committed in the attack, in not taking the proper precautions as to scouting ahead and the use of advanced patrols, the cause of disasters at Stormberg, Magersfontein (to the Highlanders), and apparently also when we lost our guns at the Tugela.

It is evident that the new conditions introduced recently, and which we have first encountered here in war, of a long range, rapid-firing rifles and artillery, of much accuracy, using smokeless powder, and of heavy guns to back up in the field the lighter calibres, have revolutionized the relations of the defence to the attack, making the former so much more formidable that the ratio of numbers necessary may be roughly estimated as three for attack to one for defence.

The difference in mobility between our troops, mostly infantry, and the Boers, almost all mounted, was one for which our commanders in the field are not responsible; they had to do their

* Our Australian, New Zealand, Canadian and South African soldiers have shown themselves excellent material. Their mode of life and their horsemanship fit them admirably for this war, to which they are more adaptable than the English soldiers in many ways.

best with the material provided for them, but it has terribly handicapped their tactical work.

The Boers have proved themselves brave and formidable foes on the field of their own choosing, and their commanders most capable leaders. Tactically they have shown themselves superior to the ordinary British soldier, from the possession of the many advantages already mentioned, from their being accustomed to the climate and the country, fighting in their own land, with sympathizers to aid them in every direction. When deprived, however, to some extent, of these advantages, and fighting the British soldier on a more equal footing, man to man, the latter has proved himself the better of the two, whether in bold assault of almost impregnable positions, or in determined defence of weak ones; the British officer is, as always, brave almost to recklessness, active and energetic, but the conditions have been altogether so new to him, in many ways, that he is only now beginning to understand them fully and to meet them as they should be met. Our commanders have labored under the many disadvantages, strategical and tactical, already mentioned, and have also been often obliged to take action, against their better military judgment, for political reasons, local and otherwise. It is not possible at present to criticise them fairly.

So far, the Boers may pride themselves upon having had the best of the game. The British losses have certainly been greater than theirs; they hold as prisoners a large number of our officers and men; they have invaded our Colonies and forced us to fight them there, on ground of their own choosing, and they hold closely invested some 10,000 of our troops. Strategically and tactically, they have had the best of it, on the whole.

The causes are easy to perceive. For political reasons which the British Government considered sufficiently cogent, no steps, except reinforcing Natal on a small scale, had been taken by them for years past to increase our permanent garrisons in South Africa to meet a coming danger—nor when war was imminent, to make preparations for it on a large scale until so late in the day that the enemy (looking also to our distance from South Africa) had a clear start of some six weeks, which he made good use of.

When preparations on a large scale were begun, they were quite insufficient both as to the magnitude of the force to be sent and as to its nature; they included far too small a proportion of artil-

lery and mounted troops; the preparations were made but slowly and the greatness of the emergency was not understood. When at last this was forced on the Government and the nation it could only be met by quite abnormal steps; our army organization as such was not able to meet it.

There is no doubt, however wise one may be after the event, that we were all surprised, Government and nation, in many ways. It was not seriously expected, for instance, that the Orange Free State would act as it has done and join the Transvaal in an aggressive* war against us. The Boers were not credited with the powers of resistance they have shown. The marvellous increase in the power of the defense due to the immense improvement in arms—magazine rifles, long-range artillery, smokeless powder, etc.—was not duly appreciated, notwithstanding M. Bloch's predictions, most of which this war has amply justified; nor was it foreseen by us—perhaps not even by our present Continental critics—what it would be to contend against large forces consisting almost entirely of mounted troops, possessing from their very nature a wonderful mobility.

We have not, of recent years, been a military nation, and we have unfortunately rather prided ourselves upon the fact; and though individually of the best stuff for soldiers, and of combative and determined idiosyncrasy, we have preferred to utilize these qualities in pushing our commercial supremacy, and have troubled ourselves but indifferently as to national defense, save as represented by our Navy. Large expenditure upon the Army and its armament has always been begrudged. When in this instance the real strain came and our War Office organization failed, scapegoats are naturally sought for. But the nation itself is responsible. It has, through its representatives in Parliament, not only condoned but encouraged the neglect of many administrations to ensure sufficient expenditure on the Army and its armament. The same causes underlie the fact that our rifles and artillery are becoming obsolete, and that the Boers were ahead of us in having the latest arms out. For Great Britain to re-arm herself with either is a big business, meaning a very heavy expenditure, and we have always dallied long ere making the plunge, perhaps wisely so unless caught in such an emergency as this.

* For aggressive it certainly is. What better proofs of this than the annexations of British Territory coolly proclaimed by the President of either Republic.

We have experienced so rude a shock, and the weak points in our armor are so plain to us, that the nation, thoroughly awakened, will insist on a complete reorganization of our War Office, which has worked too long in ancient grooves, and of our Army, to meet new conditions.

It seems probable that we shall again become more of a military nation, as of yore, and that some system will be devised also, as in olden times, by which every able-bodied man will be obliged to take a personal share in the national defense.

Not only that, but even broader lines will be followed, and the military foundations of our Empire made doubly strong. Our great Colonies, who so loyally stand by us now, will rightly have a voice in the matter. A practical organization, including their forces for imperial defense, will grow out of it, and the British Empire will stand more secure than ever, through the sacrifices her sons have made and their blood shed for her greatness.

As to the war itself, it is taken for granted that British arms will win, probably after much further loss. But win we must, if but by the process of attrition.

Should Ladysmith be relieved—as now seems more probable—it will either be by the Boers raising the investment voluntarily to prevent worse things happening to them, or by Buller's succeeding in turning his adversary's flank with a mobile column, which he is no doubt organizing. In the latter case, the Boers may fare badly. If the town is relieved in either way, it is presumed that we shall leave a sufficient force to hold Ladysmith against any possible attack, strengthen our central force in Cape Colony by the remainder of our troops in Natal, and invade the Orange Free State, when the second act of the drama will commence. Should Ladysmith fall, we should probably hold the line of the Tugela in Natal, but otherwise proceed as above.

Three words spell the principal Boer advantages and our disadvantages, "Mounted Men" and the consequent "Mobility." We shall gradually become possessed of the same, and though we know that every preparation has been made for a prolonged and determined defense of the Republics, we shall show ourselves as stubborn and stiff-necked as our enemy and in time subdue them. It is not unlikely, however, that, when the Free State has been invaded, her people will no longer care to be dragged at the wheels of Krüger's chariot.

The British nation is firmly convinced that in this struggle it is fighting the battle of civilization, real freedom and individual liberty. Its enemy is a brave and in many ways a noble peasantry, misled by an ignorant and presumptuous Oligarchy who would keep civilization far from them, save where it meets their selfish ends, and who, much in the hands of alien intriguers, have crushed individual liberty as far as lay in their power. Firm in this conviction, we shall eventually win in the struggle—nor in the meantime allow any outside interference from great or small; and, as conquerors, we shall show the brave Boers that their individual liberty is as sacred to us as our own, but that their petty despots must disappear from the scene, and the peace of our Empire be disturbed no more from within.

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STRATEGICAL PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

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"MISTAKES in strategical deployment cannot as a rule be corrected later on; but the space and positions required for this operation can generally be determined beforehand in time of peace." Thus wrote Moltke. But it is not sufficient to make sure in advance of the most suitable strategical positions to be taken up by troops in the event of war; preliminary strategy demands that the exact number of the active force required should be calculated, and that their timely arrival at their respective positions should be assured. Moreover, the question has to be considered whether the war is one of a defensive or of an offensive nature. This question in its turn will largely depend upon the political conditions and the amount of resistance which may be expected from the enemy.

A satisfactory answer to these questions is by no means as easy as is generally supposed; and, in addition, there are other so-called "imponderable" forces, according to the nature of the struggle, which have to be taken into account, the moral and political bearings of which are often only recognized and appreciated later on, after the struggle has already begun.

Now, there can be no doubt that, since the well-known Jameson Raid, England—in a political sense—has been the offensive* party, inasmuch as, ever since that event, the English Government has cherished the idea of securing an increased political influence in the Transvaal. The Transvaal Republic did not oppose the English aim in principle; but it did not give way to

* The terms "offensive" and "defensive" are hereafter generally employed in the technical sense of strategy and tactics.

the extent which England believed herself entitled to demand, and thus the Transvaal remained in a defensive political attitude. As England did not renounce her political design of gaining an increase of influence in the representative bodies of the South African Republic, and as the latter stood out in her determination to decline to admit of such, only two issues were left: England might have resigned her pretensions for a time and awaited a more propitious moment for their realization, or she might have adhered to her demands. In the latter case she should have seen that her offensive policy was at once followed up by the military offensive—namely, the declaration of war to be succeeded by offensive military operations. This England failed to do; probably for reasons of two distinct kinds. By a declaration of war, England would have become, in the eyes of the world, the attacking party in a military sense, as she already was in a political sense, and she was evidently determined to avoid creating this impression. Moreover, a declaration of war would not have harmonized with the conception of suzerainty which England, rightly or wrongly, asserted that she possessed over the Transvaal. On the other hand, by leaving the declaration of war to her antagonist, she was unable to hide her political offensive from the world, or her desire to enlarge her sphere of power in South Africa; and to-day there can no longer be any doubt that, although England managed to throw upon her enemy the *onus* of declaring war upon her, she has neither gained the sympathy of foreign Powers nor succeeded in creating for herself a favorable military situation.

After the failure of the political negotiations, the enemy assumed the offensive; and it then became evident that England was not ready with her military preparations.

Thus, England's first mistake consisted in the fact that her political and military action, which were evidently both intended to bear an offensive character, did not keep pace with each other. At the same time, her policy had been in so far successful as to keep foreign Powers from attempting to interfere in South African affairs. This, indeed, narrowed the war down to a struggle between the Boers and the English; but, on the other hand, England has not been able to gain the moral or political support of any Power whatever. The English Government probably held, however, that this in itself constituted a sufficient

political success, in the expectation of being soon able to get the better of the obstinate Boer Republic by force of arms. For England, thoroughly wrapped up in her belief in a professional soldiery, has always been inclined to underestimate the military strength of an opponent whose force consists of a volunteer militia. The English military profession is even prone to believe that every army with universal conscription, and with a system of more or less short service with the colors, belongs to a somewhat inferior category. In this underrating of the enemy lies the source of many of the mistakes of the English method of waging war, from the requirements of preparatory strategy down to the details of tactical conflict.

The Transvaal Republic saw an act of predatory incursion in the Jameson Raid, whereas, in the subsequent political negotiations with England, the Suzerain State, she recognized a carefully planned procedure on the part of England to gradually absorb the Republic. As France in 1870 thoroughly failed to recognize the national sentiment in Germany, and even based her war plan upon the assistance she expected to find in south Germany against Prussia, so has England blinded herself to the national movement which, since the Jameson Raid, sprang up first of all among the Transvaal Boers, and then, from a variety of reasons, spread silently throughout Cape Colony and Natal, and, at the last moment, led to an alliance between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. The anti-English movement originated as far back as the first Transvaal war, and it is due, in large measure, to the obstinate aversion of the Dutch element toward the tutorial imperiousness of the English section of the community. English politicians underrated this Afrikaner movement, just as the English military authorities, like those of the French in 1870, entered upon the war with an entirely erroneous estimate of their enemy, and built up their plan of campaign upon false suppositions. The English further blundered in the choice of the region for deploying their forces in Natal, and made no preparations for the eventuality of the war's extending south to Cape Colony. Neither, when the alliance between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State became known, did England alter her plan of strategical deployment in Natal, although there would have been ample time to do so, and although the alliance entirely altered the military situation of the English in Natal.

The troops of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State had no sooner taken the strategical offensive, than the imminent danger of the situation must have come home to the English in Natal. Yet their plan of campaign seemed to remain the same as it had been at a time when it was understood to be directed against the Transvaal alone; beyond a small addition to the forces which were now supposed to cover Natal against the united power of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State.

Thus all the mistakes of the English strategical deployment of their forces, as well as most of the subsequent blunders in carrying on the campaign, are to be explained by their misjudgment of the political conditions and by their military underrating of the enemy. The English gave their opponents credit neither for the strength nor the aptitude necessary for assuming the strategical offensive, and just here they were destined to be sadly deceived. They underestimated the preparedness and the rapidity of action of both Republics, because the latter only disposed of volunteer militia. They reckoned on the proverbial want of discipline of the Boers; they misjudged and underestimated their mobile, tactical defensive qualities—that is to say, the method of fighting of their opponent. They also misjudged his strength and his ability to draw the war out at length, and, finally, they were surprised by the Afrikaner movement in Cape Colony and the number of the troops arrayed against them.

Instead of having one area of deployment in Natal, the English were obliged to establish a second one near the Orange River; and this one again, in consequence of the character of the railway system, they were forced to divide up into two separate positions, so that three distinct seats of war came into being, upon which the comparatively weak separate corps were either unable—or only after complicated operations in a position—to support each other. But the western field of operations in the direction of Kimberley, as well as the southern toward Queenstown, Burghersdorp, Middelburg and Colesberg, lies in territory in which the Dutch element is largely represented, so that the entire length of the railways upon which the English depend may be threatened by hostile bodies of men. Therefore, the English army is obliged to detach considerable forces for the protection of these lines; which must necessarily weaken their strength for offensive purposes. Moreover, the very character of the country,

combined with the mobility of the Boer forces, which are able to act swiftly in small bodies, all this is calculated to facilitate attacks on the English lines of communication in their rear. Besides, the need for unremitting alertness on the part of those to whom is confided the protection of their lines of communication is apt in the long run to put a severe strain upon the nerves even of the best of troops, and to impair their military value. It is here also necessary to bear in mind that the English laws of military service are not based upon the assumption that England may have to wage protracted foreign wars involving a great sacrifice of men. England's military reserve is limited, and she is not in a position to draw *ad libitum* upon human supplies, as is the case with States which have introduced universal conscription. Therefore, a long war will inevitably mean to her a gradual dwindling away of the force at her disposal.

These unfavorable limitations, however, apply to a certain extent to her opponents; inasmuch as the forces originally at the disposal of the Transvaal and Orange Free State Republics can scarcely be rated higher than fifty thousand men. Still, they have the advantage of being able to dispose of their total forces actively in the field, for they are not obliged to protect their communications. Also, every man of the Boers is thoroughly imbued with the feeling of the danger with which his country is threatened. It is, therefore, permissible in the present case to speak of a national war in which the "imponderable" elements play a great part. The Boers are also well conversant with the country and its inhabitants, and thoroughly inured to the climate which varies between cold and great heat; they are, one and all, mounted on hardy, home-bred horses, armed with Mauser rifles and are excellent shots; they are expert in seeking and utilizing strong defensive positions; and, finally, it may be said that warfare under such conditions is almost second nature to them.

Whereas the manifold tasks of this war are likely to use up unduly the English forces, their enemy has the advantage of seeing his forces increase in number as the war proceeds. For the additional forces which, since the beginning of the war, have joined the Boers from Cape Colony are estimated at twelve thousand men. Therefore, it is permissible to place the present number of the Boer forces at not far short of sixty thousand men, which are probably divided in two parts, one in Natal and

Cape Colony, and the other part on the Orange River. And as the cardinal law of the Boer tactics is evidently to husband their forces—that is to say, not to attempt any sanguinary offensive movements—they will in all probability continue in their efforts to combine the strategical offensive with the tactical defensive. The English forces in the field must at the very least reach the total of one hundred and twenty thousand men if England is to drive back her antagonists by force of arms and dictate peace at Pretoria. In addition to this large force, about forty thousand men will be required in Natal and in Cape Colony for minor eventualities, as well as for the protection of the railway lines, etc. Besides these, at least eighty thousand men ought to be kept ready in England in the shape of reserve recruits. England will, therefore, be obliged to adopt extraordinary measures to meet the situation. It must be further borne in mind that, hitherto, every serious engagement has been of an exceptionally sanguinary character for the English. It is, therefore, only fair to draw the conclusion that the English method of fighting is an unsuitable one to the existing conditions, and that the training which the troops have received at home is not adequate to enable them to get the better of their antagonists. As it is impossible to remedy this effectually at short notice, the English must be prepared to expect further considerable losses in actual battle. This makes an immediate ready supply of reserves all the more imperative, and here we are met by the weakest feature of the English military system. To be economical with their troops is the principle of the Boers; to be lavish in the expenditure of theirs is the unavoidable result of the English method of waging this war; for the English cannot possibly gain their end by standing still. They will be obliged to attack their opponent and endeavor to drive him back. But even victorious onslaughts may lead to a draining of their forces, as long as the military authorities are not able to guarantee a sufficient and timely supply of reserves to fill up the gaps in the ranks.

The garrisons of the English in Natal and Cape Colony were small at the time the Boers decided to adopt the strategic offensive. All the same, there were about twelve thousand men in Natal with a comparatively large proportion of artillery. However much the English may have underestimated the value of the Boer militia, they must still have been conscious that these

men had beaten them before. Besides, the wholesale arming of the Boers since the Jameson Raid could not possibly have escaped their notice. Therefore, from the moment it was known that the Orange Free State had joined the Boers, the English must have been prepared to meet an enemy of considerably increased strength. It is, therefore, evident that the English military leaders were guided from the first by the belief that they would be able to protect Natal from invasion with the forces at their disposal. They, therefore, pushed forward the Natal forces, which had been reinforced by a brigade from India, toward the frontiers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State, and took up a position on the line Dundee-Glencoe-Ladysmith, in order to await under cover of these places the full army with which they intended to assume the offensive and march on Pretoria. For the moment, no steps were taken to protect the extensive line of the northern boundary of Cape Colony. This shows clearly that the English did not fear anything serious in that quarter, whereas, as a matter of fact, it was just here that subsequently the flame of revolt burst forth. Now, even if the English had thought ever so little of the possible danger from this quarter, from the moment that England decided to adopt the offensive, and more particularly since the Orange Free State had joined the Transvaal, the most elementary caution would have dictated the imperative necessity of securing this possibly necessary basis of operations in Cape Colony, as against Pretoria. That is to say, that they ought to have endeavored to retain control of the railway line to Molteno, Naauwpoort and De Aar to the Orange River, as well as the bridges between Hopetown and Aliwal North. The latter, however, was, of course, only possible after the declaration of war had taken place. In consonance herewith, as soon as war was declared, the English ought to have been prepared to seize the passes from Natal *viâ* Newcastle (Laing's Nek) in the direction of Pretoria, and from Ladysmith *viâ* Van Reenen to Harrismith. Both, or either, of these plans, however, would have involved the necessity of immediately pushing forward sufficient forces to enable them to seize the principal strategic points by one or, at most, two days' marching. But nothing of this was attempted or, indeed, seems to have been even considered. And yet the English military authorities are certainly not at liberty to plead in mitigation that there were not sufficient troops at hand in

South Africa, at the time of the outbreak of the war, to allow of the execution of such a plan: for though such is indeed the case, the very fact that England was carrying out an offensive policy made it a matter of course to take timely preparations to follow it up by offensive military operations. Nor can it be argued that they had no time at their disposal for the purpose of getting the necessary force together. Inasmuch, however, as England showed herself to be unable to follow up an offensive policy by an offensive conduct of military affairs, she left the initiative of action to her better prepared opponents, and thereby gave up incalculable advantages to them. Now, as the allied Boer States were sufficiently prepared for action to be able to begin operations at once, they had the power to decide upon the exact theatre of war and were thus in a position to transfer it to English territory, while at the same time they made sure of the strong passes of Laing's Nek and Van Reenen, as well as of the railways connected with them.

And the Boer allies were indeed prepared!

On the 9th of October, 1899, the Transvaal Republic summoned the British Government to declare within forty-eight hours that it would withdraw its troops from the frontiers of the Republic. This the English Government declined to do. Simultaneously, the Boer field cornets received instructions to be ready to march on receipt of the simple watchword, "*Orlog*" (war). This word was despatched by telegraph from Pretoria, on the 11th of October, to every station throughout the country, and on the same day the Boer militia started according to a pre-concerted and well-considered plan, and began its march against Natal.

In several instances, the Boer forces covered as much as fifty kilometres (about thirty-one miles) in one day, and by the 12th of October they were all united in a concentric advance against the northwest corner of Natal. In the night from the 12th to the 13th of October, the allied Republican militia occupied all the mountain passes leading to Natal—the Laing's Nek, Botha, Müller, Van Reenen, Tintwa, and Bezuidenhout passes. Within the short space of two to three days, they had narrowed down their line of extension from an arc of the length of three hundred kilometres (about one hundred and eighty-seven miles) down to one of ninety (about fifty-six miles). They had traversed a difficult mountainous region, and cut off the English from

all the available roads for invading their country! The Boers thus prescribed the theatre of war and brought the English under the influence of their decision, of their initiative. General Joubert held supreme command over the entire forces of the allied Republics, a proof in itself how carefully all the details of this operation must have been thought out and planned in advance. For not even a European standing army could suddenly be set in motion, let alone successfully carry out such an operation without the slightest hitch, as was done here, unless the operation had been carefully matured and planned out beforehand. This also speaks volumes for the reliable character of the information the allies must have possessed concerning the English, and it shows further that the allies must have a strategist of great ability—perhaps several such—at their disposal. By these measures, the allies insured themselves the possession of the railway line leading through the interior of their own country and created a basis for the continuation of the offensive. This took the English completely by surprise. Even before the alliance between the two Boer Republics had become known, the English supreme military command had caused General White to advance on the line Dundee-Glencoe-Ladysmith. This line was evidently originally intended to be the area for the strategic deployment of the English forces, and then to serve as the basis of operations. Hence, it was self-understood that General White would hold this line against the enemy. As the crow flies, it extends to a length of forty English miles, and it would thus correspond to an area for the proper deployment of an army of one hundred and twenty thousand men. On the 18th of October, however, General White only had an army of twelve thousand men at his disposal. Besides, this said line was only two days' march removed from the enemy's frontier; and, as all the connected lines of the allies converged toward Ladysmith, it might easily have been cut through by them between Glencoe and Ladysmith, thus exposing the English both ways to be surrounded and cut off.

This, indeed, was the original plan of the allies.

The only efficient line of communication of the English was this one of road and rail from Glencoe to Ladysmith. Obviously, this line of deployment ought only to have been chosen, and could only have been adhered to, under the supposition that General

White would be strong enough to debar the approach of the advancing lines of the allies to within a distance of at least a day's march. This, however, poor White was not in a position to do. The English military authorities had thus given him a task the imposition of which would only have been justified if the enemy had been incapable of interfering in any way with its performance. General White kept about half his forces together at Ladysmith and occupied the position Dundee-Glencoe with the remainder. His forces were thus distributed at two wings without any prospect of mutual support or guarantee of united direction. Although without sufficient forces, yet General White, on the 13th of October, went with three thousand men to meet the Boers, but he was obliged to retire before their concentrated movement, and thus to give up the whole of the northwest corner of Natal to the Boers without so much as drawing a sword.

In order to understand the action of General White, it is necessary to bear in mind that the English had a strong motive for retaining Glencoe, for the sake of the coal-fields which supplied the fuel for the working of the railway and shipping. Nor can they have harbored any doubt as to the feasibility of their plan of deployment and subsequent operations, for they had accumulated an enormous amount of ammunition and food supplies at Glencoe-Dundee, and had selected Ladysmith as the headquarters of the army of operations. Since the Jameson Raid, an enormous amount of ammunition, said to represent a value of a million pounds sterling, had gradually been piled up at Ladysmith; the exact amount of the huge commissariat stores at Ladysmith is not accurately known. However, they are sufficient to relieve General White from fear of famine for the present.

The construction of these store magazines on the lines of deployment, within two days' march from the enemy's boundary, shows most clearly of all how thoroughly the English underestimated the military capacity of their opponent. It also affords a clear insight into the original plan of operations of the English; for, according to this, it could only have been based upon the assumption that the Boers would remain on the defensive in a military, as they had indeed done in a political, sense. Therefore, the English intended to deploy along the line Ladysmith-Dundee, and thence by way of Laing's Nek to march upon Pretoria, thus taking the shortest road to advance. But, even here,

they must have terribly underestimated the tactical power of resistance of the Boers, which would have had to be expected and encountered in the projected advance through the passes—an operation which must have required several days. There can be no other explanation for the entertaining of such a plan. That the English, however, should still have adhered to it, when it was known that the two Republics had concluded an alliance, and that the Orange Free State Boers were able to threaten the English line of deployment on the left flank by the mere concentration of their forces; this can only be explained by the supposition that they were anxious concerning their political prestige in Natal, and that, above all things, they could not make up their minds to withdraw their valuable store magazines from Glencoe-Dundee, or, if this were no longer practicable, to abandon or destroy them. Had either of these courses been taken, General White would have been able to gather all his forces round Ladysmith and wait for the further development of events.

To be sure, in order to take this course it would have been absolutely necessary for him to have his road free across the Tugela to the coast. The English, however, were unable to make up their minds with regard to this course, and now proceeded to make one mistake after the other.

Thus we find the underrating of the opponent as the cause, first, of the unfortunate choice of the line Ladysmith-Dundee as an area of deployment; secondly, of the erection of magazines along this line at only two days' distance from the enemy's frontier; thirdly, of the disposal of insufficient forces to hold this line until the arrival of the army of operations; fourthly, of the presumable intention of taking the offensive along the shortest road to Pretoria, through a country easily to be defended, the forcing of which must have cost rivers of blood. It was a misconception of the political situation which led the English to a mistaken choice of the area of deployment, and allowed them to completely ignore the dangers which threatened them from the side of Cape Colony. This it is which has brought them into a political and military dilemma to which it would be difficult to find a parallel. All this is not calculated to do much credit to the foresight and judgment of the authorities responsible for the direction of England's military affairs.

Evidently, the allies were excellently informed about the in-

tentions of the British; they also estimated correctly both the number, condition and capacity of the English troops. They knew besides that the British had erected store houses and exactly where they were situated. Thus, they were able to calculate approximately that the real army of operations would not arrive in Cape Colony or Natal before the middle of November. Before this army could begin operations, a further delay of a week or two must necessarily elapse; the allies had thus about six weeks' time at their disposal, which it was for them to turn to the best advantage. They, therefore, in the first place continued their offensive movement against Natal with all the forces at their disposal, attacked the English on the 20th of October at Glencoe, were in their turn attacked on the 21st of October, repulsed the English, drove them out of Glencoe and captured the stores which had been accumulated there, as well as the coal-fields which were so much needed for the service of their railways. The English troops, moreover, were now no longer able to reach Ladysmith by the direct road *via* Elandslaagte, and were obliged to take a wide circuitous route by the south. After a long march full of hardship, they at last joined General White at Ladysmith. The latter had recognized the dangerous position of the Glencoe column, and, fearing that the enemy might force his way past Elandslaagte in order to cut it off, advanced against the Boers on the 21st of October. After a bloody encounter the English retired toward Ladysmith, where White was defeated on the 30th of October and afterward blockaded. By the end of October the Boers had gained their primary object, carried the war into English territory, and secured all the passes in their rear. In addition to this, the Boers seized the railway bridge over the Tugela at Colenso and, with their front facing Maritzburg, took up a defensive position, while pushing forward an adequate body of troops toward Estcourt.

As the Boers destroyed the railway bridge over the Tugela, it was obviously their fixed intention to give up for the moment any further offensive movement in Natal, and to await the attack of the English on the Tugela River. This resolution on their part was a most judicious one. In the first place, they were obliged to be economical in the use of their forces; and to assume the offensive, unless they were prepared to follow it up with the tactical attack, would have led to no practical result. Whereas,

the line of the Tugela formed a position of strategical importance and great tactical strength. Moreover, the tactical superiority of the Boers is never more strikingly manifest than when they are on the defensive. In this way, by taking up their position on the Tugela, they had realized all the expectations they could reasonably have entertained. The successes of the Boers in Natal had broken up the strategical lines of the English.

General White, in all probability, no longer disposed of sufficient strength to fight his way through the Boer forces; and even though he had, he would not have been warranted in risking the loss of the valuable stores at Ladysmith by making the attempt. The English had thoroughly lost the first game in the rubber in the campaign in Natal, and were obliged to start afresh on the arrival of the main body of the army of operations. The conditions were now much more unfavorable than they would have been if they had started with sufficient force from the beginning, and had chosen a suitable area of deployment. While the English were now obliged to remain on the strategic defensive, their opponents prepared to assume the offensive in the west as well.

Immediately after the commencement of the war, the allied Republics proceeded to invest the fortified towns at Mafeking and Kimberley. But their forces were insufficient to do more than cross the Orange River and seize the fords and bridges between Hopetown and Aliwal North. Their successes in Natal, however, were of great service to the Afrikander movement in the north of Cape Colony; comparatively large numbers of men flocked to the army under Cronje's command, and thus materially assisted him to assume the strategical offensive. It is thus evident how effectual the strategical offensive had become in Natal. For only thereby were the Boers able to gain the time necessary to organize their forces, and also in the west to compel the English to accept the consequences of their enemy's offensive movements. The Orange River makes a great bend here toward the south. This enabled the Boers to penetrate into Cape Colony along the railway line Queenstown-Middelburg, in order to seize the central railway junction of Molteno and Naauwpoort, and consequently to deprive the English of the use of the transversal line Molteno-Naauwpoort-De Aar, which might have become of great strategical importance to them. By adopting the offensive against Queenstown-Naauwpoort (and Aliwal North-Dordrecht), the Boers brought

themselves into direct contact with the strongly represented Dutch element existing there, and thereby opened up the chances of attracting the considerable additions to their strength already referred to. This offensive movement had further untoward consequences for the English cause, inasmuch as it enabled the population of the districts south of the transversal railway line already mentioned to render direct or indirect assistance to the Boers, which they were prompt to avail themselves of. The important consequences of this offensive movement are as yet not fully to be realized. In every case, the political as well as the strategical gain to the allied Republics has already been great. For, while the Boers remained in control of the railway line Cape Town-Kimberley on the right bank of the Orange River, and thence on both sides of the railway to the south of Kimberley occupied the strong position of Spytfontein and Magersfontein—where they intended to await the attack of the English—they sent detachments forward toward the Orange River, thus compelling the English to attack them in case they wished to relieve Kimberley.

The Republicans drew their right wing back considerably and pushed with their centre and left wing forward against Queens-town and Middelburg. Thereby they were enabled to threaten the flank of any English force advancing to the relief of Kimberley, and to organize a guerilla war in their rear. Nor is it beyond the range of probability that here too the Boers might be able to throw themselves upon the English line of communications and cut them off in the same way as had already been done in Natal.

This plan gives evidence of the same careful preparation, mature forethought and clever utilization of the local military and political conditions as we have already witnessed in Natal, and it ought to be equally successful. Above all, the Boers have here again gained the object they evidently had in view: to draw the attack of the English to the very point at which they wished to be attacked, where they would be able to avail themselves to the fullest extent of their great advantages, namely, their exceeding mobility and their excellent marksmanship. The positions of Magersfontein and Stormberg fulfil these conditions.

In the meantime, England, by the incorporation of reserves, had mobilized three divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, and given to General Buller the command of all forces in South Africa. The work of embarking and transporting this goodly mass of

troops was accomplished between the 20th of October and the 20th of November, and, apart from the stranding of a solitary ship, without any noteworthy mishap. The punctual arrival of so many transports in the appointed South African seaports bears striking testimony to the administrative ability of the English military department; and, in view of this remarkable performance, it stands to reason that with clearer vision, greater energy, and truer measurement of the enemy's resources, the English leaders would have had a fair chance from the outset of conducting the campaign on correct principles of strategy. But an unlucky star overhung even this first brilliant achievement from the moment that an attempt was made to turn it to account.

Obviously, General Buller had complete liberty of action. It lay, by all accounts, in his absolute discretion in what manner and at what points he should distribute, with an eye to strike the enemy, the not inconsiderable forces under his orders. Having regard to the state of things that prevailed in the Colony at the time of his landing, Buller can have been under no illusions as to the faint remaining chance of bringing the war to a speedy termination. Undoubtedly, he knew that General White had stores of food and war material sufficient to last him for months, and, as the sequel has shown, that Kimberley likewise was as yet not menaced by famine. There was, accordingly, no good ground for hasty action. But what is matter of common experience befell in this as in so many other similar instances. Reaction against deep-rooted habits of carelessness and dilatoriness took the dangerous form of precipitancy. The promptest measures imaginable seemed to Buller's vision not prompt enough. The collected troops had been carefully organized as a military unity, and there was no adequate reason for breaking up the "order of battle" in which they had been arrayed. What may have induced Buller to take so hazardous and, in its disruptive effects, so disastrous a step, is matter of speculation. It is not probable that he underestimated the strength of the enemy. Very likely, his high estimate of that strength, together with misgivings as to the Afrikaner movement, determined him to send forward, as fast as ever they could be entrained, reinforcements to Natal as well as to the north of Cape Colony. Buller was, however, not content with dividing his forces. He went on to disorganize them, with the result that he found himself ultimately unable to command,

at any single point, the needful numerical superiority. Buller must have put to himself the question: On what battle ground, Natal or Cape Colony, did it behoove him to throw the bulk of his forces? In Natal, heavy blows had been dealt to England's military prestige. General White was shut up in Ladysmith. The English line of march to that point was shorter than any other line under present review. The railway ran from Durban to Estcourt. The easy distance to be covered, the feeding of the troops, the favorable climate, were so many good reasons for selecting Natal as the theatre of war. It must, however, be borne in mind that, without great numerical superiority, and without special topographical advantages to aid his tactics, Buller would have entertained no reasonable hope of gaining a victory so decisive as to enable him to liberate General White and save the rich stores of Ladysmith. The attainment of this object would at one stroke have afforded satisfaction to the military prestige of England, and Buller would thereafter have been free to consider whether he might venture to push on to Pretoria by way of Laing's Nek, by way of Harrismith or, peradventure, by both routes. Doubtless he would have decided to take that course only when he had succeeded in defeating the Boers so crushingly as to make further effective resistance on their part impossible, even behind their excellent mountain entrenchments with the formidable character of which Buller must have been more or less familiar. Such a consummation, however, he could not anticipate, much less rely on, as here again tactical conditions proved adverse to British aims. In view of these disappointments, Buller would have been warranted in striving after the deliverance of White only upon condition of his being able to confine himself to strategically defensive operations in Natal, while working for a decisive military success on a western battle ground. This idea was no doubt in Buller's mind when he determined to divide his forces. In provisionally keeping back his main army in Natal, while ordering Generals Methuen, Gatacre and French to invade the Orange Free State from the Cape, his calculation presumably was that the Boers in Natal, feeling themselves threatened in their rear, would transfer part of their forces from Natal to the western seat of war. But this proved to be a mistake on Buller's part. His adversaries had in the interval found leisure to organize their forces at the western seat of war and, stiffened by strong reinforcements

drawn from the Republics and from northern Cape Colony, had found means to confront the British with thirty thousand men under Cronje. It is true that Buller could not by any possibility have foreseen all this. Thus the unsuitable line of deployment in Natal, in conjunction with the erection of store magazines at Ladysmith, were destined to be pregnant with bad results to the English during the further course of the war.

And yet Buller would have done better if he had left White and Ladysmith to work out their own salvation, and had sent to Natal a single brigade, whose exclusive duty should have been to undertake the defence of Durban and Maritzburg; while he himself had proceeded with his whole remaining force to the western seat of war and striven to decide the conflict victoriously on that ground. Let it be admitted that here also the difficulties were considerable. The climate is trying, necessaries to sustain an army are scarce and inaccessible; but, on the other hand, the English dispose of three lines of railway, from East London to Burghersdorp, from Prince Alfred and Port Elizabeth to Colesberg (this one has a branch line to Middelburg), and from Cape Town to Hopetown. The first is about 350 kilometres (about 218 miles) in length, the second 400 (about 250 miles), the third 750 (about 468 miles). By availing himself of these three lines, Buller ought to have pushed on the main army as far as possible into the heart of the Orange Free State. It is said that none of these railway lines are adapted for transport on a large scale. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Buller had at his disposal a line of rails for the conveyance of each division and its appurtenances, and that, with timely and proper arrangements, troops and stores might have been conveyed from the several ports of arrival within eight days at the outside, assuming that it was possible to detrain them at the Orange River—in six days, assuming that it was desirable to detrain them at Molteno, Naauwpoort and De Aar. This last performance has actually been surpassed by the column under Methuen. In any case, no pains or cost should have been spared to obtain control of such strategic points as Molteno, Naauwpoort and De Aar, and with them possession of the transversal line of De Aar-Molteno. This line, running nearly parallel with the Orange River, measures 300 kilometres (about 187 miles) in length, and it would have offered facilities for consolidating or contracting the line of deployment more or

less effectually. For such a purpose, there can be little doubt that Buller's professional eye was directed to the tract lying north of the connecting railway line, which as a plan was well-advised. But in war the fruition of our schemes is always more or less dependent on the enemy's counter-schemes, and by the time that Buller had made up his mind to put his plan into execution, it was too late. The enemy's will had already circumvented his own. It was thus only at De Aar that the detraining could take place according to plan. On the two other lines the debarkation had to commence at Queenstown and Middelburg, respectively. From that moment it became a question of marching against time.

In the meantime, the Boers had made an offensive movement toward Molteno and Naauwpoort, but had not destroyed the bridges over the Orange River. While, on the line between Cape Town and Kimberley, they awaited the British relieving column to the north of the Modder River, they took up at Stormberg, north of Molteno on the East London and Burghersdorp line, a position of great natural strength, but still further strengthened by art. They did likewise to the north of Naauwpoort. In this manner, the Boers threatened the British connecting (transversal) lines, thereby compelling their opponents to attempt the assault of each of the several points mentioned.

Thus, likewise, on this western theatre of war, the Boers had strategically forestalled their adversary, and precisely as befell in Natal, proved themselves equal to reading him a tactical lesson on his own ground. This was a great triumph, political and military. If Buller had pushed forward his whole active force, with the exception of a small fraction, to the north of Cape Colony, while preserving the "order of battle" that had originally been given to it, he would have acted prudently and rightly. The average distance of the transversal line (connecting or loop line) to the Orange River is one hundred kilometres (about sixty-two miles), equivalent in an unfavorable case to five or six days' march. The question whether he should direct his forces toward Bloemfontein, or toward Kimberley-Mafeking depended upon many circumstances. But, whatever might have been his decision, it behooved him in any case to throw the bulk of his forces against the point selected for attack. This unfortunately he failed to do.

The divisions commanded by Methuen and Gatacre operated over a front of three hundred kilometres (about 167 miles)

at the extreme wings against Burghersdorp (Bloemfontein) and against Kimberley; they had as a link between them only French's cavalry division on the Port Elizabeth and Colesburg railway line. As the population of that district joined hands with the enemy, the Boers received timely warning of the English offensive projects, and, thanks to the wonderful mobility of their mounted troops, they were enabled in every instance to oppose an adequate defending force to the several English attacking columns, and to compel these to deliver their assaults on the very ground that the defenders had chosen for the purpose of defense. Here again, unfortunately, the English in each several instance played into the hands of their enemies, and that after having committed the initial error of dividing their active armies at both seats of war, an error aggravated by the wilful severing of the links which held these armies together as organic unities. As a consequence they were left sadly weakened at both theatres of war; but, none the less, they persisted in carrying out their plan of relieving Kimberley and Ladysmith.

In order to reach Pretoria and dictate terms of peace there, the right course of action would presumptively have been to march thitherward with the main body of the army by way of Kimberley and Mafeking. Mafeking, once reached, there would have remained some two hundred and fifty kilometres (about one hundred and fifty-six miles) to cover. The route indicated is beyond a doubt the longest; yet, in spite of the labor, perplexity and loss that a forced passage thereof would entail, that route is for the advance of a compact army undoubtedly the safest. A detachment might have operated independently by way of Bloemfontein, best composed of a strong force of cavalry with sufficient artillery and backed by a small force of foot. If they had adopted this plan, the advancing English would have taken advantage of a well-regulated railway line, and would have had Mafeking behind them. The line would, of course, have required protection, and at some points actual reconstruction, before it could be turned to practical account. Yet, when the worst is said, here was a real prospect of eventually reaching the desired goal, though the path leading thither would have been irksome and stained with blood; whereas, the same object undertaken from the Natal side, unless fortuitous circumstances arose, would have proved most difficult of attainment, even at a heavy sacrifice of blood and treasure.

At Ladysmith, General White has under his orders the Seventh and Eighth Brigades of infantry, the Third Brigade of cavalry, and one "irregular brigade," together with six field batteries and four naval guns. After the several unsuccessful actions in which they have been engaged, and the wearying exertions forced upon them as a consequence of their being closely invested, the effectiveness of those troops as a fighting body can no longer be very great. From the main body of his army General Buller detached "the Natal relieving force," and placed it under the orders of General Clery—who had originally commanded the Second Division—and this disposition was carried into effect by (1.) depriving the First Division (commanded by Methuen) of its Second Brigade under Hildyard, and (2.) by depriving the Third Division (commanded by Gatacre) of its Sixth Brigade under Barton. Of his own original Second Division, General Clery retained half of the Fourth Brigade, under Lyttelton. Lastly, Buller organized a new brigade under Hart, pieced together out of the Fourth and Third Brigades. Methuen's First Division was strengthened by adding to it the larger part of the Third Brigade under Wauchope, which originally had been attached to the Second Division. In this fashion, the whole original disposition of the forces was rent asunder, and General Buller, by proceeding to Natal in person and taking over the command in that colony, made Natal the principal theatre of war. To secure stations along the line of communication, no less than seven battalions were engaged, and to protect the line of deployment in the north of Cape Colony, five battalions with about eighteen guns. It is true that a Naval Brigade, landed for the purpose, was added to Methuen's force, so that he disposed of some three brigades in all.

Before General Buller had proceeded to Natal and undertaken the direction of affairs on the spot, the campaign had been opened in the northwest by Methuen, operating against Kimberley; by Gatacre, against Burghersdorp, and by French, against Colesberg. The total British force in South Africa at the end of December, 1899, including the Fifth Division under Warren, numbered in Natal, between 21,000 and 22,000 men, with 80 guns; in the Midlands of Cape Colony, where Gatacre held command, 16,000 men and 96 guns; in the west, where Methuen held command, 12,000 men and 20 guns. Warren's Fifth Division numbered 7,500 men with 18 guns. To these must be added, in

Kimberley, 3,000 men; in Mafeking, 1,500 men; in Rhodesia, 2,000 men; Colonial troops and volunteers, 20,000 men. This total is considerable; but, if it is borne in mind that the enemy disposes at present of 30,000 men in Natal, and of an equal number in Cape Colony, it will be clear that even inclusive of Warren's Fifth Division, the British do not command the needful superiority in numbers at either of the two seats of war, for the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions, since mobilized or mobilizing, do not come as yet under discussion.

The Boers were attacked by General Methuen on the 23d of November at Belmont; on the 25th at Graspan, on the 28th at the Modder, where they were driven across the river. The several actions were fruitful of loss for the British, and yet they are chronicled as victories. But the very fact that, after the last-named fight, Methuen remained inactive for nearly a fortnight, although he was separated from Kimberley by only two days' march, is in itself good evidence that the Boers had no other thought than to retire, in pursuance of a plan formed for the express purpose of luring on the British to attack them in their strongest entrenchments at Spytfontein and Magersfontein. On the 10th-11th of December, Methuen made up his mind to deliver this last assault, but he met with a bloody reverse. Again, on the 10th of December, the central column under Gatacre had likewise been repulsed at Stormberg, and lastly, General French with his division of cavalry was compelled to fall back. This disastrous chain of events wrecked the scheme for relieving Kimberley. The Boers now hold their position at Magersfontein, while continuing the siege of Kimberley. General Methuen has been compelled to withdraw toward Belmont and to entrench himself there. In their present quarters his troops, after a needful rest, may recover their tactical efficiency. But the British ought not to think of resuming the offensive in that region until they have been largely reinforced. For such a purpose, however, Warren's Fifth Division will not suffice. General Gatacre's columns are much in the same plight. As a result of the defeat of the two armies opposing them, the Boers now threaten the connecting line of De Aar-Naauwpoort-Molteno, as well as the rich British stores accumulated at De Aar. Finally, in Natal, General Buller, when he attacked the Boers with four brigades at the Tugela on the 15th of December, met with a serious reverse. Having lost

twelve guns, he retired to Frere, whence he had sallied. The consequence here again was failure to relieve Ladysmith and to save the stores accumulated there.

Thus, at the end of 1899, the campaign, in its second phase, as in its first, has at nearly every point, both in Natal and in Cape Colony, shown results unpropitious to the British arms. Nor does there seem anything to be done for it, in the immediate future, but to remain on the strategical defensive. This, however, may demand some patience, as the mobilizing, transporting and landing of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions stand little chance of being accomplished before at least six weeks have elapsed. In the interval, the Boers will take occasion to stir up the fires of Afrikaner sedition in Cape Colony, to fill up their ranks by recruiting in the districts occupied, to perfect their organization, and to improve the martial training of their forces. By the time the campaign enters upon its third active phase, their numbers will presumably have grown, the individual fighter will have become tactically more expert, and in a certain sense the English have the prospect of a new war, the real war, before them. But even after the arrival of the Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions, the situation can scarcely be deemed favorable from a British point of view. They have no option but to take the offensive, and they will find the Boers in occupation of strong positions. In Natal, the strategical defensive is at present the safest attitude for the British to adopt. Such an attitude would, of course, entail White's being left provisionally to his own devices. On the other hand, everything points to the advisability of sending to the western seat of war all fresh troops as they arrive. That the conflict must be decided in that region—whether in the direction of Bloemfontein or Kimberley-Mafeking—can no longer be doubted, at least by those who see justification for the main points of our argument. But offensive operations, even in that direction, must needs be bloody and protracted, seeing that the intentions of the British are not likely to remain unknown to the Republican commanders. The Boers might see their way to make use of the "inner line," and take advantage of the railway to despatch reinforcements wheresoever they might be wanted.

In pursuing this line of action, the Boers, while weakening themselves in Natal, would, perhaps, even thus weakened, yet prove sufficiently strong to repel British attacks on that side. In

whatever way, accordingly, the British address themselves to the proximate third phase of the present campaign, they will be confronted by an enemy who grows day by day more fit for the purposes of war, who, thanks to his extreme mobility, is able to take full strategic advantage of the "inner line," and to forestall his enemies at any threatened point. Thus the prospect before the British is not particularly alluring. But, apart from other reasons, the political condition of the northern parts of Cape Colony is grave enough to leave them scarce a choice. Here, if anywhere, it behoves the British to strike with overwhelming force.

The trend of things hitherto bears out Moltke's expressed opinion, to the effect that England habitually underrates the military efficiency of her opponents, makes no adequate preparations, and chooses an unsuitable line of deployment. In the present instance, England could not, at the critical moment following the discovery of her initial error, bring herself to take so momentous a decision as to let White and Ladysmith work out their own salvation, and, while confining herself to strategically defensive operations in Natal, throw her whole might and weight upon the invaders of her western borders. England gave her enemies time to gather strength, to organize themselves, to carry the war out of their own territory into hers. Wavering between the policy of choosing one seat of war or the other as a basis of operations, she divided and disorganized her forces, and consequently was nowhere able to bring the requisite strength to bear. Her errors have borne bitter fruit—defeat, tactical, strategical, political. England has been the loser in this first campaign, and must now grapple with the difficult task of converting a, so far, losing campaign far from her base into a victorious one. Is she strong enough?

In consequence of England's military failure in two directions, Field Marshal Roberts has been appointed Commander-in-Chief in South Africa, with General Kitchener as chief of his staff. General Buller retains, under Roberts, his command in Natal. This change in the chief command is a necessity, since the operations of war no longer admit of being supervised and directed from Natal, where Buller's duties are onerous enough to take up all his time and attention. The state of affairs at the western theatre of war also demands the special services of a governing hand and head. Want of such may have contributed not a little to untoward events in that region. Generals Methuen, Gatacre and French originally

commanded divisions, and, since General Buller's departure for Natal, have had no general-in-chief over them. In the circumstances, convergent unity of action between the three was barely practicable. As, furthermore, the new Fifth, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth Divisions will, in all probability, be sent to the western seat of war, it is indispensable to create a new and separate command for the western army.

But the organizing and consolidating of the last two divisions will be a work of considerable difficulty, involving serious delays. Of infantry England possesses one hundred and fifty-three battalions, of cavalry thirty-one regiments, of artillery twenty-one horse, ninety-five field and ten mountain batteries. At the present moment, there are already in South Africa, or on the way thither, sixty-eight infantry battalions, fourteen cavalry regiments, seven horse, twenty-six field and two mountain batteries. In England there remain only twenty-one battalions of infantry, eleven regiments of cavalry, all other troops being stationed either in India or in the colonies. For the Seventh and Eighth Divisions now in process of mobilization, sixteen battalions are required, which will about exhaust the reserve infantry. It is, of course, not impracticable to substitute militia for some of the regular infantry battalions now stationed in the colonies, but this amounts to little more than a temporary makeshift. This militia, which has had but a superficial training, numbers 110,000 men, from which, however, 30,000, belonging to the so-called "Militia Reserve," have to be deducted, because, as a matter of fact, they are reckoned as part reserve of the regular army. Seeing that in order to complete the Seventh Division, now mobilizing, the militia reserve has already been broached, it must be concluded that the regular army has been practically drained of her infantry reserves. The immediate inference is that the Seventh and Eighth Divisions cannot be placed on a war footing without drawing heavily on the militia. Granted that later on England will want more men to fill up gaps in her South African expeditionary army—a contingency by no means remote—these would again have to be furnished by the militia; and the question is, whether these troops in point of numbers and efficiency are equal to the duties expected of them.

Fritz Hoenig.

MILITARY PROBLEMS IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY MAJOR-GENERAL O. O. HOWARD, U. S. A. (RETIRED).

IF we could get at the numbers of the different commands, as historians after the events are able to do, we could make more trustworthy statements of the present military situation in South Africa. Still, taking the number of Boers from General Joubert's estimate, and the number of British troops from the newspaper accounts, we may discuss the operations and battles which have thus far transpired, and arrive at some conclusions of interest, particularly to military readers.

Whatever may be the political conditions, the Boers, in my judgment, the instant they resolved to go to war with Great Britain and strike for absolute independence, acted wisely in doing as they did. The situation required (1.) that they should put their capital in a state of defense, fortifying it and using for armament the best procurable modern inventions; (2.) that they should prepare to defend their borders—the borders of the Transvaal or South African Republic and of the Orange Free State—along the three lines of approach, by every military means; (3.) that they should begin offensive operations before their opponents could strengthen their garrisons, and crush them in detail; and also they brought to battle column after column of their foes, before the garrisoned forts could be relieved.

The first requisite President Krüger and his governing assembly were able to comply with, because they began years ago to get ready. By a singular combination of circumstances, their enemies, the Uitlanders themselves, furnished millions to their treasury, and the quick declaration of war gave the Boers complete and absolute control of the gold mines within their domain. The nearness of Delagoa Bay kept them in prompt communication with all markets of the world till the last moment, and even now

they are permitted to get food supplies across or from Portuguese possessions lying on Delagoa Bay and bounding their eastern side.

The second object, President Steyn helped the Transvaal people to secure, as well as that could be done with the men and means at his disposal. General Joubert, the Boer Commander-in-Chief, only needed enough men to put in strongest defense, with very little fortifying, the mountain passes of which Newcastle is the centre. Here a few brave men with modern arms can keep back the many. President Steyn within his State had more difficult problems to solve, because the Cape Town and Mafeking Railway ran for one hundred and fifty miles along and near his western border, and because his only natural obstacle on the south for two hundred miles, east and west line, was the Orange River, coursing in an apparently open country. These facts, evident enough to General Cronje, a Boer military leader of experience, carried the defense of all southern and western approaches to the two States beyond their own borders.

Cronje, who evidently had this important work assigned to him, has fulfilled, with more or less success, the third requisite. That is to say, he has done much, or he has had much done, beyond the western and southern boundaries, while General Joubert, besides reinforcing him, has done the same thing on the Durban and Pretoria Railway line, operating actively as far southeastward as Colenso.

Now with regard to the number of soldiers opposed to the British, General Joubert is said to estimate them as follows:

The first contingent of the Transvaal Boers, eighteen thousand; the first contingent of the Orange Free State, sixteen thousand; from Natal, Cape Colony, Bechuanaland and friends who are helping, sixteen thousand: total under arms or available, fifty thousand.

In extremity, by counting the old men and boys, there is a possible reinforcement of twenty thousand more. We have no certain information as to how the Boer forces were distributed at the beginning of the conflict. But we know that, besides his home guards and the necessary defensive garrisons in the Transvaal, numbering probably three thousand, Joubert had a movable column of nine thousand that he himself commanded on the Durban line in Natal. Taking into account all the different state-

ments, there must have been of the Boer force, in the mountains south of the Orange River, near Stormberg, about five thousand; on the west, opposing Methuen directly, twenty-two thousand; and around Vryburg, Mafeking, etc., four thousand. Calling the total thus divided Cronje's command, he has available thirty-one thousand. Adding the eastern column, the garrisons and the home guards, we have twelve thousand, giving us actually on duty in the war a Boer force of forty-three thousand men. The other seven thousand may be regarded as a reserve, like our minute men of the Revolution, to be called out when necessity demands and for very short periods.

Among the Boers the mounted infantry prevails. The horses carry the men rapidly from place to place, then they fight as infantry and not as cavalry with carbines. Their artillery thus far keeps about abreast of the British, having modern pieces as well as older guns of large calibre, and abundant machine guns for close work in defense.

The English had several forts and garrisons within the field of prospective operations when war began; for example, five thousand at Ladysmith and one thousand two hundred at Dundee; three thousand at Kimberley, eight hundred at Vryburg and one thousand two hundred at Mafeking, with enough more at Durban, Cape Town and elsewhere to make up an aggregate of twenty-five thousand men—quite a force when concentrated, but very weak, when so far asunder, to hold such a vast region. Of course, it was only intended as a nucleus. The force at Kimberley, it is reported, now numbers about eight thousand for the defense of that important stronghold. Cecil Rhodes is there, and with his usual energy, has doubtless put every man able to bear arms on the line of defense.

What were the British officers to do last October, when the ultimatum passed and the Boers took the field for an offensive campaign? Plainly just what they did do, stand substantially on the defensive and wait for reinforcements from England and elsewhere. General White, with four-fifths of his garrison at Ladysmith, *i. e.*, four thousand men, was doing that very thing effectively at Glencoe on the 20th of October. Joubert had divided his nine thousand into three parts. Only one part, that coming from the west, did General White, aided by General Symons, have to meet and overcome on that day. The British loss in killed and

wounded was about three hundred, and that of the Boers seven hundred. On October the 21st, Saturday, came the next combat, called the battle of Elandslaagte, between the same contestants. They fought all that day, and General White scored a second victory. Then Glencoe resisted another attack of the Boers, but General Yule, out at Dundee, failed to resist an assault; he lost the day and fell back to Glencoe with such of his one thousand two hundred as were not disabled. The next engagement was near Ladysmith. It was not called a victory for General White. His loss was this time about eight hundred killed, wounded and prisoners. The British losses were heavy, but the defenses of Ladysmith were maintained and secured by the British commander.

A little earlier, on the 17th of October, the Vryburg garrison (of eight hundred) was forced to surrender: but Colonel Baden-Powell held out against Cronje's attacks at Mafeking, inflicting a loss upon the Boer forces of over a hundred. Thus we see that the garrisons had done all that could be expected of them.

The troops for reinforcement were landed at Cape Town, East London and Durban (eight hundred miles up the coast from Cape Town). They were called "Relieving Troops." The British Navy added a wholesome contingent to each column. The work of relief must be done at once. By the 20th of November, there were fifteen thousand new men at Cape Town and fifteen thousand at Durban, soon increased to twenty thousand, and pushed forward toward Ladysmith, to meet the Boers already in force far south of that city.

General Lord Methuen, leaving Cape Town with the left column—small at first, but before long by Navy help, mounting up to five or six thousand—fought a successful battle against about an equal force at Belmont on Thursday, the 23d of November. Then followed a second victory on Saturday, the 25th of November. The fighting was severe enough, and the losses great: but with an energy like that of our Sheridan, Methuen pushed on to Modder River. With reinforcements which had come up by rail, he had at last nearly fifteen thousand soldiers, with considerable artillery. The Boers, some twenty-thousand strong, hardly realizing that they had been defeated at Belmont and Graspan, were well placed in defense along the Modder River, intrenched on both banks and on an island which was convenient. The fight this time was stub-

born, lasting fourteen hours. Methuen's loss was four hundred killed (one thousand eight hundred wounded and missing). The Boer loss, as far as known, counted five hundred and thirty killed and wounded. Methuen secured his crossing of the Modder River, but was able to advance only in sight of the strongest kind of intrenchments at Magersfontein. When ready, Methuen made an assault with like results to ours at Kenesaw, straight against prepared works with barbed wires stretched along the Boer front. This battle ended in a terrible disaster, where over a thousand of his men fell, with small loss to his Boer adversary. Still, he communicates by heliograph and searchlight with the garrison at Kimberley.

The force under Gatacre and that under French, despatched, as I fancy, from East London, and intended to clear the cross railways to Middelburg and De Aar, were stopped and quite effectually debarred. On Saturday, November the 9th, Gatacre, with about four thousand men, made a night march, with guides who proved inefficient, to strike a Boer force at or near Stormberg. The Boers, superior in numbers, were in fine ambush, waited for his approach and repulsed his column with great loss and confusion to the British. Gatacre retreated to Molteno, and now, like Methuen and French, stands safely on the defensive.

General Buller, at Cape Town, the new Commander-in-Chief, seeing the greater immediate danger to General White at Ladysmith, hastened to Durban and to the front on that line. He threw his forces squarely against the entrenchments of the Boers, bringing up his splendid artillery to marvelous proximity to well-filled rifle pits. The repulse under the Boers' fire, steady and accurate in its aim, all along the well-hidden lines, was sudden and complete. Eleven British cannon were taken, and hundreds of officers and soldiers became wounded and prisoners or were slain. General Buller quickly brought back his battalions to the position they had left for the battle, that the useless destruction of life might cease. It would not do to let the Boers spring again that well-set trap, even if the British were mortified at the unprecedented loss of their artillery. It is probable that General Joubert had caused to be brought up all the home guards, the reserve, and, perhaps, considering the grim determination of the Boers, enough of the old men and boys, to make a frontage of at least twenty thousand against General Buller. The latter, like

Gatacre and Methuen, has now been put completely on the defensive. Lord Roberts, the new Commander-in-Chief, has this military problem before him. He must choose one of the three lines of advance, as soon as he shall have men enough to work out a decisive movement.

(1.) Will he take the Durban line? It is the shortest; but it is intrinsically the most difficult to carry, and has the best Boer troops to defend it.

(2.) Will he choose the line through the Orange Free State? Possibly; but I think not. He will need, however, to clear those cross railways, and secure the country below to the Orange River, that he may have the connecting railways from Molteno *via* Middelburg to De Aar as a secondary base. That could be done promptly. Then he could go forward rapidly, repairing the western railroad above De Aar as he pushed on to join Methuen; then crush Cronje's force, relieve Kimberley and at once break across eastward to the central railroad, and use that road for a rapid advance upon Pretoria. Of course, Joubert would retire from Colenso and Ladysmith the instant he saw Lord Roberts's plan. Then Buller could pick up General White's force of five thousand and press along with vigor to keep as many Boer soldiers as possible there to oppose his threats against Johannesburg and Pretoria by that route. If, after the crushing defeat of Cronje, Joubert and his stalwart President did not make peace, probably there would be first a hard-fought battle near Kronstad, and another, the last one, at Johannesburg.

The British will be constantly reinforced, while the Boers are already at their best in numbers, in *morale* and in supplies. General Winfield Scott, in 1861, by opening his hand and slowly closing it, showed how the Confederacy was to be conquered. We tried to keep many armies going, all at the same time, from the outer to the inner circle, of which Richmond was the center; but ultimate success came to the Union forces by so combining armies as to greatly outnumber the enemy on some important line, and then defeat him in battle all along that line. Kimberley should be the Nashville, Kronstad the Atlanta, and Johannesburg the Appomattox of the South African war.

Would that it might all be settled without the waste and horrors of war!

O. O. HOWARD.

THE DUTCH IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY HENRY CUST.

THE material and political interests of South Africa have, during the last five years, been subjected to so much distraction, have been treated with such varying prejudices and passion, and have been confused by such divergent national bias, that it is hard to see in a white light exactly what they are, and how they stand to-day. English, Boer, German, French and Portuguese have all taken a more or less violent part in the struggle, each actuated by keen national sympathies and antipathies, each considering erroneously that his own interest is separate and opposed to that of any other, and that it must therefore be separately and aggressively promoted. The result of such a conduct of affairs is obvious. Instead of one united and continuous effort pressing toward a stable and united prosperity in politics, in finance and in industry, we have had that bitter and barren struggle which leads in any community to a crippled and a sterile life, and which has in this case ended in a hateful but inevitable war. Abuses grow or are created on the side of the one party, to be countered by some opposite abuse on that of the other. Corruption leads to bribes, and bribes to more corruption. To gratify the prejudice of one group the industry and property of another is oppressed, and the oppressors, in the blindness of their spite, do not see that they too share the general depreciation. Uncertainty, distraction and distrust impel the community to violence in thought, word and deed, and what should be the most prosperous country in the world has served merely as a cockpit for the very petty squabbles of very petty men.

The war we wage to-day directly concerns the British Empire alone. It is that Empire alone which pours out the blood and spends the treasure. But it should be impressed upon people of

all nations—and that not merely on the millionaires, but on the middle classes and small investors, and even on the country tradesman and the thrifty peasant—that they have a great, a vital and a rapidly increasing interest in the question. On the original invitation of the Transvaal Government, a flood of gold has streamed into the country from Europe and America. It is clear that the nations of the world did not send out their hard-earned dollars, francs and sovereigns so far from home merely to brighten the eyes of President Krüger. The understanding which actuated all the operations of cosmopolitan investors was the establishment of a contract for mutual advantage. "Send your money to the Transvaal," said the Boer, "and we will give you the raw material which money alone can develop; the Transvaal will profit by the development of its resources and by the trade which will follow your enterprise, and you will profit by the harvest of riches which that enterprise will reap for you."

It was trusting the good faith of this proposal that America and England yielded up their men and their millions, millions supplied not only from the great banks and syndicates of London, Paris or New York, but ultimately, and often directly, from smaller country and provincial firms, and from the pockets of every man who has even a single share in the least of the innumerable South African companies. It is extremely important to remember—and it is this which I wish to bring home to the American nation—that, in a large measure, South African finance affects the finance of the world; that every blow struck at the industries of the gold fields is struck at the interests of I know not how many hundreds of millions of capital, and that every sovereign held back from the output of the Rand by the action of the Transvaal Government means so many sovereigns held back from the pockets of the European or American citizen.

If you are rightly to understand and justly to consider the South African question, it is necessary to have some coherent knowledge of the rise and development of the Boer nation. And, indeed, the story is interesting enough on its own merits; for it tells a tale of national life, apart and aloof and different in kind and character from the story of any other nation. The historical and racial factors in South Africa have combined to evolve organic, social and political types which are to be found nowhere else in the world.

It is not necessary to linger at any length upon the foundations of the first Dutch settlement in South Africa. Interested as they were commercially and politically in their Eastern colonies, and in their trade to India, to Java, to Japan, a half-way house of call was necessary in those days of year-long voyages.

Accordingly, in 1652, the Dutch East India Company sent Jan van Riebeck and some two hundred men to form a port and a store and an arsenal at the Cape of Good Hope, and there for two hundred years the company remained. But what is far more important to us than any incidents of their parochial history, than the lions they hunted or the Hottentots they killed, is the gradual formation of the Boer character, a character different in nature, in tradition and in outlook from any other white man's that we know, the character with which we have to deal to-day.

From start to finish, from 1652 to 1900, the Dutch in South Africa have been narrow, strong, tyrannical and pious. Their faults have been born of their virtues, and their virtues of their faults, and both faults and virtues have resulted from the conditions of their life and the mixture of their blood. They have been narrow because of their utter separation for two hundred years from all the thoughts and influences of the modern world. No book, no art, no learning ever reached them. Indeed, for them such things did not exist. To give one instance of their remoteness even to-day: in the back country of the Transvaal not long ago a resolution was unanimously passed and forwarded to the Government in favor of an immediate invasion of England, although, as matter of fact, the Transvaal does not touch the sea at any point, and to ferry across their generally dry rivers the rowboat has usually to be found by the English.

Another reason for the extraordinary isolation of the Boers has been the language which they speak, which is called the Taal. This is not a *patois* of the Dutch, as is usually supposed, but is practically a separate speech. The Dutch of Holland is a rich and highly developed language, in which any thought can be expressed; the vocabulary of the Taal has shrunk to a few hundred words, which have been shorn of all their inflections and otherwise clipped and debased. The words from Kafir and Malay sources, the broken language spoken by the black slaves, the turns of phrase handed down from French and Portuguese immigrants, have all done their work. An additional "e" will turn

any word into the plural, and the conjugation of verbs exists in the third person singular alone. No subtlety of thought or emotion can find expression in such a speech. No interchange of knowledge with the greater world could be gained through such a language, and no human intercourse could be held, except among themselves, by those who speak that language only.

But I have said that the Boers are strong. They are strong because of their lifelong struggle for existence against man and beast and country. Every mouthful had to be won from a burning sun and from an unknown soil. Every sheep had to be guarded from wild beasts. Every woman and child had to be protected from men worse and wilder than the beasts themselves. To be strong or to perish was the alternative before the Dutch; and the Dutch were strong. They were tyrannical partly because what they had gained by violence and severity could only be maintained by sternness and repression; partly because the policy of the East India Company—which set the national mode, and against which the Boers twice openly rebelled—was directed wholly and solely to favor its own commercial and financial interests, with little thought for the progress or prosperity of the colonists, who had no rights of land, of trade, of barter, or even of personal liberty, and with still less thought for the welfare of the native races; partly, too, because of their piety, for, as I have said, they were pious. But their piety was that of the Old Testament, not that of the New. Their fathers had fought for their faith through two generations in the bitterest religious wars of modern history. They had themselves seen all Europe torn through the long agonies of the Thirty Years' War in the defense of the Protestant cause. They were of the generation which produced the Puritans and the Ironsides, and Puritans and Ironsides they remained for two hundred years. Isolated in a strange but fruitful land, and girt about by danger and terror, with their Bible for their single book, they grew to regard themselves as the Chosen People of the latter days. South Africa was the Promised Land that God had granted, and the black races were the Amalekites and Hittites whom it was theirs to smite with the sword and to turn to hewers of wood and drawers of water.

Narrow, strong, tyrannical, pious—such were the Boers two hundred years ago, and such in all essentials (and this it is important to remember) are they to-day. For they are an in-

stance of what is known as an "arrested development," similar to the civilizations of China or of Mexico. Up to a certain date, in this case the seventeenth century, they formed part and parcel of the world's onward and evolving stream of history and expansion. But, at a given moment, from causes and conditions of which they were themselves unconscious, they ceased, not to live, but to grow. As in a frozen river, or as in an electric engine with the current switched off, the raw matter is there, and the strength, but the movement, the swing, the development, the power of growth is gone. And in all our dealings with them, in business, politics or war, it must always be remembered, and emphatically remembered, as a key to many difficulties and uncertainties, that the Boers even of to-day are a people of the seventeenth century.

Some changes and chances without doubt made their influence felt. The introduction here and there of Portuguese families, with their Latin traditions and language, broke the solid completeness of Dutch life and habit. A growing intercourse arose with the English on their way to and from the East. But the chief among these new impulses was the introduction of French blood, of French traditions, of French industries, and for a time of the French language. The Edict of Nantes was repealed, and many of the best and the bravest of the French Protestants were driven from their country. The Dutch, with a keen eye to their own advantage, at once offered them an asylum in South Africa. Free passage was granted, and on their arrival, ground, implements, seeds, and tools of every trade were distributed among them. Perhaps the most noticeable of material gifts brought by the refugees was the knowledge and culture of the vine, and to-day the broad acres of Constantia and the Western Province tell us of the skill and industry of the Huguenot vine-growers. The Dutch, however, had no intention of allowing the foreign colonists to develop on their own lines, and the same pressure and even tyranny were used to suppress the French language and all visible manifestations of French tradition and custom as have been used against the Uitlander in the Transvaal of to-day. Nevertheless, the leaven was there, and did not cease to work, and the innumerable families of Therons, Du Toits, Faures, Jouberts, and a hundred others scattered throughout South Africa, still serve to remind the French of the struggles which their fathers made for freedom.

And, further, one strong stream of influence of a less healthy nature flowed from the conditions under which the Boer existed: the influence, the inverse influence, so to speak, always exercised by conquered races upon the dominant power which controls them. The conquered tribes and nations with whom the Boers have had to deal have been uniformly savage. That is to say, they have never met with any community possessing any government or organization save despotism and militarism. A king, the punishment of death, and annual wars represent the highest stage of development reached by any South African race. In such a polity the only available weapons are force and cunning. It is against force and cunning that the Boers have had to fight, and it is in the long run the weapons of force and cunning that they have chosen for themselves. If a black man cannot enslave you he will kill you; if he cannot do either he will deceive you; if he cannot do anything at all he will run away. Of course, in such a case the influence of the black upon the white will be largely determined by the white man's individual character. There are some who will be roused to pity and a desire to help and educate. But to the larger number of rough frontier pioneers will come the lust of domination and tyranny; and their higher education will only produce a fiercer wish to win and a quicker catch to see and use the cunning, however unscrupulous, of their foe. Such, I think, has been the main effect of their influence upon the Boers. From the day when they enslaved or exterminated the Hottentots, from the day when they looted and destroyed the missionaries' houses and burnt their books, they have shown, when strong, no mercy; whenever they have been firmly faced by an equal or a superior force, they have shown more cunning and not much courage.

Let us now consider how this character has acted since England and South Africa became a common ground. The earlier history may be rapidly passed over. In 1795, England took the Cape of Good Hope, to save it from the clutches of Napoleon, who had conquered Holland. In 1802, by the peace of Amiens, she gave it back again. In 1805, at the outbreak of the war which ended with Waterloo, she took it again to hold it, as we believe and hope, forever. Was it a robbery and a crime, as some would have us think to-day? Hear what a Dutch judge and a Dutch historian says: "Some national feeling in favor of the fatherland

may have lingered, but, substantially, every man in the colony, of every hue, was benefited when the incubus of the Dutch East India Company was removed."

And now, what of its result? I must admit that the history of the English in South Africa, or, to be more accurate, of the English Government—of the English Cabinet—in South Africa, makes about the most discreditable and unhappy reading that an Englishman can face in all the great history of his people. Time upon time, a continent has been at our feet; time upon time, we have refused it, spat upon it, despised it and rejected it. The first cause of vice lay, as is so common with us English, in our own act of virtue. Having encouraged slavery and imported slaves for many years, the English Government suddenly abolished slaves and slavery. They agreed to grant one-third of the value in compensation to the Boers, but one way and another the money, though paid, never reached the creditors. This was in 1834. Said the Boers: "We are weary of this Government; we will wander away." For, whether it be that the sailor habits of the old Dutch race found ease in endless voyages across the grassy oceans of the South African uplands, or whether it be that the habit of revolt and independence was so strong as not even to bear the restraint of a neighbor's presence, the fact remains that the Boers became a race of wanderers. And away they went and wandered, and among them President Krüger, a child of four. For years, for generations long, they wandered. Born in the wilderness, dead in the wilderness, a wagon between blue sky and yellow grass their only home from birth to death, born without a midwife on the sand, dead on the sand without a parson, they wandered on—shooting lions, fighting natives, drinking endless coffee, begetting endless children, always wandering on. They crossed the Orange River, and they crossed the Vaal River. They crossed the Drakensberg mountains, and founded Natal. There at last the English interfered. "No," they said, "the land may be ours or yours or anybody's, but the sea at least is ours." So the English took Natal and have it now, "the garden colony of the world," they call it, and free to all the world. And the Boers wandered onward, onward to the north, in growing isolation and discontent, with the hunger after land and loneliness waxing and gnawing in their hearts and souls and bodies.

And now we must come down nearer to our own days. By

1850 the Dutch had built up two vaguely constituted pastoral communities, the one in the boundless prairie sea beyond the Orange River, the other still further north in the uplands beyond the Vaal. But though they loved their independence, they needed English aid both for their stores and in their wars against the Kafirs. A solid empire merging the two white races was the great ideal. But, with that inconceivable madness which marks the action of the English Government in South Africa, the English Government refused to accept it. Philosophic Radicals and Little Englanders were rampant in those sad days. "What good are the colonies?" they cried in their opacity. "We will have none of them." And so—and this must be remembered—against the wish of every wise Boer, against the wish of every loyal colonist, in spite of addresses, in spite even of deputations sent to London, the English Government insisted wantonly and wilfully in 1852-4 on founding two independent Boer States to mar the unity of our African dominion, and built up with deliberate carefulness all the pain, anxiety and danger that we have to face to-day.

Such was the beginning of trouble in South Africa. Let us see how that trouble has developed.

When more settled conditions were imposed upon the Boers, the character which I have endeavored to analyze remains, in new environment, indeed, but at the bottom essentially identical. Narrow, strong, tyrannical, pious, restless and keen, such are the Boers to-day. These qualities will be found to inspire the whole of their internal and external life; to them you may refer the raids and the conquests, the oppression and the self-righteousness, and the paramount selfishness, which actuate the Governments of the two Boer States. Democratic in principle, they are in fact limited oligarchies of Genoese and Venetian type.

So long, however, as the burghers wandered, uncared for, unknown, across their boundless plains, their shortcomings mattered not to the world; but to-day, when, by their invitation, the wealth, the industry, the fortunes of so many thousand English and other foreigners have been entrusted to their good faith, it was both just and necessary that the Boers should enlarge their scope of view and modify their inherited intolerance. For the hour was drawing near of the clash between that most modern of all modern communities, a gold-field population, and the most antique and intolerant government that exists in the world.

For twenty years affairs in the Dutch States went from bad to worse. If the farmers were unwilling to obey the Queen of England, they declined point-blank to obey one another. Revolution followed revolution; dissension, dissension; at one time there were three separate Governments in the Transvaal. The burghers owned no authority, and declined to pay any taxes. The treasury was utterly bankrupt. The Zulus on one side and another great tribe, the Bapeli, threatened the Dutch with destruction. All South Africa was agitated and in danger. The Boer President himself said that federation under the English flag was the sole way out of the difficulty. At last England annexed the country, and found exactly twelve shillings and sixpence (a few cents over three dollars) in the treasury.

Of the bad and shameful years that followed I need not speak. Stupidity, shame and disaster were the Englishman's only fare. And when we had spent English blood and English treasure without end upon the country, and saved it, by Englishmen, from itself and from the Zulus, then came upon England the crowning dishonor of this generation in Mr. Gladstone's surrender of the country itself.

But meanwhile other things had happened.

In 1867 an event occurred which changed the history of South Africa. An Irish hunter named O'Reilly saw a white pebble in a farmhouse, and, liking the looks of it, put it in his pocket. He sold it for £500 (about \$2,500). It was the first South African diamond. The farmer, hearing of this, bought another pebble like it from a Hottentot. This he sold to a Jew for £10,000 (about \$50,000), and an English great lady gave £25,000 (about \$125,000) to possess it. South Africa was made. Men and money flowed in like a racing tide. In twenty years, those diamond mines of Kimberley produced sixty-five millions of pounds sterling (about \$325,000,000), and founded, in the heart of the wilderness and on the edge of the isolated Transvaal, a great town of newspapers, railways, money and millionaires, and all the apparatus of modern civilization. What would be the next step? The next step was even more curious. For some years there had been rumors now and again of the finding of gold in the Transvaal. At first, the Boers feared the consequences of such a discovery, but at last the appetite for gain proved too strong, and the Government invited prospectors and offered rewards to

prospectors who succeeded. Here and there payable reefs were found, a certain interest was aroused, and a few men with a small amount of money went to work in the country.

Now, in the middle of the bare and desolate uplands of the Transvaal, the high veldt, as it is called, was a yet more bare and desolate ridge, some thirty miles long by about two or three broad. It was not of quartz or of any known gold-bearing rock. But in July, 1886, it was discovered that the reason it was not of gold-bearing rock was because it was almost of solid gold itself, for this you may practically say—all gold, for thirty miles by two or three, and one knows not how many thousand feet in depth. The report spread like wildfire. Farms of bare pasture, that ranged in value from £350 to £750 (about \$1,750 to \$3,750), were sold for £70,000 (about \$350,000) apiece. In 1885, for £10,000 (about \$50,000) you might have bought the entire ridge, until it was discovered in 1886 that it was worth about one thousand million pounds. You may guess what happened when the news was known. First from the diamond fields of Kimberley, then from the Colony, from England, France, America, Australia, all Europe, from all the world, poured in a feverish, hungry tide, to win wealth and take fortune by storm. What actually resulted may most briefly be indicated by a few simple figures. In 1886, the Transvaal was a thinly populated country, the Government was nearly bankrupt, and there were neither trades nor towns. In 1886, there were, perhaps, some 60,000 whites scattered over some 110,000 miles of country. In 1897, there were about 180,000 whites, of whom some 60,000 were Boers, including women and children, and the remainder foreigners, almost entirely men. In 1884, the revenue was £143,000 (about \$700,000), and the expenditure £183,000 (about \$900,000), leaving a deficit of £40,000, and a debt of nearly half a million (about two and a half million dollars); and not a soul would lend the Boers a shilling. In 1897, the revenue was five millions (about twenty-five million dollars), and the credit of the nation the best in the world; and a balance of £1,200,000 (about \$6,000,000) was lying at the bank. In 1884, there was practically no trade in gold in the Transvaal. In 1896, the total output amounted to something like three million ounces, valued at about £9,000,000 (about \$45,000,000), and there are probably some 450 millions (about 2,250 million dollars) left in the soil.

And on that barren upland ridge, nearly six thousand feet above the sea, where, in 1884, there were perhaps some half-dozen Boer huts and a few wild beasts, there stood in 1899 a great city of houses, mills and warehouses, of churches, clubs and theatres, of railways and of electricity, and some sixty thousand of the keenest, eagerest, busiest men on earth, hustling and jostling in the offices and streets. You must have seen it to conceive it—the endless roar, the endless throb, the unceasing telegrams to and from every city in the world, the thirty miles of tall chimneys with their rushing, crushing, roaring stamps, tearing the pure yellow gold from its hiding-place and flinging it forth to do its part too in the sin and shame, in the charity and goodness, in the sorrow and delight, in the peace and war of all the born and even the unborn millions of the earth.

Or you must go to Pretoria, thirty miles off, the seat of this strange Government, and see the great Government buildings and Government banks and Government mint, all built out of the foreigner's money, and see the club and the rose-covered houses and the running water, and President Krüger in his wealthy, tyrannous Puritanism. And all that, too, is paid for out of the foreigner's money.

And then you will get some idea of what the foreigner or Uitlander has done for the Boers of the Transvaal. Remember, too, that the foreigners were invited by the Boers to come, that they have made the fortune of the Boers individually and nationally, and consider what has been their final fate!

Once more for a moment we must dip back into history. When Mr. Gladstone surrendered the Transvaal, at least even he made some terms for the future, though three years later he yielded a little more to the insistence of the Boers. But certain claims of common humanity and civilization were demanded, not for Englishmen only, but for all white races, and certain political obligations were reserved. Complete self-government was granted to the Boers, but they undertook in return to give free rights of entrance into, residence in and departure from the country to all men; to give freedom and protection to all commerce; to grant all legal rights and protection to all; not to try to increase their boundaries; to conclude no treaties without the permission of England, and to conduct in general a civilized government. You must remember that this was solemnly promised and guaran-

teed by signed convention with England as paramount or suzerain power, in return for the internal independence of the Transvaal.

It was on the faith of these simple, yet solemn, promises that England and the world sent their men and money in peace. It is to insist on the observance of these promises that England sends to-day her men and money in war. From the very first, it would seem, President Krüger had leaned toward some sort of subterranean understanding with Germany, and to some hidden hope of one great Dutch Republic, with England and the English wiped away. Whatever expectations may have been based on German help have been obliterated by Germany's later and wider policy. But he was, indeed, to receive a reinforcement, both of rancor and effective strength, in the shape of a body of men known as the Hollanders.

And here, perhaps, I might explain who these much-hated Hollanders are. The Boers, as I have already pointed out, are a lazy, ignorant race, and after the great gold discovery they suddenly found themselves face to face with men and facts and circumstances with which they had neither enough knowledge nor enough energy to grapple. To meet this, Mr. Krüger imported from Holland a large number of somewhat low-class Dutch adventurers, to whom he entrusted almost every post of responsibility in the country. These Hollanders, as they are called, are perhaps the heaviest curse of all the curses in the Transvaal. Self-seeking, corrupt, tyrannous, spiteful, they robbed both Boer and Uitlander impartially, and, to forward their own bad ends, kept up a constant intrigue with Germany to thwart the interests of England. It is satisfactory to know that the true Boer hates them even more than the English. They quickly saw their line and took it. The Boers were idle and the Boers were ignorant. If by incessant and insidious intrigue the Hollanders could monopolize the machinery of government, if their hands were on the wires and their mouths at the speaking-tube of every department of civil organization, President Krüger might decree, but it would be their own leader who governed. To conduct such a campaign it was obvious that money was the first material necessity, money to bribe and money to buy. To this the Hollanders were more than equal. Monopolies, concessions, private arrangements, all played their part. Was it a railway? Was it a tariff? Was it some necessity of the mining industry? In each case, said

the Hollanders, "let us give it to some chosen *concessionaire*, German or Dutch for choice, and let us ourselves stand in when the carcass is divided. Let us grow rich, and let us win or buy German support of some kind, and the interests of the country, and of the community, and of the vast body which makes our fortune, matter not at all." Such, roughly and crudely expressed, was the policy which has underlain the actions of the Transvaal Government since the day when the Transvaal Government became of importance to the world.

Thus stood the situation in general in the spring of 1899. To state it in full detail would require many pages more. The whole wide budget of abuses and corruptions which led to the Reform Movement, and indirectly to the indefensible Jameson's Raid and its further results, must need a book for telling. And the needed book has but now been presented in Mr. Fitzpatrick's admirable and accurate tale of "The Transvaal from Within." It seems already amazing, and will seem yet more wonderful hereafter, that, in a small community, a large majority of Anglo-Saxon blood could bear for so long a period so tyrannous a government, so corrupt an administration, so intolerable a condition of life. To some, perhaps, it will seem still stranger that the proud Empire, professing to be paramount, could endure a humiliation so protracted and profound. But history shows us that the deep, immutable foundations of Anglo-Saxon Empire are bedded in the strong stupidity and unreasoning endurance of the Anglo-Saxon race. Sometimes, indeed, these qualities are pushed beyond the mark. The United Colonies of North America could not properly explain their view to England, and England was too stupid to understand such explanations as were given. And so both fell back on endurance, and it may be that neither has lost by the outcome of that struggle. In Canada the triumph of those excellent principles which unconsciously impelled us stood for years upon a razor's edge. And in South Africa, as I have tried to show, we have made love to disaster with all the taciless vehemence of a lusty but insensitive aspirant. But once more that other element of Anglo-Saxons, the sheer quality of luck, has intervened. And with luck the other qualities, once awoke to action, are irresistible.

In the case of the present war, the side of sentiment may be omitted wholly, save on the narrowest personal footing. The

Boers, it is true, wish to remain independent; the English wish to readjust the social and political conditions of life in South Africa. It cannot be denied that, by both the original Sand River Conventions of 1852 and 1854, England *granted* autonomy to the two Boer States. It cannot be denied that by the acceptance of that grant, *as a grant*, the Boers admitted the paramountcy or suzerainty (the word matters little) of England. It cannot be denied, in the case of the Transvaal, that by the further grant of 1881, modified by the concessions of 1884, which were *appealed for* by the Boer Government, the principle of British paramountcy was again admitted, and that an absolute equality of political and other rights was solemnly promised, not only to the British, but to all immigrating foreigners.

On the other hand, by ignoring utterly and ostentatiously the engagements on which their national existence has depended; by refusing the least of political or even municipal rights to that majority of the inhabitants who paid nine-tenths of the income of the country; by using vast sums of the money so obtained to enlist the enemies of England, and to equip themselves with an arsenal of arms against the Power which created and maintained them; and, lastly, by declaring war against her—by these things the Boers have made South Africa what it is to-day. A thousand voices tell us that it is the land-greed, the gold-greed, the Empire-greed of England that have made the war. England, they scream, is the conquering tyrant of free nations. Yet it is a French-born Government, loyal to England, that sends troops to the front from Canada, and it is a Dutch Government, loyal to England, that is in power at the Cape to-day. Formulas grow meaningless by repetition, but what truth they carry is unchanged. When England claims “equal rights for all white men south of the Zambesi,” she says, what generations in practice have proved true, that in Cape Colony, and Natal, and Rhodesia, the Boer stands on exactly the same footing with the English-born; and more, that in no English colony of the world has the proudest, richest Englishman one lonely political or commercial advantage over the humblest and poorest foreign immigrant.

It is to extend this equal freedom that we are fighting now, and, as the world lives longer and judges more wisely than the man, by the world this fight will never be regretted.

HENRY CUST.

THE AFRIKANDERS IN NATAL.

BY DR. J. C. VOIGT, AUTHOR OF "FIFTY YEARS OF THE HISTORY OF
THE REPUBLIC IN SOUTH AFRICA."

IN the second week of October, 1837, half a dozen horsemen were riding eastward through the mountain defile now known as the Van Reenen's Pass of the Drakensberg.

Each man carried, suspended over his back by a shoulder strap, or resting across the pommel of his saddle, a long carbine with a large "sight" of bone or ivory on the muzzle—the old-fashioned, flint-lock elephant gun. A bullet pouch, made of soft calfskin and filled with slugs and big six-to-the-pound musket balls, a powder horn and a long-bladed hunter's knife were his other military accoutrements. Bearded faces, browned and tanned by sun and wind and dust; strong limbed frames clad in coats of corduroy or *bafta* and in leather or corduroy breeches; stiff-brimmed felt hats; hard-soled *veldt schoene*,* all bespoke the frontiersman.

But this description of the typical, rough South African borderer of 1837 does not quite apply in every detail to each of the six horsemen who rode through Van Reenen's Pass; for there was one among them in whose wearing apparel and equipment evidence of taste for the artistic and the elegant was not altogether wanting.

Broad-shouldered and of medium stature, with dark hair and beard, and with eyes as keen as those of the mountain eagles gyrating in the sky overhead, high above the loftiest peaks of the Berg; animated in speech and gesture, and yet over all his features a quiet dignity and reserve, which marked him out to command and be a leader of men; such was the first Commandant-General of the Emigrant Farmers.

* Skin shoes; the South African moccasins.

Pieter Maurits Retief was born at Wagenmakers Vallei, in the Paarl district of the Western Province of Cape Colony, in 1797, two years after the proclamation of the first Afrikaner Republics of Graaff Reinet and Swellendam. Early in life he had emigrated to the Eastern Province of the Colony, where, in the district of the Winterberg, he had become a very influential man, and held the office of Field Commandant. He had married the widow of Commandant Greyling, a burgher officer who fell in the Kafir war of 1834.

The Republics which had been established, two years before he was born, by his countrymen in the districts of Graaff Reinet and Swellendam, had been suppressed by England. The Republican leaders who attempted a rising in 1799 had been punished with relentless cruelty in the unsanitary cells of the Castle prison of Cape Town, where two of them had died. When Retief was twenty years of age, some of the Graaff Reinet Republicans had again risen in insurrection. By the open grave of a frontiersman named Frederik Bezuidenhout, who had been shot by the British Hottentot soldiery, they had listened to the impassioned words of a brother of the deceased man, and taken an oath to drive the Government's Hottentot troops out of the country. Their chief leader, Hendrik Prinsloo, and several others, had been arrested. Jan Bezuidenhout, his followers dispersed and scattered, his wife and son fighting by his side, had made his last stand, and died. His wife and son, both wounded, had been taken prisoners. On the 16th of December, 1815, a British tribunal for the trial of thirty-nine prisoners concerned in the insurrection had met at Uitenhage. Then had followed the sentences, and, in March of the following year, the execution of five of the Republican leaders on the hill of Slachtersnek.

Retief had frequently heard narrated to him all the details of the cruel execution scene: how the friends and relatives of the condemned men begged in vain for a reprieve; how thirty-two of the other prisoners, many of them condemned to banishment from the country for life, were compelled to witness the execution; how the gallows collapsed and fell to earth when the unfortunate victims were half-strangled; how the bystanders then went down on their knees and pleaded with the British officer for mercy, pointing out to him that God had interceded for the unfortunate sufferers; how the executioners of the Sovereign, who,

according to the Government proclamation of the day, was "so eminently distinguished for tempering justice with mercy," were implacable; how brave Martha Bezuidenhout, who had been wounded, and whose husband had been killed by the Hottentots, was among those banished for life; how the British Crown refused to surrender the bodies of the executed men to their friends and relatives, who desired to give them Christian burial.

In the Winterberg Mountains, Pieter Retief had brooded over the wrongs of his nation. Like Joan of Arc, he had heard voices. They had called him to lead his people to the north, and then to the sea. He had seen more of South Africa than the other leaders of the emigrants. Born and educated in the west—where the industrial and agricultural pursuits of the people, as well as the climate, scenery, and configuration of the country, are so totally different from what pertains in the eastern district as to make the one a different world from the other—and with a career in the east already not without distinction, Retief was somewhat of a cosmopolitan as well as a patriot. He was going to found a State, not for cattle farmers and stock graziers alone. He meant to build up a free republic for all Afrikanders, where industries and commercial pursuits could thrive; and, therefore, he thought it of the greatest importance to secure an independent seaboard. He had grown up and worked with the evidence of the misrule and stupidity of the Cape Town officials and of Downing Street all round him. The grumbling and the muttered curses of the frontiersmen had told him of the discontent which was spreading through South Africa. He thought he saw the opportunity to raise up a State unfettered by British dominion, and to make his nation free and independent. A harbor on the Indian Ocean would give access to the rest of the world.

Thoroughly understanding his own countrymen and the situation of the country; seeing clearly what made for weakness and what for strength in the popular cause; gifted with a genius for organizing and for commanding, and with a power—far above that of his compeers—for inspiring confidence and trust; impulsive and enthusiastic, and at the same time resolute and determined; characterized by restless activity and untiring energy in the execution of his projects; bold and daring to the verge of rashness in his enterprises; of amiable, frank and generous disposition, and eminently fitted by all these qualities to be a leader

of men, Retief, moreover, possessed acquirements which were rare accomplishments at a time and in a country where few opportunities existed for obtaining such education as can be derived from schools and from reading. He not only understood his own nation—Eastern as well as Western Province Afrikaners—he also knew something of the literature of Holland, as far as it related to politics and history. He had, besides, a good knowledge of English, which he could speak and write fluently. He was an orator and a keen student of the history of his own times, not only in his own country, but also in the outer world. He was as enlightened and educated a South African as it was possible to find in those days.

Riding through the great clefts between the rock masses of the Drakensberg, Pieter Retief and his companions, in October, 1837, passed on to descend the mountains where the railway line from Ladysmith to Harrismith in the Orange Free State now zigzags up the steep slopes. The plains to the north of the Orange River were dotted with the encampments of those who had undertaken the Great Trek from Cape Colony. North of the Vaal, some of the emigrants—those under Trichard and Van Rensburg—had already passed through the country to Zoutpansberg and then to Delagoa.

All these men and women who left their homes in Cape Colony to go into the wilderness were the pioneers of self-government in South Africa. Self-government was then unobtainable under British rule. The government of Cape Colony was an "unlimited despotism." The Trek began in 1833; and, therefore, it could not have been caused, as British writers say it was, by the emancipation of the slaves, which took place in 1834. Besides, the emigrant farmers, or Trekkers, practically all came from the Eastern Province of Cape Colony, where there were no slaves, or next to none. That the Republic arose again in South Africa because magnanimous England emancipated the slaves—in other words, the Republicans favored slavery—is a pious fiction, a convenient invention of British writers. The Trek was the protest of the frontiersmen against foreign autocratic despotism. As the creation of the Republics of Graaff Reinet and Swellendam, in 1795, had shown his hostility to the misrule of the Dutch East India Company, so his declaration of independence north of the Orange River proved the frontiersman's determination to be free

from all foreign control. The emigrants were the champions of self-government and of free representative institutions in South Africa, against despotic rule from abroad. They showed continuity of policy in their aspirations, and consistent attachment to the ideals of their fathers; for the cause was exactly the same as that of 1795. To ignore this, and to say, as do the official British chroniclers, that the great emigration northward and the re-establishment of the Republic were caused by England's emancipation of the slaves, is about as absurd, and as historically untrue, as it would be to affirm that the origin of the American War of Independence and of the great Commonwealth of the United States was the attempt on the part of the British Government to suppress a mob in Boston, and to put down anarchy by force of arms.

Retief's mission was to proceed to the Bay of Natal, and from there to Umkungunhlovu, the capital of Zululand. The Zulu King, Dingaan, ruled over Natal by right of conquest. The armies of his predecessor, Chaka, had overrun all the country lying between the mouth of the Tugela River and that of the Umzimvubu. From the coast line between these two rivers, inland to the Drakensberg and the Upper Tugela, the land was waste and relatively uninhabited by native tribes. Some five or six thousand blacks, living mostly in concealment in the forests and mountain ridges, in order to escape Zulu raiding parties, represented the entire population of Natal. The triangular area of country lying northward of the Upper Tugela—which river may be taken as the base of the triangle, the apex being at Laing's Nek, and the two sides being formed by the Drakensberg Range and the Buffalo River—was part of Zululand proper.

In the immediate vicinity of the harbor of Natal some hunters and adventurers from Cape Town and Port Elizabeth had built a small settlement of huts and wigwams. They acknowledged the rule of the Zulu king.

By Government proclamations and despatches, England had repeatedly disclaimed all intention and wish to obtain any territory in Natal.

Such was the political situation of the country when Retief and his companions arrived at Port Natal, obtained the co-operation of the English settlers there in his projects, and then travelled to Dingaan's Kraal on the White Umveloosi.

He desired to get the Zulu monarch's consent to the settlement of the emigrants in Natal, and to obtain a cession of the territory from the king.

A marauding band of Basuto raiders from the Drakensberg Mountains had previously carried off some Zulu cattle, and Dingaan consented to comply with the emigrant leader's request if the farmers could retake the cattle from the Basutos.

Sikonyella, the Basuto chief, whose raiders had carried off Dingaan's cattle, was compelled by the emigrants to give up his booty. Then Pieter Retief, accompanied by sixty-five armed horsemen, rode back to Zululand. Dingaan ceded to them "the region Port Natal with all the land attached to it—that is to say, from the Tugela as far as the Umzimvubu River to the west, and from the sea to the north as far as the country may be suitable for occupation."

Then a war dance was performed, apparently in honor of the strangers.

The ground trembled with the incessant heavy thump of the feet of two thousand dusky warriors. Accompanying voices intoned the cadences of the battle song. Loud and clear rang out the herald's mimic challenge to the foe. Stalwart captains, whose head circlets were ornamented with heavy plumes, muscular Indunas, whose loins and shoulders were partly covered with massive leopard skin karosses, roared and bellowed their words of command in deep-toned basso; and, from all the line of Zulu soldiers came the answering echo of deep bass voices, as once more the earth seemed to tremble under the heels of the dancers.

Then the vessel containing the maize brew was brought, and as the emigrants sat down to drink the parting cup, Dingaan stepped back toward his hut, and gave the treacherous signal to his warriors. "Kill the wizards!" was the cry, as the doomed men were seized. They were dragged to the hill, Chlooma Ama-boota, on the edge of a precipice overlooking the kraal. Here they were murdered by the Zulus.

Ten months later, when the avenging win-commando, under Andries Pretorius, reached this part of Zululand, they found, impaled on a sharp stake, the body of Pieter Retief, half-mummified, half-crumbled to dust, untouched by vultures and wild beasts. From the shoulder hung suspended the little leather despatch bag, in which was safely preserved the deed of cession

of Natal. Ranged around their dead leader, and, like him, impaled on stakes driven into the ground, stood the other sixty-five faithful sentinels—faithful to the Republic, even in death.

While Retief had been negotiating with Dingaan, a thousand wagons of the emigrants had descended from the Drakensberg by way of Van Reenen's Pass. The massacre at the Zulu kraal took place on the 6th of February, 1838. Soon after that date there were laagers on the Tugela, Blauwkrans, and Bushmans rivers, near where Colenso, Frere and Weenen are now. There were also a few small camps south of the Bushmans River.

Swiftly Dingaan's *impis* swept over the land. Neither man, woman, nor child was spared. Several hundreds were killed.

Reinforcements came from the other side of the mountains. Pieter Uys and Hendrik Potgieter led the burghers into Zululand; but, at Italení, Uys and his gallant son were slain and the burgher column had to fall back on Natal.

The winter of 1838 was a dark period in the history of the emigrants. Sickness, poverty and distress were in their camps; the graves of their murdered relatives around them. The Zulu army attacked them once more on the Bushmans River. The British Government, in proclamations issued at Cape Town, not only threatened them with all sorts of pains and penalties, but interfered with their supplies of ammunition, prevented their sympathizers in Cape Colony from going to their assistance, and even refused to allow medicines and hospital necessities to be forwarded to them by their friends.

Their courage, however, did not falter in the time of their adversity. A few waverers among the men were in favor of giving up the enterprise and returning to Cape Colony. But the women unanimously resolved not to abandon Natal. The gallant struggle to defend the land where the lost ones lay buried was continued.

On the death of Gerrit Maritz, the successor of Pieter Retief, Andries Pretorius was appointed Commandant-General. Early in December, a commando of burghers crossed the Upper Tugela and advanced into Zululand. On the 9th, their laager stood on the banks of the Sundays River, about fifteen miles east of the present town of Ladysmith and thirty miles northeast of where General Buller's camp stood on the 9th of December, 1899.

A vow to God was solemnly entered into by the burghers in

their camp. Andries Pretorius and others of their leaders addressed them and invoked the help of Providence.

On the following Sunday—the 16th of December, 1838—at daybreak, fully 12,000 Zulus, led by Dingaan's two best generals, swept down on the three hundred white men, in their laager on the Blood River, a tributary of the Buffalo. The battle was over by ten o'clock in the forenoon. Time after time the black columns had hurled themselves against the solid squares of wagons, in vain. The rifle fire of the defenders had strewn the plain with dead Zulu warriors. Then Bart Pretorius, brother of the Commandant-General, had cleft the Zulu army in two by a charge of burgher mounted riflemen. Dingaan's finest regiments had been scattered like chaff before the wind. Three thousand Zulu soldiers lay dead on the veldt.

Into the heart of Zululand rode Andries Pretorius and his three hundred burghers. Dingaan's royal kraals were burnt; the deed of cession of the territory of Natal to the emigrants and their descendants was recovered; the bodies of Retief and the others who had been massacred at Umkungunhlovu were interred. The win-commando returned to Natal.

At the Buffalo River a horse express came to inform Pretorius that a British force had seized the Bay of Natal and all the stores of ammunition belonging to the emigrants.

It was the first British raid on the Republic, the Napier Raid. Governor Sir George Napier, of Cape Town, urged on by colonial merchants and traders jealous of the growing commercial importance of Natal, had seized the harbor of Durban without official sanction from Downing Street.

Such sanction not being forthcoming, the British force subsequently retired.

The Republican colors were hoisted over the fort which had been occupied by the British troops. The townships of Pietermaritzburg, called after Pieter Retief and Gerrit Maritz, Weenen, named in memory of those who had been massacred on the Bushmans and Blauwkrans rivers, and Durban were established.

Another campaign against Dingaan completely shattered the Zulu despot's power. His brother Panda was installed ruler of Zululand in his place. The deposed chief fled across the Pongola River into Swaziland, where he was slain. The new king of Zululand declared himself a vassal of the Republic of Natal.

The old district of Potchefstroom, the country north of the Vaal River, and the district of Winburg, the region between the Vet and Vaal, together formed the Republic of Winburg. This State, under the rule of a Commandant-General, Andries Hendrik Potgieter, and a Volksraad, now formed a federal union with Natal. There was a Court of Landdrost and Heemraden. Every white inhabitant had the franchise, and all white emigrants who settled in the country received a free grant of land for a farm. There were no taxes, except a land tax, and the officials were unsalaried.

Such was the primitive constitution of the peasant State. Laws and institutions exactly similar to those in the Republic of Winburg prevailed in that of Natal.

The territory under Republican rule thus extended from the Orange River, in the south, to the Zoutpansberg, in the north, and from the Indian Ocean, on the east, to the border of the Kalahari Desert, on the west.

In four years' time the emigrants had transformed the wilderness into what would soon have grown into a flourishing State. The great military despotism which had sought to destroy the pioneers had been humbled and shattered.

Great streams of native immigration then began to pour into the territories of the newly established Republic, where the aborigines found protection and safety. While the missionaries and the Cape newspapers were telling the people of England that Pretorius and Potgieter and their followers were the oppressors and exterminators of the native races, these natives themselves regarded the Voortrekker commandants as deliverers, under whose rule they came to place themselves, in thousands and tens of thousands.

During less than six years of Republican rule in Natal, the native population increased from five or six thousand (the figure given by Theal as that representing the total number when Retief crossed the Drakensberg), to between eighty and one hundred thousand (the figures of British Commissioner Cloete).

The foundation of the Afrikaner Republics—Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal—is as unique an example as can be found in the history of the modern world of a small white community, struggling for self-preservation against barbarism, and yet just and humane in its policy toward the savage races. In-

dividual acts of cruelty there have been, of course; where have they not occurred when the white man meets the black on the frontiers of civilization, when the European builds his dwelling in wild, new lands? But the historian cannot hope to arrive at correct conclusions by judging from individual instances. And yet one British writer after another, in dealing with South Africa, has employed this faulty method of generalizing without sufficient *data*. The Afrikaner has been described as cruel to the natives, as being little, if any, better than a robber and a plunderer.

The broad facts of history have been ignored by the mass of British writers on South Africa. The great British public has been led to believe that its own Government is the heaven-appointed protector of the aboriginal races all the world over. As a matter of fact, there is not a single one of the large self-governing British colonies in which whole nations of the aborigines are not dying out, owing to the indirect action of bad laws, in some cases; as the direct result of the cruelty of the State, in others. In every one of the Afrikaner Republics the immediate result of the establishment of the government of the emigrants was an enormous increase in the numbers of each individual Kafir nation enjoying the protection of that government.

It was British rule which caused the Hottentots in Cape Colony to die out. It was Afrikaner rule, the rule of the despised and maligned "Boer," which saved the natives of Natal, as well as those to the north of the Orange and Vaal rivers, from annihilation.

The great British public is nothing if not imaginative. Can it not put itself in the place of others and judge other nations charitably? Even lyddite shells will not maintain an empire which is built on delusions.

The Republic meant salvation to white as well as black. Thousands of Cape Colonists left the British territories and joined the emigrants, between the years 1836 and 1840.

When, in August, 1841, the harbor of Natal was entered by the American ship, "Levant," with a large cargo of merchandise for the emigrants, there was a flutter in the dovecotes of those enterprising and enthusiastic empire-extenders, the Cape Town shopkeepers. Then, as now, the so-called South African Association was formed—in London. To suppress the Afrikanders

and to paint the map red, were the objects of that agitation as of to-day's.

The second British raid was the Smith Raid. British troops were marched from Pondoland to seize Natal. In a night attack on the emigrant laager, near Congella, Captain Smith was badly beaten and lost his artillery, May 24, 1842. He was then besieged in his own camp for a month, when strong reinforcements under Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete, together with the sixty-four guns of a British frigate, compelled Pretorius to retire from his position, give up the harbor, and retreat inland.

While Captain Smith was besieged by the farmers, he had sought, but failed to obtain, aid from the Zulus.* Lieutenant-Colonel Cloete was equally unscrupulous. He employed Kafir marauding parties as scouts and looters for his army. They murdered several farmers on isolated farms. They maltreated women and children, stripping them stark naked, and driving them away into the veldt. These helpless victims of England's might were found, and rescued, by a patrol of burghers under Bart Pretorius, after having wandered about for three days without food.†

When Pretorius, whose conduct to the wounded and non-combatants on the British side had been generous and magnanimous, remonstrated by letter with the Queen's military officers and protested against their inhuman method of carrying on the war, the answer was that, as the burghers had caused the condition of affairs in Natal by "rebellious," they "must bear the consequences."

The order for the Kafir marauding expeditions remained in force.

Under these circumstances, the struggle was not resumed. The Volksraad of Natal submitted. The Republic was subdued.

The leaders, Pretorius, Burger, Prinsloo, and the Bredas, father and son, were outlawed. Pretorius was afterward pardoned. Prinsloo and the elder Van Breda died of fever on their journey inland from Delagoa Bay. Burger made his way over the mountains to Lydenburg.

* See Theal; "History of South Africa," Vol. 4, p. 317.

† P. 251 *et seq.* of Vol. 2 of the writer's, "Fifty Years of the History of the Republic in South Africa." London, T. Fisher Unwin; 1899. The particulars are taken from the oral narrative dictated to the author in 1881, by Senior Commandant J. H. Visser, one of the Voortrekkers who fought under Pretorius against the British.

The Volksraad and all popular representative institutions were abolished. Thousands of Zulus, cattle thieves and plunderers were allowed to overrun the country. The farms of Republicans were practically confiscated. All this, in direct violation of the terms of the treaty of submission.

Back over the mountains, through the passes of the black Drakensberg, went the Voortrekkers. Men, women and little children again went into the wilderness, in order to retain their flag. In poverty, in suffering, in sorrow, they looked back on the lost land in which their loved ones lay buried. The mists came over the mountains, and the drenching showers descended in torrents. Shoeless, and often hungry, weary, and faint; worn out with hardship, and toil, and battle, and sickness, and distress; their own beloved land, for which they had suffered and bled, in the grasp of that Power which they now regarded as the oppressor and the spoiler; homeless outcasts in misery and exile; with bleak rocks around and the wilds of trackless deserts in front of them: the South African Pilgrim Fathers did not yet lose heart.

The Republic was not dead.

The children of those who had suffered and died for the cause of liberty, the sons of the martyrs of Weenen and Umkungunhlovu, would know how to defend the great heritage entrusted to their care.

“ For Freedom’s battle once begun,
Bequeathed by bleeding Sire to Son,
Though baffled oft, is ever won.”

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It is the last year of the century which opened with the cruel punishment of the Republicans of Graaf Reinet,* among whom there was one Lucas Meyer—as there were, also, two named Krüger, and two named Botha—in the prison at Cape Town.

It is the 16th of December; the anniversary of the opening ceremony of the court which ordered the execution of the Afrikaner leaders at Slachtersnek; the anniversary of the great defeat of Dingaan’s armies at the Blood River; the anniversary of the commencement of the Transvaal War of Independence at

*From June, 1799, to August, 1800, these men were kept imprisoned, without trial, in an overcrowded prison cell—more than eighty prisoners being locked up in one room every night. In September, 1800, two were sentenced to death, one was condemned to be publicly flogged on the scaffold, others to banishment for life, or to imprisonment.

Potchefstroom; the anniversary of the proclamation at Heidelberg of the restoration of the South African Republic.

The sons have come back over those mountains—the sons of the Voortrekkers. Over the Drakensbergen they have come back, to retake the land of their fathers.

The largest army which England has ever had on the battlefield in South Africa—over twenty thousand men, horse, foot and artillery, with powerful guns from British warships and with lyddite shells to help them—has been hurled back from the Upper Tugela line, losing two thousand men in killed, wounded and prisoners, and, also, eleven guns.

On the Tugela, where the fathers died in 1838, ay, and south of the Tugela, are the sons—now, on the 16th of December, 1899.


They are there with Lucas Meyer; with Louis Botha, whose mother was in the laager on the Bushmans River in 1838; and with Schalk Burger, whose father was outlawed and proscribed by the British Government, and went across Drakensberg, in 1842.

They stand on the Tugela, while, in the background, the great Drakensberg Mountains, where the snow-white everlastings grow, rear their topmost peaks above the clouds.

The British General has asked for an armistice to bury his dead—on the 16th of December—to bury his dead, in the very ground where rest some of the bones of the murdered Voortrekkers.

“Avenge Majuba!” the crowds have shouted, in London and at Durban and Cape Town. God has avenged Slachtersnek, instead.

J. C. VOIGT.



THE DANGER OF PERSONAL RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA.

BY MONTAGU WHITE, RECENTLY CONSUL-GENERAL OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN REPUBLIC IN LONDON.

VARIOUS motives have been put forward to justify the war which is at present paralyzing the commercial, political and social life of South Africa. "Equal rights for all white men in the Transvaal," "No taxation without representation," "The redress of the Uitlanders' grievances," "The maintenance of British supremacy or paramountcy," are among the more plausible reasons advanced by the war party.

The disclaimer of Lord Salisbury, "We seek no territories, we seek no gold fields," provoked a storm of protest and explanation from the Unionist press, and will no doubt be carefully scrutinized at the conclusion of hostilities.

On the other hand, the war has been proclaimed inevitable on account of the "Great Dutch Conspiracy"—a theory suggested by two facts: first, the open and public arming of the Transvaal on an extensive scale since the Jameson Raid, and secondly, the action of the Orange Free State, unexpected by Great Britain, in joining the Transvaal in order to resist the extinction of the latter Republic by imperial aggression. This theory was eagerly adopted and developed in the interests of political opportunism, in order to cover the retreat of the clumsy diplomacy and the lack of statesmanship which has characterized the British negotiations with the South African Republic during the last four years. An elementary knowledge of South African conditions and sentiment is sufficient to banish this absurd "nightmare" from the area of serious controversy.

It would be impossible to discuss at length the various influ-

ences and forces all heading straight for this war. It is only necessary to make a brief reference to some of the more important causes. First of all, a discontented and irreconcilable British element in Johannesburg was one of the most potent factors. This element was confronted by an original population of Dutch farmers, whose conservatism was intensified by sixty-five years of bitter experience of Great Britain. The sudden inrush of a mining, commercial and speculative community was a complicated problem which would have taxed the abilities and resources of the best organized administration in the world. Even Great Britain was at first unsuccessful in governing the smaller population of the Diamond Fields, for riots, bloodshed and anarchy characterized the early days of British administration in Griqualand West.

The clumsy diplomacy, to which reference has already been made, must not be lost sight of. Then there was a disappointed capitalistic politician, who had ruined his career as a statesman by an act of mad folly, and who was burning to be revenged on those whom he had bitterly wronged. Last, but not least, there were three immensely powerful but unavowed forces, which may be conveniently described as greed of gold, lust of empire and a thirst for revenge. The first was represented by Capitalism, in its pleas for a change in the administration of the Republic, which would result in higher dividends, based upon cheaper white labor and a modified system of black slavery. The second was voiced by the yellow press of London, and posed as Jingoism pure and simple; it was intoxicated but not satiated by the successes of Omdurman and Fashoda, and shouted loudly for the suppression of the two "nebulous" Republics which marred the symmetry of the South African map. The third was strikingly illustrated by the farewell cry of the crowd, "Remember Majuba!" as the troop-laden trains steamed out of the terminal stations in London.

There is another element, however, in the situation which must be kept steadily in view in apportioning the blame for this deplorable tragedy in South Africa. I refer to the growth of personal rule as embodied in the High Commissioner of South Africa.

For those who are unacquainted with local conditions, it may be necessary to explain that the supreme imperial representative in South Africa is the High Commissioner, who is at the same time Governor of the Cape Colony. In dealing with strictly Colonial matters, the High Commissioner, as Governor of the Cape Colony,

is bound to act constitutionally with the advice and consent of his Colonial Ministers. His duties as High Commissioner, however, embrace the care of imperial interests in Rhodesia and Basutoland, as well as the conduct of negotiations with the Governments of the South African Republic and the Orange Free State. In the exercise of these duties he would be technically correct in acting autocratically and in ignoring the views and advice of his Colonial Ministers. Whether he would be wise in acting in such a manner is quite another matter. Those who are intimately acquainted with the conditions in South Africa would unhesitatingly answer the question in the negative for the following reasons. It is impossible for the High Commissioner to take any important step in regard to either the Transvaal or the Orange Free State without its having very marked direct or indirect results in the Cape Colony and Natal, because the same racial sentiment and social conditions exist in the Free State and the Transvaal as in the Cape Colony and Natal. The countries are closely connected by the ties of blood and kinship.

The Boer in the Transvaal and in the Free State is almost exactly the same type as his kinsman in Natal and the Cape Colony. Some of the most progressive and liberal-minded Boers in South Africa are to be found in the districts of Ermelo, Wakker-Stroom and Utrecht, in the Transvaal, and in the districts of Winburg and Harrismith, in the Free State, while some of the most backward and uneducated types are subjects of Queen Victoria, living in the districts of Prince Albert, Carnarvon and Beaufort West. The Boers are practically the same throughout all South Africa; they inhabit the country districts; they are inclined to be conservative, averse to high taxation, intensely imbued with local patriotism and unaffected by imperial developments beyond the confines of South Africa. In a word, their political horizon is limited by the boundaries of South Africa. The local English, on the other hand, with the exception of a few farmers in the North-eastern Province of the Cape Colony and in the coast districts of Natal, are dwellers in towns, full of imperial patriotism and somewhat contemptuous of local politics, overflowing with zeal for imperial expansion, and singing "God Save the Queen," in season and out of season, not so much in the spirit of a prayer for the Sovereign as a trumpet-note of defiance to the Dutch.

The Dutch in the Cape Colony are perfectly loyal to and con-

tent with British rule, and no dissatisfaction is expressed as long as their kinsmen in the Orange Free State and the South African Republic are left unmolested. They have always been opposed to changes in the Constitution, even to the substitution of responsible government for direct imperial rule. It is this very conservatism and contentment with British administration that would be an effective obstacle to any conspiracy for the purpose of introducing a Republican instead of a Colonial form of government. The Cape Colonial Dutch, who form quite three-fifths of the whole population, have seen their kinsmen oppressed, pursued, wronged and unsympathetically treated by Great Britain for nearly a hundred years, and they are extremely sensitive on this point. It is this vigilance and the very natural expression of dissatisfaction at England's constant violation of her pledges to their Republican brethren, which have been adduced as reasons to justify the theory of "Disloyalty" and the "Great Dutch Conspiracy" to which reference has already been made. The Cape Colony is the oldest settlement in South Africa, and the Colonial Ministers, fortified by local knowledge and permanent traditions, are perfectly justified in attempting to influence the High Commissioner, who, no matter how distinguished or able he may be, arrives at Cape Town a stranger, ignorant of local conditions and absolutely inexperienced as to South African politics. It will be readily conceded, therefore, that it is of the utmost importance that the High Commissioner of South Africa, as well as the Governor of Cape Colony, should be guided by the advice and experience of his Colonial Ministers, and should so shape his policy as to harmonize imperial ideals with colonial sentiment. Such a policy would tend toward confederation or union; it would strengthen and deepen the loyalty of the Cape Dutch; and while fully respecting the rights and the independence of the two Republics, would enable the latter to co-operate cordially with the Colonies in promoting the welfare of South Africa.

The history of the relations between the High Commissioners and the successive Cape Ministers since 1877 would yield very instructive results. It is, however, not possible now to do more than roughly sketch the outlines and characteristics of the different policies and attitudes adopted by the four imperial officers who have presided over the destinies of South Africa since 1877.

The following is a list of the High Commissioners, with a

fairly correct indication of the duration of their successive terms of office: Sir Bartle Frere, 1877 to 1880; Sir Hercules Robinson, 1880 to 1889; Sir Henry Loch, 1889 to 1894; Sir Hercules Robinson, 1895 to 1897; Sir Alfred Milner, 1897.

Sir Bartle Frere was one of the most distinguished officers in the imperial service. His successful career in India entitled him to a far more important position than that of the High Commissionership of South Africa. He was, however, specially solicited by the Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, to accept the position in order to carry out his policy of confederation. As an inducement he was promised the position of the first Governor-General of United South Africa, with a salary of £10,000 a year. Sir Bartle Frere accepted the position, and in April, 1877, assumed the duties of High Commissioner. It must not be forgotten that he had been trained in the school of Indian administration, which is nothing more or less than a pure military despotism. In January, 1878, Imperialism and Colonialism came into conflict over the conduct of a colonial war with the Gcalekas, a Kafir tribe in the Transkei. He quarreled with his Ministers and took the high-handed course of dismissing them, and requesting Sir Gordon Sprigg, the leader of the opposition, but an untried politician, to form another Ministry. The personal popularity and prestige of Sir Bartle Frere enabled him to obtain from the Cape Parliament an indorsement of this arbitrary proceeding. But it was the first of the many fatal steps in his career of personal rule.

The triumph of personal rule then, as now, was marked by a trail of blood in every part of South Africa. Gcalekas, Gaikas, Tembus, Zulus, Basutos, and, ultimately, Boers, were sacrificed on the altar of autocratic power. The opposition to Sir Bartle Frere's policy spread from South Africa to Great Britain, and ultimately became so overwhelming that the British Government decided upon his recall in 1880, and a distinguished career was ended in disgrace.

His successor, Sir Hercules Robinson, arrived at the Cape at the end of 1880. His term of office was inaugurated by the outbreak of the Boer War of Independence, and he was thus confronted at the outset of his career by difficulties that certainly appeared insurmountable. Peace was concluded shortly after Majuba, and the Convention of 1881 restored to the Boers a very limited instalment of the independence which they had enjoyed under

the Sand River Convention before the annexation of 1877. Long after the excitement of the war had subsided in the Transvaal and Free State, the reflex action of sympathy with their kinsmen made itself felt in the Cape Colony. The Cape Dutch awoke to political life, and there was much ferment and unrest, the direct outcome of indignation with the imperial Government in annexing and retaining the Transvaal, against the wish of its inhabitants, up to the climax of bloodshed. Sir Hercules Robinson's tenure of office also embraced that very critical period in South African history which culminated in the Bechuanaland Expedition and the settlement of the western border. The foregoing will indicate some of the difficulties which confronted him during his administration. The Dutch, now fully awake, had become a political power, and have controlled the fate of the different Ministries at the Cape from that time until the present moment. The uprising of Dutch sentiment was said to be originally inimical to British interests; under unwise or autocratic administration it might easily have been consolidated into an element of permanent hostility to Great Britain. But Sir Hercules Robinson, by working in harmony with his Ministers on strictly constitutional lines, succeeded in establishing a sane Imperialism on the broad basis of colonial sentiment. He rejected all ideas of personal rule, was sternly intolerant of Jingoism, Empire leagues and all the paraphernalia of a bastard Imperialism. When he arrived in Cape Town he found that Imperialism had been debased and was at its lowest ebb. It is no exaggeration to say that when he left, the prestige of true Imperialism was higher than it ever has been either before or since. The breach between English and Dutch was healed, and harmony and confidence characterized the relations between Great Britain and the Republics.

"Sir Hercules Robinson," President Krüger once exclaimed, "ah! he was a man of his word." His term of office really expired in 1885, but so successful had his administration been that he was asked to remain, and did so until 1889. Before leaving he made an important speech at Cape Town, of which the following extracts sufficiently indicate the lines of his policy:

"There are three competing influences in South Africa. They are Colonialism, Republicanism and Imperialism. As to the last, it is a diminishing quantity, there being now no longer any permanent place in the future of South Africa for direct imperial rule on any large

scale. . . . The 'Governor-General in embryo,' of whom we have heard who is to administer, as in India, a system of personal as distinguished from Parliamentary rule, and round whom the several Colonies and States are to rally, will, I venture to think, remain permanently 'in embryo.' . . . There being then, as I have shown, no longer any permanent place in South Africa for direct imperial rule, and viewing it simply as an aid to colonial expansion, there remain only the competing influences of Colonialism and Republicanism. Whether these will always retain, as at present, their separate organisms, or whether one will, like Aaron's rod, absorb the other, is a problem which I will not attempt to discuss, but I venture to think that British Colonialism is very heavily handicapped in the race by the well-meant but mistaken interference of irresponsible and ill-informed persons in England. The tendency of such amateur meddling, to my mind, is injurious in the long run to the natives, while it makes every resident in the Republics—English as well as Dutch—rejoice in their independence, and converts many a colonist from an Imperialist into a Republican."

This speech created a sensation in England and was the subject of debates in Parliament and of leading articles in the press.

The *Times*, in its issue of the 6th of June, 1889, while taking exception to certain portions of the foregoing speech, advocated the return of Sir Hercules, and concluded its article as follows:

"No Governor of Cape Colony has as yet ever proved able to give perfect satisfaction to his two masters (the Colonial Office and the Cape Cabinet). Sir Hercules Robinson has completely contented the Colonists, which is, after all, the chief thing needful, and probably no one will reconcile better than he the conflicting duties of the position."

In 1893 Sir Hercules Robinson, in the course of a conversation on the subject of Swaziland and the Transvaal, remarked that experience at the Cape had convinced him that there was only one true way of governing South Africa, and that was through the Dutch. The Dutch were a permanent factor, intensely imbued with local patriotism, loyal to the Crown when their racial sentiments were not outraged, and perfectly easy to reconcile with a legitimate Imperialism. The English were, for the most part, townspeople; some of them rather deficient in local patriotism, but surcharged at times with inconvenient loyalty to England, which left them at the mercy of every irresponsible agitator who might appeal to racial passions. The High Commissioner should sternly discourage anything like racial cleavage and attain Imperialism by shaping it in accordance with local and Dutch sentiment. Such a policy might necessitate ignoring, if not repressing, the ultra-Loyalists of the English party. Sir Hercules Robinson

concluded by saying that no one had strengthened his convictions in this direction more than Mr. Rhodes, whom he termed a "sound Afrikaner." After his return to England this most important position in the British Empire was said to have been hawked about and cheapened before it was finally accepted by Sir Henry Loch, the Governor of Victoria. He entered upon his duties toward the end of 1889. Unlike Sir Hercules Robinson, who was cold and reserved in manner and somewhat indifferent to general social functions, Sir Henry Loch, like Sir Bartle Frere, possessed great personal charm and affability, while Government House soon became noted as a delightful social centre. But the influence of social charm does not extend much beyond Cape Town and its suburbs, whereas the policy of a High Commissioner makes itself felt in the remotest corners of South Africa. Sir Henry Loch had only been in Cape Town a short time when the impression, rightly or wrongly, got abroad that the new High Commissioner was hostile to President Krüger and to the Dutch Republic. In Johannesburg there was a certain amount of discontent owing to the depression, caused by the inevitable reaction after the great gold boom of 1889. Disappointed speculators, however, generally vent their spleen upon the administration, which in the Transvaal has always been a convenient scapegoat, especially during a slump in the market. But the dissatisfaction had hitherto been expressed within strictly constitutional limits. An event happened, in the early part of 1890, which caused a great deal of excitement. President Krüger was on a visit to Johannesburg, when a riot took place, the President being hissed and hooted, amid shouts of "God Save the Queen," and the Transvaal flag was hauled down and torn to shreds. The beginning of Sir Henry Loch's career may be said to have been marked in Johannesburg by a riot in 1890, and to have terminated by what was very nearly a serious disturbance at Pretoria in 1894. Sir Henry Loch, who had an insatiable appetite for conferences, proceeded to Pretoria to discuss Swaziland and other questions with the Republican Government. On his arrival at the station he was met by President Krüger and the members of the Executive. There was considerable excitement among the crowd and a disturbance took place. To quote Sir Henry Loch's description:

"When I entered the carriage with President Krüger, two men got on to the box with a Union Jack, and the crowd, notwithstanding the

President's remonstrances, took the horses out and dragged the carriage to the hotel, a distance of nearly a mile, singing all the way, 'God Save the Queen' and 'Rule, Britannia.' "

It is not for an instant suggested that Sir Henry Loch was cognizant of or approved of these riotous proceedings. On the contrary, the latter incident must have been as embarrassing to him as it was annoying to President Krüger, but the impression prevailed, rightly or wrongly, that he was antagonistic to the Republic. Sir Hercules Robinson visited Pretoria at a far more critical time, in January, 1896, but his arrival and stay in Pretoria were not characterized by any untoward incident.

The relations of Sir Henry Loch with the Pretoria Government were not satisfactory; he was constantly sending impressive warnings to President Krüger, coupled with professions of the most friendly feelings. The same warnings and remonstrances were urged upon officials and friends of the Government during visits to Cape Town. Swaziland, in the meantime, which the Transvaal wished to absorb, was kept dangling before the Republic as a sort of bait to induce it to enter the customs union and to make concessions to the British. The result of this policy, however well meant, was deplorable, for Sir Henry Loch became profoundly distrusted in Pretoria, and his great charm of manner simply created an impression of duplicity. Notwithstanding the demonstration in Pretoria, Sir Henry Loch did not enjoy the entire confidence of the English population in the Transvaal, for the *Star*, an irreconcilable Uitlander and "anti-Boer" organ, characterized his administration as "feeble and fussy," an indorsement of what was said to be the verdict passed upon his tenure of office in Australia. But he was not only a victim of misunderstanding as far as the Boers were concerned; he appears to have been entirely misunderstood by so able and intelligent a representative of the Uitlanders as Mr. Lionel Phillips, by whom he was visited during his stay in Pretoria, in 1894. To quote from Mr. Phillips's letter to Mr. Wernher, of the firm of Wernher, Beit & Co., London:

"Sir Henry Loch (with whom I had two long private interviews alone) asked me some very pointed questions, such as what arms we had in Johannesburg; whether the population could hold the place for six days, etc., etc., and stated plainly that if there had been 3,000 rifles and ammunition here he would certainly have come over. He further informed me in a significant way that they had prolonged

the Swazi agreement of six months, and said he supposed in that time Johannesburg would be better prepared, as much as to say, 'If things are safer then we shall actively intervene.' "

A peerage had been bestowed on Sir Henry Loch, and on the 1st of May, 1896, the date on which the foregoing letter from Mr. Lionel Phillips was first made public in Europe, he, as Lord Loch, made a statement in the House of Lords, in reference to the arming of Johannesburg, of which the following is an extract:

"To strengthen my position with the Deputation, I asked them what amount of arms they had at that time in Johannesburg. They informed me that they had 1,000 rifles, and that at the outside they did not believe they had ten rounds of ammunition per rifle. I then pointed out to them the situation, not as an encouragement to resist, but to show them what a futile measure it would be if any action on their part brought about disturbances and a consequent attack."

In the same statement Lord Loch admitted that he had taken steps to place certain imperial police on that fatal spot, the Bechuanaland border, in case disturbances arose in Johannesburg. In other words, preparations were made for an imperial raid into the Transvaal, to be justified as protection for British interests. With regard to Sir Henry Loch's relations with his Cape Ministers, it is no secret that there was constant friction on the very question of the conflicting interests involved in the two positions of High Commissioner and Governor of the Cape Colony. Sir Henry Loch's tendencies were all in the direction of personal rule, but he was fortunately not a strong man, and his autocratic aims were qualified by prudence. To do him justice he was equally watchful of Mr. Rhodes, who exemplified at this stage of his career certain aspects of personal rule. Sir Henry Loch retired at the end of 1894, or beginning of 1895, and the choice of Lord Ripon, the Colonial Secretary, fell upon Sir Hercules Robinson as his successor.

The political conditions of South Africa had, however, sadly changed since 1889—the relations between the South African Republic and Great Britain were unsatisfactory; the racial cleavage in the Transvaal was very marked; the power and prestige of Mr. Rhodes had increased enormously; while the attitude of the Cape Dutch was one of renewed vigilance as to imperial designs upon the Transvaal. Sir Hercules Robinson was, moreover, an old man, and his health began to fail shortly after his arrival at the Cape. Had he been induced by Lord Knutsford to remain as High Commissioner after 1889 it would have been an act of the highest

political wisdom and would no doubt have brought about marked and beneficial results upon the development of South Africa. But in 1895 matters had gone too far and he was powerless to avert the catastrophe of the Raid. He was deceived and kept in absolute ignorance of what was going on. Immediately after the Raid he proceeded to Pretoria, damped the revolutionary movement in Johannesburg and was the only imperial official who satisfied the Government at Pretoria of absolute *bona fides* in repudiating the action of the Raiders and Reformers. On the 4th of January, 1896, he telegraphed to Mr. Chamberlain: "I take this early opportunity of testifying in the strongest manner to the great moderation and forbearance of the Government of the South African Republic under the exceptionally trying circumstances." Sir Hercules Robinson left Pretoria on the 15th of January, having received the thanks of the Executive and Volksraad for his services. He had averted bloodshed in Johannesburg, for a collision at that time between the Boers and Uitlanders would have been an awful catastrophe. "I have been confronted by many difficulties," he once said, "but I have one formula which I have never known to fail, and that is, Do what is right." Imperial prestige, imperial honor and imperial dignity had been lowered and dragged in the mire by Dr. Jameson, Mr. Rhodes, and afterward by Mr. Chamberlain. It is safe to assert that if any shred of imperial dignity and honor was preserved in South Africa, it was due to the integrity and high-mindedness of Sir Hercules Robinson. He successfully withstood Mr. Chamberlain's efforts at inopportune interference and his wish to use force as a remedy in South Africa, but his health completely broke down, and after a visit to England in 1896, when he was raised to the Peerage as Lord Rosmead, he retired from the position early in 1897. Mr. Chamberlain selected Sir Alfred Milner as the new High Commissioner.

The latter had enjoyed the distinction of a brilliant university career at Oxford; he had served on the staff of a well-known newspaper; he had been an unsuccessful candidate for Parliamentary honors; but he first came into prominence as Mr. Goschen's secretary, and cemented his success by the ability with which he had discharged the duties of Under Secretary of Finance in Egypt.

His appointment was greeted by a perfect chorus of approval. The Unionist press vied with the Radical journals in extolling his moderation, his tact, his impartiality, his patience, and his

personal charm. The newspapers and society united in attributing to him just those qualities which were needed to deal with the delicate situation which had arisen in South Africa. Here and there, however, a doubtful note was sounded as to the wisdom of Mr. Chamberlain's choice. One view—that of a Conservative—was that Sir Alfred Milner's success in life lay in the fact of his being a courtier, who placed his abilities and entire energies at the service of his chiefs, and that he had thereby gained their affection, esteem and support. He had proved a most capable official and administrator in a subordinate position, but it was doubted whether he was fitted for a position of such responsibility and power as that involved in the High Commissionership.

A Radical view of Sir Alfred Milner, expressed immediately after the appointment was made, was to the effect that, although he possessed all the good qualities which had been enumerated by an appreciative press, yet these were neutralized and even rendered dangerous by the fact that he was a Jingo of the most pronounced type. It was feared that he might easily be led to the conviction that force was the only remedy for the distracting conditions of the South African problem. If he did adopt that conclusion, nothing would stop him, and his reputation for moderation and patience would make him all the more dangerous in influencing public opinion.

Sir Alfred Milner's experiences in Egypt, which are set forth in his work, "England in Egypt," were hardly a happy omen to South Africa. The influence of British domination may have proved distinctly beneficent in Egypt, but the administration is a military despotism. The coercion of the fellaheen, the intimidation of the Khédive and the Egyptian pashas by threats and a display of military force are hardly the methods necessary for governing the descendants of the Dutch who had successfully withstood the might of Spanish Philip, or of the Huguenot emigrants who had refused to bow to the imperious will of Louis XIV. An experience of military despotism in India had not produced happy results in the case of Sir Bartle Frere. When Sir Alfred Milner arrived at the Cape in June, 1897, Sir Gordon Sprigg—who had proved to be such a passive instrument in the hands of Sir Bartle Frere—happened to be Prime Minister. It is interesting to observe that Sir Gordon Sprigg was among the first, if not the very first, to raise publicly, as an electioneering cry, the question of

British supremacy in South Africa. For this, curiously enough, he was roundly rebuked by the *Times*, which afterward adopted this shibboleth as one of its favorite battle cries. To return to Sir Alfred Milner. A speech made by him at Graaff Reinet in the Cape Colony clearly indicated his anti-Transvaal bias, and a subsequent speech at Swellendam foreshadowed the exercise of personal rule by the importance which the speaker attached to the High Commissionership as distinguished from the Governorship of the Cape Colony. Much to the consternation of Sir Alfred Milner, the elections of 1898 resulted in the defeat of the Progressives and in the triumph of the Afrikaner Bond under Mr. Schreiner. It is probable that the relations between Mr. Schreiner and the High Commissioner were unsatisfactory from the very first, and that the personal rule of the latter began from that moment to make itself felt in South Africa. Sir Alfred Milner paid a short visit to England in the beginning of 1899 for the purpose, it has been stated, of urging a policy of force upon the British Government. During his absence the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape, Sir William Butler, acted as High Commissioner, and, following the example of Sir Hercules Robinson, worked harmoniously with the Cape Ministry on constitutional lines. His short tenure of office was marked by three important incidents. First of all, he refused to receive a petition to the Queen, organized by the South African League at Johannesburg. Secondly, he warned the Imperial Government against accepting the statements of this mischievous body, and, thirdly, he made a speech at Grahamstown in which he declared that South Africa was in need of rest, and did not require a surgical operation. Upon Sir Alfred Milner's return, Sir William Butler's policy was immediately reversed. The South African League got up another petition, this time ostensibly containing 21,000 signatures. It was unreservedly accepted by Sir Alfred Milner and forwarded to the Imperial Government. He co-operated with the South African League, and every one will admit that a very serious surgical operation is now being performed in South Africa as the outcome of his policy. Sir William Butler was recalled.

Space does not permit any discussion about the abortive Bloemfontein conference, which, in Sir Alfred Milner's spirit of no compromise and "irreducible minimums," was doomed to failure from the very first. Compromise is the essence of South African

politics, and, with the exception of the annexation in 1877, had characterized all the transactions between the Imperial Government and the South African Republic since 1852. Sir Alfred Milner's astounding dispatch of May 5, 1899, with its reference to "helots" and "festerings sores," and its cravings for a "striking proof" of imperial power, must also be passed over. His career was now nothing else but a triumphant development of personal rule. He absolutely ignored his Colonial Ministers, and treated them as traitors; the clergymen of the Dutch Reformed Church and the majority of the Cape Parliament, in their efforts for peace, suffered the same fate. "I am determined to break the power of Afrikanerdom," he arrogantly informed Mr. Molteno, the delegate of the Cape members. It was this spirit which induced him to cable over *in extenso* all the inflammatory resolutions of reactionary associations, and to suppress information as to the pacific endeavors of President Steyn, satisfying his official conscience by a meaningless summary of important communications. A further incident will illustrate the arbitrary nature of his rule. Endeavors were made by a section of the Cape people to induce Sir Alfred Milner to petition Queen Victoria to send one of her characteristic messages to the Cape Dutch, who were placed in a position of agonizing difficulty. The person of the Queen is held in the highest veneration by the Dutch throughout all South Africa. Her qualities as a noble woman, leading a simple life, and as a pattern mother, appeal strongly to the Dutch, and it was felt that a kindly message from the Queen would have the most beneficial effect upon the Cape Dutch. It is reported that Sir Alfred Milner haughtily refused, and concluded by saying that he had made up his mind that there was no room for two white races in South Africa. Such a statement would be incredible were it not that Sir Alfred Milner's proceedings during the six months before the war have been characterized by the maddest folly. His acts have been an eloquent falsification of the attributes of tact, moderation, prudence, patience and impartiality, which were so abundantly postulated at the time of his appointment.

At Bloemfontein he was advocating democratic constitutionalism to President Krüger in order to assure British ascendancy in the Transvaal. At the Cape, on the other hand, in the interests of the same ascendancy, he was using all means in his power to

override and crush constitutionalism by contemptuously ignoring the Dutch majority in Parliament, and treating their Ministers as traitors. It seems as if the Dutch had to be ground between the lower and the nether millstones. What a commentary on the cry of equal rights! What an outcome of the policy of reconciling the two races! The irony would be ludicrous if it were not overshadowed by the grim tragedy of suffering. Constitutionalism has once more been defied, and personal rule is again triumphant, and, just as in the time of Sir Bartle Frere, its success is marked by bloodshed and carnage.

The various forces and influences which have been allowed to flow unchecked in the direction of this deplorable war have been briefly touched upon. But there are three persons—Mr. Chamberlain, Sir Alfred Milner, and Mr. Rhodes, each in himself an exemplification of the danger of autocratic power—who have a large and direct responsibility for this calamity.

The power of the High Commissioner, if unchecked by constitutionalism, is almost supreme in South Africa, while the prestige of the position and the paramount importance attached to the office in England are sufficiently great to impose a salutary check upon the dangerous interference of the Imperial Parliament, as well as upon autocratic or inopportune intervention on the part of the British Colonial Secretary.

Sir Alfred Milner has had magnificent opportunities for doing beneficent imperial work in South Africa. But instead of using his great influence in removing the distrust and unrest in South Africa, which were intensified by the clumsy diplomacy of Mr. Chamberlain after the Raid; instead of checking and sternly repressing mischievous and reactionary organizations like the South African League, of which Mr. Rhodes is the President; instead of ignoring and discountenancing the frenzied efforts of the local newspapers, which are largely controlled by Mr. Rhodes, he appears to have utilized all these baneful forces for the purpose of bringing about this disastrous war in South Africa, the far-reaching consequences of which no man is able to foresee.

MONTAGU WHITE.

GERMAN FEELING TOWARD ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SIDNEY WHITMAN, F. R. G. S., AND
PROFESSOR THEODOR MOMMSEN, OF THE UNIVERSITY OF
BERLIN.

[In response to a request of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, Mr. Sidney Whitman, the well-known authority upon German affairs, submitted the following questions to Professor Theodor Mommsen, eliciting from the famous historian the cogent communication published herewith, which is accompanied, in accordance with Professor Mommsen's express desire, by Mr. Whitman's letter.—EDITOR.]

December 12, 1899.

HONORED SIR: There is no historian living whose judgment on great political questions commands such universal respect as your own. This is due not only to an amount of erudition which even in Germany is unrivalled, but also to the unflinching fearlessness you have ever shown in the formation and upholding of your opinions.

During a long and distinguished life devoted to study, after pursuing your researches into the remotest detail in the life of nations in bygone ages, you have been able to draw broad conclusions of inestimable value concerning the rise and fall of civilization. May I, therefore, venture to appeal to you, on behalf of all those who seek enlightenment from a dispassionate source, to favor me with your views upon the following pressing questions of the hour:

(1.) What is the feeling of academic Germany toward the United States, and what ulterior effect upon the future relations between the United States and Germany do you anticipate from the colonial expansion of the former?

(2.) What is your opinion of the present feeling in Germany toward England—more especially in connection with South Afri-

can troubles? What effect, in a broad, historical sense, is the present war, in your estimation, likely to exercise upon the political future of England and the British Empire?

With deep respect,

Your faithful servant,

SIDNEY WHITMAN.

Professor Theodor Mommsen, Berlin.

DEAR SIR: It is but too true that the relations, or let me say the sympathies, between Englishmen and Germans have undergone a great and a sad change in the half-century upon which I look back.

When I was a young man, England appeared to us as the asylum of progress, the land of political and intellectual liberty, of well-earned prosperity. We thought the English unwritten Constitution a model one. We rejoiced when Settembrini and Kinkel were able to put their feet on British soil. We sneered with Byron, we laughed with Dickens. We did not quite overlook the reign of King Cant, the commercial egotism; the officers buying their commissions and the privates bought; there was plenty of ignorance and illusion in our English feelings; many a London tailor has been admired in Germany as a living lord. But the horizon, especially in politics, was very dark in every other corner; we held on to the small blue spot ruling the waves. The general feeling in Germany was that Englishmen were happier than Germans, and certainly in politics our betters; and if they were not overcourteous, the which we were not blind to, they had some right to despise their Continental cousins.

Now the tables are turned, the illusions have vanished. The radical defects of the English system, the trampling on nations subjugated and despised, and the prevalence of money interests, the leaving of the defense of the country to the billows and to the tars, all this has become too evident. We begin to doubt if Britain, even Greater Britain, may in the long run be able to cope with the great nations of Europe and America. But it is not only that judgment has changed; Englishmen themselves have done much to change the German feeling.

Bismarck is a witness you will admit. He writes in a private letter, "To the question whether I am Russian or Western European, I have always answered that I am Prussian. Concern-

ing foreign countries I have only felt sympathy for England and its inhabitants; and even now I am at times not free from it; but they will not allow us to like them." This is but too true. The English have done their best to get hated in Germany, and they have been successful.

No German caring for politics can forget the English meddling during the question of the Elbe Duchies* and the Franco-German war. I am not recriminating, but stating a fact. No political necessity obliged Great Britain to side with our adversaries. Denmark is regarded as an English dependency, and Paris as the summer residence of the rich English. It is easier to forget the battles than your diplomacy.

Our commerce and our industry are increasing. It is not easy for the English to bear with equanimity a competitor fifty years ago unheard of; we acknowledge also that still in the present time England, true to its ancient and honorable traditions, opens to the stranger every harbor it obtains. But with the remains of the old system is combined a series of petty annoyances which the upstart resents. Is it true or not that the old contempt of Germans and Germany has been not changed to envy, but coupled with it? We are not likely to forget the taunt of "Made in Germany."

If we could forget, every day your public press would remind us: it has got to be a public nuisance, like its Parisian sister. Have you read the article in your *Navy and Army Illustrated*, published a fortnight ago, and holding forth—in these days of the South African War—about the German mercenaries and their military capacity? Regarding German Africa, every day brings us treacherous fiction and hateful innuendoes from the London papers; an English notice about a disaster in our African colonies has become a byword for a lie.

I have not the pretension either to lay down the results of our Colonial system, which certainly are extremely shadowy and full of very loyal, but also very unsolid, fancies; nor to be spokesman for the academic public in Germany, and still less for my country. But as far as I know, every German is at heart with the Boers, and that not because their cousinship is a little closer than the English, but partly because the hate against your countrymen has reached fearful and, I must add, unjust dimensions; partly be-

* The conflict between Denmark and the combined forces of Germany and Austria concerning the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein is here referred to.

cause this war is not only, as every war is, a calamity, but also an infamy. The repetition of Jameson's Raid by the English Government (I won't say by the English nation) dictated by banking and mining speculations, is the revelation of your moral and political corruption, and of your military and political weakness. If there remains still in England some wisdom and some patriotism, it would send Mr. Chamberlain to Coventry to elaborate there his three-cousin system, and accord to a wronged people not only the peace, but the full sovereignty they have a right to. This is certainly not business-like, but it would be a moral victory, effacing every military defeat.

Regarding the relations between the United States of America and Germany, certainly we have not forgotten the glorious time of the great Frederick and of General Steuben. We do not at all look upon the powerful Republican Confederation as an appendix of the British nation. The millions of Germans who have found a German home across the ocean form a link between Americans and Germans which is absolutely wanting with the English. There is no name more popular in Germany than that of Carl Schurz, as good a German patriot as he is an American one. But as far as I can see, the Monroe Doctrine holds good not only in America, but also in Europe. I mean to say, that in politics the two parts of the world are not intimately connected. This, however, will probably be changed by the new state of things created by the breaking up of China and the consequences of the Spanish-American war. A change of internal American politics, involving a revolution in military and naval matters, is imminent. May it bring to the States not only greater extension, but also greater force and good luck. I am certainly a well-wisher, but as certainly no prophet.

Yours truly,

MOMMSEN.

Sidney Whitman, Esq.

THE TRUST IN POLITICS.

BY W. A. PEPPER, FORMERLY UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR KANSAS.

I.

INDUSTRY is now so greatly diversified, commerce so widely spread, and trade so active, that all the people are interested in what concerns any portion of them. It is well, therefore, that the trust question is to be taken up by the voters as a political issue in the approaching Presidential campaign.

The main contention is this: That no profession, trade, occupation, business or calling shall be permitted to operate to the public injury; and it is fortunate that upon this principle men and women of all parties and creeds are agreed. It gives us reason for hope that the discussion will be conducted on higher and broader ground than is usually occupied by disputants in the consideration of partisan issues. It is not to be expected that party feeling will be wholly eliminated from the debate; it will appear, doubtless, when the parties cross one another's tracks in their search for remedies to remove or check the evils complained of.

Not to be technical, but taking the common understanding of the people, a trust may be defined as "an organization formed mainly for the purpose of regulating the supply and price of commodities."

The force of the objection to trusts lies in the danger to be apprehended from an improper use of their power. They may interfere with commerce, through their ability to corner the market or to secure advantages in transportation; they may operate in politics through pecuniary aid to party committees and candidates; they may influence legislation through hired lobbyists; they may affect the decisions of courts through the influence of learned lawyers.

We have with us, at the same time, another great power to be reckoned with, a power possessed by the working people, the greatest of all human powers, commercially speaking. It is the power to quit work. The Bricklayers' Union, for example, or the Carpenters' Union, by stopping the work of building in a large city, may occasion more trouble there than the Sugar Trust could do by levying tribute on the people through an advance in the sugar market; and a general strike among railway men would be more hurtful to trade than anything that the Standard Oil Company has ever done.

The complaint of working people against trusts is not that they oppress labor, but that they lessen the demand for it. Travelling men, for instance, complain that many of their number have been relieved from duty since the trust epoch appeared. This operates hardly on the unfortunate men who are put out of employment, but the public—the people at large, who have to pass upon the trust question—have suffered no injury on that account. This is just what has been going on all the time wherever invention and enterprise have displaced old methods and substituted new and better ones. Much as we may feel for the people who have lost their places by reason of the formation of these gigantic trade organizations, are we justified in regarding their cases as outside the ordinary rules of business? Is anybody bound to employ help that he does not need? If a farmer, after purchasing a gang plough, a seed drill and a self-binding reaper, discharges a hand or two that he does not need longer, is he culpable? If the relations of these people were reversed, would not the travelling men and the farm hands do just what the trust manager and the farmer did?

Whatever injury has resulted from displacement of labor and the closing of shops by the trusts thus far has been of a private character. It has not affected the public credit injuriously, nor has it diminished the volume of our trade either at home or abroad. We are now doing a larger business among ourselves than ever before, and the value of our exports of manufactured goods has increased 110 per cent. during the last ten years.

II.

An important element in the trust problem is the consumer's interest in trade. We are, each and all of us, consumers, and as

such we are interested in the wages and profits of other people just as we are in our own calling and income. We are working for other people, whether we are hired or conducting business of our own; and other people are working for us, whether they are hired or doing business on their own account. No man liveth unto himself. No man makes everything he uses and no one uses everything he makes. The farmer sells all he raises excepting what is required for his home supply; the manufacturer retains but little of the wares he makes; and that is true of all producers—they get their income out of their output. About five of every one hundred persons of the adult population of the United States are engaged in collecting and distributing the surplus productions of the people. The world is fast coming under the dominion of trade, the great conqueror, and wages and prices are steadily approaching a common level. The laborer is worthy of his hire, and the consumer is entitled to procure his supplies at reasonable prices. When this rule prevails in practice, we shall have found the level of justice and the trust problem will have been solved.

Through the methods in vogue a hundred years ago, the wants of the people of the present time could not be supplied at all. We are outgrowing old ways in almost everything. The railway, the big factory and the department store are reducing prices to consumers and multiplying comforts to the multitude. Although selfish to the last degree, they are pioneers in a commercial reform which is to make living easier and life more lovable. They are teachers, too, demonstrating the truth of the axiom that in union there is strength. And the people are learning. If the amalgamation of a hundred little shops into one large establishment reduces the cost and improves the quality of watches and wagons and shoes and sugar, why not gather a hundred little banks into one and thus reduce the cost of borrowed money? Why not concentrate the business of merchandizing and reduce the cost of store goods in general? Why should not the farmers combine, throwing a hundred or a thousand farms under one management, dispensing with needless machinery and labor, reducing cost of production, while easing the burdens of toil and adding to the comforts of life? Look at the daily newspaper, a compendium of the world's passing history, collected in twenty-four hours by an association of news-gatherers—a feat impossible of accomplishment by individual effort. The constantly increasing wants of consumers

stimulate invention. Note the evolution of machines and implements. Through the development of the barrow and the canoe, the oar and the wheel, we have the railway train and the ocean steamer. A modern locomotive will draw twenty thousand bushels of wheat, and fifteen such train-loads can be easily carried in one of our largest steamers. The mowing machine cuts more grass than five men could do with scythes; the self-binding reaper does the work of a dozen men with cradles and rakes; and the combined harvester, in ten hours, cuts, threshes and bags the wheat grown on twenty-five to forty acres of ground. The old wagon maker who, with his axes, saws, rasps, drawing-knife and plane, fashioned the woodwork of three or four wagons in a year, has given way to the big company that employs a thousand hands with machines capable of turning out a complete wagon every hour. The sewing machine makes stitches more neatly and speedily than ten of the nimblest hands with needles. One man on the linotype is equal to five average hands at the printer's case, and a sextuple printing machine with three attendants runs off papers faster than a thousand men and boys could do it with Washington hand presses. On the general average, one hand accomplishes as much now as five did under the old hand system. And in addition to the improvement in the efficiency of labor, we are now saving of what formerly went to waste—enough to furnish employment to many thousands of people, in working it into useful commodities that are distributed in all parts of the world.

This concentration of energy, from which the world is receiving so much benefit, is but the operation of the law of progress. The wrecks which have been strewn in its wake indicate the cost of the world's betterment.

The travelling man is employed by the house he works for, but his wages are paid by the people that the house trades with. Loss of this employment falls heavily on the victim, but the public sustains no injury by reason of the change, and will probably so report during the campaign. The trusts are proper subjects for study and criticism, and the fact that they are to be made an issue in politics is proof conclusive that their business is looked upon by the people as being of a public character and in need of public oversight and supervision. But abuse of the trusts will not drive them out of business; it will not determine the questions involved in their existence, nor will it open the way to work. Denuncia-

tion may add to the vigor of arraignment, but a verdict without evidence will not stand. If the trusts do nothing worse than relieve from duty some persons whose salaries have been paid by the public, there is no case against them that the people will care to meddle with.

However, these travelling men, if they are idle and unable to find work to do, have a case, as have all other idle people who want to earn their living by honorable toil. Every man has the right to live, and he ought to have an opportunity to earn his subsistence. The man with energy and brains is resourceful and will work his way, rising as he goes. But the average man is timid and will push only in company with others; if he is dropped out he is lost. The way of the poor man now is beset with difficulties.

III.

The individual counts for little in the great aggregate. The man is merged in the mass, and the mass moves with commercial tides as waves are moved by the tides of the sea. At high tide in business, all willing hands may be employed; at low tide, some must be idle, and these changes will probably be more marked in the future than they have been in the past, because of the massing of trade forces in these great commercial aggregations.

The people at large are very much interested in this phase of the trust question; for, after all, the public, in one way or another, has to take care of such as cannot help themselves. Trades unions have been and are a refuge to many of the unfortunate idle; but members of the unions are themselves in other people's employ, and they cannot afford to throw out the life line to every poor castaway left adrift by receding business waves. The great, big-hearted and full-handed public, in the end, gathers in the waifs and feeds them, clothes them and keeps them warm.

Combination is not, of itself, an offense, nor is it a crime to favor such a regulation of commerce as will ensure fair returns for labor and capital. Farmers, proverbially the most conservative class, are studying the art of combination. The Patrons of Husbandry (commonly called "The Grange") began their organization in 1867. The Farmers' Alliance and several other similar bodies were formed within the next ten years. Live stock companies with large capital operated during the eighties, and now we read of proposed combinations of cotton planters, wheat

growers and stockmen. These farmers are seeking, and will eventually find, the sort of union they need—an organization large and strong enough to help its members over the hard places, so that, together, they shall be able to hold their products at pleasure and feed the market as it needs.

It is the essential purpose of labor organizations to regulate the supply and wages of labor. The principle involved is exactly the same as that which is urged by railway companies and other powerful commercial bodies—to regulate supply and price. The principle is right, it is basic, fundamental, and must be recognized in law and jurisprudence before we shall have peace in the commercial world. But who shall have charge of the regulating processes? To whom shall we entrust this beneficent work? Surely not to a half-dozen interested men, but to representatives of the great body of the people. The founders of the Republic, in their third grant of power to the National Congress, specifically mentioned "commerce among the several States." If this does not include power to prevent private persons, companies and corporations from regulating supply and prices, the Constitution of the United States ought to be so amended that it would.

It will not be disputed that, up to certain stages in the evolution of trade, private agencies for doing work are to be preferred before those of the State. But, in many instances, a time comes when the public interests require a change from private to public management. Banking was once a mere agency for the safe keeping of depositors' moneys or other valuables. The postal system originated in the private carriage and distribution of personal communications. Railroads were first constructed for purely private uses. Government itself was begun in the family. But now all the great nations exercise supervision over banking institutions. In the United States we have national banks, issuing notes printed only at the Treasury Department and based on the public credit. The Government carries letters a thousand miles or more at two cents apiece; railroads have become great public highways, and the Government extends over millions of people.

And the time may come, forced forward by the cupidity of manufacturers, merchants and traders, when, in order to secure justice to labor and capital alike, to producer, carrier and consumer—to the whole people, that is to say—it shall be necessary to

reorganize some of the leading industries, to the extent at least that they shall be subject to Governmental surveillance, as banks and railways now are.

IV.

Combination is in many instances necessary, not only in private but in public affairs as well. As farmers combine at a barn-raising or a log-rolling, so do citizens of all occupations and from all parts of the country go together in response to a call from the President for volunteers. The most complete and powerful of all combinations—amounting, in fact, to an absolute monopoly—is the National Government. It illustrates the trust principle when carried to its extreme limit. Government makes laws for people's guidance, it interprets the laws and executes them. It may, and does, take private property for public use; it may draft a citizen into the public service; it may imprison for violation of law; and it may sell property for the satisfaction of private debts. The Government assumes to settle, in its own way, disputes between citizens of different States. The Government is supreme in its power over all people and property within its jurisdiction.

This giant among monopolies, however, did not grow of itself; nor is it the creature of avarice brought into being for purposes of pecuniary gain at the expense of the purchasing public. It is a great political machine, made up of congruous parts skilfully designed by proficient architects, fashioned and put together by master builders, according to plans and specifications approved by the people of the United States for their own especial use and benefit. This ponderous instrument, now operating for seventy-five million people, at a yearly cost of half a billion dollars, is the people's agent for expressing, interpreting and executing their will. It is moved according to rules and regulations which they, through their regularly appointed representatives, have provided; and these are all written in the Constitution of the United States, which every officer, before he enters upon the discharge of his official duties, solemnly swears to support. Query: If the people can handle their own immense business thus easily, is there any reason to doubt their ability to provide such rules and regulations for the government of trusts and other trade machines as will keep them within lawful and reasonable limits?

The fact that the power of wealth in the hands of strong men

may be used for doing evil is not sufficient reason why they should be shorn of their power for doing good. The proper thing to do is, as far as possible, to prevent them from doing harm.

As to the matter of regulating prices, justice demands it; but it must be done by authority of the people and through their agents. Trade is a public matter, and its regulation is a function to be exercised only by public functionaries.

Regulating price does not mean fixing price. It is not contended that the National Congress or a State Legislature may prescribe the prices at which commodities shall be sold or bought, excepting, of course, articles made or owned by the General or State Government; but they can at least provide for the enforcement of the common law rule that prices shall not be exorbitant or unreasonable. Congress is explicitly empowered to regulate commerce among the several States, and the power has been frequently exercised. The Interstate Commerce law and the Anti-Trust law have both been held good by the Supreme Court. But they do not cover the whole ground. They are only the first and second steps in an advance movement, and they will be followed by others as the way is made clear by discussion. Producers want a lean market and high prices, while consumers would have a full market and low prices. The workingman asks for steady work and honest wages, and the capitalist demands a fair profit on his investment. The merchant is after business, the carrier wants trade; the speculator, being no respecter of persons, wants victims. We all want a comfortable living, and if we are temperate, industrious and honest, we are entitled to it. There is enough for all, both of labor and supplies, when we secure an equitable adjustment of industrial forces.

States, within their spheres, can do much toward a settlement of the pending difficulties, but the greater work will have to be done by the Congress of the United States under its authority to "regulate commerce," and under the additional authority granted in Clause 18, of Section 8, of Article 1, of the Constitution, which empowers Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States or in any department or officer thereof."

Any and all articles produced, manufactured or prepared any-

where within the jurisdiction of the United States for general consumption here or elsewhere, or to be transported beyond the limits of the State or Territory where made, produced, manufactured or prepared, ought to be declared by law to be an article of interstate commerce and within the jurisdiction of Congress. If this is not held to be within the constitutional power of Congress, the remedy is by amendment to the Constitution.

A new executive department is needed—the Department of Commerce, with a Cabinet Secretary or a commission at its head, supplied with necessary administrative machinery, specially charged with the execution of laws enacted to secure freedom for commerce and justice in trade.

Senators and Representatives will have to deal with these various phases of the commercial situation and provide a national system, which, under direction of a Governmental department, will gradually bring the conflicting elements into a harmoniously working whole.

W. A. PEPPER.

SOME NOVELS OF 1899.

BY W. E. HENLEY.

A NATION has its day-dreams, even as men and women have theirs; and when it takes, in Balzac's phrase, to smoking enchanted cigarettes, as, if it means to go on being a nation, it must and will, then the enchanted cigarettes it smokes are inevitably common in make and of a general flavor. When Elizabeth was King, for instance, we English sought and found relief in blank-verse plays, and sugared sonnets, and lyrics amatorious and vain. Under the blessed Restoration, we imported much tobacco from France (with some from Spain), and were greatly addicted to "satyr" and the comedy of manners. Then, Messrs. Pope and Addison aiding, our humor changed, and we were all for didactic verse, the amiable essay, the stately yet insufferable five-act tragedy. Meanwhile Defoe had come, and Mrs. Behn, and Manley of "The New Atlantis;" and hard on their heels came Richardson with "Pamela" and "Clarissa," and a new view of *das Ewig Weiblich*; came Henry Fielding, with such inventions in art, such achievements in observation, such masterpieces of execution, as "Jonathan Wild," as "Tom Jones," as "Joseph Andrews" and "Amelia;" came Smollett, with his excellent eye for new material, his capacity for comic narrative, his brilliant and taking gift of farce; and with these masters came the mob of imitators of whom you read in Mr. Raleigh's learned and admirable "Short Sketch of the English Novel;" and Sir Walter arose, and Miss Austen, Miss Edgeworth and Miss Burney; and only the "Fiction" brand of enchanted cigarettes has had a lasting vogue in England for a hundred years.*

* Since Scott, too, who says the English Novel says Dickens and Thackeray, says Marryatt and Lever, says Bulwer and G. P. R. James, says Irving and Hawthorne and the incomparable Edgar Allen Poe, says Trollope and Alnsworth, and the Brontës and Mrs. Gaskell and Mrs. Oliphant, and James Payn, and the Kingsleys, and R. L. Stevenson: to name but these among the dead. I think there is no such list of names in the literature

And now the English novel is upon us like a visitation from the sea: obliterating districts, changing the face of provinces. To none, save perchance the Author of *Evil*, has it been revealed how many are written in a year. The disconcerting and amazing thing is in the number that get into print. There are half a hundred publics for novels—that is the fact; so that this immense and ever-waxing output is, when one thinks of it, not so wonderful after all. There are scores of publics, I take it, between Mr. Meredith's, on the one level, and Mr. Hocking's or Miss Annie Swan's on the other; and under these latter there are subterraneanities! The mind reels from the vision. No Dante has ever made the journey; and if a Dante should be ever found, who would, who could, do duty as his Virgil? In truth, there is nothing to be said about these uncharted, undistinguished Circles. *Non ragionam di lor*, but, without even looking, pass with the inevitable, incontrovertible reflection that there is never an English-speaking subject of the Queen—nor, it may truthfully be asserted, an English-speaking elector of the President of the United States—who, whatever his age, and his calling, and his type of sentiment, has not his enchanted cigarette, in a hundred varieties, ready to his hand; to be smoked at any hour of the day or night, in such circumstances as he, being a man and master of his fate, may be able to control.

The public then is by no means one and indivisible—like the Republic. On the contrary, it is one and manifold. It is figured as a great organism which buys (or borrows) and reads; but it should rather be figured as a multiform “globe of continents;” as one of these Japanese boxes, which seem to be singular, and are plural; being composed of a more or less imposing shell, which contains a sequence of boxes made in its image, but each one smaller than the last; the essential difference consisting, of course, in the fact that the public is a live thing, while the box is a dead one. And to this difference is due the circumstance that a good writer and good novelist is very often felt to some extent a great way outside the limits of the particular public which happens to be his. As thus—and here I must fall into my anecdotage, and tell a tale once told to me. The late R. L. Stevenson began, as we all remember, as a kind of literary cherub; he wrote delightful

of any country in the world; and if I began upon the living, Meredith, Barrie, Kipling . . . But, no! The Intelligent Reader may compile that list for himself.

essays on morals; he was responsible for books of sentimental travel, which were a joy to the memory and to the mind; he had a public of his own, which believed and rejoiced in him, and said so. But he felt that he was, as I have said, a literary cherub—a head and a pair of wings, with nothing to sit down upon; he hated the idea; he longed to be something more than the darling of a literary set; and in the end—a good genius appearing in the person of Dr. Jack—he got his chance, and he planted “Treasure Island” on a journal called (if I mistake not) “Young Folks’ Paper.” ’Twas a capital print of its kind, and its editor and proprietor* was a very able and intelligent man; but the public to which it was addressed was inconceivably larger and less lettered than any to which Stevenson had hitherto appealed. But it suited him—so he thought—to a nicety; he did his best for it; and when Billy Bones, and Pew, and Captain Silver had “done their pitch,” he wrote “The Black Arrow” for it; and when that had gone the way of all serials, he gave to it the first of David Balfour and Alan Breck. The result was at once illuminating and strange. I do not know that Stevenson, the story-teller, ever did better than he did in at least two of these three tales. Yet his public would none of him; his public, drenched and drugged with imitations of Marryatt and Mayne Reid—with “Jack Harkaway the Mid,” and “Miguel the Marksman,” “The Gitano of Puerto del Sol”—received his advances with a chastened air of doubt, and considered his effects with a most “austere regard of control.” In brief, he was but a *succès d’estime*; and you would have thought that he had worked in vain. But he had not. The masters who wrought for “Young Folks’ Paper” were (so Stevenson told me) in no wise model citizens; they had their weaknesses, and (on his editor’s report) were addicted to the use of strong waters, so that they had to be literally hunted for their copy. But, being writers, they were a level or two above the public for which they wrote. That public had seen little or nothing in Stevenson; they saw a great deal, and in his imitators Stevenson had, I believe, a very considerable success with a circle of readers which began by politely disdaining him. He had paid in gold, and his gold was not recognized as current coin until it was turned into copper. The currency was debased? Of course

* His name was Henderson: A Scotchman and a radical. I rather think that he is dead; but, dead or alive, he is a person for whom I have a very great respect.

it was; and if it had not been—here is my point—it would never have passed with that public which Stevenson tried, and failed, to win. And this is the way in which publics are, not made but, effected and influenced by talent. In Stevenson's case, the provocation was unusually direct, the effects were unusually gross. But the same sort of thing has ever been, and is ever being, done all over the novel-reading world: so that many thousands have rejoiced in the gift of Ainsworth and Marryatt, of Kipling and Barrie and Scott, who have never so much as heard their names.

And the Book of the Year? So far, I believe, the honors are with Miss Fowler's "A Double Thread," of whose copies it has been my privilege to peruse one of the "Fortieth Thousand." But "A Double Thread" was published, if I mistake not, early in '99; and in the late autumn thereof there arose and "overtook us like a flood" the glory and the wonder and the fame of Miss Mary Cholmondeley's "Red Pottage," which, at the time of writing, is going so strong—there are cases in which, as I blush to acknowledge, nothing but slang will serve—that there seems no reason why, if the rate of production be justified, the younger book should not supplant the older. It is so much the better of the two that I can scarce believe it will. Miss Fowler is pleasant, ingenious, incredible; she writes neatly, and has a trick of what looks like epigram,[†] which, to the cultured, seems to be entertaining—even fascinating—to the *nth* degree. Also, Miss Fowler has a good enough eye for absurdities in speech and character and conduct; therein, as it appears to me, is her saving grace. If she reported them less literally, she would be less "skippable" than she is, and her results would have a greater authority than they have, for that they would come nearer to being creations than they are. I can see that, to enjoy her, the great thing is to be

* By which is meant, of course, not the year's best book, but the book whose sales are heaviest, and whose readers are most numerous. It is again a question of publics; and I fancy that Mr. Silas Hocking (say) would give most of those whose quotations run highest in recognized markets, an indefinite number of "pounds and a beating."

[†] Here are specimens culled with a fleeting finger: "I can't make jokes before I've finished my lunch, my wit is all of the P. M. variety, and never scintillates in the morning. Making jokes before lunch is as bad as making love before lunch; and they are both as bad as going to the play in the afternoon." Thus the *scintillante* Lady Silverhampton. And again:—"Oh! don't waste your time in doing your duty; it is as reckless" (as "reckless!") Why "reckless?")—"as wasting your money in paying your debts." And, yet again: "The Art of forgetting is a vulgar accomplishment." Well-bred people remember everything, and are ashamed of nothing." This, to be sure, is Miss Camilla, and one is vaguely reminded of literature. And for the last time:—"I used to hate olives myself, but now I like them; they taste of hair oil, and remind one of kissing the top of Silverhampton's head." Thus Miss Fowler, coruscating, endlessly coruscating to the Cultured; and the Uncultured tire.

Cultured, at once, and Smart (pseudo-Smart). It is nothing to the purpose that in no world of man's making, whether Smart (pseudo-Smart) or Cultured, did anybody ever talk as her people talk: the same reproach might well have been, and doubtless was, addressed to the author of "Love for Love" and "The Way of the World," though essentially on very different grounds. What is really important is that "A Double Thread" is at once clever and crude, at once ambitious and raw.

Miss Cholmondeley carries far heavier metal. She also has an eye for the absurd; but her absurdities are realized. Moreover, her absurdities have something dignified and decent about them. I do not know that I am particularly taken by her Hester (though her Rachel, as the phrase is, gets me); but her Mr. and Mrs. Gresley, her Pratts, her Sybell Loftus, her Hugh Scarlett, her Lady Newhaven—these, I say, are caught and figured in the act of life. Also I like her Bishop, I like her Australian, I like her quiet yet affecting touches about animals and children. Also, she does not try to say good things *à tort et à travers*: she says them when she can; she does not sparkle viciously; she uses her means to an end. Her duel, I confess it, finds and leaves me cold; but even here I must be with her, because, as I see it, the "business" between Newhaven and Hugh Scarlett is largely, if not wholly, a preparation for the "business," which is altogether excellent, between Rachel and Lady Newhaven. On the whole, though, I see no reason why Miss Cholmondeley should be popular, except it be that she starts her story from an adultery. 'Tis a safe card with the Cultured; but, in the sequel, her book will, I fancy, resolve itself into her portraits of Lady Newhaven and Mrs. Loftus, together with her admirable picture of Middleshire, the Zealous Fool and his adoring helpmeet, the Fraulein Boulou, the children, the excellent Pratts, the Village Independent, and the Village Doctor.

Another novel that was by way of being the Novel of the Year, but, somehow, hopped short of the distinction, was Mr. Richard Whiteing's "No. 5 John Street." That this was so is explicable enough. Mr. Whiteing, an amiable and expert journalist, has many friends upon the press; he had written no book for years; and those who knew him were glad to meet him in a higher capacity than the mere pressman's—and to tell the public how vastly good they found him. That, as I think, was much;

but it was not all—not all by any means. Mr. Whiteing's style is bright and alert and cheerful—even gay; he has a pleasant gift of narrative, a still more pleasant gift of commentary; above all, he is much of a sentimentalist, with illusions which he is eager to communicate in his light, amiable way. Again, the public and the critics both had been dismayed, a little before, by the deadly calm, the murderous artfulness, the easy and complete assurance of mastery, displayed in a book by Mr. Arthur Morrison—"A Child of the Jago," to wit; and they turned with rejoicing to an authority who could and would "tickle othergates" than the author of that dreadful work. So Mr. Whiteing's fairy-tale went home, as your fairy-tale does always; and his Virgin Pugilist, his Thalestris of the Kerb, was thought to be—no impossible monster, no mere debauch in sentiment, but—a refined and moving expression of reality, and the story of her valiant life and her untimely though quite decorative death, was extolled through edition after edition, until it almost seemed as though the laurel were growing for other brows than those of the authoress of "A Double Thread." I have heard nothing of the book—which I read with wonder—of late, but that is rather the way with all these Books of the Year: to-day they are, and there is none like them, none; and to-morrow they are not, and 'tis hard to discover if they have ever been. This, however, is by the way.

In '99, as if to keep the good public right in its attitude to the immense congeries of interests and societies which is vaguely described as "the East End," Mr. Arthur Morrison published "To London Town;" and this was so obviously a book, so unmistakably an accomplished piece of art, that, from the outset, its chances of getting itself considered as a Novel of the Year were seen to be small. Yet the reviewers did their best. In "To London Town," as in "A Child of the Jago," Mr. Morrison is but an artist—discreet, passionless, expert, serene; yet his critics hailed his conversion to optimism in "To London Town" as fluently as they had bewailed his plunge into pessimism in "A Child of the Jago." The fact is, that in the one book he set forth a hopeless state of things in the terms of art; that in the other he set forth in the terms of art a state of things in which there is room for hope; and that he has done both with equal artistry and with a single regard for both the essential truths—truth in art and truth to life. I know how much has been omitted from both books;

but then, I can give a guess how much was omitted from (say) Mrs. Gamp and Sir John Falstaff, and, without placing Mr. Morrison's achievement on the same plane with these, I can see how notably good it is, and remain convinced that to these books, and to "Tales of Mean Streets," we must still turn if we would know aught of the East End. We get, it is true, no Virgin Scrapper; but we do get as much of the truth about things—of *la vérité vraie*—as can be conveyed in English art.

Very nearly as interesting (I will not say convincing) as Mr. Morrison is Mr. Zangwill, when he writes about his own people, whether in the East End or out of it. He "fluffs" a little, perhaps: he is too much bent on the romantic presentation of mole-hills as first-class mountains; he has a pen, but he has also an ink-pot; and ink is cheap—cheap! Yet have I read much—I have not read all—of "They That Walk in Darkness" with a regard which I cannot develop in "The Colossus," let me say, though "The Colossus" is, so far as I know, its author's best work; nor even (I blench as I record it) in "No. 5 John Street" and "A Double Thread."

Is "Stalky & Co." a novel? I fear it is not. But it is a book; that much must be conceded by its worst enemies. It is a little hard, I think; for one of Mr. Kipling's innumerable merits is that of never leaving you in doubt as to his meaning. It is a merit, "like another;" but I think that in "Stalky & Co." it is possibly a little too meritorious. Be this as it may, the book is alive from beginning to end; and Stalky and Beetle and McTurk are the living things that make it so. I was not in a public-school, so that I cannot sympathize with them that say that Stalky and Beetle and McTurk are in no wise typical public school boys. I am prepared to believe that they are not; and I am also prepared to assert that the author of their being does not anywhere declare they are.* If I be not mistaken, Mr. Kipling pictures not the British schoolboy in the lump, but the three uncommon and peculiar British schoolboys who did business as the firm of Stalky. England, he says, is full of Stalkys; and with all my heart I hope that what he says is true. With all my heart, too, I wish it were just as full of Beetles; though three Kiplings at a time were, per-

* It is to be noted that in this book Mr. Kipling's other boys are pretty much the boys we know: they might—and herein, I think, consists the fault—have gone in with Tom Brown and Scud East and Madman Martin, or even have joined hands with the heroes of *Eric*. But, in truth, the British boy is none of these; and his living picture as (within limits) a resourceful, valiant, and unscrupulous young scoundrel, has yet to be done.

haps, as much as the world could stand, while for any number of Corkrans there is even room and to spare. On the whole, though, to get back to my point, the Messrs. Stalky are too diabolically clever for the schoolboy as I knew him, and as he is extant in me; and, to refresh my memory, I turn to "The Human Boy" of Mr. Eden Phillpotts, in which I get some aspect of the wretch as I remember him—romantical, desperate, for the most part futile; and all the better for that touch of "the true Dickens," which reconciles to every page in which it is found shining.

This reminds me that Devon is fortunate in a novelist. I do not know whether "Lorna Doone" is a great book or not; but I am assured that it is by way of becoming one of the "glories of our blood and state;" and I can see for myself that in Mr. Eden Phillpotts aforesaid and in the lady who calls herself "Zack," Mr. Blackmore's tradition is, to say the least, to be worthily upheld. In "Children of the Mist" Mr. Phillpotts walks with the old, leisurely gait; he rejoices in temptations to describe that coign of England which he knows and loves beyond the rest of our common Isle; he lingers on her beauties, and her oddities are, like her speech, of an absorbing interest to him; so that her Will Blanchard, her Sam Bonus, her Lyddon, her Billy Blee are by his contrivance brought as near to us—almost—as Dugald Dalgetty and Newman Noggs. And if he should fail his county, there would still be "Zack;" and of "Zack" we have the right to expect something distinguished—it may be, something great. Her first book was absurdly over-praised. Her second, "On Trial," shows, albeit a little skimmed and breathless, that she has a great talent. The person who "lays out" seems to me something overwrought; but her Ostler and her Ostler's woman are at once fantastical and real, her heroine is undeniable, while in her hero she sets forth such a story of cowardice, moral and physical, as one must go far—and possibly fail in the end—to parallel.

And now must come my Catalogue of the Ships. It is not that I like the items in it less than these free and independent subjects on which I have spoken at a certain length; 'tis simply that I have said so much about the others that I must cut short whatever I might have to say about them that are left. To begin then: There is some excellent story-telling, with a capital Villain (Mr. Townshend) in Mr. J. Maclaren Cobban's "Pursued by the Law," and there is a capital villain (Major Wilbrahan), with some ex-

cellent story-telling, in Mr. W. A. Mason's "Miranda of the Balcony." Mr. H. G. Wells sets forth a merely admirable *donnée* in "When the Sleeper Wakes," and invents a number of most plausible and most devilish forecasts of the future; but he fails, as it seems to me, to make his hero possible or his heroine even probable; and I turn with joy from the "Sleeper" to his "Tales of Space and Time"—which could have been written by nobody else alive, and in which there is one thing—*The Star* is what he calls it—which seems to me quite his finest achievement since *The Time-Machine*. To contrast with this is Harold Frederic's posthumous novel, "The Market-Place," a careful and capital study in reality—not so good as "Illumination," but good enough, at least, to make us regret that 'tis the last we shall get from Harold Frederic's hand; is Mr. Henry James's "The Turn of the Screw," an achievement in the Real-Unreal, in which the writer invents a shudder; are Mr. Bernard Capes's "Our Lady of Darkness" and "At a Winter's Fire." Now, Mr. Capes has made himself notorious as the writer of a more than Meredithian variety of Meredithese. If I had room, I might lecture Mr. Capes upon the merits and demerits of his style. But I have none; so I shall content myself with saying that "Our Lady of Darkness," if you can leave the style alone, is crammed full of invention and character, and that in "At a Winter's Fire" there is at least one story—"The Eddy on the Floor"—which made me think I was a boy again, when my flesh would creep with the best.

And to conclude: I have read Mr. Neil Munro's "Gilian the Dreamer" with great satisfaction. It is a good thing, so good a thing that I do not know why it is not a better. I thought, as I read, that I'd rather have written "*Jus Primæ Noctis*" and "The Lost Pibroch;" but I relented as I read, and in the end I settled that here, perhaps, was Mr. Munro's best work. It is, in truth, most personal, most persuasive—in places merely exquisite—yet, somehow, the Saxon pock-pudden is not passionately interested. Gilian is a study of the Celt, as notable as and much more completely phrased than John Splendid; and yet . . . and yet . . . I, for one, would rather that the book had ended with Part I.; I want no Part II. I love the old soldiers, and Miss Mary, and the rest; but, for Gilian, excepting in so far as he—not exists but—reflects the life about him, for Gilian and his loves I own I do not care a fig. And, with this declaration, I turn from

"Gilian the Dreamer" to "The Princess Xenia." It is to Seaboard Bohemia, to the Bohemia of Florizel and Perdita and Autolyceus, that Mr. Marriott Watson has turned for inspiration: as Mr. Anthony Hope in "The Prisoner of Zenda," as the late R. L. Stevenson in "Prince Otto." And the inspiration has served him well. His heroine is, in the beginning, at all events, a little shadowy; but throughout his hero is impudent, alert, delightful. And I counsel everyone to read the story of his attempt at playing Providence and its romantic yet most human sequel.

W. E. HENLEY.

THE POWER OF MR. MOODY'S MINISTRY.

BY THE REV. LYMAN ABBOTT, D. D.

THE death of Mr. Moody naturally suggests the question, What was the secret of his extraordinary power? Without office in Church or State; without theological, collegiate or even the better Sunday-school education; without a church or society behind him to support him, or a constituency, except such as he himself created, to afford him moral support; without any of the recognized graces of oratory, and without any ambition to form a new ecclesiastical organization or a new school of theological thought, and perhaps without the ability to do so; nevertheless, Dwight L. Moody probably spoke to a greater number of auditors than any man of his time in either Europe or America, unless possibly John B. Gough may be an exception, and he spoke on spiritual themes to audiences which were less prepared therefor by any previous spiritual culture than those addressed on such themes by any preacher since Wesley and Whitfield. In this paper I do not propose to attempt any analysis of Mr. Moody's character, or any sketch of his extraordinary career, with the main facts of which it is safe to assume that all readers of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW are familiar, but simply to use that career to elucidate a truth to the affirmation of which he gave his life, and which needs constant reiteration in press, pulpit and platform.

The question is much discussed in the press, Are the churches losing their power? More fundamental is the question, What is the secret of such power as they possess? The question is much discussed in ministerial circles, Why do not more people go to church? More fundamental is the question, What is the secret of the attraction which draws to the churches, with such regularity, so many men and women, of different stations and of varying degrees of moral and intellectual culture? From the

point of view of a pure secularist, the phenomenon is an extraordinary if not an insoluble one. To the markets the people go to procure the food required to support physical life; to the dry goods stores for clothing necessary for comfort or contributing to luxury; to the theatres, wearied with their work, they go to forget their toil in an hour of amusement; to the art galleries and the concert rooms, attracted by esthetic desires; to the schools, that in their youth they may obtain the results of the experience of the past, and so may live more intelligently, avoiding the blunders of their fathers. But why do they go to church? What in their nature prompts them? Not for food, or protection from weather, or amusement, or instruction in the art of present-day living. What do they expect? What have they a right to expect? What must the churches give to them, if the congregations are not to go away disappointed? These questions Mr. Moody's character and career help at once to emphasize and to answer.

It is not enough to reply that a habit of church-going has been formed and is kept up from mere tradition. A habit does not exist in all classes of society, during a period of many centuries, in different localities and even in different countries, without some ultimate reason behind this habit which has induced it. It is not enough to say that the people are attracted by the oratory, the music or the art. The minister is rarely an orator; the music rarely equals that of the concert room; the art does not compare with that of the art galleries, and, though generally in better taste, is rarely as popular as that of the theatres. At best, oratory, music and art are but incidental and subsidiary attractions to the church. The answer can only be found in the declaration of Sabatier, that "man is incurably religious," in the affirmation of Jesus Christ that "man does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God." The marketplace is not a more sure witness that man has a physical appetite, the concert room and the art gallery that he has esthetic appetites, than are the churches and the Sunday congregations that he has a spiritual hunger. That the churches often fail to satisfy this hunger, and even sometimes pretend to satisfy it by methods which injure instead of benefiting the attendant, no more militate against the witness which the existence of the churches bears to man's spiritual needs than does bad music or bad art indicate that man has no esthetic nature.

I shall not undertake here to analyze this spiritual hunger, or to describe all the elements which enter into it, or all the occasions which especially and notably excite it. It must suffice for my present purpose to indicate two elements, neither of which is ever wholly wanting from any man who is not himself wholly lacking in some of the elements essential to a normal manhood: the first relates to his past, the second to his future.

Every healthful man sometimes—some men at all times—looks back regretfully upon his past. He is conscious of blunders in judgment, conscious of aberrations of will, conscious of deliberate acts of wrong-doing which have brought injury upon himself and upon others. He wishes that he could live again his life, or some particular crisis in his life. His experience answers more or less consciously to the expression in the General Confession in the Book of Common Prayer: "We have done the things which we ought not to have done, and we have left undone the things which we ought to have done," even if his self-dissatisfaction does not lead him to add, "And there is no health in us." Sometimes this is a keen sense of shame for some specific deed done or duty neglected; sometimes it is a vague feeling of self-condemnation, without clearly defined specific cause. Sometimes it is a passing shadow, evanescent and uninfluential; sometimes it is a morbid self-condemnation, depressing the spirits and tending toward despair. But he who has never felt this sense of remorse in some one of its various forms is singularly lacking, either in his memory, his ideals, or his power of sitting in judgment upon his own conduct and character. It is doubtful whether any desire which the human soul ever possessed is keener or more overmastering than the desire which sometimes possesses it, in certain phases of experience, to be rid of its ineradicable past and to be permitted to begin life anew, unclogged and unburdened.

The other spiritual hunger of the soul relates to the future. The soul is conscious of undeveloped possibilities in itself; it is spurred on to it knows not what future, by unsatisfied aspirations. It longs to do and to be more, and rather to be than to do. It suffers what I may call "growing pains." It has in the sphere of moral experience aspirations which may be compared to those which have summoned the greatest musicians and the greatest artists to their careers. This sense of unsatisfied aspiration differs from the sense of remorse in that it relates to the future, not to

the past; the one is a consciousness of wrong committed or duty left undone, the other of life incomplete. The cry of the soul in the one experience is that of Paul, "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" The cry of the other is like that of Tennyson:

" Oh for a man to arise in me
That the man that I am, may cease to be."

The one is a craving for peace, the other for achievement. The one belongs to a nature which dwells in the past, the other to a nature which lives in the future. Not only are different temperaments differently affected, the one being more conscious of regret, the other of unsatisfied aspiration; but the same person sometimes experiences the one, sometimes the other. One age of the world is more prone to the former, another age to the latter. In our time, there is comparatively little experience of regret for the past. There is, to use the phrase current in theological circles, very little "conviction of sin." The age has its face set toward the future. Its ideals lie before it, not behind. It is eager, expectant, hopeful, aspiring. It takes no time to look back, not even time enough to learn the lessons which the past can teach. But it is full of eager expectations for a nobler civilization, greater wealth, more harmonious relations between employer and employed, juster government, better social and industrial conditions, a nearer approximation to brotherhood. In the Middle Ages, humanity was burdened by the consciousness of past wrong-doing, and it sought relief from its burden by seclusion from the world in monastic retreats. In the present age, humanity is feverish with unsatisfied aspirations, and is driven by its fever into the world, there to engage in ceaseless and excessive activities. Like a mettlesome steed cruelly rowelled with spurs, yet held in by a curb bit, is the present age, spurred on by aspiration to even greater achievements, yet held back by prudential self-interest from the great endeavor and the greater self-sacrifices without which the noblest achievements are always impossible.

It is because the Christian religion professes to be able to satisfy these two passionate desires of the human soul—the desire for peace and the desire for achievement—that it possesses the attraction which the failures and the folly of its adherents may diminish, but cannot destroy.

Christianity is not a system of ethics—though it has revolutionized ethics; nor a method of worship—though it has furnished

a new inspiration to worship and given it a new character; nor a philosophy—though a great many divergent philosophies have been attempted to account for it. It is a life founded on a historic fact; take that fact away and it is difficult to see how the life could survive. The belief of the universal Christian Church in that fact is expressed with incomparable simplicity in the words of one of the more ancient Christian creeds: "I believe in one Lord Jesus Christ. . . . Who for us men and our salvation came down from heaven." What is the relation of this Lord Jesus Christ to the Eternal Father from whom He came, and how He accomplishes our salvation are questions to which Christian philosophers give different answers. But all Christian believers accept the historic fact that there is one Lord Jesus Christ, and that He came down from Heaven for us men and our salvation. In its possession of this faith and its interest in this fact lies the secret of the power of the Christian Church. Rob it of this faith, take from it this fact, and its peculiar power would be gone; it would only be a teacher of ethics, or a school of philosophy, or a conductor of religious mysteries in an unintelligible worship of an unknown God. For in its possession of this fact lies its power to take from men the two burdens which so sorely oppress them—that of a remorse for a wrongful past, that of unsatisfied aspiration in the present and for the future.

Empowered by this fact, the Church declares to men burdened that their sins are forgiven them. This is not a philosophical statement founded on a general faith that God is good and therefore will forgive sins; still less is it the enunciation of a general belief that He is merciful and therefore will not be very exacting of His children, but will let them off from deserved punishment if they appeal to Him with adequate signs of repentance, in penances or otherwise. It is the statement of the historic fact that God forgave men their sins before they repented; that He bears no ill will and sometimes no wrath against them; that He only desires for them that they shall be good men and true; and that, to accomplish this, His good-will toward them, Jesus Christ has come for His Father and our Father into the world. Empowered by this fact, the Church acts as the official and authoritative promulgator of a divine forgiveness, an authoritative and historically re-enforced interpreter of the divine disposition; empowered by this fact, the Christian teacher repeats of

himself what Jesus Christ said of Himself: "The Son of Man hath power on earth to remit sins." He reiterates Christ's message and with the same authority: "Go in peace and sin no more." He re-declares, not as a theory, but as an historically established fact: "Almighty God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ . . . hath given power and commandment to His ministers, to declare and pronounce to His people, being penitent, the absolution and remission of their sins. He pardoneth and absolveth all those who truly repent and unfeignedly believe His holy Gospel."

While the Church thus with authority unloosens the burden of the past from those on whom a remorseful memory has bound that past, it also inspires with a hope for the future which turns the anxious and sometimes despairing aspirations into eager and gladly expectant ones. For it tells the story of a Man Who in Himself fulfilled the spiritual desires which are in all noble men, and then, departing, left as His legacy the command, which is also a promise: "Follow me." It answers the question, What is human nature? by pointing to the character of Jesus of Nazareth, with the assurance, What He was every man can become. It answers the question, Is life worth living? by pointing to that life and declaring that, as He laid down His life for us, so can we lay down our lives for one another. It presents to humanity not an ideal merely, but a realized ideal, and in this realization of the highest ideal of character gives assurance that our aspirations are not doomed to disappointment, unless we ourselves so doom them. That they are intended by our Father to be realized and that we can realize them, is historically attested by the life of Him Who was the Son of Man, and Who experiencing our battles has pointed out to us the possibility of and the way to victory.

This is the secret of the power of the Church: not the excellence of its ethical instruction, not the wisdom of its religious philosophy, not the esthetic beauty of its buildings or its services, and certainly not the oratory of its preachers: but this, that it is charged with a double message to men burdened by a sense of wrong-doing in the past, tormented by unfulfilled aspirations for the future; a message to the first, "Thy sins are forgiven thee;" a message to the second, "You can do all things through Him that strengtheneth you." Poorly as the Church understands its mission, poorly as it delivers its message, it nevertheless has this as

its mission, this as its message. And when it fulfills the one and delivers the other with the power that comes from the conscious possession of divine authority, men gather to its services to receive its gift. This is not the only message of Christianity; it teaches a purer ethics, it proffers a more sacred consolation, it incites to a more joyous and inspiring worship than any other religion; but no other religion has attempted to proclaim with authority pardon for the past or to give as from God Himself power for the future.

Of the principles which I am here trying to interpret, two illustrations are afforded in the very recent life of the Church—illustrations which are all the more significant because they come from quarters so dissimilar theologically and ecclesiastically that to many persons they seem to have nothing in common. The first illustration is afforded by the High Church movement in England—the second by the life and work of Dwight L. Moody.

It can hardly be necessary to say that I have no ecclesiastical or theological sympathy with the High Church movement. I do not believe that Jesus Christ organized a Church, or appointed bishops, or gave directly or by remote implication any special authority to the bishops thereafter to be appointed in the Church, or conferred special grace, or intended that special grace should be conferred, by the sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, or made either of them means of conveying supernatural grace, except in so far as they became the expressions of a mood or spirit of mind receptive of grace. I do not believe in the perpetuity of a priesthood, or an altar, or the kind of sacrificial system which a priesthood and an altar seem to typify. And yet it is impossible for any student of current events to doubt that the High Church party in the Anglican Church is really exerting a notable spiritual influence in England; that it is attracting in many cases large congregations to before sparsely attended churches; that it is felt as a power in many hearts and homes. To think that this is because Protestant England is going back to its old-time allegiance to the Pope of Rome, or because a generation which has departed in its social standards from the severer simplicity of Puritan England wants elaborate ritualism in its churches, or because it is easier to conduct an orderly ritual than to preach a tolerable sermon, and easier to go through the first without attention than to give attention to the second, is to misread the signs of the times, and, in judging a movement, to esti-

mate it by the mere incidents which happen to accompany it and not by the essential spirit which characterizes it. The essential spirit which characterizes the High Church party is its sacerdotal spirit; its exaltation of the priesthood and the altar; its conversion of the memorial supper into a bloodless sacrifice of the mass; and its use of priesthood, altar, and mass to emphasize the right of the priest to declare *authoritatively* the absolution and remission of sins. It is because the High Church priesthood assume power on earth to forgive sins, and so to relieve men and women of the first of the two burdens of which I have spoken, that it has its power over the hearts of its adherents. It is for this reason, also, that its power is mainly seen among women. Women's morbid consciences make them susceptible to painful and sometimes needless regrets, and a Church which offers to remove this burden of the past appeals to them more than it does to men, who are more inclined to let the dead bury their dead and ask for a religion which will help them to a better future. High Church theology has no special efficacy in equipping the soul for the future, and it has therefore no special attraction for virile men. But so long as men and women feel the burden of the irreparable past, so long they will come to that Church, and that alone, which declares with authority that the past is forgiven; and they will not always be critical in inquiring whether all the grounds on which that authority is claimed can stand historical investigation.

At the other extreme, ecclesiastically, are the evangelists of our time, chief among them all, and type of them all, Dwight L. Moody. If I speak of him peculiarly, it is because he affords so striking an illustration of the principle which I wish to elucidate. Mr. Moody belonged to a denomination which discards all notion of the priesthood, whose ministry are only laymen performing a special function in a church without orders. In this church he never had such ordination as is generally required of those who desire to exercise ministerial functions. His services were attended neither by Baptism nor by the Lord's Supper. He believed that the latter was a memorial service, not a bloodless sacrifice; that any Christian, whether lay or clerical, was equally a priest; to him the church was a meeting-house and the altar a communion table or table of meeting; and most of his services were held in unconsecrated halls. But never did a High Church priest of the Anglican Church believe more profoundly that to him had been given

authority to promise the absolution and remission of sins, than did Mr. Moody believe that he possessed such authority. Rarely, if ever, did priest, Anglican or Catholic, hear more vital confessions or pronounce absolution with greater assurance. The High Churchman thinks that he derives such power through a long ecclesiastical line; Mr. Moody believed that he derived it through the declarations of the Bible; but both in the last analysis obtained it by their faith in "one Lord Jesus Christ, . . . Who for us men and for our salvation came down from Heaven," The one no less than the other spoke, or claimed to speak, by authority; both derived their authority from the same great historic fact; and the attractive power which drew unnumbered thousands to the preaching of Mr. Moody, was in its essence the same as that which draws unnumbered thousands to the Altar and the Eucharist.

For myself I believe neither in the authority of the ecclesiastical organization with the Churchman, nor in the infallibility of the Book with Mr. Moody. The authority to pronounce absolution and remission for the sins that are past and to proffer this gift of life to fulfill the aspirations of the soul for the future, I take to be spiritual, not ecclesiastical nor traditional, and to belong equally to every one who has received such absolution and remission, and such gift of spiritual life. But I am sure that if we of the so-called liberal faith hope to retain in these more liberal days the attractive power of the Church, we can do it only by holding fast to the great historic facts of the birth, life, passion and death of Jesus Christ essentially as they are narrated in the Four Gospels, and to the great spiritual fact that in the God whom He has declared to us, there is abundant forgiveness for all the past, and abundant life for all the future; and we must declare this, not as a theological opinion, to be defended by philosophical arguments as a rational hypothesis, but as an assured fact, historically certified by the life and death of Jesus Christ and confirmed out of the mouth of many witnesses by the experience of Christ's disciples and followers in all Churches and in every age. If we fail to do this, men will desert our ministry for Romanism, Anglicanism and Evangelism, or, in despair of spiritual life in any quarter, will desert all that ministers to the higher life, and live a wholly material life, alternating between restless, unsatisfied desire and stolid self-content. And the fault and the folly will be ours more even than theirs.

LYMAN ABBOTT.

OUR RULE IN THE PHILIPPINES.

BY BRIGADIER-GENERAL THOMAS M. ANDERSON, U. S. A., LATE
MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V., IN COMMAND OF THE FIRST
EXPEDITIONARY LAND FORCE FROM THE UNITED
STATES TO THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS.

BEFORE Admiral Dewey left Hong Kong to attack the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay, Prince Henry of Prussia went to the "Olympia" to bid him farewell. At parting, the Prince said: "Good-bye, Commodore; I fear I shall never see you again;" and he added, "You are going on a desperate undertaking."

So low an estimate was at that time placed upon our war power, that Prince Henry was not alone in the belief that our contest with Spain would prove disastrous to us. In no part of the world were we held so cheap as in the Orient. Even then the collapse of the Chinese Empire was thought inevitable, and the stronger European Powers were preparing to seize upon the fragments. Northward from the Straits, the Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, French, British and Russians had their dependencies. The United States alone had no foothold along the Asiatic coast, nor any port at which in time of war its naval vessels could remain over forty-eight hours. One old side-wheeled, wooden gun-boat represented our naval power in Shanghai or Canton. Dewey had, in the harbor of Hong Kong, the strongest fleet we had ever sent to the China coast, but it was inferior in number and armament to the British, Russian, French, German and Japanese squadrons in those waters. And, strange as it may seem, nearly everybody on the coast, Asiatic and Europeans, believed it to be inferior even to the Manila fleet of Spain. The low estimation in which we were held is almost beyond belief. One reason for this is that Orientals are powerfully impressed by ostentatious display and arrogant pretension. As a rule, our diplomacy in the

East has been colorless and our representatives unpretentious gentlemen, living in rented houses so inferior to those occupied by other embassies that the contrast was humiliating. Our consuls also in those parts were constantly assuming that they had some diplomatic functions which made them very unpopular with the consular representatives of other nations.

It happened, therefore, that when Dewey started for Manila the officers of all the naval squadrons at Hong Kong, except the British, thought and hoped that he was going to certain destruction. I learned afterward from these prophets of evil that they thought our fleet would be brought to grief by the Krupp guns of the shore batteries, rather than by the Spanish squadron. It was probable that, if any of our unprotected cruisers had been struck near the water-line by a nine-inch projectile, it would have gone to the bottom.

As soon as the report of Dewey's May-day victory reached Hong Kong, the British, French, German and Japanese squadrons followed him to Manila. Soon, as is usual under like conditions, questions arose as to the rights of neutrals and the efficiency of the blockade. Manila Bay is thirty-five miles long and twenty miles wide. It is not one harbor, but embraces a number of harbors. Our squadron did not take station at the entrance of the bay, but anchored at Cavite, seven miles from Manila, and intercepted vessels passing that point. War vessels of neutral States are not forbidden by the *lex non scripta* of international law to enter blockaded ports, but it is an understanding that they are to hold no communication with the shore, except through ministers or consuls of their respective Governments. The Germans were suspected of violating this understanding. Their officers were bumptious and brusque in manner. Their sympathy for Spain was openly expressed and plainly shown. Their conduct all through was in striking contrast with the cordiality of the English, the good-natured affability of the Japanese, and the studied and formal courtesy of the French. On the other hand, our squadron apparently did not attempt to enforce a very strict blockade. Small native boats with fish and fruits ran into Manila constantly. On the land side, supplies were gotten in by bribing the insurgent leaders. The garrison and people of Manila during the siege, although reduced to rather unpalatable fare, were never in danger of starvation.

Our first expeditionary land force entered the Bay of Manila on the 30th of June, 1898, under the convoy of the "Baltimore" and the "Charleston." As we passed the quarantine station at Marivelis the German protected cruiser, "Kaiserin Augusta," the most formidable war ship in the bay, steamed out, and, running close to the "Australia," on which the writer had his headquarters, followed us up to Cavite. I did not suspect at the time that any discourtesy was intended; but I found afterward that our naval officers thought it was a discourteous bit of bravado. Many of them expressed the opinion that the Germans intended to interfere to prevent the bombardment of Manila. I never believed, however, that their squadron would go as far as overt acts. War is too expensive a luxury to be waged on a matter of sentiment, and the commercial interests of their nation in the Philippines were too small to warrant a war in that behalf.* I believed, moreover, that the Berlin Government would be deterred by the fact that there are eight millions of Germans in America and by the importance of the trade relations between Germany and the United States. It may have been as a matter of abundant caution that Admiral Dewey insisted on waiting for the monitors before opening his guns on Manila in August, 1898. Considering his responsibility, his prudence was commendable. We had another proof of it. When he heard that a Spanish fleet, with a land force of 3,000 men, had passed through the Suez Canal on its way to Manila, he came to me and proposed that I should re-embark the soldiers we had landed at Cavite and take them to Subig Bay. He explained that he could not prudently fight such vessels as the "Pelayo" and other formidable ships in the close waters of the bay, where they would have the support of the heavy Krupp guns on the Lunetta, and that, on the approach of the Cadiz squadron, he would have to leave me and go to the open sea. My attention was also called to the fact that the position of our land forces at Cavite would be untenable under the guns of the Spanish fleet. After thinking over the situation, I told him not to hesitate to adopt any course he deemed advisable, without regard to our land forces, as we would take care of ourselves. "But what will you do?" he asked. I answered that we would take to the woods. He seemed much pleased with this answer when I explained to him that we had subsistence supplies for six

* It is not generally known, yet it is a fact, that many of the reputed German merchants in Luzon are not German, but Swiss.

weeks, and that we could move to a good position on the mainland beyond the range of the enemy's guns.

At that time the insurgent Filipinos had driven the Spanish soldiers within the defenses of Manila, and had them completely invested on the land side by light field works, which they held with about fourteen thousand men. They were poorly armed and equipped, yet, as they had defeated the Spaniards in a number of fights in the field and had taken four thousand prisoners, it may be asserted in the vernacular of the camp that "they had the morale on them." The Manila garrison was so demoralized at that time, and so incomplete was their line of defense, that I believe it would have been possible, by coming to an understanding with Aguinaldo, to have carried their advance works by storm and to have captured all of the city, except the walled city or the old Spanish town. Under existing orders, we could not have struck a bargain with the Filipinos, as our Government did not recognize the authority of Aguinaldo as constituting a *de facto* government; and, if Manila had been taken with his co-operation, it would have been his capture as much as ours. We could not have held so large a city with so small a force, and it would therefore have been practically under Filipino control.

On the 1st of July, 1898, I called on Aguinaldo with Admiral Dewey. He asked me at once whether "the United States of the North" either had recognized or would recognize his government—I am not quite sure as to the form of his question, whether it was "had" or "would." In either form it was embarrassing. My orders were, in substance, to effect a landing, establish a base, not to go beyond the zone of naval co-operation, to consult Admiral Dewey and to wait for Merritt. Aguinaldo had proclaimed his government only a few days before (June 28), and Admiral Dewey had no instructions as to that assumption. The facts as to the situation at that time I believe to be these: Consul Williams states in one of his letters to the State Department that several thousand Tagals were in open insurrection before our declaration of war with Spain. I do not know as to the number, yet I believe the statement has foundation in fact. Whether Admiral Dewey and Consuls Pratt, Wildman and Williams did or did not give Aguinaldo assurances that a Filipino government would be recognized, the Filipinos certainly thought so, probably inferring this from their acts rather than from their statements. If an in-

ipient rebellion was already in progress, what could be inferred from the fact that Aguinaldo and thirteen other banished Tagals were brought down on a naval vessel and landed in Cavite? Admiral Dewey gave them arms and ammunition, as I did subsequently, at his request. They were permitted to gather up a lot of arms which the Spaniards had thrown into the bay; and, with the four thousand rifles taken from Spanish prisoners and two thousand purchased in Hong Kong, they proceeded to organize three brigades and also to arm a small steamer they had captured. I was the first to tell Admiral Dewey that there was any disposition on the part of the American people to hold the Philippines, if they were captured. The current of opinion was setting that way when the first expeditionary force left San Francisco, but this the Admiral had had no reason to surmise. But to return to our interview with Aguinaldo.

I told him I was acting only in a military capacity; that I had no authority to recognize his government; that we had come to whip the Spaniards, and that, if we were successful, the indirect effect would be to free them from Spanish tyranny. I added that, as we were fighting a common enemy, I hoped we would get along amicably together. He did not seem pleased with this answer. The fact is, he hoped and expected to take Manila with Admiral Dewey's assistance, and he was bitterly disappointed when our soldiers landed at Cavite. In a few hours after our interview, two of my staff officers, Major Cloman and Lieutenant Clark, who were walking through the streets of the town, were arrested and taken before Aguinaldo. They were told by him that strangers could only visit the town by his permission, but that in their case he was pleased to give them permission to proceed. We at once landed our forces, and on the 4th of July Aguinaldo was invited to witness a parade and review in honor of our national holiday. He did not come, because he was invited not as President but as General Aguinaldo. This led me to write him a letter stating that, while we hoped to have amicable relations with him, I would have to take Cavite as a base of operations, and closing with this sentence:

"I have therefore the honor to ask Your Excellency to instruct your officials not to interfere with my officers in the performance of their duties and not to assume that officers or men cannot visit Cavite without your permission." *

* Sen. Doc. 62, p. 1, 52 Cong.

A few days thereafter, he made an official call, coming with cabinet and staff and a band of music. On that occasion, he handed me an elaborate schedule for an autonomous government which he had received from some Filipinos in Manila, with a statement that they had reason to believe that Spain would grant them such a form of government. With this was an open letter addressed to the Filipino people from Pedro Alexandre Paterno, advising them to put their trust in Spain rather than America. The day before, two German officers had called on Aguinaldo and I believed they had brought him these papers. I asked him if the scheme was agreeable to him. He did not answer, but asked if we, the North Americans, as he called us, intended to hold the Philippines as dependencies. I said I could not answer that, but that in one hundred and twenty years we had established no colonies. He then made this remarkable statement:

"I have studied attentively the Constitution of the United States, and I find in it no authority for colonies and I have no fear."

It may seem that my answer was somewhat evasive, but I was at the time trying to contract with the Filipinos for horses, carts, fuel and forage. We soon found that Aguinaldo had forbidden his people to sell us anything without his permission. We then informed him that we would have to revert to requisitions. This brought him to terms, and he sent his brother-in-law to us with the assurance that he would give us all possible assistance in obtaining supplies. The depot quartermaster then employed the brother-in-law, and after that we had no further trouble on that score.

The prevailing sentiment of the Filipinos toward us can be shown by one incident.

About the middle of July the insurgent leaders in Cavite invited a number of our army and navy officers to a banquet. There was some postprandial speech-making, the substance of the Filipino talk being that they wished to be annexed, but not conquered. One of our officers in reply assured them that we had come not to make them slaves, but to make them free men. A singular scene followed. All the Filipinos rose to their feet, and Buencomeno, taking his wine-glass in his hand, said: "We wish to be baptized in that sentiment." Then he and the rest poured the wine from their glasses over their heads.

Statements have been made to the effect that Manila was taken

by agreement, and that, if our agreement with the Spanish authorities had been intelligently carried out, there need not have been the loss of a single life. Much of our intelligence in regard to Philippine matters has come from the Epistle and not from the Gospel side of the altar. I do not know that I can give the absolute gospel truth as to the so-called capitulation agreement, yet I can say that, if there was any agreement that Manila was to surrender with only a semblance of a fight, it was not communicated to the Army. I was directed to draw up and submit what is known as the tactical plan of attack. I drew it up on the theory that there was to be *bona fide* resistance, and it was adopted by the Commanding General. I was directed not to press the land attack until it was seen whether the Spaniards raised the white flag after the navy opened fire. We had twelve field pieces of artillery bearing on the Spanish line, and four in reserve. I waited twenty minutes after the naval guns began firing, and then directed the land batteries to open. As the white flag was not raised, the infantry advanced, carried the Spanish works and entered the city, and then, and not before, the white flag was raised. Even then, the Spanish authorities forgot or neglected to notify their troops on the Singalon front, for they gave MacArthur quite a stiff fight at that point.

The negotiations by which it was attempted to secure a surrender without resistance were carried on through Mr. André, the Belgian consul. His method was to go to the Governor-General and get a statement, which he wrote down in a memorandum book; then he would go to General Merritt and Admiral Dewey and get a statement from them, which he would carry back to the Governor-General. This was apart from some formal correspondence. After the surrender, André translated to me the notes in his memorandum book, for they were written in Spanish. The substance of the agreement seemed to be that if the fleet did not throw shells into the walled city or the Spanish part of Manila the Spanish artillery would not open on the fleet. There was no agreement, as the memorandum was read to me, that our land forces would not be fired on. On the contrary, there was a statement that the honor of Spain required that there should be resistance, and that, under the Spanish army code, their officers surrendering without resistance or giving a parole would subject themselves to trial by court-martial. Accordingly, we were fired on from the trenches and back through the streets of the city.

So far as the land forces were concerned, they took the place by storm. And it has never been made apparent why the Spaniards were allowed the honors of war, and why the return of all captured property upon the signing of a treaty of peace was assured to them. The Filipinos assumed that it was because we intended to turn the Spanish loose on them as soon as we had made satisfactory terms with the Spanish Government.

The origin of our controversies and conflicts with the Filipinos can, as already explained, be traced back to our refusal to recognize the political authority of Aguinaldo. Our first serious break with them arose from our refusal to let them co-operate with us. About nine o'clock on the evening of August 12, I received from General Merritt an order to notify Aguinaldo to forbid the Filipino insurgents under his command from entering Manila. This notification was delivered to him at twenty minutes past ten that night. The Filipinos had made every preparation to assail the Spanish lines in their front. Certainly, they would not have given up part of their line to us unless they thought they were to fight with us. They, therefore, received General Merritt's interdict with anger and indignation. They considered the war as their war, and Manila as their capital, and Luzon as their country. Knowing that they would disregard any remonstrance on our part, I sent a battalion of North Dakota Volunteers to hold a bridge they would have to cross if they followed us into Manila when we made our assault on the next morning, but when the battle began they broke in by way of Santana and got into the city as soon as we did. After the white flag was raised and the firing ceased, it was found that fully four thousand armed insurgents had taken possession of Paco and part of Malata, two important suburbs on the south of the Pasig. To hold them within these limits and stop any attempt at looting, a cordon of troops was thrown around them. The situation was exceedingly critical. Our soldiers believed that the Filipinos had fired on them, and the Filipinos were almost beside themselves with rage and disappointment. The friendly relations we had with Generals Recati and Morial alone prevented a conflict then and there.

At seven o'clock I received an order from General Merritt to remove the Filipinos from the city. Had we attempted to use force, we would have had to fight to carry out our orders. In that event, we would certainly have had a serious complication.

With ten thousand men, we would have had to guard thirteen thousand three hundred Spanish prisoners and to fight fourteen thousand Filipinos. I therefore took the responsibility of telegraphing Aguinaldo, who was at Bacoar, ten miles below, requesting him to withdraw his troops and intimating that serious consequences would follow if he did not do so. I received his answer at eleven, saying that a Commission would come to me the next morning with full powers. Accordingly the next day Señors Buencomeno, Lagarde, Araneto and Sandeco came to Division Headquarters in Manila and stated that they were authorized to order the withdrawal of their troops, if we would promise to reinstate them in their present positions on our making peace with Spain. Thereupon I took them over to General Merritt. Upon their repeating their demands, he told them he could not give such a pledge, but that they could rely on the honor of the American people. The General then read to them the proclamation he intended to issue to the Filipino people. The Commission then went back to Aguinaldo for further instructions. A member of the Commission had brought me a letter from Aguinaldo, complaining that he had been harshly treated, and that his army had given up a part of their lines to us on the understanding that there was to be a co-operation between us in future military movements. I showed this letter to General Merritt after the Commission had withdrawn. He directed me to reply that, if Aguinaldo had been apparently harshly treated, it was from a military necessity, and that while we might recognize the justice of their insurrection, it was thought judicious to have only one army in Manila at one time.

On the 15th the Commission returned with a paper containing ten unreasonable demands. There was an astonishing change, from one very reasonable condition one day to ten aggressive demands the next. The change can only be accounted for on the theory that Aguinaldo and his counsellors plainly perceived, from General Merritt's proclamation, that we intended to hold the Philippines under military rule. Upon this they determined to obtain the best conditions for themselves at once. There was subsequently ample confirmation of this, from the fact that General Otis suppressed that part of the President's letter (December 24, 1898) to the Secretary of War, which directed our military forces to take possession of all the Philippine Islands by

right of transfer from Spain and by right of conquest. Upon receiving their demands, I told them that their propositions could not be considered until their troops withdrew from the city limits, and a map was given them with a line of delimitation traced upon it. I had the demands translated and laid them before General Merritt. What action he would have taken I do not know, but just at the time he received the cable message announcing the signing of the peace preliminaries in Washington. He took the message and the Filipino propositions to the flagship in the harbor for a consultation with Admiral Dewey. On his return, he directed me to return to Cavite and assume command of a district south of the Pasig.

There is a great diversity of opinion as to whether a conflict with the Filipinos could not have been avoided if a more conciliatory course had been followed in dealing with them. I believe we came to a parting of the ways when we refused their request to leave their military force in a good strategic position on the contingency of our making peace with Spain without a guarantee of their independence. From what was known of the situation, our Government was justified in not recognizing Aguinaldo's authority as a *de facto* government. For, even if it had been determined to recognize an independent Filipino government, it did not follow that we should recognize a self-appointed *junta* as constituting a government. On the other hand, the *dicta* of international law that, in war, the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme and immediately operate upon the political conditions of the inhabitants—which the President made the basis of his instructions to General Merritt—could only be made to apply to the Philippines by a very liberal construction.

Was Luzon a conquered country? We held Manila and Cavite. The rest of the island was held not by the Spaniards but by the Filipinos. On the other islands, the Spaniards were confined to two or three fortified towns. At the time referred to, we could not claim to hold by purchase, for we had not then received Spain's quit-claim deed to the Archipelago. Making allowance for difference of time, we took Manila, almost to the hour when the peace preliminaries were signed in Washington. But, no matter when Manila was taken, it was unfortunate for us that we felt so bound by the meshes of diplomatic amenities as to permit Spain's insurgent subjects to levy war against us, and attack

us when they felt fully prepared—a philanthropic policy which has cost us many valuable lives.

To return to the question of conciliation, one of Aguinaldo's Commission, who was subsequently a member of his cabinet, said to me: "Either we have a *de facto* government or we have not. If we have, why not recognize the fact? If not, why have you recognized us at all?" This last remark referred to General Merritt's conceding them the control of the Manila water-works, and to General Otis's attempts to negotiate with them without committing himself.

There were other causes of antagonism. Our soldiers, to get what they considered trophies, did a good deal of what the Filipinos considered looting. A number made debts which they did not find it convenient to pay. They called the natives "niggers," and often treated them with a good-natured condescension which exasperated the natives all the more because they feared to resent it.

Thus it happened that the common people, from at first hailing us as deliverers, got to regarding us as enemies. After the assembling of a Filipino congress at Malolos with representatives from the other islands, there was but little hope of a peaceful solution. Restrained by diplomatic and philanthropic considerations, we had given them time to organize their revolutionary government and to consolidate their power. Naturally, they did not wish to stultify themselves by making terms with us, when the only terms offered involved the absolute abrogation of their authority. The leaders were influenced by another consideration. All the religious orders, except the Jesuits, held valuable properties and concessions. The Dominicans, for instance, held large areas of rice lands south of the Pasig. A number of civil corporations held concessions—or charters, as we call them—for railways, tramways, electric plants, water-works, etc. The leaders wished to enrich themselves by confiscating all these properties. In our treaty with Spain, we were pleased to recognize all private and corporate rights. It was, therefore, evident to them that under our administration they could not carry out that project. The common people had been made to believe that in accepting our rule they would simply exchange one set of oppression for another. Yet there was a possibility of breaking the power of the Malolos government by conciliating the common people and

winning over certain friendly military leaders. This was done in Negros, but never attempted in Luzon; yet this was the method by which British power was established in India. We know how to fight, but we do not know how to conquer, if the accepted principle of dividing to conquer is to be rejected.

As to our ability to establish a stable government in the Philippines, we have certain things in our favor. The people of those islands have no other traditional allegiance and no other governmental traditions. They wish to break all connection between Church and State and to try a representative form of government. As Mabini says in his so-called "appeal" to the people of the United States, they look upon our Government as the best example of republican government.

The dangerous element is a spirit of faction begotten of generations of oppression and misrule, yet education and good government may in time regenerate a race not without good qualities and not without ambition.

This task, imposed upon us by a combination of circumstances, we must now carry out to its logical and legitimate conclusion. It is a part of "the white man's burden" which we can not now lay down.

THOMAS M. ANDERSON.

AMERICAN MISGOVERNMENT OF CUBA.

BY MAJOR J. E. RUNCIE.

THE United States expelled Spain from Cuba because the island, under Spanish rule, had become an intolerable neighbor, and because it had been sufficiently demonstrated that Spain was incompetent to restore and maintain peace and order. The sufficient and justifying motive for American intervention was the desire to remove what had long been a source of danger to the peace and welfare of our own country. There was, to be sure, in addition to this, a deep and widespread sympathy for the oppressed Cubans; but this feeling, by itself, would never, probably, have brought on, even if it could have justified, a war with Spain for the sole purpose of liberating the Cubans from Spanish rule. We forcibly abated a nuisance which had long been maintained in our neighborhood. We did this for our own advantage primarily. Necessarily, but only incidentally, our neighbors; the Cubans, should derive from American intervention even greater advantages than the Americans themselves. But, whether the war with Spain be considered as a merely utilitarian undertaking or as having in addition a humanitarian motive, its purposes can only be regarded as accomplished when we shall have effected in Cuba a complete and permanent reformation of the condition of things which made necessary the forcible expulsion of Spain. Not only must the house be swept and garnished, but care must be taken that no other devils shall enter, and that the last state of the island shall not be worse than the first. For almost a year now the United States has been in complete control, and it may be interesting to take account of how much, or how little, has been accomplished of the enormous task involved in the regeneration of Cuba.

In estimating what has been accomplished under American

control, it must be remembered that the region surrendered when the Spanish forces capitulated at Santiago has been in American hands ever since the date of the surrender, July 17, 1898, while the rest of the island remained under Spanish rule until the first day of January, 1899. The territory surrendered when Santiago fell included, approximately, the eastern half of Santiago Province, the scene of repeated insurrections against Spanish rule, and the home of the most ignorant, turbulent and lawless people of Cuba. The task of establishing order in this distracted region and maintaining peace among the inhabitants devolved on the American military commander and his subordinates. These officers were not specially chosen for such duty, and they had no time for preliminary studies of the situation which confronted them. They had no instructions from higher authority other than those contained in an order issued by the President, which wisely directed that, for the time being, the laws of the land should continue in force, but only so far as they were not inconsistent with "the new order of things." The general in command governed the surrendered region with commendable disregard of such provisions of the Spanish codes as were in his judgment incompatible with the objects of the American occupation. Courts were promptly established, the judges being appointed only after careful inquiry and upon the express recommendation of the best citizens. The demoralized municipalities were reorganized, the municipal officials being appointed in the same way as the judges. Forces of police were organized for the towns and rural districts. Cities and towns were cleaned of the accumulated filth which had made them for ages plague-spots and centres of infection for the most dreaded diseases of the tropics. Sanitary regulations were enforced among people who had never before known what such regulations were or were intended for. All available funds were devoted to the prosecution of public works, affording employment and relief to the destitute laboring element of the population. A system of internal taxation was devised, which, though crude and far from satisfactory even to its authors, was probably the best that could have been arranged in the existing emergency, and was certainly more reasonable and equitable than any that had ever been known under Spanish domination. As soon as possible, free public schools were established, and no other measure of the military government for the

benefit of the governed met with such prompt and cordial recognition and support as the attempt to establish public instruction in a land in which four centuries of Spanish civilization had failed to produce so much as a single schoolhouse. In addition to all this, the sick, the helpless and the destitute were relieved and cared for till they could be put in a position to care for themselves. Public order was restored and maintained in the most turbulent section of Cuba. None but Cubans were appointed to office, but every Cuban official was subject to the supervision of the military authorities. Dismissal and, if necessary, punishment were promptly and summarily dealt out to those who were found guilty of neglect or malfeasance. The surrendered district was quiet, contented, and, if not prosperous, it was at least self-sustaining. In less than six months, substantial progress had been made toward the accomplishment of the purposes for which the United States had intervened in Cuba, when, on January 1, 1899, it lost its identity, becoming thereafter only a part of the Military Division of Cuba, subject, in all respects, to the Military Governor at Havana.

The history of the American occupation since the day when the entire island passed into American hands is simply the story of what has been done at Havana. It is a record of error and neglect, of folly, ending necessarily in failure, and, possibly, in shame and disgrace.

Some preliminary mistakes and omissions seem to have been made at Washington. During all the period between the fall of Santiago and the occupation of Havana, nobody seems to have thought it worth while to study the problems involved in the transfer of the island, or to arrange a scheme for administering the government with a view to accomplishing economically, quickly and effectively the ultimate purposes of the intervention. Those purposes seem to have been lost sight of. A garrison was sent into the island, just as would have been done if the surrender had been arranged the previous day. So far as can be discovered, no general policy was prescribed and no specific instructions were given by the Government at Washington to guide the Military Governor in the performance of his difficult duty. The occupation of Cuba being of a purely military character, the President, as Commander-in-Chief, was invested with legislative, executive and judicial powers over the island. He could prescribe

the methods by which those powers were to be used to accomplish the purposes for which the war had been waged, and he could select, with those ends in view, competent subordinates to whom to delegate their exercise.

If the President deemed it wise, as it seems he did, to commit the exercise of his vast powers in Cuba to the absolute discretion of the Military Governor, his next mistake was in the selection of an officer for that trust who had no qualifications for the position, and no claim upon it except such as might be due to his high rank in the army. If the duties to be performed had been of a purely military character, the selection made would have been natural and proper; and there is no reason to doubt that the results would have been satisfactory. But there were no military problems to be solved in Cuba. The military duties of a Military Governor were certain to be only those of ordinary routine. It was equally certain that whoever might be appointed would find his real work in dealing with problems of a civil nature, the successful solution of which would call for the exercise of the highest and most exceptional ability, or, in its absence, for the results of special training and long experience in similar duties. High rank and long and honorable service in the army are not evidences of qualification for a task of such difficulty. When the name of the first Military Governor was announced, there was dismay in the hearts of all intelligent Cubans. They knew nothing of his long and honorable record as an officer, but they knew all about his brief career as Governor of Puerto Rico, and of his deplorable failure as an administrator of civil affairs. Neither by ability nor experience was he fitted for the duties entrusted to him, and it was inevitable that when he found himself unable to exercise the great powers conferred upon him those powers should fall into other hands.

Before this occurred, however, the Governor made two fatal blunders, apparently of his own motion. On assuming his office he proclaimed the restoration of the Spanish law *in its entirety*. Of what the Spanish law was, of its defects and its enormities, he probably knew nothing at all. Of the scandalous judicial system and the more scandalous methods of procedure, in both civil and criminal cases, which that law provides, he must have been totally ignorant. The effect of this was to revoke all the modifications of the law which, under the saving clause of the President's order re-

ferred to, had been enacted in the surrendered region of Santiago, and to restore to life every iniquitous practice against which Cuba had rebelled. It remained then only to find subordinates to whom to confide the application of unmitigated Spanish law, under American responsibility, to the government of the people who abhorred that law and all that it represented, for the purposes for which the intervention had been made. If the trust had been passed on by the Governor to American subordinates, or to Cubans carefully selected and carefully and constantly supervised in the discharge of their duties, the result might have been favorable; but in selecting his counsellors for civil affairs the Military Governor made another blunder, as serious as the first. The administrative duties of his government were distributed among four departments, each with a secretary at its head. The four secretaries formed the Governor's "Cabinet." Nominally, the Governor retained absolute control of the government, but really, without a formal delegation of his authority, he allowed to lapse into the hands of the four secretaries the great powers which he was himself too weak to wield. It was not long until the facts became known in Havana, and from there the knowledge spread over all the island. The expression of it took the form: "The American Governor reigns, but the Cuban secretaries govern." With this second blunder, the Military Governor practically disappears from the record. From this point, the government becomes practically a Cuban government, without responsibility on the part of the Cubans. That responsibility is all that is left to the American who is nominally the Governor and the Government.

It may be interesting, as throwing some light on the question as to what the Cubans would do if left to govern themselves without even nominal control, to follow the course and to point out the results of Cuban government so far.

If the secretaries, when they found themselves in possession of the Governor's powers, had exercised those powers to relieve their countrymen as soon as possible from the burdens and afflictions imposed by Spanish law and Spanish rule, the accomplishment of the ends for which the Cubans revolted and those for which the Americans intervened would have been equally promoted. If, without any regard whatever for American interests, they had laid out and pursued a wise and patriotic policy in the

interest of their own country, they would necessarily have been promoting the real and ultimate purpose of the intervention, from the American point of view, the turning of the island from a serious and standing nuisance into a good and quiet neighbor. But no such course has been taken. The folly of the Military Governor in proclaiming the complete re-establishment of the Spanish laws had the effect of preserving, in working order, every weapon and device for the purposes of fraud, corruption and oppression that Spain had perfected after four centuries of misrule, and the use and control of this arsenal and magazine of iniquities was weakly handed over to men who, though they had rebelled against the system when Spaniards were the oppressors and they themselves were the victims, have shown since they came into power, not only their desire to preserve the same system with no material modifications, but their willingness to employ it for the oppression of their own countrymen. After almost a year of American supremacy, Cuba is governed by Spanish methods. The only change has been in the substitution of Cubans for Spaniards as the administrators of the machinery of government.

No American who is not familiar with the Spanish language and the Spanish laws, and who has not lived in a country subject to Spanish rule long enough to become familiar with the methods by which those laws are administered, can have any adequate conception of the enormities which can be, and are, as a matter of course, perpetrated by due process of law and in the name of justice, under the Spanish system. It would take too long to describe here, in anything like detail, the deformities of the Spanish codes, the barbarities of Spanish procedure and the defects of the Spanish organization of the judiciary. It must suffice to say, briefly, that the body of Spanish law is not a growth upward from the needs and the customs of the people who are subject to it, like the common law and the statutes in the United States. It is a rule imposed from above by an authority higher than the people, and framed without much regard to the people's welfare. If it does not fit the people, they must fit themselves to it as well as they may. And for the application of the law to litigated cases, for the prosecution of persons accused of public offenses and for the accomplishment of the purposes of the Government, worthy or unworthy, there have been devised a sys-

tem of courts and a method of procedure differing radically from anything of the sort that any English-speaking people have known for the last three hundred years. Americans have never thought of their courts of justice as anything less than co-ordinate parts of the mechanism of their Government, not to be interfered with or restricted in the exercise of their judicial powers by any other branch of the same Government. No Spaniard or Cuban has ever risen to such a conception of a court. In Cuba to-day, as in Spain, the courts are subordinate, not co-ordinate, parts of the Government. They are merely instruments in the hands of higher powers by which those powers may accomplish their purposes indirectly whenever, for any reason, they do not care to do so openly. To this end, the tribunals are so organized and their procedure so arranged that the guilty may be shielded and the innocent persecuted to destruction, as may suit the whims, caprices or corrupt interests of the persons in possession of the powers of government. Since the Cuban secretaries took possession of the American Government at Havana, nothing has been done by them, or by any person under their authority, to introduce any reform, in the furtherance of common justice, in the laws, the courts or the modes of procedure. They have carefully preserved the entire iniquitous system, showing every desire to make it permanent, merely substituting themselves for the Spaniards who were formerly masters of the same powers for evil. The result is that the Cuban people have no more confidence in the courts of justice to-day than they had when the domination of Spain was unchallenged. Corruption exists everywhere. Justice and injustice are commodities disposed of, more or less openly, in the forum as in a market. When the Cubans cry out against the continuance of a condition of things against which they repeatedly rebelled, and which they believed could not exist under the American flag, they are told, by the Cuban secretaries, that the American Governor is responsible and that he declines to take any steps in the direction of reform. When, on the other hand, indignant Americans, scandalized at a state of affairs for which the whole American people will be held morally responsible, ask the Military Governor for an explanation of his tranquil inertness, they learn that such or such a secretary has the matter in hand, that it requires careful consideration; that much time is necessary, but that, ultimately, something will be done. Substantially

nothing has been done, and there is no prospect whatever that any material improvement can ever be effected under the present system of Cuban government, with American responsibility for the results of Cuban incompetence and corruption. As stated above, the result is valuable only as showing what will infallibly result whenever the destinies of Cuba are turned over without reserve to the hands of Cubans, as Cubans are now.

Aside from the administration of justice, no other public duty was more grossly neglected or perverted under Spanish rule in Cuba than the duty of public instruction. There were laws in abundance relating to the subject—as, indeed, there are voluminous laws relating to almost every conceivable subject; but there was not a school in the island worthy of the name it bore. The end and purpose of the public schools, as they existed, was not to educate the young, but to pay salaries to the teaching body. Nobody could teach school, or pretend to teach, who was not possessed of an official license. The possession of any degree of learning, or of the capacity to impart knowledge to others, was not at all indispensable in the candidate for such a license. Other considerations, of a pecuniary character, seem to have been much more weighty in securing the coveted "*titulo*" for those who were anxious, not to teach, but to hold the office and receive the salaries of teachers. One of the first things the Cubans looked and prayed for, when the Americans took possession of their island, was the establishment of public schools, in which their children might be redeemed from the bondage of ignorance in which they themselves had been held. About the clearest idea that the ordinary Cuban peasant has of the United States is that it is a land where all children go to school and everybody can read and write. He looked for the advent of some such delightful condition in Cuba soon after the Americans came; and his hopes were greatly strengthened when the military government in the surrendered region in Santiago set to work, immediately after the capitulation, to organize public schools everywhere within its jurisdiction. The schools so organized were but poor affairs, if judged by any American standard, and the resources for sustaining them were scanty and precarious; but they were the best schools that country had ever known, and for the first time in the history of the island the instruction of children was made of greater importance than the emoluments of teachers. The system

was developing, extending and improving, with results that were highly satisfactory, when, at a blow, it was destroyed, by the mandate of a Cuban secretary, because it had not been organized and administered in strict accordance with the discredited Spanish law of public instruction. To Americans this may seem to be incredible, but it is deplorably true; and it was done in the name and by the authority of the highest representative of American authority in the island. The Cubans promptly lost faith in America as a land of light and leading. They believe, and with some reason, that Americans are just as anxious to keep them in ignorance as ever their Spanish masters were. The revolutionary element takes pains to explain that the American Governor is again responsible for this failure, while the Governor explains to inquiring Americans that some secretary, as usual, has the matter "under careful consideration"—so careful, in fact, that it will never get beyond his consideration.

Another of the grievous complaints which the Cubans made against Spain was that the whole government of the island, even in its smallest details, was centralized at Havana. It has remained for the Cuban ministers of an American Governor to prove that the Spaniards were mere amateurs in the art of centralizing power. As soon as the secretaries at Havana became the real masters of the island, they began a system of appointments and removals in all the offices, from the highest judicial and administrative posts down to the third and fourth assistant mayors of little hamlets in the remote wilderness. Every one of these appointments was made with due consideration of its effect on the political future of the small *junta* in control. Many of these appointments were made in spite of the earnest and repeated protests of the American generals in command of subordinate departments, but the generals soon learned that they too were practically subject to the secretaries, and that a demonstration of the fact that a candidate for any important position was unfitted for it by personal character, attainments, antecedents or for any other reason, had no weight with the American Governor as against the recommendation of a Cuban secretary. Appointments were confined almost exclusively to those who had served in the Cuban army. That force never represented ten per cent. of the Cuban people, and its general character was such that high rank or long service in it might better be regarded as disqualifica-

tions for office, rather than as claims to consideration. As a body, it is avowedly hostile to the continuance of the American occupation, even for a day, and equally hostile to the exertion of any American influence in determining the final settlement and reconstruction of the country. Yet from this body have been appointed judges of all grades, civil governors in every province, the mayors and other municipal officers in all cities and towns—almost every Cuban officeholder, in short, every one of whom is dependent, for his continuance in office, on the secretaries who gave it to him. The result is a political machine which covers the entire island, which has been constructed under cover of American authority, but is bitterly hostile to every American influence, and the aim of which is to obstruct and to defeat, if possible, the very purposes for which the Americans intervened and expelled Spain from Cuba.

Another effective device of the *junta* at Havana for increasing their power has been to make every municipality in the island directly dependent on the general treasury at the capital for the means with which to pay its way. No municipality is allowed to raise sufficient revenues out of its own resources and expend them for its own benefit. The custom house receipts and the greater part of the internal revenues are sent to the capital, there to be doled out to the cities and towns, for their local expenses, in sums deemed suitable for the purpose by functionaries who have no local knowledge whatever, and who may give or withhold as may suit their discretion or their personal or political interest. If the municipal affairs of Seattle were subject to the dictation of the Cabinet at Washington the conditions would be parallel.

It may be stated, in brief, that wherever Cubans, under nominal American control, have been trusted to exercise the functions of government, the result has been worse than failure. The courts are corrupt and incompetent; the police forces are hopelessly inefficient; the public schools are unorganized; the municipalities are all bankrupt dependents on a political machine; the offices of government, high and low, are filled, very largely, with unworthy and incompetent officials; the laws, the courts and the methods of procedure are unreformed; and, finally, almost every abuse against which Cubans rebelled and to remedy which the United States intervened is in operation to-day under American authority. There exists throughout the island a condition

of tame anarchy, which awaits only the withdrawal of the American forces to burst out into anarchy of another type.

In two branches only of the public service has there been great and highly satisfactory advance from the previously existing conditions. The receipts from the custom houses have greatly increased, in spite of the reduction in trade due to the exhausted condition of the island, and the reductions made in the tariff rates. This will be understood when it is remembered that an American, an officer of the regular army, collects and accounts for the receipts in every custom house in Cuba, and that a regular officer is treasurer and another is auditor for the whole island. In the department of sanitation and public health, also, the American control has been absolute, and no Cuban has been permitted to interfere with the operations of that important branch. The result is seen in the lowest death-rate ever known in the island. In other words, where Americans have been allowed to work, with American methods, the result has been distinguished success. On the other hand, wherever Cubans have been allowed to proceed, by any methods of their own choice, they have invariably clung to the methods of Spain, which they have employed for their own ends, not for the public good; and the result is disastrous failure, for which Americans are responsible. Not one step has been taken toward a realization of the purposes of the intervention. The problem has become, by reason of neglect and incompetency, more difficult to-day than it was a year ago. The house was swept and garnished, but the door was left open and the seven other devils seem to have taken advantage of the opportunity. If no change occurs soon the last state of Cuba bids fair to be far worse than the first.

J. E. RUNCIE.

December, 1899.

EASTERN COMMERCE: WHAT IS IT WORTH?

BY EDWARD ATKINSON, LL.D.

THE main object of the people of the United States now is to find a market for their surplus product of the field, the factory, the mine and the workshop. That market will be greater or less according to the relative needs of the people of different parts of the world for the products which we have to spare, and according to their ability to buy and pay for them. Their ability to buy what we have to spare will depend upon two factors: first, their own purchasing power, which will depend on their greater or less use of the labor-saving inventions of modern times; second, upon our willingness to accept in payment for our sales equivalent quantities of such goods as each country or State may have to sell. We may buy more from some States than we sell to them; but, if we still obstruct the import of many articles which other nations might supply, especially Eastern and Latin-American States, we thereby limit their power of purchasing from us.

The valuation of our exports in the last fiscal year was \$1,227,203,088. Our largest customers are found among the English-speaking people of the United Kingdom, and of such of her colonies as are mainly occupied by her own people. Therefore, omitting for the present the British dependencies in Asia and Africa, we get the following facts: The people of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, numbering in round figures, according to the latest census, forty million persons, bought from us in the last fiscal year food, fibres and fabrics to the value of \$511,816,475, making 41.71 per cent. of our total exports. The people of British North America, Australasia, the British West Indies, Bermuda, British Guiana and Honduras,

numbering in round figures, according to the latest *data*, eleven million five hundred thousand persons, chiefly of English blood, bought our goods to the amount of \$122,129,368; that is, 12.17 per cent. of our total exports. The purchases of the English-speaking people thus amounted to \$633,945,843, or 53.88 per cent. of our total exports.

We purchased from them a far less quantity and value of goods, but we supplied them with the crude or partly manufactured materials, and with the food which enabled them to convert our supplies into manufactured goods and to export finished products to other parts of the world, to which they open the largest market free of duties on crude or partly manufactured products. The British, German and French manufacturers are enabled to displace many classes of our goods which might otherwise be exported by us in the finished form, by their free import of wool, dyestuffs, chemicals and other materials which are necessary in the processes of their domestic manufactures. We have restricted the import of similar materials and have thus increased the cost of our own supply of wool, hides, chemicals and other crude or partly manufactured materials which are necessary in the processes of our own domestic industry by imposing heavy duties upon their import. We thereby increase the cost of many branches of our domestic manufactures, while excluding from our own markets large quantities of goods derived from Asia, Africa, Australasia and South America, which, if entered free, would enable the inhabitants of these continents to purchase of us many of the finished goods they now get from European countries. Our very large export of the manufactures of metal, of wool, of cotton and other fabrics, made almost wholly from crude materials of domestic origin, has proved conclusively that, when our manufacturers who use foreign wool, leather, chemicals, etc., can secure supplies of crude materials, either domestic or foreign, on even terms with their European competitors, they can successfully compete with them in every market in the world, in every branch of finished goods.

Our next largest customers were the people of Germany, probably numbering at the present time about fifty-five millions, whose purchases amounted to \$155,772,279. The next largest customer for her own domestic consumption was France, with a population of forty millions, whose purchases represented \$60,596,899. The

Netherlands and Belgium, with a population of about eleven and one-half millions, imported from us goods to the value of \$123,605,237. But Antwerp and the Dutch ports are mainly distributing points, through which goods pass to the rest of Europe, their duties being few in number and very low in amount, many of the goods passing to any point free of duty.

The remaining European countries, comprising a population of two hundred and forty millions with Russia in Europe added, bought goods to the amount of only \$84,278,238.

The total purchases of Europe and the British English-speaking colonies, on a computed population of somewhat under four hundred millions, amounted, therefore, to \$1,058,198,496.

It appears, accordingly, that, in proportion to their relative ability to purchase and consume, the people of Europe and of the English-speaking colonies of Great Britain—mainly the inhabitants of Great Britain, France, Germany and the Low Countries—bought from us seven-eighths of our total exports in the last fiscal year.

In the same year we sold to the British dependencies in Asia and Africa goods to the amount of \$27,230,071, which will hereafter be treated.

Our next largest customers were to be found in the Latin-American States: South and Central America, Mexico, Cuba, Hayti, Porto Rico and a few other islands aside from the British, containing a population probably approximating sixty-five millions. Their purchases of our goods in the last fiscal year amounted to \$91,952,143. It will be observed that these sixty-five million people, whose purchasing power has been but in small measure developed by the application of science and invention, were able to consume but a trifle more than our kith and kin in the neighboring Dominion of Canada, numbering a little over five millions, whose exchanges with us might be doubled by a removal of the heavy duties which now obstruct our mutual service. As yet we have not reached the commerce of the East; yet we have designated the markets for ninety-four per cent. of our total exports. The British dependencies in Asia and Africa bought a fraction over two per cent. of our total exports, or \$27,230,071 worth.

The figures of our Eastern commerce elsewhere were as follows, and represent only four per cent. of our total exports:

Japan	\$17,264,688
China, not British.....	14,493,440
Russia in Asia.....	1,543,126
All other Asiatic countries.....	2,984,446
Oceanica, omitting the Philippine Islands and British Australasia	9,693,693
Africa, not British.....	3,438,814
Philippine Islands.....	404,171
Total	\$49,822,378

Mark, again, the singular fact that, omitting the Australian contingent of less than five million persons, the people of Asia, Africa and Oceanica—comprising, at least, two-thirds of the population of the globe, about 800,000,000 in number—were able to purchase from us goods and wares at the rate of less than ten cents per head, to the value of only \$77,000,000; that is less by ten million dollars than the purchases of our neighbors in Canada, about five millions in number, with whom, at our own will, we might double our traffic, which is now at the rate of eighteen dollars per head.

Again, the entire traffic with Asia, Africa and Oceanica, aside from the British possessions, was only one-tenth of the demand of our kith and kin in the United Kingdom, numbering only forty millions. Forty million English-speaking people, whose purchasing and consuming power has been developed by science and invention, consumed over five hundred million dollars' worth of the food, fibres and fabrics produced in the United States in a single year; while a population living on the edge of want, undeveloped by modern science and invention, in Asia, Africa and Oceanica, numbering approximately eight hundred million people, were able to buy and consume less than eighty million dollars' worth of American fabrics.

Is it not very plain that if our ports were as free from the obstructions of heavy duties on the crude products of these continents as are London, Antwerp and other European ports, we might diminish the cost of our manufactures which depend in part upon materials of foreign origin, and thus compete successfully with European manufacturers in meeting the increasing demands, especially in South America, where railways, steamships and other modern appliances are being most rapidly extended? If we thus increase our purchases, may we not also of necessity increase our exports? Trade follows the price and consists in an exchange of products, balances only being settled in money.

But now suppose that our present efforts to develop the commerce of the East should be successful, at what rate would it increase? Only in ratio to the increased purchasing power of the people. What have we to expect in the immediate future? China, torn with intestine troubles, more and more subject to foreign domination, may develop a demand for railway material and for a few more cotton fabrics, especially in the northern Province of Manchuria, since the stable Government of Russia has taken control from the unstable Government of China. But where masses of the people are on the edge of starvation all the time, and where we already buy all the tea, raw silk and a few other commodities that China can produce and that we want, what is the measure of the possibility of an increase of traffic?

The same question may be put in regard to India. Indian ports are open to us on the same terms as to all other nations, and India has the benefit of the stable control of the British Government, but the great mass of the people are constantly on the verge of starvation. The wealth of India is in a very few hands and consists mainly of hoards of precious metals and other property of that kind.

If we subjugate the Philippine Islands, what will be the possible increase in their purchasing power? Although we have been the largest buyers of Manila hemp and Philippine sugar for many years, purchasing from four to seven million dollars' worth every year, yet the wants of the people enabled them to buy from us four years ago only one hundred thousand dollars' worth of goods, and last year four hundred thousand dollars' worth, the increase consisting largely in liquors and other supplies chiefly consumed by the American troops.

It may be remarked that the fallacy in regard to the possibility of an immediate and very great increase in our sales to Eastern countries is due to a delusion regarding what used to be called the "wealth of the Indies." The masses of the people of Asia and Africa are the poorest in the world; that is to say, they barely derive from the soil and other sources the means of a very wretched existence. We often hear their low wages quoted. All wages are a reflex of the product of the country. They are and must be very small measured in money when the whole product is very small in ratio to the population. There is, of course, a small class of very wealthy men in Asia in whose hands the

"wealth of the Indies" is concentrated, largely in hoards and in very small measure in reproductive enterprise. This phrase originated in the earlier times of modern commerce, when the exchanges of the world consisted mainly in articles of luxury or of comfort, rather than in articles of necessary use.

It would be interesting to compute, if it were possible, the proportions of the imports of foreign goods into Europe, especially from the East, from 1650 to 1850. They consisted in large measure of tea, coffee, spices, silks, gums, tropical wood, fine pottery, fine metal-work and other articles of like kind; while the exports, although in larger measure of useful goods rather than comforts and luxuries, were of such purchasing power that a very small export of the product of labor sufficed to bring back a very large import in return.

I have had put before me the accounts of the early adventurers to the Northwestern coast in the early days of the trade. A small ship or brig would be loaded in Boston, Salem or New York with red flannel, muskets, gunpowder, beads and a few common tools. These would be broken up on the voyage into parcels, each containing a few yards of flannel, one gun, a certain proportion of powder and bullets and so many beads, altogether of very small cost; but that parcel exchanged for a bale of beaver-skins of very high value. This exchange being completed, the ship or brig would start for China, there exchanging the beaver-skins in about the same proportion for tea, silks and other products of China; thus bringing back an excessive amount of the "wealth of the Indies" for a very small product of the factories and workshops of this country. All these conditions have been changed. The vast proportion of the commerce of the world, especially of this country, consists in the exchange of the necessities of life, of food, fuel and metals, or of the articles of foreign origin which enter into the processes of modern manufacture in each importing country. A few comparative figures will make this plain.

The population of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland is, in round figures, forty millions. Their imports, less re-exports, are fifty dollars per head; their exports of British merchandise twenty-nine dollars per head. The more they import of the materials which enter into the processes of manufacture, the more they are enabled to export. Without import and export on a very large scale, the present forms of society and

the distribution of wealth and welfare in the United Kingdom could not be maintained.

The computed population of this country for the last fiscal year was seventy-six millions. Our imports were sixteen dollars per head; our exports nine dollars per head. With us, import and export are more a matter of choice than of necessity. But we may not only develop the home consumption of our own products by increasing our commerce; we may also greatly increase that commerce, both import and export, whenever we choose. We might add at least three dollars per head to our imports, or two hundred and twenty-eight million dollars' worth of the products of other countries which may be used in our processes of domestic industry, by removing obstructive duties, and we might add, as a result of that import, four to five dollars per head, or three to four hundred million dollars to our exports every year. All that is necessary to compass this change is the removal of the obstructions which we have by legislation placed in the way both of the import and the export traffic.

If any question should arise about the rate of wages in this and other countries, it will be manifest, from the fact that we last year exported over twelve hundred million dollars' worth of goods, that the rate of wages does not govern the cost of labor. The highest rates of wages to be found anywhere in the world were recovered and distributed among the workmen of this country last year from the sale of this twelve hundred million dollars' worth of products. If the cost of labor were governed by the rate of wages, we could not export a dollar's worth of anything. We are now seeking to increase our exports and to develop our commerce with the East. To that end we are conducting a war in the Philippine Islands at a cost of at least three dollars per head of our population. That is to say, the normal cost of this Government for all purposes, for twenty years prior to the Spanish war, was five dollars per head, tending to diminish with the falling in of pensions and the increase of population. It is now nearly eight dollars per head, and may be more. The difference of three dollars per head comes to over two hundred million dollars a year, all of which must be distributed in the taxes, increasing the cost of production and diminishing our power to compete with other countries. In fact, it would very seriously impair our power of competition with England, France and

Germany, were they not committing greater folly than ourselves by increasing their destructive military expenditures even in greater measure than we are.

Is there not something grotesquely absurd in the commercial support which is given to this Philippine war? It will not in any measure help to increase our commerce with Japan, with British India, with Borneo or Sumatra. The only argument in its favor consists in its advocates holding up a brilliant expectation of the development of commerce with the Philippine Islands, where white men cannot live and work, and as a stepping-stone to getting a larger share of the commerce with China. Our commerce with the Province of Manchuria has already increased very greatly since Russia obtained a sphere of influence. Our commerce with every part of China that comes under British influence must greatly increase, so far as her supervision gives stability and maintains order. Any expenditure of our own for warlike purposes only diminishes our power to sell more goods and to buy more in return from the Philippine Islands and from China. Our exports for the last fiscal year to both amounted to fifteen million dollars' worth outside the British possessions, on which it may be assumed that there was a profit of ten per cent.—call it twenty. Admit that some merchants in this country made a profit of a million and a half to three million dollars in the export of fifteen million dollars' worth of goods in this branch of Eastern trade, China outside British possessions and the Philippines, which the advocates of military expansion and control hold up as a magnificent example of the possibility of expansion. It cost the taxpayers two hundred million dollars to get whatever increase of traffic has been or may be secured by this method. Could anything be more foolish?

There is another aspect of the case. Since the beginning of the war with Spain we have spent about five hundred million dollars in excess of what we should have spent except for the war; half of which may be charged to the liberation of Cuba, the other half to the effort to extend commerce by military aggression. We shall spend about as much more next year. The contest in the Philippines will cost the taxpayers of this country from four to five hundred million dollars, even if it is stopped within the next year. What could we have done with five hundred million dollars in order to promote commerce, had such an expenditure by the

central Government been warranted for constructive purposes at the cost of the taxpayers?

(1.) We could either have finished the Panama Canal, or we could have constructed the Nicaragua Canal at the highest estimate of its cost.

(2.) We could have developed every river and harbor of this country up to its maximum capacity, and we might have added cross-cut canals to bring Philadelphia and Baltimore closer to the sea, a short canal on Cape Cod, and other enterprises of the like kind. Which expenditure would best promote commerce, the destructive expenditure of military aggression or the constructive expenditure in developing the ways of trade and commerce?

(3.) If it were right and suitable to spend great sums of money for the special development of particular parts of the country at the cost of the taxpayers, a single hundred million dollars, or six months of our present waste on the warfare that we are conducting, would probably suffice to irrigate the entire arid lands of the middle section of our country.

(4.) The central mountain section of the eastern part of the country, eastern Kentucky and Tennessee, western North and South Carolina, northern Georgia and Alabama—an area nearly as large as France, twice as large as Great Britain, containing mineral and timber equal to both combined, and a potential in agriculture equal to either—has hardly been entered upon in the progress of development. There is more individual wealth and more common welfare waiting for brains and industry combined, either in the development of the arid lands or in the development of this middle section of the Southland, than could be gained by commerce with the East in half a century, even if we were not wasting annually in the effort to gain commerce by aggressive warfare more than the whole commerce can be worth if it were all profit in the next twenty years.

Another almost ludicrous block to the Administration policy has appeared in this matter. The Chinaman is representative of the only race which maintains habits of industry, economy and honesty in the tropics. Skilful according to their methods, and earnest in their efforts, they are doing a vital and essential part of the work of preparing crops for export from the Philippine Islands. They number there about one hundred thousand; yet, under the existing prejudice against Chinese labor in this country,

the Administration has been obliged to prohibit the further entry of the Chinese into the Philippine Islands. Thus, while excluding the Chinese from one of the few places open to them for relief from their excess of population, the advocates of expansion are at the same time pretending that the Philippine Islands will be a great stepping-stone toward our traffic with China. Could the force of folly go any further ?

I would by no means undervalue the development of Eastern commerce. It is of importance even at its present measure. We are but witnessing the beginning of the process of development of Asia, Africa and South America by the railway and steamship. With that development, commerce will increase by leaps and bounds, provided it is not interrupted by war and by criminal aggression. If we only stand and wait, that commerce is at our feet. It must come to us in very large measure, because we hold the paramount control of the iron and steel products and manufactures of the world, and these give us the control of shipping and commerce whenever we choose to free the natural course of trade from obstructive taxes and repeal our obsolete navigation laws, which only keep our flag from the sea. Every step that we take in criminal aggression, or in warfare of any kind, for the control of commerce only adds to our burden, destroys the power of those with whom we would trade to buy our goods, while working a possible profit to the few promoters and contractors who desire to get the first plunder out of ignorant people in the construction of their railways, but at the cost of the mass of the taxpayers of this country.

"A fool and his money are soon parted." The typical Uncle Sam is held in international repute to be rather shrewd and to comprehend his own interest, and yet he is now a most conspicuous example of that aphorism. How other nations must laugh in their sleeves while witnessing what a fool Uncle Sam is making of himself at the present time, in the matter of military aggression under the pretext of expansion of commerce. Uncle Sam may be fooled for a short time by specious and delusive arguments based on pretexts of piety, profits and patriotism. He cannot be long misled by false pretenses, and he will presently take measures to expose them and to stop the course of criminal aggression.

EDWARD ATKINSON.

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REALITIES OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN WAR.

BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE MARQUIS OF LORNE.

IT is too much the habit of men who have more education than experience, more culture than perception, to desire to mould the policy of the future by avoidance of all causes of trouble in the past. They do not sufficiently consider the change of circumstances that may sanction persistence in the pursuit of the old objects to be attained now by altered methods. The Anglo-Saxon has been compelled to pursue a policy of influence wherever he has gone, and this has generally become a policy of domination. But it is not in virtue of being Anglo-Saxon; it is in-virtue of the free form of government that his race has been first to practice. It is not a dominance of race, but a dominance of policy and institutions. Each country in which this constitutional method of government has been instituted has absorbed within itself men of all races. The original Anglo-Saxon stock has been recruited by the best Northern races, and by others who love the Union Jack, or its progeny, the Stars and Stripes, because they find under these so-called Anglo-Saxon flags the liberty unknown elsewhere.

That this method of government, for all and by all of worth, must expand and have a policy of influence and dominance is shown in America in the Monroe Doctrine, which, originally a

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policy of influence, becomes more and more a policy of dominance. Australia is jealous of any influence but her own, for she must aim at rule in the Southern seas. It is the law of being of constitutional government where commerce has freest play, that those who are chosen by the people to represent them shall see that commerce extended and protected, while their own ports are open to the trade of the world. In South Africa the same end must necessarily be achieved. Why? Because it is experience as against mere education, knowledge of man's desires as against mere culture, that succeeds. It is practical civilization against the wisdom of the closet. Wherever you can find a people armed with this, that people is sure to expand, and others, if they attempt to occupy the same field, will give way before the force of its institutions, more than before the strength of its arm of flesh. In South Africa the Boer is much as an Englishman was over two centuries ago, after two bottles of heavy beer. His strength was greater than that of the great native tribes he dispossessed. But he is attempting now to withstand institutions of modern make and a people who are freer than he is. We shall see who will win.

The nations who have no Anglo-Saxon stock or institutions, and who aspire, without these, to form colonies and control them from home, as the Englishman of long ago tried to do, are all against us. They dislike the temper of our travelling public; they abominate what they call the insolence of our press, and they are intensely envious of our success. It is natural that a socialistic feeling should prevail even at their courts, and that they should feel that if we were out of the way they would have a better chance. But the vast majority of men who have tasted the good of free institutions are with us. To say nothing of Americans, Canadians, of both English and French stock, Australasians and most of the Cape Colonists are united in sentiment. Parliamentary government, with the alliance and good offices, or only the "*bon-accord*" of the motherland, full popular freedom, full fiscal liberty, the power to make and unmake their own governments, and yet have the imperial fleet and might at their back, these are guarantees for good which they see have been possessed by few in the world's history. It is, therefore, somewhat surprising to find some men of more culture than perception writing as though they could, by abusing Great Britain, set back the tide of time and breathe into the dying giant of Privilege and Isolation the life

which modern days have taken forever. I have known such men of good intention in Great Britain. One was a Congregationalist minister. He was full of righteous wrath against those who condemned the Boers. He went to Johannesburg and returned with ten-fold more wrath against those he had befriended. He had found them out. It is a pity that personal inspection is so often necessary for many men before they find out their idols.

There is a volley fired in the January number of the *NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW* from the trenches of these gentlemen. They have run to a historical "kopje," where, from the entrenchments of superior culture, they have fired on the advance of the Anglo-Saxon. But, unlike the Boers, whose cause they champion, they fight also in the open, for they give their names. It would take too much time to deliver a purely frontal attack on the position they man so heavily. "Can't you get round?" said an American soldier critic to a British officer, who, as usual, wanted to march straight to death. Let us see if there be not some present conditions which make a great deal of the historical retrospect indulged in by these gentlemen an unnecessary labor on their part.

When writing or judging of the policy to be pursued in a new country, flirtations with the muse of history are entangling to no ordinary degree. What may have been wisely or foolishly done ten or even five years ago, will give little guidance under the rapidly changing conditions of the present. New facts must alter even old treaties. It is probably to this fact that the Boer Government will revert when they acknowledge that the solemn promises given by them, to the effect that any person coming to their State would be treated as one of themselves, were cancelled. They had declared that there should be no difference in political status. It was on these promises being made that they were granted the first convention, providing for their independence in all but the power to conclude foreign treaties. Their State was the creature, the offspring, of those promises, solemnly given before witnesses. There would have been no question of leaving them to their own devices but for these assurances. This is a fact, a cardinal fact, conveniently ignored by the volley-firers in the *REVIEW* of January. It is strange that even education without experience can make men miss such historical and vital facts.

But we have admitted that altered circumstances may rapidly change the human chance of keeping promises. So we may, at all

events, cite present experience as of more value than education in the lore of the past. And what does the present show? The altered conditions, as compared with that which went before, due to the "rush for gold." This has brought a great change in the balance of power in the population. The descendants of Dutch colonists were no longer in the majority in the mining district. On this change the Boers found their plea of necessity in not adhering to their bond and covenant. On this fact, also, the Uitlanders and the Anglo-Saxon constitutionalists found their claim for fair treatment and equal rights. It is no answer to this to say that some Scottish and Cornish miners did not care to possess the franchise, and that all they wanted was to make money to go back to Great Britain. It is not for passing sojourners that the legislation of a country must be made. It must be made for all who care to stay and enjoy freedom and their rights. The Boers say, "Oh, that destroys our domination, which we went into the wilderness to secure. Our dear independence is endangered." The Anglo-Saxon replies, "It is no longer a desert; it can be made fruitful by irrigation and an honest government. It is a land rich in minerals. You must keep your promises: share and share alike—equal rights." "Equal rights means your domination," shrieks the Boer. "Equal rights means an equal chance for each citizen," answers the Uitlander; "and you, Mr. Boer, will get your individual share, but you can have no racial or collective or State superiority confined to one clique or class in the State."

British domination is not race domination. It is the influence and domination of free government, which happens to be adopted largely by the British or their descendants. Is not this the ideal all our English-speaking Governments have in view? What is there in the present case to warp any educated man's mind the other way?

Is it gold? "Syndicates, and trusts, and Jews," sneer the writers who are above thinking of the value of gold. "All your language stinks of the Stock Exchange!" cries another virtuous politician, who knows that politicians are always superior to bankers or brokers. Is not this a confusion of educated thought? Gold is only a measure of value, and any value brings men and has brought men to desire it. This has been so since Cain lost the fruits of Eden, and will be so until all fruits and values are consumed in the last fires. Good soil of old was as gold, and men

fought for the good soil and its fruits. Then flocks and herds were as gold, and men fought for them and went and settled where they could get them best; as did the Boers, the other day, expelling the Zulus and Kafirs and Hottentots and taking their cattle. And these pre-historic Boers would like the world still to be satisfied with cattle as a measure of value, and don't like the new medium, the gold, which they don't mind using to preserve their cattle ranches and in buying guns to shoot all modern-minded people. But what they do not see is that it is as much one of God's laws that the strong and energetic will go where there is most to be got, as it was that they themselves moved first to Africa and then on into the interior. Where there is value, whether in diamonds, or in gold, or cattle, or anything else highly prized among men, there will men go, including even the Jews, about whom the Boers are so fond of reading and with whom they care so little to make personal acquaintance! And seeing that this movement of mankind has just as divine an origin as has the Boer himself, he must adapt himself sooner or later to the circumstance. It is the abuse of gold, not its use, which is evil. It does not do to say that the Boer is a peculiar person or his people a peculiar people, able to indulge their selfishness as they choose under the name of independence. Independence is a thing of value only when it brings blessings to all and sundry. Some of your correspondents would become enthusiastic for a cannibal tribe's "independence," especially if they often consumed a successful Anglo-Saxon of good taste. Man was not made to set up for himself in little exclusive states, and bar out the ocean of humanity. It is too late in the day for that. The Mormons wanted to play the same game, and found that even Utah was too much on the high road of advance. In Africa, the Transvaal and the Orange Free State are on the high road between the Cape—the New York of Africa—and the lakes and Egypt, which may be likened to the California of Africa. Being on the high road, they must, some time or other, if not now, fall into line with the general customs of the world, and be amenable to public opinion and to influences which not all the interested praise of their foreign friends can shut out.

No talk of Boer piety, bravery or weakness will avail in the long run. The fanatics of the Inquisition were brave and pious enough, but they found progress too much for them. Boers, like Inquisitors, would shut out knowledge by refusing to allow the

teaching of English beyond elementary school standards. They have laid on iniquitous taxes, while they will not touch with their little finger any State financial burden. They have shown an insolent contempt when any redress of grievances was demanded. They forbade any one but themselves to carry arms. They made their judges subordinate to their politicians. The grievances were severe enough to make any free people rise in revolt long before exasperation produced the ill-advised Jameson Raid. It was their purpose to grow rich and powerful at the expense of free government. Religious intolerance and civil intolerance bred of ignorance made them believe that they could drive the Uitlander away from their own confines, which were to be extended to the sea, that their land should be a power among the nations.

This was their ambition before the Raid; it is their ambition now—one Afrikaner nation, under the backward rule which sees no good in anything but serfdom for the blacks, inferiority for the British and other Uitlanders, subordination of justice to the caprice of the President and his council, a maimed public intelligence and general backwardness in all things, except in making the crafty and tyrannical the lords of the citizens coming from more progressive countries.

Can this policy be expected to succeed? Ought it to prosper or to awaken any sympathy?

Were it English or British power alone on which advance depends, it is doubtful if success could attend it, but the forms of free government become loved by those descended from other nations. The United States and England are full of Germans who love to live under this free form of government, and whose children, in a generation or two, become incorporated with the nation practising this liberty. At the Cape, were the people of English or of Dutch descent to like another form, such as that of the Boers, it would be impossible to prevent them from casting aside the English flag. But with the English flag they know they have independence, and a powerful force from the motherland of free government at their back in case of trouble. This gives them, as it gives Australians and Canadians, an advantage which they can realize. It is only the small minority in isolated parts and the most ignorant who ever wish to disturb the liberty enjoyed with the safety of union with a power sympathetic to them and willing to shed its blood in their defence. Is it selfish

only on England's part to act as fighting parent in defence of the offspring, not always of her loins, but of her laws? If it be selfishness, it is selfishness of a type unknown before in the world, and the cause of good to others than herself. It gives the open door of commerce to all people. It gives to those who pride themselves on political connection with her a liberty, not only of home laws, but a liberty to act without her in treaties of commerce. A voluntary alliance is all she reaps from the bond. She thinks this enough, believing it will continue. But it is a selfishness based on self-sacrifice in war for those who are not pledged to war for her. She has defended by her fleets their infant liberties. Selfishness is a foolish word for the conduct of any of the members of a great alliance, strengthening every decade in the invigorating air of a mutually protected freedom. At all events, such a selfishness is one that any people must fight for, and if they did not they would be worthy only of the contempt of mankind. We who are the sowers of freedom have a right to reap the harvest, and we prefer to have the envy and malice rather than the contempt of those who have not ploughed the straight furrows we have made.

LORNE.

THE MERITS OF THE TRANSVAAL DISPUTE.

BY CAPTAIN A. T. MAHAN, U. S. N.

IN contemporary disputes, passionate and partial assertion rarely fails to play as conspicuous a part as truth ; with the result that there accumulates round the question at issue, and round the merits of the respective parties to it, a cloud of imperfect or erroneous statements, which not only confuse, but obscure. When such is the case, bystanders, who wish to understand, must be at the pains, first, to obtain a sufficient mastery of the various incidents and pleas which constitute the case on either side, and, second, to reject by elimination such of these attendant circumstances as are irrelevant or superfluous. The residuum of decisive factors, thus obtained, will commonly be found not too complicated or too doubtful to admit of a correct appreciation. The yield of the process will usually be twofold, viz., the facts, and the principle, upon both of which just judgment depends.

The dispute between Great Britain and the Transvaal, from which war has resulted, forms no exception to the general experience. On the contrary, passion and feeling, with their usual concomitant of hasty and vehement prejudgment, enter largely ; while the facts of the case are numerous, and sufficiently complicated to require a very real mental effort to catalogue, comprehend and appreciate them in their relative importance. I assume, however, that they are in their entirety sufficiently familiar to all readers of the NORTH AMERICAN, through the numerous articles of the last three issues. It is fair, therefore, to presuppose some acquaintance with the detailed occurrences, extending over the past fifty or sixty years, which have resulted in the war of to-day. As a first elimination, it may be affirmed with probable exactness that the events and disputes precedent to the Pretoria Convention, in 1881, may now be dismissed from consideration. They

possess, indeed, historical interest, useful to an understanding of conditions, but are no longer pertinent to the discussion of right. That Convention, with its successor, the London Convention of 1884, being acts in which both parties consented, regularized and legalized their political relations. Whatever the latter may previously have been, is now immaterial; the two conventions settled them then, and, conditional upon due observance on either side, remained the standard until the advent of war, which dissolves all conventions between belligerents, except such as pertain to the state of war itself. Our purpose here being to investigate the respective right and wrong, moral and political, in the conduct of both parties, which resulted in the quarrel, the outbreak of hostilities, in October, 1899, marks the termination, as the Convention of Pretoria, in 1881, marks the beginning, of the period under examination.

To make war is a moral action, to be judged by moral standards. The statement is applicable, not merely to the general question of waging war, but to all acts which lead up to war; as applicable to defensive war as to offensive. It is as wicked to maintain wrong by force as it is good to enforce right by arms, when it cannot be otherwise insured.

In political, as in personal, questions of moral conduct, I apprehend that judgment falls under three principal heads: Justice, Expediency or Policy, Duty. They answer to the questions: Is this within my right? Is it wise to enforce it? Is it my duty to do so? As St. Paul says, a thing may be lawful, but not expedient; the lawfulness and the expediency alike are elements of moral decision. Again, a man may without wrong waive a purely personal right, but when the rights of others are involved by the same concession, the question of duty to those affected enters; as, for instance, a father's action as affecting his children. The contemplated act may be lawful, it may be expedient at the moment, yet duty may forbid. By universal consent, Duty, when it clearly enters into a case, is paramount. It is the first in obligation, though not necessarily the first in order, of moral considerations.

War exists in South Africa because Great Britain has determinedly followed a certain course of action, which falls under two principal divisions: insistence, first, that a large alien population in the Transvaal must be relieved from grievous political and

social wrongs under which it is laboring; and, second, that she has, in dealing with the Transvaal in this matter, a particular right and duty—as distinguished from those general rights which all nations possess as members of the international community. This particular right is called suzerainty, a term admittedly vague at the present day; that is, the word itself does not, in default of particular definitions, express the extent of the rights of the possessor—of the suzerain. It is inherited from the feudal system, where the obligations of tenure under a suzerain were of different kinds and degrees.

In the case of the Transvaal and Great Britain, the political relationship—independent of the word itself—is indicated by the character of the Conventions of Pretoria and of London. In both, the document is in the nature of a grant from a superior to a dependent.* The former and earlier consists of a “Preamble” and “Articles.” The “preamble” expressly states, “on behalf of Her Majesty, that, . . . complete self-government, subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty . . . will be accorded to the inhabitants of the Transvaal, upon the following terms and conditions;” these terms, etc., being expressed in the “articles”—thirty three in number. In the Convention of 1884, an introductory clause—not styled “preamble” in the document itself—reads: “Her Majesty has been pleased to take the said representations (of the Government of the Transvaal) into consideration, and has been pleased to direct, and it is hereby declared, that the following *articles* of a new Convention shall, when ratified by the Volksraad, be substituted for the *articles embodied* in the Convention of August 3, 1881.”† In both cases there is a grant from one in authority over the other, the latter accepting; and in both cases terms—articles—are affixed to that grant of “complete self-government,” which is the substance of each. It has been contended by the Transvaal statesmen that the omission, in the second convention, of the words, “subject to the suzerainty of Her Majesty,” which were in the preamble of the first, abolished the suzerainty in fact. The sufficient reply to that is that the same construction abolishes the “complete self-government” granted; for the one

* “When the Transvaal deputation visited the country in 1883, they asked ‘that the relation of a dependency, *publici iuris*, in which our country now stands to the British Crown, may be replaced by that of two contracting Powers’ (C. 3947, p. 5), and they submitted a draft treaty to give effect to their views. This draft treaty Lord Derby entirely rejected, observing that it was ‘neither in form nor in substance such as Her Majesty’s Government could adopt.’”—Parliamentary Papers, C. 9507, p. 34.

† My italics.

phrase and the other occur only in the first Convention, in the preamble. To the latter the second makes no allusion, but it is explicit as to the substitution of one set of articles for the other.

Sir Alfred Milner justly observed,* "Whether the relationship created by the Conventions is properly described as suzerainty is not, in my opinion, of much importance. It is a question of etymological rather than of political interest." Still, the tenacity with which the rulers of the Transvaal clung to the renunciation of the word has given it substantial significance; for in the end, three months after Milner wrote the above sentences, they offered to concede nearly, if not quite, all that he had suggested for the benefit of the Uitlanders, upon two or three conditions, chief among which was that "a precedent shall not be formed by the present intervention for similar action in future," and "that Her Majesty's Government will not insist further upon the assertion of suzerainty, the controversy on this subject being tacitly allowed to drop."† This the British Government refused,‡ and the Transvaal withdrew its offer. It was too evident that the relinquishment of the word would be understood to mean a concession of non-dependence, and of non-responsibility to Great Britain, in all matters not expressly reserved. For the substance of suzerainty is the existence of dependence in the vassal, except so far as independence is conceded. "Complete self-government" is not independence. The explicit reservation by Great Britain of the right to nullify any treaty, or engagement, entered into by the Transvaal with a foreign country,|| necessarily reserved with it responsibility for its relations with the outside world; for when treaties or engagements cannot be independently concluded, although dealings may be had and business carried on, it is impossible to guarantee satisfactory relations of any kind. The whole includes the parts; final ratification conditions and embraces all the antecedents.

The troubles which led up to this war sufficiently illustrate this. Among the Uitlanders in whose behalf Great Britain interposed were the subjects of many foreign States. In particular difficulties connected with these, the Transvaal agents might, by concession or otherwise, reach a satisfactory arrangement with the Powers concerned, which might obviate the necessity of an

* Parliamentary Papers, C. 9507, p. 6.

† Parliamentary Papers, C. 9521, p. 44.

‡ *Ibid.*, pp. 45, 50; C. 9507, p. 33.

|| Art. 4, Convention of 1884, Parliamentary Papers, C. 3914.

engagement; but if it became necessary to enter into engagements, the reserved right of Great Britain entailed not only power, but responsibility, for the two are inseparable. Upon responsibility follows obligation—to procure a remedy for conditions provocative of just reclamation by foreign States; and this obligation outweighs, in moral force, that political expediency—or interest—which, by common consent, justifies interference in the affairs of a neighboring State, when these threaten your own peace or welfare, as, for instance, when we lately interfered with Spain in Cuba, a course in which our obligation was not legal, but moral. Our own keen national sense on this subject is evidenced by our Monroe Doctrine. In the Americas we object to foreign interference carried beyond certain limits, because the matter comes too near home for our peace and interest. Well, Great Britain, which rules by far the greater part of South Africa, and is predominant there as we are here, objects to foreign interference in the Transvaal, her statesmen having even used the Monroe Doctrine as illustrative of her policy in that respect. Consequently, when she established the Transvaal as a self-governing but dependent State, she, in addition to the right resting upon general interest in a neighbor, reserved a check upon its relations with foreign States.

The *right* to interpose as she has done—the first, in order, of the moral considerations—rests upon two grounds: First, of general policy, in the necessity of remedying conditions in a neighboring State, which threaten one's own tranquillity or welfare—as when we intervened in Cuba and in the Venezuela business; and, second, upon the specific right of suzerainty, retained in the Acts which constituted the Transvaal into the South African Republic. For those not satisfied, as I am, with the technical verbal argument in proof of this retention (given above), the purpose and understanding of the British Government in the transaction were affirmed in Parliament by its negotiator, Lord Derby, on March 17, 1884, the Convention having been signed February 27, less than three weeks before. "It has been said that the object of the Convention had been to abolish the suzerainty of the British Crown. The word 'suzerainty' is a very vague word, and I do not think it is capable of any precise legal definition. Whatever we may understand by it, I think it is not very easy to define. But I apprehend, whether you call it a pro-

tectorate, or a suzerainty, or the recognition of England as a paramount Power, the fact is that a certain controlling power is retained when the State which exercises this suzerainty has a right to veto any negotiations into which the *dependent** State may enter with foreign Powers. Whatever suzerainty meant in the Convention of Pretoria, the condition of things which it implies still remains; although the word is not actually employed, we have kept the substance. We have abstained from using the word, because it was not capable of legal definition, and because it seemed to be a word which was likely to lead to misconception and misunderstanding."† It is clear that Derby, overlooking the retention of the preamble of 1881, understood himself to have abandoned, not the thing, but the word, because the latter was indeterminate; owing to the historical applications which constitute its definition being so varied.

Passing with these remarks from the question of Great Britain's rights, I take up next that of her duty, under the conditions existing prior to the war; leaving to the end a brief summary of the reasons which, in my opinion, constitute the expediency, or policy, of her action in the premises.

It is a commonplace, that responsibility is the complement of power. It is also the foundation of duty. A person responsible has a duty to do, when occasion arises. In refusing the Transvaal that independence in foreign relations which would enable other States to hold it directly accountable, Great Britain retained, in so far, responsibility that foreigners should be so treated as to give no just ground for reclamations. In the case of wrongdoing by a dependent, one's duty, or responsibility, is not limited to correction upon complaint of grievance. Even for single, unforeseen, acts of wrong, reparation may be exacted; but for a continuous act, or condition, clearly known, the duty of remedial measures is such that the failure to institute them is just cause for complaint. A foreign State, in its care for its citizens abroad, does not, for redress, look below the supreme power of the State where they are domiciled. From the latter it demands justice, nor does it concern itself with the methods by which justice is reached; those are part of the internal affairs of the other country. The home government of the injured man sees only the injury and the re-

* *My italic.*

† *Parl. Papers, C. 9507, p. 34.*

sponsible power; that is, the supreme Government. When Italian citizens were lynched in New Orleans some years ago, the Italian Government had before it two facts: violence done to its citizens, and the government of the country where the violence occurred. The laws and courts of the United States, State sovereignty, the laws of Louisiana, were nothing to it—part of the internal machinery of our Government. The injured persons and the responsible Power were the only things with which Italy then had concern.

The political relation of the Transvaal to Great Britain is certainly not the same as that of one of our States to the central Government; but Great Britain, by retaining the ultimate control of foreign relations, and by her well-defined purpose not to permit interference in the Transvaal by a foreign Power, was responsible for conditions of wrong to foreign citizens within its borders. She had surrendered the right to interfere, as suzerain, with internal affairs; but she had not relieved herself, as by a grant of full independence and sovereignty she might have done, from responsibility for injury due to internal mal-administration; any more than the United States was relieved of the responsibility to Italy by the State sovereignty of Louisiana. The responsibility thus remaining gave the right to require, not that this or that change should be made in the internal administration of the Transvaal, but that the condition of the foreign population should in some way be made socially and economically tolerable. The method was not her affair, but the result was. Internal affairs and external relations are logically separable; but mutual interaction takes place between them.

Citizens of other States, however, formed a minority of the Uitlander population; a majority were British subjects. To these the duty of Great Britain was that of a State to its citizens residing in foreign countries, everywhere throughout the world. If they received wrong, she had the duty of reclamation; if the wrong were continuous, she owed sustained diplomatic pressure for a change of action; if this were refused, she had, by international law, the right of war. When the exercise of this last right becomes a duty, is a question for the sole decision of the injured State. In this particular the Transvaal stood to her, by her own act, in the relation of an independent State. Control of internal affairs had been conceded to it, and to demand, as suzerain, a change of

the laws, would have been to break the compact. "The British Government," says Mr. Bryce, "always admitted that they had no right to demand the franchise;"*an assertion which demonstrates the correctness of their attitude, and which is most fully substantiated by the papers submitted to Parliament. But it was no breach of compact to demand that existing wrongs should be righted, leaving to the Transvaal authorities the determination of the methods—the internal arrangements—by which the result was reached. Such pressure rests on international law, would be as applicable to a difficulty with the United States as to one with the Transvaal, and, if wrongs sufficiently great existed, it was the duty of Great Britain to exert such pressure. This was her second duty. There was a third that will be mentioned later.

Did such wrongs exist? In my judgment there certainly did, and of a character and extent that, if not remedied, would justify war. Of course, when one comes to estimate injury, great differences of opinion will be manifested. It is not every small wrong that makes it expedient to go to law; nor does even serious damage constitute an unendurable wrong. But, if it be hard to measure wrongs in degree, it is less difficult to value them in kind; to recognize an underlying principle, and to see that when this is violated by rulers, there is planted a root of bitterness which sooner or later must bear its evil fruit, and which therefore cannot be too soon extirpated. I prefer here, first, to state the character of the Transvaal Government in its relation to the Uitlanders in the words of Mr. Bryce, for not only are his moderation and candor universally recognized, but he has not approved the course of his own country in so far as war has by it been made inevitable. "The position of the Transvaal Government, although it had some measure of legal strength, was, if regarded from the point of view of actual facts, logically indefensible and materially dangerous. . . . They—or rather the President and his advisers—committed the fatal mistake of trying to maintain a Government which was at the same time undemocratic and incompetent. . . . An exclusive government may be pardoned if it is efficient; an inefficient government, if it rests upon the people. But a government which is both inefficient and exclusive incurs a weight of odium under which it must ultimately sink; and this was the kind of government which the Transvaal attempted to main-

* "Impressions of South Africa," Second Edition. p. xxxiv.

tain. They ought, therefore, to have either extended their franchise or reformed their administration.”*

Reform of the franchise was what the British Government suggested, but could not demand; for it had no control of the internal affairs. But, underlying all this undemocratic and inefficient Government, was unwillingness to acknowledge the fundamental principle, by the maintenance of which liberty has made each painful step upward, viz., that taxation rests in the hands of the taxed community, acting through its representatives, while enlargement of the basis of representation is one of the particular notes of modern political advance. The Uitlanders produced more than nine-tenths of the revenue, but the terms upon which they were admitted to the franchise were so exorbitant as to be prohibitory. Especially grievous was the condition that between naturalization and franchise a long period intervened, during which the man had lost his old citizenship without acquiring the privileges of the new. While in that position he was no man's man, having lost his hold on one country, while in the other he had obtained no rights, but only duties; such as compulsory military service, and the payment of taxes, in the levying of which he not only had no vote at the polls, but no organ of speech, no adequate representative, in the deliberations of the Legislature.† The political sin of the Transvaal against the Uitlander, therefore, was no mere matter of detail—of less or more—but was fundamental in its denial of elementary political right.

Consider the conditions of the franchise in June last, at the time of the Bloemfontein Conference, between Sir Alfred Milner and President Krüger. In 1882, one year after the Convention of Pretoria, the period for attaining the full franchise, which in the earlier days of the community had been one or two years, was fixed at five years. In 1885 came the gold discoveries, with the inflow of the mining population, and in 1890 the time was extended to fourteen years. Nor was this all, although extremely oppressive, judged by all modern standards, when it is considered that the men to whom it applied were those who were developing the resources of the State and producing nine-tenths of its revenue. The law was made applicable to those already in the country; so that

* “*Impressions of South Africa*,” Second Edition, p. xviii.

† The gold fields, in which district live most of the Uitlanders, who alone are far more numerous than all the burghers in the Transvaal, had but two representatives in a House of 28.—C. 9404, p. 54.

men who had entered in 1886 and the intervening years, however valuable as members of the community, were unable to acquire full citizenship in five years, according to the conditions of their immigration, but were compelled to wait fourteen. To this were attached other vexatious regulations, which made it an onerous task for a man to establish his claims, and left it in the power of the authorities to retard and thwart him in his effort to gain citizenship. Above all, by a singular provision then introduced, an interval of twelve years was interposed between naturalization and full franchise; the latter consisting in power to vote for members of the First Volksraad, in which the valid legislative power of the Republic is concentrated. During this period, a man, having become by naturalization a citizen of the Transvaal, lost the protection his native country would give him, in case of injustice, but acquired no real share in the government of his new State.

That any men of English or American origin would rest quietly under such political treatment is most improbable; but it is impossible unless administration be such as to give them all the benefits of pure and efficient government. This, however, was not the case, as Mr. Bryce has said. Into the details of mis-government there is not here space to go; they must be sought in the many books on the subject. A Boer partisan cynically observes, "In the Transvaal the poor have the power, and compel the rich to pay the taxes;"* the truth being, however, that an armed minority holds the power, compels the majority to pay the taxes, denies it representation, and misgoverns it with the money extorted.

Such internal administration must entail external complications. In the neighboring British colonies there is a large Dutch population, which everywhere possesses equal political rights with its British fellow subjects. The wrath of the latter was stirred by the inequality and indignity suffered by their countrymen in the Transvaal; and the political agitation instituted by the Uitlanders was warmly seconded by the men of English blood in the surrounding districts. Both carried their appeals to the home Government, and the latter was made to feel that the loyalty and contentment of the colonist, upon which depends the integrity of the Empire, require that the latter not only be just itself, but shall exact justice for its citizens when clearly refused to them by others. That

* Hillegas: "Oom Paul's People," p. 232.

this view of the South African colonists was shared by the other parts of the Empire is shown by the enthusiasm with which, not Great Britain alone, but Canada and Australia espoused the cause of the Uitlander. The wrongs of the latter, by intensifying a common sentiment, have done more to rivet Imperial Federation than aught that planning and organization could contrive.

The British Government has for nearly a decade been confronted with the conditions which resulted last year in the Bloemfontein Conference. At this the British representative expressly disclaimed any intention of "giving orders or commands."* There had been long disagreements between the two States, which were increasing instead of diminishing. In his opinion, "the cause of the most serious differences arises out of the policy pursued by the Government of the South African Republic toward the Uitlander population."† If that "Government, of its own accord, would afford a more liberal treatment to the Uitlanders, this would not increase British interference, but enormously diminish it. If they were in a position to help themselves they would not always be appealing to us under the Convention."‡ As a definite proposition he suggested that the full franchise should be given to every foreigner who had resided for five years in the Republic—thus reverting to the law of 1882. To this could be attached a property qualification which would prevent so many new voters as would outnumber the old burghers. Also, as the Uitlanders mostly live in one district of the Republic, and in order that their representatives should not be "in a contemptible minority," he proposed that there should be a certain number of new constituencies in the First Volksraad.‡

The Conference separated without reaching an agreement. On June 15, the Raad adjourned, to allow members to consult their constituencies. On July 3 it reassembled, and in the course of the month passed an act granting naturalization and full franchise to residents of seven years, having certain property qualifications. Not only was the period thought too long, but to the process of obtaining these rights were attached conditions so complicated as to be unsatisfactory to the Uitlanders and to the British Government; for it was believed that they could, and would, be used to defeat the applicant. A request of the British Government for

* Parliamentary Papers, C. 9404, p. 16.

† *Ibid.*, pp. 14, 15.

‡ *Ibid.*, C. 9404, p. 3.

"an opportunity of making its views known on this new franchise law" was refused, on the ground that "the First Volksraad had now 'passed the law and finally fixed it.' "* Diplomacy cannot go on when one side invokes the law of its land to close discussion. The South African Republic overlooked the fact that, where parties disagree, agreement must mean acceptance by both, whether with or without war.

Being thus dissatisfied, the British Government, on August 1, invited the Transvaal to appoint delegates, to discuss with British delegates, whether "the Uitlanders will be given immediate and substantial representation by the Franchise Law recently passed, together with other measures connected with it—such as increase of seats—and, if not, what additions or alterations may be necessary to secure that result."† To this Commission of Inquiry the Transvaal Government was averse, assigning as its reason that joint inquiry would prejudice the right of full independence in internal affairs; and on August 15, intimated that it was "willing to make the following proposals, provided that Her Majesty's Government are willing not to press their demand for the proposed joint inquiry into the political representation of the Uitlanders."‡ These proposals were: A five years' retrospective franchise, which was Milner's suggestion at Bloemfontein; ten seats in a First Volksraad of thirty-six members; and certain other minor concessions.§ With these propositions, however, were coupled three conditions, one of which was a provision for arbitration, to which the British Government acceded tentatively. The other two, already quoted, were: "That Her Majesty's Government will agree that the present intervention shall not form a precedent for future similar action, and that in the future no interference in the internal affairs of the Republic will take place; and that Her Majesty's Government will not further insist on the assertion of suzerainty."|| The latter was refused; to the former the reply was that, "Her Majesty's Government cannot, of course, debar themselves from their rights under the Conventions, nor divest themselves of the ordinary obligations of a civilized Power to protect its subjects in a foreign country from injustice."¶ The British

* Parliamentary Papers, C. 9518, pp. 51, 53.

† *Ibid.* C. 9518, p. 30.

‡ *Ibid.* C. 9521, p. 44.

§ *Ibid.* p. 46.

|| *Ibid.* pp. 46, 47.

¶ *Ibid.* p. 50.

Government had not interfered in the internal affairs of the Transvaal, as implied by the latter. Seeing the oppression of its citizens there, and the resulting friction between the two Governments, it had demanded relief, suggesting that a liberal franchise would most surely afford this, and it had refused to accept, as adequate, measures that in its judgment were inadequate; but further than suggestion no claim to intervention, as suzerain, was advanced. Of course, the compulsion of force—of possible war—hung in the background, as it does in all diplomatic disputes of a critical nature between States, even mutually independent.

Dissatisfied with this reply, the Transvaal withdrew its offer. The subsequent negotiations are important as elucidatory, but may be neglected, as not otherwise essential to the merits of the case. On October 9 the Transvaal issued its ultimatum. In my opinion, the question who declared war is immaterial, except for the moral effect upon the sentiment that condemns all war, judges mainly by feeling and preconception, and looks little into causes. Briefly stated, the argument in my mind runs thus: There were in the Transvaal some 60,000 Uitlanders and 30,000 Boers* of an age fit for suffrage. Of the former the great majority were British subjects. They were oppressively misgoverned, and were denied both franchise and representation. In a Volksraad of twenty-eight there were from their district only two, in the choice of whom they had no adequate voice. They raised the revenue, from less than a million, to twenty million dollars. Their appeals for good administration and for fair treatment were disregarded. They had entered the country by encouragement of the Government,† many of them at a time when five years' residence conferred the franchise; but before they could obtain it the period was increased to fourteen years. The laws were unstable and easily altered; confused, purposely or not, so that the difficulties of qualifying were enormously increased. Unable to become citizens, unprotected, and unable politically to protect themselves, they appealed, as every domiciled foreigner does, to their home Government. Innumerable complaints cumbered the files and embarrassed the relations of the two States. Agitation spread throughout South Africa, defining itself on lines of race feeling, never wholly ex-

* President Krüger's estimate. — *Parliamentary Papers*, C. 9404, p. 19.

† Letter of Ewald Esselen, Secretary to Transvaal Deputation, in London, December 21, 1883. *Contemporary Review*, February, 1893; Article, "Real Grievances of the Uitlanders."

tinguished, and threatening the deplorable antagonisms that thence arise. The elements of a conflagration were all there, and the atmosphere rising to the kindling point. To compose the trouble, Great Britain suggested a plan eminently reasonable, unfair only to the Uitlanders, to whom it gave far less than all white men throughout South Africa receive at British hands, and she refused to accept as satisfactory anything less than the minimum of remedy; for let it be continually remembered that the franchise was sought, not mainly as an act of justice, but as the most promising means of escape from a position become unendurable.

"The franchise," says Mr. Bryce, "did not constitute a legitimate cause of war."* In this it appears to me there is a confusion of idea, or a begging of the question. The question is begged, if it is implied that the cause of the war was a demand, based on suzerainty, for an extended franchise. That would not be a legitimate cause. But, in so far as a cause good in morals is legitimate, the denial of an adequate franchise was a legitimate cause of war, because, in the absence of an adequate alternative, it kept in a condition of intolerable oppression a number of British citizens who had been invited to commit their persons and their fortunes to the protection of the Transvaal Government, in order to develop the resources of the country. Great Britain had the highest moral duty to see that those people received—not the franchise necessarily—but fair treatment and decent government. There is not an American pro-Boer partisan that would have endured for six months the conditions of the Uitlanders, without appeal to his Government, if it were in a position to aid.

That race differences were at the bottom of the war is an interesting philosophical explanation, and has its value. It is true, indeed, in great part, as a fact; for I trust no American or English community in the present day could, without its own blood boiling in its veins, give to any indwellers such treatment as the Boers have given the Uitlanders. But whatever part race differences have played, it has been as an ultimate cause, not as a proximate. The occasion of the war has been as described.

To the occasion, also, every consideration of duty and of expediency combined to compel Great Britain; to constitute a third duty already alluded to—the duty to the Empire. The peace of

* "*Impressions of South Africa*," Second Edition, p. xxxiv.

South Africa was not merely imperilled; it was destroyed, unless the conditions were healthfully and radically changed. Whether there was any widespread, organized conspiracy to supplant British rule by Dutch, is a matter only of inference; but it appears to me beyond doubt that a considerable number of Boers throughout South Africa cherished that purpose, consciously, and had succeeded in setting in motion feelings and conditions—of which the Transvaal was the centre—that would, unless abruptly checked, result in the subversion of British rule. We in America, who know the history of Secession, know to what lengths small beginnings, ably guided, can go. The political complexion, tenure and stability of South Africa, however, are not a concern of the British Isles only, but of the British Empire. My professional opinion does not attach supreme, exclusive, naval importance to the Cape route as compared with that of Suez; but the mass of sound British opinion does, and its commercial value is beyond dispute. To India and to Australia it is of the first consequence; to Great Britain and to Atlantic Canada hardly less. The Cape is one of the vital centres in the network of communications of the whole Empire. To let it go, wrenched away through culpable remissness, would be to dissolve the Empire; and justly. A government is not worthy to live, that, having shown to all its subjects the impartiality and liberality which Great Britain has to British and Dutch alike throughout South Africa, should supinely acquiesce in the conditions of the Transvaal, as depicted, or fail to take heed that the Dutch Afrikaner, as a class, has so little learned the lessons of political justice and true liberty, that his sympathies are with the Boer oppressor rather than with the Uitlander oppressed. Under such conditions it would have been imperial suicide to have allowed the well-known, though undervalued, military preparations of the Transvaal to pass unnoticed, defiant oppression to continue, and race disaffection to come to a head, until the favorable moment for revolt should be found in a day of imperial embarrassment. To every subject of the Empire the Government owed it to settle at once the question, and to establish its own paramountcy on bases that cannot be shaken lightly.

A. T. MAHAN.

NOTE.—The Parliamentary Papers referred to in the foot-notes contain the official correspondence of *both* parties to the negotiations.

THE DOOM OF THE BOER OLIGARCHIES.

A NETHERLANDER'S VIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROBLEM.

BY THOMAS C. HUTTEN.

THE widespread prevalence of Boer sympathies, account for it as one will, is an obtrusive fact. Anti-British demonstrations are reported from nearly every large city of the German Empire. Italian Liberals applaud burlesques at the expense of the nation that ridiculed the results of the Abyssinian enterprise. The harangues of Lisbon agitators are attracting mobs that have repeatedly overawed the Metropolitan police. In France, every rumor of Boer victories is hailed with shouts of exultation. "*Rasgalosotravez*"—"hit 'em again"—is a stereotyped heading of Spanish papers that confidently predict that the flag of the Boer Confederation will soon wave from the ramparts of Table Mountain.

Few of these sympathizers would be able to comprehend the significance of the fact that their acclaims have awakened but few responses in Holland, and that the attitude of the Netherlandish press is almost one of neutrality—even in cities where no police regulations could suppress the outbursts of popular enthusiasm that kindle about individual Afrikanders.

America, however, can interpret those signs of the times from analogies of her own experience. The citizens of the quasi-neutral Middle States would hardly deny that a large percentage of the thousands who championed the cause of the Confederacy were noblemen in Nature's truest sense of the word: chivalrous, persevering, enterprising, cheerful and hospitable under extreme difficulties; and it is equally indisputable that they had taken up arms in defence of the worst cause that, perhaps, ever united five million

intelligent beings of our species. France might remember the gallant Vendéans, whose campaigns in the crisis of the Revolution very nearly reversed the current of liberal reforms, and the victors of the Boyne have not yet forgotten the valor of the exiles who died in defence of a despot.

But it may be questioned if heroism and baneful prejudices were ever more strangely united than in the stock-breeder communities of South Africa. To say that the social tendencies of Boerdom are a hundred years behind the march of progress, would be an insult to the culture of the eighteenth century. Their votaries are relics of the dogma-crazed Middle Ages, uncompromising disciples of the bigots who exiled Hugo Grotius and blighted the career of the patriot Barneveldt, of the obscurantists whose opposition to every national reform forced Holland from her proud position in the forefront of cosmopolitan enterprise.

There was a time when the Netherlands held the keys of fourteen magnificent colonies. They anticipated Great Britain in Australia, in South Africa, in Borneo and Ceylon, at the mouth of the Hudson River, in Japan, China and Burmah.

They checked the ambition of France; they humbled the world-power of Spain.

"Every invader," says Macaulay, "could at that time" (the end of the seventeenth century) "insult and plunder the heir of Charles V., while one of Spain's former dependencies had become a power of the first class and treated on terms of equality with the courts of London and Versailles." Another half-century of success would have placed Holland at the head of the progressive nations.

What has become of those bright prospects? They were eclipsed by the clouds of fanaticism; the tree that had weathered the storms of the Thirty Years' War was blighted by the worms of internal decay. While England, France and Germany fought the battles of science, our obscurantists quarrelled about ceremonies and legends. While our neighbors enforced the rights of man, we enforced tithes. We forfeited the prestige of our fathers. In the struggle for colonial supremacy, we could no longer hope to profit by the survival of the fittest. Victorious foes at last crossed our own frontiers.

In that period of a precarious struggle for the preservation of our national existence, thousands sought refuge in exile; but even

then party bias dictated the choice of a new home. The champions of liberalism migrated to the "Gardens of the Sun," to Java, Sumatra and Celebes; their adversaries went to the Dark Continent.

We had no reason to wish them ill-luck, and were glad to see them succeed to the extent of attracting a few additional shiploads of their sympathizers; but we knew them too well to delude ourselves with the hope of their permanent prosperity.

They would, perhaps, have done better to settle nearer the centre of the continent, at the sources of the Congo, or in the Mountains of the Moon. A colony of mental mummies might hold its own in a region of absolute darkness, but could not hope to prosper beside communities basking in the sunlight of civilization.

An instinctive appreciation of that fact induced the Transvaal refugees to surround themselves with a Chinese wall of the most exclusive by-laws that have perhaps ever been enacted since the time when Dictator Francia stampeded his Uitlanders with gunpowder arguments. In some respects the administrative arrangements of his Sultanate were, in fact, more liberal than those of the South African "Republics." As long as the citizens of the scattered frontier towns did not engage in contraband traffic they were at liberty to settle their own religious controversies, frame their own school laws, and elect their own municipal officers. The subjects of the Transvaal Volksraad never enjoyed such privileges. A Junta, more narrow-minded, more intolerant, more obstinate than the State Council of mediæval Venice, restrains their progressive tendencies, and reduces their suffrage to the formality of ratifying a prearranged programme. Parish bigots complete that system of feudalism. Rationalists exist, but a liquor dealer, advertising his stimulants on the temple walls of Mecca, would not provoke more immediate ruin than a philosopher expounding the principles of liberalism in a Transvaal country town. An aggressive boycott would be organized in less than forty-eight hours. The dissenter's neighbors would be warned to cut his acquaintance. Gangs of superstition-crazed Yahoos would howl under his windows after dark. Goodwives, at his approach, would snatch up their youngsters and slam the door in his face. A ceaseless cackle of vituperation and slander would dodge his steps from house to house, from camp to camp; till, for the sake of peace, he would recant his convictions or seek refuge in a settlement of Uitlanders.

The Transvaal "Republic" is administered in the interests of a conservative clique of about three dozen families. "He heaps up pensions and preferments on his relatives in a way that would put Tammany Hall to shame," writes Mr. T. A. McKenzie in his recently published pamphlet on President Krüger. Yet the Grand Boer, with all his edifying proverbs and orthodox quotations, is not quite conservative enough to suit a plurality of the Junta. He is just tolerated, as a pious, but withal easy-going, Gentile would be tolerated in a community of Mormon fanatics.

The compromise projects were fiercely contested by sages of the school that ascribed a plague of locusts to the toleration of Jews and Catholics, and proposed to avert the consequences of a drought by public penance. They overruled his plan to shorten the probation period of resident foreigners. Their muttered threats of impeachment forced him to precipitate the declaration of war.

The proximate causes of the war, it is true, seemed to entitle the Afrikaners to the sympathy of every lover of justice. A British-African syndicate of political stock-jobbers had plotted the destruction of their political independence. Their frontiers had been invaded without a previous declaration of war. An insolent bureaucrat had attempted to bully their chief magistrate into a change of domestic policy. As victims of wanton provocations, the Boers were clearly justified in striking the first blow in defence of their national existence.

But it is not the first time that a proximately justified war has been waged for indefensible ulterior purposes. The war of 1898 was forced upon Spain. In 1756, the Kidnapper of Silesia had to take up arms in stress of self-preservation. After the massacre of the Alamo, the persecutors of Texas dissenters would have been glad to purchase peace by any available means, but were forced to choose between war and national dishonor. The despot of Dahomey tried to avoid the campaign that cost him his throne and his life.

The Afrikaners were badgered into a frantic appeal to the arbitrament of arms, and, from one point of view, that crime is apt to appear like a consummation of many crimes, for it is not the first time that the thrifty settlers of South Africa were ousted from their farms and forced to seek new homes in the wilderness.

But it is a fact that on all previous occasions the dislodging force was the pressure of competition. Though numerically su-

perior, the feudalists of Cape Colony could not hold their own against the rivalry of a progressive race, and they pushed further and further north, as the Mormons moved ever further west and the Finnish tribes of Sweden further east.

As pioneers, as hunters, trappers and herders, they were more than a match for all European rivals; as citizens of an industrial community they were constantly made to feel the weight of their mental handicaps. Their feelings toward the usurpers of their homesteads were the bitter feelings of humiliation that make the peons of the Rio Grande frontier both dread and detest the victorious wizards of the North.

In the exultation of their success, the champions of civilization have underrated the physical prowess of their neighbors, and they are now paying the penalty of their mistake. But their ultimate triumph cannot be doubted, and that most horrible stimulant of savage passions, a protracted war of races, may prove a blessing in disguise if it should result in freeing the entire reclaimable part of Africa from the incubus of a political anachronism.

THOMAS C. HUTTEN.

AMERICA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD ENGLAND.

BY R. A. ALGER, FORMERLY UNITED STATES SECRETARY OF WAR.

THERE has probably been no war in modern times as to the necessity or justice of which the opinions of men have not been sharply divided. In 1870 the responsibility for the bloody contest between Germany and France was cast upon the one country or the other, according to the judgment which the critic had formed of the events and negotiations which preceded the outbreak of hostilities. In the Græco-Turkish war, the partisan of the Greeks vindicated their cause against the aspersions of the Sultan's supporters. In our own war with Spain, the verdict as to the course of the United States was far from being one-sided, and even among our own people there were some—fortunately not many—who condemned the action of their country. It would be strange, indeed, if the present war in South Africa afforded an exception to the historical rule. That it has not done so is sufficiently obvious; for, while Great Britain is not without sympathizers among the people of European nations, the great majority of Continental observers appear to have ranged themselves on the side of the Boers; while in the United States—and even in a measure in Great Britain itself—diverse views are entertained in regard to the merits of the questions in dispute between the Britons and the Boers, which have been brought to the dread arbitrament of war.

The intensity of the interest which the present conflict has excited throughout the world is reflected in the force and vigor with which the adherents of the contending peoples have given utterance to their respective views. In the press, on the platform and in private conversation the controversy has raged, being not infrequently conducted in an intemperate spirit of passion and bitter prejudice; and in that way the issue between the British Empire and the Republics in South Africa has been discussed in almost every civilized country.

It is most unfortunate that in the United States the expression of opinion on the war has exceeded legitimate limits. In not a few cases, the public men of our country, who stand in a representative relation to their fellow citizens, and whose words have therefore a significance which never can attach to those of private individuals, have gone out of their way to pass unfriendly judgment upon the action of the British Government. Resolutions in favor of the Boers have been adopted, not only by large mass-meetings of private citizens, but even by the Legislatures of some of the States.

Such a course is greatly to be deplored, especially since the animus is directed against Great Britain. Two years ago, when, under the not too friendly observation of some of the Powers, we were discharging our duty as the guardian of liberty and humanity in the Western Hemisphere, Great Britain stood conspicuous among the nations as our friend. Nor was her cordial sympathy valueless. She remained strictly neutral; but her whole attitude toward us was so unmistakably friendly that its influence in preventing what might otherwise have occurred in the way of European intervention will never be capable of full measurement. Great Britain did nothing and said nothing, yet by implication she warned all other nations to attend to their own business and leave us to work out our problem alone. We owe her a deep debt of gratitude, and the very least we can do is to abstain from interference in her present struggle in South Africa.

I have heretofore and elsewhere stated these convictions as to the duty of the United States at the present crisis; and the number of communications which I have received endorsing my views strengthens my belief that they are shared by a substantial proportion of the American people.

It is greatly to be regretted that a man of Mr. Bryan's position, hoping as he does (I trust and believe in vain) that he will some day be President of the United States, should go about the country trying to create a difference between America and Great Britain. He is the spokesman of a great American party, and it would not be surprising if, speaking in that capacity, he placed the country in a false position before the world in its relations to the South African situation by passing from place to place, attempting to further his political ambitions by fanning into flame whatever anti-British sentiment he may find among our heterogeneous population. Here, where he is known, the object of his endeavor to

incite the American people against the British will be understood, and his statements will be valued at their true worth. So far as I am aware, he has never contributed anything that has added to the substantial growth of this country, either by employing men or doing anything to develop our industries. To use a little slang, he seems to produce "nothing but wind and noise." The course he advocates with regard to the financial policy of his country would disgrace us in the eyes of the world, ruin our credit and place us at the rear, instead of the van, where we now are, among the great commercial nations of the world. But abroad, where he is regarded only as a political leader with a large following, his words as to the policy of a friendly nation may have greater weight and effect than they ought to have.

If, during our war with Spain, the leader of one of the great political parties in Great Britain had indulged in frequent denunciation of the United States and of the motives which animated the United States in their determination to free Cuba from Spanish control, his conduct would have aroused the most bitter resentment in the minds of our people from Maine to California and from the Canadian frontier to the Gulf. If in the House of Commons and in the House of Lords prominent British statesmen had introduced resolutions condemning our Government and expressing sympathy with the weaker power against which, under a sense of duty, we had turned the vast resources of our country, the act would have excited just indignation in the breast of every American patriot. But we had no such experience. And I hold that we should treat Great Britain in 1900 as squarely as she treated us in 1898.

R. A. ALGER.

COULD THE WAR HAVE BEEN AVOIDED?

BY S. M. MACVANE, PROFESSOR OF HISTORY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY.

IN the January number of this REVIEW Dr. Leyds gives the following answer to the question, "How Could the War have been Avoided?"—

"England had acted in such a manner as to render it absolutely unavoidable. The Boers did to avoid it everything that it was humanly possible to do."

The official correspondence shows that any one of three courses, if taken by the Boers, would have averted the war.

(1.) They could have avoided the whole trouble by removing the most oppressive abuses of which the Uitlanders complained. Was it not humanly possible, for example, to have abolished the monopolies, to have improved the police, to have admitted Uitlanders to juries—in a word, to have taken the sting out of their exclusion from political rights by giving them friendly consideration in other ways? Government by a minority can do something to justify itself by trying to be a good government. Minority rule coupled with crying abuses is impossible in the modern world. If there had been no abuses, there would have been no intervention.

(2.) After intervention came, there were still two alternative courses open, either of which would have averted the war. The English Government would have been satisfied with the grant of a subordinate municipal government to the Uitlander community, with the right of managing their schools, police and other local affairs in their own way. This was summarily rejected by President Krüger as a proposal to create an *imperium in imperio*; but that seems a poor reason. Other countries grant such rights; why was it not humanly possible for the Boers to grant them?

(3.) The third alternative was to grant full burghership to such of the Uitlanders as fulfilled certain requirements:

1. Such as had resided in the Republic five years or longer ;
2. Such as had declared on oath their intention to remain ;
3. Such as had acquired property or an income of a certain amount ;
4. Such as had taken the oath of allegiance and sworn to defend the independence of the State.

The new burghers so admitted to have a few members in the Legislature (the First Raad) ; the highest number suggested was five, in a house of thirty-one. Why was this not humanly possible? That it *was* humanly possible is pretty conclusively shown by the Boer offer of the 19th of August, to do even more than this. Unfortunately, the Boers attached to the offer conditions which, however desirable they may have been from the Boer point of view, had no obvious tendency to make the acceptance of the offer by England as humanly possible as it would have been without them. The conditions were that England should (*a.*) accept arbitration, (*b.*) drop the controversy on the suzerainty, and (*c.*) never intervene again. How could acceptance of these conditions make possible a grant of political rights to the Uitlanders? Would there have been less danger of their swamping the old burghers with than without these concessions from England?

Further, England accepted the offered redress for the Uitlanders ; accepted also in substance the first and second conditions ; the other she declined, giving two clear reasons for the rejection of it. The Boer Government replied, saying that the third condition had not been intended to include the cases alleged by England as her reason for rejecting it ; but they at the same time *withdrew the whole offer*, and never afterward renewed it.

Is that so clearly a case of doing all that was humanly possible to avert the war?

S. M. MACVANE.

AMERICA AND THE WAR.

BY SYDNEY BROOKS.

NINE months ago, at the time, that is, of the Bloemfontein Conference, when the Transvaal question was formally reopened, England and America stood closer together than at any period of their separate histories. The unstinted sympathy of the English people during the Spanish War, and especially the attitude and services of the British Government, had at last opened American eyes to what they should have seen long before; and, no doubt, would have seen, but for a host of factitious circumstances, aided perhaps by a little wilful blindness. To an Englishman of the post-bellum generation, who knew how genuine was the attachment to the United States that had grown up among all classes in England during the past thirty years, there was, indeed, almost a touch of absurdity in the astonishment with which America hailed the first proofs of it. But England's was not the only surprise which the war sprang upon the United States. The friendship for France and Russia which rested on the same basis of sentiment and tradition as the old enmity to England, and was equally divorced from present-day facts, crumbled away just as rapidly when put to a real test. Germany, who, in the simplicity of American inexperience had been counted on as at least a benevolent neutral, showed the snarling hostility expected of her by every one outside of the United States. America made her first essay in *Weltpolitik* in the teeth of a sullen and resentful Europe, and unwelcomed by any friend but England. The year 1898 has been called the year of Europe's discovery of America. It might much better be spoken of as the year of America's discovery of Europe. Then, for the first time, did the United States realize that it is not safe, and may be quite misleading and even a little foolish, to judge the present by the past—to conclude as a matter of course that the France of Lafayette is necessarily the

France of to-day, and that England must always be panting for a chance to fit out another "Alabama." We have grown used to being hated, envied and misrepresented on the Continent, but for America the experience was new. The enmity that used to be confined to the English nation was expanded to include all English-speaking peoples, and succeeded, of course, merely in bringing the two great divisions of the race into closer union. This union the essential tendency of the enormous quantity of history manufactured in the following two years greatly strengthened. Omdurman and Fashoda did something; Samoa more still; the Far Eastern crisis penetrated even the provincialism of Congress with a sense of the oneness of English and American interests; and as Americans advanced gingerly along the road of Imperialism and began to appreciate the nature of the boulders in their path, they came for the first time to a true perception of what England had done for the world, and of the difficulties she had met and conquered in doing it.

The two countries stood, in fact, just where most rational people wanted them to stand, and knew, even in the thick of Venezuelan squalls, that ultimately they must stand. The only nations on earth that have made it their policy to eschew formal alliances found themselves in an alliance that needed no official endorsement—an alliance of sympathy and kinship, and the understanding that comes from the possession of common aims and ideals. Better still, it was an alliance—I know Americans jib at the word, so I would be understood to use it in an ultra-Pickwickian sense—based on the enduring quality of national self-interest. It was remarkably free from gush on the British side; and on the American from that flattering suspiciousness of British diplomacy which wrecked the Arbitration Treaty—a suspiciousness that used to awake Homeric laughter among Englishmen, who are quite indignantly conscious that the great fault of their diplomacy is that there is nothing to suspect in it. It was, in short, a coming together of two nations, one of them long desirous of reconciliation, the other forced by events to stop playing at make-believes, especially the make-believe of being enemies, and collect herself for the effort of seeing things as they were. Out of tenderness to American prejudices, and to make the process of education as little startling as possible, neither Government cared to make any great official display of the new sentiment; but for all that, it was wide-

spread and profound. How profound and how widespread may be recalled from the fact that the professional Anglophobic, who has often the Celtic grace of tact and sensitiveness to atmosphere, actually held his tongue for two solid years. America seemed a little dull just at first without his familiar rhetoric, and the calm more uncanny than holy, as though some Niagara had ceased to flow. But we thought steadfastly of all the good it meant for civilization and so bore with his suppression, which turns out after all to have been but for the moment.

It was a question with Englishmen how long this cordiality would last. America had proved herself a good hater. Would she show herself an equally staunch friend? The conversion, it could not be forgotten, had been somewhat sudden. It was, if I remember rightly, one evening at the end of February, or possibly the beginning of March, 1898, that America stumbled upon "a new fact." Forthwith, the case against England was taken down from its hoary shelf, reopened, retried and a verdict of full acquittal given in England's favor before morning. We said good-night with cousinly restraint and fell into one another's arms over the breakfast table as long-lost brothers. It was quick work even for the facile American. - Indeed the very ease of the transformation made one suspicious of its durability. True, America at that time was sloughing day after day, without appearing to notice it, other traditions as inveterate and cherished as her belief in English enmity. But that was no guarantee, especially as one noticed signs of an even excessive devotion to the new religion, that the particular change of faith in which we were so interested might not turn out to be merely the output of a lucid interval. The pace struck some anxious observers in England as a little too hot to last. Reformation in a flood is comprehensive enough for the moment, but the flood is apt to abate.

England can never be indifferent to what America thinks of her conduct; but it was with a quite special concern that we watched the slow development of American opinion on this Transvaal question. I believe I am right in saying that at the time of the Bloemfontein Conference the overwhelming majority of Americans—of those, at least, who had troubled their heads about the matter at all—were in sympathy with England. They saw in the South African Republic a sordid and oppressive oligarchy in a state of perpetual opposition to a primary American principle—

the principle that where men are taxed they ought also to have a voice in the government that taxes them. They recognized in the Boers a backward and uncouth community such as the United States had had to deal with in the Mormons. They realized that the unrest in the Transvaal, infecting all parts of South Africa, constituted a state of affairs which Great Britain, with her enormous stake in the country, could not afford to ignore. They perceived that the Jameson Raid was not so much the cause of the disturbance as its result, that President Krüger had failed to carry out any of the reforms solemnly promised to the people of Johannesburg, and that England had stretched almost to the point of weakness the natural hesitancy which a great Power feels in calling a weaker Power to account. They, therefore, looked upon the Conference as the best means of settling an irritating and somewhat undignified dispute, not doubting that it would be successful, or that its outcome would be a satisfactory and harmonious compromise. And this was not only the attitude of America, but of all Europe. It is worth remembering that the necessity of calling upon President Krüger to set his house in order was approved nowhere more emphatically than in France and Germany.

How completely this attitude has changed on the Continent within the last nine months is known and admitted in England. No attempt is made to hide the fact that even in Pitt's time the animosity of France was not more waspish than it is to-day; or that Bismarck's hatred of England is now the common sentiment of all Germany. But whether from that inspired ignorance of things American that still obtains in the United Kingdom—an ignorance which the correspondents of the English papers do very little to dispel and a good deal to foster—or from a blind trust in the permanence of the good feeling that followed the Spanish War, the veering round of American opinion has passed unnoticed or is flatly disbelieved. That it has veered round, it seems to me no Englishman who strives to go about with open eyes and mind can affect to deny. The fact to my observation is so patent and indisputable that I may as well take it for granted and deal with the probable causes of the change, before attempting a composite picture of the American attitude to-day.

It is one of the misfortunes of the British case that it has to depend on the cumulative effect of a large number of details. It

cannot readily be summed up and presented in a single alluring sentence. It is a Blue Book rather than a popular case. It has no attractive catchword to command general sympathy, none at least so attractive as the Boer cry of "Freedom and Independence." One has to carry in one's head a great many dry facts and technical arguments to be convinced of its justice; and this is precisely the sort of labor that the average man shrinks from. He does not want to be bothered about franchise questions and dynamite and railroad monopolies and the liquor laws and the taxation of chemicals, and suzerainty quibbles and tariff and educational minutiae; but to have a square issue neatly served up for his consideration, and the side which can make out the least abstruse case is the side to which his sympathies naturally lean. The squarest issue which came to view on the British side involved a paradox which it was difficult for America to stomach. It hardly seemed reasonable that England should be taking so much trouble to get rid of British subjects and hand them over to an alien State; and it seemed still less reasonable that a refusal on the part of the Transvaal to accept them on England's terms should be made a *casus belli*. Yet, with this exception, no dominating point arose out of the negotiations. Moreover, all the natural advantages, so to speak, of the dispute were on the Boer side. England was heavily handicapped by her size. The smallness of the Boer Republics was an unanswerable appeal to foreign, and especially American, sympathy. So were their history and the flavor of mediæval romance that hung round their lives and character. England, too, had never managed to shake herself free of the suspicion of stock-jobbing and speculative influences in her dealings with the Transvaal.

All this told heavily in favor of the Boers. Even so it might have been counteracted had the conduct of the negotiations been anything but what it was. America was both bored and befogged by Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy. It tired of trying to keep track of its manifold gyrations, and it failed to detect in the fresh entanglements that each week seemed to produce either any straightforwardness of purpose or any rallying-point round which British sympathizers could gather. Lord Rosebery was complaining the other day that the Prime Minister made it very hard for the man in the street to support his policy. Mr. Chamberlain certainly made it difficult for the man in the cars to support or even com-

prehend his diplomacy. As the weeks dragged on America was puzzled to know whether the Colonial Secretary was deliberately playing for war or hoping to coerce Mr. Krüger by a display of force. In either case his diplomacy seemed tactless, provocative and tortuous. It had the additional demerit of still further clouding the real issue. The climax came without America being able to grasp why it had come or what it was all about.

I have said that the natural, the superficial advantages of the case were all on the Boers' side. It is scarcely necessary to add that their valorous declaration of war confirmed these advantages, which were further strengthened and made more captivating by their surprising successes in the opening phases of the campaign. In a contest between a giant and pigmy it is hard to convince the average onlooker that the giant may, after all, be in the right, and harder still when his huge frame is staggering under the blows of his plucky little opponent.

One of the clearest and most detached observers of American and international politics, discussing the reasons for American sympathy with the Boers, let fall a remark which struck me as eminently just. "You must remember," he said, "that Americans are Gladstonians." Why Americans should elect to take their cue on English issues from a party which has shown itself during the last twenty years to be singularly out of touch with the real movements of English political thought, is a very fruitful question. But the fact that they do instinctively range themselves with the Liberals and against the Conservatives has had a very considerable effect in determining American attitude toward the Transvaal war. The leaders of the chief section of the Liberal party have been unsparing critics of Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy and of the policy or lack of policy which brought on the war; and the views of Mr. Morley, Mr. Courtney, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and Mr. Bryce—Mr. Bryce above all—have been received in America as revelations of the real and exclusive truth.

Politics, too, have inevitably had their say in the matter. The Democratic opposition to the President's Philippine policy includes denunciation of Great Britain as the "secret ally of the Republican party," the arch-example of Imperialism and the friend and abettor of the American venture in that direction; and the Democratic leaders have been able to make great play with the Boer war as a shocking instance of the fruits of "expansion."

The Republicans have not accepted the challenge or acknowledged the parallel between the Filipinos and the Boers to be exactly on all fours; but an uneasy sense of what might be made out of the comparison has possibly kept their sympathy for the Boers within the bounds of temperance. The Democrats, on the other hand, "unfettered by a sense of crime"—in a way not intended by the poet—and overflowing with a novel but politically very useful zeal for abstract humanitarianism, have loosed their souls with satisfying and comfortable freedom.

And then, of course, there has been our delightful old friend, the professional Anglophobic, resurrected anew after two years' interment. This has been a great and glorious time for him. He has bought flags and held meetings and passed resolutions to his heart's and lungs' content. He has cheered with intelligent fervor the amiable Mr. Bourke Cockran's description of Englishmen as "a set of perjurers," "ruffians in finance and ruffians in everything," and groaned with approving horror when this same accomplished publicist informed him that "in England a Catholic cannot hold office," and that the Uitlanders in the Transvaal numbered 35,000 and the Boers about 150,000. There even seemed to be a Vice-Presidential "boom" within reach of the still more amiable gentleman who publicly prayed that the war might "send up the price of crêpe in England." And so, no doubt, there would have been in years gone by. But to-day it is one of the Anglophobic's many grievances that the genuine American no longer attends his meetings. Dutch-Americans and Irish-Americans and other hyphenated Americans are there in plenty, but not the real article. The tail-twister has done his best since the war broke out, and no doubt influenced some people, but the really palmy age of Anglophobia seems to have passed. It has been made too pitifully apparent that nine-tenths of his love for the Boers is made up of his hatred of the English, and the other tenth of ignorance of South Africa. In spite of his best exertions, the country is not greatly moved to see him exploiting the Boers, as five years ago he was exploiting the Venezuelans, to damage "the common enemy."

There is one curious obsession, of quite surprising hold on the average mind, which has driven many Americans to the Boer side. You will hear it trumpeted from all pro-Boer platforms and made the basis of their appeal for American support. Taking

part during the last few months in various joint debates before clubs and literary societies in and around New York, I have seen my opponents dangle it before even intelligent audiences. The main fallacy is this—that the Transvaal war is a war between a monarchy and a republic, consequently between a system of tyranny and darkness and a system of liberty and enlightenment; and to it is appended a corollary to the effect that America is bound to sympathize with any and every republic in a conflict with any and every monarchy. It is hardly worth while to discuss such an elementary absurdity in the pages of this REVIEW—to inquire why Americans should consider the American idea to be wrapped up in the accident of a republican form of government instead of with the essential principles of democracy that underlie that form; to ask why they should prefer to stand by the great name instead of the great thing; or to point out that, anyway, the Transvaal had nothing republican about it except its title; that it was, in fact, a despotism masquerading under republican insignia, and that its whole policy and conception of the art of government were a flat denial of everything that America stands for. It is only in a country where education is rampant and the average man instructed up to the point where he may think foolishly for himself and resent being told how to think rightly by his natural leaders, that such a notion could hold its own for long.

A more respectable error which has doubtless estranged a good many would-be sympathizers with the British cause, is the suspicion that England is fighting for the gold mines or for territory. It would, of course, be just as sensible to say that America fought Spain for tobacco and the Philippines. We are not fighting for territory, for the sufficient reason that the Transvaal has no strategical or commercial attractiveness, outside of the Rand; and we are not fighting for gold mines (*a.*) because we own them already; (*b.*) because even if we didn't they would not be worth a conflict—our whole imperial policy forbidding us to draw any sort of direct profit from colonial wealth and thus making it a matter of completest indifference, from the financial point of view, whether the gold mines are on British territory or not; and (*c.*)—and Americans should not need to be told this—because the morality of the English-speaking people is such that you will never find any branch of it waging war for a purely selfish and mercantile purpose.

Such, so far as I have been able to gauge them, are the main causes, artificial and otherwise, which have operated on American opinion to the disadvantage of the British. It is a more difficult matter to say with any precision how great their effect may have been or what is the exact attitude of America to-day. Certain features of that attitude, however, are, I think, indisputable.

The educated classes of the United States—the best opinion of the country—take up pretty much the same ground as that occupied by Mr. Bryce and the Liberals. That is to say, they believe that the grievances of the Uitlanders were real and vexatious, and such as the home Government was justified in seeking redress for. But they also hold that the time for entering on the question was singularly ill-chosen; that a few years more of patience would have allowed the memories of the Jameson Raid to die away and given the reforming party among the Boers a chance to regather strength, and that all the natural forces were on the side of the Uitlanders, not the least of them being the great age of the President and the certainty that his successor would have not one-tenth of his influence.

They hold, too, that nothing is to be gained from the war that can outweigh the inevitable alienation of the Dutch colonists and the enormous difficulty of governing the Transvaal and Orange Free State. They are entirely sceptical of the alleged Dutch plot to oust the British from South Africa. They are vigorous and pertinent critics of Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy in setting to work by means of a semi-public conference, the break-down of which could only add to the ill-feeling on both sides; in making the franchise the chief issue and so neglecting to establish a legal *casus belli*; in raising the irritating and profitless question of suzerainty; in writing ambiguous dispatches just at the moment when the utmost precision was needed; and in adopting throughout the negotiations a tone of "monocular insolence" highly injurious to the prospects of peace. In other words, they consider the war a gigantic and unnecessary blunder which a more tactful diplomacy would have avoided. But that is the extent of their pro-Boer sympathies. They are under no illusions as to the real character of the Transvaal Government, and while admiring the sturdy courage of the Boers, are very far from wishing to see it prevail. In their view the British, fundamentally in the right, have put themselves, technically, in the wrong. They justify the

object aimed at without approving of the means. They wish that a peaceful solution had been found—believe, indeed, that a peaceful solution could have been found—but, war having come, they range themselves unhesitatingly on the side of the higher civilization. They appreciate the fact that the ultimate defeat of the British would entail the loss of the whole of South Africa and with it the beginning of the end of the British Empire; and to avoid such a worldwide catastrophe, they are constrained, somewhat regretfully, to sacrifice the Boers on the altar of necessity.

Such, I believe, to be the views generally held with a few variations here and there, among the most intelligent people of the United States. I cannot help thinking also that they reflect in the main the great body of American opinion. There are some who carry their objections to the war further than others, who denounce it as a “gold hunters’ conspiracy,” and believe with Mr. Morley that it is simply the culmination of a sordid plot of English and foreign capitalists against the Transvaal and at the expense of Great Britain; and that England has been used as a mere pawn in a game of bulls and bears. There are others, too, who stigmatize it as “a war of conquest,” or “lust for gold.” But even among these I do not detect any desire for the triumph of Boer arms. I have met very few Americans who believed in Mr. Chamberlain’s convenient theory that the war was “inevitable;” I have met a great many who have denounced it as a crime, and more still who have anathematized it as a blunder; but I have failed to come across any who would not agree to the proposition that it was better for the world at large that England should succeed. The sentiments of Americans may be pro-Boer, but their reason is pro-British.

There is, however, a clique composed of one or two Senators, and a large number of Irish and Dutch-Americans, backed up by a few “yellow” journals, which openly gloats over the reverses to British arms, and works mightily for the Boer cause. It is a noisy and demonstrative clique, and having some political influence, can get pro-Boer resolutions passed by municipalities and such like bodies. But it does not in any way represent the real feelings of Americans, and it has conspicuously failed to move the Administration from its position of strict neutrality. The collapse of its efforts and the generally temperate tone of even the most pronounced Boer newspapers are, I think, the best answer to the question raised at the

beginning of this article as to the stability of the new régime of Anglo-American friendship. The struggle with the Transvaal has greatly moved the country. Almost from the first it killed the small interest still surviving in the Philippine war and quite overshadowed the currency debates in Congress. It became, in fact, the most prominent of American public questions, influencing politics and engaging the keenest attention of millions. Yet the discussion of it, both in and out of Congress, except among a discredited and dubious faction, has been on the whole courteous, well-informed and restrained—in singular contrast to the wild virulence of Continental critics. The Senate, which more than once was given an opportunity of expressing itself with pristine freedom, held its emotions in unwonted check. The State Department declined most significantly to be drawn into any action at which Great Britain could take umbrage, and its attitude was but the official reflection of the people's wishes. One has only to imagine the tornado of invective that would have whirled over the country had the Boer war broken out five years ago to gauge how far America has travelled from the point of view which made the Venezuelan outburst possible.

· SYDNEY BROOKS.

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF CECIL RHODES.

BY A BRITISH OFFICER.

[The following article is unsigned for obvious reasons; but it is from the pen of a well-known officer who has taken an active part in the war, and who undoubtedly expresses the views of his brother officers.—EDITOR.]

THAT the military situation in South Africa is one of exceptional gravity is incontestable. But that we are, therefore, justified in accepting all or any of the gloomy forebodings as to the outcome of the war is both absurd and an insult to the tenacity and determination of the Anglo-Saxon race.

There was a time in the great struggle for the American Union, when the immense armies of the North were headed and checked by the determined valor of the Southern States, aided by the difficulties of the country which formed the theatre of war. Nor were there then wanting critics who predicted the collapse of the Federal forces, and counselled the abandonment of the struggle and acquiescence in the dismemberment of the States. Fortunately for the American nation, and also for the civilized world, more courageous men directed her destinies, the unhappy strife was brought to a close, and a settlement effected honorable alike to both parties. Now that time has healed the wounds and softened the animosities of that terrible epoch in history, it seems incredible that the great and powerful branch of the Anglo-Saxon race who govern America could, at one time, have been in such deadly peril of dismemberment and disintegration.

It is the custom of races less robust in physique and more excitable in temperament than are the Anglo-Saxons to be unduly elated at any success which may be gained by their arms, and proportionately depressed and despondent at any reverse which may fall to them. Our neighbors across the Channel have ever been famous for the confidence and light-heartedness with which they embark in war, and the rapidity with which they fall into the

depths of despondency when victory does not immediately attend their efforts. In such circumstances, they have ever found an unfailing solace in attributing all their bad luck to treachery. "*Nous sommes trahis*" has for years served as a consolatory explanation for disaster and defeat. The student of military history can hardly refrain from a smile when this oft-repeated reason is adduced for mismanagement or failure. Napoleon, in his ingenuous account of the defeat he sustained at Waterloo, lays the blame upon certain traitors, who at the precise instant when victory had declared for the French arms, raised cries of "*Sauve qui peut*" and others of similarly encouraging nature. In 1870, the aggressive shouts of "*à Berlin*" were rapidly supplanted by "*nous sommes trahis*," when, in battle after battle, the superior strength, discipline and organization of the German hosts had become apparent to all the world.

It is well in these days for Englishmen to call to mind this unpleasant trait in their neighbor's character, which they profess to despise so heartily. For there is a risk that some of the more nervous and excitable members of the community may be led into similar ungraceful and unedifying demonstrations, with reference to our petty reverses in South Africa.

That traitors have been at work and have in no small degree assisted the enemy, either directly or indirectly, by misleading and misdirecting our military authorities, is indeed most probable. But that we should at once raise the refrain of "We are betrayed!" is both undignified and ridiculous. So far, the nation has received the news of our successive disappointments in a manner which has elicited the grudging praise of even the most bitterly hostile Continental journals. It would be well, therefore, that we should, in the face of any possible further check or disaster, remember that the eyes of the whole civilized world are upon us, and that it is the sacred duty as well as the inherited birthright of Britons to receive, unmoved, news either of defeat or of victory.

Nelson, writing to a military officer in 1801, bitterly animated as follows on the celebrations which marked the conclusion of peace with France in that year:

"I dislike all these childish rejoicings for peace. It is a good thing, I hope, but I would *burst* before I would let a d—d rascal of a Frenchman know that either peace or war affected me with either joy or sorrow! . . . D—n them all! is the constant prayer of your much obliged and affectionate friend,

NELSON."

Such is the true Anglo-Saxon spirit, and it were well if, in these days of mock sentiment and exaggerated censure and praise, we were to keep in mind the undaunted words of our great hero, and endeavor to follow them in practice.

Now, although we most sternly deprecate any attempt to make excuse for our own shortcomings and reverses by following the example of the French, no harm can accrue, and indeed much good may come, from a critical examination of some of the exterior forces which have undoubtedly influenced our military operations in South Africa.

For good or for evil, the most commanding figure in that region at the close of the nineteenth century is assuredly that of Cecil Rhodes. Never was there a man about whom such opposite views were held, and so strongly held. It is, of course, an enormous gain to him that his most bitter and irreconcilable enemies are the Boers. This of itself has been sufficient passport for him to obtain the suffrages of a vast number of the British public. Added to this is the undoubted fact that he has, of late, posed as the one loyal Minister and representative of the Imperial Power, as against the veiled disloyalty and dishonesty of the Afrikaner party. In mentioning the latter, we purposely exclude the name of Schreiner, for it is still a disputed question at the Cape whether that individual is an honest fool, who has failed to appreciate the corruption and villainy of the members of the Bund who direct his movements, or a most accomplished, disloyal knave, who, under the veil of being a constitutional representative, is quietly doing his best to undermine and subvert British rule in South Africa.

It will thus be seen that Cecil Rhodes has an extraordinarily good start in the direction of general popularity; so good a start, indeed, that, unless there is something overwhelmingly to his disadvantage, of which the public is ignorant, it would seem hardly possible to oust him from the commanding position he has seized upon with such consummate assurance. His early indiscretion of subsidizing the disloyal party in Ireland to the tune of £10,000, although not forgotten, is one that has long since been forgiven, as are more egregious failures which leave no ill results behind.

The wearisome wrangle as to the amount of his complicity in the Raid is also a matter which it is not worth while here to revive. All men in touch with South Africa are well aware of how deeply he was involved in that miserable fiasco.

The injury to British interests in South Africa caused by the Raid is enormous, and, as military men know bitterly to their cost, the price is now being paid in their own blood and in that of their heroic soldiers. For it was the Raid which rendered it possible for President Krüger to add to his already abnormally heavy armaments, and to openly import thousands of rifles and millions of cartridges, not to speak of ordnance and other war material, which could only be destined for use against the Suzerain Power; and this without a word of remonstrance from the latter.

But the indictment against Cecil Rhodes, and one which he will before long be called upon to answer before the tribunal of the whole civilized world, is of far graver import than one of subsidizing Irish rebels or of financing raiders. It is no less than that he, for reasons which are strongly suspected, if not already known and capable of proof, deliberately misled the British nation, so as to bring about the present war in South Africa for his own personal aggrandizement and the fulfillment of his ambitious schemes. Truly, a stupendous charge to bring against a man who has been, and may again be, the Prime Minister of the Colony which is now suffering so much from the effects of war.

All known circumstances, however, tend to prove that Cecil Rhodes has acted throughout in a manner which indicates that he not only concealed facts of vital importance, which were well within his knowledge, but that he, when occasion demanded it, wilfully and gratuitously made mis-statements of fact well calculated to mislead both the Government and the nation.

That he is an absolutely unscrupulous man may be accepted as proved by his cynical conduct in subsidizing the Irish disloyal party, and by his unblushing effrontery when his connection with the Raid was brought to light.

Taking the present charges in succession, the first in military parlance may be thus paraphrased: "In that he, knowing well the great extent of the armaments and preparations for an aggressive war against Great Britain being made by the South African Republic, wilfully misled the nation, by his solemn assurance of last summer that there would be no war."

That he was morally bound to tell the truth in this matter may be taken as granted, viewing his position and influence in Rhodesia and Cape Colony. That he should so calmly tell what he well knew was a falsehood is, therefore, unpardonable. True is it that

the Transvaal had been preparing for war for years, and that its preparations were practically completed last summer. Hence, it may fairly be argued that nothing would have stopped it from declaring war, as it did upon the first favorable opportunity presenting itself.

Unfortunately for this argument, we are met by the fact that the mounted Boers require food for their horses, and that it is impossible for them to move in any numbers through their country during the winter and early spring months—from June to September—and until the spring rains cause the young grasses to grow.

The effect, therefore, of Cecil Rhodes's solemn assurance was to lull the natural anxiety aroused by the reports of Boer armaments and aggressive actions. No sooner had this difficulty of subsistence disappeared than the mask was thrown aside, and the Boer determination to fight plainly shown. Had Great Britain taken action in July or August, an adequate force could have been thrown into Natal before the Boers could have mustered in sufficient numbers to overwhelm that colony. Also even had they thus mustered, the Boers would have been unable to keep the field, owing to want of subsistence at that time of the year.

Thus it will be seen that the direct effects of Cecil Rhodes's concealment of the Boer preparations, of which he was surely cognizant, and of his repeated assurances that there would be no war, combined most disastrously to mislead a Government by no means too energetic in its guardianship of national interests; and also to soothe the awakening anxieties of the nation, which somehow began to realize at last that things were not going quite well in South Africa.

We now come to the second charge which Cecil Rhodes stands arraigned upon. When the war broke out, for reasons at present unknown, he proceeded to Kimberley. At first, nobody paid much attention to this, beyond being somewhat amused at the energy of the Boers in at once surrounding and laying siege to the town which contained their detested enemy. Had Rhodes been content to remain as one of the many civilians shut up there, nothing more would probably have been said. But this was precisely what he was unable to do. A man who has wielded such immense powers and has realized the advantages which great wealth confers, could not remain a passive spectator under such circumstances. Thus,

before long we find him interfering, and interfering disastrously, as we shall prove, with the general conduct of the war.

To follow what we now propose to describe, it is first necessary that the general plan of campaign, as arranged for the expedition, should be understood. It was assumed, erroneously, as facts have turned out, that Sir George White, with his Natal field force of some 12,000 men, would be able to keep the invaders of the Transvaal at bay. That he could have done so, had he elected to hold the line of the Tugela, is, of course, open to discussion. Such, however, was the original idea, which, of course, must be considered in conjunction with the general scheme. This latter was to assemble an army corps and a cavalry division in Cape Colony, and to advance on Bloemfontein and through the Orange Free State on Pretoria. It was reckoned, and with good reason, that any such advance would quickly have the effect of reducing the pressure on White in Natal, since the bulk of the Transvaal and Free State forces would most certainly be withdrawn to oppose a British advance through the heart of the Orange Free State. It would also, of course, have drawn off the Boer commandoes besieging Kimberley.

Such, briefly, was the plan of campaign when Sir Redvers Buller landed at Cape Town on the 1st of November. But, during the seventeen days he had been at sea, the military situation had entirely changed. He now learned that the Boers had invaded Natal in overwhelming numbers, and that White had, after three battles in which he had worsted the enemy, been compelled to fall back on Ladysmith. He further heard how, owing to the unfortunate interference of the Civil Governor of Natal, all the munitions and stores had been collected at Ladysmith, thus obliging White to hold on to that town in place of retiring to the Tugela. To the north, Mafeking and Kimberley were beset and cut off; while many Boers were collecting along the Orange River and a commando had actually invaded the colony and advanced on Colesburg. Added to this was the unpleasant news that a vast number of the colonists were thoroughly disloyal, and anxiously awaiting a Boer success to take up arms against the colony! The troops available to withstand the impending Boer invasion were a small force of all arms at the Orange River Bridge, the remainder of the passages on that river being only held by the Colonial Police Force. At De Aar, an important junction, there were a few infantry and guns; while at

Stormberg and Naauwpoort, two railway junctions which commanded the line of advance on Bloemfontein, there was only a Naval Brigade and a detachment of infantry. Scattered here and there along over a thousand miles of railway were small parties of colonial volunteers, posted with a view to terrorizing the known disaffected colonial population. Truly an imposing force with which to keep the Boers, armed to the teeth, at bay!

Far away in England, some 6,000 miles distant, the famous Army Corps and Cavalry Division were being mobilized and put on board ship; a portion had indeed already been embarked and was somewhere near Madeira—not near enough to be of immediate use, unfortunately.

Buller must have seen at a glance the highly critical state of affairs in Natal; with White shut up in Ladysmith there was practically nothing to prevent the Boer invaders from sweeping the small forces at Maritzburg into the sea. Hence, he was compelled to direct every available battalion and battery as it arrived at Cape Town to Durban, thus, of course, diverting the stream of reinforcements from the true line of advance on Bloemfontein. On one point he was firm, namely, that the defence of Mafeking and Kimberley must be left to the local troops.

With a view to the general advance through the Free State, it was deemed advisable to collect a large depôt of supplies on the Orange River at the bridge of that name. This point afforded protection to the left flank of the advance, and if necessary would enable a flanking column to move on Kimberley or Bloemfontein, as might be considered desirable.

Things seemed to be going on fairly well. Strong reinforcements were pushed on to Natal, and a division under Lord Methuen assembled at De Aar, which was designed to advance to the Orange River at Norval's Pont.

It had been the custom, since the investment of Kimberley by the Boers, to keep up communications with the beleaguered garrison by men who knew the country well, and who were willing to risk the perils of breaking through the Boer lines for a consideration.

About the middle of November, when Kimberley had been invested for less than a month, one of these men succeeded in evading the Boer scouts and brought in a budget of news from Kimberley. He carried despatches for the military authorities, and also

for the Governor of Cape Colony and other high officials. The substance of these has since leaked out. For, while the military chief in Kimberley reported the situation as secure, Mr. Cecil Rhodes demanded the immediate despatch of a relief column to Kimberley before the end of the month.

Of course, it is impossible to say precisely what and whose influence were brought to bear; but the remarkable fact remains that Buller, despite his notorious objection and opposition to the despatch of any force for the relief of Kimberley, now suddenly ordered Methuen's division to advance to that town, thereby abandoning the original plan of operations for an indefinite period.

It was an open secret in the colony that Cecil Rhodes had thus forced Buller's hand, and against the latter's better judgment. As a proof of Buller's objection to this diversion of the nucleus of his fighting force from the true line of advance, it was well understood that its precise mission was to proceed to Kimberley and relieve that city, after which it was to return at once down the line to De Aar, and thus regain its position on the general line of advance into the Orange Free State.

All who have followed the movements of troops during the recent operations cannot have failed to remark on the repeated instances in which Buller has, as on this occasion, denuded his center and uncovered his line of advance by sending reinforcements to Natal and the Western Border. Excuses for the former may possibly be found, although we are of opinion that it would have been far sounder strategy to have merely sent *sufficient* troops to hold the line of the Tugela and protect the southern portion of the colony. Such an arrangement would have given Buller by this time an overwhelming force with which to advance on Bloemfontein.

But with regard to the latter, no such plea can be urged. It was obvious to all military men from the first that the correct way to secure the relief of Kimberley was by the occupation of Bloemfontein, and that any divergence of troops to that remote and unimportant part of the theatre of war involved a most dangerous splitting up of the British forces.

The truth of these criticisms is unfortunately borne out by the present condition of affairs. We see Buller twice roughly repulsed in his endeavor to break through the vast natural fortresses on the line of the Tugela. Methuen, on the other side, is headed and

checked full twenty miles short of his goal—Kimberley; whereas, in the center, the remaining forces are, at the time we write, only sufficient to keep the invading Boers, backed by the rebellious colonists, in check.

Reverting to our indictment of Cecil Rhodes, we maintain that the main cause of the present unfortunate deadlock in South Africa is directly attributable to his unwarrantable interference in the strategy of the campaign, resulting in the misdirection of Methuen's force, and the consequent breaking up of the army which ere now would have been operating on its proper line of advance with telling effect.

This is said in no spirit of desire to shift the responsibility from the military chiefs, upon whose shoulders the blame must inevitably fall. But it is well that the world, in criticising the campaign in South Africa and its, so far, abortive results, should not lose sight of the baleful influence which first misled the British public as regards the probabilities of war, and thus gave the Boers time to complete their arrangements for the invasion of our colonies; and, secondly, induced our military authorities to abandon the only sound plan of campaign for an indefinite period, and to hopelessly break up and disintegrate our forces at one of the most critical periods of our history.

A BRITISH OFFICER.

THE PROPOSED HAY-PAUNCEFOTE TREATY.

BY MAYO W. HAZELTINE.

SHOULD the Senate of the United States to ratify the convention into which Secretary Hay and the British Ambassador at Washington have entered, and which, according to the admission of our State Department, reaffirms, where it does not supersede, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty? In order to answer the question, we should recall distinctly the situation which existed before the new convention was signed; the views of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which have been expressed by eminent American statesmen during the last twenty years, and the effect which the provisions of the convention, if ratified, would have on the expediency of permitting the American isthmus to be cut by a canal. We may say at the outset that, if the projected artificial waterway is to be open in time of war to the battleships of a public enemy of the United States, the American people will never suffer the rampart which Nature herself has erected for the protection of our Pacific States to be demolished; much less will they commit an act of suicide by demolishing that natural rampart at their own expense. We say, further, that, if it shall appear that through the ratification of the new convention, the neutralization of an American canal, even in times of peace, is to be upheld, not solely by the guaranty of the United States and of the Central American Republic, or Republics, directly concerned, but also by the guaranty of European Powers, it would become the duty of the House of Representatives, adhering, for its part, to the Monroe Doctrine, to nullify the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, by refusing to make any appropriations under it, and by thus renouncing, for the present, the hope of an interoceanic canal. As yet, happily, we are not reduced to that desperate expedient. Three other courses are still open to us: First, the President may withdraw the new treaty for

amendment; second, the Senate may refuse to ratify the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty; third, before the document comes up for consideration in that body, Congress may enact canal legislation totally inconsistent with its provisions and based on the assumption that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is obsolete and no longer binding.

I.

Up to February 5, 1900, when Secretary Hay saw fit to enter into the new convention on the subject with the British Ambassador at Washington, the international situation, with regard to a canal across the American isthmus, had been this. The British Government was supposed to hold that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, although never acted on since it was concluded in 1850, was still obligatory on the United States, and entitled England to exercise jointly with ourselves a control over any interoceanic waterway, even although this should be constructed at our own expense. It had been long recognized, however, on both sides of the Atlantic that, by insisting upon the letter of the rights given to her by the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, England would pursue a dog-in-the-manger policy, for, hampered by the provisions of that agreement, the United States would never consent to build a canal. Acknowledging the futility of such a policy, and perceiving that England would have much to gain, even if she were restricted to the use of a canal in peace times and were shut out from it in the event of war with the United States, the London *Spectator* and other authentic representatives of British public opinion, have lately advocated the total annulment of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. When we call to mind that England in 1871, although she had nothing to gain by it, consented, at Russia's demand, to the annulment of the clause in the Treaty of Paris prescribing the neutralization of the Black Sea, which was the principal outcome of the Crimean War, we cannot doubt that, in the existing circumstances, a request for the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, if earnestly pressed by our State Department, would have been granted by Great Britain. Besides the consideration of the immense commercial profit derivable by England from a canal, even though this should be exclusively controlled by the United States, Lord Salisbury would not unreasonably have been moved by the reflection that it might be judicious to acquiesce gracefully in a transaction which the American people, apparently, were de-

terminated to carry out. There is only one courteous and friendly mode of terminating a treaty, but it can be rendered practically void in several ways, although recourse to any of these would have to be made at our own risk. We could inform the British Foreign Office through our State Department that, although the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty is, on its face, of perpetual obligation, and contains no denunciation clause, we should, nevertheless, decline to consider ourselves bound by it any longer. Again, a treaty may be invalidated through a second treaty concluded between one of the signatories and an outside Power. The treaty which we made with France during our Revolutionary War was rendered practically worthless when we made the Jay Treaty with Great Britain. Such would be the effect upon the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, if provisions totally inconsistent with it were to be inserted by us in a treaty concluded between the United States and the Republic of Nicaragua, or by the admission of the last-named commonwealth into our Union. In the third place, a treaty may be abrogated by legislative acts incompatible with its conditions. Congress may pass a bill providing that a canal shall be constructed across the American isthmus at the cost of the United States; that it shall be fortified and controlled exclusively by the United States and Nicaragua, and that, in the event of war, it shall be closed to the ships of the public enemy of either of those Powers. Such a law would be manifestly irreconcilable with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and would be, practically, tantamount to a repudiation of that instrument. The British Government, however, would have no moral right to regard such a repudiation as an affront, if, on repeated occasions, our State Department had courteously but vainly requested it to assent to an abrogation or drastic modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty.

II.

Now, for twenty years, the most respected and trusted of American statesmen, including distinguished Secretaries of State, have advocated the annulment of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, or such trenchant changes in it as should permit the United States to fortify the waterway and to close it against their public enemy in time of war. The views held by the Hon. W. M. Evarts, Secretary of State in the Hayes Administration, were unmistakably expressed in a message transmitted to the Senate by President

Hayes on March 9, 1880. The message pointed out that the policy of this country is a canal under American control, and that, if existing treaties stand in the way thereof, negotiations should be entered into to establish the American policy. It was further averred that the capital invested in the enterprise must look for protection to one or more of the great Powers of the world, but that no European Power could be allowed to intervene for such protection. The United States, said the message, "must exercise such control as would enable this country to protect its national interests." Again: Such a canal would be virtually "a part of the coast line of the United States," and its relations to this country would be "matters of paramount concern to the people of the United States. No other great Power would, under similar circumstances, fail to assert a rightful control over a work so closely and vitally affecting its interests and welfare."

Very soon after President Garfield's inauguration, Mr. Blaine set forth the grounds of his conviction that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty needed to be abrogated or materially changed. He did not assert that the treaty was already void, either by lapse of time or change of circumstances, or by any positive act of Great Britain, but he evidently believed that these and other considerations rendered the total or partial abrogation of the treaty by mutual consent or by our own act indispensable. He adopted the courteous course of proposing to the British Government that the treaty should be changed by mutual agreement, and, naturally, refrained from saying that, in the event of a refusal, the treaty might be practically nullified by an Act of Congress inconsistent with it. In a letter dated November 10, 1881, and addressed to Mr. Lowell, our Minister in London, Mr. Blaine pointed out that the Clayton-Bulwer convention had been made many years before under conditions which "were temporary in their nature, and can never be reproduced." He also recalled the fact that one of the motives which induced our Government to assent to the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was the expected aid of British capital, an expectation which had not been realized and had long ceased to be entertained, the resources of our own Government and people being amply sufficient for constructive purposes. Mr. Blaine proceeded to insist that Great Britain could not reasonably object to the demand of the United States that they should have the right to fortify the canal cut through the American isthmus and to close

it against a public enemy in time of war. He made it plain that "the operation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty would practically concede to Great Britain the control of whatever canal should be constructed," because it is incumbent upon Great Britain with its extended colonial possessions to maintain a naval establishment vastly superior to that required by any other Power. Hence, if the United States should bind itself not to fortify on land, Great Britain would have an advantage which would prove decisive in the possible case of struggle for the control of the canal. Finally, Mr. Blaine declared that our Government would not consent to perpetuate any treaty that, by conceding to European States a right of joint guaranty of an American canal, "impeached our rightful and long-established claim to priority on the American continent." The United States, he said, were resolved to defend their interests precisely as Great Britain defends hers. It would be as reasonable, he asserted, for the United States to demand a share in the fortifications by which Great Britain excludes all other Powers from the waters of the Red Sea, and thus virtually controls the Suez Canal, or to demand their neutralization, as for England to make the same demand in perpetuity from the United States with respect to the transit across the American Continent. Here we should note that, as a glance at the map will demonstrate, the geographical and strategic parallelism assumed by the Hay Pauncefote convention to exist between the Suez and Nicaragua canals, does not exist in fact. It could only exist, if we controlled the Caribbean, as England controls the Red Sea. The pretended neutralization of the Suez Canal is farcical, because the southern neck of the Red Sea, the natural continuation of the Suez Canal, is absolutely controlled by England. In a previous letter to Mr. Lowell, dated June 24, 1881, Mr. Blaine had repelled with vehemence the notion of subjecting an American canal to a joint guaranty of European Governments. An agreement, he said, between the Powers of Europe jointly to guarantee the neutrality, and thus, in effect, control the political character of the canal would be viewed by this Government with the gravest concern. And again: "The United States have never offered to take part in agreements in which European Powers have united, such as guarantees of the neutralization of certain European countries; and it is the long-settled conviction of this Government that any extension to our shores of the political system of Europe would be

attended with danger to the peace and welfare of this nation." Lord Granville, who, at the time, was Secretary for Foreign Affairs, replied to the letters addressed by Mr. Blaine to Mr. Lowell, and declined to modify the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in the particulars just mentioned.

Mr. Frelinghuysen, who succeeded Mr. Blaine as Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Lowell on May 8, 1882, a letter to the following effect: He declared that the only species of control over an artificial waterway cut through the American isthmus to which the United States could assent would be a control exercised exclusively by them and by the Central American Republic or Republics, the territory of which might be traversed by the canal. A protectorate, or joint guaranty, or joint control—in practice, the words would prove synonymous—by European nations would run directly counter to the Monroe Doctrine to which the American people are unshakably committed. Mr. Frelinghuysen went on to point out that Great Britain, by erecting during our Civil War the woodcutters' settlement, possessing no right of sovereignty, into the Crown Colony of British Honduras, had violated a fundamental condition of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, and had thus rendered the treaty voidable at the pleasure of the United States. Lord Granville, in reply, refused to admit that the treaty was voidable at the option of the United States, but the position taken by our Government was reaffirmed by Mr. Frelinghuysen in letters to Mr. Lowell, dated May 5, 1883, and November 22 of the same year. We should here add that Mr. Cleveland, though he did not reassert Mr. Frelinghuysen's views with regard to the voidability of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, but seems to have accepted the convention as obligatory in the absence of any executive or legislative act upon our part tantamount to an abrogation of it, never denied that the document would require material alteration, should the United States undertake to construct an interoceanic waterway. The course which Mr. Cleveland pursued in regard to the Venezuela boundary dispute furnished a conclusive proof of his resolve to uphold the Monroe Doctrine, and he must have been aware that the only pronounced departure from that doctrine ever made by the American Executive and by the United States Senate was embodied in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. There is, indeed, no doubt that Mr. Clayton deliberately meant, in negotiating the Convention of 1850, to disregard the Monroe Doctrine as in any

sense obligatory. This he did not shrink from avowing when, on becoming a member of the United States Senate only a few years later, he was drawn into a bitter discussion with General Cass, of Michigan, as to the meaning of the treaty, and as to the intentions of the contracting parties. Although, therefore, it cannot be denied that, in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, our Executive and our Federal Senate did abjure allegiance to the Monroe Doctrine, it has been ever since maintained by American statesmen, and conspicuously by Mr. Cleveland in the Venezuela controversy, that the Monroe Doctrine still represents the inflexible policy of our Government, and that a single departure from it in 1850 cannot be construed as a renunciation thereof.

III.

Such was the international situation with regard to an American isthmus canal in the month of January in the current year, the month preceding the provisional conclusion of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty on February 5, 1900. Three Secretaries of State had protested against the perpetuity of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty in its original form. Secretary Evarts had insisted that the canal must be built and operated under the exclusive control of the United States and of the Central American country through the territory of which the waterway should pass. Secretary Blaine had taken the same ground, and maintained that no canal should be built, if any European Power were to share in the control thereof; further contending that, in order to make our assumption of control effective, we should claim the right to rear fortifications. Secretary Frelinghuysen made the same declaration of principles, and asserted that we might make them immediately operative, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty having been violated by Great Britain in a vital condition, and thus rendered voidable at our option. It is true that, during the years 1880-83, when these declarations were made, Great Britain had shown itself unwilling either to abrogate the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty or so to modify it as to repel European control and give the United States the right to exclude the battleships of a public enemy from the canal in time of war. During the ensuing seventeen years, however, a signal change had taken place in British public opinion. It had come to be widely recognized by the beginning of 1900 that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was an obstruction to interoceanic communication,

and that the great commercial benefits derivable by England in times of peace from a canal traversing the American isthmus ought not to be sacrificed, or even postponed, on account of the reasonable reluctance expressed by the United States to place the artificial waterway under the guaranty of a European syndicate, or to open it to British warships in the regrettable and improbable, but at least possible, event of a war between the United States and England. Simultaneously with this notorious change in British public opinion both Houses of Congress, which constitutes the dominant branch of our Federal Government, had given unmistakable signs of a determination to cut without further delay a canal through the American isthmus; to operate it under the exclusive control of the United States; to repel the idea of a British or European guaranty and, while opening the waterway under liberal and equal conditions to the mercantile marines and the navies of all nations, to reserve, nevertheless, the right, inseparable from the duty of self-preservation, to close the canal against the battleships of any Power with which our Government should happen to be at war.

Under the circumstances, it was imperative upon Secretary Hay to point out to the British Foreign Office that the virtual abrogation of the Treaty by a legislative act of Congress was imminent; that, by a timely precaution, he desired to avert what might be deemed an affront, and that he would most earnestly request an immediate modification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty on the lines proposed by Mr. Blaine, lines which would place the projected interoceanic canal under the sole control of the United States, and which, while welcoming thither the commerce of the world in times of peace, would assert the right to close the waterway against our public enemies. That was the request it behooved Mr. Hay to make and to press. Nor have we reason to suppose that such a request, properly presented, and firmly urged, would have been rejected by the British Foreign Office. It is, indeed, incredible that the British Government, in its present situation, would not prefer to "save its face," as it did with regard to the neutralization of the Black Sea in 1871, by acquiescing in a drastic amendment of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, rather than see it torn to atoms by an act of the American Congress. No such request, however, was made. The State Department, for which Mr. Hay is personally, and President McKinley vicariously, responsible, has

had the amazing fatuity to announce that the Hay-Pauncefote convention is due exclusively to its own initiative; that not a line nor a word in it should be imputed to pressure from a British source.

What, then, is this convention, the authorship of which is claimed with pride? It is a convention which makes absolutely no concessions to the United States except the futile one of building, operating, repairing and policing the canal at its own expense, while it revives all the obnoxious provisions of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, placing the canal under the guaranty of a European syndicate, prescribing for it the rules applied to the Suez Canal, denying to the United States the right to fortify its own structure, and compelling us, under the penalty of coercion at the hands of United Europe, to permit in war-time the battleships of a public enemy to traverse the interoceanic waterway for the purpose of assailing our Pacific States.

It is a Trojan Horse that Great Britain, speaking through the mouth of Mr. Hay, has offered us in the Hay-Pauncefote convention; a treaty which invites us to level at our own cost the mountain rampart which Nature has interposed between our Pacific States and European aggression. By ratifying this astounding convention, we should place the cities on our Pacific coast at the mercy of any European Power possessing a stronger navy than our own. We should also deal, by implication, a deadly blow at the Monroe Doctrine, for, if we recognize to-day the right of European nations to guarantee jointly the neutralization of an American canal, with what force of logic could we deny hereafter their right to extend their power of political regulation over any part of Latin America?

There are four ways of dealing with the Hay-Pauncefote convention, and one of these must be adopted, unless the American people are to be made the victims of a wrong, the dire proportions of which will become patent in the twentieth century. If President McKinley desires to absolve himself and his party from the responsibility for this monstrous blunder; he will forthwith recall the Hay-Pauncefote convention for amendment. If this he neglects to do, the Senators may clear their own skirts of responsibility by refusing to ratify the document. Thirdly, the Senate may suspend consideration of the convention and indirectly kill both that and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by com-

binning with the House of Representatives to enact into law one of the two Nicaragua Canal bills which are now pending in Congress, and which are irreconcilable with the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty or its supplement. Or, finally, if the President and the Senate, which seems incredible, should both prove recreant to duty, the House of Representatives can still safeguard the interests of the United States and of the American Continent by refusing to appropriate a dollar for the construction of a canal under conditions subversive of the Monroe Doctrine, and of the power given us by Nature to protect our Pacific States from assault by European naval Powers. Better, far better, would it prove in the future, for the United States, and for the smaller commonwealths, of whose independence we are the guardians, that the American isthmus should be pierced never by the hand of man, than that we should be prohibited from closing a canal constructed and operated at our own expense against the warships of a public enemy.

MAYO W. HAZELTINE.

WE ARE TOO MUCH GOVERNED.

BY DAVID B. HILL, FORMERLY UNITED STATES SENATOR FOR NEW YORK.

I AM asked to express my views of the tendency—said to be increasing—on the part of the Legislatures of the various States of the Union in the direction of multiplying legislation.

That such tendency now exists in a large degree, even if not to a greater extent than ever before in our history, is evidenced by the fact that, as appears by the State Library Bulletin for January, 1900, published under the auspices of the University of the State of New York, there were enacted in the United States during the year 1899 by our State Legislatures the enormous number of 4,834 separate and distinct enactments known as “general laws;” while I find upon investigation that there were passed during the same period (including those passed by a few States which held their bi-ennial sessions in 1898) in addition thereto “local, special or private” laws to the number of 9,325, making a grand total of 14,159 laws enacted in the United States, exclusive of Congressional and Territorial legislation. They embrace almost every conceivable subject, from the commendable purpose of the protection of the life and liberty of the citizen to the unnecessary regulation of the wearing of hats at places of indoor amusement, and the ridiculous designation of a “State flower.”

It appears that New York has contributed its full quota to this mass of good, bad and indifferent legislation, having in 1899 added 741 laws to swell the grand total, which, however, was an improvement on the record of the preceding four years, wherein had been passed 3,516 laws, the year 1895 alone witnessing the enactment of 1,045 statutes, being the largest number ever enacted in any one year since the organization of the State Government.

The admonition of the Scriptures, “Of making many books

there is no end," may well be applied to the volumes of our session laws.

The contemplation of this astonishing activity in the making of laws naturally leads the thoughtful student of public affairs to inquire whether there is any real necessity for so much regulation of human conduct, and such constant interference with the business concerns of the people.

For every unnecessary statute which is enacted is an unreasonable imposition upon the citizen, who must not only examine it, but endeavor to understand its nature and effect, not merely for his own protection, but, if for no other purpose, for the very laudable desire of verifying that time-honored or moss-covered maxim of jurisprudence that "Every man is presumed to know the law," however unfounded and troublesome that presumption may oftentimes be.

It may well be questioned whether a State has the moral right to compel a citizen, in order to prevent his becoming, unwittingly or involuntarily, a civil or criminal wrong-doer, to annually undertake the laborious task of reading through huge volumes of session laws, at much expenditure of time and effort, that he may understand the laws of his own commonwealth and with reasonable certainty remain a law-abiding member of the community.

There seems to be a mania on the part of modern legislators to pass as many bills as possible during each session, probably indulging in the delusion that their zeal for their constituencies will be appreciated in proportion to the number of measures which they secure. There was never a greater mistake. I recall an instance several years ago where a member of Assembly, who, although representing a small county containing only about fifty thousand inhabitants, had secured the enactment of some nineteen local measures, at the close of the legislative session congratulated himself on his success, and unmindful of the dangers incurred by such undue zeal, stoutly predicted his sure return the next year by a grateful constituency, but who signally failed of re-election, owing to the complications occasioned by the very numerous measures which he had procured.

While the large number of laws which a representative secures may be an indication of great industry, it is not of itself any evidence of wisdom on his part any more than it is of the value and benefit to anybody of the measures themselves.

The Common Council of an interior city in New York once passed a resolution which after reciting the number of arrests that had been made by a certain policeman during the preceding year, which happened to be greater than those made by any other member of the force, formally thanked him for his services, as well as commended him as the "best" policeman, although there was no evidence of the outcome of such arrests, the necessity or propriety thereof, or any other circumstances attending them. The Council apparently labored under the erroneous impression that in a multitude of arrests there is safety, and that the number and not the quality or circumstances thereof should count or control in estimating the efficiency and value of a policeman.

The constituency of such a Council would doubtless appreciate the services of their legislative representative in proportion to the number of local bills which he might be instrumental in placing on the statute books.

It is to be regretted that there are not more legislators possessed of the courage sufficient to refuse requests for the introduction of measures of doubtful necessity; but the unvarnished truth is that too many members seem eager and anxious to introduce some measure—it matters little what it is—in order that it may not be said that they lack the requisite influence to procure the enactment of a single law during an entire session. We are sure, however, that the representative who cannot place a single statute to his credit will, on the other hand, have none to discredit him, and we are not so sure but what he confers upon his commonwealth a more lasting benefit than the officious law-maker who passes a dozen laws of doubtful expediency.

And while we may not agree with Montaigne, who once said, "I am further of opinion that it would be better for us to have no laws at all, than to have them in so prodigious numbers as we have," yet we must respect the sentiment which impelled so emphatic, even if so exaggerated, a protest against the prevailing disposition to multiply laws for the government of intelligent people.

Legislation breeds legislation. The more laws we have, the more we are apt to think we need. The first forty days of a legislative session ordinarily witness the accomplishment of little, because there is really little which needs to be done; and if the regular appropriation bills for the support of the Government were

ready for passage, the final adjournment might speedily follow without detriment to the State, even if not to its positive advantage. But usually the longer a Legislature continues in session imaginary needs for relief naturally arise or are created, one measure begets another, the introduction of bills becomes contagious and soon the flood gates of legislation are opened up, the legislative mills begin to grind, corporate and private greed becomes aroused and participates in the struggle for legislative favors—with the final result that hundreds of measures are ultimately passed, most of which were never contemplated at the outset, and two-thirds of which are either unnecessary, wholly or partially bad, or without substantial merit.

An idle man is bad enough, but an idle body of men is worse, and an idle Legislature, like an idle man, is usually mischievous, if not positively dangerous, and when the actual needs of a State in the direction of desirable legislation are comparatively few, the opportunities afforded in a long session for vicious, corrupt and improper legislation are much increased—and therein lies the danger to the State.

It may be safely asserted that it is not true that the interests of the people of the several States really require such a mass of legislation as is annually or bi-ennially foisted upon them by their respective Legislatures.

It may be asked, "What is a *Legislature* for, unless it be to *legislate*?" The answer is plain. A Legislature is given the power of legislation to subserve the best interests of the people—to meet their actual needs—to perform its proper functions as a part of the machinery of the State Government, but only whenever necessary. The legislative machinery, however, is not to be operated continuously. A legislative body is not to legislate simply for the mere sake of legislating. The power of legislation is not a mere toy to be constantly played with; but it is a high prerogative to be exercised only when occasion imperatively requires. A physician is licensed by the State to practice medicine, but unless necessity absolutely requires, it is not his province to dose his patients with medicines, although they may clamor for them. It is as much the duty of a conscientious lawyer to keep his client out of litigation as it is to protect him when he has unfortunately been drawn into it. Water is excellent to quench thirst, but too much of it impairs one's digestion. There can be too much even of a good thing.

The point to these homely illustrations is apparent. Legislation is being carried to excess in this country, and excesses in the body politic are equally as dangerous as excesses in anything else.

It is to be feared that the people are becoming accustomed to look to legislative bodies for relief from all of their grievances, real or imaginary, the most of which are remediless because they are largely incidental to a free government which was not intended by its founders to be paternal in its character.

It is a serious mistake to teach the doctrine that the State must support its citizens, must provide them with work, must regulate what they shall eat, drink and wear, and otherwise control their customs, recreations and privileges through and by means of the authority of legislative enactments.

Legislation needs to be restricted within reasonable bounds either by constitutional limitations or through the influence of an intelligent public sentiment which sometimes is more effectual than law. Otherwise it is apt to run wild—to overleap the bounds of prudence and safety—to oppress, injure and annoy the citizen. It is capable of being a mighty weapon for good or evil, for the protection or the destruction of the community. Its danger lies in its very power.

Its constant use leads to serious abuses. Unscrupulous partisanship seizes it to secure and maintain political ascendancy through unjust apportionment measures, unfair election laws, the arbitrary removal of political opponents by statute, providing long terms of office for partisan favorites, and amending municipal charters one way for political friends and another way for political opponents without regard to decency, consistency or right.

Partisanship in legislation seems to have run mad in Kentucky when that State tolerates an election system which centralizes and vests in the Governor (or in officials selected by him) the appointment of all the local election officials throughout that State, regardless of the democratic principle of home rule, and which permits a popular body like the Legislature to canvass the election returns and to reject at its virtual discretion the votes of any county in the State, and declare whichever candidate it pleases to be elected, with no power in the courts to review its proceedings, to correct its errors or to regulate its action in accordance with well-established legal principles.

That over-legislation constitutes a positive evil must be readily

admitted. If there were some excuse for such excessive activity, if the majority of the enactments while although not strictly necessary were at least inoffensive and non-meddlesome in their character, the mere quantity thereof might not be regarded as specially objectionable. But when it becomes apparent that legislators have acquired the pernicious habit of excessive activity, devising and enacting measures simply to occupy the time during which they are expected to be at their respective State capitols—resulting in an enormous number of measures of no substantial benefit to the community, many of them petty and ridiculous in their purposes, or dangerous in their invasion of the liberties of the people, or special, local and private in their nature, with few general laws of practical utility and widespread importance—then the conviction becomes irresistible that the wise and beneficent purposes of legislation as contemplated by the framers of our various constitutions have become largely perverted to the serious detriment of the State. We may well recall the solemn warning of Tacitus, “When the State is most corrupt, then the laws are most multiplied.”

The inordinate desire to legislate manifests itself not only in new and wholly experimental legislation, but in the constant amendment of old and existing statutes.

These unnecessary changes are apt to undermine our respect for law. A fickle man is always distrusted, and public confidence is soon destroyed in an unstable statute.

It is desirable, even if not essential, that laws should be permanent—fixed—certain; rather than transient—temporary—and constantly tampered with. Otherwise how are the people to become accustomed to them, how are they to understand and obey them? A State has no moral right to exact obedience to its legislative commands if they are as varying and numerous as the waves of the ocean.

It is not believed that the evil of undue legislation is one that is necessarily incidental to our political institutions, and therefore unavoidable. It may be largely, even if not entirely or effectually, corrected in many ways which can be suggested.

Of course, under our free institutions, where the people govern themselves through their chosen representatives, some discretion as to the number and nature of legislative enactments must be permitted to repose in our law-making bodies.

It would be unwise to attempt to unnecessarily, much less unreasonably, restrict them even if it were practicable. Their sovereignty must be recognized and respected, although the frequency of its abuse or misuse severely tests the general confidence in the perfection of this portion of our governmental system. But it is "The Only Way," because no better repository for the exercise of legislative power than a popular body chosen by and of the people has yet been devised, and with all its shortcomings it must be admitted that it has accomplished wonders for humanity, liberty and progress.

It should be observed in passing that the evils of questionable legislation are more to be apprehended from State Legislatures than from Congress, owing to the difference in the extent of their authority.

Intelligent readers do not need to be informed that Congress can only exercise such powers, legislative and otherwise, as are conferred upon it in the Federal Constitution, while the powers of State Legislatures are unlimited except wherein they are restrained in their own State Constitutions or are prohibited in the Constitution of the United States. This distinction is most important. When our States can legislate on any subject and in any direction except that from which they are expressly restrained and prohibited, the opportunities for experimental and visionary legislation are practically as extensive as the open sea.

But it is asked, What are the remedies suggested for these prevailing and unsatisfactory conditions?

Let me specify and to some extent amplify them.

(1.) The creation of an intelligent public sentiment, always a powerful factor in the determination of public questions, which shall insist that the volume of legislation shall be steadily reduced within reasonable limits. Let law-making bodies be given to understand that they incur the displeasure, instead of the gratitude, of the people for the meddlesome industry which characterizes the numerousness of the enactments inflicted upon the community. Of course, there will be opposition to such a sentiment: it is inevitable. Every corruptionist, every lobbyist, every public legislative printer, every "striker," every promoter or "hanger-on" around legislative halls, and every schemer whose "business" interests might be injuriously affected, will be united, as they always have been, in resisting any diminution in the extent of legislative

favors to which they have unfortunately been accustomed: but right-thinking people who have no special axes to grind and no selfish interests to promote, and are actuated solely by their concern for the general public welfare, will cordially welcome any concerted effort to secure reform in the direction indicated. It may reasonably be anticipated that the usual obstacles will be interposed, and that the same threadbare arguments will be presented which have always been put forth, to wit: that we are a growing country and that our new, increasing and varied business interests require much more legislative regulation and interposition than formerly. It is a plea easily made and as easily refuted. The existing statutes in nearly all the States are largely sufficient to meet the demands of all our genuine business interests; in fact, those interests would be better prospered by being let alone. Permanence is the desirable and essential feature in such matters. Nothing is so detrimental to every kind of legitimate business as uncertainty; and fluctuating laws are more demoralizing than fluctuating markets.

(2.) General laws should be enacted instead of special laws, wherever practicable. The evils which pertain to over-legislation may largely be attributed to special legislation, which constitutes the bulk of our undesirable enactments. It is in this field where favoritism is dispensed, where general laws are ignored or evaded, where corruption usually accomplishes its purposes, and where objectionable private schemes of every sort find their expression. Whatever questionable pension legislation has been enacted by Congress has been through special bills providing for some particular person to the exclusion of others equally or more deserving, while little criticism has ever been offered to general pension laws providing equally for all persons similarly situated. Uniform pension legislation should be the general rule, and while some exceptions must necessarily be tolerated, the general purpose should be to provide for all alike who are equally deserving, and their right to relief should be guaranteed under just and liberal general laws, and not be made to depend on their having the ear of their Congressman or upon the zeal or influence of some unscrupulous pension shark.

Special laws of the average kind are ordinarily a legislative nuisance, because they are usually without real merit, and unnecessarily and unreasonably occupy the valuable time of legis-

lators who should be engaged in studying and serving the general interests of the whole instead of the particular interests of a few.

For some years Congress was in the habit of passing special bills giving to various soldiers' monument associations, posts of the Grand Army of the Republic, and municipal corporations, some condemned cannon which the Army or Navy Departments did not need, and these bills became so numerous that they clogged the calendars of the two houses, and in the year 1896, after having passed some twenty-four of them that year and the calendars being full of others awaiting action, Congress finally tumbled to the idea that it might with propriety pass a general law authorizing the Secretaries of War and of the Navy to loan such cannon to such organizations under such rules and regulations as those officials might prescribe, and accordingly such a bill was passed and became a law on May 22, 1896, much to the personal comfort of individual Congressmen and to the relief of the session laws of the United States.

The Constitutional amendments which were adopted in 1874 in New York, and which were retained in the revised Constitution of 1894, accomplished much in the direction of home rule, whereby the Legislature was expressly forbidden to pass any private or local bills providing for changing the names of persons, laying out or altering highways, locating or changing county seats, providing for changes of venue in civil or criminal cases, incorporating villages, selecting grand or petit jurors, regulating the rate of interest on money, conducting elections and designating places of voting, increasing or decreasing the allowances of public officers during the terms for which they were elected or appointed, granting the right to lay down railroad tracks, granting to any private corporation, association or individual any exclusive privilege, immunity or franchise whatever, or providing for building bridges except in certain specified instances; and these amendments empowered the Legislature to pass general laws providing for such cases, and "for all other cases which in its judgment may be provided for by general laws;" and also directed the Legislature "by general laws" to "confer upon the boards of supervisors of the several counties of the State such further powers of local legislation and administration as the Legislature may from time to time deem expedient."

These wise and important provisions have proved of especial

benefit to the people in preventing much legislative interference in their local affairs and in enabling them to enjoy a large measure of the blessings of home rule, but the inestimable advantages in those directions might have been greatly enhanced had the Legislature, on the one hand, fully availed itself of its authority to confer upon local authorities additional powers of local legislation as contemplated by the Constitution, and, on the other hand, had refrained from evading its provisions by passing laws which, while general in their form, were really "local or private" in all their essential features, but which the courts have been reluctant to declare unconstitutional.

"The Tendency of the Courts to Sustain Special Legislation" is the subject of a paper read by the Hon. John Woodward, of Jamestown, N. Y., a Justice of the Supreme Court of the Eighth Judicial District, before the Social Science Association at Saratoga Springs on September 7, 1899, which has been published in pamphlet form and which I have perused with no little interest. It is an able presentation of the question, and does infinite credit to this accomplished jurist. In well-chosen words he deprecates the previous tendency of some of our courts to sustain special legislation, and urges a rigid adherence to the old-fashioned doctrine of a strict construction of Constitutional prohibitions against the exercise of legislative power.

In view of a recent decision of our highest court he declares that "the re-action has set in; the courts have called a halt upon this class of legislation, just as they did in the legislation which sought to violate the policy of home rule in the selection of local officials." He now believes that "the tendency of the courts, both in the States and in the nation, seems to be in the direction of a larger protection of individual and community rights against the encroachment of legislation."

Judge Woodward's paper can be read with profit by every judge, lawyer and student in the country.

The passage in 1898 by the New York Legislature of a general law (which went into practical effect on January 1, 1900), providing for a uniform charter for all cities of the second class, as defined in the revised Constitution of 1894, was a step in the right direction for which the Legislature deserves commendation. The danger is that the Legislature may be persuaded to frequently amend the act, not in its general features, but in providing ex-

ceptional provisions to meet the supposed requirements of some particular city; and in that event the charter soon ceases to be uniform, losing its general character, and special charters might as well be substituted at once.

But the movement to secure a uniform charter for cities of the third class seems to have been abandoned. This is unfortunate because, as the number of such cities largely exceeds that of the second class, the necessity of uniformity is greater, and the benefits would be augmented proportionately. The propriety of a uniform charter for all the villages of the State, whether incorporated before or since 1874, deserves careful consideration, because, while the Constitutional amendments of 1874 prohibited the incorporation of villages thereafter, except under general laws, which have since been passed, yet there were hundreds of villages in existence in 1874 already incorporated under special acts, whose charters are still amendable at the pleasure of the Legislature, and which are being constantly tampered with. It may be stated in this connection that last year alone there were passed forty-two special acts relating to villages, and even that record was an improvement on recent Legislatures; and at the same time thirty-one bills were passed for Buffalo, twenty-four for Rochester, ten for Syracuse, nine for Yonkers, and a considerable number for other cities; while thirty-one special bills relating to towns, besides twelve for Westchester County, nine for Suffolk County, fifty-nine bills relating to miscellaneous corporations, twenty-two claim bills, fourteen escheat or release bills, fifteen amendments to the Penal Code, and fifty-eight amendments to the fish and game laws (the latter probably for the benefit of our amateur sportsmen from our large cities)—all found a place in our over-burdened session laws. In addition thereto, forty-eight amendments were added to the Code of Civil Procedure, showing what a defective (!) system of practice the State of New York had previously endured. An incident relating to the procurement of code amendments generally may not be amiss right here. It is well known that these amendments are largely secured by attorneys to affect particular pending law suits, but are usually pressed ostensibly in the public interest. Recently the chairman of a sub-committee on codes, who comprehended the situation and appreciated the humorous, presiding at a meeting of his committee, before which there had appeared numerous lawyers pressing their various code amendments, in-

interrupted one of them who was about to proceed to advocate his proposed amendment in the "public interest," with the naïve suggestion, "Please give us the title of the cause before you proceed," which produced such a chorus of laughter from those assembled, and so disconcerted the astonished advocate, that for some minutes he was unable to proceed at all.

The effort in behalf of a uniform charter for cities of the third class deserves to be renewed, and notwithstanding the antagonism which it is likely to encounter from local and selfish interests, it should eventually be successful. No good reason can be urged why a citizen moving from one city into another city, or from one village into another village, in the same State, should find himself confronted with a different system of local government, different offices, different methods of taxation, different elections and other troublesome and vexatious differences in procedure.

Besides, uniform charters lessen the temptations for unfair partisan legislation. A temporary political victory or defeat in a city by a party politically opposed to the party in control of the Legislature, cannot well be made the occasion by the Legislature, as has been too frequently the practice in the past, for wholesale charter changes designed to secure temporary political advantage in that particular city, for the party which is in affiliation with the legislative majority, at the expense of the other party.

Fair, uniform and permanent legislation constitutes the true remedy for the evils of excessive partisanship.

Another suggestion is perhaps worthy of notice. The Constitution of a State should not contain too many india-rubber provisions; and while elasticity may be desirable in some of its features, it is more essential that at least the limitations and restrictions upon the arbitrary power of the Legislature should be so definite and certain as to leave nothing to discretion. The provisions of the New York Constitution, relating to certain private or local bills, to which we have heretofore referred, are of the latter character, and are for that reason especially valuable, but those which simply authorize the Legislature to pass general laws in "all other cases which in its judgment may be provided for by general laws," and those which require it to confer upon boards of supervisors such further powers of local legislation and administration "as the Legislature may from time to time deem

expedient," and those which forbid the creation of corporations by special act except "in cases where, in the judgment of the Legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general laws"—all these provisions being addressed merely to the discretion of the Legislature, afford no real protection to the people from unwise and ill-considered special legislation in the cases mentioned.

(3.) Bi-ennial sessions of the Legislature should be substituted for annual ones.

This has been accomplished in all but six States of the Union, and the combined testimony in all of the States wherein the improvement has been tried is to the effect that it has proved most salutary, reducing the volume of legislation and improving its character. There may be honest differences of opinion about the necessity of this step, but surely the favorable experience of so many States should count for something in its behalf.

There is much which may be urged in its favor. It lessens the opportunities for mischief. It affords the people time to discover what one Legislature has done, before another one is convened. It reduces the expenses of government. It is in line with the spirit of the age, which dictates less frequent elections, longer terms for local officials, for instance, like supervisors, and in national matters demands the election of United States Senators by the people instead of State Legislatures.

The effort to secure bi-ennial sessions for New York resulted in failure. A constitutional amendment proposing the change was first recommended by Governor Black in both of his annual messages and passed the Republican Legislature of 1898, in the Assembly almost unanimously and in the Senate by nearly a party vote; but in the succeeding fall the Republican State platform omitted to endorse the proposition, while the Democratic State platform distinctly approved it, but in the Legislature of 1899 it was unexpectedly defeated in the Senate by the Democratic minority, aided by a few Republicans—for reasons which have never been satisfactorily explained. There are some indications that the issue thus presented may enter into the campaign of 1900.

The question is sometimes asked whether the suggestion for the reduction of the number of legislative sessions is not a reflection upon the competency of the people to govern themselves. A

fair question deserves a fair answer. The proposition implies no such criticism, any more than the reduction of the hours of labor, the establishment of the Saturday half-holiday, the early closing of places of business, the omission of schools on Saturday, or the summer vacations of the people which are becoming more general each and every year, imply a lack of public confidence in those who are allowed such a reasonable suspension from their ordinary avocations. It is a sufficient argument for bi-ennial sessions that there is no real necessity for annual sessions; and this argument censures no one nor anything. The necessary appropriations for the support of the State Governments can as well be made bi-ennially as annually.

The demand for less frequent legislative sessions is no more a reflection upon the competency of the people to govern themselves, than are the restrictions upon legislative power found in the Federal and State Constitutions. As well might it be suggested that the Ten Commandments are a reflection upon humanity, or that all criminal laws imply a lack of confidence in the people. The whole theory upon which government is founded is that the human race requires some such restraining instrumentality.

A clever writer (Mr. H. Gerald Chapin) in an article published in the "University Law Review" in 1897, describes some remarkable specimens of legislation which had recently been enacted or proposed in the various American Legislatures in the attempt to make mankind "good" by statute. He says:

"They would warrant the belief that our legislators are soon to be regarded as the 'fathers of the people.' Dress, ethics, the mere convenience of the citizen, nothing is too high or low for legislative inspection and regulation. The various and usually fruitless attempts to pry into strictly private and personal matters, by means of legislative investigating committees, so-called, are of this class. . . . Some recent legislative problems are especially to be noted. The Michigan Legislature has under consideration the prohibition of printing hotel menus in a language other than English: Indiana, the establishment of 'a new mathematical truth,' viz, the squaring of the circle; Nebraska the penalizing of football as a misdemeanor; Missouri, an act to prohibit railroad companies from using wooden rails and tying them with string, and flirtations with or by railroad employes; Kansas, an act to prevent the wearing of corsets or bloomers; Pennsylvania, so we hear, an act to require every man to pay for his own drinks; Minnesota, a bill to require a red light to be displayed on the outside of every drinking saloon, with the word 'Danger' thereon; and the Senate of another State not long ago wrestled with the problem

whether a druggist selling patent medicines should not keep affixed in a conspicuous place in his store an affidavit stating that he had himself tried one bottle of the mixture in question and experienced no deleterious effects therefrom. At the present moment another learned assembly is gravely debating the question of the statutory enactment of the Ten Commandments, an amendment having been proposed to the tenth prohibiting the coveting of a neighbor's bicycle; and the high theatre hat has been the subject of much anxious legislative thought in half a dozen States.

"The truth seems to be that our unhappy country at the present moment is surfeited with legislation. Believing, in our gloriously democratic way, that every man should be given the chance to enact laws, provided his pull with the political leader of his district happens to be strong enough, we send every year into our Legislatures men of transcendent (!) ability, . . . but of somewhat limited parts as regards the duties of their new office. As a matter of fact, statutes have already been passed to regulate human conduct in all the more important points, and a new fledged lawmaker goes to his particular Senate or Assembly with a vague notion that he must make laws of some kind, that being what he is elected for. He finds scarcely anything of real importance that demands attention, and consequently resorts to paternalistic methods. Legislate he must, and legislate he undoubtedly does. A most naïve statement is reported to have been made by a some-time member of a certain Western Legislature when asked what object he had in view in introducing a bill prohibiting the use of stuffed animals for advertising purposes, and who said that he had thought for two full months of some law that he could introduce, but found that most of his ideas had been pre-empted, until he passed a furrier's window, wherein was a stuffed and mounted lamb. This American Lyncurgus thereupon, inspired with a noble zeal for the public welfare and conscious of the demoralizing effect that the sight of stuffed lambs would have upon the mind of the common citizen, peacefully pursuing his tranquil way along the street, all unconscious that a sight of such horror and awfulness was soon to burst upon his affrighted gaze, nobly 'seed his duty and he done it.'

"There is one new act, however, to which our unqualified support would be given—a bill which would materially reduce in number the sessions of State Legislatures."

(4.) Wherever the evils of over-legislation exist, constitutional amendments should be secured further restricting the power of legislation.

This may not be an easy task in some States, but nothing is impossible in a free Government like ours. Agitation is the strongest weapon of a freeman, and it is an accepted truism that a cause which is right is sure to ultimately prevail.

The expenses of government are everywhere increasing, both in State and Nation; and while legislative bodies are busy devising new schemes of taxation upon the people, there are none of them proposing anything for the relief of the taxpayers. The more the

revenues of the State are increased, the higher the taxes seem to become. New officials are constantly being created, salaries are being raised, State commissions are being multiplied, and old laws which have stood the test of time and experience are being swept aside in a mad rush for new and experimental legislation.

Constitutional restrictions on the legislative power would seem to be most timely.

The people do not require more legislation—they demand less.

They firmly believe in the old cardinal doctrine that “that government is best which governs the least.”

Instead of extending the powers of government, individualism should be exalted, and the arbitrary powers of government curtailed: all of which can safely be done as a higher civilization advances. Strong governments are not needed in this age of reason as much as liberal governments, whose strength is founded on the affections and intelligence of the people.

I realize that this sentiment in favor of individualism somewhat runs counter to a concerted effort which has recently manifested itself in behalf of governments—National, State and municipal—assuming the direction and management of every enterprise and undertaking of a *quasi* public character. Within appropriate limitations the proposition is not without some merit, but it should not be extended unreasonably, or else the principles of socialism might as well be adopted at once. The desirability of the control and regulation of such enterprises, especially those which are corporate in their character, is one thing, while the necessity of the ownership or actual management thereof, as a part of the functions and machinery of government, is quite another and a different thing. The one is safe and desirable; the other is largely experimental and may not be without some elements of danger.

Control, for the public welfare, under prudent laws, is always expedient: paternalism is always objectionable.

The present American people have never suffered from the despotism, the exactions, the corruptions, the arrogance, “the long train of abuses and usurpations” on the part of their Government and its officials as did their forefathers of Revolutionary memory, and hence they do not readily appreciate the hardships and dangers of immense standing armies, of unjust taxes, of arbitrary laws, of “a multitude of new offices” and “swarms of

officers to harass our people and eat out their substance;" and they are therefore slow to realize that any perilous complications and difficulties can possibly arise from an increase of legislative powers and an extension of the functions and operations of government.

It is believed that, guided by "the lamp of experience" derived from the lessons of history, the great conservative masses, the thinking people of the country, the men who honestly work with muscle and brain—not merely "The Man with the Hoe," but the independent, resolute and intelligent men in the field, the shop, the office, the pulpit, the press, and all the avenues of trade and commerce, and thought—those people who lend dignity to labor and add character to the free institutions of our country, who know their weakness and realize their strength, are not clamoring for greater power for the Government, but prefer more individual freedom for themselves; they are not turning to the State for aid in all their private enterprises, but, on the contrary, wish to be let alone; and finally they are not asking for more laws, but for less, having already reached the reasonable conclusion that "We Are Too Much Governed."

DAVID B. HILL.

CHIEF CAUSES OF DISCONTENT IN INDIA.

BY A. HENRY SAVAGE LANDOR.

DEFEAT after defeat for the British arms—or, disaster after disaster, as we prefer to call them when the loss is on our side—has stared us in the face since the beginning of our war with the Transvaal. England has had to witness the sad spectacle of her most popular generals pass from the status of exalted tacticians to that of blunderers. We may well ask what we are to look for next. We are told in Mr. Balfour's late speech in Manchester that "the Government was absolutely ignorant of the actual strength of the Boers; that there was no official knowledge that the Boers had all mounted soldiers; that they possessed armored trains and artillery as good, if not better, than ours;" and all this, to use Mr. Balfour's words, "because there was nobody to tell us of the importance of these things." Yet, leaving aside the advisability of embarking in such a war, neither the generals nor the home Government are altogether directly to blame for our unpreparedness and its fatal results. There is no doubt whatever that from beginning to end they had been grossly misinformed. It would, however, be interesting to know how it was that they came to be so misinformed. Was it ignorance on the part of our local officials or wilfulness?

Let us take the South African question as an example of what might happen to us in India should ill-fortune further attend our arms in South Africa. Hardly since the beginning of the present war, have I heard mention, or speculation, as to what moral effect our lost battles in Africa might have on the natives of our great Indian dependency. Why is this? Because the home public are led to believe that we are invincible in India; that we have there a well-regulated and powerful Government, an efficient and sufficient army; that we are beloved by the natives, and that never will there

be a rising of the population against the British, such as the mutiny of 1857. For some years it has apparently been the policy of the Government to hide from the public anything that might bring criticism on the doings of its officials; and the people have so far been astoundingly ready to swallow, in perfect faith, all that has been served to them; this owing to the commendable faith they have in their leaders. One thing in England that must strike a travelled man is the absolute lack of knowledge on the part of the Government and the majority of the people regarding our colonies, chiefly those in Asia. This ignorance, as I have already said, must to a certain extent be excused, since it is caused by the incompetency of the officials there employed. I have known of several cases where the Government has been and is still grossly misled and misinformed by local officers. Speaking from my own experience, an official of no less importance than a certain Lieutenant-Governor still in office in India, at a conference which I attended regarding my Tibetan troubles, had not the slightest notion where his northern frontier was, and his geographical knowledge was so meagre that he actually asked me whether one important town in his own province was a suburb of Lhasa in Tibet! As for the frontier tribes, their characteristics, their troubles, the Lieutenant-Governor scarce knew of their existence. Other officials present, with the exception of two, were just as vague regarding information on matters relating to their own district and frontier, and I could quote one instance where, possibly through the ignorance of the informer, the House of Commons has been shamefully misled concerning affairs on our frontier and disgraceful abuses to our natives.

There is no doubt that our Indian Empire has not forgotten the lesson received in 1857, and the people are beginning to get accustomed, although not reconciled, to our civilization. The civil administration of the country is theoretically much improved; in fact, so improved that, for practical purposes, it would suit the natives better were it not quite so perfect. The Government since the time of the Mutiny has not left a stone unturned to establish British rule on a firmer basis, and the native population, first aghast and suspicious at the radical changes which we made in their country, have fallen in with apparent readiness with our Western mode of locomotion, our telegraphs, postal system, and education. We now find excellent universities

in Calcutta, Bombay, Allahabad, Madras and Lahore, where the English language is not only taught, but actually used as a medium of instruction; and such, I believe, is also the case in many of the primary schools of the principal towns and stations. Lower and primary schools are innumerable all over the country and are well attended, the natives showing a keen desire to have their boys instructed according to Western notions. They, nevertheless, display much reticence and even objection to having their women educated. It has been found from experience that the promotion of education has only been thoroughly appreciated by the natives when founded to a certain extent upon lines indigenous to the land, when the changes from the Eastern to the Western mode of thinking have not been too sudden, and when they combine in themselves some of the conservative traits so dear to Asiatics with the go-aheadativeness so characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon.

There are scattered about India a number of private missionary schools, and, where conducted in a reasonable and tactful fashion, they are doing good.

The public schools are under the supervision of a provincial department of public instruction, and they are subsidized by the Government, which spares no trouble in attempting to support and perfect all such institutions. This is very commendable, and the natives should be grateful, for indeed a boy can to-day receive in India an education as good as, if not better than, he would in England. Unfortunately, it will be found on closely studying the natives that these very fellows who have been educated by us to a point much too high for their social position in the scale of human races are the first to turn enemies of Britain, of the Government, of all imported institutions. With their superior education they obtain great power over the less educated masses, and, having learned our weak points, they are not loth in secretly spreading revolutionary ideas among the people. These fellows, nominally by examination, in reality mostly through protection, generally manage to obtain Government billets. Showing abject servility to British officials, they manage to get a thorough insight into the most secret doings and condition of the Government. It is to be hoped that we shall not live to see how this information may be used by them.

But to proceed. The Government has established a regular

network of railways and roads, built firm bridges over every river, and canals have been cut in all directions to provide against that sword of Damocles that ever hangs over India's head—famine. Extensive granaries and stores are kept in hand to supply the population, and strict measures are enforced to minimize its sufferings. Government officials are despatched to work among the people, rendering assistance to all who require it. Yet when famine comes, precautions of no mean scale have to be adopted for fear of a rising.

The Hindoo population, as everybody knows, is divided into a number of castes. Roughly speaking, the chief ones are the Brahmin or priestly caste; the Rajputs, the "King's followers" or warrior class, and the agricultural settlers, the servile classes, subdivided into minor divisions, such as Sudras, etc. Then there are over fifty-seven millions following the religion of Mohammed, who seem to be in constant friction with the Hindoos. Serious riots between Mussulmans and Hindoos are frequent in the larger towns. We have a small percentage of Christian converts, subdivided into innumerable creeds, each at war with all the others, and in their turn looked down upon with the utmost contempt by both Hindoos of all castes and Mussulmans, not to speak of the English community.

Last, but not least, there is in India a large number of Eurasians, or half-castes, unfortunates possessing all the evil qualities and none of the good of both the English and native races. In a way, if this is the case, they individually are not altogether to blame for it. It is through no fault of their own. People are hard upon them, almost to the point of cruelty. They are treated little better than vermin by the British; they are ridiculed by the natives; they are excluded from Anglo-Indian society—a small loss, if you like, yet one which they much feel. They are generally refused admittance to local English clubs. No one associates with them; they are outcasts, and the stigma of a fault which was not their own is at every occasion thrown in their faces. These well-educated fellows, as a rule, possess wonderful brain power, joining the acuteness of the Asiatic with the smartness of the European. Hated by their own parents, looked down upon by all, they keep among themselves, forming a distinct class of their own. Unable to raise themselves from the mud, not because they lack ability, but because they are forcibly

kept there, it is no wonder that all the good in them, if ever there was any, has been stamped out, and that they detest the British for the treatment they receive.

One of the worst pests in India, however—one which we have created and which is the chief cause of the ever-growing ill-feeling of the natives against the British—is the swarm of unscrupulous pleaders, or native lawyers. This disreputable class we have introduced in the country, in order that law may be administered according to Western ideas. These fellows, whom we have thoroughly trained into the mysteries of our law, take advantage—naturally enough and with the object of filling their own pockets—of the ignorance of the natives to encourage legal procedure on the slightest pretext. Any one who has visited India knows well enough the mean, quarrelsome nature of the inhabitants, especially in money matters. These lawyers have no difficulty in finding fertile soil wherein to sow the seed of discord and litigation. To a casual observer, this would seem only to affect the parties concerned, but the evil is much further reaching. Like most other Asiatics, the Indian is born in intrigue, lives in it and for it and dies at it. Save the younger generation, which is better educated, the majority of the people are absolutely ignorant of the complicated technicalities that in our Western law are necessary to conduct a case in court. Thus, in a moment of weakness, petty quarrels that could be settled easily by the good advice of an honest friend, are dragged by the pleaders from one court to another indefinitely, until one or both litigants become penniless. But this long, tedious, expensive way of settling quarrels is not to the taste of the Asiatic native. He has always lived in servility, and he likes to have a master whom he honors and can look up to—a master who can tell him straight when he is right or wrong, a man before whose authority he can bow, and who is able to define and give sound judgment on any civil or criminal case without having to appeal to a higher court. Suspicious as the natives are, often with reason, of intrigue and bribes to influence the magistrate, the very existence of courts of appeal is only put down by them as a check to the incompetency and dishonesty of the various magistrates. Thus, with rare exceptions, there are few magistrates in India that, in the eyes of the native masses, command absolute respect and confidence. The most honest and just of them are never trusted by the

natives; and, if the people go to law, it is not with the intention of obtaining justice, but simply to gamble. The serious fact that many of our magistrates are incompetent youths hardly out of their teens, with no experience of the world and an overbearing manner, goes far to shake the confidence of the nation in the respect that the officials of the Queen should not fail to command. We want men like Sir Henry Ramsay, who administered the law in his own patriarchal fashion, was a thorough gentleman, firm, just, courteous and paternal, and who to-day, many years after his death, is still remembered by the natives of Kumaon Province, as a *debta*, a god, "whose like," they add, "alas! we shall never see again in India." Notwithstanding the technical faults which the new class of petty "shop keeper" officials attribute to him, I rather doubt whether there is, or ever will be, in India an official so highly respected and adored. He went by the name of "King of Kumaon," a nominal title which he fully deserved, a title, indeed, different from that applied to his present successor. Sir Henry studied and understood the natives, he enforced his will upon them, he treated them with courtesy, and by so doing gained their confidence. He was their father, their adviser, their comforter, not an unapproachable figurehead, like some of our present officials, whose tactless snobbishness gives a shocking example to the natives, and brings their hatred upon the whole British nation.

There is a belief prevalent among the younger lot of "civil officers" that it is only by slashing the natives with a whip across the face for no plausible reason, by not allowing them to approach, by treating those of high birth like low tramps, by never condescending to shake hands with even the noblest of them, that the prestige of the British Empire can be kept high in the estimation of the population of India. The most common answer one receives when astonishment is shown at such conduct, is: "Well, you see, we have not forgotten the Mutiny of 1857. We must impress the natives that we are the rulers." And they never perceive that the best way to bring about another mutiny is the pursuance of this short-sighted policy. In a country like India where a gentlemanly and courteous manner, more than anything else, appeals to the mind of the people, and where officials are judged by what they do and not by what they think themselves; in a country where the minutest actions of individual Britishers are watched, discussed with an unusual amount of sound sense

and magnified either in exaggerated praise or condemnation; and, moreover, with the astounding rapidity with which the natives can spread and circulate news all over the country, it is a great pity that so much and fast-increasing discontent and actual ill-feeling against the British is created by the inexperience and narrow-mindedness of some of our "civilians." A thoroughly insular but much mistaken notion is imported with these boys in the Civil Service, that every man who is not an Englishman is "a nigger;" and as they seldom take the trouble to study or try to understand the natives over whom they are given so much power, as they seldom or never move among them, they rarely learn to discriminate that even among "niggers" there are men of brains, there are gentlemen whose acquaintance is worthy of being cultivated and even revered. Let me give an instance.

"Get out of my way, you dirty nigger!" shouted one day a certain Deputy Commissioner in the North West Province, to a wealthy and most honorable native, who had approached him, stooping low and with a grand salaam—a gracious custom to express his pleasure at the official's visit to his village. The *chaprassis* who stood by the pompous youth, hearing the angry words of their master, seized the native gentleman and knocked him out of the Sahib's path.

"Why did you do that?" I asked the Deputy Commissioner. "Oh," said he, twisting up the ends of his diminutive, fair moustache, "we have to keep up the prestige of England. That is the only way we can make them feel we are their superiors. That man will have the greatest respect for me now."

It is usually my habit to hear both sides of a story before forming an opinion. Having heard the official, I proceeded to interrogate the native, who, half-ashamed and deeply hurt, stood sulkily a little way off.

He salaamed me, and, much to his astonishment and delight, I salaamed him back and entered into a most instructive and pleasant conversation regarding the country around, the natives, their customs, trade, etc.

"What do you think of Mr. —, the Deputy Commissioner?"

"Oh, Sahib," said the old gentleman, "it is a pity the *Ma-haranee* (Queen) Victoria does not now send to us men of good birth and breeding. We would gladly give our lives for them, a thing we will never do for fellows . . . like that." And,

with an expression of the most absolute contempt, he spat upon the ground to give strength to the expression of his feelings.

"What has he done to you?"

"He thinks, by not returning my salaam and having me thrown back by his *chaprassis*, that he is a *burā Sahib*.* But men of high position are kind to their fellow creatures, whether poor or rich, white or colored. I will tell you. Some years ago, when the Queen's first son (the Prince of Wales) came to India, I waited on the road at Cawnpore to see him. I got near the carriage and I salaamed. The Prince, the highest man in your country, returned my salaam; yet a mere servant of the country, like the Deputy Commissioner, who is fed at our expense, never returns salaam for any one. That shows that he is a man of low breeding. We love and worship the Sahibs that are just and kind, but we cannot appreciate the like of that man." Here another exhortation.

I agreed with the native, remarking that spitting is a bad habit. He said he only did it when he spoke of men that were unclean. I have mentioned this incident, for it depicts the feelings of most natives.

Another source of friction and discontent is the coolie question as applied to travelling officials. It is compulsory for every village to supply a certain number of coolies when requested by the official's *chaprassis*, and also provisions, etc., for which the natives should receive payment. Each coolie is usually entitled to a pay of four annas (four pence) for a march the length of which is established by local regulations and varies from about eight to fifteen miles, according to locality and condition of roads. These coolies are wretched creatures, who live from hand to mouth, and whose miserable existence can but excite the pity of any traveller. Yet I have known an official, who, while furnishing each coolie with a load considerably heavier than they are supposed to carry, illegally cut down their already meagre pay by about one-half. Result of this, abuse of Sahibs in general all along the line, natural comments on what became of the other half of the pay to which they were entitled and which they knew the official received in full from the Government, and disgrace and dishonesty applied to Her Majesty's servants at random. Another frequent occurrence when officials travel is the casual

* A great man; used in the sense of a high officer.

way in which they leave money matters regarding the purchase of provisions for their swarm of followers, to be settled by *moonshees*, *bearers* or *kamsamas*. In many cases, the villagers are made to provide food for all the camp and amounting, for them, to quite a small fortune, and although the official may be under the impression that he is paying for it all, not a penny reaches those who supply the goods, but the money is instead divided among dishonest servants. The villagers have no way of approaching the officials to complain; for, if they do, they are ejected by the very servants who have swindled them of their due. Every time that I have travelled through India, it has been a source of great pain to hear the complaints of the poor villagers against the individual doings of officials; and many a time I have blushed to think the almost incredible fact that my own countrymen can lower themselves to take advantage of poor natives. I can quote even worse. A Deputy Commissioner well known all over the North West Provinces for his dishonesty, intrigue, misconduct and ignorance—yet with all this a *protégé* of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North West Provinces—for purposes best known to himself, tried to compel natives to give false evidence in a certain case. He threatened them with *imprisonment if they spoke the truth*, he forged statements of several witnesses, and having been discovered, caught *flagrante delicto*, was severely reprimanded by the Government, and was removed from the hill station, where he occupied the highest post. Although in disgrace, I am told that he is still in the Civil Service.

Now, I do not believe that there are many who go quite so far as this; but people in England have no idea how much harm even one man of that kind may do in a district of several hundred thousand people. If one points out these facts concerning our officials, it is merely to show that if we continue to pour into India men unfit to govern—men who, like our Intelligence Department in South Africa, mostly through ignorance and self-reliance, grossly misinform the Government—no doubt we will find that sooner or later we will have in India a disagreeable surprise, which will be even less expected, and probably more felt, than our Transvaal trouble. This is not the time to unnecessarily alarm the nation, only it is well that England keep her eyes open, for should we have more disasters in Africa, India, no doubt, would be the first colony to give us trouble. The abject

servility of the natives may deceive the casual and inexperienced observer; but under it is, half-smothered yet ready to flare up again, a flame which the slightest ill-wind might develop into a destructive fire. Much harm is done in that direction by the scurrilous native press of India. These papers are usually edited by pleaders and hot-headed students, their main object of publication being to attack the Government and create a general ill-feeling against the British. Too much freedom is allowed to these sheets, the writers of which are interested instigators of riots and quarrels between religious factions, as well as gross misrepresenters of the policy of Great Britain in her Indian Empire. But one thing above all which England needs must see to—and it has been plainly shown in the unfortunate blunders in South Africa—is that she ought to be careful in the selection of men to whom her interests are entrusted. Ignorance is bliss, no doubt, but when we have to contend with rapidly progressing adversaries such as Russia, we had better not fall again into the fatal blunder of overestimating our power and resources.

The days of placidly relying on our prestige have passed; we have educated the natives; we have spoiled them to a great extent; we have given them a freedom which they neither understand nor appreciate, and they do not thank us for it, no matter what the official reports may say. Were a great conflict to take place between England and the ever-advancing Russia, I much doubt whether we could rely on our Indian subjects to stand *en masse* by us. There are many things that might be said, only let England find out thoroughly how she stands in India before it is too late. A good step was taken in appointing Lord Curzon as Viceroy. A man of his talent, firmness, knowledge and tact is bound to do endless good in India. Even during the short time he has been in office, he has been able to win back to a certain extent the hearts of the natives who were wavering, and with his sound judgment and his fearless temperament, he has already been able to do away with much of the endless and incomprehensible red tape, intrigue and protection that have of late made us so disliked by the natives. "To me," he said in a speech at a *darbar* held lately in Lucknow, "it seems that the times have passed by when the ruler or the deputies of rulers can anywhere live with impunity in the clouds of Olympus. They must descend from the hilltops and visit the haunts of men." That is just what is wanted

in India. Let all the officials grasp the meaning of those words and let them carry them out in practice. Let them remember that whether yellow, or brown, or black, the natives of India are human after all; therefore why not within their compass treat them as human? Certainly I think it is unwise to give them immeasurable freedom in one direction and absurd restrictions in another, such as the sanitary regulations which are no doubt quite in keeping with the requirements of Brighton, Eastbourne or Westgate-on-Sea, but somewhat hard on the nerves of Orientals who have their villages perched on the slopes of the Himalayas. There is at present in India too much done in the line of adapting villages and towns to the standard of the various suburban localities in England, from which the young officials have arrived direct. A little experience, however, ought to teach them that what is good in Brixton or Hampstead Heath is hardly conducive to the happiness of Hindoos or Mohammedans, and is often in conflict with their religious ideas. Much unnecessary friction might easily be avoided. I have always found that with a little common sense and fairness one can easily get great power over the natives, who wish for nothing better than to be well led. Another most exasperating thing for the natives is the constant change in their ideas and methods of living. Each succeeding officer invariably finds that all that his predecessors had done in that direction was all wrong. What the natives are told is to-day the right thing to do, is to-morrow disgraceful, and the next day right again. Conservative and sound enough in their own reasoning as they are, how can they have confidence in us? They are puzzled, they can well see through it all; they conclude that our officials are incapable, nor, indeed, can one blame them for it.

There is, so far, no cause for immediate alarm, yet let England be on her guard. If prepared she will no doubt hold her own, but I repeat again, let her be prepared.

A. HENRY SAVAGE LANDOR.

DISAPPEARING AUTHORS.

BY JUSTIN M'CARTHY.

BEFORE entering on my theme I think it well to say that, when I write of disappearing authors, I do not mean authors of the revolving-light order, whose rays disappear from our sight for a moment, only to shine as brightly as ever in the certain moment of return. There are some authors, and really great authors, too, whose fame seems to be governed by a sort of process of regular action and reaction. The author is cried up during the later years of his successful working time and for a while after his death, and then the reaction sets in. People begin to say that too much has been made of him, a new school arises by whom he is proclaimed to be old-fashioned, and it gets to be the right sort of thing not to admire him or even to talk about him any more; and so, for the time, the author has disappeared. But if there was any real stuff in him the disappearance is only for a time. He outlives the reaction against him, he outlives the school which, for a time, was successful in crying him down, and he comes back to his former fame at the call of a new generation.

Macauley was an author of this order. All the reading world went wild over him during his later years, and then after his death a reaction took place, and those who claimed the right to dictate to public opinion pronounced that Macauley was nothing but well-balanced antithesis and elaborate exaggeration. But already Macauley is coming back, and we find his imitators even among the school of those who but lately were professing their scorn for him. Something of the same kind might be said concerning an author of later date and very different qualities, the author whom we still describe as George Eliot. George Eliot was idolized in her time; she was declared by many critics to be superior to Dickens and Thackeray, to Scott and Fielding. I heard one highly

accomplished woman announce that, having read one of George Eliot's novels, she would never read any other novels, because she did not believe that any other novels could be worth the reading. Later, however, there came, at least in England, a decided reaction against George Eliot, and people who wished to be sure of saying the right thing would shake their heads when her name was mentioned and declare that she had been utterly overrated and that her day was done. In George Eliot's case, too, the reaction soon spent its force, and even young persons now are not afraid to say that they admire "Adam Bede" and "The Mill on the Floss." I am inclined to think that both Tennyson and Browning are passing through the period of reaction also; but in their case, too, the revolving lights, if I may return to my former metaphor, may be expected to turn their full rays upon us soon again.

Such are not the disappearing authors concerning whom I wish to write. My subject has to do with the authors against whom there is no visible reaction, who are not disparaged or underrated by any school of critics, or indeed by criticism of any kind, but who were undoubtedly very popular at one time, and whose popularity is now unmistakably fading. The disappearing authors whom I have in my mind do not, any of them, represent any set school of literature. If they did, their disappearance might be easily explained. It might be said that the public grow tired of the ways, the fashions, the tricks of a school, and are glad to be rid of them once for all. But some of the authors whose disappearance, gradual though it be, I cannot help observing and whose disappearance I personally regret, were not followers of any particular school, had no set mannerisms or fads, and were indeed in their way thoroughly original. Take, for instance, such a man as Charles Kingsley. Kingsley did not attach himself to any school, so far as novel writing was concerned. In such a book as "Alton Locke," he drew directly from the life he saw around him. There was nothing in a school of literature which flourished at or before his time that could have taught him anything about the scenes he had to picture in his romance. But I wonder what proportion of English-speaking novel readers take much interest just now in "Alton Locke." The same question may be asked about any other of his novels. Yet there has been no reaction against Kingsley that I could see. No sets of new critics have gone to work to disparage him and to teach us that we were all wrong when we consented

to admire him. I am afraid there can be no doubt that he is one of the disappearing authors.

What about Anthony Trollope? Was not Anthony Trollope popular, even during the days of Dickens and Thackeray? And who ever preached a reactionary crusade against him? Yet is he not fast disappearing from the attention of our novel readers? Trollope, unlike most successful novelists, was himself made sensible during his later years of a steady decline of his popularity. I heard a well-known London publisher once say that the novelist who had once obtained by any process a complete popular success never could lose it during his life time; that, let him write as carelessly and as badly as he might, his life time could not last long enough to enable him to shake off his public. But the facts of Trollope's literary career show that the declaration of my publisher friend was too sweeping in its terms. For several years before his death, Trollope's prices were steadily falling off. Now, one seldom hears him talked of; one hardly ever hears a citation from him in a newspaper or a magazine.

Charles Reade, too, that strenuous, masculine, masterful novelist, must he not be regarded as one of the disappearing? Probably it may be said that most of Reade's novels were novels with a purpose, novels written to expose some social grievance, or some iniquity of legislation; and that, with the gradual accomplishment of the purpose, the interest in the book necessarily fades, just as the speeches of the political reformer soon cease to be read when once the reform has been accomplished. Still, I should have thought that the artistic workmanship of most of Reade's books was good enough to secure for them a life with the ever-living works of fiction. Moreover, the one of Reade's novels which has usually been accounted his very best—I mean "The Cloister and the Hearth"—has nothing to do with law reform of any kind, and I have lately seen it stated, on what appears to be good authority, that "The Cloister and the Hearth" is the one of Reade's books which would have the poorest chance just now of a large circulation in a cheap form. Besides, we have to remember that most of Dickens's stories are concerned about social or legal reform of some kind; and, although we have got rid of schools like Dotheboys Hall, and no longer allow imprisonment for debt, still the very youngest among us is not likely to class Charles Dickens among disappearing authors.

I am afraid my old countryman, Charles Lever, must be consigned to that vanishing order, although some of us can well recollect the day when the red-covered monthly parts of his stories used to be looked for with almost as keen an interest as the yellow covers of Thackeray or even the green covers of Dickens. Perhaps it may not be altogether unnecessary to explain to an American reader who has not yet passed middle age, or, indeed, for that matter, to some English readers in the same blessed condition as to years, that the novels of Dickens, Thackeray and Lever used to make their appearance in monthly parts, twenty-three parts constituting a story, and the twenty-third containing two instalments issued together in order not to tax too severely the impatient curiosity of the reader. I think the last English novelist who thus appeared in monthly parts was my old friend Shirley Brooks, who belongs, I regret to say, not to the ranks of the disappearing, but of the disappeared. Now, Lever's novels had nothing to do with law reform, or social reform of any kind; they did not depend for their interest on the existence of any particular grievance; they were undoubtedly clever, brilliant and original in their own way; and yet there can be little doubt that they are disappearing from among us. It cannot even be said, with regard to the best known among them, that they tell of lives and people whose ways were not our ways, and that, therefore, we are ceasing to care about them, because, I believe, there are Fox Hunts and Steeple Chases going on at this very day, and I read in the papers that English soldiers and Irish soldiers are being killed together on the far-off battle-field, while I am working at these pages.

I have often read and heard, of late, that certain novels are no longer popular because they are old-fashioned, and I have entangled myself in many futile discussions as to what constitutes, in that disparaging sense, an old-fashioned novel. Is a novel old-fashioned because it describes manners and customs and costumes which are now out of date? If this be so, then, of course, Dickens and Thackeray, to say nothing of poor Walter Scott, are old-fashioned, and "The House of the Seven Gables" has nothing to do with the fashions of to-day, and Jane Eyre is a hopelessly old-fashioned little person, and Romola herself is hardly up to date. Do the censors of the old-fashioned mean to tell us that we ought to read nothing in the shape of a novel unless it occupies itself only with the manners and customs of the year or the week in

which we live? But then, if they do say this, how do they explain the popularity of Dr. Conan Doyle and Mr. Stanley Weyman in their scores of adventures in the far-off days of romance? I have, indeed, argued the point with some critics who maintained that Conan Doyle and Stanley Weyman could not be set down as old-fashioned because, although they sometimes dealt with old-fashioned subjects, they always treated them in a new-fashioned and up-to-date sort of way. But even this way of looking at the matter would only put off for a little the fate of Conan Doyle and Stanley Weyman, because, after a short lapse of time, their very way of treating the subjects will itself seem old-fashioned to a new and a pert generation, and there will be an end of them. I do not think, therefore, that we can account for an author's disappearance merely on the ground that he is growing old-fashioned and that he is not up to date. Nor do I think it can be settled merely by a general declaration that all the really great authors shine for ever, and that only those disappear whose light has lost its power of illumining the human heart and intellect any more. This, of course, if we could all accept it, would be a very satisfactory and comfortable application of the doctrine that proclaims the "survival of the fittest," and there would be no occasion for argument or protest or pity. But I cannot, for myself, quite accept this dogmatic conclusion. There are some of the disappearing authors who have written books which seem to me quite as well entitled to hold a place in what may be called our classic literature, as some of those which we all believe to be firmly enthroned there.

I do not quite know where to look for two short novels, little one-volume stories, which have in them more truth and tenderness, more genuine human feeling, and more faithful local color than are illustrated in Anthony Trollope's "Linda Tressel" and "Nina Balatka." These stories were published anonymously, because Trollope wanted to try whether he could make a success in scenes and atmosphere and a kind of life which he had never touched before; and, in order to give the public a better chance of forming an unprejudiced judgment, he did not put his name to either of them. The stories, however, delighted the critics, and, for the time, delighted the general public. After a while, Trollope acknowledged their authorship, and most of us declared that he had never done better work in his life. But I do not suppose that any one reads these stories now, and the Trollope who still lingers

among us is the Trollope of "Barchester Towers" and "Phineas Finn." Of course, one has to feel much the same kind of wonder when thinking of some of the books that, with their authors, are not merely disappearing, but have absolutely disappeared. There was an effort made in London some few years ago to tempt the public—I mean the English-speaking public—into a readmission of the two Hajji Baba novels into popularity. They had a great run in their day, these two novels, "The Adventures of Hajji Baba of Ispahan" and "Hajji Baba in England," about the time when Captain Marryatt's sea stories were at the height of their celebrity; and I think for genuine humor, broad knowledge of human nature, and a keen appreciation of the Eastern way of looking at things, it would be hard to beat Morier's two stories, which tell how Hajji Baba rose from his humble position in Persia to be the Secretary of the Persian Minister in London. But the attempt lately made to get the newer public to take any interest in Hajji Baba's adventures was, I believe, a total failure.

I wonder how many of my readers could tell me, without consulting a biographical dictionary, who was Mrs. Marsh? Yet Mrs. Marsh was a very popular novelist within my own recollection, and there is a story of hers called "The Admiral's Daughter" which is curiously bold, original and successful in its drawing of character, and rises at its close to a tragic power and pathos which might seem to assure, as well as deserve, an abiding fame. I read the book when I was a young man, and was deeply impressed by it, and at that time, as I have said, the authoress was popular. Only a few years ago, I came by chance on a cheap copy of the volume containing it, "Two Old Men's Tales," of which "The Admiral's Daughter" was the longer and the more important. I read the story over again, and was fully confirmed in the judgment I had formed of it so many years before. I tried to get some of my friends to read it, but was not very successful. Some of them had never heard of it, and did not seem inclined to believe that a book could have great merits and yet never have forced itself on their attention. One man told me that he had read it on my suggestion, but that it did not belong to the modern movement of fiction and it therefore failed to interest him. I pointed out to him that it might distinctly be classed as a problem novel, although it was written before the days when the problem novel had set itself up as an institution, and had been proclaimed as a school.

"Don't you see," I vainly pleaded, "that the whole story turns on the fortunes of three persons, two men and a woman, all three being delightful and excellent persons in themselves, and that the tragedy and the trouble arose from two of the three getting married under the impression that they would keep on in love with each other for ever, and then the third person finding himself in love where he ought not to be, and so on to the fate of all three." I do not myself particularly admire the problem novel; but, as my friend raised objection to the story I favored, on the ground that it was not in the movement of modern fiction, I had a faint hope of conquering his objection by urging that it was as good a problem novel as any other, and that the problem is admitted to be a peculiar growth of modern fiction. Now, I can quite understand how a novel can cease to be popular, and at the same time become classic. The book undergoes a fate not unlike that which occasionally befell some Homeric hero who lost his life on the battlefield and disappeared for ever from the gaze of mortal men, but who was rewarded for his virtue and his valor by being turned into a demi-god and revered as such for evermore.

We know that the modern reader, as we find him in ordinary life, never thinks of reading Fielding, or perhaps even Walter Scott; that he has probably never heard of "Anastasius;" that he has never troubled himself even with an attempt to read Jane Austen's novels, and probably never saw a copy of Mrs. Inchbald's "Simple Story."

But then, it may be said, the authors of these books, if they still concern themselves with the affairs of earth, have the pride of knowing that they are regarded as demi-gods. Even those who never read Fielding, or Miss Austen, or Scott, or Mrs. Inchbald, are quite willing, whenever occasion calls for such an act, to render homage to the merits of these illustrious authors. The ordinary mortal would be rather slow to admit, in the presence of his intellectual superiors, that he knew nothing at all about the merits of the authors whom they agreed to regard as classic, and therefore he mumbles his tribute of respect to the great departed and he goes back to his Marie Corelli and his Guy Boothby. But I confess to a great feeling of regret and a great impulse to remonstrance on account of the fate of the authors who have just missed becoming classic and have in consequence become declassified.

I feel, however, that I have been wandering from the lines of

my original purpose, which was to deal with the authors who are disappearing, and that I am now going out of my way to lament over some of the authors who have actually disappeared. I do not think there is among English-speaking races so great a desire to hurry the departure of the disappearing authors as there is in France.

In the literary France of the present day I am assured, on competent authority, that there is a positive eagerness to "speed the parting guest" in that sense, and an almost virulent impulse to get rid of him once for all, and fill his place with some one new. In the present anxiety for novelty, which prevails, I am told, in France, the next thing that happens, after a man has obtained a settled reputation, is that the critics pronounce him to belong already to the old school, and say that he had better cease to lag superfluous on the stage. There would seem to be three stages in the career of a French literary man, according to this account—first, the striving after a reputation; second, the reputation achieved, and, third, the intimation that he has done his work and that the world wants no more of him. Of course, I do not suppose, for a moment, that this impatience of the older school and tumultuous welcome of any newer school applies to the really great minds in any department of letters. Balzac and Victor Hugo, I presume, do not grow old. The growing intolerance of authors who belong to an older epoch, asserts itself, I take it for granted, only against the class I have been venturing to describe as disappearing authors.

But among English-speaking readers and writers, public and critics alike, there is, I think, no such desire to be rid of our old friends, and to give their places to newer comers.

English and American writers have not, in general, the same ardent desire to form themselves into schools that the observant world has noticed among the literary men and women of France. Now and then, of course, such a fashion does arise, and the consequent phenomena present themselves, as in the case of the æsthetic school in England and the Boston school in America. Whenever a school of literature is ostentatiously set up it is certain, almost in the nature of things, that there will sooner or later be a revolt against the authority of that school, and men with ideas which profess to be newer will claim a right to take the place of their elders. In this way, perhaps, it comes to pass that in France there

is so marked an anxiety to let the seniors feel that the time has come for them to take a back seat, and allow the new men to come to the front.

But I do not think that such is the feeling with which in England and America we regard our disappearing authors. We do not want them to disappear, we are not always conscious that they are disappearing, we might perhaps entreat some of them to stay with us if we knew that they were taking their departure; but we do not notice their going at the time, and after a while we become conscious that they are gone.

I have been writing of novelists; but I think my observations will apply equally to authors in any department of literary art. Everybody must have observed, or at any rate may have observed, that there are authors of histories, authors of essays, authors of plays, authors of scientific books, who were very popular some time ago, and are now beginning to fade out of the world's notice without giving any indication that they are likely, by any reaction of enthusiasm in the public mind, to be exalted into the Elysian fields of the classics.

A poet who was not very long ago popular in England, and whom I knew personally as well as in his poems, complained in verse that we are apt to "honor overmuch the mighty dead, and dispirit living merit, heaping scorn upon its head." I certainly do not think that such a charge could be fairly sustained against England or America, and I think the present tendency in France is decidedly the other way—to honor too little the mighty dead, and to make a great deal too much fuss about living merit. I have sometimes wondered how a disappearing author, if he were conscious that he had outlived his popularity, would accept the recognition of the fact.

Would he take it in the spirit of an ancient philosopher—at least as the ancient philosophers are declared by their admiring disciples to have taken discouraging decrees of fate?

Would it be comfort enough for him to know that he had had his day?

I suppose it would depend in very large measure on the temperament rather than upon the philosophy of the disappearing author. I should think Anthony Trollope would have taken it composedly enough, and that Charles Reade, if he could have been convinced by any power of evidence that such a fate was awaiting

him, would have stormed against the destinies and anathematized the upcoming generation which was to permit of his disappearance. There are two consoling reflections for those who are **disposed**, as I am, to muse in melancholy fashion over the disappearing author. The first is that, in most cases, the author thus doomed, may not have the least suspicion that he is disappearing, and the second is that, in the rare cases where he has such a suspicion, he may get it firmly into his mind that he is only disappearing from mortal sight to become a demi-god, that he is only **vanishing** from the classes to become a classic.

JUSTIN MCCARTHY.

ARE HOMOGENEOUS DIVORCE LAWS IN ALL THE STATES DESIRABLE?

BY ELIZABETH CADY STANTON.

THERE has been much discussion of late in regard to the necessity for an entire revision of the laws on divorce. For this purpose the State proposes a committee of learned judges, the Church another of distinguished bishops, to frame a national law which shall be endorsed by both Church and State. Though women are as deeply interested as men in this question, there is no suggestion that women shall be represented on either committee. Hence the importance of some expressions of their opinions before any changes are made. As judges and bishops are proverbially conservative, their tendency would be to make the laws in the free States more restrictive than they now are, and thus render it more difficult for wives to escape from unhappy marriages.

The States which have liberal divorce laws are to women what Canada was to the slaves before Emancipation. The applicants for divorce are chiefly women, as Naquet's bill, which passed the Chamber of Deputies of France a few years ago, abundantly proves. In the first year there were three thousand applications, the greater number being from women.

Unhappy husbands have many ways of mitigating their miseries which are not open to wives, who are financial dependents and burdened with children. Husbands can leave the country and invest their property in foreign lands. Laws affect only those who respect and obey them. Laws made to restrain unprincipled men fall with crushing weight on women. A young woman with property of her own can now easily free herself from an unworthy husband by spending a year in a free State, and in due time she can marry again.

Because an inexperienced girl has made a mistake, partly, in many cases, through the bad counsel of her advisers, shall she be

denied the right to marry again? We can trace the icy fingers of the Canon law in all our most sacred relations. Through the evil influences of that law, the Church holds the key to the situation, and is determined to keep it. At the recent Triennial Episcopal Convention held in Washington, D. C., bishops, with closed doors, discussed the questions of marriage and divorce *ad libitum*, a large majority of the bishops being in favor of the most restrictive canons; and, though an auxiliary convention was held at the same time, composed of 1,500 women, members of the Episcopal Church, they had no part in the discussion, covering a dozen or more canon laws.

A recent writer on this subject says:

"There is no doubt that the sentiment in the Episcopal Church, at least among the clergy, is strongly in favor of the Church setting its face firmly against divorce. An evidence of this is the circulation of a petition to the convention requesting that it adopt some stringent rule for this purpose, which has already received the signatures of about two thousand of the clergy. The proposition to adopt a stringent canon received the undivided support of the High Church ministers, and finds many supporters in the Low Church."

The question of marriage and divorce, and the attitude the Church should take toward divorced persons who wish to marry again, has been up before many General Conventions. The attitude of the Episcopal Church has always been strongly against divorce, and particularly against the marriage of divorced persons. The Catholic Church takes a still narrower ground, positively declining to recognize such an institution as divorce.

As early as the year 1009, it was enacted by the Church authorities of England that a Christian should never marry a divorced woman. Down to 1857, it was necessary that a private act of Parliament should be passed in order that a divorce could be obtained. In 1857, the State took action looking toward the granting of divorces by the courts without the interposition of Parliament, but this action has not been sanctioned by the Church of England. Hence has arisen a peculiar state of affairs in England, which has led to considerable confusion. The Church forbids the marriage of either party, except of the innocent parties in cases where the cause is adultery. But as the State permits the marriage of divorced parties, the ministers of the Church of England were put in an awkward position. As ministers of the Church, they were forbidden to marry these persons, but as the Church is allied

to the State, and to a certain extent subject to it, a number of them believed it their civil duty to perform such marriages, and they performed them in violation of the canonical law. The agitation over this question has attracted a great deal of attention during the last few years, and is looked upon as being one of the most powerful causes which may lead to the disestablishment of the Church of England.

Marriage should be regarded as a civil contract, entirely under the jurisdiction of the State. The less latitude the Church has in our temporal affairs, the better.

Lord Brougham says :

"Before women can have any justice by the laws of England, there must be a total reconstruction of the whole marriage system; for any attempt to amend it would prove useless. The great charter in establishing the supremacy of law over prerogative, provided only for justice between man and man; for women nothing was left but common law, accumulations and modifications of original Gothic and Roman heathenism, which no amount of filtration through ecclesiastical courts could change into Christian laws. They are declared unworthy of a Christian people by great jurists; still, they remain unchanged."

There is a demand just now for an amendment to the United States Constitution that shall make the laws of marriage and divorce the same in all the States of the Union. As the suggestion comes uniformly from those who consider the present divorce laws too liberal, we may infer that the proposed national law is to place the whole question on the narrowest basis, rendering null and void the laws that have been passed in a broader spirit, according to the needs and experiences of certain sections of the sovereign people. And here let us bear in mind that the widest possible law would not make divorce obligatory on any one, while a restricted law, on the contrary, would compel many, who married, perhaps, under more liberal laws, to remain in uncongenial relations.

As we are still in the experimental stage on this question, we are not qualified to make a law that would work satisfactorily over so vast an area as our boundaries now embrace. I see no evidence in what has been published on this question, of late, by statesmen, ecclesiasts, lawyers and judges, that any of them have thought sufficiently on the subject to prepare a well-digested code, or a comprehensive amendment to the National Constitution. Some view marriage as a civil contract, though not governed by the

laws of other contracts; some view it as a religious ordinance—a sacrament; some think it a relation to be regulated by the State, others by the Church, and still others think it should be left wholly to the individual. With this divergence of opinion among our leading minds, it is quite evident that we are not prepared for a national law.

Local self-government more readily permits of experiments on mooted questions, which are the outcome of the needs and convictions of the community. The smaller the area over which legislation extends, the more pliable are the laws. By leaving the States free to experiment in their local affairs we can judge of the working of different laws under varying circumstances, and thus learn their comparative merits. The progress education has made in America is due to the fact that we have left our system of public instruction in the hands of local authorities. How different would be the solution of the great educational question of manual labor in the schools, if the matter had to be settled at Washington!

From these considerations, our wisest course seems to be to leave these questions wholly to the civil rather than to the canon law, to the jurisdiction of the several States rather than to the nation.

As many of our leading ecclesiastics and statesmen are discussing this question, it is surprising that women, who are equally happy or miserable in these relations, manifest so little interest in the pending proposition, and especially as it is not to their interest to have an amendment to the national Constitution establishing a uniform law. In making any contract, the parties are supposed to have an equal knowledge of the situation, and an equal voice in the agreement. This has never been the case with the contract of marriage. Women are, and always have been, totally ignorant of the provisions of the canon and civil laws, which men have made and administered, and then, to impress woman's religious nature with the sacredness of this one-sided contract, they claim that all these heterogeneous relations called marriage are made by God, appealing to that passage of Scripture, "What God hath joined together, let no man put asunder."

Now, let me substitute the natural laws for God. When two beings contract, the State has the right to ask the question, Are the parties of proper age, and have they sufficient judgment to make so important a contract? And the State should have the

power to dissolve the contract if any incongruities arise, or any deception has been practiced, just as it has the power to cancel the purchase of a horse, if he is found to be blind in one eye, balks when he should go, or has a beautiful false tail, skillfully adjusted, which was the chief attraction to the purchaser.

You must remember that the reading of the marriage service does not signify that God hath joined the couple together. That is not so. Only those marriages that are harmonious, where the parties are really companions for each other, are in the highest sense, made by God. But what shall we say of that large class of men and women who marry for wealth, position, mere sensual gratification, without any real attraction or religious sense of loyalty toward one another. You might as well talk of the same code of regulations for honest, law-abiding citizens, and for criminals in our State prisons, as for these two classes. The former are a law to themselves; they need no iron chains to hold them together. The other class having no respect for law whatever, will defy all constitutional provisions. The time has come when the logic of facts is more conclusive than the deductions of theology.

It is a principle of the common law of England that marriage is a civil contract, and the same law has been acknowledged by statutes in several of our American States; and in the absence of expressed statute to the contrary, the common law of England is deemed the common law of our country.

Questions involved in marriage and divorce should be, in the churches, matters of doctrinal teaching and discipline only; and, after having discussed for centuries the question as to what the Bible teaches concerning divorce, without arriving at any settled conclusion, they should agree somewhat among themselves before they attempt to dictate State legislation on the subject. It simplifies this question to eliminate the pretensions of the Church and the Bible as to its regulation. As the Bible sanctions divorce and polygamy, in the practice of the chosen people, and is full of contradictions, and the canon law has been pliable in the hands of ecclesiastics, enforced or set aside at the behests of kings and nobles, it would simplify the discussion to confine it wholly to the civil law, regarding divorce as a State question.

ELIZABETH CADY STANTON.

“DAVID HARUM:” A REVIEW.

BY JOHN OLIVER HOBBS.

IN the course of a conversation with regard to the complete interest and sympathy felt by all Americans for the novel “David Harum,” it was said that no book, no play, no poem, could be written in England, by any existing or conceivable author, which in subject, sentiment and style would attract the allegiance of every class. A welcome subject, for instance, might be treated with such vulgar intention, it might betray such insincerity, or such ignoble lack of restraint in its very workmanship, that all educated minds would find it degraded. Again, sentiments of universally admitted force and beauty might be expressed in language so meagre, so brutal, or so tame, that, but for an accident or a miracle, they would not obtain a hearing. On the other hand, some unfamiliar or forbidding theme, though handled with that knowledge and faithfulness given only by the supreme masters, would reach a few only and be utterly rejected by the common run.

So far as great art is concerned, this last rule—for it is a rule—would hold good in any civilized community. Many productions of genius are neither amusing nor at first sight attractive, nor immediately delightful—and least of all to the impatient, innumerable majority who have nothing themselves to bring toward the understanding of unusual things. Talent is winning, gracious, flattering and companionable; genius is commanding, moody, irritable, irritating, often detested, always feared.

It may be that Cardinal Newman in one hymn, “Lead, Kindly Light,” and Charles Dickens in “David Copperfield,” most nearly accomplished a feat which has now become impossible to other English literary powers of the first rank. They reached the heart, as it is called, of the nation, and they reached it with lines, in the one case, of the utmost grace and purity, and by a book, in the

other case, which showed its author at his highest. Each man of gifts nowadays in England has his own particular following or *clientèle*; it may well be a very large one—thirty, forty, fifty thousand strong, and the like. He gets a "party" which is animated, probably against his will, by a political spirit. Admirers of A. cannot hear one word of praise concerning B.; any tolerance, any excuse, one might say, for B. makes the gorge rise in every throat of A.'s devoted band. X., of a newer school, stands apart with his agent. A. and B. themselves may be close friends, they may even admire the audacities of X.—this has nothing to do with their loyal admirers. It is held that A. can only be what he is by proving, somehow, that B. is absurdly overrated; B.'s position, in both worlds and even in intermediate space, depended, one would indeed suppose, on the utter annihilation of A. X. is sometimes treated to patronage by the malcontents among the A.'s and B.'s—the situation resolves itself into a good-natured civil war.* Nobody minds what is said; nobody means, probably, half of the hard things, or all the soft things, he may say under the stress of polemical emotion. A pleasant, wholesome animosity is kept up: no writer—worth his salt—could, or would, object to this sensible, human state of things. It must work out ultimately—to use the consoling expression of St. Ignatius—"for the greater glory of God."

We are considering now, however, not glory, but the taste of a huge multitude, and it would not be presumptuous to say, well remembering the magnificent ability of certain English authors of the present day, that not one could create a character which would win the whole English population as David Harum has won the American public. The reason is plain. With so many class distinctions, a national figure is out of the question. A national hero—yes; but a man for "winterin' and summerin' with"—no. Social equality and independence of thought, in spite of all abortive attempts to introduce the manners and traditions of feudal Europe, are in the very air of the United States. One could not find an American man or woman of the true stock who had not known intimately, or who did not count among his or her ancestors, connections, relatives, a David Harum. The type, no.

* As an example of this curious partisanship, the reader has only to be reminded of the illiterate abuse heaped, in early days, upon the work of Robert Browning by those who imagined they best exhibited their intellectual capacity for appreciating Lord Tennyson, in these crude discourtesies toward one of the greatest minds of this century.

doubt, is getting old: becoming more and more "removed" from the younger generation. In the course of the next twenty years it may become so changed as to seem extinct, but it is a national figure—certainly the most original, probably the purest in blood. And the spirit of Harum is the undying spirit—no matter how much modified it may eventually become by refinement, travel and foreign influence—of the American people. Individuals may change, but the point of view remains unalterable.

Now, there is no Englishman who could be, by any showing, everybody's cousin, or, for that matter, everybody's friend. Tommy Atkins at the present moment is monopolizing—and most properly—the public attention, yet he never strikes any two "sets" in precisely the same light. The Pauline sympathy which can make one "all things to all men" is not an English gift; it is left out of the educational training. Where the English can understand quickly, their kindness is unsurpassable, but where a new view, an uncongenial opinion, or an odd manner makes the least strain upon their ordinary habits of thought, they are apt to be impatient, even harsh. And the harshness lasts until their constitutional love of fair play is actually appealed to. Then one may expect justice. But justice is still not sympathy. Thus John Bull himself is an outsider everywhere. The quest of John Bull would be in no place so hopeless as in the British Isles. He is mentioned, he is drawn; words are put into his mouth by witty caricaturists, but the voice is the voice of a party, not a race, and John's sentiments are those of the most popular statesman of the week. A novel, therefore, about that unknowable abstract would prove a bewildering bore. People would ask each other: "What does it mean?" and they would complain of the chief character's inconsistency. The unparalleled truth and satire of Thackeray were not, and never will be, popular in the widest sense. He described a large class—too dull to appreciate him—for a comparatively small class who could recognize his brilliant fidelity in portraiture. He has the admiration of all Europe and America; he is understood by a fraction, relatively, of his own countrymen.

The novel, "David Harum," is no example at all of literary skill, regarded as skill. It is the manly, straightforward, conversational style of narrative which we find in reminiscences or biographies by politicians, soldiers, diplomatists and professional men generally. Effects are neither aimed at nor made; technique,

and the art which hides it, have no part in this eminently unpretending, very able book. Why, then, it might be asked, is it not artistic? There is no worse error going than the supposition that, because a story is moving, or vivid, or interesting, it has the further rare quality of inspired workmanship. The mere pathos of real life as told by the police court reporter will bring tears to one's eyes; the chatter round a dinner table is certainly more interesting to most people than Dante; many will sob over melodramas and sit unmoved, outwardly, through "King Lear." A factor in "David Harum's" success lies much in the popular grace that it leaves nothing to the imagination; this high uncommon faculty is not displayed by the author nor exacted from the reader. It is as a letter from a friend who has escaped the self-criticism, and therefore reserve, which is the inevitable result of the artist's daily portion—the severe constant discipline of eye, heart and brain. Harum himself is not the solitary life-like figure of the book. We have his sister, Polly Bixbee, John Lenox, his manager, the young American girl, Mary Blake, highly intelligent, noble in impulse, a little cold from the English standpoint. Each of these deserves a careful study, because they are honestly drawn, without mannerism, exaggeration, prejudice, or the pedantry of a professional "psychologist."

David Harum is a country banker, the ninth son of a small farmer; the air of his home circle "wa'n't cal'klated to raise heroes in; and when the old man wa'n't cuffin' David's ears, he was lickin' him with a rawhide or a strap." He had but four years' schooling; at six "he had to work reg'lar on the farm for anything he had strength fer, and more too;" at fourteen he ran away from home forever. At this point his career becomes characteristically mysterious; we hear that at seventeen he was helping a lock-tender on the Erie Canal, and "trading," privately, in the "hoss bus'nis," by which he purchased a "towing concern." This he sold at a profit when he was one-and-twenty, "quitted the canal fer good and went inter other things"—not specified.

When we first meet him he is one of the richest men in Homeville, Freeland County, living with his elderly stepsister, the widow of "about as poor a shack as ever was turned out." David and Mrs. Bixbee are not troubled by social aspirations; and let us hasten to mention, as one among many proofs of the author's sound observation, that they never have them. David may wonder,

with a certain grim humor, why his neighbors, of equally humble origin, who "belong to the Episcopal Church," regard him as one of the "village folk;" but his own plan of life never changes, his own self-respect is never sunk in any abject pretensions to "aristocratic beginnings." He wears one "suit" all day, he has several "helpings" of turkey at Christmas, he "don't cut no figger at all," and he does not "set up fer shapes." In spite of his garrulity and his tendency to indulge in "meemoores," it is not until we reach the concluding chapters that we learn he had married a widow who kept a boarding house. His own account of the courtship of the "good-lookin' woman, some older 'n he was," of his "beavin' her round quite consid'able," of her later causeless jealousies (she was jealous of "wooden Injun women outside cigar stores"), their unhappiness, her tragical, grotesque death, and the death, later, of their son, must be counted as the most pathetic and powerful passage in the book.

But where David is typical of the whole American race is in his love of a joke, even at his own expense, in his keen appreciation of an enemy's shrewdness or good points, in his generosity ("I'm alwus willin' to let the other feller make a little"), and in his delight in somewhat stagey romance. In illustration of this, we need only refer to the episode of the Widow Cullom and her "morgidge"—which, beginning with a cruel threat, is worked up into an astonishing kindness—as an accumulation of "intrist" on an old silver dime once given, by the late "Billy P. Cullom," to David when he was a friendless truant. In a novel of the commonplace type, this particular incident would have been condemned as artificial, with more than a touch, too, of the old-fashioned Sunday-school tract to make it acutely unreal. But here we are shown the very effect of the tract on a mind naturally chivalrous, following the best ideal, on the whole, it has been able to find. The actual trick is, beyond doubt, rough—even humiliating. A more enlightened courtesy would shrink from the idea of calling an aged, impoverished, heart-broken, ill-fed, ill-clad gentlewoman through the snows on a Christmas morning to be badgered, harrowed, threatened, and finally rewarded (above all, in the presence of a witness) merely for the gratification of a personal joy in happy surprises. Yet we feel—as the widow herself felt—that David's soul was kind. When she says, between her tears, "David, I can't thank ye 's I ought ter—I don't know how—but I'll pray

for ye night and mornin' 's long 's I got breath. . . . Dave Harum, you ought to 'a' be'n a king!" we know that she is in earnest. And when Harum replies, with a grin, "Wa'al, I don't know much about the kingin' bus'nis. I guess a cloth cap 'n' a hoss whip 's more 'n my line," we recognize the bluff self-knowledge and good sense of a genuine republican.

The religious sentiment in Dave comes out only in his liking for Moody and Sankey's hymns. He owns that, in his time, he has been "more or less a very reg'lar church-goer," but sermons seem long to him, and he "reckons it's a sight easier to have faith on meat and potatoes 'n it is on cornmeal mush." He agrees with the Widow Cullom, who confesses: "I haven't be'n to meetin' fer a long spell 'cause I hain't had no fit clo'es, but I remember most of the preachin' I've set under either dwelt on the wrath to come, or else on the Lord's doin' all things well, and providin'."

Harum's early philosophy in the matter of a runaway visit to a circus gives the key of his human wisdom. "I had the all-fireddest lickin' ahead of me 't I'd ever got, but I had grit enough to allow 't was wuth it, an' off I put. . . . 'T was the only enjoy'ble day I'd ever had in my hull life, and I hain't never fergot it. I got over the lickin' in course of time, but I've be'n enjoyin' that cirkis for forty years. . . . 'S I look back, it ain't the money 't I've spent fer the good times 't I've had, 't I regret, it's the good times 't I might 's well 've had, and didn't." One feels that there was little pleasure or even ordinary happiness, as we define it now, in Harum's experience.

"Mis' Perkins is ailin' some," he remarks to his sister.

"They do say," put in Mrs. Bixbee, "thet Mis' Perkins don't hev much of a time."

"*Guess she hez all the time the' is,*" answered David.

John Knox Lenox, the son of a New York stock broker, a young man educated at Andover and Princeton, a student in Germany and France, makes an excellent and true contrast to old Harum. Lenox is self-reliant, reserved, faithful in love if not especially passionate in his expression of it. With much delicacy we are led to see the gradual wearing away of his health and spirits under the silent anguish of an unhappy attachment. He utters no complaint; he will not even admit to himself that he is "in love;" but the "nabobs" of Homeville vainly "rope him in" for their "social evenings." All in vain do Miss Clara and Miss Juliet Verjoos

praise his fine voice and find him "a welcome addition" to their set. Once David finds the courage to ask him:

"Did you ever think of gettin' married?"

"Well," said Lenox, with a little hesitation, "*I don't remember that I ever did, very definitely.*"

"Somebody 't you knew 'fore you come up here?" said David, jumping at a conclusion.

"Yes," said John.

"Wouldn't she have ye?" queried David, who stuck at no trifles when in pursuit of information.

John laughed. "I never asked her," he replied. . . .

"An' didn't you never get no note, nor message, nor word of any kind?" asked David.

"No."

"Nor hain't ever heard a word about her f'm that day to this?"

"No."

"Nor hain't ever tried to?"

"No," said John. "What would have been the use?"

"Prov'dence seemed to 've made a pretty clean sweep in your matters that spring, didn't it?"

"It seemed so to me," said John.

Nothing more was said for a minute or two. At last Harum said:

"You be'n here most five years."

"Very nearly," John replied.

"Be'n pretty contented, on the hull?"

"*I have grown to be,*" said John. . . . "I remember my former life as if it were something I have read in a book. There was a John Lenox in it, but he seems to me sometimes more like a character in a story than myself."

"An' yet," said David, turning toward him, "If you was to go back to it, this last five years 'd git to be that way to ye a good deal quicker. Don't ye think so?"

"*Perhaps so,*" replied John. "Yes," he added, thoughtfully, "*it is possible.*"

Volumes of careful analysis could not convey so well as this short dialogue the power of silent endurance coupled with caution which is so remarkable a trait in the American character. Scotch metaphysicians have taught no greater fear of self-deception than the Americans instinctively possess. They have a passion for

square-dealing with their own consciences; no country is so free from the cant enveloping this, that and the other sentiment; each man thinks for himself, and endeavors, as a first duty, to understand himself. This frankness is brought out with peculiar force in the final scenes between Lenox and Mary Blake. They have not met for six years, nor corresponded, nor heard one word of each other. He supposes (owing to a mistake in the passenger-list) that she has married in the interval. They are on deck together, bound for Europe.

“Do you remember the last night I was at your house?” he asked.

“Yes,” she said.

“Did you know that night what was in my heart to say to you?”

There was no answer.

“May I tell you now?” . . .

“Do you think you ought, or that I ought to listen to you?”

“I know,” he exclaimed, “you think that as a married woman you should not listen, and that, knowing you to be one, I should not speak. If it were to ask anything of you, I would not. It is for the first and last time. . . . I have carried the words that were on my lips that night all these years in my heart. I know I can have no response—I expect none; but it cannot harm you if I tell you that I loved you then, and have——”

She put up her hand in protest.

“You must not go on, Mr. Lenox,” she said, “and I must leave you.”

“Are you very angry with me?” . . .

“Not so much as I ought to be,” she answered; “*but you yourself have given the reason why you should not say such things, and why I should not listen, and why I ought to say good-night.*”

“Ah yes,” he said, bitterly, “of course you are right, and this is to be the end.”

She turned and looked at him for a moment.

“You will never again speak to me as you have to-night, will you?” she asked.

“I should not have said what I did, had I not thought I should never see you again after to-morrow,” said John, “and I am not likely to do that, am I?”

“*If I could be sure,*” she said, hesitatingly, and as if to herself.

“Well,” said John, eagerly. . . .

"We expect to stay in Algiers about two months," she said.

Mary Blake is admirably drawn, but she is not instantaneously sympathetic. She seems rather hard, and perhaps a little priggish in the earlier chapters. Her conversations with Lenox are severe even in their lightest moments, yet we feel, nevertheless, that she is handsome, devoted, womanly, and without nonsense. We are not surprised at John's constancy; we have to share his admiration for her cheerfulness, her vigorous will, and her lack of vanity. She is a good friend "right along the line;" she resolves to keep "sentimentality on his part strictly in abeyance;" she is, by no means, thirsty for admiration, nor eager to marry, nor anxious to "have an influence" over some man.

"I fancy," said John, "that there has seldom been a great career in which some woman's help or influence was not a factor."

"Even granting that," she replied, "the career was the man's, after all, and the fame and visible reward. A man will sometimes say, 'I owe all my success to my wife, or my mother, or sister,' but he never really believes it, nor, in fact, does any one else. . . . Woman's influence is rather an overrated thing. Women like to feel that they have it, and men, in matters which they hold lightly, flatter them by yielding."

One could forgive a good deal of apparent coldness in a girl so modest, so sensible, and so free from petty feelings. When we are told that she and John were happy in their marriage, we believe it—which is more than we can say of most heroes and heroines of fiction.

It would be pleasant to quote the many quaint and pregnant sayings of David. One, at least, ought to be immortal: "A reasonable amount of fleas is good for a dog; they keep him f'm broodin' on bein' a dog." The book, however, owes its worth less to its humor, which is excellent, than to its humanity. There lies its real strength. Other works have been equally, and even more, entertaining; the novels of that very distinguished artist and man of letters, Mr. W. D. Howells, belong already to the literature of both worlds, and contain portraits of incomparable force. Bret Harte and Mr. Cable have drawn pictures and people which will live while romance can stir the hearts, or poetry lift up the souls of men. It may not be claimed that the author of "David Harum" takes his place beside writers of such high rank. But his book reflects a brave, independent, manly spirit, without fear, without

affectation, honorable, just, grave, but not melancholy, seeing the laughter of things, yet never descending to that coarse levity which passes all too easily, in these days, for courage. And the American nation, quick to appreciate good mettle, have not missed the vision. Thus it happens that a story, with little plot, with no "purple patches," with no sensational appeals to the senses, to opinions, or to political feeling, has won, from the most highly cultivated minds down to the homeliest of village bodies, an affection which is as much stronger than mere popularity as a wheat field is better than the paper rose garlands of a street festival.

JOHN OLIVER HOBBS.

THE END OF "AMERICANISM" IN FRANCE.

BY P. L. PÉCHENARD, RECTOR OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF
PARIS.

THE question is put us from beyond the Atlantic as to what has become of Americanism in France, and we are requested to furnish detailed information about the state of the question, and above all, about the state of mind of our people on this subject.

Were we to yield only to an idle desire of appearing in print, and did we wish merely to feed the curiosity of American readers, it would be easy for us to fill out for their gratification a certain number of pages, and to display before their eyes the picture of the commotion excited among us by this question for the space of an entire year.

But if we take counsel chiefly of our love of peace and of our desire to advance the cause of religion, nothing appears to us preferable to silence, and nothing, in fact, answers better to the actual condition of minds in France. For after a period of lively discussion, calm was very quickly restored, and it seems now as though nothing could hereafter disturb it.

It is then chiefly this happy frame of mind of our fellow-countrymen that we are anxious to bear witness to, and which we should here wish to bring out into relief. For this fact once ascertained, it will become evident that any attempt hazarded with a view to prolonging the discussion would be superfluous and ill-timed, and would not find so much as an echo.

Only later on, when passions have cooled, and distance allows things to be arranged again with a proper regard to perspective, will it be possible to tell with certainty the history of this ferment of opinions and doctrines known under the name of "Americanism," and to appreciate it at its proper value. For although it has

lived but a short time and has traversed our atmosphere like an aërolith, Americanism has had its history.

After a long period of incubation, during which it was silently taking shape in America and consisted in particular and isolated facts much more than in general theories, it passed over into Europe and burst forth suddenly into view upon the appearance of the French translation of the "Life of Father Hecker." It appeared then as a complete system, where were found all jumbled together opinions respecting dogma, discipline, Christian and religious life, and democratic and social doctrines. Its tendencies and its assertions filled Christian souls with trouble, upsetting as they did their ideas and habits, and at the same time awakened the attention and solicitude of the natural guardians of faith and morals.

These opinions and doctrines were advanced as new, and as representing a step forward beyond the past and satisfying a need of modern times. Yet they were not as new as we were asked to believe; they were rather repeated from past ages. For as early as the sixteenth century, St. Ignatius, in his "Spiritual Exercises," had pointed them out to his religious brethren under the heading, "*Regulæ ad sentiendum vere in Ecclesia militante*"—rules for judging correctly in matter of doctrine in the Church militant; and it is scarcely two years since the venerable Archbishop of Paris in turn pointed them out to his clergy assembled for their pastoral retreat, by commenting upon this passage of the "Spiritual Exercises."

While minds grew heated, some siding with, others against, these opinions, the Pope, with a promptness that belied all calculations, suddenly raised his voice and spoke as Supreme Pontiff. With admirable wisdom he disengaged the elements of this nebula, pointed out to the world the new danger and censured what was deserving of censure. Once he had spoken, as the threatening cyclone falls back upon itself by the action of a cannon-shot fired in mid-ocean, so, beneath the influence of his word, the system of Americanism fell shattered, the waves remained agitated for a moment beneath the débris, and almost immediately calm was restored and silence ensued.

That before the decision of the Holy See there were in the course of this conflict of ideas ill-directed blows on one side and on the other; that personal views and even passion found their

satisfaction simultaneously with an unselfish concern for truth and virtue; that sometimes a general thesis has been made out of what in the mind of its author was intended only as a statement of a particular fact, all this seems to us unquestionable. But why should we be surprised at this? It is so easy for human passion to transform itself into zeal for the law! And besides, when the objects at stake in a contest are the truths of religion, the authority of the Church and the practices on which the whole Christian life depends, it is easy to conceive how this zeal, however pure and sincere, becomes excited little by little, and runs the risk of appearing very much like sharpness. Were not the Apostles animated by a sincere zeal when they asked Jesus to cause fire from heaven to fall upon those who refused to listen to Him?

From a distance, one might imagine that the errors of Americanism had made great conquests in France. As a fact, however, they did no such thing. The partisans of Americanism—priests, simple faithful, writers, journalists, whether more or less conscious of the work they were doing, or only the mouthpiece and instrument of more powerful agents, who inspired them from afar—were very few in number.

Without wishing at all to belittle the danger to which these new doctrines exposed us—a danger which was real and serious, seeing that the Sovereign Pontiff judged it necessary to denounce it before the world and to condemn its source—we must be able to recognize, to the honor of the Church of France, that these errors, perhaps for want of time, reached only an imperceptible minority of the members of her clergy!

Now that we are congratulating ourselves on having escaped this danger, and now that we have a true notion of Americanism, thanks to the luminous exposition of its tenets as given by Leo XIII. in his letter to Cardinal Gibbons, it will be allowed us to call attention to the fact that even while stirring up for a moment the passions of men, as all noisy novelties are apt to do when they are as yet but ill-defined, this system clashed in reality with a state of mind, the fruit of a serious moral formation, which was bound to earn for it a vigorous resistance on the part of the French clergy, and that, if it had a momentary, apparent success, this was due mainly to the confusion it had created between its religious errors and certain democratic and social tendencies.

Taken, in fact, in its *ensemble*, Americanism implied a certain

bending in the matter of dogmatic affirmation, a separatist tendency with respect to the central ecclesiastical authority, a claim to a larger individual independence, and a minimizing in the practices of the Christian, and especially the religious, life.

Now, from all these points of view it could not but have encountered, on the part of the French clergy almost universally, a firm and resolute opposition, resulting from their long education in opposite views.

First of all, to place one's self at the purely dogmatical point of view, the French clergy, without exception, is so attached to pure orthodoxy that there is no one among its members who thinks of attenuating or obscuring any of our dogmas.

Even the motive which might practically have led certain American priests to resort to a certain minimizing or a certain prudent silence does not exist in France. For if some members of the American clergy have considered that they might act with this sort of prudence, it was with a view to bringing back more easily into the bosom of the Church dissenting brethren with whom they are engaged in controversy. Now in France this need does not exist, as Catholics and Protestants live side by side without discussing doctrine, and there is for the time being no appreciable effort at proselytism on one side or on the other.

This tendency systematically to abandon dogma, to the advantage, so-called, of morality, to do away with the customs and duties separating the various creeds, to welcome everybody without distinction and without question as to his faith, in order to put an end to polemics and to unite all men as brethren on the ground of peace—this tendency may be discovered also in France, but without any reference to Americanism. Evidence, in fact, may be found of it in the rationalistic schools, which interest themselves in the philosophical movement and endeavor to accredit the theory of evolution even in the matter of religion. For such as are adepts in this theory, the Catholic faith itself obeys the law of evolution; it is one of the necessary but provisional stages in the march and development of the religious sentiment athwart the history of the human race. Gladly do they pass the sponge over all dogmatic formulas, and invite all men to meet upon the ground of religious sentiment and morality. But this minimizing or suppression of dogma, entirely rationalistic in its kind, has nothing to do with the doctrines styled Americanism. And

besides, how small is the number of the champions of this theory!

If we take for our point of view that of obedience to ecclesiastical authority, chiefly the authority of the Holy See, Americanism had still less chance of success among us.

Whence, in fact, could this loosening of the bonds of subordination proceed? From a need of individual independence and a separatist tendency? But every one knows that it is precisely the contrary tendency, which for more than half a century has been the characteristic attitude of the Church of France with respect to the Holy See.

In the last century, Gallicanism had lessened the authority of the Pope in favor of the authority of the King; parliamentary Jansenism arrayed itself against the teachings and directions emanating from Rome. The Church of France in consequence sank beneath the sway of these fatal influences into a particularism that separated her little by little from the centre of unity and led her on to her ruin.

But in our age she opened her eyes, recognized her danger, and faced about completely. After casting forth the poison of Jansenism and Gallicanism, she turned resolutely toward Rome, and by a liturgical and disciplinary revolution without precedent she re-established herself in the closest communion with the centre of Catholicity, welcomed with affection the definition of the Vatican Council on the subject of papal infallibility, and has ever since gone to seek through her bishops, her priests and her faithful, counsel and guidance from the Roman Church and from her august head.

How can we suppose that a clergy with such dispositions of close union and filial obedience toward the authority of the Roman Church, the mother and mistress of all the other Churches, could have seriously welcomed new tendencies whose spirit was altogether opposed to their own? Could they, without open contradiction, have stretched forth their hand to those who claimed a less degree of dependence with respect to the teaching authority of the Church, and a wider liberty of ideas and of individual action?

As regards the rules of Christian life and the forms of religious life, particularly the vows of religion, the French clergy felt the need of innovation quite as little, and were not consequently disposed to favor the new ideas. If, in fact, they proclaim, with all the great mystics, that the Holy Ghost exercises a direct action

upon souls, and that He "breatheth where He listeth," they recognize no less the need of guarding against the illusions of illuminism, and of submitting one's individual inspirations to the control of lawful authority. They are thoroughly convinced that "Christ does not change," that there has been no discovery of new and easier means of sanctification, and that we must always come back to the narrow way preached by the Gospel, to detachment from riches, renunciation of self, the mortification of the flesh and the spirit, the practice of humility and obedience and the daily carrying of one's cross.

Apart from these excellent dispositions, which the French clergy inherit from their education and which might have enabled them to cope successfully with the new danger, they had moreover the good fortune of being wisely warned.

Upon the appearance of the French translation of the "Life of Father Hecker," it was speedily denounced to the public as the embodiment of the new ideas. Ardent polemical writers unmasked its errors one by one, and then combining them into a whole presented them in a series of striking pictures. With much learning they reduced to a system the numerous errors of detail, sown here and there by the partisans of Americanism, in their writings or their discourses, and of which the public was scarcely in a position to detect the common bond. It may be that they also introduced certain opinions or practices more or less foreign to the matter in dispute, and thus prepared a subterfuge for those who later refused to be responsible for all the doctrines imputed to them, and which it was attempted to comprise in their system.

There are only two aspects under which the system of Americanism might more easily have insinuated itself, and which rendered it more attractive and more dangerous for the young French clergy. The first aspect is that of its democratic and social ideas, which are every day gaining ground, and which produce a great effect on the minds of certain young priests, because they seem to them likely to give more ready satisfaction to their ardent love for the lowly and the little ones. The second is the glitter of that natural activity and that personal initiative which French writers have chosen to applaud in the Anglo-Saxon races, and which it is now the fashion among us to wish to copy, as though the French had hitherto been deficient in these qualities.

If this twofold point of view has nothing in common with

religious theories, it was calculated, nevertheless, to serve them as a vehicle and passport, thanks especially to the obscurity which, at the outset and for most people, hovered over the system as a whole. But these same motives, which served as a recommendation in the eyes of some, helped to discredit it and to render it still more suspicious in the eyes of others; animated as they were by opposite sentiments on political and social questions, they only conceived a more lively aversion for it.

Once the disputes began, they soon became embittered. The agitation was all the more lively that it was felt that grave interests were involved in a question the full bearing of which was not yet well understood. Some writers, who had been able to grasp beforehand the import of the movement of ideas originating in America, pointed out to the public little by little the bold and dangerous propositions which they extracted from the "Life of Father Hecker," from the Introduction and Preface accompanying the French translation, and from the writings or discourses of the advocates of Americanism. But it was some time before the general public was alive to the situation in which it found itself amid this chaos where political and social matters were mixed up with questions of religion.

The French clergy therefore followed with lively attention the controversy waged beneath their eyes by a small number of writers. But it must be remarked that no important personage from among their ranks advocated the novelties, and that none espoused the cause of their upholders; so much so that undoubtedly within a few years not a name will survive of those who were involved in them.

The French episcopacy uniformly maintained the greatest reserve, listening, observing, but without committing themselves.

While noting the various errors comprised under the name of Americanism, according as they were pointed out to them, and while at the same time rejecting them, the French clergy appear to have seen in them only the expression of the views of a small group of Americans, bishops, priests and simple faithful, not of the American Church in its entirety; and they refused to admit the hypothesis, put forward by several, of a separatist plot or of a plan of campaign knowingly inaugurated and conducted against the Catholic Church. They awaited with respect and confidence the decision of the supreme head of the Church.

That decision came, even more promptly than was expected. On the 23d of January, 1899, His Holiness Leo XIII. wrote to His Eminence Cardinal Gibbons the letter beginning "*Testem benevolentiae*," in which he exposed with great precision the different elements that might be included under the term Americanism. As far as by the word Americanism were understood the peculiar characteristics of the American people, their political constitution, laws and customs, the Pope declared that he had no reason for rejecting it. As far as by the word was to be understood a series of doctrines prejudicial to the integrity and maintenance of dogma, to the obedience due to the authority of the Church, to the sacredness of its discipline, and to the rules of Christian and religious life, he reprobated and condemned it with firmness, a firmness, however, tempered with sweetness and benevolence toward the people and Church of America, and he confirmed all the ancient rules of Christian piety.

As soon as the echo of this word of deliverance was heard, the French clergy uttered a cry of relief and of joy. Disturbed for a moment by those conflicts of contradictory opinions which are the consequence of a liberty to think and to write as one pleases, they welcomed with transports of joy the papal decision which had just dispelled all uncertainties and pointed out to each one the traditional path. It was marvellous how speedily calm was restored and silence ensued.

We could rejoice all the more securely, because with us the condemnation struck at no great reputation. The handful of priests who had been the agents and supporters of the condemned system were most eager to submit with absolute docility of mind and heart. The one who had most deeply compromised himself by the publication of the French translation of the "Life of Father Hecker," and by the Introduction which preceded it, the Abbé Klein, had allowed himself to be drawn into this course by an exaggerated admiration for the qualities of the Anglo-Saxon races. But once the Pope had spoken, he, as became a priest of sincere piety, made in the presence of His Eminence Cardinal Richard, Archbishop of Paris, an act of such filial and complete submission as to deserve the congratulations of Cardinal Rampolla.

After the pontifical utterance, the French episcopacy continued to maintain the same prudent reserve which they had previously observed. A few bishops only wrote brief letters to

their clergy in order to communicate the document to them. Let us mention only Cardinal Richard, Archbishop of Paris, who expressed himself with as much moderation as propriety;* Mgr. Fuzet, Bishop of Beauvais, who, in a few pages, succeeded in showing clearly the poison that lay hid in the new doctrines, and the greatness of the service that the Pope had just rendered to the world by condemning them, and by pointing out to the faithful the safe path;† Mgr. Isoard, Bishop of Annecy, who, from Rome itself, where he happened to be, was the first of all to write to His Holiness to thank him for his letter to Cardinal Gibbons.

In a short while, the literature on the subject of Americanism, which had so violently attracted attention during the year 1898, entirely disappeared from the papers and reviews. Some rather acrimonious explanations were still exchanged between *l'Univers* and *la Vérité*, which passed from doctrines to persons, endeavoring to scrutinize the motives that had made them speak and act. Canon Delassus, of Cambrai, published a volume entitled "Americanism and the Anti-Christian Conspiracy," which had been composed before the appearance of the pontifical letter, and which perhaps the circumstances no longer called for.‡ M. l'Abbé Periès, formerly Professor at the Catholic University of Washington, contributed two articles to the *Revue Canonique* on the "Dissolution of Partnership of the Advocates of Americanism" (*La Liquidation du Consortium Américaniste*),§ in which he attempts to determine the share of responsibility that falls to each in this matter. The *Études Religieuses* of the Jesuit Fathers also published two articles on the question. But the public, enlightened by the pontifical letter, appeared to evince great weariness, and turned their eyes away.

A single incident, however, revived their attention for an instant and awakened some echo from without.

Great was the general surprise when, after the papal condemnation, the chief American supporters of these novelties were seen vying with each other in their reprobation of them and declaring with the greatest nonchalance that they had never had anything in common with them. But then what were the meaning and the purport of the pontifical decision? Could it be that it had

* Letter to the parish priests of the diocese of Paris, March 17, 1899.

† Letter to the clergy of the diocese of Beauvais, February 28, 1899.

‡ Lille, *Librairie St. Augustin*, 12mo, XXXIX., 450 pp.

§ *Revue Canonique*, Avril et Mai, 1899, Lamuelles et Poisson, 14, rue de Beaune.

struck at phantoms and condemned *imaginary* errors, maintained by no one? That is what the people asked themselves.

A writer of great talent, editor of *La Quinzaine*, M. George Fonsegrive, undertook to solve the problem. He endeavored to show that the Americans had not really professed the errors as condemned by the Holy See; and that the most conspicuous among their prelates could write in all truthfulness, not "that they renounced their errors, but that they had never professed those which the Pope condemned."

There occur at times, he wrote, general misunderstandings of certain formulas taken by their author in one sense, and taken by the public in another. This happens and must happen above all when formulas are transplanted from one country to another, from one civilization to another, when they are enunciated by men of certain habits of mind, and when they are repeated by and to other men of totally different habits of mind.

"Now it will be easy to demonstrate that such is the case with the formulas of certain American writers or orators when they have been interpreted and understood by European intelligences. And I don't mean to say that that is the fault of the French translators or commentators; I believe rather that it is the fault of the readers themselves, a fault quite involuntary, and even unavoidable. . . . And the best proof that this is indeed the case is that so long as the books and discourses from which the Americanism that has been condemned was taken had not yet crossed the ocean, so long as they remained in the country that had given them birth, understood in their proper sense, they were accepted by everybody."*

The misfortune is that the eminent writer, in his desire to explain and to excuse, was led into error both in regard to the material facts and in regard to his philosophical theory, and, without meaning it, did the Holy See the cruel injustice of implying that it had condemned doctrinal errors which, in reality, had no existence, since they were undeserving of condemnation in their original authors, and in the translations were only an involuntarily incorrect rendering of the thought of another.

The attempted explanation was too unsatisfactory to pass unperceived, and too false not to be criticised. Scarcely had the number of *La Quinzaine* containing it appeared, when the Bishop of

* *La Quinzaine*, 1st April, 1899, "*Américanisme et Américains*."

Nancy, Mgr. Tweinaz, always on the watch like a careful sentinel, denounced to his clergy the article on "Americanism and Americans," and condemned it, in virtue of his episcopal authority, as erroneous and injurious to the Holy See. This condemnation caused a stir, but it was the death-stroke of Americanism in France—for since that time it has never lifted up its head.

Were the errors condemned by the Holy Father really professed in those terms in America? The fact is incontestable, and many bishops of that country have had no hesitation in recognizing it publicly.

We have first of all the testimony of Mgr. Corrigan, Archbishop of New York. Writing to the Holy Father on the 10th of March, 1899, in his own name and in that of the bishops of his province, he admires the wisdom with which His Holiness has succeeded in embodying in one document the *manifold and fallacious errors* which are put forward as sound Catholic doctrine under the specious title of Americanism. *

Recently, too, the bishops of the province of Milwaukee, in an address to the Sovereign Pontiff, recognized in the most explicit manner that the errors condemned by the Holy See have really been professed in America, and expressed their disapproval of the subterfuges to which certain Catholics resort in order to evade the condemnation.

"We cannot," they said, "suppress the grief and indignation we experience at the sight of the number of our fellow-countrymen, chiefly Catholic journalists, who declare indeed that they disapprove and reject the errors in question, yet who, after the manner of the Jansenists, are not afraid to reiterate them over and over again. Were we to take their word for it, scarcely any Americans have shared these errors, and the Holy See, misled by false reports, has only been beating the air, so to speak, and chasing a phantom.

"How far this way of acting does injustice to the infallible See, and how far it is at variance with a true spirit of faith, there is no sincere Catholic who does not perceive. It is certain that these erroneous opinions have been advanced among us by word of mouth and by the pen—not always, it is true, with the same degree of frankness—and on the other hand, whosoever is a true Catholic at heart cannot deny that the teaching power of the Church em-

* *Revue de Droit Canonique*, No. de Mai, 1899, p. 418.

braces not only all revealed truths, but also all such facts as bear upon dogma, and that it belongs to her to pass judgment by an infallible sentence upon the objective sense of any doctrine whatever, as well as upon the reality of the errors."*

After the condemnation passed by Monseigneur the Bishop of Nancy upon the explanations of M. Fonsegrive, no one any longer undertook the defense of Americanism, whether in the French press or in the reviews, and at present there is no talk of it. The errors have been abandoned and the very term "Americanism" is in ill-repute.

In its political and economic significance, as an expression of the ways of action of the peoples of America, Americanism may have its partisans and its supporters; the letter of Leo XIII. has here no fault to find. But in its religious, dogmatic, disciplinary and mystic sense it is dead, beyond all hope of resurrection.

We have had, moreover, beneath our eyes quite recently a very characteristic sign of the actual disposition of French Catholics. Mgr. Ireland came to France last May to preach the panegyric on Joan of Arc in the Cathedral of Orleans. He afterward spent a long time at Paris, and traversed France in every direction; he appeared and spoke at a number of public meetings. His person, his activity, his zeal have been applauded; but on these occasions the question of Americanism was nowhere discussed. The illustrious prelate understood himself that he must say no more about it. The disavowal, moreover, which he had made of it in his letter to the Pope dispensed him from any explanation.

In conclusion, this passing storm, grave and menacing as it was, will at least have served to render manifest, in the sight of the whole world, the superiority of Catholicism, as a social religion, over all other Christian communities, and the providential importance of the part entrusted by our Lord Jesus Christ to His Vicar upon earth.

The storm was beginning to rumble, the waves were rising, a portion of the crew were filled with alarm. The sovereign Pontiff, like Jesus of old upon the Lake of Gennesaret, arose; he stretched forth his hand, he spoke one word and immediately there was a great calm. Rome has spoken, the case is settled, and, as we firmly hope, the error is at an end.

"Let us bless God," said Monseigneur the Bishop of Beauvais,

* Extract from the *Univers*, July 25, 1899.

with good reason, "for having bestowed on us the grace of being born in a religious society with so strong an organization as the Catholic Church.

"As soon as a doctrine prejudicial to the integrity of the faith or to the rules of discipline makes its appearance anywhere, the successor of Peter interferes with authority to decide. He condemns what should be condemned, puts aside what should be put aside, and the Church continues her progress, always sure, always majestic, across shoals, and in the face of storms, without ever turning aside from the way of salvation.

"It is the action of the Roman Pontiff that maintains our beautiful and beneficent religious unity; it is that action which does not suffer it to be broken to pieces nor to be split up into a thousand opposite sects, as happens in the case of other societies which do not recognize the primacy of the Pope. Let us proclaim it aloud."*

P. L. PÉCHENARD.

* Mgr. Fuzet, Bishop of Beauvais, letter to his diocesan clergy, 28 February 1899.

THE PRESIDENT'S WAR POWER AND AN IMPERIAL TARIFF.

BY THE HON. PERRY BELMONT, FORMERLY UNITED STATES MINISTER
TO SPAIN.

THE result of the exercise by the President of what is known as "the war power" is daily becoming more evident. Heretofore "the United States" has embraced all the States, the District of Columbia and the Territories. The words "throughout the United States," which are used in the Constitution, have long been taken to mean "within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." That phrase is employed in the Thirteenth Amendment, but there is now an effort to regard "the United States" as confined to our forty-five States, and, although existing statutes have extended the Constitution over all our organized territories, there is a persistent attempt to place our newly acquired islands outside the United States and the "Union." If we can make a safe inference from the writings of their leading professors, even our universities and colleges are taking sides in the controversy; Harvard, Cornell and the University of Pennsylvania insisting that the Constitution protects only States, and that Congress is as supreme over our new islands as is the British Parliament over its colonies and dependencies, while Yale and Columbia take a different view.

The United States had outlying possessions described as territories when the treaty of peace was concluded with England. The Constitution provided for them. Later other outlying possessions came by cession from France, Spain, Mexico and Russia. All have been embraced by the words "United States." In 1853, the Supreme Court declared that "after the ratification of the Mexican treaty, California became a part of the United States." If the decision does not in principle

cover our new islands, it must be because of the difference in the language of the two treaties of 1848 and 1898. The Mexican treaty declared: "The Mexicans who, in the territories aforesaid, shall not preserve the character of citizens of the Mexican Republic conformably with what is stipulated in the preceding article shall be incorporated into the Union of the United States, and be admitted at the proper time (to be judged of by the Congress of the United States) to the enjoyment of all rights of citizens of the United States, according to the principles of the Constitution." The recent Spanish treaty declared "the civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." Has the recent treaty made the precedents set by the Supreme Court inapplicable to Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands? The words "United States" have, as used in the Constitution, two meanings: one, the political corporation, the body politic, the Government now at Washington; the other refers to the States, the District of Columbia and the Territories. Since the inauguration of President McKinley there has been an enormous extension of Executive power. What went on during a previous administration while President and Congress were contending over the question of recognizing the insurgent Cubans as belligerents, **may** have accustomed the country to look on the Executive as a chief source of power in the Spanish question then impending.

During all the annoyances of the last half-century endured by the United States from Spain in Cuba, England has headed or united with the concert of Europe to resist our intervention. England warned President Grant against doing exactly what President McKinley did twenty-three years afterward. In 1898 England changed her policy, and when armed hostility against Spain began, the prerogative of our Executive known as the "war power" was brought into use which, as the President said in his recent annual message, only Congress can end, even after peace has returned. These were his words: "Until Congress shall have made known the formal expression of its will, I shall use the authority vested in me by the Constitution and the statutes to uphold the sovereignty of the United States in those distant islands, as in all other places where our flag rightfully floats." That adroit language has put on Congress the responsibility of continuing the supremacy of military rule.

The President is always, in peace or in war, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, but when war exists there flows into his hands new powers and duties. Over what is embraced within a military occupation, or a conquest, the President is supreme. During the War of 1812 serious questions of "war power" on land did not arise. But during the Mexican War they did. Mr. Marcy, Secretary of War, ordered Colonel Kearny to occupy California and to organize a temporary military government. The treaty of peace with Mexico was proclaimed in 1848. Congress in 1849 extended the revenue laws over California. Owing to delays created by the slavery question, California was never organized as a Territory, and was finally admitted into the Union as a "State" in 1850. California had been governed under the President's "war power," but the *de facto* government then existing was continued till Congress legislated, and Marcy declared that the President will, "of course, exercise no powers inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law for all the States and Territories of our Union." The exercise of such "war power" was then so novel that the Whig majority in the House bombarded the Executive with resolutions inquiring where the President obtained constitutional authority to govern California.

Excepting by the declaration of war against Spain, the voting of men and money therefor, the ratification of the treaty and appropriating twenty millions of dollars, Congress has had little to do with initiating and executing the policy which has resulted in the new problems referred to by the President in his Annual Message. The record of the written debates between the plenipotentiaries of the negotiating nations makes it indisputable that when the President executed the August Protocol, his judgment was in suspense regarding the future of the Philippines. There was ample time to convene the Senate, but the treaty was concluded by the President on his official responsibility. That was his prerogative right. He could not make a treaty binding on the United States till two-thirds of the Senators had consented to it, but it would not, under all the circumstances, have been easy for the Senate to reject the treaty with Spain which had been already signed. When it had been ratified the House was morally bound to vote an appropriation of the needed twenty millions. It may fairly be said that by sending to Paris as his plenipotentiaries three ex-

perienced, able and trusted Senators, the President took the Senate into the negotiations. His plenipotentiaries must, in theory, obey him, even when they are Senators, and in voting as Senators on ratification, it is improbable that they would repudiate their own work as negotiators.

Those who now examine the official papers emanating from the President, to which publicity has been given, and which assign reasons for the Protocol of August, 1898, and for the treaty itself, must be impressed by the sterility of information therein contained. The Constitution has not been violated, but how omnipotent has been the Executive during nearly two years!

II.

The natives of the ceded islands were transferred to the United States without their consent, and a phrase in the Declaration of Independence is used as a ground for criticism of the treaty. Some modern treaties have contained stipulations for obtaining such consent; but, in general, the engagements in treaties of transfer have only gone so far as to give the inhabitants time and right to decide to remain in the ceded country, or to depart therefrom. Such engagements existed in the cessions to the United States by France, Spain and Mexico. The free white inhabitants remaining were to be citizens of the United States, and the territories ceded were to be, in due time, admitted into the Union as States, according to the principles of the Constitution. That was deemed a compliance with the requirement regarding "consent of the governed." The recent treaty with Spain was negotiated on a different basis, compelled probably by the conditions existing in the Philippine Archipelago. The Spanish plenipotentiaries insisted on a stipulation that the natives should, like those born in Spain, have a right to choose their nationality. In the twenty-first Protocol they appear as saying:

"The American Commission refuses to acknowledge the right of the inhabitants of the countries ceded or relinquished by Spain to choose the citizenship with which, up to the present, they have been clothed, and nevertheless this right of choosing, which is one of the most sacred rights of human beings, has been constantly respected since the day on which man was first emancipated from serfdom. This sacred right has been respected in treaties of territorial cession concluded in modern times."

To that the American plenipotentiaries replied:

"An analysis of this article will show that Spanish subjects, natives

of Spain, are allowed a year's time in which, by the simple process of stating in a court of record their intention so to do, they may preserve their allegiance to Spain. Such persons have the fullest right to dispose of their property or remove from the territory, or, remaining, to continue to be Spanish subjects, or elect the nationality of the new territory. As to natives, their status and civil rights are left to Congress, which will enact laws to govern the ceded territory. This is no more than the assertion of the right of the governing power to control these important relations under the new Government. The Congress of a country which never has enacted laws to oppress or abridge the rights of residents within its domain, and whose laws permit the largest liberty consistent with the preservation of order and the protection of property, may safely be trusted not to depart from its well-settled practice in dealing with the inhabitants of these islands. It is true that the Spanish Commissioners propose an article on the subject of nationality supplementing the one offered by them as to nationality of Spanish subjects, which provides that all inhabitants of the ceded territory other than Spanish subjects shall have the right to choose the Spanish nationality within one year after the exchange of ratification of the treaty. This would permit all the uncivilized tribes which have not come under the jurisdiction of Spain, as well as foreign residents of the islands, to elect to create for themselves a nationality other than the one in control of territory, while enjoying the benefits and protection of the laws of the local sovereignty. This would create an anomalous condition of affairs leading to complications and discord important to avoid."

There is still a valid reason why Congress should execute the treaty in a way to give the natives the rights of "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," the treaty definitely excluding the exercise of the President's "war powers" in the determination of those civil rights. Halleck, in the chapter of his *International Law* on "The Rights of Complete Conquest," points the way. He says that the rule of public law with respect to the allegiance of the inhabitants of a conquered territory is no longer to be interpreted as absolutely unconditional, acquired by conquest or transfer, and handed over by treaty, as a thing assignable by contract and without the consent of the subject. If the inhabitants of the ceded territory choose to leave it on its transfer, they have, in general, the right to do so. He then quotes from a decision of Chief Justice Marshall:

"On the transfer of territory the relations of its inhabitants and the former sovereign are dissolved. The same act which transfers their country transfers the allegiance of *those who remain in it.*"

"This rule," Halleck says, "is the most just, reasonable and convenient which could be adopted. It is reasonable on the part of the conqueror who is entitled to know who become his subjects

and who prefer to continue aliens; it is very convenient for those who wish to become the subjects of the new State; and it is not unjust toward those who determine not to become its subjects. According to this rule, *domicile*, as understood and defined in public law, determines the question of transfer of allegiance, or rather is the rule of evidence by which that question is to be decided."

III.

Under the Constitution, "no money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law, and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money must be published from time to time." All money received by tax gatherers, or collectors of customs, must, in time of peace, be paid into the Treasury of the United States, and can only be expended by an appropriation by Congress, to be examined and certified by the proper accounting and auditing officers of the Treasury. The power to modify tariff laws was committed to Congress.

The danger of pressure by importers and tax payers upon the Executive was deemed too great to permit any discretion to be lodged there. Since April 11, 1899, and for some time before that, the power to levy duties on merchandise imported into our new islands, and internal taxes therein, has been exercised by the War Department, and the rates of those import duties and taxes varied to suit the pleasure of the Executive. Executive orders under the "war power" to that effect have been made applicable in Cuba, in Puerto Rico and in the Philippine Islands. The following is a sample:

"War Department, Washington.

"July 13th, 1898.

"The following Order of the President is published for the information and guidance of all concerned:

"Executive Mansion, July 12th, 1898.

"By virtue of the authority vested in me as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States of America, I do hereby order and direct that upon the occupation and possession of any ports and places in the Philippine Islands by the forces of the United States, the following tariff of duties and taxes to be levied and collected as a military contribution, and regulations for the administration thereof shall take effect and be in force in the ports and places so occupied. Questions arising under said tariff and regulations shall be decided by the General in Command of the United States forces in those islands.

"Necessary and authorized expenses for the administration of said

tariff and regulations shall be paid from the collections thereunder. Accurate accounts of collections and expenditures shall be kept and rendered to the Secretary of War.

(Signed)

"William McKinley.

"Upon the occupation of any ports, or places, in the Philippine Islands by the forces of the United States the foregoing order will be proclaimed and enforced.

(Signed)

"R. A. Alger, Secretary of War."

The Republican leaders are restive under the obligations imposed by the Constitution regarding duties to be levied in the ports of the United States on the American Continent upon imports from our new islands. Those who negotiated and ratified the treaty with Spain should have considered that. There is a way by which those who dread the effect upon certain voters of conceding free trade between the before-mentioned ports can perhaps avoid the anticipated political consequences to themselves. They might promote a suit which should carry the question to the Supreme Court for a prompt judgment. Unless the precedents in previous cases should be set aside, the result must be that absolute free trade has existed since April 11, 1899, and that such free trade cannot be prevented by Congress unless our new islands shall again become foreign territory, which is inadmissible.

IV.

There have been suggested these three ways of Congressional dealing with Puerto Rico and the Philippines:

First. A concession to the natives of powers of self-government and home rule, with independence more or less qualified under Congressional supervision.

Second. Ruling the islands as colonies in the way Great Britain rules her dependency, India, and her Crown colonies, on the theory of an unlimited power in Congress to govern them under the recent treaty as a peculiar estate outside the Constitution and the Union.

Third. Assimilation of the new islands to the conditions of New Mexico, for example, and governing them as our territories are now governed.

The first plan is sternly condemned by the President in his late Annual Message. He has not distinctly commended any other plan, but what he said plainly indicated his preference for a continuance of his "war power"—"belligerent right"—as he describes it.

The second plan is the favorite of Republican leaders.

While the President is reticent, his present Secretary of War, appointed on account of his learning and wisdom in matters of Constitutional law, has, in his recent Annual Report, spoken definitely, clearly and concisely. The following is what he said:

"I assume, for I do not think that it can be successfully disputed, that (1) all acquisition of territory under this treaty was the exercise of a power which belonged to the United States, because it was a nation, and for that reason was endowed with the powers essential to national life, and (2) that the United States has all the powers in respect of the territory which it has thus acquired, and the inhabitants of that territory, which any nation in the world has in respect of territory which it has acquired; that (3) as between the people of the ceded islands and the United States the former are subject to the complete sovereignty of the latter, controlled by no legal limitations except those which may be found in the treaty of cession; that (4) the people of the islands have no right to have them treated as States, (5) or to have them treated as territories previously held by the United States have been treated, or (6) to assert a *legal* right under the provisions of the Constitution which was established for the people of the United States themselves, and to meet the conditions existing upon this continent, or to assert against the United States any legal right whatever not found in the treaty.

"(7) The people of the ceded islands have acquired a *moral* right to be treated by the United States in accordance with the underlying principles of justice and freedom, which we have declared in our Constitution, and which are the essential safeguards of every individual against the powers of government, not because those provisions were enacted for them, but because they are essential limitations inherent in the very existence of the American Government. To illustrate: (8) The people of Puerto Rico have not the right to demand that duties should be uniform as between Puerto Rico and the United States, because the provision of the Constitution prescribing uniformity of duties throughout the United States was not made for them, (9) but was a provision of expediency, solely adapted to the conditions existing in the United States upon the continent of North America; (10) but the people of Puerto Rico are entitled to demand that they shall not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, that private property shall not be taken for public use without compensation, that no law shall be passed impairing the obligation of contracts, etc., because our nation has declared these to be rights belonging to all men. (11) Observance of them is a part of the nature of our government. (12) It is impossible that there should be any delegation of power by the people of the United States to any legislative, executive, or judicial officer, which should carry the right to violate these rules toward any one anywhere; and there is an implied contract on the part of the people of the United States with every man who voluntarily submits himself or is submitted to our dominion that they shall be observed as between our government and him, and that in the exercise of the power conferred by the Constitution upon Congress, 'to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting

the territory or other property belonging to the United States,' Congress will hold itself bound by those limitations which arise from the law of its own existence."

For convenience the foregoing has been divided by numerals.

In the debate over the purchase and government of Louisiana, every question of constitutional law was considered that has been presented by the acquisition of our new islands. Democrats argued that Federalists played upon words when they endeavored to discriminate between the *inherent* powers of a "nation" of States united, and the Government at Washington created by the Constitution.

A quarter of a century after the chaos of opinions over such arguments, the Supreme Court, by the luminous pen of Marshall, brought order out of disorder. He said of the inhabitants of Florida:

"They do not share in the government till Florida shall become a State. In the meantime, Florida continues to be a territory of the United States governed by virtue of that clause in the Constitution which empowers Congress '*to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.*' Perhaps the powers governing a territory belonging to the United States which has not, by becoming a State, acquired the means of self-government, may result necessarily from the fact that it is not within the jurisdiction of any particular State, and is within the power and jurisdiction of the United States. The right to govern may be the inevitable consequence of the right to acquire territory. Whichever may be the source whence the power is derived, the possession of it is unquestioned."

As to Secretary Root's first proposition, it is not to be denied that our treaty-making power could and did acquire our new islands, but that treaty-making power had the needed authority therefor, not because the United States constitute a "nation," but because it was imparted by the second article of the Constitution.

Of thesecond proposition, it is clear that the Government at Washington is sovereign and independent in its domestic as well as its foreign affairs, with absolute and exclusive authority within its own territory, which embraces the right to make such fundamental law and such statutes as it pleases, but the pending question is whether or not our existing Constitution restrains Congress in the execution of the last clause of the ninth article of the Paris Treaty.

The third proposition recognizes that question. As sovereignty is the power to govern, the people of the ceded islands are, by the treaty, under the sovereignty of the United States. Its ninth

article stipulates that the civil rights and political status of the natives thereof shall be determined by Congress, but that stipulation has not ousted all control by the Constitution over Congress when making its determination.

The fourth may be agreed to, and as to the fifth, the natives under the treaty have no right to demand anything except that Congress "determine" their civil rights and political status, but the voters of the United States may insist that the new islands shall be treated by Congress as other territories of the United States, including those ceded by France, Spain and Mexico, have been treated.

As to the sixth, the preamble of the Constitution declares it to be established "for ourselves and our posterity." It makes no mention of conditions existing on this continent, excepting that it had been framed "for the United States of America." The last clause of the sixth proposition takes us around in a circle to the old question of the power of a treaty to modify the fundamental law of the existence of our Government.

Up to this point the Secretary of War has contended that our Constitution does not extend over the natives of the new islands, and they cannot appeal to it, but in the seventh proposition he concedes they can appeal to it on the ground of morals. How and why in regard to moral rights if not legal rights? Could the Supreme Court pronounce unconstitutional a determination by Congress of the civil rights and political status of the natives which would violate their moral rights?

The eighth and ninth proposition affirm that the first clause of the eighth section of the First Article of the Constitution is only to be enforced "upon the Continent of North America," and therefore a higher or lower rate of duties on similar imports can be collected in the ports of Puerto Rico and the Philippines than in the port of New York, although the Constitution declares that "all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States."

The eighth and ninth propositions also raise the inquiry whether or not the Constitution compels absolute free trade between our new islands and our ports on the North American Continent, and at its threshold stands the now well-known Supreme Court case of *Loughborough vs. Blake*, declaring that "our territories are a part of our society in a state of infancy, looking for-

ward to a complete equality as soon as a state of manhood is obtained." The question involved in that case was the meaning of the phrase "throughout the United States," and these were Marshall's words:

"The eighth section of the first article gives to Congress the 'power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises' for the purposes thereafter mentioned. This grant is general without limitation as to place. It consequently extends to all places over which the Government extends. If this could be doubted, the doubt is removed by the subsequent words, which modify the grant. These words are: 'But all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.' It will not be contended that the modification of the power extends to places to which the power itself does not extend. The power then to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises may be exercised, and must be exercised, throughout the United States. Does this term designate the whole or any particular portion of the American empire? Certainly this question can admit of but one answer. It is the name given to our great Republic, which is composed of States and Territories. The District of Columbia or the territory west of the Missouri is not less within the United States than Maryland or Pennsylvania; and it is not less necessary, on the principles of our Constitution, that uniformity in the imposition of imposts, duties and excises should be observed in the one than the other. Since, then, the power to lay and collect taxes, which include direct taxes, is obviously coextensive with the power to lay and collect duties, imposts and excises, and since the latter extends throughout the United States, it follows that the power to impose direct taxes also extends throughout the United States."

That is a clear judicial precedent, and later there was an executive precedent which should now appeal with great force to the War Department. The Whigs in Congress, during and after the Mexican War, annoyed the Polk Administration with numberless inquiries respecting its power to tax imports into California and to lay taxes in New Mexico after peace with Mexico had been proclaimed in July, 1848. Robert J. Walker was then at the head of the Treasury Department, and he informed the collectors of customs that, by the treaty of peace with Mexico, "the Constitution of the United States is extended over" California, and customs duties there applied according to the rates of the tariff law of 1846.

At that time, an illustrious New Yorker was at the head of the War Department who was, like its present chief, an eminent lawyer, and there was also in military command over California General Persifer Smith, reputed as wise a lawyer as he was efficient in the control of a military department. Marcy held that on the conclusion of the treaty of peace with Mexico, the military govern-

ment which had been established in California "under the laws of war, ceased to derive its authority from this source of power." The end of the war, he added, left a government *de facto* in full operation, "with the presumed consent of the people" until Congress should provide a government, and that such *de facto* government as existed must obey the Federal Constitution. No duties could be levied in California on articles imported from any State or Territory, nor could they be levied in any part of the country on the products of California. Secretary Root may argue that the ninth article of the Spanish treaty was intended, by the President and Senate, to make those precedents inapplicable to Puerto Rico and the Philippines. He must then contend with Marshall and Marcy.

After the ninth and tenth, the propositions seem to conflict with the previous ones, and especially with the third, which had affirmed that Congress in governing the natives of the Philippines will be "controlled by no legal limitations except those which may be found in the treaty of cession." The tenth declares that the natives are entitled to insist on three of the enumerated guarantees contained in the Constitution, because the United States has declared those guarantees to belong to everybody, because observance of them is a part of the nature of our Government, and because there is an implied contract that Congress will observe the three guarantees. When and where have those three been made "a part of the nature of our Government" to the exclusion of others? They are not specially referred to in the treaty. Why those, any more than guarantees against *ex post facto* laws, unwarranted trial and conviction for crime, juryless civil trials, and even uniform taxes and customs duties?

The Secretary of War seems confident that the recent treaty, and not the Constitution, is the test of the authority of Congress over Puerto Rico and the Philippines. He has perfect trust, no doubt, in the wisdom of the present Congress and of the President. Yet, he manifests an uneasiness over what a possible future Congress and President may do, if the islands be left exposed to legislation unrestrained by the Constitution. That he prefers to rely on the spirit and nature of our fundamental law rather than on its letter is perhaps immaterial provided the judicial power can, in a proper case, sit in judgment on whatever Congress may do. The essential thing is Constitutional control.

During the second quarter of the century just ending the opinion of the Supreme Court regarding the power of Congress over national possessions outside of States, whether Territories or dependencies, was affected by the slavery problem. In the Dred Scott case the "needful rules and regulations" clause of the Constitution was set aside as not applicable to possessions acquired by cession, and power to govern was, in that case, based on the power to acquire, accompanied by a denial of unrestricted right to rule over them as colonies or dependent provinces. After the War of Secession the "needful rules and regulations" clause was revived and the power of Congress to govern Territories was vested therein by the Supreme Court, but always subject to restrictions imposed by the Constitution.

PERRY BELMONT.

"WOMAN'S VOCATION" AND OTHER POEMS.

BY CARMEN SYLVA (QUEEN OF ROUMANIA).

TRANSLATED BY SIDNEY WHITMAN.

WOMAN'S VOCATION.

WITH Woman's nimble fingers
Awake life's beauty everywhere;
Things small and unregarded
Beneath thy touch shall change to fair.

With Woman's tender insight
Unspoken sorrow understand:
The watcher's aching forehead
Shall yield unto thy cooling hand.

With Woman's soul of sympathy
Bring healing to the wounded one:
Pass over human frailties,
As spots upon a cloudless sun.

With Woman's tranquil courage
Meet with a smile Fate's buffets rude:
Thy guerdon of achievement,
Win, if need be, with thy heart's blood.

With Woman's noble purity
Be as the snow-white lilies are;
Their glowing heart shall beckon
And be the wanderer's guiding star.

With Woman's strength eternal,
Thy life, for others freely given,
Shall shine afar, translucent,
Clear as the crystal gate of Heaven.

A COAT OF MAIL.

IN Ireland, once, I saw a stately grove
Of great oak-trees, a hundred full years old;
And round their shoulders clung a curving coil,
Thick with a strong arm's thickness three times told!
It was the ivy, that in years gone by
Had grappled to the oak with dragon's strength,
Intent to drain its sap, and clog its growth,
Till it should strangle all its life at length.
But, stronger than the giant force of Fate,
The great oak's will to live began to stir,
Made of its sap a new encircling bark,
And took the parasite a prisoner!
And so, thrice strengthened to all future time,
The tree resists the tempest and the hail;
Its foeman's force is welded to its own
In an enduring harmony of mail!
E'en so, my heart, within the clutch of Care,
Which, mounting once, seemed like to drag thee down,
Thou findest now thy foeman an ally,
Thine armament, thine honor, thy renown!

THE MID-DAY PEAL.

THE bells swung out into music,
Mid-day they pealed from the church-tower gray;
And oh! it was so they were ringing
When my life set out on its wandering way!
It was close to the old year's ending,
When an angel kind bent over my head,
And sighed, as she pointed gently
The way that the path of my pilgrimage led.
"Through a waste land, thorny with briers,
'Neath a heaven of storm and of clouds of snow,
Beset by cares and by terrors,
The course of your life must onward go.

“But follow the sound of the bells, child;
Be fearless still with a joyous might:
Let their music banish your sorrow,
And fill you with courage to face the fight!

“And then, in the day of reckoning,
The Bells of High Heaven shall your welcome ring,
And your weary heart shall be happy
With the peace and the slumber their echoes bring.”

TO BACH.

COME, let me plunge beneath thy mighty wave;
Immerse me in the current of thy mind;
Thy thoughts, which spread like branches intertwined,
All let me know! Thy guiding hand I crave!
Thy voice shall cheer my pathway to the grave,
Like springing water in a cavern blind,
Or in white desert some oasis kind.
My care to live thy harmony shall save.
Thy meaning, Master, let me comprehend;
Upon thy giant form mine eyes would gaze;
Toward thy basalt dome my feet would press!
O, let my prayers thy Temple-steps ascend,
Mine ears enjoy thy heavenly Hymn of Praise,
Till all my soul forget its weariness!

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WAR.

BY ÉMILE ZOLA.

IN the first place, I must confess that my whole being rebels against the idea of war. Its massacres exasperate me and appear to me a useless atrocity. This may seem a sentimental view of the matter, one for which temperament and mental and physical habits are undoubtedly responsible, but it is also a reasonable view, for, in looking back over history, I am amazed at the bloody uselessness of war.

I have not yet found, and I believe no one has discovered, the pretended law of civilization demanding that nations mercilessly attack one another. In the beginning there was evident need of war, it being the means by which nations were enabled to establish themselves and to acquire their respective strips of land. Then came immigration, political upheavals, long hereditary hatreds; but, apart from that, I doubt if, as has sometimes been alleged, war has been a means toward civilization. Our map of the world bears no trace of it as a civilizing element. All great conquerors such as Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne and, at a later day, Napoleon, bettered the world only by what they were able to give it of the good and beautiful, and we are shocked at the hurtful consequences of some of their brilliant exploits. The great empires founded by their splendid warlike achievements have

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crumbled away, and are known to us only through history, through the pen—the work of the sword has disappeared.

Could it be proven that each new empire came nearer to being civilized than did its predecessors, then it could be maintained that the work of arms tended to bring about this civil progress. But, in history, we see empires fall one after another, and very often darkness follows their decline. For instance, if we affirm that, in conquering the world, the Romans civilized it, we cannot claim that the rest of humanity was thereby much improved, because it was then that the barbaric hordes appeared, and after their brutal invasions the Roman Empire relapsed into nothingness, and the long, dark night of the Middle Ages settled for centuries upon it. Then, with the *Renaissance*, Roman civilization awoke and it was the Arts, Literature, the Codes and the spirit of legislation that revived it. Therefore, again we say that whatever remains of nations is not due to warlike deeds, but to artistic, literary, scientific and social achievements fostered in time of peace.

However, it must be conceded that, in civilization, war has played a necessary and defensive part. Of course, in order to develop, a nation required to be undisturbed, to protect itself from the possible encroachment of its neighbors and to insure its tranquillity. We are no longer alluding to aggressive warfare nor that of conquest, but to that of defense, and we must admit that it is frequently necessary. Indeed, I can readily understand why a people must sometimes defend itself; that is to say, be sufficiently strong and well armed to withstand becoming the prey of its neighbors, and be enabled to quietly accomplish the development of its interior civilization.

We are, I hope, witnessing in our day a slow transformation of the object of war. In the beginning of humanity, in heroic times, war was essentially an aggressive measure: a people attacked its neighbors intending to rob them of their country and reduce them to slavery. To-day, if such be the intention, at least it is not avowed. There is no longer question of anything but war of defense: one's domestic peace and possessions are threatened, and one enters the field merely in self-defense. The most military nations of the day, those most thoroughly organized and best equipped for war, excuse themselves for being upon such a footing on the plea that it is solely for the eventual defense of their country. Not

one of them would confess that it meditates an attack upon its neighbor and seeks the conquest of the world. It seems, therefore, that purpose of war is losing its virulence, since it no longer dares to be one of conquest and seeks its justification in the single necessity of defending the frontiers.

All this leads me to estimate the actual state of Europe. Since 1870, all the large European countries have been converted into immense intrenched camps. This state of affairs is, I believe, due to our defeats; in fact, it is certain that the formidable war footing on which Europe now lives is the result of the situation created by Germany's victories and by her conquest of the two provinces which she took from us. As Germany wished to retain these two provinces she was obliged to keep herself strongly armed; and as we, on the other hand, were anxious to regain them, we had to put ourselves on an equal footing with Germany. It necessarily followed that Austria, Italy, and even Russia, were constrained to do likewise, and therefore, as I have said, all the great nations of Europe are to-day possessed of troops innumerable, and may indeed be compared to huge intrenched camps. Such a situation has naturally produced very serious consequences. First of all, there is obligatory military service—whole nations under arms and at an incalculable cost to their respective treasuries. Next comes the question of equipment, and a great expenditure is required for fortifications, arms, provisions and all war materials. Besides, modern improvements in the manufacture of arms have caused weapons made at an earlier date to be discarded as useless and replaced by new ones, thereby greatly increasing national expenses, and, since 1870, the war budgets of European nations have consumed millions.

This state of affairs has begotten a peculiar social and political condition which threatens precipitate ruin. Business is more or less paralyzed; the money of the different countries goes into the war budget, this budget grows larger from year to year, and it really seems that, if things so continue, these nations must inevitably become bankrupt. And underlying it all there is much anxiety; it may not be admitted, but I am convinced that in poor countries, such as Italy, which has really gone to extremes in the matter of armament, the people know full well that, in case of war, their exorbitant military expenses would exhaust the national fund.

In the Conference held at The Hague there was an indication of this fear. I do not care to analyze the reasons which prompted the Emperor of Russia to convoke this Conference, but, be they what they might, they were born of the situation, they were in the very air. All nations are preoccupied. It is a universally evident fact that the war budget of each people is gradually consuming its fortune and that such a condition of affairs cannot continue indefinitely, unless the nations come to grief. Consequently, to the question of army equipment may be referred the financial, political and social anxiety now prevailing throughout Europe.

As has been said, the Conference of The Hague has been prolific of no practical result; still, I consider it a highly important event, a very propitious occurrence, inasmuch as it brought up the question. It showed the uneasiness of nations, indicated that they fully realize that the social and economic crisis through which they are passing is the issue of the terrible war footing on which the people of Europe are obliged to live. The opinion is an intelligent one: the existing situation is indeed awful, and may, in the near future, lead to catastrophe. I therefore consider the Conference of The Hague important, since it called forth a momentous question which must sooner or later be solved. Besides, in the thousands of millions uselessly expended by those nations which, without profit, are exhausting their finances in maintaining standing armies; in the continual improvement of military equipment which is ever making the engines of war more and more deadly—in all this, I, the avowed enemy of war, can see its approaching end. And why? Because it is evident that such a condition of affairs cannot last. Nations cannot remain forever under arms, for if they did, national production and social life would, in the long run, be arrested, hemmed in and sacrificed. Moreover, arms are becoming daily more murderous. With long-distance guns, with shells which are ever more destructive, with other late inventions, machines and explosives which, at a distance of kilometres, can annihilate entire regiments, it is evident that the character of warfare is changing; it is no longer a test of physical courage, a hand-to-hand encounter with sword or bayonet, but a sort of science by the practice of which one can destroy the enemy without approaching him. The aspect of warfare is indeed becoming so terrifying that henceforth one nation, before declaring war upon another, will probably pause and think a second time.

It is no longer a question of hirelings fighting a duel in a corner, with two nations for witnesses; no, it is the two nations themselves falling upon each other with intent so abominable that, to terminate the bloody quarrel, either assailant must be destroyed.

Under such conditions war becomes execrable, and humanity should be spared like attacks. It is understood that before plunging into such excesses every possible means is employed to bring about an understanding, the more so, since at present, granting that all Europe is in arms, a war would not be confined to two nations, but would entangle all the neighboring countries till, at length, all Europe would find itself within the mesh, and a general massacre would ensue. This explains why, for the last thirty years, despite threats of war, despite the strong hatred existing between France and Germany, and all that we have been led to fear, there has been no war. And the further we go, the more impossible war seems to become, the more it appears to develop into a crime of high treason against humanity—an atrocity for which no nation would be responsible.

If present difficulties have reached such a pitch that we could not lay down our arms without first fighting it out; if, in the near future, we were to suffer from a sort of general conflagration, I think that war would be forever at an end: because, after the great massacre, the nations would be unfit to resume the struggle, and exhausted, filled with horror and pity, they would be convinced that henceforth peace should reign among them. Yes, the whole world would hold this last abomination in such remorseful abhorrence that warfare would surely die.

When I declared myself the adversary of war, it was not that the martial ideal is not grandly poetic. And that it is poetic may be learned by observing what is at present taking place in the Transvaal. Since the war broke out, we have beheld all nations intensely interested; the newspapers are replete with telegraphic dispatches and all correspondence from that quarter is eagerly perused, even we, the enemies of war, reading it most attentively.

It must be admitted that, in the Transvaal, the situation is peculiar, and I believe that the almost universal sympathy expressed for the Boers is elicited by facts which can be easily explained. The Transvaal is a republic, a small country struggling for its independence. Its antagonist is a very powerful nation, one with infinite pecuniary resources and that boasts its ability to

reduce its foes by sending into their midst troops four times more numerous than they can gather; a nation with immense imperial sway and possessions broadcast throughout the world, and confident of easily subduing the little republic which refused its submission.

Thus we see that the Transvaal is the weaker attacked by the stronger party, the free country seeking to defend its territory and its institutions; and it can be readily understood why the sympathy of the world at large should go out to the Transvaal and not to England, which seems like a great bull-dog, or lion if you will, pouncing treacherously upon an enemy who, it had supposed, would fall an easy prey to its greed.

Moreover, since the beginning of the war, the Boers have defended themselves most nobly and have inflicted bloody defeat upon their powerful assailants, in a manner to call forth the admiration of the entire world.

And here I would like to make a few personal remarks. From the outset of this war I have been appealed to from several different quarters and have received many letters, especially from Holland, soliciting my intervention. During the Dreyfus case the Dutch tendered me their sympathy and congratulated me upon the attitude I had assumed in an affair of justice, and, looking upon me as a sort of mediator, they asked me to interpose in favor of the Boers, by addressing an open letter to the Queen of England, pleading the cause of humanity and justice, and showing her that it would be a crime to abuse her nation's strength in trying to enslave a small Republic which was seeking to preserve its independence. I resisted these appeals for several reasons. In the first place, I was and am still ignorant of the primary cause of this war: I have not studied the question, and its close consideration was something of which my occupation would not permit. Therefore, it would certainly have been difficult for me to decide either in favor of England or the Transvaal. Secondly, the question was a political one. If I interfered in the Dreyfus case it was because it was not a political issue, but one which concerned humanity and justice; and my express desire being to keep aloof from politics, I felt the greatest repugnance toward meddling in the dark struggle between the English and the Boers. Besides, I did not consider myself an authority on any such subject. I felt that I would not be listened to and that I would speak in vain,

since England would certainly not conform to my views. Moreover, the Boers seemed to me a people thoroughly capable of defending themselves and who would not accept any intervention, unless on condition that it were favorable to them. I add that I did not feel equal to the task, and if my effort were to prove merely that of a poet and be productive of no practical result, I would consider it ridiculous. It would indeed be nothing more than a platonic protestation, the dream of a visionary. And a last consideration withheld me. I had but just spent eleven months in England, where I received the most touching hospitality, and I felt that it would ill become me to interfere and thereby displease the English people, who had treated me with such sympathy and discretion. And I do not regret remaining silent because, as I have said, my mediation would have counted for naught and I consider that the Boers did not require it; they are shrewd and smart enough to manage their own affairs.

Nevertheless, I am following up the war with great attention, and in it I behold, as I said before, a revival of the warlike spirit, of the grand poetry of heroism and death, and likewise of those abominable massacres which strew the battle-field with the wounded and the slain. I know what a hold warlike exploits take upon the imagination of different peoples, and in vain do we endeavor to advance in civilization, since we must inevitably drift back to our primitive instinct: to the admiration of valor, to the hero-worship of those who fight, who kill or are killed. Therein danger and bravery are both exalted. War brings all men's passions into play, and the champions who consent to die stir the innermost emotions of our souls. Peaceful philosophers, poets, confined within their sanctums, quiet men like myself, writers who believe in the superiority of the pen over the sword, who are convinced that civilization is the result not of battles, but of books—in a word, the passions of all studious men are irresistibly appealed to when they read the account of a battle. In vain do we aspire after universal peace, in vain do we seek to encourage fraternity among people, when there is in our very blood a sort of atavism which agitates and excites us as soon as a new war is announced; when we are seized with a species of delirium upon hearing that one nation attacks another, fights, exults and finally flaunts the flag of victory. We repudiate all this as a return of barbarism, thinking rather that humanity should advance toward a future city of

peace and goodness; but I repeat that in our blood is that old war-like atavism which prompts us to applaud the conqueror even though he be in fault.

This fact is certainly ominous, and yet I believe that, sooner or later, warfare will have become a thing of the past. As I have stated, many reasons seem to indicate that it is being gradually eliminated from civilization; it will end by costing too high a price and being too murderous in its effects. Europe, not to mention a country which I know well, will be on the fair road to bankruptcy if she persist in keeping all nations on a war footing, if she continue the manufacture of guns that are becoming daily more costly and more destructive, and if she stock her arsenals with shells, which, when such missiles are required, must be discarded for those of later manufacture, the deadly secrets of which are as yet unknown to neighboring nations.

The chief reason for the eventual disappearance of war is that it will have become useless. When speaking thus, I have in mind the democratic movement, the great socialist movement which, within the last hundred years, has made such advancement. In my way of thinking, the real human struggle is no longer on the field of battle, but on that of labor; in industry, in agriculture, in fact in every human effort for production and prosperity. The mighty contest going on to-day is that between capital and remunerative labor. I am convinced that now, in our day, there is in progress as important and decisive a social transformation as took place in olden times, when slavery was abolished and paid labor introduced. It required a great change to bring about such an issue, a change which caused the overthrow of the Roman Empire. The idea of having no slaves for manual and agricultural labor, industrial and domestic work; the thought of abolishing slavery and replacing it by something else, could not be entertained, and called forth the most vehement protestations even from the intellectual and liberal-minded. It was deemed impossible to live without slaves, and the hue and cry arose: "By what can you replace them? How live without them?" And when slavery was superseded by paid labor, a new state of things was created, even empires being carried away. And therein Christianity played a great part. It declared all men equal, helped to destroy slavery and created, to a certain extent, the modern laborer, thereby immensely benefiting humanity.

Well, to-day the situation is pretty much the same. They say: "How can a nation exist without paid workmen? How can work be accomplished unless the workmen be remunerated? And by what can you replace workmen?" There have been precursors, apostles, like Saint Simon, Auguste Comte, Proudhon and above all, Fourier, who have sketched or outlined a future society in which the question of wages and salaries was not considered even by workmen themselves; in which there was co-operation, community of interests and responsibilities; in fact, an entirely new state of affairs which was destined to replace actual pay. And it is evident that we are tending toward just such a state. The contention that we witness is really between capital and labor, and will eventually lead us to that other state which, as yet, is not clearly defined, but which will surely exact a total reorganization of labor and bring about a new distribution of riches. Yes, I maintain that this state of future society is the object for which we are now struggling, the new ideal toward which we are advancing, in direct opposition to the ideal of war which has so long stirred the passions of nations.

It is certain that in this future society war will be unheard of because the reorganization of labor will everywhere beget greater solidarity, bind the different nations closer together, either by arbitration or some other means of which we have, as yet, formed no conception. War cannot be a factor in this future state which the struggles of a closing century will link to the century about to dawn. It will be doomed to disappear, for it will be incompatible with the new condition of things.

Is it a dream to believe that we are witnessing war's last agony? Do not a thousand symptoms indicate the fact? May not the furore caused by the question of military equipment and so forth, be regarded as the last fitful glow in the dying embers of war? Would it not be impossible for the men of to-day to engage in combat similar to that into which their ancestors ruthlessly plunged, combat which could bring about no good but would do much harm?

Perhaps in France we suffer more than do our neighbors from the war footing we are obliged to maintain. One of the most serious causes of the crisis in which for several years past we have been writhing, is the antagonism existing between the republican institutions of a democracy, and the support of an im-

mense standing army. It seems impossible thus to live. On the one hand there is the strict discipline exacted of the nation, for in our land the nation is the army; and, on the other hand, the liberty allowed the citizen, the liberty of voting, thinking and writing.

If our troops were hired or even picked, this contradiction would be less pronounced, or perhaps might not exist at all. But when our whole nation is in arms, when, on the one side, strict obedience is demanded of it, while on the other it is told: "Thou art free; thou mayest vote as thou pleasest; think and write as thou pleasest;" is there not a formal contradiction which may be held responsible for the annoyances and trouble that beset us?

And, for all that, there is no one in all France, even among revolutionists and the avowed enemies of militarism, who would dream of asking for the disbanding of our troops. People may read in our newspapers of violent attacks upon some of our generals; they may sometimes see standing armies assailed; but, notwithstanding all this, we uphold the maintenance of the army as it is to-day. This is because we clearly understand our position, because we Frenchmen know and fully admit that, living in the midst of our enemies, it is impossible for us to lay down our arms unless these enemies do likewise. We are therefore simply submitting to a necessity—that of being on the alert, as is the rest of the world. I repeat, there is not a Frenchman who would be willing to take a soldier from the ranks of our army.

However, I also believe that there is not a Frenchman who dreams of a war of conquest. We may read in our newspapers of men who, under cover of patriotism, daily sally forth to battle, but their attitude is merely political; at heart no one is anxious to fight, and, above all, no one thinks of a war of conquest. It would be only some deplorable mistake, a stray spark, that could now cause a conflagration. The best guarantee of peace lies in the fact that not a nation is inclined to fight; and France, in her present situation, will not be so foolish as to desire war.

Therefore, even in France, despite the military passion we show, the martial ideal is on the wane, and this betokens a change of spirit in us, because we have always been a warlike and extremely turbulent people. Our ancestors wandered into all parts of the ancient world. They went to Asia, Greece and Rome. Then came the time of the Crusades, which expeditions may be said to have

been born of our disputatious inclination, our adventurous spirit. In the French temperament there has been implanted from the beginning, a craving for battle, a desire to go out among others, achieve feats of prowess, conquer lands, amass fortunes, please women and flaunt our standards of victory before the world.

One needs but to read our romances of chivalry in order to hear our warlike valor praised. The knights-errant leave their castles and, on mischief bent, go out into the world; and when there is no direct question of conquest, they pretend to espouse the cause of justice, to redress wrongs, deliver imprisoned princesses, kill traitorous knights, tyrants and the tormentors of women. But, in the story, there is always an adventurer, a cavalier who tramps the highways in search of a fortune, who starts out to seek a treasure and hopes that he may not return empty-handed, but bequeath to history a thrilling account of his daring exploits.

Ours is indeed a warlike past. Our history is replete with accounts of our secular combats with England, combats the memory of which is still with us; because, into the hatred which we are accredited with having for England, there evidently enters the recollection of our long struggle, all the rancor that could have been harbored against a neighbor with whom we fought for centuries. There were also our conflicts with Austria, Italy, Germany and Spain; in fact we were never known to remain quiet. France, the most turbulent nation of Europe, was constantly rekindling the flame of war. Our neighbors always considered us, and I think they hold the same opinion still, a people who could not remain quietly at home, but were ever looking after others and ready to interfere in their behalf; who, when we had no war question of our own to settle, felt that we must deliver Greece or Poland, and went meddling in foreign affairs, showing a truly chivalrous, but very restless, spirit, and remaining a constant menace to the peace of Europe.

This reputation of ours was well confirmed during the Napoleonic campaigns. These abounded in historic exploits to which I shall not now revert, but there was at length a supreme outburst of warlike sentiment in France; certain events helped it out, and, at a given moment, France was seen setting out to war against the combined nations of Europe, threatening and fighting them and acquiring vast lands. But it must be confessed that Napoleon failed to realize France's old dream—European domination. More-

over, his prodigious adventure was also the most cruel lesson that France could receive, as, in the wake of Napoleon's dazzling warlike achievements came, first of all, defeat, then social discontent and exhausted finances, and, lastly, the degeneration of our country. This lesson teaches us that such conquests are always followed by dire results, as, for instance, interior difficulties arising from the foothold gained by political rings and parties, and the prolonged crisis which still holds us in the balance, rendering us unable to find our equilibrium. The perusal of Napoleonic history would tempt none but a madman to wish for a renewal of military feats which, glorious as they were, were followed by a dismal confusion from which our country still suffers.

This is why I cannot admit that France would ever so jeopardize her future as to try to make it a repetition of her warlike past. I cannot believe that there are in France men possessed of so little reason and so ignorant of the philosophy of history as to dream of a belligerent future for their country; men who could cherish the idea first of fighting Germany, then of beginning afresh the marvellous campaigns of Napoleon and starting out anew to attack Europe. In the first place, such a dream could never be realized; and if it could, it would bring back upon us all the disasters which have oppressed us, all the difficulties which have beset us from the beginning of this century. If France were to hypnotize herself into this hope of conquest, she would be irrevocably, irretrievably lost. To encourage such aspirations, to make her believe that she could once again become the War Queen of Europe, the conquering nation, would be to feed her with poisoned bread, to lead her on to new catastrophes, and at length prepare her for her supreme defeat and subsequent disappearance.

I claim that her salvation lies in her abandonment of the warlike ideal. She has become a democracy, she is a Republic. I know full well that there is but little of the Republic about her except the mere name, and that, democratic as she wishes to be, she is still full of monarchical and clerical atavism. But, notwithstanding that she is so far from being the free republican nation that I would wish, I deem it impossible for her to turn backward unless she wishes to go headlong to destruction. If France be eager to resume her place as a great European nation, if she be anxious to once more find herself at the head of nations, if she be legitimately ambitious to be again preponderant, she must courageously re-

nounce her old martial ideal. In 1789 her cry for deliverance re-echoed through all nations, and at that time she may be said to have instilled into the world the idea of liberty: her part to-day would be to inflame it with a spirit of justice. I would have her take the lead in this great socialist movement, in the re-organization of labor, which, in my opinion, will be the great feature of the coming century. I would see her at the head of the nations which will beget that future society in which, thanks to the organization of labor, there will be an even distribution of riches. I would that France might be the handmaid of this future society, of this expected evolution which will transform the world by bringing into it a new civilization.

In fine, I wish that she might live, above all, by her men of learning, by her thinkers; and that she would be convinced that war can only give a nation transitory power, a power subject to challenge, whereas, by fostering labor, by encouraging that progress toward a society in which justice will reign, a nation such as France can make herself mistress of the future. Thought is supreme; it breaks swords and stops the cannon's roar. The world was never positively conquered except by thought. What remains of great ancient nations, of Syria, Egypt, Greece and Rome, is not warlike achievements, but books and monuments; in fact, whatever is the fruit of labor and of peace.

We may speak of Alexander and Cæsar, but their splendid conquests belong only to a dead past, even their empires have crumbled away, nothing being left of them but ruins, grains of sand which are carried off by the wind; whereas, the works of Homer and Virgil and all the monuments of legislation and civilization still live and form a part of our wealth. And we are the children of these ancestors of human thought. The exploits of war count only insofar as they procure for legislators, poets and artists that peace which they most need in order to be able to produce these monuments of the wisdom and beauty of man.

I know that, for belief in peace and future disarmament, the time is scarcely auspicious, as we are now beholding an alarming recrudescence of militarism. Nations which until now seem to have held aloof from the contagion, to have escaped this madness so prevalent in Europe, now appear to be attacked. Thus, since the Spanish War, the United States seem to have become a victim of the war fever. I am not quite competent to judge the situation

in the United States, as I am not sufficiently well informed on the subject, and I speak merely from what I have seen in the newspapers and in some documents that were given me. However, I can see in that great nation a dangerous inclination toward war; I can detect the generation of vague ideas of future conquest. Until the present time, that country wisely occupied itself with its domestic affairs and let Europe severely alone, but now it is donning plumes and epaulettes and will probably be dreaming of possible campaigns and be carried away with the idea of military glory—notions so perilous as to have been responsible for the downfall of nations.

And England, since the resistance offered her in the Transvaal, that small Republic which she expected to subdue almost without an effort, even England has yielded to that most disturbing emotion, the growing desire of fostering the military spirit. To be sure, this state of mind is nothing new to the English. There is in England much of what we call *imperialism*; that is to say, a sort of national impulse which may lead her to extremes, a desire to extend her colonies, to make herself mistress of the most important posts in the world, or to acquire what the word imperialism denotes, dominion over the world.

Such is England's dream, and her symptoms in this regard are indeed alarming. Therefore, is Rudyard Kipling the most popular English novelist: it is no longer Dickens, the charming narrator, that the nation reads; no, Kipling is the author now winning loudest applause, Kipling, who is almost a soldier, a bugle sounding the charge. He fans all England's warlike passions, chooses his types from the new generation, and these types are those of men ready for war, putting in war their only hope, developing themselves morally and physically for war—in fact, having naught else in view but fighting and conquests. Until now, England has escaped the military spirit, in the sense that she has not had conscription. She has had no experience of that blood-tax, for she always had, and still has, paid troops. But the possibility of establishing military conscription in England, as it now exists in France and Germany, has already been discussed in the Houses of Lords and Commons. And this fact is singularly significant. After the battle of Waterloo and the defeat of Napoleon, England was wise enough not to be intoxicated with the glory of victory, and was satisfied with an army of hired soldiers; but to-

day she is prone to introduce the system of military conscription. It can be clearly foreseen that if England should continue to meet with reverses in the Transvaal or, if victorious, should later be forced to defend herself or to attack stronger nations, she would hurriedly adopt conscription and exact military service from her subjects. This contingency is a serious one and shows that England is about to enter upon a new phase of her history. She has always been looked upon as being in retirement in her island, well protected by her coast defenses, proud and happy of her free institutions, sparing her subjects military conscription, living for commerce and for the development of the arts, when lo! she succumbs to the war passion which has reached her from the Continent, and becomes the latest victim of a folly which threatens the destruction of Europe in a frightful, general massacre.

It must be admitted that symptoms such as these are indeed terrifying. If the United States, on the one hand, and England on the other, were to arm all their male citizens, would not the situation become only the more alarming? On the other side of the seas would be found great fortified camps such as we have in Europe; there would be one in England and another in America, and both nations could truly be said to be under arms. Well may one tremble when peace is thus threatened. How, in face of it all, can we believe that war will soon have become a thing of the past?

Nevertheless, in conclusion, I shall repeat that I consider these terrifying symptoms the result of that ever-increasing uneasiness which is pushing to extremes the dread of war, is goading nations on to self-destruction, forcing them to make extravagant preparations for war in the hope that they will never again have to fight. The present crisis will, I feel, be the last, and is undoubtedly war's death-cry. It is war killing war; war making further war impossible; war forced to disappear because it is anti-social, because it ruins nations and impedes the progress of humanity toward the City of Peace and Justice, because it is a factor which, on account of its utter uselessness, must henceforth be banished from history.

ÉMILE ZOLA.

THE UNITED STATES AND PUERTO RICO.

BY J. B. FORAKER, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM OHIO.

So much has been said about Puerto Rico that it is difficult to say anything new. All understand the nature of the island and are familiar with the fact that, under that name, we are proposing to govern not only Puerto Rico proper, but also a number of adjacent islands—Vieque, Culebra, Mona, etc.—that were ceded to us by the treaty with Spain. Likewise, all are familiar, in a general way, with the population of these islands; that is to say, all know that they number, in the aggregate, about one million people; that only about fifteen per cent. are able to read or write, or are possessed of any property. This means that, in this new possession, we have something like 800,000 people who neither read nor write, and who own no property. These 800,000 are not only illiterate, but they are without any experience in self-government, and know nothing, practically, of what is meant by free popular government.

If this were all that should be taken into account, it would be enough to make the problem of providing a government for Puerto Rico a serious one. But, when this duty was entered upon by the Congressional committees, they found not only the conditions already named, but they also found that the total property in all this island amounts, in the aggregate, to a valuation of only about \$150,000,000, or a tax valuation—adopting the rule generally prevailing in the United States, where property is assessed for taxation—of about \$100,000,000, that being two-thirds of the fair average selling price, and quite as much as it would bring, as a rule, if sold at a forced sale.

They found also, from the testimony adduced, that while there is no debt of a public character fixed upon the island, as a whole, there is, yet, a private indebtedness, evidenced by recorded mortgages on the real estate, of more than \$26,000,000, or more than

twenty-five per cent. of the total fair taxation valuation of all property in the island. In addition to this, there is a large indebtedness not secured by mortgage on real estate.

They found also that, prior to the war with Spain, the exports from Puerto Rico were sold chiefly in Spain and Cuba, the ports of which she could enter with her products upon payment of only a very light duty. But when the treaty of peace was concluded the ports of both Spain and Cuba were closed against Puerto Rico, except only on payment of a high rate of duty; so that practically her products were barred out of these markets; and our tariff duties are so high that the same was true as to our market. This, of itself, was enough to paralyze the industries of the island, and did paralyze them. But, in addition to this, there came, on the 8th of August last, a hurricane of unprecedented violence, by which the whole island suffered severely, particularly the coffee plantations. The testimony produced before the Congressional committees was to the effect that the coffee plantations were practically destroyed. According to this testimony, the crop of coffee for this year will not exceed ten per cent. of the average annual crop. When it is remembered that coffee is the principal crop of the island, constituting about seven-ninths of its export, it will be seen how disastrous the results of the hurricane were. It was further shown that, in many of the municipalities of the island, it would be impossible to make collection of any direct property taxes at all.

All can see from this glimpse of the situation that a direct tax on property, which is the usual way of raising revenue to defray the expenses of local governments, would be a great and impossible burden for these people, even if it did not exceed one per cent. But the testimony is that the necessary expenditures of the government that we are instituting will amount, according to the most conservative estimate, to not less than \$3,000,000 annually, while there should be an additional million added for municipal governments. It was more than \$6,000,000 under Spanish rule, and nothing was done for schools, roads and other public improvements.

This expenditure for the insular government comprehends the inauguration of a system of education, the building of school houses, etc., and also the construction of roads, bridges and other public improvements, without which it is impossible to restore

prosperity to the island and to institute any substantial progress for the people.

But to raise this amount of revenue (\$4,000,000) upon a hundred millions of tax valuation would mean a tax rate of four per cent. per annum. That would be a ruinous rate to be imposed upon even the most prosperous State in the Union. It was because of this fact that, when the subject was brought before the Senate Committee on Pacific Islands and Puerto Rico, it was seen that some other way must be found to raise revenues for Puerto Rico than the usual way—by imposing taxes directly on property. In every other Territory that we have ever had since the beginning of the Government, the revenues have been raised, for local purposes, by direct taxation of property, and in every such Territory the people have been required to pay internal revenue taxes besides, and where the Territory had ports of entry, as Florida, Louisiana, Washington and Oregon had, the full tariff rates have been imposed. But in all cases, without an exception, the internal revenue taxes and the tariff duties so collected have been paid into the national Treasury at Washington, for the common benefit of the whole country. In addition, therefore, to all the internal revenue taxes and tariff duties which the people of the Territories have heretofore been required to pay, they have had also to pay whatever direct taxes upon the property were necessary to furnish a sufficient revenue for their Territorial and municipal governments.

For the reasons given, we recommended a departure from that rule in this instance, and provided for it by the provisions of the bill reported to the Senate. We provided that full tariff rates should be collected on all imports into Puerto Rico from countries other than the United States, and that full internal revenue taxes should be collected within the island, the same as elsewhere in the United States; but that all these tariff duties and internal revenue taxes so collected should be paid, not into the national Treasury at Washington, but into the insular treasury of Puerto Rico, for the sole and exclusive benefit of the government of the island; all for the sole purpose of exempting that people from direct taxation on their property which would otherwise be necessary, and, for the reasons given, ruinous and impossible.

But, according to the estimates furnished, not more than about \$2,000,000 could be raised in this way, leaving a deficit of about

\$1,000,000 to meet the necessary expenses of the insular government. To meet this deficit, it was then further provided that there should be, until March 1, 1902, a tariff of twenty-five per cent.—afterward changed to fifteen per cent. of the regular rates, to correspond with the action of the House—upon commerce between the United States and Puerto Rico. But it was further provided that all *this* tax, both that which will be collected in Puerto Rico and that which will be collected in the United States, should go to the benefit of the Puerto Rican government. In this way it was hoped to raise a revenue which could not, without the greatest hardships—if possible at all—be raised by direct taxation.

In other words, the provision of the bill which has excited so much criticism was but a part of a general scheme the sole purpose of which was a generous exemption, at the expense of the whole nation, of the people of Puerto Rico from the burdens of direct taxation, which have always been, and are now, imposed on all the other people of the United States, in both States and Territories alike.

It will be seen from this that the provision was not conceived in a spirit of illiberality or injustice, but in a spirit of mercy and generosity, with the idea that it would be helpful, as, if it should be adopted, it clearly will be. If there be any injustice involved, it is to the people of the United States, at whose expense all this unprecedented favor is shown.

It was well understood by the Committee, when these provisions were adopted, that important questions as to the power of Congress to so legislate would be raised. While the Committee did not adopt any of these provisions for the purpose of raising these questions, yet a majority of the Committee, at least, were of the opinion that this incidental result of the bill need not be evaded, but rather, on the contrary, should be gladly met.

When the treaty of peace came before the Senate for ratification, it precipitated a great debate. The questions were, first, whether or not our Government had any power to acquire territory in the way proposed; in the second place, whether or not we had power, when it was so acquired, to hold it unaccompanied by present intention of making it ultimately a State; and, in the third place, whether or not, if we acquired and held it, we had the power to govern it, and, if we had, how—whether as a possession or dependency, a district, a territory, or otherwise; and

whether, no matter what kind of a political subdivision we called it, the government of it should be restricted and restrained by the provisions and limitations of the Constitution, or whether Congress was free to govern such territory without such limitations and restraints.

That debate, in one form and another, has been going on ever since. It has now, however, by the march of events and by the force of circumstances, come to be plainly established and conceded on every hand that our Government does possess equal sovereign power with every other sovereign nation of the earth to acquire territory by discovery, treaty, or conquest, and to hold such territory at its pleasure, and, of course, as a corollary to this, that when it holds it must govern such territory. But the question remains as to *how* such territory shall be governed, whether subject to the restraints and limitations of the Constitution, or free therefrom. Republicans generally are of the opinion that the Constitution is the organic law for the States of the Union alone, unless, by Congressional action, it be extended and applied to Territories outside of the Union. All the territory that we have heretofore acquired, excepting only Alaska, has come to us under treaties that stipulated that it should be, in due time, incorporated into the Union, and that the inhabitants of it should be admitted to the privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Constitution to citizens of the United States; and, by Congressional action, the Constitution and all laws of the United States, not locally inapplicable, have been expressly extended to all the Territories of the United States that we had prior to the Spanish War.

But, by the treaty of peace with Spain, we took possession of these islands without a stipulation that they and their inhabitants should be incorporated into the United States, but with a stipulation to the effect, on the contrary, that the Congress should determine the civil and political status of the inhabitants of the island.

A treaty is a part of the supreme law of the land. This provision of this treaty was clearly within the scope of the treaty-making power. It is, therefore, binding on all concerned. Under this provision of the treaty, the Congress was, therefore, invested with full power to legislate with respect to these islands and their inhabitants in any way it might see fit, on all subjects affecting

their civil and political status, restrained only by the general spirit of our institutions. The Congress is given the same power by the Constitution itself, for it invests the Congress with power to "dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory and other property belonging to the United States."

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, under this power given by the Constitution, Congress can legislate as it may deem advisable with respect to the Territories, and not subject to the limitations and restraints of the Constitution, except only as the spirit of our institutions has been formulated in the Bill of Rights.

Under these two powers, therefore, Congress is at liberty to make any provisions it may see fit to make with respect to Puerto Rico and the Philippine Islands that have relation to the civil and political status of their inhabitants. It may make them citizens or withhold citizenship; it may impose equal or unequal taxation, as compared with the rest of the United States; and it may, as there is occasion to do in this instance with respect to coffee, impose a duty upon the importation of coffee into Puerto Rico for the protection of the coffee industry there, while, under the general tariff laws of the United States, at all the ports of the United States, coffee is admitted free; and it may—as many of us believe, and as the bill provides—impose a duty upon products imported from the United States into Puerto Rico or from Puerto Rico into the United States.

But, upon this question of power, sharp differences of opinion exist, and, after two years of debate, in which all the judicial decisions that bear on the subject have been carefully analyzed and elaborately discussed, men find themselves more than ever confirmed in their respective views. It is contended, on the one hand, that the Constitution extends itself, *ex proprio vigore*, to all territory acquired by the United States at the moment of its acquisition. "The Constitution follows the flag," says Senator Jones, the Democratic leader in the Senate. This is denied, on the other hand. Until the Supreme Court of the United States passes upon it, the proposition will remain controverted. It is fortunate, therefore, that the necessities of Puerto Rico can best be met by provisions that raise all these questions; and the importance of this is in the fact that, next after Puerto Rico, we will be called upon to provide civil government for the Philippines.

The importation of the tobacco and sugar of Puerto Rico into the United States, free of duty, could not prejudicially affect our home industries, because the amount is unimportant. It would be more serious with the Philippines. If the products of the Philippines, whether the growth of the soil or of their manufactures, can come into this country free of duty, upon the theory that they are a part of the United States within the meaning of the Constitution, and that the Constitution, *ex proprio vigore*, extends and applies to them, not only are we at once brought face to face with the inhabitants of those islands as citizens of the United States, invested with the same privileges that the citizens of New York have—because they are under the Constitution—but our wage-workers and our industrial interests are all subjected to competition with their cheap labor.

In the last campaign our Democratic friends and many labor leaders were contending that we had made a mistake in annexing the Philippines, because these results, for the reasons given, would have to follow. Republicans as a rule deny these claims. But, beyond all this, comes another question. We have reached that point in the development of our resources, in the aggregation of capital and in the command of skilled labor where we are producing many millions in value beyond what we are able to consume. For this surplus we must find markets abroad. The best markets are in the Far East. In a few years the foreign trade of Japan has grown to more than a hundred millions annually. But Japan is but an island of the sea, with a population of only forty-two or forty-three millions of people. China has a population variously estimated at from four to six hundred millions. They are just being introduced to our civilization. What has happened as to Japan will happen as to China, multiplied over and over again. The whole world recognizes that China is the great market of the future, and there have been, accordingly, corresponding efforts made by all the leading nations to secure a fair share, and, by some, to secure a monopoly, of this vast trade.

With a view to securing our fair share, we have been insisting and demanding, and, finally—to the great credit of our diplomacy—we have succeeded in securing what is called an “open door” policy. That means only that our ships and merchandise shall be allowed to enter the ports of China on the same terms and conditions as apply to the ships and merchandise of the other and most

avored nations. But, having been given an "open door" as to China, we cannot expect that, when the insurrection is suppressed and civil government is instituted in the Philippines, we will not be asked to give an "open door" there in return. It seems inevitable that we shall have to meet and determine this question. It would be a most serious misfortune if we should grant an "open door" policy in the Philippines and then find out, by a decision of the Supreme Court—which, sooner or later, must come—that we have no power, under the Constitution, to levy duties upon products going from this country into the Philippines.

It would be extremely unfortunate, because, if we cannot impose any duties upon our goods going into the Philippines, it would mean that our ships and merchandise would have to go in absolutely free of duty, and, if ours go in free of duty, under the "open door" policy arrangement, the ships and merchandise of every other nation a party to the agreement must go in on the same terms; and that would mean that, the Philippines being a part of the United States in the sense mentioned, the ships and merchandise of such nations would, when within the Philippines, be also within the whole United States, and their products coming from there here could not be subjected to tariff duties any more than our products going there. This would mean the overthrow of our protective tariff and of our revenue tariff system.

Puerto Rico and the Philippines stand in precisely the same relation to this Government. We acquired both by the same instrument. Our power as to the one is the measure of our power as to the other. The necessities of Puerto Rico are such as to require our dealing with her in the most generous and merciful way possible. The provisions of the bill give rise to all these questions. While we should not legislate for the purpose of raising questions, yet, when appropriate if not absolutely necessary legislation gives rise to questions of such unusual, far-reaching and world-wide importance, which, sooner or later, we must meet, and must be governed by the solution of, it is fortunate that they can be raised and solved in time to guide us in discharging such serious responsibilities. If we have no power to do as to the Philippines what we propose as to Puerto Rico, we cannot find it out too soon, and woe be unto us if we should not find it out until after our "head is in the halter."

J. B. FORAKER.

THE EXPOSITION OF 1900.

BY B. D. WOODWARD, ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER-GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES TO THE PARIS EXPOSITION OF 1900.

ON the thirteenth day of July, 1892, a decree was issued by the President of the French Republic providing for a Universal International Exhibition to be held in Paris in 1900. One of the clauses of this official proclamation referred briefly to the periodical recurrence of expositions in France every eleven years since 1867, and in this spirit attention was called to the year 1900 as bringing to a close an era of scientific and economic achievements of the greatest magnitude. This same date, furthermore, was to inaugurate an age of possibilities foreshadowed alike by scientists and philosophers, who even in their wildest flights of imagination could not be expected to conceive and compass about the results of future times.

The nations of the world have accepted France's invitation to participate in the great event, and they have undertaken to play an important part in this universal competition. Foreign Powers have pledged gigantic sums of money to the success of the cause, and while up to the present time over two hundred million dollars have been expended on preliminary work, three-fourths of that amount have been contributed by France alone. No measure can be assigned to the results of this investment, nor may we begin to gauge the benefits which may result from it to social, political and economic studies on the one hand, or to industrial, agricultural and commercial pursuits on the other. I may, therefore, be allowed to leave the realm of theories and fancy and to turn to the consideration of things tangible and present.

The time is most appropriate, indeed, for a rapid survey of the Exposition fields at the Champ de Mars, the Esplanade des Invalides, and the Park of Vincennes. As I write these lines, the Lenten season alone stands between us and the date set for the

public inauguration, April 15. In the eyes of all the large and small *concessionnaires* of cafés, restaurants, kiosks, booths and the like, the Easter-tide will mark the beginning of an era of unprecedented plenty and prosperity, and they are too eager to reap the harvest which they have been led to anticipate to allow of a day's curtailment of the period during which they have contracted to do business. This consideration alone is supposed to confirm the promise that the gates of the Exposition will be thrown open to the public at the appointed time. But a stronger pledge is to be found in the words of the French Commissioner-General, who, on all occasions, both public and private, has stanchly asserted that the date set would be strictly adhered to, and it will be a matter of pride and record on the part of Commissioners, both French and foreign, to be found ready at the official opening.

The Exposition of 1900 will differ from that of 1889 not only in the universal classification of exhibits according to their nature instead of their nationality, but also in the greater extent of the grounds, the original manner in which they have been laid out on scientific principles and along artistic lines, and in the innovations which experience has sanctioned and daring conception has introduced into the technique of expositions. From the domain of Pure Art on the Champs Élysées one is led, on the Esplanade des Invalides, to the home of Art applied to Industries; thence to the Champ de Mars, where the raw products of the earth are viewed side by side with achievements wrought by human intelligence and ingenuity; and, finally, to the Trocadéro, where, amid exotic surroundings, the remote races of the earth strive to enter into competition with the elements of advanced civilization.

With this general idea in mind, we will return to the historic Place de la Concorde, and approach the Exposition through the portals of its monumental entrance. The Cours la Reine is bordered with beds of flowers from all climes and in richest profusion. As we advance, we leave to the right the two Palaces of Fine Arts, built of massive stone and destined, as legacies of the Exposition, to be permanent additions to the attractions of the City of Paris. Their style is reminiscent of the Palace of the Louvre, and is intended to continue one and the same vein of architecture along that most magnificent of vistas which extends from the Tuileries to the Arc de Triomphe. The smaller of these palaces will be devoted to a permanent retrospective exhibit of French Art; the

larger building will contain the International Exhibit of Fine Arts, and, after Exposition days, it will serve for the annual Salon, the Horse Show, the Dog Show, the Flower Show, and similar functions. Before crossing the new Alexander Bridge, we glance down the banks of the Seine upon the Pavilion of the City of Paris, reproducing the City Hall on a reduced scale, the two extensive hot-houses for the Horticultural Exhibit, and the Palace of Social Economy, with its generous accommodations for all the International Congresses to be held in conjunction with the Exposition. One hundred and twenty Congresses have been admitted by the French Exposition Administration. The number of attending delegates and members, and the requirements of each individual Congress, will be determining factors in assigning in each case a suitable meeting-place. In medicine, for instance, where the membership reaches 8,000, it will be necessary for the Congress to convene in the large Salle des Fêtes of the Trocadéro Palace.

The new bridge is one hundred and twenty-five feet wide and is the broadest in Paris. As we cross it, we behold in the distance the gilded dome of the Invalides, sheltering the resting-place of the great Napoleon. On either side of the Esplanade, and in rather close proximity to each other, are the long lines of buildings set aside for the Decoration and Furniture of Public Buildings and Dwellings, and Diversified Industries. Their architecture is so varied as to become kaleidoscopic: all styles and decorations prevail, including gilt domes and bell towers, applied staff mouldings, mosaic settings, colored cartouches, and Oriental structural fancies and vagaries. On the Esplanade under the trees is an Annex Building of the United States intended as a Publishers' Building; our advanced methods of journalism lead to the expectation of a most interesting exhibit here. A Moorish character was forced upon the building from the fact that the trees could not be removed, but had to be encased in staff and masonry; the general effect is strikingly pleasing and decidedly unique. To wind our way toward the Champ de Mars, we follow the left bank of the Seine through the Street of Nations. The centre of attraction in the Exposition will, in the minds of many, be found at this point. In two unbroken lines, extending from the Pont des Invalides to the Pont de l'Alma, the great nations of the earth have erected their National Pavilions, and while a reminiscence

of home will cheer the heart of every traveller as he views the building erected by his own country, the contrast in the varied forms of architecture lends to the entire series an air of attractiveness and originality calculated to arouse universal interest and admiration. The United States will have a National Pavilion, along with the other great nations of the world, on the banks of the Seine. The American citizen may come to Paris and view with legitimate pride the graceful structure rising with dome-like effect almost two hundred feet above the river.

He will be there in his own home, for the French authorities have turned over to the United States, as a conquest of peaceful times, to be held throughout the duration of the Exposition, the very land on which the United States National Building will be erected. Since the day on which we were given possession, the site has been marked by four banners with the Stars and Stripes floating to the wind. The work upon this building has proceeded so far that within a few weeks the national eagle, with outstretched wings, will crown the topmost part of the structure. Indoors, the American will be at home with his friends, his newspapers, his guides, his facilities for stenography and typewriting, his post-office and his telegraph station, his money exchange, his bureau of public comfort and even his ice-water. He may consult his "ticker," where from four to six each afternoon he can receive direct from the New York and Chicago Stock Markets the latest quotations of the busy forenoon hours at home. And he will also find there the headquarters to be established by the American Chamber of Commerce for the intelligent dissemination of trustworthy and impartial commercial information.

We pass now rapidly by the Press Pavilion, the Palace for the Army and Navy exhibit, and the Palace of Merchant Marine. While on the subject of this building, it may be mentioned that a prize of 100,000 francs has been instituted on the private initiative of the heirs of Mr. Anthony Pollok, who went down with the ill-fated "Bourgogne." This prize is to be awarded under the auspices of the United States Commission to the best device for live-saving at sea. The idea has the sanction of the Exposition authorities. The French Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Marine have given it their moral support, and therefore the United States Secretary of State has properly invited all maritime nations to this humane competition on French soil. The

great nations of the earth have decided to take part, and France, Russia and Germany have relinquished generously their respective allotments in the main long gallery of the Merchant Marine Annex Building, bordering the Seine, in order that the entire space may be devoted to an international display of devices and inventions which may be productive of the highest and truest results for the welfare and protection of mankind.

Plentiful means of transportation about the grounds have been devised—chiefly between the Esplanade des Invalides and the Champ de Mars, where, on a stretch of a couple of miles, a circular double elevated structure has been provided, accommodating an electric railroad and a double moving sidewalk, one-half of which travels about twice as fast as the other.

The Champ de Mars will, doubtless, be the great gathering point for the large mass of visitors to the Exposition. The inventive genius of man holds here full sway and reigns supreme; its products are such as to fascinate the onlooker and rivet his attention. The Eiffel Tower stands out prominently as of yore; it does not lose its prestige; its power of attraction remains undiminished.

An ingenious piece of American machinery is presented now to the public for the first time, in one of the sections of the United States exhibit at the Champ de Mars. It is in every sense of the word a moving stairway, where you select your step and ascend with it. If in a hurry you can run upstairs; if you wish to come down your speed in descent must exceed that of the stairway's ascending motion. This contrivance bids fair to be one of the great attractions of the Exposition.

The general style of the buildings on the Champ de Mars is more sober and severe than on the Esplanade des Invalides. Their whole effect is more pleasing and, inasmuch as a larger space is allowed between them for the circulation of the public, they do not convey at any time a cramped idea.

We pass in review the Palace of Education and Liberal Arts, the Palace of Civil Engineering and Transportation, the Palace of Chemical Industries, the Palace of Textiles, and the Palace of Mining and Metallurgy. It is well worth while to single out for inspection the exquisite piece of work on the frieze of the Palace of Civil Engineering and Transportation. It represents in bas-relief the entire history of the development of the means of trans-

portation, beginning with the earliest days and proceeding through the ages down to the present time, from the ungainly team contrivance, past the stage-coach and the palanquin, to the safety bicycle and the automobile.

A brilliant display is expected in the new Palace of Machinery and Electricity. No pains are spared to take advantage of all electric means and devices to enhance its beauty and attractiveness. Outside, an electric fountain is rapidly assuming majestic proportions. Huge sheets of water will flow over multi-colored electric lights, creating, especially at night, a vision of fairy splendor. This Palace of Machinery and Electricity spreads over the Champ de Mars from side to side, directly in front of the old Machinery Hall, which is now converted to the use of the exhibit in Agriculture and Food Products. In the centre of this old hall a building within a building is being erected to serve for festive purposes and gatherings. It has a seating capacity of four thousand, and work is being pushed onward continuously night and day to complete it for the opening date.

To provide in sufficient measure for an adequate display of the agricultural resources of our country, it was found necessary to go outside of the main Agricultural Building, and claim space upon which to erect an Annex Pavilion of our own. A site was granted outside the main building, adjoining, on the upper floor, an allotment already made to the United States. A covered bridge was accordingly thrown over from the main structure to the Annex, thereby uniting the two spaces practically into one without apparent transition, and increasing our exhibit area by 15,000 square feet.

Similar conditions as to lack of space arose in other quarters as well, and each time additional grants of land were obtained from the French authorities on the Champ de Mars near the river, upon which to erect Annex Buildings in the group of Forestry, on the one hand, and in Merchant Marine on the other.

Leaving the Champ de Mars we cross the Pont de Jéna, which has been built out to a considerable width, and we enter the grounds of the Trocadéro, devoted largely to Colonial Exhibits. The buildings are mostly odd, fanciful in appearance, exotic in character; a Moorish style predominates, but never to the exclusion of fantastic taste and absolute architectural freedom. As a matter of fact, attractiveness of construction is the pass-word

of the builders and the key-note to the impression gathered. Nevertheless, important displays will be made by France along the lines of the classification of the colonial group. Russia has erected here a national structure and other buildings. England and South Africa present their colonial resources side by side.

As a special favor to the United States, the rules of the French classification were broken down, in order to let us devote our allotted space at the Trocadéro to a joint exhibit of the products and resources of Cuba and Hawaii under the American flag.

Despite the fact that the exhibit area within the city limits in 1900 is considerably in excess over that of 1889, it has not proved adequate to meet the requirements of the occasion. Accordingly, it was found necessary to provide for an Annex to the Exposition, and this has been done in the Park of Vincennes, outside Paris. There, for instance, is relegated the entire, cumbersome exhibit of railroad rolling stock, as well of France as of foreign nations. The bicycle industries will have a home of their own. The automobiles will be housed in comfortable quarters in close proximity to a track where they may be tested and speeded. The United States will display here a wonderful exhibit of tool machinery—in fact, will have a vast workshop in operation, where engineers and contractors can become personally acquainted with this important branch of our modern industry. A second Annex Building in Forestry is also planned by us for Vincennes, which will cover 15,000 square feet of space and serve to illustrate in better measure our country's resources in this direction.

There will be no want of side shows at the Exposition; sixty are already accepted and approved, and represent an invested capital of over twelve million dollars. Of scientific interest is the Optical Palace. A lens of wonderful dimensions is inserted in a huge, horizontal, stationary tube, and a brightly polished circular looking-glass moves in all directions in front of the same. The idea is to reflect the skies through the mirror into the telescope, and project the picture at the other end upon a screen, where a couple of thousand people may at one time scan the heavens as though they were but sixty-odd miles distant.

Other concessions include a large celestial globe, a Swiss village, moving dioramas, a trip around the world, a Maréorama, Andalusia in Moorish days, the Subterranean Mining Exhibit, a Street of Old Paris in the fourteenth century, etc.

This coming Exposition will be the sixteenth held on French soil. The first dates back to 1798, with 110 exhibitors, and it lasted for three days on the Champ de Mars. The last was in 1889, with 61,722 exhibitors, and an attendance of 32,650,000. The conservative forecast for 1900 is said to double these last named figures.

The greater the Exposition the more potent its influence upon the future. World's Fairs are indeed peaceful competitions. As such, the results of the Paris Exposition of 1900 are awaited with interest and impatience. But, on the other hand, peace permeates the entire fabric of an Exposition, and throughout its formative period we acknowledge with the utmost satisfaction that the Paris Exposition, with millions of dollars staked upon its success, has appeared constantly amid dark and troubled scenes as a blessed peace factor in the recent history of France.

B. D. WOODWARD.

MISTAKEN SYMPATHY WITH REPUBLICS.

BY THOMAS G. SHEARMAN.

IN December, 1895, the people of the United States were stirred to great excitement by a message from the President, declaring in substance that a monarchy threatened to encroach upon the territory of a South American republic, and that our own Government ought to resist such an encroachment upon a sister republic, by every means in its power. Both branches of Congress unanimously approved of this message, and voted to appropriate all the money which the President asked, for the purpose of enabling him to decide whether any such encroachment was in danger of taking place. At about the same time, the Republic of France seized upon the Island of Madagascar, the Queen of which had submitted to every demand made upon her by the French, but was, nevertheless, deposed and imprisoned; and the entire island was annexed to the French Republic as a colony. As a necessary consequence of such annexation (since it is the invariable rule of the French Republic with regard to its colonies) American ships were practically excluded from trading with Madagascar, and American produce was shut out from its ports. Thereupon, Senator Morgan, of Alabama, offered resolutions in the United States Senate, congratulating the Republic of France upon its seizure of Madagascar, upon the sole ground that France was a "sister republic," while Madagascar was a "monarchy."

The Republic of Venezuela, on behalf of which nine-tenths of the American Congress appeared to be eager to go to war, had existed for about seventy years; during which time it had enjoyed about thirty military revolutions; and it was on the verge of another, when the intervention of the United States upon its behalf induced the revolutionists to pause, in the hope that this intervention would bring a flood of American gold, sufficient to

divide between parties; while there was good reason to fear that the result of any revolution in Venezuela, just then, would be to deter the United States from making the fortune of either party. Accordingly, the impending revolution was deferred, until the boundary question was settled by arbitration, when the military leader out of power promptly overthrew the existing Government and took possession himself.

The relations of Venezuela and the United States had previously been of that close and affectionate nature which has existed, time out of mind, between most American republics. The Government of Venezuela had for many years committed gross outrages upon citizens of the United States. After submitting to these outrages for twenty or thirty years, the United States suddenly concluded to demand justice. In one of the breathing spaces between the twenty-first and twenty-second revolutions of that happy country, Venezuela was induced to submit this demand to arbitration. In this arbitration, citizens of the United States who had suffered wrongs from Venezuela managed to avenge themselves on our sister republic, by preparing forged testimony; on the strength of which an award was made, which was soon proved to be a gigantic swindle. The twenty-third revolutionary government of Venezuela protested against this award; and after a long lapse of time, during which the citizens of the United States were almost unanimously indifferent to the fraud committed upon our sister republic, the twenty-fifth revolutionary government prevailed upon our Government to reopen the question and do something like justice.

This little bit of history, which in substance has been repeated more than a hundred times in different forms, suggests an inquiry as to what a "republic" really is, and how much claim upon the sympathies of a free people is established by the mere fact that a government calls itself a republic. The American idea of a republic is of a State, in which all residents have equal civil rights, and all male native born and naturalized residents have equal political rights, subject only to reasonable qualifications of general uniform application. And the one fundamental and indispensable condition of a republican form of government is that all its officers shall be either chosen by the free vote of a majority of citizens, or be appointed by other officers, who have been thus elected.

Now, there never has been a time in which a majority of so-called republics have answered to this description. With few exceptions, republics have always been either close oligarchies or military despotisms; in none of which have the great mass of even male adult natives had equal civil rights or any participation in the free election of their governors. Sparta and Athens are examples of the earliest historic republics. Both were oligarchies, in which only one man out of ten or twenty had the slightest share in government. In both, an enormous majority of the descendants of those who had for centuries occupied the land were absolute slaves; while in Athens, there was an intermediate class, much fewer in number than the slaves, but much more numerous than the 20,000 citizens; yet these 20,000 monopolized all the power of government. Rome was a republic, for several centuries. But this republic was governed by a Senate, which consisted of a few hundred self-selected patricians. A long time elapsed before the mass of the people had the slightest share in government; and all that they ever obtained was the right to elect two tribunes, who exercised a veto power, provided the Senate did not appoint a dictator to cut off their heads; which it had the power to do at any time, under the pretense of public danger. The name and forms of a republic were jealously preserved under Julius Cæsar, Augustus, Tiberius, Caligula, Nero and successive despots, for centuries more. Nevertheless, not even the nominally free citizens of Rome had the smallest voice in the government of the republic; while a vast majority of its inhabitants were miserable slaves.

Coming down to more modern days, Venice always called itself a republic. But Venice was governed by a small aristocracy, who delegated all power to the Council of Ten, which in turn committed the power of life and death, in absolute secrecy, to a Council of Three. Switzerland included a number of small republics, in some of which the people had a right to vote. In others, such as Berne, there never was any popular government: all power being strictly kept in the hands of a small aristocracy. Nine-tenths of the citizens of Berne were never allowed to tread upon its sidewalks. And not only did Berne hold in abject servitude the much larger district of Vaud, but even the Forest Cantons held a large and beautiful district of Northern Italy in practical slavery, for two centuries, until it was liberated by the French.

In 1792 France declared itself a republic, amid great rejoicing, not only there, but in America, where our fathers believed that the millennium had almost begun. But, within a few months, the French Republic proved itself to be the closest of oligarchies and the most relentless of tyrannies. More than two-thirds of its legislators were driven out by violence; and large numbers of them were sent to the scaffold. A small knot of blood-thirsty wretches concentrated all power in their own hands. They were followed by a Directory of Five, which permitted French citizens to vote for only one-third of the Legislature, and attended closely to the counting, even for those. When the most respectable citizens attempted to resist this decree, Bonaparte swept them away with grapeshot. The tyranny of this oligarchy having become both oppressive and contemptible, Bonaparte swept them away, in their turn, without even using grapeshot, contenting himself with the butts of his soldiers' guns. He then gave to all French citizens the inestimable privilege of universal manhood suffrage, exercised under his own supervision. Naturally, some millions of votes were cast in his favor; while not enough were counted in opposition to equal the frightened crowd which had run away before his soldiers. The new Constitution, thus adopted, provided for a Legislature which was not allowed to propose any measures of its own, but exercised the proud privilege of voting "yes" or "no" upon such measures as should be submitted for its consideration by Bonaparte himself. As it was well understood that, if any considerable number voted "no," they would speedily disappear from view, the negative vote was always small. Even after Napoleon Bonaparte was chosen Emperor, and donned a crown and purple robe, he continued for some time to issue coins, which are still extant, stamped: "*La République Française: Napoleon Empereur.*"

In February, 1848, France again declared itself a Republic, and adopted universal manhood suffrage. In December a vast majority of the nation, by a perfectly free vote, flung themselves into the arms of Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, for no other reason than that he was supposed to be the nephew of the great Napoleon, who had led two million Frenchmen to slaughter, and had caused the death of four million other Europeans. The first use which the Republic made of its power was to crush the little Republic of Rome. In December, 1851, a vast majority of the people voted

to make Louis Napoleon their absolute despot for ten years, with a Legislature having no power, except to vote "yes" or "no" upon such measures as he should propose. This form of government lasted under the name of a Republic for one year, when it was merged in the title of Empire. But, in reality, there was more freedom under the Empire than there ever had been under the Republic. In 1870, the Empire was overthrown and a nominal Republic established, which has lasted until this day. But every Frenchman is held in the iron grip of a small knot of generals. No President or Prime Minister ever dared to oppose the dictates of these military tyrants, until within the last year; and even then, Loubet and Waldeck-Rousseau would not have dared to undertake the task of government without the aid of a ferocious military chieftain, who was prepared to meet with blood and steel any attempt at military revolt. Without going into details, it is notorious that the Government of France, during all these thirty years, has been about equally divided between republican forms and military despotism.

At the present time, there are twenty nominal republics in the world, outside of Africa and the tiny mountain district of San Marino. These are France, Switzerland, the United States of America, Hayti, San Domingo, Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Brazil, Peru, Bolivia, Chili, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Of these, only Switzerland and the United States are real republics, within any reasonable definition of that word. France is half republic and half military despotism. All the remaining seventeen are either absolute military despotisms or mere oligarchies, in which a small minority of the people monopolize all the powers of government, while the great mass are little, if any, better than slaves. The forms of republican government are undoubtedly maintained in nearly all of them, to the same extent as they were maintained in Rome under Tiberius, or in France, under the Prince President, Louis Napoleon. Legislatures meet and discuss at great length propositions of law, submitted to them by a dictator, at the end of which they vote in the affirmative or fly for their lives. In Chili, Argentina, and possibly one or two more of these republics, there is a larger freedom of discussion, and a greater absence of military dictatorship than in the others. But in Chili, all the land worth having is owned by a few families; and

a vast majority of the people are bound to these families in a mild but effectual slavery. In a large majority of these republics, there is not, and there never has been, any government, except such as was imposed by military force after a successful revolution, confirmed by the forms of a popular election, at which anybody was permitted to vote freely, provided he voted for the ruling dictator. Even subjects of the German and Austrian Emperors have far more liberty and far more real voice in the government of their country, than have the "free and independent" citizens of any republic on the continent of America, except our own. The subjects of the monarchies of Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Holland and Belgium have vastly more.

It will thus be seen that there is no substantial foundation for the current opinion that the mere name of "republic" is sufficient to entitle a government to the sympathy of any free and self-governing people. But there are other considerations which are of even greater importance to the right direction of our sympathies. If experience should prove that the government of any country treated American citizens with more respect and consideration, when it was nominally monarchical, than it ever did when nominally republican, common sense would soon teach us that our sympathies were very much misdirected, if they led us to prefer republican to monarchical government in that country. And if the same experience showed us that so-called monarchical nations or colonies uniformly showed more favor to American citizens than did republican nations, it is very certain that all those who had this personal experience would prefer monarchies to republics. Now it happens that this precise fact is proved by all history as well as by all present experience. There is not a republic in the whole world, not even including France and Switzerland, in which an American citizen is as justly and liberally treated as he is under the monarchies of Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Great Britain; while the treatment of Americans in France and Switzerland is not one whit better than it is under the imperial Governments of Austria and Germany. When, however, we compare the conduct of Government officials in the kingdoms first named, with the conduct of Government officials in any of the seventeen South American Republics, the contrast is enormous, and altogether to the disadvantage of our "sister republics." There is not one of

these so-called republics which has not at some time in its history inflicted many grievous wrongs upon American citizens; and nearly all of them have at various times committed the grossest outrages, including confiscation, wholesale robbery, imprisonment, expulsion and even personal torture. The United States Government has, upon innumerable occasions, been compelled to demand compensation for such injuries, although it has only on few occasions recovered any such compensation. Indeed, it has been found such a difficult and unpleasant task to appeal to these so-called republics for justice, that in a great majority of cases American citizens have found it useless to ask their own Government to do so. There has been some slow improvement in these respects; but even yet there is not a single republic on the whole continent of America, where citizens of the United States are treated half as decently as they are in every part of the British Empire.

These considerations have an obvious application to the war between Great Britain and the Transvaal Republic. The enthusiastic partisans of the Transvaal claim that they constitute a vast majority of the people of the United States. Whatever may be their number, there is no doubt that, after setting aside that large class of citizens by adoption, whose chief motive in political life is hatred of Great Britain, the remainder are on the side of the Transvaal for substantially no other reason than that it calls itself a republic, while Great Britain calls itself a monarchy. Let us then impartially examine the principal characteristics of the two Governments, thus placed in opposition to each other.

Cape Colony is a British dependency; and, therefore, it is theoretically part of a monarchy. But that colony has a separate Government, with a Parliament elected by the free vote of all its citizens, a large majority of whom are of Dutch, not British, origin. These Dutchmen, as they are proud to call themselves, elect a majority of the Parliament, appoint all the ministry, and have in their possession the entire government of the country. They lay and expend their own taxes; and in no respect whatever does an Englishman have any advantage over a Dutchman. Great Britain, it is true, appoints a Governor; but he never interferes with the internal affairs of the colony. Those who prefer English can have their children taught in English; and those who prefer Dutch can have their children taught in Dutch. Every town has its own municipal government; justice is impartially ad-

ministered; all white men stand upon an equal footing. There is no distinction as to race among white men, or as to religion among any men. One Prime Minister was an Irishman by birth; another was a rich man, who paid all the salaries of the Irish Home Rulers in Parliament for a year; and the present one is a representative Dutchman. No one suggests that there has been any corruption in the Government, or that justice has not been impartially rendered to all; and such a thing as the removal of a judge from office, for making a decision displeasing to the ruling powers, has never been dreamed of. There is no aristocracy and no oligarchy in Cape Colony; and the only semblance of monarchy consists in the theoretical recognition of an absent Queen, who has in fact no power. This so-called monarchical province is in reality a republic, as free and independent as the United States of America, except that it has not the right of entering into foreign relations, or of making war or peace; these powers being reserved to the Parliament of Great Britain.

On the other hand, the Transvaal calls itself the "South African Republic." Its people abhor the idea of a monarchy. But their government consists of a President and two legislative bodies, called the First and Second Raads. The Second Raad has no power, except to talk. It is at liberty to frame bills, and to send them to the Upper Raad; which invariably and unanimously casts all such papers into its waste basket, never even discussing anything which comes from the Second Raad. The Constitution prohibits the First Raad from proposing any measure, and confines its powers to discussing and voting upon measures which are sent to it, either from the President or from the Second Raad. As it is determined not to recognize anything which comes from the Second Raad, the inevitable result is that no law ever can be passed which is not proposed by the President. The concurrence of the Second Raad is not necessary for any purpose. Anything which is proposed by the President and voted by the First Raad becomes a law, without further ceremony.

As the Constitution may be amended or abolished at a moment's notice, by the vote of the First Raad, on the proposition of the President, it is impossible to tell what that Constitution may be to-day. And as it is untruly pretended that the complaints of foreigners relate to regulations introduced since the Jameson Raid of December, 1895, we confine our statements to the condi-

tion of things as they were before the Jameson Raid was thought of. No local municipal government of any kind was allowed. The City of Johannesburg, with 50,000 inhabitants, was not merely not allowed to *elect* a municipal government: it was not allowed to *have* any, whether elected or appointed. Everything had to be referred to President Krüger and his First Raad. Every Boer was compelled to keep a rifle: and no foreigner was permitted to have one. No Roman Catholic or Jew was allowed to vote or to hold office; and for a long time not even a Protestant was allowed to vote, unless he belonged to the orthodox Dutch Church. Although two-thirds of the residents of the Transvaal could neither speak nor understand the Dutch language, and although all educated residents understood the English language, yet English and American children were forced to learn Dutch, to the exclusion of English; while the use of any other language than Dutch, in the courts or in any official proceedings, was strictly prohibited. It frequently happened that the judges, all the counsel and all the witnesses understood English better than Dutch, and that the technical phrases upon which the issue turned were in English, and could not be expressed correctly in Dutch. Nevertheless, everybody in court was compelled either to talk in Dutch, or, having spoken in English, to listen while his language was mangled by a Dutch interpreter. Occasionally, a judge so far forgot himself as to allow a case to be stated to him in English, where both parties spoke English only. For this, he was promptly punished by a fine, and threatened with removal if he repeated the offense. A judge of the highest court was called upon to decide a controversy between an American resident and the Transvaal Government. Being an honest man, he made a preliminary decision in favor of the American; whereupon President Krüger promptly caused his removal from office, and passed a law, forbidding any similar case ever to be brought into court. Finding that upon another question a majority of the highest court would not accept his dictation, President Krüger caused the court to be abolished and fresh judges substituted, of a more subservient nature.

President Krüger not merely expressly invited foreigners to enter the Transvaal for mining purposes, but also personally sold to them tracts of mining land, receiving \$500,000 in gold for a single farm. He procured skilled men to frame a code of mining laws for the encouragement of that industry; and, within a few

years, foreign miners and investors poured into the country at such a rate that they constituted about two-thirds of the permanent population. They paid to the Boers about \$20,000,000 for the mere land. The mines, being of low grade, would have been entirely worthless, but for the use of the finest and most highly developed machinery. The equipment of the mines, therefore, cost about \$30,000,000 more. There was not in 1895, and there is not now, any property in the Transvaal, having any commercial value outside of its limits, that is not the creation of these foreign residents and the fruit of foreign capital and industry. For the avowed reason that so many foreigners had entered into the country and had developed its wealth, enriching the Boers both as a people and as individuals, President Krüger changed the naturalization laws, so as to make it impossible for them to become citizens. Whereas, when they first began to come, the law allowed them to become citizens in two years, he suddenly changed the term to nine years, and again to fourteen years, avowing his intention to keep changing and extending the term, just so far as might be necessary to make it impossible for the great majority of the population ever to have any share in the government. He allowed foreigners to vote for members of the Second Raad, after a shorter term of residence; but, as already stated, this Second Raad had no power whatever, either to propose or to reject laws. It was a mere cipher. No one could acquire a vote for the First Raad, unless he renounced the protection of his native country, without getting the protection of his adopted country or of any other, for a term of fourteen years. During this term, he must serve in the army whenever called upon, furnishing his own horse and gun, his own food and clothing, without pay. He assumed for fourteen years all the burdens of a citizen, without any more rights than a negro. At the end of that time, he still could not get full rights of citizenship, unless he was forty years of age, and produced a certificate from the Field Cornet of his district, to the effect that his name had been registered on the Cornet's books for fourteen years, that during all that time he had faithfully served in the army, and had been in every respect a good subject. As most Field Cornets never kept any such books, the fulfilment of this condition was usually impossible. But, in the few cases where it could be fulfilled, there must be then added a written certificate, from two-thirds of the Boers living in the

same district, to much the same effect. These certificates must then be presented to President Krüger, in whose absolute discretion it lay whether to admit the applicant or not. All these rules applied equally to persons born in the Transvaal of foreign parents. As might naturally be expected, the Boers treated with the utmost contempt all white men who, thus living among them, were kept in such servile conditions.

Corruption and monopolies were universal. In a railroad litigation, it was proved before a Boer Court that nine-tenths of all the principal officials and members of the First Raad had taken bribes. Among them was the son-in-law and private secretary of President Krüger. But it was notorious that nothing could be got without bribing the President's son-in-law, and that anything could be got through in that way. According to the testimony of his own friends, he is worth several million dollars, and lives in a \$250,000 house, although he has never earned \$2,500 by honest labor in his life. As an immense amount of dynamite was required in mining, President Krüger granted a monopoly of dynamite to a small combination, with which, as usual, his relatives were closely connected. This monopoly kept the price of dynamite at about three times its price outside of the Transvaal. They pretended to manufacture it at home; but the official report of a Boer commission shows that this manufacture was a mere fraud, the dynamite being imported ready for use, and simply manipulated a little, so as to give it the appearance of having been changed. The only effect of this manipulation was to deteriorate its quality to such an extent that it became dangerous to handle, and fearful explosions, causing frightful loss of life, ensued. As fast as any article of supply or food was found to be in great demand, President Krüger would create a new monopoly. Thus, finding that Englishmen were fond of jam, he established a monopoly in jam, under the pretense of encouraging domestic industry.

Taxation was ingeniously arranged in such manner as to cast nine-tenths of its burden upon foreigners, who were not allowed to vote. It has been pretended that the greater part of this taxation was levied directly upon the mines, so as to fall mainly upon wealth. But this statement is not true. The great bulk of taxation was laid upon the necessities of life, and thus fell mainly upon the shoulders of the relatively poor. The large and rapidly in-

creasing revenue was made the excuse for a still more rapidly increasing scale of salaries and jobs. Official salaries were increased from less than \$150,000 a year to more than \$6,000,000.

The cruelty of the Boer Government could be proved in a hundred ways; but two or three examples must suffice. Pretexts were easily found for repeated onslaughts upon the black natives. Those who resisted were massacred without mercy, and those who submitted were made practical slaves, under the name of "apprentices." Erasmus, who is a particular pet of the President, drove a crowd of black women and children into a cave, and then built a fire in front of the cave, with the result of either suffocating or burning them all to death, not one being allowed to escape. General Cronjé and Erasmus were convicted in a Boer Court, of gross and unlawful brutality to the female chief of a native tribe and twenty of her men, without the smallest evidence of their having done anything wrong. They were both condemned to pay small damages to the injured natives; but they never paid any; and immediately after the conviction President Krüger appointed them to govern the district in which their unfortunate prosecutors lived. No negro has ever since made complaint of Cronjé or Erasmus.

As to their treatment of white men, the official record of the trial of the Johannesburg Reform Committee is sufficient evidence. Sixty of the very best men in the city were thrown into prison on a charge of treason; the alleged treason consisting only of an attempt to compel internal reforms, without the least idea of taking away the independence of the Republic. Every Boer of any prominence had been guilty of treason at some time or other, including especially Krüger himself. No one convicted of treason had ever been punished by anything more than a small fine. The Boer judges were too honorable and consistent to be willing to impose any greater punishment upon foreigners. Therefore, President Krüger imported a foreigner, named Gregorowski, and appointed him judge, for that occasion only, to try the foreign prisoners. Before the trial opened, he borrowed a black cap. The foreigners being then positively assured that, if they would plead guilty, they would all be let off with the usual small fine, which could not by law exceed \$185, they did so plead. Thereupon Gregorowski revived an ancient provision of Roman-Dutch law, under which treason was punishable with death, and he forthwith sentenced the principal prisoners to be hanged and the others to

long terms of imprisonment. President Krüger announced that certain pious scruples forbade him from commuting death sentences for fines; but, after much back-stairs negotiation, the prisoners were informed that if they would make charitable contributions, ranging from \$10,000 to \$125,000 each, the President would magnanimously pardon them. These contributions, amounting to about \$1,100,000 in all, were paid. Mr. Krüger put the money in his pocket, and the "charities" have never been heard of since. There is not in the record of criminal justice in any monarchy, during the last two hundred years, any example of fines of this magnitude being imposed for any offense whatever.

Illustrations might be multiplied without end, to show the true character of this so-called Republic. No public meeting could be held in the open air; and any meeting in a hall could be instantly dispersed at the will of any policeman. Newspapers could be suppressed, at the will of Mr. Krüger. Even petitions were finally prohibited. Power was given to the President to expel any foreigner, without any cause assigned, and to confiscate his property on a fictitious pretense. Fifty thousand persons were thus expelled, in October, 1899, and all their property has been confiscated. And then a law was passed empowering the Boer army to force any American or other neutral to serve it in any menial capacity which its officers might dictate.

It is pleaded, in excuse for these undeniable facts, that each of them might be paralleled in some other country; that the government of New York City is as corrupt; that our tariff is as bad; that meetings are suppressed in Ireland and Germany, and that aliens are expelled from France. But there is no such *combination* of oppression, corruption, cruelty and outrage to be found in Europe, west of Turkey, and none on this continent, except in some of our beloved "sister republics" of Central America.

To sum up, there is not a republic on earth, except Switzerland and our own United States, in which there is even an approximation to the honesty of administration found in at least six European monarchies; nor anything like the combination of governmental honesty, judicial impartiality, equality of rights, personal liberty and liberality toward Americans, which can be found in those monarchies and in all of the British colonies.

THOMAS G. SHEARMAN.

AN OBLIGATION OF EMPIRE.

BY MARY ENDICOTT CHAMBERLAIN.

THE profession of nursing is of such importance in modern times, and science and training have done so much to develop and make it efficient, that it has become the duty of all who have it in their power to help to extend its benefits to plead its cause.

It is, therefore, desired to call the attention of the readers of this REVIEW to an Association, which has only been in existence for a few years, and whose work is but little known, but which is of such inestimable value that a brief account of it may be of some interest, not only in Great Britain, to whose colonies it ministers, but in America as well.

Recent developments of policy, arising out of the Spanish-American War, have brought before the citizens of the United States many of the problems that for generations have confronted the nation which, of all others, has been the pioneer of colonial expansion of the modern type. From the moment this policy was initiated, Englishmen have watched with the keenest interest and deepest sympathy the efforts of their kinsmen across the sea to meet the responsibilities with which they themselves are so familiar, and it may be useful to those Americans whose thoughts are turning to the consideration of new needs and new obligations to have before them some of the results of the experience which the world-wide Empire of Great Britain has afforded to her sons and daughters.

For present purposes, the experiences may be divided into two classes: those furnished by the great self-governing colonies and those furnished by the Crown colonies. It is with these last that this article is especially concerned. Situated in tropical or sub-tropical regions, their European population is chiefly confined to managers of commercial undertakings and the official class, and is, of course, very limited; while their tie with the mother country is

a closer one than that of the larger dependencies, in that they are more directly connected with her in all the administrative branches of their governments, and are often dependent on her to open and extend the avenues of their material prosperity. These countries are varied in their climates, but still more so in their peoples. Races of every color and creed inhabit them, and while to the native the climate is innocuous, to the white man it is often deadly, without those aids to life and health which he must carry with him, if his work is to be one of development and progress in the distant lands for whose civilization and advancement he has made himself responsible.

For many years excellent Government hospitals have been established in the Crown colonies, which have brought medical aid and careful nursing to the natives and poorer classes of the community; but, great as is the advantage of these institutions, their good work is of necessity restricted to nursing those within their walls. Here the responsibility of the Government ceases, and rightly ceases. All who can and will enter the wards of the hospital as patients are welcome, but in many places this is practically impossible. Very often illness occurs at long distances from the capital, where the hospital is situated, in countries where the means of travelling make it impossible for an invalid to move without grave danger to life; and even where this obstacle does not exist, there are frequently objections, which long residence among alien races does not make it easier to overcome. For educated Englishmen or their wives to find themselves in a hospital among natives or other uncongenial companions, is an ordeal from which they may well shrink. In small communities the accommodation does not always permit of the multiplication of wards, and thus the divisions which in a large hospital at home are a matter of course are an unheard-of luxury.

Terrible hardships are often the result. Delicately nurtured women are exposed to suffering and peril which are inconceivable; little babies are left neglected and spend their brief lives in pain which might so easily have been saved; strong men, who have never had to think of themselves are struck down by that baleful and deadly foe, tropical fever, far away from all the comforts to which they have been accustomed, with no friend at hand, with no white woman within reach—only natives near them, who are totally incapable of carrying out any directions which the weary

doctor on his long rounds leaves during the visits which he is only able to make at rare intervals. The terror of helpless loneliness is added to the misery of a wasting disease.

From time to time in the past, efforts have been made in various places to secure a private nurse, and sufficient money has been raised to get one from England; but, as a rule, these attempts have failed, owing to the impossibility of making satisfactory investigations and engaging the nurse under a proper guarantee, or from other causes. The money once expended could not be replaced, and those who had tried in vain to make this provision were discouraged.

Such a condition of affairs as this prevailed in the Island of Mauritius when Mrs. Francis Piggott, whose husband is a distinguished member of the Colonial Service, went to live there. The crying evil that, in a colony where the well-to-do classes could afford to pay for the services of a trained nurse, there were no adequate means of nursing cases of serious illness, was brought forcibly home to her mind by the death of three young Englishmen on one plantation alone. In each case it was evident that, had proper care been available, there would have been every chance of recovery. Her own experience in going to the assistance of friends—a young officer whose wife was ill, and whose child was at death's door, while their only attendant was an ignorant native woman—still further convinced her that the time had come to make an organized effort to supply a deficiency which was fraught with such serious consequences to the lives of our fellow countrymen abroad.

She immediately began to gather information from Colonial Governors, medical officers, and others competent to give her advice in working out the problems with which she had decided to deal. By the time she came home, in 1895, she had already formed the basis of a scheme, and it only remained to enlist the sympathy and support of those who could help to make it successful. Mrs. Piggott's private friends did much to assist her at the outset, and it was not long before a fund of several hundred pounds was raised with which to begin work. But more than this was required. She felt that, in attempting to carry out an experiment of this kind, it was essential to success to have the moral support which the Colonial Office could give. Accordingly, while the scheme was still in its infancy, it was submitted to the authorities, who saw

that the need which she described was great, and that there was much scope for useful work in the direction she proposed. They promised to do all in their power to assist her, and suggested some slight alterations calculated to make the plan more practicable. These were accepted, and in the summer of 1896 the first general meeting of the Colonial Nursing Association was held. Already it had begun its work; for, during the spring, Mauritius had benefited by the first contributions which Mrs. Piggott had received, and two private nurses had been sent out, their passages being paid and their salaries of £60 a year guaranteed by the Association. At this meeting it was announced that the Secretary of State for the Colonies had given his official recognition to the scheme by sending a circular despatch to all the Governors of the Crown colonies, inclosing the papers of the Colonial Nursing Association, and recommending it to their consideration.

This led to renewed interest in the subject of nursing within the colonies themselves. The Gold Coast voted money for the establishment of three trained nurses in the Government Hospital, and before the end of the year the Colonial Office applied to the Colonial Nursing Association to select them. Lagos, where there had already been two English nurses, asked for a third, and Sierra Leone soon followed this example. The Colonial Nursing Association thus received an impetus which has been of the utmost value to it; for, though its main object from the first has been to provide private trained nurses for the Crown colonies and British communities abroad, it is a great advantage to be called upon by the Colonial Office to recommend nurses for the various Government hospitals. It helps to give wider experience of the requirements of the different colonies, and may, in the future, pave the way for placing private nurses where they are most needed. On the other hand, the Colonial Office is relieved of the difficult task of interviewing and selecting nurses; and, as long as the Association exercises a wise discretion in the recommendations it makes, there is every reason to believe that this official co-operation with a private enterprise is likely to continue.

When the Association was originally started, Mrs. Piggott was fortunate in being able to interest H. R. H. the Princess Henry of Battenberg, who consented to become its Patron, while Lord Loch, whose experience in colonial affairs made him a most valuable acquisition, undertook to be its President. A small Com-

mittee of Management, with Mrs. Piggott as Honorary Secretary, was the working body, and for three years this arrangement was not disturbed. These three years witnessed a great advance in the development of the work. Private nurses were applied for by many colonies, and the Colonial Office made further requests for hospital nurses. The increase of work made it necessary to enlarge the committee, and in 1899 more formal rules were adopted. The Association was inaugurated under the same President, with a Council, an Executive Committee, and honorary officers. The Executive Committee then appointed three sub-committees—the Colonial, Finance and Nursing Committees—which now deal with the details of the work that formerly devolved upon the Committee of Management, and leave the present Executive Committee free to devote itself to the larger questions of principle and administration.

Through the medium of the Colonial Committee, the Association is placed in communication with the colonies requiring nurses. It conducts the correspondence with the people interested in the project, induces them to form local committees to undertake the supervision of nurses and to raise funds, and is often able to stimulate them to make efforts in this direction, which would be impossible had they no assurance that the arrangements on this side would be satisfactory. Success in raising money varies with the resources of the different colonies, but when the Association is satisfied that all has been done which is possible under the circumstances it endeavors to meet the local committee by making a grant to it. Sometimes the committee on the spot undertakes to pay the salary and maintenance of the nurse, while the Association pays her passage out or guarantees this last until it can be repaid by the colonists; sometimes, the colony is only able to provide the maintenance, and the rest of the cost falls on the Association; or else the Association binds itself to provide any deficit there may be, within certain limits. Each agreement differs a little from the other, and it is the aim of the Association to help people to help themselves, rather than to make it easy to receive such a boon as it gives without any personal sacrifice on the part of the recipients. At the same time, experience shows that when once a nurse is installed she soon wins her way to the gratitude of the residents, who discover the blessing of the trained care she can give; and the contrast to the former state of absolute helplessness

is so great that they are much more ready to contribute to her support than when the proposal to do so is first suggested to them. Accordingly, when a new nurse is called for, the Association is encouraged to be as generous as its means will allow in making the arrangements for the first year.

A monthly column in a paper called *Nursing Notes* helps to make the Association known in the nursing world; but from the beginning there has been little difficulty in the supply of nurses, who apply, as a rule, on their own initiative. The candidates are interviewed before their names are taken, and there is now a long list on the books of the Association of nurses who may be called upon at short notice.

Whenever a vacancy or a new demand arises, the nurses available are sent for by the Nursing Committee, and the utmost care is taken to ascertain not only their professional qualifications, as to which a three years' certificate from one hospital and a midwife's certificate are required, but also their antecedents and everything which can bear upon their personal character, as this is a most important element for consideration before sending them so far away from the restraining influences of home. If it be possible to secure the advice of any lady from the colony who may happen to be in England at the time, she is invited by the committee to be present at the interview with the nurses, in order that full information may be given as to the climate and conditions of life in the place to which they are to be sent. When the appointment is for a Government hospital, the Association assumes no financial responsibility in regard to it. As soon as the nurse takes it up, she comes under the regulations for Government servants, and her salary and all expenses are paid by the colony in which she is employed. If, on the other hand, it is for a private nurse, she is obliged to sign an agreement to abide by the terms and regulations of the Colonial Nursing Association and to obey the rules of the local committee. These afford sufficient guarantees that in the event of her breaking her engagement without due cause, the Colonial Nursing Association will not suffer financial loss—a provision which the past experience of benevolent individuals who had occasionally attempted to get a nurse from England showed to be most necessary. The salary of these nurses is never less than £60 a year, and whether it is paid by the Association or the colonists depends on the particular arrangement which has been

arrived at between the Colonial Nursing Association and the local committee. The selection of a nurse by the sub-committee is always subject to her being declared medically fit for the post to which she is going, and in order to insure that no woman shall be exposed to an unhealthy climate without the sanction of a medical officer who has experience of the tropics, the Association requires that she shall be examined by a doctor of their own choice. Dr. Patrick Manson, Medical Advisor of the Colonial Office, who examines all candidates for the Colonial Service, has kindly undertaken this task for the private nurses as well, and thus the Association is able to discharge a responsibility which it feels to be a great one, with full confidence that the nurses sent out under its auspices will not be submitted to physical risks which can be avoided. When the candidate is finally chosen, an allowance for her outfit is sometimes made, and the Association arranges for her passage out, a second-class ticket being provided. In some cases, through the liberality of the steamship companies, her fare is at a reduced rate.

It is a satisfactory sign that so many highly qualified women are ready and eager to take posts in unhealthy climates, under conditions so different to those to which they have been accustomed. How different can best be gauged by the accounts which they themselves send home. Letters from Nassau, Perak and Kwalor Lumpor in the Malay States, Mauritius, Ceylon, Lagos in the West Coast of Africa, Gebba and Lokoja in Nigeria, coming from private as well as hospital nurses, tell of the details of their work, and the obstacles which they encounter. For instance, the hospital nurses speak of their laborious efforts to train and make use of the native attendants, who, after long hours of patient teaching, are discovered manufacturing poultices with tepid water and applying them to the unfortunate patient at random; and of the hopelessness of instilling any lasting knowledge of the simplest processes into the native mind, so that constant supervision and unflagging vigilance are necessary. Cases of all kinds come to them, from the Englishman who has fallen a prey to the ravages of fever, to the poor young native woman whose husband had tried to murder her, and who lay for eight hours more dead than alive before she was brought into hospital to have her thirty wounds bound up and treated, and her fractured arm set. Her nurse writes: "I am very proud of her, as no one but myself has touched her since the

first morning. She is now quite well, except for the fracture. It will now be put in splints. The arm was so badly hacked we could not put it in splints, owing to the number of wounds to dress. She was hacked with a short, dirty, grass-cutting knife. When her supposed husband was asked why he did it, he replied he only gave her a few little cuts to frighten her. She was wife No. 2, and very young and pretty. Three of her lovely teeth have gone, too." Such a narrative throws a side-light on the manners and customs which may be met with in the East. The cottage hospitals set down amid beautiful tropical surroundings sound very attractive, but occasionally their furnishing leaves much to be desired, and the nurses have many inconveniences to put up with, besides their difficulties in coping with the native dressers. The private nurses, too, find themselves in strange places—if they are single-handed, one case follows another so quickly that it is hard for them to feel they have done justice to all. One writes of having been called to a serious case of typhoid two hours after her arrival in Ceylon, and others find cases booked for months in advance. Their time is largely occupied by maternity cases and various forms of fever, and they have the satisfaction of knowing that they are able to save many valuable lives. They themselves feel that the strongest plea for their services is the desperate plight in which they often find young men on distant estates, ill to the point of death with enteric fever, isolated from all friends, the doctor only able to visit them once a day, and their native servants ready to be kind, but too ignorant and superstitious to be relied upon for intelligent care. The timely arrival of the nurse from home has, in many instances, averted fatal consequences from the complications which such a state of neglect brings about. The prevailing tone which runs through all the correspondence from which these facts are gleaned is one of cheerful readiness to do their duty, and it is a tribute to the unselfish devotion of English nurses that they know how to make the best of the circumstances in which they find themselves, and are not easily discouraged when their path is beset by unforeseen trials.

But, while the functions of these Colonial and Nursing Committees are the most interesting, equally important are those of the Finance Committee.

Until last year, the funds were entirely derived from the sum originally raised by Mrs. Piggott and a few annual subscriptions.

The necessities of the work require that there should always be a certain floating capital, which can be drawn upon at any moment to meet a sudden demand for outfit, passage-money, etc., which cannot be estimated beforehand, but which often needs a large sum at once. As a general rule, this sum is advanced as a loan, and is refunded as soon as the nurse arrives in the colony; but it may also be that the Association must wait for months before the local committee is in a position to repay its debt. As the list of subscriptions is not long, it was felt it would be a great advantage to have a small endowment fund, from which a regular income would accrue, and thus make the Association less dependent on the fluctuations of popular support. Accordingly, it was decided by the Executive Committee to endeavor to raise a fund of £5,000 for investment. An appeal was made to the public, and although a certain proportion of this modest sum was obtained, donations have recently very largely fallen off in consequence of the numerous demands made upon the public in connection with the war in South Africa. It is much to be hoped that the whole of this amount may before long be in the hands of the Trustees.

In July, 1899, the annual meeting of the Association was held at Stafford House. Lord Loch presided, and the resolution adopting the report was moved by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and seconded by Mr. Asquith, Home Secretary of the late Government. Both expressed their conviction that the field of work was ripe for the harvest, and in his official capacity, Mr. Chamberlain testified to the appreciation which the officials felt for the exertions of the society, and quoted a letter from Colonel Wilcox, in command of the West African frontier force on the Niger, "who had paid a high tribute to the value of the services rendered by the ladies who undertook these labors in connection with the force under his command, and declared his belief that the recovery of some of the young officers from the deadly black water fever was due mainly to the care and the attention of the nurses sent out by the Association."

Since the first appointments were made in 1896, fifty-eight nurses have been sent out by the Colonial Nursing Association, of whom twenty have been private nurses and thirty-eight hospital nurses. The former are employed in Ceylon, Cyprus, Dominica, East Griqualand, Japan, Mauritius, Perak, Selangor, Singapore, and also at Bangkok, where there is a nursing home for which

the Queen of Siam, who is much interested in it, has given a house, on the understanding that they shall train several Siamese women every year. The latter are in Accra, the Bahamas, Cape Coast Castle, Ceylon, Cyprus, Hong-Kong, Lagos, Northern Nigeria, Old Calabar, Perak, Selangor, Sierra Leone, Singapore and Trinidad. In Accra, Bangkok, Hong-Kong, Lagos, Old Calabar and Sierra Leone there is a provision which permits the nurses to go out to take care of private cases, when occasion arises. This touches a point which the committee keeps before it as an ideal—viz.: that in the future every hospital or nursing home which receives support from Government funds should have rooms attached to it which can be the headquarters of nurses whose first duty will be to devote themselves to private cases, and whose time, when not employed in this way, can be given to work in the hospital. This would greatly simplify the question of proper lodgings for the private nurses when they are disengaged—a problem which in some remote places it is not easy to solve.

Simultaneously with the work of this Association special efforts have been made, both by private individuals and Her Majesty's Government, to establish schools of tropical medicine, and to promote investigations into the causes of tropical diseases. A school has been started at the Dreadnought Hospital at the Royal Victoria and Albert Docks at Greenwich, assisted by a grant from the Imperial Government, and there is also one at the Royal Southern Hospital at Liverpool. Both places afford unusual facilities for the practical study and treatment of these disorders, as ships constantly return to the docks with severe cases on board which are at once removed to the hospitals.

The Colonial Nursing Association has arranged with these hospitals to take a certain number of their nurses for a short course of special instruction. Already a preference is given by the Association to those who have undergone this supplementary training, and, in the near future, it is probable that no nurse will be sent to the more dangerous climates who has not had the advantages of this experience.

The work which has been described in the preceding pages may appear to be unimportant in comparison with much that is done in the large charitable institutions which abound in the great cities of England and America; but, nevertheless, it is not one of the least of the obligations of empire.

The control of the tropics devolves more and more on the Anglo-Saxon race, and it carries with it the responsibility for the civilization and welfare of the vast populations which turn to English-speaking people for protection and good government.

This duty can only be satisfactorily discharged by men of character and ability, who will bring to their work the best qualities of their race.

The lives of such men are precious, and any organization which will help to preserve them will tend to make the task of administration in tropical countries more easy, and to lighten the burden which empire must bring.

MARY ENDICOTT CHAMBERLAIN.

SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF ENGLISH FICTION.

BY GEORGE MOORE.

I.

It is always difficult to realize that circumstance is unstable and fleeting and that a dream outlasts an empire. Two years ago an Englishman died amid such vociferous testimony of his greatness that he seemed certain of eternal remembrance. But in spite of our resolution to remember, a veil of dust already divides us from him; his name, though vivid in the stone, is vague in the heart, for the heart only remembers ideas and dreams. A few years before, an Irishman died, abandoned by his country amid all circumstance of political disaster. But circumstance is unsubstantial and transitory and the light that he carried on earth seems merely to have been lifted into the sky. One man sprang from an ancient civilization whose life has passed out of dream into circumstance and facts, the other from a race still subject to dreams.

* * * * *

In Elizabethan times England was young, blithe, careless, interested in ideas rather than in facts, and neither in social customs nor in adventures in the South Seas did our early poets find subjects for their poems; the human heart was their adventure, and the Elizabethans span their poems out of the passions. A nation in its youth may be compared with a fountain which, bursting through the loose earth, scatters all the summer a refreshing brightness amid embowering trees. The birds come down from the branches and drink, with sweet movement of head and throat, and flowers brighten beneath the refreshing shower. The sun's heat cakes the earth, but still the water flows, loosening it, and the grass and flowers renew themselves until the first frost marks a deadly change in the season. But even at the end of September,

in October, after the first frosts, summer may come again; a gentle, inactive summer, with here and there a day that is most June-like. And a beautiful St. Martin's summer happened at the beginning of this century. Our fountain of song burst forth again, the late summer lasted until nearly two-thirds of the century were done, and in the seventies were seen the last days of summer weather. November came with the eighties, a wheezy, asthmatic bard with gray in his beard. In December, in the nineties, the English garden was white; the diminishing water from the fountain ascended for the last time; and now it stands stiff and cold in the air!

There comes a moment in the life of every nation when it crystallizes, and England crystallized with Cromwell. An iron wind came out of the north, and Milton's magnificence is stern and cold; the feet of the colossus are beginning to freeze; the month is September, and his verse is perceptibly chiller than the warm, live stream of Elizabethan poetry. The frost continued; upon the first thin ice Pope did some excellent figure-skating; and it took fifty years or more to melt this first ice. Then spring came again, or was it a second summer which happened in our literature at the beginning of the century? No more to a nation than to an individual man does spring come again; the most we can hope for is a second summer. The fountain showered as joyfully as before, but there was sleep in the drooping boughs, and the water that surged, babbled and sang and flowed in noisy and deep streams had lost something of its primal freshness; nor was the temperature of the water equable. Keats is like a hot bath, Wordsworth is tepid, Byron steams like a glass of toddy, and Coleridge is drugged with various narcotics. Shelley is the sublime exception, and in the middle of our St. Martin's summer he stands a symbol of eternal youth. The greatness of none of these poets is in dispute; it is the sudden differences which they present that remind us that the month is October; and the poets that followed them are poets of the period. There are too many rectory gardens in Tennyson for the delight of any age except the Victorian age, and we cannot think of Rossetti singing in Elizabethan times; a little perhaps in the Italian Renaissance. Swinburne is our last universal poet; Atalanta is dateless; she seems to live in the eternal woods and hills of the morning, with the music of the Pastoral Symphony. The moralizing in "Jenny"

is surely as modish as her crinoline, which advertised "dainties through the dirt;" and the Sonnets are gold and enamel, curiously inwrought ornaments, rather than the spontaneous singing coming straight out of the heart of the springtime.

In the seventies many a pretty song passed unheeded, and it was not until the nineties, until Tennyson died and Swinburne's song had grown fainter, that people began to feel the absence of a great poet in London. For eighty years there had been an unbroken line of great poets, and suddenly there was not one; a frosty silence shivered in the ear, and we were all looking through the wintry woods where the waters stood like a great white stalk in the air. Here and there a few drops trickled through the ice, and these were collected in cups of many various designs, and whoever discovered a little muddy pool raised joyful cries, and the drinkers did not perceive that it was not spring but rain water they were drinking; water stagnant in some worn places, diluted perhaps with a few tricklings from the fountain. It was circulated in flasks of old Italian design, and in common tin flasks that the soldiers use. The palate had deteriorated, and in proportion as the water was brackish and filthy it was greedily swallowed. It suited a coarsened palate, and that this should happen in England, where poetry is a national art, is as strange as if music were to die out of the German ear, and Bayreuth were to mistake the disconnected scrapings of a Hungarian band for a Prelude by Bach.

II.

Our youth began in verse, and it is in verse that England has best told the troubled throbbing of the heart and the yearnings and visions which the mind follows after. From the beginning prose went to earn a mercenary wage in the subaltern employment of facts; and it is nearly true to say that only one English prose writer has lifted prose out of its anchorage in facts, and with sails woven out of noble harmonies sailed it down the star-lit streams of dream and vision; others have done this occasionally and partially, but only one has done it continuously. Only by one has prose been considered as verse has always been considered in England, as a medium through which we may obtain dream and ecstasy, as we attain dream and ecstasy through music and painting. The mission of prose in England has always been

limited to the service of real life, whereas the mission of painting and poetry and music has always had for its object the raising of our souls out of the lethargies of real life into a supersensuous heaven where the horizons are thrown back, and the soul is conscious of nothing but itself.

But the servitude of English prose to the things of this world began in the Elizabethan time, when men's eyes did not see so clearly the things of this world as they do now, and so the early servitude of prose was a comparatively light one; and though the English essay occupies an inferior position to the poem, whether dramatic or narrative, it still holds through the genius of Pater, Landor and De Quincey, a high place in our literature—a place so high that if all our prose literature were destroyed except the works of our essayists and translators, the inferiority between English prose and English verse would probably not strike any one except the discerning critic. It is our prose fiction that brings into striking relief the inferiority of the minds of those who worked in prose to the minds of those whose work is in verse; and that English prose fiction should be the weakest part of our literature is consonant with all that has been advanced here regarding the change which came over the national temper about two hundred and fifty years ago. Prose fiction appeared in England about a hundred years after Cromwell; it was a child therefore of our middle age. Twins, I should say, were born to us, for “Clarissa Harlowe” and “Tom Jones” appeared simultaneously. But the twins differed exceedingly from each other; one threw back to the early literature; the other dictated the form which the English novel was to take down to the present day. For so far as we are aware, there exists no instance in our literature of a deviation from the “Tom Jones” type of novel to the “Clarissa Harlowe” type of novel, and to appreciate the shallowness of the tradition which has made our fiction, and the depth of the tradition which has made our poetry, we have only to understand the essential differences which divide these novels. That neither was written by a great writer does not affect the purpose of this article, which is to classify, rather than to stimulate our admiration for Fielding and for Richardson.

That there are some who cannot survive the loss of purity is the moral idea which Richardson's tale embodies. It is said of the ermine that it dies if its immaculate fur becomes stained, and

Clarissa's purity is as sacred to her; and though she has no fault to repent—if she had, the tale would be impossible—she dies because the sense of bodily purity is essential to her. The scheme at first sight seems monastic and crude, but if we look into our hearts we find it there sure enough. It is beyond reason that we should think, yet we can think, if only for a moment, that the snow is purer over which the shadow of an eagle's wings has not fallen than the snow across which the shadow has once fled. So the tale is the certain symbol of a moral idea, and symbolism is the characteristic of the literature which preceded it rather than the literature which followed it. Are not Shakespeare's Tragedies all symbols? and that the moral idea is often so deeply hidden in the work that it escapes the notice of the casual reader, that it is so deeply hidden that it escapes the observance of so acute a critic as Mr. Quiller Couch, should not deceive us. It is always there, and our appreciation of the beauty of the tale will be heightened by finding it.

On a former occasion when this important literary question was being debated in the press, I remember that Mr. Quiller Couch, to my surprise, challenged me to point to a moral idea in the *Iliad*. At the moment I was weary of the argument, and too indolent to answer him. But, surely, Helen is a symbol of man's constant pursuit of beauty, and that Homer was aware of the symbolism of his tale, can hardly be doubted. Why else should he have made the old men say when Helen passes them: "After all, she was worth it." These are not the words, but I remember a scene when a number of old men grouped on the wall see Helen passing and in a phrase equivalent to that which I have marked by inverted commas make clear the symbolism of the epic. And it is this symbolism which makes the *Iliad* the story of all human life; divest the story of its moral idea, and it will be the story for the Greeks alone; for beautiful verses written about a merely romantic episode are never immortal verses; the verbal felicities in little literature are as numerous as those in great literature, and by felicities of diction it is impossible to distinguish one from the other.

The certain sign by which we may distinguish the great from the small in literature is by asking ourselves if a story is symbolic; if it be a symbol, that is to say, if it be the outward sign of a moral idea.

III.

The publication of "*Clarissa Harlowe*" happened just before, or just after, the publication of "*Tom Jones*," and those novels suggest the last milestone of the old, and the first milestone of the new road. The old road was tragedy—that is to say, a story which symbolizes a moral idea; and the new road was comedy—that is to say, the study of the appearances of life, the habit in which man lives; and manners were chosen by England, and tragedy was chosen by France. Richardson discovered disciples in France but none in England. L'Abbé Prévost is one instance of the influence of Richardson in France, but the influence of Richardson on the French novel is not the subject of this article.

That England should choose comedy was inevitable, for England had already produced tragedy, and when once an art has been developed to the highest point in any country it declines, and then disappears from that country forever. So England paid no heed to Richardson, and with Fielding turned to manners for change and relaxation; and since Fielding the English novel has been abandoned to the notation of the manners and customs of the different classes. And so absorbed has England been in her love of the novel of manners that criticism has forgotten that all literature which relies on manners for subject-matter cannot outlive the social aspect which it describes. It cannot outlive itself; its life is the life of one generation; after that it lives the life of a ghost; it becomes the history of trivialities which have passed away. And glimmerings of this truth float about Thackeray's remark that no one since Fielding had dared to paint the portrait of a complete man. The remark is in constant use in the newspapers, the writers of the literary article quote it always approvingly, but it may be doubted if any one of these writers ever considered the remark; it is doubtful if Thackeray considered it; it is just one of those casual remarks which the public delights in, for it compromises no position, and its meaning is uncertain and vague. It is one of those remarks which save people from the trouble of thinking, of seeing to the end; it is like a pleasant cloud, it passes overhead, casting a little shadow, and the conversation can take another turn. But the time is opportune to consider the remark more severely, and the first thing that strikes us is the expression "*dared to paint*," for it would not have occurred to Thackeray to use these words if he had been speaking of a poet

or an historian, for poets and historians had not abandoned their right to set down their whole thought on paper. So the word "dared" defines Thackeray's conception of the novel as a subaltern and mercenary literary form whose province and limitations have been settled beyond further dispute. And the application of the adjective "complete" to a man's portrait seems to us to indicate a mind naturally prone to superficial thinking. Pater could not have written a portrait of a complete man, for he would have known that it is impossible to paint the complete portrait of a man; and then Fielding's portrait of "Tom Jones" is singularly incomplete. It would have seemed to Pater if he had written on the subject to be summary, and singularly on the surface, whereas Thackeray seems to have seen no more than the average man sees in the book; what struck him in reading "Tom Jones" is what strikes the casual mind. He seems to have thought that Fielding had painted the portrait of a complete man (I don't remember if the words used are "complete portrait of a man" or the "portrait of a complete man"), because Fielding had spoken openly of Tom Jones's sexual instincts. The hungry and the lustful man always seems to us the most human, but lust and hunger are not especially human qualities. The common bull terrier may be as lustful and as hungry as any man; the qualities which man does not share in equal degree with the common bull terrier are a conscience and an intelligence; and as Fielding wished to write comedy, not tragedy, he omitted all mention of a conscience. In one of the little moralities which preface the chapters the word no doubt occurs, but he omitted to make us feel that Tom Jones ever suffered from a conscience, and on the question of Tom's intelligence it is not probable that Fielding ever bestowed even a passing thought; his artistic sense led him aright and he instinctively omitted every faintest indication of these essentially human qualities in his Portrait of a Complete Man; he wisely omitted them, for he wished to write comedy, not tragedy, and psychology is not compatible with comedy.

Thackeray's remark about Tom Jones is characteristic of all his remarks: it is at once shallow and evasive, and therefore popular in the newspapers. If he had said: "Fielding's portrait is singularly incomplete, for it is comprised entirely of lust and physical courage, but as these are immortal instincts the man lives, in the shallows of animal life, it is true, but he lives," he would

have succeeded in defining the merits of Fielding's novel in words which would not have been freely quoted in the newspapers.

"Tom Jones" is drawn in such fine, bold outline that it takes as high a place in literature as the drawings of Rowlandson and Gillray in pictorial art. But this by the way. The character of the novel which it is more to our purpose to notice is Squire Western, for on him hangs the long tradition of our fiction. Squire Western is described in the mere habit of his life; from him we learn facts concerning the squirearchy of 1750—how they swore, and how they drank, and how they were immersed in sport beyond all other considerations. He is the novel of manners which, at the beginning of this century, was carried to its conclusion by Miss Austen; for consciously or unconsciously, this lady resolved to carry to its logical conclusion the novel which Fielding had indicated in "Tom Jones." The casual reader perceives no character resembling Tom Jones among her characters, and he will seek vainly for a Squire Western; the casual reader is deceived by a difference of appearance, and he will have to make an effort if he would understand why a change from the drunken squire to the demure domesticities of Mr. Woodhouse does not constitute any change of intention or principle.

Miss Austen's genius lay on the negative side, in an unfailing sense of her limitations, and on the affirmative side in a lively sense of the pathos of domestic life. Some one has called her a prose Shakespeare, and this remark has been almost as much quoted in the newspapers as Thackeray's complete man. It would be difficult to differentiate between the two remarks; they are perfect examples of the phrases which men devise as a means of escape from thought. Was it not Lord Macaulay who called Miss Austen a prose Shakespeare? Even when we have imagined Shakespeare's poetry turned into prose we are still thinking of works that are the opposite to Miss Austen's. For as has been already said, every one of Shakespeare's tragedies symbolizes a human passion, whereas the genius of Miss Austen is that no faintest trace of passion should appear. The author of this strange remark must have been merely aware of some extraordinary excellence, the exact nature of which escaped him, and it is such vague admiration that a work of art provokes in the common heart; we stop to admire, and to ponder at the power of art to awaken reverence even in the mind which fails to understand.

Still more than Fielding's, Miss Austen's genius was to confine herself to the representation of man in the habit of his life, unmoved by human passions; and it is our sense of the tragedy beneath the treacherous calm that induces us to read the three pages which she devotes to the discussion of which lady should get into the carriage first, and the endless disquisitions of an elderly gentleman on the excellencies of gruel as an evening beverage. Never is the mask dropped. If it were, though only for a moment, the mystery of the mask could never be recaptured. It is Miss Austen's plausible lying that induces us to bear with her for a little, and allows us, when we put a book of hers down, to say that her novels are as perfect as they are tedious. Miss Austen dared everything; she was far more daring than Fielding, for she dared to be tiresome, and to dare that is the surest sign of genius.

In limiting the novel of manners strictly to manners, rivalry with Miss Austen was impossible. To say less than she said was to say nothing at all. On the other side of Miss Austen, the novel of instinct and of passion—over the threshold of which Richardson had merely ventured—was beyond Thackeray's reach, so he did what his personal limitations and the circumstances of his life willed him to do, he introduced exciting events into the novel of manners. Becky Sharp is mildly melodramatic; we see her merely as we see a fly buzzing in a glass; of the workings of her mind we know nothing. In *Tom Jones*, Fielding omitted all qualities except lust and courage; Thackeray omits both from his portrait of a woman, and he does not include either a conscience or an intelligence. Being a woman, physical courage might be deemed unessential, but a sexual temperament is necessary in an adventuress, for to succeed in gallantry a natural taste for gallantry is requisite. Shakespeare no doubt had this in his mind when he conceived Cleopatra in the rhapsody of all her passion, and Mme. La Pompadour, who can speak with the certainty of experience on such a matter, writes to her friend, Madame Hudon, in terms too eighteenth-century for quotation in the nineteenth. We imagine Becky Sharp as we please, a cold or a passionate woman; and only by exterior signs do we surmise what her intimacy with Lord Steyne may have been. The narrative never reaches a higher intensity than drawing-room gossip: the bills are not paid, and his lordship calls every afternoon, etc. And the husband, who might have stood for a fine portrait of a wittol, is

rehabilitated before the admiring gaze of the Conventions when he dashes the brooches in the face of the prostrate lord. This scene has been much admired, but those who have admired it have neglected to give the reasons for their admiration; it is surely no more than one of those extraneous scenes resting on no psychological foundation, which litter the second-rate literature of the world.

The merit of "*Vanity Fair*" is in the design, in the placing of the characters, in the ingenuity with which the parts are linked together. But if we consider the quality of the mind reflected in this book, we become aware that it is at once trivial and commonplace. Fielding has been compared to Gillray and to Rowlandson. It would be difficult to show that Thackeray's merits are greater than those of Leech or Du Maurier. There is probably not a thought in the little moralities with which Fielding prefixes his chapters which Turgeneff or Balzac would have taken the trouble to write down. His reflections on life are commonplace enough, but they are not obsequious, like Thackeray's. Thackeray did not reflect the mind of the club: he identified himself with it, with the deadly mind of St. James's Street. He is spoken of as a satirist. Well, he twitted young ladies with wanting to get married, but why should they not want to get married? His general outlook on life seems to be that if their *mammas* would allow them to marry the young men their hearts sighed for, the last reproach that could be legitimately urged against society would be removed.

The question whether the novelist should or should not comment upon his characters is a favorite theme with the writers of the literary articles in the newspapers, and the theme is suitable for the writer's purpose, for it is just one of those literary externalities which the casual reader can understand and be interested in. Nothing he likes more than that literature should be presented to him in the light of a card trick. You shuffle this way, and count ten from the king, etc. Narrate the facts, refrain from comment. That is how a superior modern fiction is written. And so the casual reader is happily led into a vague belief that literature is progressing; that the way to write perfect fiction has perhaps been found out. If the literary writer were to explain that a story cannot be written without comment, and that if it were done it would be intolerable as Bradshaw, and that it is not

the abundance nor the paucity of comment but the amount of intellect that finds its way into the comment that matters, the excitement of the casual reader would not be nearly so intense. He is aware that his intelligence is not deep, and that it cannot be increased, so he takes refuge in the cloud, he follows the illusion, the "Wild Duck." After all, who knows? "Perhaps the trick has been discovered."

The measure of a writer's intelligence transpires as much in his characters as in his comments, and no more. He may have more faculty in one direction than in another, but the true critic is never deceived; he reads the barrenness of the writer's mind though his comments are reduced, as in Maupassant, to a few phrases, and he divines the great bulk of Flaubert's mind in a single phrase; and he reads Balzac's universal mind as well in his characters as in those multitudinous discourses, so numerous that it would be vain to attempt a summary.

Dickens, Thackeray's contemporary, was a man of a deeper and a more richly colored temperament, a man of genius, but one whose genius did not meet with circumstances favorable to an intimate and energetic development. He partakes so largely of the nature of his time that it is open to doubt he achieved any serious literature. In the end it comes to this, that the English novelist does not occupy a higher place in literature than the Italian operatic composer does in music. A story is told of Rossini which might be very well told of Dickens. Rossini had been to hear Wagner, and meeting a friend, he said, sighing, "I too was gifted, and if I had been brought up in Germany I might have written music." Rossini knew the truth; he knew that his natural gifts were of a very high order, but they were uncultivated, and he knew they would remain uncultivated because he was wanting in energy of mind. Dickens lived in a time when England had grown inaccessible to ideas, in an age in which facts alone seemed to be worth acquiring, and it is to his credit that in an honest or a simple and unsuspecting way he seems to have been aware of the materializing influences at work, that a second crystallization had begun in England. Mr. Gradgrind is not a great, clear vision of the century's end, but in a limited way Mr. Gradgrind shows that Dickens was not incapable of philosophic speculation. But a man's vision is proportioned to the light of his time, and it is impossible to imagine an English Victorian writer creating such in-

instinctive men and women as Bazaroff, Helene, Irene, or seeing his race with that clear vision with which Turgenieff saw Russia, or re-thinking all the moral and intellectual ideas of Europe with the swiftness and prolonged power of Balzac. Fettered in a tradition, bad as that which held opera back until Wagner broke it, Dickens could not look humanity full in the face and allow his soul to flow out upon the paper. The English law of fiction was that man had to be considered as a joke or a humdrum creature of habit. Dickens chose the former as Miss Austen had chosen the latter; Dickens could be incisive and poignant; he could even lift a fold of the veil, for "under the cover of laughter" half a truth may be allowed to pass, but if the instincts were forbidden, and if there were no prose examples showing how they might be utilized, landscape was free to his imagination, and it was in places that Dickens's genius found an outlet. He introduced the spiritual life of places into English fiction; Balzac had done this in "Seraphita," but in Balzac we find everything; in other writers we find this and that quality. All that is spiritual in London found expression in "Bleak House" and "The Old Curiosity Shop;" the sanctity of the English landscape rises up in the pages of "Barnaby Rudge." Dickens was a great visionary, living in a time when the soul was in eclipse; living at almost any other time, his characters would have bulked up in the tragic masses of Rembrandt's imagination.

IV.

A large part of English time is given up to the reading of novels, and the supply has always been found equal to the demand; in England novelists are as plentiful as the common rabbit, and nearly as prolific, so it will not be assumed that if I do not speak of all our distinguished writers I have not shown that English novels are made of violent and episodical incidents or of descriptions of the manners and customs of the different classes. Of Scott, Reade, Trollope and Stevenson, I do not propose to speak; I expect some assistance from my reader, who is probably acquainted with these writers better than I am; he has already run their works over in his mind, and has decided if among them there is to be found a tale symbolic of a moral idea. He has probably decided if a symbolical novel is to be found among women writers. He has decided, no doubt, wisely in his own mind, but on this point I will hazard a few remarks, for in æsthetics there are few points

more interesting to ponder than woman's inferiority to man. The average woman seems so much more intelligent than the average man. Her appreciations of a book, a picture, a symphony, are more interesting than his. The woman is at least alert and sympathetic, the man is stolidly indifferent. It is quite true that in the ordinary intercourse of life it is difficult to perceive man's superiority. It is not until the hand is laid to the work that it manifests itself. Only in the art of acting, and perhaps in that of singing, is woman the equal of man. Her poetry is as inferior to Shakespeare's or Shelley's as her music is to Beethoven, and it is as impossible to think of her writing, "The Human Comedy" as it is to think of her painting Michael Angelo's "Last Judgment" or carving the statue of Victory in the Louvre. Women have written charming poems, and painted some charming pictures, but none except perhaps Miss Austen has achieved an artistic personality; yes, and perhaps Mme. Morizot. In looking at a picture by Mme. Morizot I have often asked myself if it did not contain a grace more delicate and touching than the graces which abound in the pictures of her great brother-in-law, whose art she carried with many lovely modifications across her fan. Often I have asked myself if the poems of Christina Rossetti were not more sincere than her brother's, if the emotion in them did not come straighter from the heart than the emotions which writhe about the spiral staircases of "The House of Life." Possibly they do, but the fact remains that one achieved a poetic personality and the other did not.

It is with diffidence that I intervene in this discussion, which always provokes protest; were it possible I would write only upon subjects upon which all men are agreed, but to do so would be, to borrow a phrase from Matthew Arnold, "to lie with them in the clean straw of their intellectual habits." It has been said that woman is inferior to man because man has oppressed her in the past; that now she is free and educated she will show that she is his equal in intelligence. Educated! Again the cloud, the illusion, the "Wild Duck," anything rather than courageous thought. The reason of man's oppression of woman in the past could only be because she was his natural inferior, and what has existed for a hundred thousand years will not be altered by any system of education, however carefully devised. The mare and the stallion are nearly equal in speed, in endurance, in courage; the dog and the bitch are equal; the bull is manifestly superior to the cow in all

these qualities, and the stag is still more manifestly superior to the hind. Why these things should be is Nature's secret; and possibly the stag and the hind present as exact an image as we shall find among animals of man's relation to woman.

It would be as vain to seek a symbolic novel among women as to seek a religion. Women occupy in art exactly the same place as they do in religion; they worship very prettily the gods that men create for them. They make very good saints, and they carry our ideas very gracefully across their fans. The Brontës wrote some admirable novels, melodramatic and social, but is it necessary to point out that "*Jane Eyre*" is not a symbol of a moral idea? That "*Villette*" is charming, and that "*Wuthering Heights*" is melodramatic? George Eliot tried to think like a man, and produced admirable counterfeits of his thoughts in wax-work. So far her novels may be said to be symbolical. Are Adam Bede and Arthur and the facetious farmer's wife more living than the figures in any wax-work show? They are dumpty and doll-like, their eyes are fixed, and their skins are sallow and reddened. Maggie Tulliver seems for a moment like the embodiment of an ethical principle, but the story is interrupted by a flood, and the critic asks if the subject of the book is Maggie's temperament or the rising of the Floss. Even religion has not won the English novel from its original character; neither here nor in America has religion made a single convert from Fielding; none has had the strength to break away from the raking and hoeing in the beds of rural and urban manners and build again upon the passions. In the English novel religion is lost sight of in the desire to distinguish between Roman Catholics and Baptists, and in intention the religious novel is the same as the social novel. In England the intention is to distinguish between the baronet and the grocer; across the Atlantic to distinguish between Americans who have been to Paris and those who have stayed at home.

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I stop without having said all. England has produced the richest poetical literature in the world, and in Shakespeare, in Milton, in Shelley, in Wordsworth she will find her true immortality. Her empire will pass away and be forgotten like the Babylonian and the Persian, for the heart only remembers ideas and dreams.

GEORGE MOORE.

WHY BRITISH WORKMEN CONDEMN THE WAR.

BY F. MADDISON, M. P.

DURING the last few months, and especially in the course of the recent debate in the House of Commons, much has been said about the feeling of the British people with regard to the war now raging in South Africa. With the exception of Ireland, where open sympathy with the Boers has been expressed, and endorsed by the overwhelming majority of the Irish nation, it has been claimed by Ministers, and to some extent by the Opposition also, that the Empire is absolutely united in the determination to crush the two Dutch Republics. The supremacy of the Briton over the Boer is now presented as the one sole issue, and this policy, it is declared, unites every section and merges all parties into one patriotic whole. Newspapers support this view in leading articles written to suit the occasion, while column after column of descriptive accounts of "the call to arms" of the volunteers leaves the impression that in mansion and cottage alike the war is the one absorbing topic, and to go to the front the ruling passion. This is the picture painted by the Government and their allies in the press and elsewhere. Does it faithfully represent the facts—is it true to life? The purpose of this article is to examine its accuracy so far as the work-people of the United Kingdom are concerned, and to see what is their attitude to the war and the ultimate settlement which will follow.

First, then, how has the terrible struggle in South Africa affected the masses of the people? This question may perhaps best be answered by saying that they have as yet barely realized the actual situation. When war was proclaimed it caused none of those sensations which the yellow press tried to work up, and even to-day there is an absence of anything approaching excitement. That natural calmness which has won the admiration of hostile Continental critics is displayed to the full by the work-people of

the country, but candor compels me to say that it is due to some considerable extent to their slackness in following public events, never more marked than during this last five years. But, of course, the serious reverses to our arms have had the effect of quickening the interest in the war, and just in proportion as this awakening has developed, all traces of jingoism, which feeds on ignorance, have passed away. But, as a matter of fact, among what may be called the regular body of workers there has never existed anything which could fairly be termed enthusiasm, much less any mad frenzy for predominance and conquest. The Government apologists are on safe ground when they appeal to the workman's pride of race by eulogizing the dauntless bravery of his brothers who are fighting and dying for a cause he does not understand, but associates with his country. He will listen to nothing which seeks to weaken the military arm in its effort to strike a successful blow against an enemy in possession of British territory. However wrong Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy may have been, and even if you convince him that President Krüger's ultimatum only forestalled our own by a few days, you will not shift the average British workman from his position—that so long as an inch of Natal or Cape Colony is held by the Boers there cannot and should not be peace. That this is the attitude of the working classes as a whole seems to me to be indisputable.

But even this resolute determination has not made the people jingoes, nor does it justify the assertion that the Government's policy finds universal endorsement. So far, even in free England, it has not been an easy matter to secure the opportunity to publicly examine the causes which led to the war. Under the plea of patriotism, the whole Tory and most of the Liberal press have held up criticism of the Government's diplomacy as only one remove from treason. To speak while negotiations were proceeding was characterized as playing into the hands of the Boers and embarrassing the Colonial Secretary, and to say that the war might have been avoided after it had begun is to be immediately dubbed a pro-Boer, while a reference to any other settlement than one of annexation pure and simple stamps you at once as an avowed enemy of your country. This is the kind of political atmosphere which has been created by the war party, and it is not one calculated to stimulate thought and inquiry. Under such circumstances, it is not to be wondered at that large numbers of

workmen have mistaken the dictum of a Minister for truth, and thought that patriotism demanded of them the surrender of judgment and conscience at the bidding of some statesman who had outraged both. It may be frankly admitted that the constant beating of the war-drum has for the moment caught the ear of the crowd, and at election times they are most useful. But the crowd does not ultimately govern. Experience shows that what is called working-class opinion in England is not obtained by a counting of heads, but by collective expressions from organized bodies. Thus we are said, and rightly, to be the stronghold of trade unionism, and yet only about one in every five of the male population is a member of a trade union. But that minority, even when less powerful, has inspired and given shape to industrial legislation. Nor has it done this contrary to the general desire of the majority. Outside the sphere of organized labor, but in close touch with it, is a large number of workmen, the agricultural laborers forming the chief group. For my immediate purpose these may be included in one section. Both have sufficient cohesion on the one hand and distinctive individuality on the other to be able to form a volume of public opinion capable of being analyzed and labelled. But these do not exhaust the divisions of the working classes. There is the unattached—not merely those who do not form part of any definite organization, but who lack any of those distinguishing features necessary to give them a distinctive place in public opinion. These do not argue about right or wrong. They simply accept the dogma that whoever is against the Government cannot be for his country. But this can no more be regarded as working-class opinion than that of any other section. To obtain what is likely to be the enduring verdict of British workmen, we must go to the accredited mediums by which it is invariably conveyed.

One of the most important of these organs of industrial opinion is the Trade Union Congress. This body fights shy of anything of the nature of party politics, and, as the war comes within that category to some extent, there was hesitation to allow it to be introduced. In the end, a resolution was carried protesting against asserting the British demands by force. Much of the value of this pronouncement was lost on account of the debate taking place when so few delegates were present. This was not the fault of Mr. W. C. Steadman, M. P., who moved the motion, and there is little doubt that a still better

result would have been obtained if the discussion had taken place earlier. Then the London Trades Council, the mouthpiece of the organized workers, skilled and unskilled, of the metropolis, where jingoism always begins first and ends last, has ranged itself on the side of peace. But in many respects there is no better test of organized working-class opinion on a political question like the war than the attitude of the labor members of the House of Commons. They are all trade unionists, but have no definite organization in Parliament. Each pursues his own course, and therefore they cannot be accused of acting together like machine politicians. Further, they represent various schools of thought. There is Mr. Thomas Burt, a Radical, who declines to adopt the special badge of labor, while Mr. John Burns calls himself a Socialist, and does not act officially with the Liberal party. Mr. B. Pickard is the uncompromising advocate of State-regulated hours of labor in mines, which Mr. John Wilson as resolutely opposes. Side by side are Mr. C. Fenwick and Mr. S. Woods, the latter having beaten the former for the post of Secretary of the Parliamentary Committee of the Trade Union Congress. Without any party ties or any arranged action, every workman member of the House of Commons, with one solitary exception, condemns the policy which led to the war, and has marked this disapproval by his vote. This solidarity is significant, and to many of us is the sure indication of the ultimate verdict of the democracy.

It may be worth while examining the ground of this opposition to the war policy, which is common to the entire body of working-class opponents. To begin with, they are not pro-Boers. These Dutch farmers are regarded as reactionaries—Tories, in fact, of the old school—and it is felt that it was inevitable that the new conditions resulting from the mining industry should cause trouble. Therefore, the Uitlanders' grievances have not been denied, but the British workman fails to see why the doctrine of patience, so persistently preached to him during this century, while he has been agitating for reforms, many of which are still denied him, should not be applied to the gold seekers of the Transvaal, especially as they were foreigners in an independent State. Take the question of the franchise which was selected by Sir Alfred Milner, with the approval of Mr. Chamberlain, as the test reform. These Uitlanders, many of whom were not British, have only endured their disabilities for some ten years. This seems to work-

men in England a very short period in the history of reform. Why, they remember that it was not until 1832 that any attempt was made to enfranchise the people, and that what is called the great Reform Bill left untouched entirely the masses of the population. It was this bitter disappointment that gave strength to, if it did not originate, the Chartist movement. The work-people had not to wait ten years only for the next step in the widening of the franchise, but thirty-five years, the interval being filled in with much suffering and persecution of the men who led the agitation for popular representation. And then, when the artisans of the towns did obtain the vote, it was so hampered with conditions as to make it largely inoperative. But the bill then passed left some two millions of Uitlanders in the country districts, who were for all practical purposes as much outside the commonwealth as though they had been aliens. Again a weary period of waiting followed, and it was some seventeen years before the agricultural laborer and other workers were admitted to the franchise. What adds to the irony of the situation is the fact that the very statesmen who are so zealous for the enfranchisement of the Uitlanders of a foreign country bitterly opposed the endowment of their own countrymen with the full rights of citizenship. But even now, after a century's agitation, manhood suffrage has yet to be gained, and our registration laws are designed to make it difficult for poor men to secure their votes. By the present system, many of those entitled to be on the register cannot get their names inserted, and, for a variety of reasons, not applicable to other sections of the community, it is calculated that there are no less than two millions of workmen who are excluded from the franchise. It is in this way that the working-class leaders look at the demand of the Uitlanders in the Transvaal. They do not blame them for seeking political power; nay, they are with them in their attempt to secure it. But they strongly object to assist them with the military forces of the nation to become citizens of another country, thereby renouncing their own nationality. In all the grievances set forth by the Uitlanders, workmen fail to find any which time would not have certainly remedied, and that at no distant period. They have waited for generations for reforms of the most equitable kind, and for some they still wait. Why, then, should South African millionaires not be called upon to exercise that patience preached so long as a cardinal virtue by the ruling classes in

England? This represents the attitude of organized working-class opinion to the alleged wrongs of the Uitlanders.

But it is not the details of diplomacy nor high questions of international law which appeal with much force to the democracy. These are shrouded in mysterious language, though the independence of the South African Republic stands out clear through all the fogs generated by the endless discussions in and out of Parliament. The appeal of Mr. Chamberlain to President Krüger to spare the lives of the principal actors in the Raid settles once for all in the minds of plain men the internal independence of the Transvaal. These things, however, do not go to the root of the mischief. The war is regarded as the outcome of a capitalist conspiracy. This is the conviction which shapes the action of the working-class leaders. Mr. John Burns voiced it in his able speech in the House of Commons, and it is shared by Radical and Socialist alike. They believe that it was not a desire for political power, but for Stock Exchange purposes, that the agitation against the Boer Government was started. For this view the Rhodesian capitalists are responsible. They have made it plain that to them the war has a commercial value. Mr. Hays Hammond, the engineer of the Consolidated Gold Fields Company of South Africa, estimates that the companies on the Rand will add two and a quarter millions annually to their dividend, his own company netting over a million of this extra profit. If this result is to be obtained from improved government, all well and good, and no reasonable man would object; but the source from which these increased dividends are to come is made clear. This same Mr. Hays Hammond, addressing the Consolidated shareholders, used these words:

"With good government there should be an abundance of labor, and with an abundance of labor there will be no difficulty in cutting down wages, because it is preposterous to pay a Kafir the present wages. He would be quite as well satisfied—in fact, he would work longer—if you gave him half the amount."

To the British workman this is not pleasant reading. He does not like to think that the veldt has been dyed red to make it easier for a small clique of capitalists, in which the German Jew is conspicuous, to grow rich at the expense of the wretched Kafirs. But how is the native to be exploited? This is not left in doubt. Mr. Albu, a leading Johannesburg capitalist, gave evidence before

the Transvaal Industrial Commission, and he was asked this question: "Is it in the control of the mining industry to regulate the wages of Kafirs?" His reply was conclusive: "To a great extent it is, provided that the Government assists us in bringing labor to this market." The Boer Government would not make itself a labor master to the capitalists, but would insist upon an eight-hour day in the mines, forbid Sunday labor, and would not allow the compound system to be set up. Franchise was as nothing to this unpardonable offense of the Boers. To these high-minded patriots Kimberley, with its overworked and low-paid black labor, and its state of semi-slavery, whereby the Kafir belongs to his employer during the whole of his contract period, is the paradise of their hopes, and the war may realize them. To the British democracy, such objects are altogether alien to the principles of liberty, but that is not all. The capitalists of South Africa have as little respect for white labor as black. They have not even a color pride—nothing but a passion for profit. This is how an Uitlander put it in the columns of the *Mining World*:

"White wages have not been reduced in the past, because the Uitlanders desired to work together for political salvation, and any attack upon the white laborer's pay would have caused a split in the ranks. However, when new conditions prevail, white wages must come down."

This lacks nothing in frankness, whatever one may think of its morality. In face of such avowed objects as these, is it strange that workmen in England are not at all anxious to see those "new conditions" brought about? They will be scarcely sufficient compensation for the awful loss of life and treasure of this war. If it has to be Krüger or Rhodes, British Trade Unionists prefer the old Dutchman, with all his faults, who, at any rate, is a better friend of white labor than the millionaires in a hurry to be rich, who reduce everything to the level of dividends. This is not the blind, class-war feeling indulged in by the State Socialist, nor hostility of the employed to the employer, but a deep-seated distrust and dislike of the international financier, often the enemy of the honest trader. To the representatives of labor the trail of these Shylocks of a gambling commercialism is apparent right through the devious tracks which led to the war.

In spite of the ease with which democracies can be misled by a false cry, the history of this century is a splendid tribute to the chivalry and unerring judgment of the masses of the British people, when once they realize what the issues of a great struggle be-

tween nations really mean. In the fight for Italian unity waged by Mazzini and Garibaldi, and in the heroic efforts of the Hungarian patriot, Kossuth, the heart of the democracy beat true to their cause. When the governing classes cast their influence on the side of the Southern States of America, it was workmen like Mr. W. R. Cremer and other prominent labor leaders who ranged behind Mr. John Bright the force of working-class opinion. It was there, too, on behalf of the suffering Armenians, and the spectacle of gallant little Greece throwing herself against the savage power of Turkey fired the imagination of the people. Those so-called Imperialists who can justify war to secure political reforms in a foreign State, would not risk anything to protect helpless men, women and children, for whom we had undertaken treaty obligations. For war to take permanent hold of the people, it must be for higher things than anything sought in the conflict with the two Dutch Republics. Indeed, if it rested with the democracy in England, so far as its mind can be ascertained, the resort to the sword would be a thing of the past. International arbitration as a practical proposal came from the working classes, and their leaders advocated it when the wise and eminent ones treated it as a pious opinion and its advocates as mere visionaries who were simple enough to believe in the Christianity that other people professed as a creed. It was Mr. Cremer who, in 1893, moved in the House of Commons a resolution in favor of a treaty of arbitration with the United States of America, which was carried without opposition, after Mr. Gladstone had given it his approval. That was followed by a petition to the United States Senate, which contained over 7,000 signatures of representative workmen, all of whom held some office in an organization. A similar one was presented to Lord Salisbury, to which were appended over 5,000 signatures. These documents prove in themselves how strong is the movement for international peace in the ranks of organized labor.

It is not merely that war is regarded as a barbarous method of settling disputes and a cruel waste of precious human life and treasure. It is all that, and men are beginning to question either its utility or morality. But the real fear is not so much what war costs in blood and extra taxation as the militarism it sets up. Already, the strain on our resources caused by the campaign in South Africa has begun to clothe with flesh those shadowy hints at con-

scription which have occasionally of late been thrown out. It is surely a dear price to pay for adding two republics to the Empire, even though it does increase the profits of gold mining from fifteen to forty-five per cent. Besides, the working classes have begun to doubt the "markets" policy of Mr. Chamberlain, and well they may. As the *Financial Reformer* showed some few months ago, this inflated Imperialism does not pay. From 1879 to 1894 the naval and military expenditure was £138,070,000; from 1893 to 1898 it rose to £187,058,000, the difference between these two periods of five years being an increase of £48,988,000 during the latter term. With the exports of British produce to all our colonies and possessions, it was just the reverse. Thus, from 1879 to 1884 the exports amounted to £403,799,000, while from 1893 to 1898 the total fell to £391,225,000, a decrease of £12,574,000. These figures do not make up a good balance sheet, and men now realize the hard fact that British trade in the main is done much nearer home, and that we had better pay more attention to our industrial equipment. The real battle of the future will be in the workshop, and it is technical education, not military service, which will give us our supremacy over Continental and American competitors. This is how the workers reason, and it leads them to fear the spread of militarism. So long as the Government encourages the idea that the Empire is in danger, conscription will excite little concern, but the moment it is put forward as a serious proposal the work people of the country will not hesitate in their resistance to it.

Militarism is an evil spirit not confined to the barrack-room; it creeps into the school and the workshop. Compulsory military service would change the old order of things, and would deaden that sense of self-sufficiency which has been the glory and strength of British workmen. They are willing to defend their island home, but that does not need conscription. But they do not bow down before the Imperial idea or indulge in visions of British supremacy regardless of the cost. To them England, not India, is the centre of empire, and, while by no means parochial in their outlook, they count it dear to add to the burden of the nation by imposing conscription on its sons for the sake of additional territory. Consolidation, not expansion, represents the democratic idea of Imperial policy. When Lord Salisbury declared that, in prosecuting this war in South Africa, England sought neither land

nor gold, he did much to disarm working-class criticism, but that wholesome doctrine has now been openly repudiated. The wiping out of the two Republics is now the Governmental dogma, and it is not one likely to find favor with the democracy. Though few workmen are pro-Boers, the courage the Boers have displayed and the tenacity with which they fight for their independence has won general admiration for a foe so worthy as these Dutchmen. It only needs the Government to push the conquest of the Republics to the extreme to make a goodly company of pro-Boers. Not long since, a well-known Trade Union leader declared to me that, so strongly did he feel our conduct to be unjust in this war, if he were unmarried he would attempt to join the armies of the Republics.

With a deep conviction that the gold mines are the source of all the trouble, and that the desire to make the Rhodesians supreme in the Transvaal was the most powerful motive behind the capitalist agitation, there is a rising volume of organized working class opinion in the United Kingdom against the war. The fact that President Krüger technically commenced hostilities, and that so far we have only been engaged in an attempt to repel the invaders, undoubtedly stills the voice of criticism. But this must not be mistaken for an endorsement of Mr. Chamberlain's diplomacy, nor as an indication that the democracy will look on indifferently while the all too few republics of the world are made less by two.

F. MADDISON.

OUR EUROPEAN TRADE.

BY ROBERT P. PORTER, SPECIAL COMMISSIONER FOR THE UNITED STATES TO CUBA AND PUERTO RICO.

THE United States, at the close of the nineteenth century, is undergoing a change from an agricultural and raw-material producing state to an industrial state. So long as we furnished Europe food and raw material to be converted into highly manufactured articles and to be resold to us and the other markets of the world at a profit, there was little friction in commercial relations. Balances, in many cases, were in our favor, to be sure, but what did that signify when the wheat, corn, flour, cattle, cotton, leather, oil, wood, tobacco, copper and other articles of export were all converted by European labor into something more valuable, and became a source of wealth to the countries purchasing the goods? Our commercial treaties are ancient and a little lame in spots, our consular service not trained in commercial matters (although many of its members are efficient and creditable representatives), our diplomatic service liable to constant change, to say nothing of other defects, such, for example, as the utter lack of banking facilities in our foreign trade machinery. In spite, however, of these and kindred obstacles, we have up to the present time found little difficulty in sending the products of our strongest industries into the world's markets, especially into the European markets, which absorb nearly four-fifths of our foreign exports, and whence we draw from two-thirds to one-half of our imported merchandise. Not that we have ceased to produce for export agricultural products and raw materials. Far from it; for the year 1898 registered the high-water mark of our agricultural exports, exceeding in value \$858,000,000. Relatively speaking, therefore, our exports of agricultural products retain about the usual proportion, namely, nearly 71 per cent. of the total foreign

exports; but, actually, the exports of manufactured products have been steadily increasing, as a glance at the following table shows:

1886.....	\$136,541,978	1893.....	\$158,023,118
1887.....	136,735,105	1894.....	183,728,808
1888.....	130,300,087	1895.....	183,595,743
1889.....	138,675,507	1896.....	228,571,178
1890.....	151,102,376	1897.....	277,285,391
1891.....	168,927,315	1898.....	290,697,354
1892.....	158,510,937	1899.....	338,667,794

The considerable falling off in exports of agricultural products for 1899 has increased the percentage of manufactured products, which, without including mining and forest products and fisheries, represent nearly one-third of our exports for the last fiscal year. It is this particular phase of our foreign commerce which has attracted the attention of the European economists; and the possibilities of the United States in the great distribution of manufactured and natural products has, during the last year or two, been very earnestly discussed in London, Paris and Berlin. The above table shows an increase of over two hundred million dollars in value in exports of manufactured products since 1886. The European manufacturer looks upon this increase with alarm, and the refrain of his song is, If the United States continues to do more and more manufacturing for itself, and also to meet the products of our mills and factories in the open market, we must ultimately lose the seventy-four million of customers across the Atlantic. This is particularly the German method of argument. The German statesman sees, within the last ten years, a falling off of exports from his own country to the United States, and an increase of imports from the United States to Germany, and he becomes anxious. He attributes it to our "vigorously carried out protective system," and in some quarters, at least, proposes to meet it with more vigorous restrictions on the part of Germany. Last spring one of the ablest German statesmen actually made a speech in the Imperial Diet, the text of which was the continual decrease of the exports of agricultural products from the United States and the continual increase of the exports of manufactures. This in face of the fact that the year was the greatest in the history of this country for agricultural exports, and exceeded by over fifty million dollars the highest previous record—that of 1892. No one in the Reichstag seems to have raised the point.

The Englishman looks upon our increased exports of manufactures more philosophically, thanks God that he still has a good share of the transportation, and winds up by demonstrating to his own satisfaction that John Bull is all right anyhow. Mr. Bull was staggered just a bit last July when our export figures for the fiscal year, 1899, were published. I happened to be in London then and noted the comments of the press. The total sum of our exports, namely, \$1,227,000,000, just about equalled the exports last year from Great Britain. Practically, then, the United States export trade has now about an equal aggregate value with that of the United Kingdom; while our home market is worth, roughly speaking, twice as much as that of Great Britain. The worst feature in the problem for England is that her export trade has, excepting a recent spurt, been marked by retrogression rather than by steady progress. On the other hand, the export trade of the United States represents, as I have shown, prodigious growth, a growth showing no signs of diminution. Some of the daily newspapers seemed to see in the fact that the United States has overtaken and passed the United Kingdom as an export country, danger for British manufacture. Sir Robert Giffen, the retired statistician of the Board of Trade, is in no way disturbed. Sir Robert says there are obvious reasons why the United States should have an excess of exports. "In the first place," he contends, "the United States has to pay in exports for the share of the carriage of goods in our foreign trade which is performed by foreign ships. This is a very large figure. In recent years the proportion of the imports and exports of the United States carried in foreign ships has ranged between 75 and 80 per cent., so that the United States is a country which has to pay other nations for the carriage of its goods in the foreign trade. It may be mentioned, by the way, that the foreign country which does the carrying trade for the United States is mainly the United Kingdom." Sir Robert does not inform us how long this will continue. Not long, if the shipping bill now before Congress passes this session. "Next," so says Sir Robert, "the United States is a country which owes money in various ways to foreign nations. There is an annual stream of American visitors to Europe, and there is an American colony permanently residing in Europe, whose expenses have to be paid for. More important still, a great deal of capital has been invested in the United States

by Europeans—by English people, by Dutch people and Belgians, as well as by French and Germans, not to speak of minor nationalities of Europe. The interest on this debt has, of course, to be paid in exports, unless to the extent that, in any given period, reinvestments are made in the United States.”

In this way Great Britain's cheery Scotch economist accounts for everything, and shows that, in the end, whichever way it comes out, England is on the top. If Great Britain, which is really our great competing rival, is happy and satisfied over what we are pleased to call our prosperity, why should we complain? Meantime we may safely assume that no obstacle will be placed in the way of pushing American commodities into England. Unlike the German economists, Sir Robert Giffen does not approve of our “vigorous protective policy,” hence no suggestion of legislation to keep out American commodities will come from that quarter. It should be remembered that over half—55 per cent., I think, are the latest exact figures—our export trade is with England and her possessions.

Not so very long ago, when I used to discuss tariff questions with the late Judge Kelley, of Pennsylvania, and with that Democratic protectionist from the same State, the Hon. Samuel J. Randall, the idea was to secure protection for our metal schedule, so that we could manufacture at home the hundred million dollars' worth of manufactures of iron and steel which we once purchased abroad. We must make our own steel rails, our own tin plate, our own nails, our own pipes, our own steel wire, they argued in those days, and in doing so give employment to American labor. I recall preparing for Mr. Randall—before the debate on the proposed Morrison Bill, reducing duties horizontally—a little table, showing how much of these and kindred commodities we at that time were buying abroad. I demonstrated to Mr. Randall that we could just as well make all these things at home, and thereby employ two hundred thousand additional laborers. Mr. Randall was not a man you could load down with a bushel basket of statistics. He was concise and to the point, and the little table in question only made one sheet of note-paper. I gave it to him in his committee room at the House of Representatives. He was busy, but he read it over two or three times and put it into his pocket. That night he sent for me to come to his house. I went there, and he said: “Porter, if these figures are

reliable—and they seem to be within the mark—I will never vote for the Morrison Bill, nor for any other bill that will cut duties on iron and steel, cotton goods, woollens, leather, chemicals, etc., until we have our home market secure.” I satisfied Mr. Randall of the reliability of my estimates, and history tells what he did with the Morrison Bill. That both Judge Kelley and Mr. Randall, and later, Major, now President, McKinley, builded better than they knew, we all must now admit. The voice of the old-time free-trader seems hushed in the presence of the marvellous changes that have taken place since Kelley and Randall and McKinley fought for the home market for American labor. If we could have injected some of the following facts into those debates as prophecies, how the free-trade leaders would have sizzled! For example, the exports of iron and steel and their manufactures increased from \$21,156,077 in 1889 to \$93,715,951 in 1899, or nearly \$72,560,000. I tabulate some of the items of these and other exports, and it will be seen they cover a wide range of manufactures:

	1889.	1899.
Steel rails.....	\$235,377	\$5,298,125
Sewing machines.....	2,247,875	3,264,344
Typewriting machines.....	No reports.	2,449,205
Shoe machinery.....	" "	853,936
Locomotive engines.....	1,227,149	4,728,748
Electrical and unspecified machinery.....	1,924,380	1,507,610
Builders' hardware.....	1,700,390	7,842,372
Nails and spikes.....	448,146	1,864,596
Pipes and fittings.....	No reports.	5,874,228
Steel wire.....	594,616	3,891,180
Agricultural implements.....	3,623,769	12,432,197
Carriages, etc.....	3,090,521	9,860,164
Chemicals, drugs and dyes.....	5,542,753	10,995,289
Cotton manufactures.....	10,212,644	23,567,914
Leather and manufactures.....	10,747,716	23,466,985
Wool and manufactures.....	26,910,672	41,679,416

Above are included only a few of the items which, as I recall it, composed the memorandum I prepared for Mr. Randall. We are not only supplying the bulk of the home market, but we are exporting, in large and increasing quantities, the very class of goods which fifteen years ago we were purchasing abroad. Surely on this point *The Sun*, of New York, was justified in saying last August:

“The enormous increase in the exports of American manufactures during the last ten years, and more particularly during the last two years, affords a suggestion which must be heeded by all sensible and practical men—that our economic policy is working satisfactorily. So strong has this evidence appeared to Mr. William R. Grace, an old-

time 'revenue reformer' of the Cleveland school, for instance, that he now frankly announces that he is convinced of the practical error of his past theory. Under our policy of protection we have built up manufacturing industries which are now successfully competing in the markets of the world with those of foreign nations, besides supplying a constantly increasing proportion of our domestic demand."

Verily, such figures must stagger even old-time revenue reformers.

Now that our foreign commerce has reached nearly \$2,000,000,000, we can well afford to give it serious attention. It will not drift along as heretofore. Russia, while exceedingly partial to the United States in purchasing railway equipment and supplies, and machinery of all sorts which she is not prepared to make in sufficient quantities herself, is, at the same time, energetically looking after the European markets for the products of her strongest industries. Her treaty with Germany, her friendly relations with France and her recent overtures to England are all in the line of a policy which has for its basic principle the broadening of the European markets for Russian food-stuffs, petroleum oil, mineral products, wool, timber, fibres, hides and skins. The activities of Russia, which we admire so much and on which so much has lately been written, mean a necessity for greater activities on our part to retain the markets for our exports of agricultural products and of raw material, which, as I have pointed out, have not declined with the stupendous increase in our exports of manufactures. As our home market becomes less attractive to the European manufacturer he will naturally become less friendly to the United States and more willing to encourage his own Government to make commercial alliance with the great European Power which is doing so much to bring the Far East, with all its possibilities, nearer Continental Europe. Those American concerns which compete with commodities supplied also by Russia will testify to the great activity of Russian commercial interests at the present time, not only in every country of Continental Europe, but in England. Russia, for example, was able to secure a treaty with Germany, in spite of the violent opposition of the Agrarian party, which makes it impossible for Germany to increase the duty on Russian corn while the treaty lasts. This treaty also gave Russia other decided advantages in the importation of products, some of which compete with American products. While the German Government itself has been in-

clined to deal fairly with the United States, there is a very considerable element in the body politic of that country that would not hesitate to discriminate against American products, by refusing, on one pretence or another, to recognize the "most favored nation" clause—a clause which some say exists in our various treaties with the several German States, though others claim that it is absent from these treaties. For the moment, as we have seen, our trade relations with Great Britain seem to be in a satisfactory condition, while the signing of the Commercial Treaty with France places our trade with the great European Republic in a more favorable state than it has been in for many years. The most favored nation clause given us in that treaty on some special articles, together with the minimum rates on others, will keep our French trade, so long as the treaty is in force, on a satisfactory basis. The treaty will be of decided advantage, and will prevent the anxieties which have constantly arisen in the minds of American merchants, who did not know what changes might be made from time to time in the rates. These changes—that is, from minimum to maximum—it was within the power of the Ministry to make without asking for legislation, and much of our trade depended upon "ministerial courtesy," brought about by the activity and popularity of the American Ambassador at Paris. Those not within the inner circle of diplomacy can have no conception of the constant calls upon our Ambassador to plead with his French ministerial colleagues not to disturb these rates, which were liable to fluctuate with the political barometer. For example, a sudden outburst of friendship for Russia might end in granting her the minimum rates, while articles of similar character from the United States remained at the maximum until "ministerial courtesy" brought them down. However, this is, I hope, ended now.

Our trade and commercial relations with Germany are of even greater importance than those with France; for, next to the United Kingdom, our business with the Fatherland is of greater magnitude than with any other nation. In the early part of last year, when I spent six weeks in Berlin studying our trade relations with Germany, considerable anxiety was experienced by German officials as to the future of that trade, some going so far as to claim that it was getting altogether one-sided. I did not at that time think the claim reasonable, though the

figures for 1898 showed a large balance of trade in favor of the United States and against Germany. Several natural causes contributed to this result. In the first place, we had purchased an unusually small amount of sugar in 1898, because, the year preceding, we had purchased an unusually large quantity. A fact which none of our Berlin critics realized was that our imports of sugar during 1898 were the smallest in twelve years, amounting to only 2,690,000,000 pounds. Compared with the record-breaking returns for 1897, when our imports reached the high figures of 4,919,000,000 pounds, these figures show a falling off of about 2,229,000,000 pounds. From a sugar bill of nearly \$100,000,000, we dropped with a thud to a sugar bill of \$60,000,000. Germany, in common with other sugar-producing countries, shared the loss. Having the previous year enjoyed this prosperity, the complaint was unreasonable and only indulged in by the Agrarian organs. The following table shows the imports from and exports to Germany from 1889 to 1899:

	Imports from Germany into United States.	Exports to Germany from United States.
1889.....	\$81,742,546	\$68,002,594
1890.....	98,837,683	85,563,312
1891.....	97,316,383	92,795,456
1892.....	82,907,553	105,521,558
1893.....	96,210,203	83,578,988
1894.....	69,387,905	92,357,163
1895.....	81,014,065	92,053,753
1896.....	94,240,833	97,897,197
1897.....	111,210,614	125,246,088
1898.....	69,697,378	155,039,972
1899.....	84,242,745	155,772,279

Here we have a view of our German trade for eleven years. It will be noted that, while the exports to Germany remain practically the same in 1899 as in 1898, the imports from Germany into the United States have increased, roughly speaking, about \$15,000,000. This should encourage our German friends. Long before the figures were published I told them we should import more goods from Germany this year, but they said that was only a forecast and could cut no figure in the serious facts which were facing them. We imported \$8,000,000 worth more sugar this fiscal year than last, with the strong probability that the calendar year will make a better showing. The balance of trade in favor of the United States in the fiscal year 1899 was \$71,529,476, against \$85,342,594 in 1898, \$14,035,474 in 1897 and \$3,656,364 in 1896.

During the decade 1890-1899 there have been seven occasions on which the balance of trade was favorable to the United States, and three in which the balance was against us. The total imports into the United States from Germany in the decade 1890-1899 were \$885,065,402, and the total exports from the United States to Germany \$1,085,826,756, the balance of trade in favor of the United States in the full decade being \$200,761,354. This total of 800,000,000 marks is really not a serious matter to the Germans, when we consider the commodities imported. The balance of trade against England is twice this amount, or exceeding \$400,000,000 every year. England, however, is in no way disturbed. Why? Because England has learned that three-quarters of all these imports means cheap food for her factory operatives, raw material for her mills, and commodities transported in British ships to be reshipped to other countries. In fact, this balance represents a source of wealth, not a loss, as the Agrarian statesman of Germany assumes. Cut off from Germany, the supply of American cotton, of mineral oils, of fertilizers, of tobacco, of copper, of lumber, of builders' material, of turpentine, of heavy machinery, and German industries would suffer. Reduce the supply of cheap breadstuffs, lard, bacon and meats, and the people must eat more horse-flesh and black bread, paying just as much for the inferior nourishment. Three-quarters of this so-called "balance against Germany" is a balance in favor of German industries, and simply indicates that Germany is fulfilling her mission as a great industrial nation. It represents the basis of her wealth, and is in no sense a sign of decadence. A considerable portion of this "adverse balance" is altogether fictitious, and merely indicates the great prosperity of the German shipping interests of Hamburg, Bremen and other minor ports. Quantities of these goods find their way *via* German ports and German railways to Russia, Belgium, Austria-Hungary and other European countries—a source of wealth to the German Empire rather than of discouragement.

The statesmanship which would seek to destroy these conditions is antiquated and not, I am happy to say, in harmony with the broader policy mapped out by Caprivi and approved by the Emperor. In the seven treaties already made, the idea was to assist the development of commerce. Let us hope our own Government will be able to negotiate a treaty along similar lines,

and stop the commercial friction which every now and then breaks out, threatening to upset our relations with our second most important trading nation. The main object of this treaty should be similar to the main objects of the other treaties, to secure for Germany cheaply, as imports, the necessities of life and of the raw materials for industries, in return for which Germany might secure certain reciprocal reductions in duty on her exported industrial products. It may be urged that the reciprocal clause of the Dingley Tariff Law, giving the President the power to reduce the duty twenty per cent. on products entering the United States, has expired. The next Congress, being Republican, would undoubtedly extend this power for twelve months. If this were done, and a little more energy put into our negotiations, we could tie up a considerable amount of our foreign trade for several years to come. This should be done, and now is the time to do it. It should be borne in mind that, when our commercial relations with Great Britain, Germany and France are satisfactory, four-fifths of our European trade is covered, for, roughly speaking, of the \$1,250,000,000 representing our total European trade not over \$250,000,000, or one-fifth, remains to be distributed among the minor European countries.

ROBERT P. PORTER.

A FRENCH GENERAL'S DEFENSE OF THE BOERS.

BY GENERAL COUNT DU BARAIL, FORMERLY FRENCH MINISTER
OF WAR.

THE present war in the Transvaal is certainly one of the most extraordinary events of the nineteenth century, which has been so fertile in staggering and theatrical surprises.

It is indeed amazing to see this little people of the Boers (that being the name commonly given to the citizens of the South African Republics) hold out so long against powerful England. There was a general disposition to believe that the British Government had not rushed into such an undertaking without being perfectly sure of success. Had not Mr. Chamberlain solemnly declared in the House of Commons that a simple military promenade would suffice to bring to reason those factious Dutch peasants who were foolish enough to believe themselves free and independent in that African land which they had conquered at the greatest perils? Who, then, would have dared to cast doubt upon the official utterance of the fiery and adventurous Colonial Secretary, whom, however, tragic events were swift to contradict most cruelly.

Not only was it speedily discovered that much greater efforts were needed to accomplish the purpose in hand than had at first been imagined, but after four months of a terrible struggle and the most distressing reverses the question arises whether the entire strength of Great Britain can avail to overcome the stubborn resistance displayed with such heroic energy by the Boers.

The truth is, that without an army, without a budget, without arsenals, without commissary stores, without any of those scientific preparations so indispensable to a Power threatened with war, President Krüger, strong in the right and trusting in the patriotism of his valiant little people, bravely accepted the challenge of the unjust aggressor and began the fight by boldly carrying the war into the enemy's territory.

It must be acknowledged that this audacious offensive movement of the Boers was fully successful and that the first phase of the campaign was entirely in their favor. They laid siege to three places—Ladysmith, Kimberley and Mafeking—which the English generals have not yet succeeded in relieving, notwithstanding their energetic efforts and serious losses.

At this point the English Government, persisting in its policy of absorption, decided to mobilize the entire military force of England and to put her most famous generals in command of their army of invasion.

To-day Great Britain has on the African continent under the orders of her Commander-in-Chief, Lord Roberts, the most numerous army that she has raised since the wars of the First Empire.

Let us pause a moment to examine a situation which, so far, has disappointed all expectations.

One cannot help looking back and comparing the speedy termination of the Spanish-American War with the apparently insurmountable difficulties encountered by Great Britain in her unjust aggression in the Transvaal. Here we must make no mistake. The Boers were indeed the first to attack; that is to say, they boldly took the offensive, when, notwithstanding all concessions on their part, war seemed inevitable to them, as England was bent upon it; but the real aggressor was undoubtedly England, upon which the crushing weight of this responsibility will rest, whatever be the outcome of this deplorable conflict.

The Spanish-American War was undertaken by the United States without their having a standing army. They trusted in the valor and the patriotism of their hastily organized volunteers, commanded by officers most of whom were entirely unfamiliar with military art and science.

Their adversary, Spain, once the greatest military Power in the world, was brave, disciplined and commanded by experienced generals. Notwithstanding the misfortunes of their country, they were animated by martial pride and the desire to show themselves worthy of her past.

It was generally believed in Europe that the fight would be long and hotly contested, because even if the United States could command the sea with their powerful fleet, the Spaniards would prevail on land, as a matter of course, and show their ancient

superiority on the field of battle. Nobody believed, for example, that a landing could be effected in Cuba, where there was an army of more than a hundred thousand seasoned men bronzed by the tropical sun.

It turned out differently, and events soon showed the forecasts that seemed so well founded to be erroneous. I am not now speaking of the capture of Manila and the conquest of the Philippines, which were due to the American navy, but of the loss of the Island of Cuba, the loss of the Antilles which immediately followed the decisive battle of Santiago, surrendered by General Toral to the troops landed by Admiral Sampson.

These prodigious events are not yet entirely cleared up, but their principal significance lies in their moral effect.

The Spaniards had long had public opinion against them, the feeling of the people was openly hostile to them, and the valor of their army could not overcome the destructive effects of an oppressive and tyrannical government.

The true cause of the Transvaal war is iniquitous and immoral. It is iniquitous, because of the lying pretext under which England proposed to seize a country to which she had no right. It is immoral, because no honorable Government wages war for the purpose of forcibly taking possession of the wealth of a State which it covets.

To the disloyal act committed by the English Government must be added a very aggravating circumstance which is now abundantly proved and established, namely, that it was an accomplice in the filibustering expedition attempted three years ago by Dr. Jameson and the English Commissioner, Cecil Rhodes. No, "accomplice" is not the right word; I should say "promoter." It was Mr. Chamberlain who conceived this act of veritable piracy, which, fortunately, called President Krüger's attention to the machinations of the English Government, and enabled him secretly and with rare skill to take the precautions that his limited means permitted. The problem, then, was to resist an aggression which was foreseen and whose danger was not underestimated.

But what was he to do? Not to parry the blow by which the Transvaal was threatened; for President Krüger knew very well that that was impossible and that the unsatisfied covetousness of England must be glutted at all hazards—but to make greedy and insatiable England pay dearly for her unjustifiable aggression.

Prince Bismarck once said that President Krüger was one of the most skilful and remarkable statesmen he had ever met. The really extraordinary skill displayed under these ever-memorable circumstances by the respected chief of the Boer nation proves that the great German Chancellor was not mistaken when he recognized in him the most precious qualities, not merely of a statesman, but of a chief. He had nothing, and his hours for making preparations for war in the greatest secrecy were limited. He had to conceal these preparations carefully, in the first place, from the ever-watchful attention of England; for, if she should but suspect his secret, she would at once throw aside her mask and attack him suddenly; she would surprise him without defense, and then his dear country would be certain to lose its independence.

The Transvaal had no budget; she had not even a war fund. The first measure to be taken was to procure money, but how could that be done without subjecting his unfortunate people to heavy taxation? He conceived a heroic expedient, but one which might reflect on his honesty. He did not hesitate. For the good of his country he carried his devotion to the point of risking his reputation. The gold fever had extended to the Transvaal, and he daily received numerous requests for concessions from foreign mining prospectors. These he found to be a source of considerable profit. For every such concession he stipulated, as an absolute condition, that a sum of money, which he fixed at a very high figure, should be handed to him personally. With this kind of special tax, levied solely on foreigners who flocked to the Transvaal, he created what may be called a war fund, by means of which he was enabled hastily to complete his armament.

He bought the most modern and improved Creusot and Krupp guns. He engaged skilful and experienced mechanics and instructors of artillery and infantry, wherever he could find them, particularly in France and Germany. But it was not enough to make sure of the co-operation of useful auxiliaries, and to buy in Europe improved guns and abundant ammunition; the main problem was to get them all to Johannesburg or Pretoria.

England herself transported them without knowing it. The instructors and mechanics embarked under the title of professors of agriculture, as merchants, or even as miners. The guns, gun-carriages and ammunition wagons were carefully taken apart, and each piece, packed separately, was transported by British

ships as agricultural and other machinery, thus hoodwinking the unsuspecting agents of England. On its arrival, all this material was quickly put together again by the skilful mechanics who had been engaged for service in the Transvaal.

This explains the relative situations of the belligerents at the outbreak of the war. The English arrived under the impression that they would have to do only with poor, unarmed peasants, incapable of offering serious resistance. They found instead an admirable people burning with noble enthusiasm, strong in their most sacred religious faith, and resolved to carry out the famous maxim, "Conquer or die." I firmly believe that such a people, who trust God in all things, is invincible, and that the English, who now confess that it will take 250,000 men to win, will never succeed.

Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the world, which generally does not go to the bottom of things, but judges by appearances that are often deceitful, was greatly surprised on hearing of the first successes won by the Boers over troops belonging to an army famous for its bravery and commanded by skilful generals. In trying to explain the causes, people have wondered whether so abnormal a fact was the fault of the English generals, and whether they were unskilful or careless in applying the essential rules of the great art of war. I believe that this is an error, and that viewing the matter in this way is to grasp but a small portion of it.

Some military writers have imagined that they have discovered a science which reduces war to fixed rules, and, in a measure, to geometrical calculations. This, in my opinion, is school pedantry, which is very dangerous in its applications. There are no invariable rules in war. Everything depends on the circumstances, and the talent of the general-in-chief lies in grasping their import and in taking advantage of them.

The generals have done their best in a country with which they were somewhat unfamiliar, and in which they encountered difficulties of all kinds that they were far from expecting. I should, therefore, incline to the belief that the explanation of their failures is to be found in causes solely moral.

The English army is the only one in Europe, at the present day, that is composed only of mercenaries, recruited anywhere, but certainly not from the upper *strata* of society. It therefore

lacks homogeneity in the first place, and perhaps also what I would call the national spirit. It is a kind of contract which binds the men individually to the service, a two-sided contract binding both parties equally, and if one of the two breaks his agreement the other may consider himself absolved from his. The English soldier's devotion to duty, which is always preserved by an inflexible discipline, cannot therefore be compared to that of the Boer soldier, which is entirely spontaneous and inspired by ardent patriotism. The English officers, on the contrary, belong as a body to the upper classes of society. They are a closed circle which can never be entered by a man from the ranks. They are, as it were, set over the troops, with whom they never mingle. An officer has no relations with a common soldier. With the details of military service he does not concern himself, leaving them to the non-commissioned officers. But, on the day of battle, the officer places himself at the head of his command, and sets the example of admirable personal bravery. He, too, has the pride of his race, and is anxious to keep unstained the ancient reputation which English officers have acquired on the battle-fields of Europe; and, since the beginning of the war, he has already shed much noble blood on the free soil of the Transvaal.

This is all well enough; but does it suffice for fulfilling all the conditions required for the proper constitution of an army? What makes an army solid and powerful is the legitimate ascendancy of the officers, the daily exchange of mutual devotion, the conviction that each is useful to all, and that the chiefs are the most useful of all. In order to raise the army to the highest degree of efficiency, its component elements must possess the most essential innate or acquired warlike qualities, such as a special genius for war, solid military instruction, courage, perseverance, great power of resisting fatigue and enduring accidental privations, and finally passive obedience established by the confidence of the subordinates in their commanders. I am far from denying that the English Army possesses these essential qualities, but I firmly believe that the Boers possess them in the highest degree.

The following is an actual picture of a Boer camp, which admirably depicts the profoundly religious character of this deserving people. I find it in a letter from Colonel Villebois Mareuil, who is at the seat of war in the Transvaal:

"A Boer laager offers a contrast to a French camp in the silence and

calm of the Boer men, as compared with the rather noisy vivacity of our French soldiers. There are no bells, the service is in successive little groups from sunset to nightfall. The tent of the general, the major, or the field-cornet is used as a clubroom by any that choose to do so. The life of these commanders is to me a mystery of physical and mental endurance in the midst of continual disturbance. There are neither punishments, nor altercations, nor coercion. Everything is done freely at the required time from a sense of duty. No constraint, yet not a single reprehensible act. To understand it, we must go deeper, abandon the technical standpoint and examine the underlying moral idea.

"These laagers have a telegraph and a postal service like our modern armies, electric searchlights, improved ambulances, a commissary station which works as regularly as may be, considering the too free transportation of goods. These laagers are, above all, interesting by reason of the spirit which pervades them. They have a very high religious atmosphere, everything being referred to God, the fate of the Transvaal as well as the defence of liberty and the rights of an oppressed people. If a general is complimented, he replies: 'God has permitted it.' When a Boer is encouraged in his secret aspirations, he turns toward Heaven with eyes full of trust. And, more imperious than human passions, stronger than war, the power of prayer poured out in psalms by their victorious voices fills them with faith and hope. Their pastors are among them, living their life, helping the dying, and simple in their demeanor, although treated with peculiar respect. Around these men the world has moved on; they have remained what their fathers were two hundred years ago when they brought to this African cape their household gods and their faith. Noble, or of good descent, for the most part, they lived on their farms as in castles of former times, free and isolated, hunters and cavaliers, soldiers by inheritance, noblemen chivalrous by nature, in a manner worthy of their ancestry. It is like a restoration of the days of yore to see these quaint people stepping out into the broad light of to-day to challenge our decadent civilization. They have thrown down the gauntlet to the nation which is the most absorbed in selfish contemplation of practical materialism; and, whatever may be the outcome, they have humiliated, vanquished, outwitted her. Let Europe understand that to allow this green branch of our old and already impoverished trunk to be stripped, would be to cut off a means for her own regeneration, and to offer a new and more complete homage of servility to England and her incorrigible pretensions, who is already giving signs of her impotence and who, after her crisis of imperialism, will have to be content with more modest aims."

That is indeed the main point of the question: Will Europe allow a nation of one hundred and fifty millions of inhabitants to crush by force of arms a little people whose entire number, counting men, women and children, is hardly equal to that of the army sent to coerce them by the most improved means of destruction? Will she stand by while so inhuman and odious a national crime is being perpetrated, without raising a cry of

horror and indignation in favor of these Boers, who are so worthy of her pity and admiration? And what adds still more to the infamy of this crime against humanity is the unspeakable object for which it is committed. It is for the purpose of seizing the gold and diamond-bearing lands of the South African Republics, in the interest of the London speculators and money-brokers.

I am aware that to justify itself in the eyes of the world, which has its own opinion of such a doctrine, the English Government claims that it intends to seize the Transvaal only in the superior interest of civilization. It is for the purpose of hastening the pacific and moral conquest of the inferior populations of Central Africa, that the British Government desires to realize the great boon of a railroad connecting the Cape directly with Alexandria. The English have given themselves the reputation of a colonizing people. But to colonize the populations which are not strong enough to resist them, the English simply exterminate them, either by the sword and by fire-water, as in America, or by opium, as in the Far East, or even by famine, as they are now doing in India. For a Christian people that distributes Bibles broadcast by the hand of its missionaries in every country to which it desires to extend its influence—and there is no people on the face of the earth safe from its influence, or, rather, its cupidity—that is indeed a curious way of propagating the Word of God.

It is only necessary to glance backward and remember the origin of the conflict, to convince one's self that the unjustifiable pretensions of England rest on no other foundation than the right of the stronger.

Cape Colony was founded about the middle of the seventeenth century by the Dutch, who were joined by numerous French refugees, who fled from religious persecution and endeavored to find liberty of conscience and the right to bring up their children in the faith of their fathers.

In 1806, the fortunes of war caused this beautiful colony to fall into the greedy hands of England—who is always ready to profit by the misfortunes of others. A large portion of the population soon emigrated, to escape the tyranny of an unsupportably oppressive administration, whose first requirements were to forbid the use of the national language in the courts and in Parliament, and to enjoin the use of English in all official and public acts.

These emigrants, then known as the Boers, journeyed north-

ward and founded the Republics of the Orange River and Natal. As England claimed hegemony in South Africa, she wished to establish not merely a nominal but a real suzerainty over these young Republics, which were obliged to submit, at least apparently. But a portion of this proud population preferred to resume their wanderings, rather than submit to the domination of their insufferable neighbors. These independent people once more harnessed their oxen to their heavy carts and settled in the vast regions beyond the Vaal. From the outset they had to defend themselves against wild beasts, which abound in that country, and against the continual ambushes of the native savages.

When they had at last become the masters of the country, their love of independence and liberty led them to establish isolated farms and to devote themselves to hunting and to raising large flocks, instead of shutting themselves up in towns. These were not built until much later, and then on a small scale.

The English again interfered with their peaceful occupations, and about 1877, taking up the cause of the original owners of the soil, they obliged the Boers to recognize their protectorate, and it is a notable fact that, when they had set themselves up for protectors of the aborigines, they massacred ten thousand of them on some pretext that I do not now remember. It was at that time that the Zulu War broke out, in which our unfortunate Prince Imperial perished under such sad and mysterious circumstances.

The Boers then wanted to resume their independence and liberty. The result was a new conflict with the Cape Government, during which the troops of the latter were defeated by General Joubert, assisted by Krüger, in 1881, in a fight known as the Battle of Majuba. Negotiations became necessary, and a compromise was effected the same year, recognizing the independence of the Boers, with some reservations which disappeared in the new treaty concluded two years later.

Why, then, did England make a peaceful solution impossible by her increasing demands? The reason is that the gold question is at the bottom of it all; that the Transvaal war is but an odious financial speculation.

When the present ministry established its solidarity with the fraudulent manœuvres of Mr. Chamberlain, it assumed a moral and real complicity with Jameson and Cecil Rhodes, from which it will **never** be able to exculpate itself.

Will the fate of the Transvaal be definitively settled by the terrible campaign now going on? I hope so, because I believe in the justice of God and in the righteousness of the cause defended by the Boers, who deserve the sympathy of the whole world.

The first phase of the war is undoubtedly in their favor. The English Government is making immense and unprecedented efforts to restore the fortunes of its flag. It has sent to the Transvaal all the military forces of Great Britain and of the colonies that it can spare. It has changed its commander-in-chief, and placed in charge its most noted generals.

Notwithstanding all this, I persist in my hope. How could I do otherwise, on seeing with what heroism General Cronje is fighting the English generals sent to pursue him, and with what consummate science and skill he manœuvres to escape their endeavors to surround him? But if at last he should be deserted by fortune and succumb in so disproportionate a struggle, even then all would not be lost to the Boers. The distance from Ladysmith to Pretoria is long, and the Boers will not make peace. They are resolved to rival the marvellous American War of Independence and to defend themselves with the most unconquerable energy.

And who knows but that Europe, electrified by the sight of such heroism, will then emerge from her selfish apathy, and make England understand that the trident of Neptune is not yet the sceptre of the world.

In any event, this war will not add to the glory of England, and it is not impossible that it may mark the beginning of her decline.

February 25, 1900.

DU BARAIL.

FOOD ADULTERATIONS.

BY W. E. MASON, UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM ILLINOIS.

THE United States of America, the greatest food-producing country in the world, is suffering from the adulteration of food products. The extent of this adulteration it is difficult to comprehend, but it grows largely, in fact almost entirely, out of excessive competition. There is hardly an article of food that has not been at some time more or less adulterated; flour, butter, cheese, tea and coffee, syrups, spices of all kinds, extracts, baking powders; and yet, notwithstanding this great adulteration of food, every manufacturer will testify that he is perfectly willing to stop the adulteration if his competitors will stop so that he can honestly compete with them.

This was especially true in the case of flour, and investigation during last session of Congress showed that very dangerous and absolutely insoluble substances were being used to adulterate flour, and it became very well known that this fact impaired the credit of American flour in foreign countries. The adulteration became so extensive that the manufacturers who would not use adulterants appealed to Congress for protection, and the law as applied to oleomargarine and filled cheese was made applicable to mixed flour. At the present time it is perfectly clear that the mixing of flour has practically stopped in the United States. This not only assists the honest manufacturer of flour, but it protects the consumer and at the same time gives us a reputation for manufacturing honest goods, and its influence has already been felt in our export trade to all the countries that buy our flour.

The Committee on Manufactures has had presented to it letters that come from at least twelve or fifteen of the large cities of the world, all of the same tenor and general effect as the following:

"London, October 12, 1899.

"Dear Sirs: Replying to yours of the 16th ultimo, with regard to the pure food law now in operation in your country, since this act was passed by Congress it has certainly restored confidence on this side, and in my opinion will materially assist your export trade.

"Yours faithfully,

W. M. MEESON,

"The 'Modern Miller,' St. Louis.

Per JOHN STANMORE."

It is a well-known fact that our meat products have had a greater demand and better sale since the Government undertook their inspection, and it is safe to say that nothing will more encourage our export trade than for the Government of the United States to have some standard fixed, to which the food products of the United States must rise before they can be sold to our own people or our customers abroad.

It is not the purpose of this article to go into details, either as to the different adulterations or as to the remedies proposed, but a general discussion may be advisable to give the reader an idea of the needs of legislation and of the legislation which is pending.

In the first place, it would seem apparent that national legislation is necessary, for the reason that different State Legislatures have different ideas as to food products and food standards. Take for illustration the subject of beers and malt liquors. Practically every manufacturer of these goods ships from one State to another. What would be satisfactory under the law of New York might not be satisfactory under the law of New Jersey. As a matter of fact, the Government tests and analyses that have lately been made by Dr. Wiley, the Chief Chemist of the Agricultural Department, at the invitation of the Senate Committee, show that the American malt liquors are actually superior as a rule to the imported malt liquors, and that in the language of Dr. Wiley, "out of the analysis of about fifty American beers, I think only two contained the least trace of a preservative, which is not the case in the imported beers."

Practically every manufacturer of this product is willing to have a Government standard fixed whereby the article shall contain at least a certain percentage of malt extracts, etc., but the reader can see at once the manifest injustice if one standard were to be fixed by the Government and the States fixed another standard. The law would lack uniformity in its application, and a practical law must be uniform.

The writer does not intend to say that the State Legislatures should not make their own pure food laws. On the contrary, every one of the laws so far has been successful (and about one-fourth of all the States have passed some pure food legislation in the last two years), and there are many subjects which the States can handle that cannot be reached by Congress for two general reasons. The law of Congress regulating the manufacture of food for consumption in the State where it is made would be a police regulation within the State and therefore void. In other words, the Congress can only pass laws regulating for police purposes the manufacture and sale of food products between the States.

This rule, of course, does not apply where the regulation of the food product is effected through the Revenue Department of the Government, as in the case of flour and butter. The violation of those laws would be a violation of the Revenue laws, whether the goods were sold in the same State or not.

There is a vast field for discussion under the head of "Sophistication"—including those articles of food which are simply cheapened by substances which are in themselves perfectly healthy, but frauds. If milk is diluted by water, the only danger to health is lack of nourishment, but it is also a fraud upon the consumer. If, however, it is preserved, as it is in some cases, by the use of acids, it becomes a menace to public health; and jellies and jams, when manufactured, as they are manufactured by the thousands of pounds, by the use of gelatine, vegetable dyes and natural acids, are simply a fraud; but when they are manufactured through dangerous acids, which have no place in the human economy, then a different rule should apply. Thousands of barrels of maple syrup and honey are sold that do not contain ten per cent. of maple syrup or honey, and yet the article known as glucose, and which is used to sophisticate goods, is regarded by the experts as a perfectly safe, healthy and nutritious food. This mixing or blending simply sells to the consumer what he did not intend to buy, but it does not endanger the public health. This is probably true of the adulteration of spices. From twenty to eighty per cent. of the ground spices and peppers, etc., that we get are made up of nutshells—certainly not a very desirable article of food, and yet the amount taken being so small it may not work a danger to public health.

Yet the fact remains that all these articles should be marked and branded for what they are, and a violation of that rule should

be punished by a national law. Every manufacturer should be compelled to put his own name and the date of manufacture on the package which contains his product.

The evidence is overwhelming that the goods which are put up in packages, bottles and cans that have been carelessly prepared, and the character of which the manufacturer is not willing to stand for, are marked and sold to the public under fancy and fictitious names. And the writer of this article will favor a law that every bit of prepared food exposed for sale must bear the name of the manufacturer so that the purchaser can see it when he buys. And further than this, the manufacturer who puts upon the market an article of food that is dangerous to public health ought not to be permitted to sell it, even though it is branded for what it is. Permitting poisons to be sold to the public, who have no time or opportunity to educate themselves as to the effect of poisons and drugs that are sold as foods, is simply legalizing a crime.

There has been a great desire on the part of the American public to eat and drink imported food products. Imported champagnes have been regarded as most desirable. The analyses and tests show that the genuine American champagnes that have been fermented in the bottle are superior to the imported. The same is true as to malt liquors. Among other reasons for this is the fact that the sterilizing process, invented by Pasteur, which is the mere heating of the beer in the bottle up to a certain degree to destroy the germ life, has been found sufficient to preserve the American product for American consumption, and the other producing countries of the world, which are very strict as to the manufacture of beers for their own people, do not demand the same rule and the same care if the beer is to be shipped here. The Pasteur process cannot be applied to the goods in casks, and it is not to be wondered at that the Government experts found more preservatives in imported than in the domestic goods.

Take coffee as an illustration. In Germany they select the good coffee and reject what are known as the dead or sour beans. The sour bean has a taste, but not a coffee taste. The sale of it is prohibited in Germany, but it is sold here in large quantities. It is called in the trade "black Jack," and it is mixed with our coffee and sold as coffee. This is but one article as illustration, but there are many others, and to-day I know of no country that is so strict in its food laws as to protect any but its own people.

Clearly the only remedy in this case is to prohibit the importation and sale of any article of food the sale of which is prohibited in the country from which it comes.

There has been a general awakening upon this subject throughout the United States in the past few years. Pure food congresses have met and public spirited men have joined a crusade in favor of pure foods. Legislation has been had in many States. Congress has passed some legislation. It is to be hoped that the agitation will continue until we have a system of laws which will absolutely prohibit the sale of dangerous and deleterious substances as foods, which will prohibit the importation of unhealthy or dishonest food products from other countries, which will compel the marking of every particular bottle, jar, can, etc., with the name of its true manufacturer and also a statement of what it is.

It is believed by those who have given the matter careful attention that then we will encourage the honest manufacturer and protect him from dishonest competition, we shall protect the consumer, who will know in each instance what he is buying; we shall, by establishing a reputation for a high standard of food products, increase the demand for our goods all over the world, and also, what is more important to all, we shall raise the standard of the purity of goods that go into the human stomach, and by the use of better foods, make a better citizen.

"The destiny of the nations depends upon how they feed themselves."

WM. E. MASON.

JOHN RUSKIN.

BY PROFESSOR CHARLES WALDSTEIN.

WITH the death of John Ruskin a noble life has ended. His life was, above all, noble in being true to itself. There is a singleness and harmony in such lives which make them stand out as complete and clearly perceptible entities, dramatic types on the world's great stage, to which future ages can always turn back and learn their lesson in clear and striking examples—to be admired and followed when noble, condemned and shunned when ignoble. Ruskin was one of those men who dared to live his thoughts. “And if we should feel that there are inconsistencies in his life, these do not arise from the usual cause of such inconsistency, namely, the discrepancy or contradiction between practice and profession, between the actual course and the theory of life: when mystical, ascetic, and other-worldly preachers shine in the ball-room and speculate on the Stock Exchange; when philosophers, historians and scientists, whose vision penetrates down to the principles of all things, soars over countless ages in the history of nations, and traces the links that bind things animate and inanimate together, crouch before an ephemeral prejudice or fashion of a petty locality; and when economists and social reformers pen the gospel of socialism over oysters and champagne. If Ruskin's life appears inconsistent, the contradictions are to be sought for in his thoughts and theories.”*

But Ruskin has not merely lived his thoughts, he has expressed and perpetuated them in monumental prose; and, apart from his living personality as an example, he stands before us as the writer of thoughts, the man of letters, the philosopher and teacher. And now that death has crowned his life with victory, we are

*See p. 7, “The Work of John Ruskin, etc.,” by the present writer. New York, Harper & Bros.; London, Methuen & Co., 1894.

justified in asking: What will actually live in his life-work, when the memory of his striking personality has faded and the continuous charm of his refined genius can only be recalled by the tradition handed on from the lips of those who knew him? The stupendous versatility of the man, as reflected in his numerous works, makes an answer to this question all the more difficult—whether all his work will equally live, or, if not, what part of it; whether he will live as a writer on the theory of art, or as a critic and historian, or as a philosopher and moralist, or as a writer on social, economical and political questions, or as the founder of the art of observing nature—or chiefly as a great prose poet? Is his lasting greatness to be found in the teacher, or in the poet, or in both combined?

The difficulty which has been felt in the minds of his numerous friends and admirers with regard to the choice of his last resting-place may be permitted to serve as an illustration for the answer I would propose to the question I have raised. The choice lay between Poet's Corner in Westminster Abbey and the rural churchyard of Coniston, in the very heart of the English Lakes, where Nature in all her purity and beauty reigns supreme, uncontaminated by the hand of man as he interferes with her serene peace in the endless search for material subsistence. Both these resting-places in death appear to me to indicate clearly the sphere in which Ruskin's work will gain for him immortality. He will ever live in the grateful minds and hearts of the English-speaking world, both as the greatest of prose poets and as the truest exponent of nature's beauty. This, truly, is enough for one man to have attained, for one life to have achieved.

If Milton has rightly defined poetry as "simple,* sensuous and passionate," the prose of Ruskin amply fulfils and illustrates these characteristics. It is the imparting to the human mind of the world without, as well as the world within, by means of language which should be so completely in harmony with the thing described that this very harmony becomes a thing of beauty in itself. But, more than this, the language is not only to be in complete accord with the object it conveys, but it is to respond fully to the harmony of our own feelings and passions, so that the whole

*"Simplicity" here means naturalness, appropriateness and absence of affectation. It is not found, as is so frequently supposed, in plainness, commonness of thought or diction, in the affected and unnatural choice of short Saxon words and short sentences, the inappropriate obtrusion of vernacular phrases.

emotional mood corresponds to the experiences expressed. To do this, it must possess a formal harmony of its own, a completeness and roundness in its sequence and flow which is the soul of poetic beauty in form. This beauty of form is not tied down to metre and rhyme; it also lives in the rounded period of prose, with its even balance of parts, its clear and yet not rigid division, its symmetry as well as its rhythm. This produces what is essential to all true art, namely, the unity of sequence and tone which binds the multiplicity of movement and sound into the harmony of form. The prose of Ruskin fulfils these conditions as does no other, the only exception perhaps being the Bible, from which he learned his art. Whether he describes a picture of Titian or a landscape by Turner, a Gothic cathedral or a Venetian palace, clouds or mountains, a tree, a flower or a blade of grass, we feel that, not only is his description adequate and convincing, but that the object, great or small, which he thus describes, has by its existence almost served a new purpose in that it has furnished the material for the creation of a new literary art—the prose of Ruskin. Nay, even when he is unappreciative and unjust in his disapproval, scathing and grandly vituperative in his contempt, we could not miss the beautiful form in which his passionate and, at the moment, sincere protest is couched. For he has raised us out of the sphere of theory and criticism into the domain of poetry. The balance of our mental attitude has dipped into the regions where Milton, Shelley and Keats are the ruling spirits.

Yet, even poets, who create the brilliant atmosphere of beauty, may send flashes of inspiration to illumine and penetrate to the innermost core of truth. All the more is this the case with Ruskin, who primarily and sincerely aims at truth. Still, his best work, that part of it which will last, lies in the region of poetry. The very strength of our conviction that Ruskin has gained immortality by his work in these spheres must make us mindful of not falsely attributing to him qualities and virtues which, in our belief, he does not possess.

He himself was fond of quoting Mazzini's opinion, that he was the greatest analyst in Europe. It was upon the thoroughness of his philosophical work, the validity of his theories with regard to nature, to life and to art, that he chiefly prided himself. He wished to be regarded as a thinker and a teacher, not as a writer of "fine English," or, as we should put it, as a great poet. Yet, it is

not unfrequently the case that man's estimate of what is most valuable in his own work is not borne out by the judgment of posterity.

For my part, I must state emphatically that I do not consider the influence of Ruskin's work as an "analyst" and teacher of the theory of things to have been either deep and effective in his own days, or likely to last in its influence upon the future. The thorough and systematic study of the phenomena of nature, of art and of life, from the point of view of science, which enables us to grasp the "laws" which underlie the phenomena, to detect and to fix in clear and dispassionate language what is universal and essential, as distinguished from what is individual and accidental—these have not been the achievements to which I believe in the future the work of Ruskin will maintain its claim. And I feel convinced of this, not only with regard to those portions of his work where he has ventured into the domain of the natural sciences, or philosophy or political economy; but even with regard to his writings on the theory and criticism of art. These are frequently held up as the works of the supreme master, possessing the most thorough and the deepest insight. Though his best books on this subject—notably, "Modern Painters" and the "Stones of Venice"—contain numerous passages, paragraphs, nay, chapters which give evidence of supreme insight, the most penetrating intellectual sympathy, in which the apprehension of individual facts is most clear and accurate and the grasp of the "general principles" in every region of thought seems most complete, there are wanting in his connected work, on the one hand, a systematic continuity and consistency of thought, and, on the other, that just weighing of evidence, that sobriety of mind which is required for any valid induction. This makes him a most difficult author to refute; as, for every statement criticised, some passage may be found to support the views of the critic and give these, moreover, a beauty of form to which few writers on art can lay claim. But, taken as a whole, his work is distinctly wanting in necessary sobriety of analysis.

Where he is most successful—and this is, no doubt, a most important sphere of criticism—is where there is a call upon his sympathetic imagination, where he is led to appreciate and admire. It is here, when he observes with loving sympathy the works of the great Venetian painters and architects, or the orna-

mental detail of a Northern Gothic cathedral, or the beauty of design and color in the luminous landscape of Turner, that he is at his best. At his hands we can be taught to observe more fully and justly the works that we may have passed over hastily before, and to appreciate qualities that to our uninitiated or unsympathetic eye were hitherto unrevealed. He can teach us to admire.

But we must not always follow him in accepting the reasons which he assigns for admiration, still less must we follow him blindly when he disapproves. There are whole regions of art, expressive of great and admirable peoples and periods, for which Ruskin's poetic temperament has no response and appreciation; and the reasons which he assigns for this disapproval are as fallacious as they are fundamentally unscientific. The golden rule for the reading of his critical works on art would, in my opinion, be: Follow him when he admires; shun him when he disapproves; and examine carefully for yourself when he gives a reason for either admiration or disapproval.

The besetting sin in Ruskin's work as a thinker and teacher is, it seems to me, the same weakness that we find in the intellectual and, perhaps also, in the practical and industrial life of England, namely, *amateurishness*. Though this defect arises, primarily, from the love and appreciation of the objects which one is studying, it implies nevertheless an absence of the thoroughness and schooling, a revolt against the constraint of systematic work and thought and routine. It arises from the repugnance to professionalism and the fear of pedantry; but it leads to the reign of empiricism and the lawlessness of individual effort.

In Ruskin—and his own education and life will amply account for this—it has led to intellectual isolation and self-indulgence. In writing on any subject, there is no evidence that he has ever set himself the task of ascertaining what others who have thought and written on the same subject have said and accomplished. The continuity of human effort, as it is embodied in each department of science, which ensures the handing on of the torch of truth, has never existed for him; he does not even appear to have been desirous of acquainting himself fully with the views of his intellectual peers in his own days who differed from him. He wished to think it all out for himself.

The inevitable result of such intellectual isolation is that our own thoughts obtain an undue and disproportionate value. We

have thought them out for ourselves, they are our intellectual children, and we bestow upon them all a parent's fondness. This leads to a provincialism of mind. And thus we easily slip into the kindred failing of intellectual self-indulgence, with the result that we fling down before the world thoughts which required sober and mature co-ordination within the general system of thought.

The true student cannot forego the advantages arising out of a thorough acquaintance with the best works on his subject. It is often in studying the thoughts and methods of others that we become really possessed of our own, and that they develop their intrinsic originality. On the other hand, such study may be carried too far, so as to stifle all freedom and spontaneity; learning may then supersede thought and originality. No doubt we should not wish Ruskin to have become the typical German professor, as there is no doubt that, in spite of all their shortcomings, "Modern Painters" and the "Stones of Venice" will be read by thousands when the learned works of many a writer on æsthetics and the history of art are long forgotten. But this will be not because of the actual criticism in them, not because of their scientific spirit, their philosophy or analysis; but because of the poetic insight into art which they manifest, and because of their beautiful language.

If Ruskin has not studied the thoughts of others, he has not even allowed his own thoughts to mature and to find their proper place in the general system of his subject before publishing them. He did much of his thinking in print instead of in his study; his manuscript ought to have been put by for a long time, and it would have gained much—though not in volume—from being kept. But he appears to be in love with every one of his thoughts. The result is that he revises and corrects in public his already published works: and hence we meet with frequent retractions and the candid criticism of views expressed in previous works or passages—all of which ought to have been done before they appeared in print.

This habit of intellectual self-indulgence and egotism was favored by the fatal facility and fervor of his diction, which enabled him immediately to express in perfect form, needing no alteration, the rapid thoughts or flashes of inspiration which came to him gladly like a first love and which he cherished accordingly.

On the other hand, his unfamiliarity with the work of others

and the want of critical balance and co-ordination in his own thoughts, which prevented him from seeing all sides of a question or of realizing the difference between a desirable idea and its execution in life, often produced a certain spontaneity and boldness—one might almost say, *naïveté*—in the expression of great truths. This is especially the case in his treatment of economical, social and moral questions. His powerful diction and beautiful style save such enunciations from commonplace and platitude. But his insistence upon the introduction of moral and even artistic considerations within the sphere of economics and politics, and his eloquent advocacy of their practical validity have been made by many writers from Sir Thomas More onward. The reforms of abuses in the social and moral life of the beginning of the sixteenth century in England, as advocated then, closely resembled those which Ruskin and all good people would like to see introduced in our own times. Only More was wise enough to urge them in his *Utopia*.

In this domain, again, the efficaciousness and influence of his views are lessened by his want of balance and moderation in expression, as well as by the one-sidedness which comes from his isolation. He shut himself up in a rural home and his own thoughts, and he could never have been in touch with the real life about him. His positive schemes and proposals thus lack the foundation of real life to give them a lasting hold upon the community; while his criticism and censure are devoid of moderation and sympathetic justice, and are all pitched in the comminatory key of the Hebrew prophets, his masters. He might have learned from the ancient Greeks, whose works he but imperfectly knew and whose genius he failed to appreciate, a little of their cardinal virtue: the love of sanity and moderation—their *Sophrosyne*. It is the fondness for prophetic preaching which runs through all his works and counteracts all healthy and noble sobriety.

Still more disturbing do these elements become when he turns to the scientific study of nature, be it geology, zoölogy or botany. His want of real preparatory study, of ordinary schooling, coupled with the inopportune intrusion of his ethical and religious bias, here lead to pronouncements which are at times childish. If he had but realized it, he would have been shocked to see that the very ethical effect of such an attitude of mind toward serious domains of study, which demand all the energies and intellectual

self-effacement of great students and great lives, is most demoralizing as regards the sense of truth—if he had but realized this, he would have been the first to condemn this manifestation of amateurishness run riot. I have on another occasion contrasted the moral effect exercised by the life-work of Charles Darwin, with its noble, almost religious, thoroughness in forming an induction, with the ready dogmatism of Carlyle and Ruskin.

From all this we turn with unalloyed pleasure to Ruskin's descriptions of nature based upon thoroughly artistic observation of her manifold forms. I have called such study by a barbarous and pedantic term, the *Phænomenology of Nature*. Of this fruitful attitude toward nature, Ruskin may almost be said to be the founder. Whatever the fondness for natural scenery among the English-speaking peoples may have been at all times, those who have read Ruskin carefully and sympathetically have turned to the clouds, the mountains and plains, the rivers and lakes, the trees, flowers and shrubs with a new power of observation, a new sense for their specific qualities, a widened and deepened appreciation and love of their every form. He has made the observation of nature a new art. Here he marks a distinct step in literature and his work will live and grow.

Hitherto, we have judged Ruskin's personality by his published work, and his works again by the standards of excellence ruling such productions in themselves. There is another point of view. We may regard him, as it were, historically, as an expression of his own times, as one of the forces which make up the intellectual current of an age.

It is here that he appears to me to be decidedly a representative figure in the intellectual movement of the latter half of the nineteenth century in England. The later Victorian era is in marked contrast—in some respects antagonism—to the earlier Victorian era. It may be called a kind of Renaissance, and it has analogies in many respects to the English Renaissance at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Like that age, it marks an effort on the side of intellectualism in its struggle with sterile and stereotyped convention and authority, coupled with effete scholasticism and low standards of living. As a reaction against the spirit of the French Revolution, and perhaps as a result of the victorious issues of the Napoleonic wars, the late Georgian and early Victorian periods developed a tone of stolid and self-satisfied conventional-

ism—Philistinism in life, in thought and in art. The reaction to which this again led in our immediate past took the form of conscious intellectualism in science, æstheticism in art and philanthropy in morals.

All these movements came into antagonism with the existing order of things. They had to struggle against the general conventionalism and conservatism of the English mind, its hatred of “new things,” of theory and thought, its sane mistrust of the doctrinaire, its deep-rooted and sincere aversion to cant and gush, with the predominance of the manly, though sometimes brutal, spirit of public-school athleticism, with the conformity of social tone in club-life, with the atmosphere of the country house and its field sports.

This spirit reigned supreme—its rule is far from having vanished in the present day—in Church and State, in the mart and in the drawing-room, nay, in the universities and the schools and museums of art.

Against this mental and moral brutality, this coarseness or stolidity, against this indifference to, or contempt of, things intellectual and artistic, there arose a phalanx of thinkers and reformers, some extreme, some moderate, reviving religion and thought, ennobling action, and proclaiming aloud the necessity to examine and to reform. They have all passed away—Stanley and Jowett, Emerson and Carlyle, Kingsley and Maurice, Darwin, Huxley, Clifford, Martineau, Matthew Arnold and Newman, George Eliot, Morris and Ruskin, the Præraphaelites, Browning and, fortunately still among us, Meredith.

In this phalanx Ruskin was a protagonist. Since the last few years, and in the immediate present, there is a lull, even a back-wave. How long will it last? Is there an Elizabethan age to follow our own?

CHARLES WALDSTEIN.

ROMAN CONGREGATIONS AND MODERN THOUGHT.

BY DR. ST. GEORGE MIVART, F. R. S.

THAT marvellously learned and scrupulously impartial man, Professor Harnack, of Berlin, has shown us at how early a date the authority of the Bishop of Rome grew into importance in the nascent Catholic Church.

After all, it was very natural, as Gibbon in his wonderful history clearly pointed out, that he who occupied the Episcopal Chair of the capital of the world should grow to be regarded as the central ruler of Christendom and become inspired by that instinct and capacity for ruling and domination, which was the chief characteristic of ancient, imperial Rome.

The opportunity for aggrandizement and for the gradual transformation of a local "bishop" into a "Pope"—as we now understand that word—was amply supplied by a multitude of appeals from all sides with respect to matters of doctrine, discipline and ritual.

The Papacy soon grew to be an enviable post, if only on account of the power, wealth and luxury it conferred on the holder of that office.

Even in the days of Pope Damasus, not a few lives were lost in struggles to attain the Papal Chair, and the amiable Pagan Symmachus banteringly remarked to that bishop: "I would consent to become a Christian, if I could thereby become a Pope."

It was manifestly impossible for any man by himself to carry on more than a small portion of affairs so multitudinous.

Thus, an increasing number of trained assistants became organized, and their organization became more and more complicated (as the matters requiring attention became not only more

and more multitudinous, but also more varied in character) till they attained the condition in which they exist to-day.

At first, the parish priests and deacons of Rome, to whom were afterward added a few suburban bishops, served this function, as they do now when they have become transformed into the College of Cardinals. Each Cardinal takes his title from one such urban or suburban post—Cardinal priests, Cardinal deacons and Cardinal bishops, respectively. Thus a Cardinal need not be a priest. The well-known and much-detested Cardinal Antonelli, of Pius the Ninth's time, was not a priest.

As above implied, the whole mass of Papal assistants soon required to be divided into sets—each set devoting itself to a special kind of business. Each such set was termed a "Congregation." And the Roman Congregations now existing are, briefly, as follows:

The first and highest Congregation is that of the *Holy Office*, commonly known as the *Inquisition*. It is highest because its president, or prefect, is the Pope himself, and, at its principal sittings, he, unless it happens to be impossible, actually takes the chair. This Congregation was erected by Paul III. in 1542. There was, indeed, a so-called Inquisition and also Inquisitors, mainly Dominicans, at a much earlier date; but the organization of the present Holy Office is a Congregation of Cardinals erected as just stated, and further organized by Sixtus V.

It consists of twelve Cardinals, a judge, a counsellor and consultants selected by the Pope, who give their opinions on points submitted to them, an advocate for the defense of accused persons, and other subordinate officials.

It is a tribunal which relates only to matters of faith and morals, and it is supposed to act for the spiritual good of the accused and of the community.

The Roman Inquisition, though severe, was not intentionally cruel, though its modes of procedure naturally seem to us appalling.

Any one denounced to this tribunal was speedily arrested, but he was not told what he was accused of, nor who his accusers were, though pains were taken to find out whether an accusation might not be due to private enmity. The accused was asked to confess, and he was elaborately examined in order to elicit an avowal, or some confirmation, of the charge made against him. He could be examined under threat of torture and under torture itself—not

any fancy torments, but only two or three traditional kinds of torture carried to a fixed extent and no further. Witnesses could be arrested and examined without being told against whom they were called to testify or what the accusation was; and, if thought needful, they also could be examined under torture. The accused was provided with an advocate, but he had no power to cross-examine. If found guilty, the condemned might be sentenced to protracted or even perpetual imprisonment and to heavy fines.

Such a procedure was by no means confined to centuries long past. It remained in full force and activity at Rome down to the great French Revolution, and it was, for a time, restored after Napoleon's defeat. But in earlier ages death sentences, though infrequent, were by no means rare, as in the case of Giordano Bruno and various other obstinate or "relapsed" heretics. Any man who denied that Mary was a perfect virgin after having given birth to Christ, was reckoned a "relapsed heretic," and, as such, he could not save his life by any recantation or profession of faith. All that he could gain thereby was the privilege of being strangled before he was burnt.

In those days the Inquisition claimed the power to compel all magistrates to carry out the regulations against heretics and to swear so to act.

The second Congregation, and that concerning which the present writer has some personal experience, is called *The Sacred Congregation of the Index*. It was instituted by Pius V. in the latter part of the sixteenth century, with a Dominican friar for its secretary. It consists of such a number of Cardinals as the Pope may appoint, the head of them being termed "Prefect." There are also a number of consultors, whereof the Master of the Apostolic Palace is the chief.

The object of the Congregation was, and is, to compile as complete a list as possible of publications judged, by Church authority, to be unfit for the perusal of Catholics.

In 1616 works teaching Copernicanism, or heliocentric astronomy, were placed on the Index as being heretical.

Among other Roman Congregations is that of *Sacred Rites*, instituted by Sixtus V., toward the end of the sixteenth century, to regulate all ceremonies of worship, the veneration of relics and images, and it has to do with processes of beatification and canonization.

Then there is the *Congregation of Immunities*, instituted by Urban XIII., but this is a small affair now, when rights of asylum and clerical immunities are all but extinct. It rather deals with small matters in which Church and State may come into conflict.

Next is the *Congregation of Bishops and Regulars*, also instituted by Sixtus V., which concerns itself with the relations between monks and friars and the episcopate.

The *Congregation of Indulgences*, established by Clement IX., sees to the conditions on which indulgences are granted and is directed to avert, and correct, abuses.

Lastly, may be here mentioned the *Congregation of Propaganda*, which was instituted by Gregory XV. in 1632, to protect, regulate and promote foreign missions.

I came into collision with the Holy Office and the Sacred Congregation of the Index in the following manner:

I had long made it my business to try and effect a satisfactory reconciliation between recent science and modern culture, on the one hand, and ancient Catholic dogma and contemporary Roman Catholic teaching, on the other. The questions to which I naturally first addressed myself were those of my own department of science, biology, and especially the doctrine of Evolution. To this end I published two works, "Genesis of Species"* and "Lessons from Nature,"† which did a good deal toward effecting the object I had in view.

But, though my notions appeared to be sympathetically regarded by a large number of priests, I was attacked by others, and notably by one Murphy, in the *Irish Ecclesiastical Record*, a journal much esteemed by not a few Catholic theologians.

Thereupon I endeavored to demonstrate,‡ by a notable example from astronomical science, how much greater the freedom of Catholics really was than they seemed to suppose.

The example I took was the never to be forgotten case of Galileo, and it was this which led me to study the nature and effects of decrees made by the Sacred Congregations of the Index and the Holy Office. In 1616 the Index made a decree condemning Copernicanism, as before stated, because it was "altogether opposed to divine Scripture;" and, in 1632, the Inquisition con-

*Macmillan & Co., 1870.

†John Murray.

‡In an article entitled "Modern Catholics and Scientific Freedom," in the *Nineteenth Century* for July, 1887.

demned the astronomer Galileo for having held a doctrine "contrary to the sacred and divine Scriptures," and he, in his abjuration, speaks of its having been declared to him by authority that his doctrine was "repugnant to Scripture."

From all this I argued, since it has now become universally acknowledged that both the Holy Office and the Index had erred in their interpretation of Scripture, Catholics had become forever free from such trammels, since one error sufficed to destroy all confidence in the absolute certainty of their future decisions.

Fairly satisfied by my success—especially since my article, though somewhat provocative, elicited no censure—I next attempted to meet a much more serious difficulty.

It was, and is, an absolute dogma of the Church that the damned are damned eternally; that from hell there is no possibility of escape, and that the two kinds of torment in the infernal prison, the torture of loss and the torture of hell-fire, will go on for ever and ever and ever!

So terrible, so revolting, a doctrine constituted for many Catholics the one great trial of their faith. Some known to me, priests as well as laity, neither could nor would believe in it; and yet to deny, or even inwardly to reject, any single dogma of the Catholic Church was, and is, simply not to be in reality a Catholic at all. The horror of this doctrine was, I knew, very much felt in the United States; as might be naturally expected from a people so rationally considerate for and tolerant of the beliefs both of their fellow citizens and of strangers.

There was small wonder that such terror should be felt for the doctrine taught by the Fathers and Saints of the Church regarding hell—SS. Cyprian, Gregory, Chrysostom, Augustine, Aquinas, etc.

Two quotations from modern writers will, I think, quite suffice. A priest known as Father Furniss thus describes the place of punishment:

"But listen to the tremendous, the horrible, uproar of millions and millions and millions of tormented creatures mad with the fury of hell. Oh! the screams of fear, the groanings of horror, the yells of rage, the cries of pain, the shouts of agony, the shrieks of despair, from millions on millions! There you have the roaring like lions, hissing like serpents, howling like dogs, and wailing like dragons; there you hear the gnashing of teeth and the fearful blasphemies of the devils. Above all, you hear the roaring of the thunders of God's anger, which shakes hell to its foundations."

The teaching of that modern Saint, St. Alphonsus Liguori, about hell, has been thus summarized:

"In hell there is a kind of horrible gloom, where the dim light only serves to reveal objects of horror—a vast expanse, overarched and searched by torrents of devouring flame, where lie in heaps the carcasses of the damned, incapable of motion from their first casting down; and as long as God shall be God, the brains within the head, the marrow within the bones, the bowels within the body, the blood within the veins, the heart within the breast, shall be searched and interpenetrated by quenchless fire. In that dim and glimmering light the senses of the damned shall each receive its own particular torture; the sight shall be appalled by the view of devils who trample upon the bodies of their victims, assuming shapes the most horrible to increase the terrors of their presence; the sense of smell shall be assailed with a stench so great that, by comparison, all earthly stench would seem jasmine or attar of roses. * * * The ears of the damned shall ever echo to the unceasing howling of the devils and of their own shrieks of despair, of agony, and of impotent rage. How painful," says St. Liguori, "to listen to the groans of a sick man, and what must be the torture to the inhabitants of hell to listen, not for an hour, a day, a week, but to the dreadful sounds which fill the air of hell forever and forever. * * * In that fiery deluge must the souls of the lost forever toss to and fro, like chips upon an ocean, but chips consubstantiated with fire."

What would seem wonderful about such writings is that their authors should think any readers would tolerate and accept such statements. Yet their very existence shows that men and women, deluded even to so great an extent, do in fact exist. What a gospel for mankind! What "good news," compared with what Paganism had to offer! But let us consider one of the most cruel of Pagan cults. Surely the Mexican god before whose image the priests cut open the breasts of living victims, in order to smear its lips with blood from their torn-out, but yet palpitating hearts, was a god of benevolence and mercy compared with the Divine Monster worshipped by St. Alphonsus Liguori! The Mexican's sufferings, after all, were short, and he was often a voluntary victim; but the God ordinary Catholic theologians would have us adore is represented as regarding with complacency torments compared with which burning alive is as nothing. For the hellish torment is to be endured by thousands of thousands of human beings, for a duration which we can only picture by millions on millions of years recurring without end.

Such a god we must refuse to worship; and, did a being of the

kind exist, we should be ethically bound, happen what might, to abhor, execrate and defy him.*

Yet such is the Divine Demon who seems to be praised and adored by Catholic Saints and Fathers, and by the common teaching of the Church.

Well might any Catholic desire to free his Church from the incubus of such teaching, could it be possible for him so to do. This I endeavored to effect by my articles entitled "Happiness in Hell," which were published in the *Nineteenth Century* in December, 1892, and in February and April, 1893.

Of course, I could not pretend to know anything more about the next world than other men. My task was limited to such a criticism of Catholic doctrine and such a statement of its terms and propositions as might show that the Church's teaching about hell, rightly understood, contains nothing which cannot be seen to accord with right reason, the highest morality and the greatest benevolence.

I will now, very briefly, state the essence of my contention.

(1.) I recalled the fact that, according to Catholic doctrine, man, at his first creation, was raised above his natural state and condition to a supernatural existence which carried with it, as a consequence, that inconceivable happiness in the next world which is technically called the "Beatific Vision;" a happiness as utterly unattainable by the mere natural man as it is impossible for a fish to live the life of a bird—or rather inconceivably more impossible, since between a natural and a supernatural mode of existence there is an infinite difference.

(2.) Man by "the Fall" descended to a mere natural existence, and so became incapable of the Beatific Vision.

(3.) The Redemption having again made a supernatural life attainable through baptism, the baptized, who did not die in a

*As some relief to the horrors above depicted, I may quote some of the quaint ideas of Father Lessius, S. J., recorded in his work "*De Perfectionibus Moribusque Divinis*" (A. D. 1620). Their perusal will demonstrate the immense gulf which has come to exist between the conceptions of his age and modern ideas. In his chapter (XX.) on the general resurrection, he describes the despatch of angels to collect the minute, scattered fragments of bodies, and treats of the bearing of cannibalism on the process. He was, in a way, a precursor of Rochefoucauld, since he described how the blessed look on at the torments of the damned and congratulate themselves "*quod tantis malis in æternum sint exempti*." He also estimates the time it takes to descend into hell and the number of miles to be traversed. He considers its size and structure, and declares it need not be so very large because the damned will neither have to stand up nor run about, but are piled up in a great heap on either burning coals or burning wood. He also describes the damned as in a pool of burning liquid sulphur, the diameter of which need not be more than 20,000 feet.

state of grave sin, would enjoy the supernatural happiness of the direct Vision of God.

(4.) No one unbaptized, or dying in grave sin—such sin putting an end to the supernatural life of the soul—could ever attain the Beatific Vision, there being no state of probation after death. Thus, all grave sinners, with all the unbaptized, must pass their eternal existence excluded from the Beatific Vision—that is, they must remain in hell for all eternity.

I then proceeded to argue that there *must* be happiness in hell, because the Church teaches that the souls of unbaptized infants live there, for all eternity, a life of the most perfect and complete *natural* happiness, though forever excluded from the supernatural mode of existence. Of this they might be forever unconscious, and, certainly, having no experience thereof, would as little desire it as a trout would desire to be a humming-bird.

I added that there were millions of savages who were probably as irresponsible as little children, and for them also a happy natural future must be in store. Next, I pointed out how many persons, from congenital defect, early bad influences, or overpowering temptation, might commit faults actually very grave, for which, however, they were but little, or not at all, responsible. To such, a just God could not apportion a miserable eternity.

If, then, there was so much happiness in hell, how could the terrible declarations of Fathers, Saints, Theologians and Preachers be justified and harmonize therewith?

To me it seemed an easy task, and I rejoiced to undertake to demonstrate that harmony, knowing how much solace and comfort it would give to many an anxious mind, possessed by terrible fear, as to the future.

Now, as I have said, the difference between supernatural and natural happiness is declared by the Church to be an infinite one. How can the real nature of such a difference be best brought home to men's minds? Our natural mode of life, our natural joys and sorrows, we have all constant experience of and can readily understand. But, as to what the Supernatural may be, we can form no conception, as we have had no experience of it; and men cannot imagine anything of which they have never had any experience. How then can its value be made most appreciable?

If a painter had to depict, as best he could, a brightness which no pigment can approach, his only resource must be to deepen the

shadows as much as his palette will permit—regretting all the time that he has no colors nearly black enough to convey, by contrast, a due appreciation of that unrepresentable brightness. Therefore, since it was utterly impossible to depict the bliss of heaven directly, it had been indirectly brought out by depicting hell as a place of all the horrors that the imagination could by any possibility gather together.

Thus it seemed to me that the objections against the Catholic doctrine of an eternal hell might be entirely obviated.

I further added that, of course, all this horrible picturing must be exclusively taken as symbolizing the *difference* between eternal bliss and its non-attainment, and not by any means as depicting the difference between hell and life on earth. To take it in that old and too generally accepted sense, would be to bring back the horrible teaching which represents God as an execrable demon.

Would my interpretation (brought forward to remove the most fatal of all objections against the Roman Catholic Church) meet with acceptance or even toleration?

By many priests, both in England and the United States, it was gladly accepted. It was declared tenable by the most learned theologian I have ever known—now a “Consultor” of the “Holy Office” and theologian to the Pope.

But many of my friends doubted the result; the editor of the *Nineteenth Century* said to me, “They will never allow that whip to be taken out of their hands.”

The Rev. Father Clarke, S. J., said that the fear of hell could not be spared as a deterrent, and I have indeed heard it said, “If there is no hell-fire, what can be the use of being good?”

I had not long to wait. The memorable year (1893) when Leo XIII. promulgated his terrible Encyclical saw my writings placed upon the Index. This process deprived them of any value they might have had. But the decree did not censure a single proposition I had put forward. As far as I knew, the act of the Congregation of the Index might merely mean that Authority thought the moment inopportune for such a publication, or that I had perhaps handled some dignitaries too roughly. I was therefore advised by my most sympathetic friends to submit, and I submitted, without, of course, unsaying a single word of what I had advanced.

I subsequently found, however, that as usual I had been secretly

denounced to the Inquisition and that all possible efforts had been made for my condemnation, without any notice being given me that I was accused, or what I was accused of, or by whom—according to the use and wont of “Roman Congregations.” This mode of procedure had long before excited the indignation of not a few English priests and laymen, and last year one of the most pious of the English laity, Mr. James Hope, a relative of the Duke of Norfolk, addressed a letter to a newspaper, in which he did not scruple to denounce vehemently such un-English modes of judicial procedure. His protest met with much sympathy among the clergy, who were nevertheless kept silent through prudence. It also came to my knowledge that a new edition of the Index had been sent forth wherein my name still found a place, or rather, had been freshly inserted. Thereupon, in August last, I wrote directly to Cardinal Steinhuber, S. J., the actual Prefect of the Congregation of the Index.

I represented to him how abhorrent to English-speaking Catholics were the modes of procedure of the Roman Congregations, and I begged him, very respectfully, to have me informed who had denounced me and what propositions of mine were found fault with; adding that if His Eminence could not, or would not, furnish me with the information I desired, I must withdraw my submission. I received a reply saying that my writings on hell had been denounced to, and censured by, the Holy Office, which had caused Cardinal Steinhuber’s Congregation to put me on the Index. No further information was vouchsafed me, so my submission was withdrawn accordingly.

I have had no further contention with any Roman Congregation, but only with Cardinal Vaughan, Archbishop of Westminster, the head of the Roman Catholic Church in England.

After mature reflection and many mental struggles, I had come to the conclusion that the Roman Catholic Church must tolerate a transforming process of evolution, with respect to many of its dogmas, or sink, by degrees, into an effete and insignificant body, composed of ignorant persons, a mass of women and children and a number of mentally effeminate men. I was acquainted with a not inconsiderable number of cultured English Catholics—clergy as well as laity—who were severely tried by the reactionary policy which has shown itself of late years at Rome.

One matter about which they were anxious was the attitude

toward Scripture which had been taken up at the Vatican Council, and which was made still more intolerable by that terrible Encyclical of Leo XIII., which was promulgated in 1893, and is known as "*Providentissimus Deus*." My cultured friends varied greatly in breadth of views and secret dissent from received dogma, but all agreed as to the necessity of freedom to regard the Bible from the point of view of the "higher criticism," and to declare without disguise their entire disbelief in the historical truth of large portions of it.

To my mind it was clear that, unless the infallibility of the Church could be seriously disclaimed* and the possibility of error in passed conciliar decrees allowed, the needful evolution of dogma was impossible. But if changes in the meanings of dogma could once be admitted by authority as possible, or even if the assertion that they had changed were only tolerated, an immense gain would be achieved thereby.

Convinced that such would be the case, I wrote my two articles which appeared in the *Nineteenth Century* and the *Fortnightly Review*, respectively, last January.

On purpose, I made them of a startling character, so that I might be able to ascertain whether the position I, and not a few other Catholics, occupied in the Roman Church was, or was not, a tenable one—whether it was in any way possible to continue in that communion.

My effort was successful, and though I deeply regretted, and regret, this clear demonstration, through the action of Archbishop Vaughan and his advisers, that the Roman Catholic Church has thus shown itself to be essentially a *petrified* and not a *progressive* Church, I feel none the less convinced that it is better that such a fact should become distinctly known than that it should remain concealed by the subterfuges and evasions of ecclesiastics who seek to retain, and gain, adherents through a pretence of logically impossible liberalism.

The Archbishop, acting as my Ordinary, required me to subscribe a profession of faith which contained the following clause:

"In accordance with the Holy Councils of Trent and of the Vatican,

*The late Mr. Richard Simpson, a very distinguished and witty convert, endeavored to get rid of this incubus by a joke. He said the word was of a similar nature with the political term "non-intervention." As to that, he quoted Talleyrand's explanation as follows: "*Non-intervention c'est une mot politique et metaphysiq e qui signifie à peu pres la même chose qu'intervention.*" But I do not think jokes on serious subjects can do any real good.

I receive all the books of the Old and New Testaments, with all their parts as set forth in the fourth session of the Council of Trent and contained in the ancient Latin edition of the Vulgate, as sacred and canonical, and I firmly believe and confess that the said Scriptures are sacred and canonical, not because, having been carefully composed by mere human industry, they were afterwards approved by the Church's authority, nor merely because they contain revelation with no admixture of error; but because, having been written by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they have God for their author, and have been delivered as such to the Church herself."

The books, all parts of which I was thus called on to declare had God for their author, include that of "Tobit," with its account of how Tobit and the Archangel Raphael, with the aid of the liver of a fish, overcame a homicidal demon and imprisoned him in Egypt. The fabulous second book of Maccabees is also among them, as is also the story which relates how, when Daniel was thrown a second time into the lion's den, an angel seized one Habbakuk, in Judæa, by the hair of his head, and carried him with his bowl of pottage to give it to Daniel for his dinner.

It was, of course, absolutely impossible for me, or for any other scientific man, to sign such a formula, unless it was clearly and publicly known that I should be free to reject, as errors, statements historically untrue, such as the account of the serpent and the tree, the bringing of animals to Adam to be named, the history of the Tower of Babel, that of the Deluge, and so on.

Accordingly, I wrote to my Archbishop begging him, as my Ordinary, to give me an authoritative answer whether I was, or was not, right in judging that the signing of the formula submitted to me would be equivalent to an assertion that there were no errors in the Bible, and that I could then no longer rationally and logically deny the veracity of the Biblical statements above referred to, and many others equally untrue.

It has been commonly supposed that one characteristic of the Roman Catholic Church was its distinct and definite teaching. It has also been credited with having the courage of its opinions, while being, at the same time, a tender and faithful mother to her spiritual children.

I sought in vain for the decisive reply it was plainly my Archbishop's duty to give, when appealed to as my Ordinary. He referred me to Leo XIII. and certain writers.

Now, the Pope, in his celebrated Encyclical about Scripture, after reaffirming the decrees of Trent and the Vatican, laid down

the following most unequivocal declaration about the writers of Scripture:

"By supernatural power, God so moved and impelled them to write—He was so present to them—that the things which He ordered, and those only, they, first, rightly understood, then willed faithfully to write down, and finally expressed in apt words and with infallible truth."

It would surely be impossible to use words more decisive as to the assertion by the Roman Catholic Church that God must be declared indeed the author of every statement, in every part of all the books declared by Trent "sacred and canonical."

This fact was for me decisive and I refused to sign the formula.

But it is very noteworthy that I could get no authoritative answer from my Archbishop in reply to my question. The fact was, he dared not answer it. He could not allow that God had inspired men to write falsehoods, or that the Church had (as of course it has) misled mankind as to the "Word of God" for a long succession of centuries. He could not admit that the Councils of Trent and the Vatican had erred, because he was hidebound by the doctrine of the Church's infallibility, which, as a Catholic Archbishop, he had strenuously to uphold. Neither could he venture to declare that I was bound to hold, as certainly true, all the puerile absurdities to be found between the covers of the Bible. Therefore, on this important matter of Scripture, Catholic authorities trifle with truth and "palter with us in a double sense." Most shocking of all is their utter disregard for the anxiety and distress of so many Catholics who know not what they must believe about Scripture, yet dread peril to their immortal souls if they do not believe what the Church teaches.

The most imperative task for Roman theologians to-day is so to modify the meaning of the dogma of the Church's infallibility as to render possible the admission by them that the Councils of Florence, Trent and the Vatican have erred, and that the Pope's Encyclical is to be put on one side as of absolutely no account whatever. By such a course, the way will be prepared for the play of evolution on Church dogma through the future centuries, and for the gradual construction of a Catholicity which shall embody all scientific truth and all the religious truths held by all forms of belief, including the beauties and noble precepts of the old Paganism, which were too quickly and carelessly thrown aside.

ST. GEORGE MIVART.

THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD IN THEOLOGY.

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THE recent correspondence between Professor St. George Mivart and Cardinal Vaughan concerning the Professor's recent articles on the relation of educated Roman Catholics to the Bible, marks a most significant epoch in the history of religious thought. It brings most strikingly to view the fact that the time is past when any one can serve the cause of true religion by ignoring the methods of modern science. It also makes clear and vivid the necessity of establishing our theological beliefs on just the same scientific basis as our beliefs in any other sphere of inquiry, if they are going to influence in any effective way the thought of the future.

The aim of the present paper is to set forth with clearness the principles that underlie all our beliefs, and then to show how these principles are to be applied to the particular field of investigation we now have in view.

It is customary in discussing the method of science to go back to Aristotle and treat of the subject under the two distinct heads of induction and deduction. But we now see that the two methods are not wholly independent of each other. In reality, they are frequently blended or employed alternately in the pursuit of science. It is no exaggeration to say that all the more important and extensive investigations of science rely as much upon the one as upon the other. In both, the syllogism, with its major and minor premises and conclusion, holds the foremost place. For the syllogism is not only the form of deductive reasoning, but it is the true type of all reasoning properly so called. It may not be always necessary to express an argument in the form of a syllogism, but it must always be thrown into this form when scientific accuracy is required.

While there is little or no disagreement among thinkers about the nature and place of deduction in science, there is often a great deal of controversy over the sphere and proper function of induction. This arises from the fact that the term induction may be employed in at least three different senses.

In the first place, induction may be used to designate the old Socratic method of attaining definitions. This consists simply in enumerating all the particulars of a class. It is what is sometimes called a perfect induction; and, although it is in the form of reasoning, it is not reasoning at all. All we do in such a case is to solve a simple problem in addition and state the result.

Induction, according to the second meaning given to the term, is any process of adding to our knowledge. It was Bacon's chief objection to the Aristotelian logic that its premises were all taken for granted. It could never, in his opinion, in any way increase our knowledge. He therefore asked the question, How do we obtain our knowledge, and how do we progress in it? His answer to the question was, By induction; and, as contrasted with the old method, the term took on the meaning of any process that adds anything to what we already know at any given time. But this view of induction is too broad, just as the first view is too narrow. It includes every other mode of acquiring knowledge as well as reasoning, while the first view excludes reasoning altogether.

The third and most rational definition of induction represents it as the process of thought by which we pass from particulars to generals, or from effects to their causes. It is only in this sense that it can in any way be brought into contrast with deduction, as one of the essential methods employed in the pursuit of science.

Of course, the chief preliminary step in any induction is the acquisition of the particulars, and this can only be done by the two processes of observation and experiment. But they do not form any part of induction properly so called. The mere ascertainment of facts does not make a scientist. There are a thousand workers in science to one scientist. The most exact observers and the most skilful experimenters are not, by any means, the best scientists. Quite the opposite is probably the rule. Many of the world's greatest scientists have been notoriously defective in this respect. Nevertheless, a highly developed science, in any department of knowledge, is possible only upon the basis of a large supply of carefully ascertained facts.

The great and distinctive element in all induction is the formation of the hypothesis; and there can be no inductive science formed of any sort where this is not the chief feature.

What, then, is to be understood by an hypothesis, and what is the process the mind goes through in bringing it to view? An hypothesis is a supposition, a guess, or conjecture as to what the general fact is which includes the given particular facts, or what the cause is which has brought about the given effects. The term is sometimes contrasted with the term "theory," as though the two were necessarily distinct; an hypothesis being regarded as a mere possibility, while a theory is called a verified hypothesis. But this view is largely an arbitrary one, as the terms are often used interchangeably, as when we speak indifferently of the Darwinian hypothesis or the Darwinian theory.

Much might be said about the conditions most favorable for making a good hypothesis, but the chief thing that concerns us for our present purpose is the fact that every hypothesis, however formed, is always a product of the constructive imagination. All previous acts are simply by way of gathering material for the imagination to rearrange and recombine into a new creation.

In a certain sense, the mind takes a leap into the dark. It literally passes, *per saltum*, from the realm of the known to the realm of the unknown. From all the material that the memory places at its disposal it makes a guess or conjecture as to what will best meet all the exigencies of the situation.

It is for this reason that men of science, in all realms and in all ages, have always been men of powerful imaginations. The Greeks were the first great scientists of the race, because they were far more highly endowed than any other people with great imaginative powers. What they saw excited these powers and urged them to conjecture, to reason about things, and try to explain their nature and cause. It was well said by Dr. Carpenter that "it cannot be questioned, by any one who carefully considers the subject under the light of adequate knowledge, that the creative imagination is exercised in at least as high a degree in science as it is in art or poetry. Even in the strictest of sciences—mathematics—it can easily be shown that no really great advance, such as the invention of fluxions by Newton and of the differential calculus by Leibnitz, can be made without the exercise of the imagination."

Given the hypothesis, the next step in the scientific process

is to verify it; and this is done by making the hypothesis the major premise of a deductive syllogism and noting the results. If the conclusions obtained coincide with the observed facts with which we started, the hypothesis is *probably* a correct one, and, others things being equal, may be accepted as an established truth.

From this outline of the scientific method we see that no induction can be established beyond a high degree of probability. That is, no one can ever be absolutely certain that the hypothesis he assumes is a veritable truth. All generalizations in every science thus have their logical basis in the theory of probabilities.

When Bishop Butler asserted that "probability is the very guide of life," he might have added, "and we have no other." For all our judgments of what the past has been, or the present is, or the future will be, are necessarily formed on that basis; and as we are finite creatures and can never have infinite knowledge on any of these subjects, the knowledge we do have can never be more than probable.

The truth is that every man is so constituted by nature that he can never be absolutely certain of anything outside of the facts of his own consciousness and the simple intuitions necessarily involved therein; and when he makes an assertion transcending this realm, he passes at once into the sphere of the probable.

What we know with absolute certainty is never a matter of inference. It is never the result of a process of reasoning. It is always known directly, at once, by an immediate beholding. It is easy to see, therefore, that the realm of absolute certainty is a clearly limited one, and that the realm of probability includes within itself the great body of our knowledge. I am absolutely certain that I experience sensations, that I who experience them exist, and that the sensations have a cause; but I can be only probably certain that this particular concrete object was the cause. It is exceedingly easy for the most cautious person living to be mistaken in his judgments, and to draw wrong inferences from the *data* furnished by any one or all of his senses; and he can never be absolutely certain that he draws the right one. All the wisest man in the world can do is carefully to estimate the probabilities in the case and act accordingly. To say of a thing, "I have seen it with my own eyes," is only to make its existence probable; and to obey the injunction, "Handle me and see," can give only probable knowledge.

In every discussion of this sort a clear distinction should always be made between intuitively knowing and believing. I intuitively know a thing to be true when I am absolutely certain of it; I believe a thing to be true when I fall short, however little, of such certainty. That is to say, belief is simply imperfect knowledge. It is any kind of knowledge, in any sphere, which fails, in any respect, of being absolute. No proposition, perhaps, is more familiar to a beginner in logic than the statement, "All men are mortal," but even that assertion can be to him nothing more than a matter of a high degree of probability. For he has known only a very few men in the past, and as to those who may come to exist in the future he cannot positively assert that they will possess that property. He simply believes the proposition to be true, in just the same way, and no other, as he might believe in a material heaven, or a mountain of gold, or the real existence of a centaur.

Every natural scientist, I suppose, accepts and teaches the doctrine that every particle of matter attracts every other particle directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance. But he has examined only a few of the particles; and, from the very nature of the case, he can never be certain that those he has not examined are exactly like those he has. The doctrine furnishes him with a good working hypothesis. The probabilities are very high in its favor. But all he has any right to say about it is that he believes in the law of gravitation, not that he is absolutely certain of its truthfulness.

And so it is when we come to the realm of theology. We employ the same finite powers of mind in constructing a theology as in forming a science of botany or of physics. There is no difference in the kind of knowledge we have of each, but only in the class of objects taken into consideration. And my faith in the truth or falsity of their respective doctrines, and the degree of my faith in them, should always vary with the degree of their probability.

Theology, properly understood, is the science which seeks to account for the universe from the standpoint of God. It attempts to put all the known facts together into a system around this idea. It does not draw its material from any alleged revelation alone, although the revelation, if true, will furnish some of its most important *data*. But it gathers its material from every realm of knowledge. Every new fact discovered in any quarter

of the universe increases its material, and every old supposed fact exploded diminishes it.

Now, all the facts that any man can possibly know may best be divided, for our present purpose, into two classes, internal facts and external facts. By internal facts we mean the facts of one's own consciousness, and by external facts, all else that can be mentioned. The former are certain to one, the latter merely probable. Every man who constructs a botany, or a geology, or any other science, makes it out of probable facts only. Every man who writes a history states and explains nothing of which he can be more than probably certain. How evident it is, then, that he who seeks to give unity to all the sciences, to explain the universe in which the great mass of the facts are only probable, can never attain to more than a probable solution of the problem, and can never justly ask another to accept his conclusions on any other ground than the high degree of their probability.

Great thinkers, from Thales, Plato and Moses, have had their theologies—their explanations of the origin and nature of the universe, as they understood it, and many of these explanations have been of extraordinary merit; but even St. Paul himself could never have been certain that his explanation was more than a probably true one.

Three great systems of theology are presented in the New Testament. Some prefer that of St. Paul; some find the Petrine theology more to their mind; while others adhere to that of St. John. The Apostles' Creed contains, perhaps, the sum and substance of all three; but no assertion in it transcends the realm of the probable. A brief examination of the creed itself will make this apparent. It begins with the statement, "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth." Now, the existence of the Absolute back of nature and all finite being, like one's own existence, is a matter of positive certainty; but any assertion concerning the nature of that Absolute, since it is an induction from probable facts, can never be more than probable. When we say, therefore, with the creed, that God is the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth, we are asserting something about the nature of the Supreme Being of which no man can be more than probably certain. The degree of confidence we are justified in having in this statement depends on the degree of its probable truthfulness.

Take, again, the statement of the creed concerning the nature and mission of Jesus: "And in Jesus Christ, His only Son, our Lord; who was conceived by the Holy Ghost, born of the Virgin Mary; suffered under Pontius Pilate, was crucified, dead and buried; He descended into hell; the third day He rose from the dead; He ascended into heaven, and sitteth on the right hand of God, the Father Almighty; from thence He shall come to judge the quick and the dead."

Whether there ever existed on the earth such a person as Jesus, and what He experienced, are purely matters of historical evidence. And as everything that is a matter of evidence is a matter of probability, this must be also. We can never be absolutely certain that those who wrote His history were really acquainted with the facts of His life, or have honestly represented them, or that their testimony, after being once recorded, has not been so frequently and radically altered as to give us to-day, in some respects, an erroneous conception of the truth. Even if we regard the record as it stands as veritable history, the doctrine of the actual divinity of Jesus, that He is in reality Son of God as well as Son of man, is an induction from certain alleged facts, and can, therefore, never be established beyond all possible doubt.

The creed closes with the affirmation: "I believe in the Holy Ghost; the Holy Catholic Church; the communion of saints; the forgiveness of sins; the resurrection of the body; and the life everlasting."

The writer of this passage, from the *data* that he had before him, simply drew the conclusion that the arguments in favor of these propositions were far stronger than those against them; and, accordingly, he was ready to say concerning them, as he does say in the statement itself, "I believe"—not "I am absolutely certain of their truthfulness."

But it makes no difference to the matter in hand from what source he obtained his information. Even if we allow that every word in Scripture came directly from the lips of the Almighty, no man could ever be more than probably certain that he correctly heard the words when they were uttered, or correctly wrote them down, or correctly understood them after they were written, either by themselves or in their mutual relations. There is always room for possible doubt concerning any of these assertions; and all that

the profoundest thinker can do for them is to establish their probable truthfulness.

What we have said concerning the so-called Apostles' Creed applies with equal force and validity to every creed in Christendom and to every system of theology, however elaborately constructed or however dogmatically expressed. The most certain of their generalizations are probable, and probable only, and those who teach them are never justified in urging their acceptance upon others on any other ground. The only theology that has any basis for its existence is an inductive theology; and just as "all inductions in physical science are only probable," so they are in theological science also.

It is never necessary, in fact it is never possible, to do more for any doctrine in any department of inquiry than to show that the balance of probabilities is in its favor. When we have shown that, we have made the doctrine worthy of credence, we are entirely justified in accepting it as a truth and adopting it as a rule of conduct.

He who says of any generalization in any sphere of thought that he will not accept it as true until he is absolutely certain of it, literally does not know enough to eat when he is hungry, or to drink when he is thirsty. The conduct of an ordinary idiot would put him to the blush. As John Locke so tersely puts it, "He that will not stir until he infallibly knows that the business he goes about will succeed, will have but little else to do but to sit still and perish."

Every man, because he is a man, is endowed with powers for forming judgments, and he is placed in this world to develop and apply those powers to all the objects with which he comes in contact. In every sphere of investigation he should begin with doubt, and the student will make the most rapid progress who has acquired the art of doubting well. But doubt is simply a means to an end, not an end in itself. We begin with doubt in order that we may not end with it. To continue to doubt after the material for forming a judgment is before the mind, is a sign of weakness. The man who does so commits intellectual suicide. All you can do for him is to give him a decent burial and pass on.

We ask that every student of theology take up the subject precisely as he would any other science; that he begin with doubt, and carefully weigh the arguments for every doctrine, accepting or re-

jecting each assertion according as the balance of probabilities is for or against it. We demand that he thoroughly "test all things," and thus learn how to "hold fast that which is good."

We believe that even the teachings of Jesus should be viewed from this standpoint, and should be accepted or rejected on the ground of their inherent reasonableness. But we also firmly believe that the probabilities that He spoke the truth are so high that they can never be made any higher; that, when His doctrines concerning God and man and nature are correctly apprehended, it will clearly be seen that they fully satisfy the demands of the intellect and the cravings of the heart. And we do not regard it as at all likely that any theology of the future will have much influence over the minds of the thoughtful, that does not draw its chief and most important *data* from that source.

Superficial critics call the age in which we live an age of novel-reading and devotion to trifles; but the more thoughtful observer does not hesitate to affirm that it is unsurpassed in earnestness.

True, it is disinclined to acknowledge the supernatural. True, it is more inquiring than asserting, more doubting than believing. Yet, there probably never has been a time in our history when purely spiritual questions have been so widely and seriously discussed as at present. The creeds of the world, both Christian and un-Christian, have never before been studied with such universal interest, or criticised with such unsparing vigor.

In fact, the one pre-eminent demand of the present hour is a truly scientific theology—not a Chinese nor a Roman nor an Anglican theology, not a Baptist nor a Methodist nor a Presbyterian theology, not a Mosaic nor exclusively a Pauline theology, but a theology so cautiously constructed as to exclude all fiction, and so profound and comprehensive in its teachings as to include all the facts.

But this imperative need of the age will never be satisfied until every student of the subject clearly recognizes the fact, and constantly applies it, that in theology, as in every other department of knowledge, all generalizations are matters of a high or a low degree of probability, to be accepted or rejected according as the balance of probabilities is for or against them; and that the degree of confidence we should have in such generalizations is to be determined by the degree of their probable truthfulness.

This position, it may be said, requires that all our theological

opinions should be very largely regarded as products of faith. We admit it at once, and we reply that this is true of all opinions. Faith lies at the basis of every science. So far from faith commencing where science ends, "there could no more be science without faith than there could be extension without space."

What Professor Rice has so fittingly said in his "Twenty-five Years of Scientific Progress" about the physical sciences applies with equal relevancy here: "From the clear recognition of the extremely narrow limits within which certitude is attainable, we may learn the rationality and wisdom of acting upon beliefs which are probable, and acting with an earnestness proportionate to the importance of the interest involved. We may learn to walk by faith more steadily by perceiving that, in this universe in which we live, only he who is willing to walk by faith can walk at all."

FRANK SARGENT HOFFMAN.

AFTER ORTHODOXY—WHAT?

BY THE REV. MINOT J. SAVAGE, D.D.

SOME years ago I wrote an article, which was published in this REVIEW, entitled "The Inevitable Surrender of Orthodoxy." The result was a deluge of newspaper articles, in both the religious and the secular press, and of letters from Oregon, Texas, Arkansas, the Carolinas and all over the land. It is nothing to the present purpose that many of these were ignorant and many more abusive. But what is very much to the purpose is this, that many of them expressed surprise that "a minister" could hold such opinions, and begged of me to tell them what I really did believe. I will indicate the tenor of one of them as representative.

The writer said, in substance, "I find myself agreeing with you in the main; but what surprises me is to see the '*Rev.*' attached to your name. I have been compelled to give up the old ideas, but from what I have been taught, and in view of the general opinion around me, I supposed I must give up *religion itself*. I have wanted to be religious, but have been told it was impossible unless I surrendered my reason. Pray tell me, therefore, what kind of religion you hold."

My purpose in this article, in answer to these questions, will be to show that religion is not dependent on orthodoxy, and that a grander religion remains when orthodoxy has passed away. For an interregnum of apparent irreligion, following on the decay of orthodoxy in many minds, who is responsible save orthodox teachers themselves? For they are constantly teaching that there is no religion possible except on the basis of their theories. Ought they to wonder if they are taken at their word?

But a change of theory, compelled by new and broader knowledge, abolishes no single fact or truth. It is only misconceptions that are left behind as the world advances. When the Ptolemaic theory of the universe was given up in favor of the Copernican,

none of the stars was put out, nor did they shine any the less brightly.

"Kopernik's thought a new world made,
Though Ptolemy's stars still shone:
New eyes a new religion gave,
Yet not a truth was gone."

Theology is man's theory of the relations in which he stands to the power manifested in the universe. The field of religion is in the facts of this relation. A change of theory does not abolish any facts, any more than the change from Newton's to Young's theory of light interfered with the sun's power to give light to the earth. But, since what we shall try to be and to do, in order to get into right relations with God and with our fellow men, depends on our theory as to the nature of God and man, it is of the gravest practical importance that these theories be in accord with the facts.

Now, the essential features of the orthodox theory of religion have been discredited by the modern knowledge of the modern world. Since a similar thing has happened over and over in the past, it ought not to seem strange that it should happen again in a growing universe. The foundation stone of orthodoxy has always been the dogma of the Fall of Man and the consequent lost and ruined condition of the race. In accordance with this theory, the one great work of religion has been to "save" men from this "ruin." That has been the theory of the Fall—and in the light of **it** all the wrong and sorrow, the vice and crime of the world have been explained. But study of Jewish thought and life has shown that this whole Eden story was a late importation from a pagan people. The older prophets know nothing of it. And even Jesus, who is said to have been supernaturally sent to save us from the effects of the Fall, never makes the slightest allusion to it. Besides this, science has demonstrated that man has steadily risen from the first, and it makes all stories of original perfection impossible of belief, on the part of all free and intelligent people. And thus we are now able to explain the world's evil, vice, crime, suffering and death in the light of theories much more honorable to God and more helpful for man. Since orthodoxy is inextricably bound up with these theories, since she has committed herself to the assertion that they have been infallibly revealed, she must cease to be orthodox (*i. e.*, the "right opinion") now that these beliefs are passing away.

The only thing that is happening, then, is that the world is

growing wiser and better. And this should seem to be cause for rejoicing rather than of lamentation; unless people really hold the opinion of the old Scotch lady who said, "Some persons think everybody is going to be saved; but, for my part, I hope for better things."

I am now to outline what, in my opinion, is to follow orthodoxy—what is to be left after orthodoxy is gone. To be left? Why, this is one of those paradoxical cases where, after something is taken away, a good deal more is left than was possessed in the first place. It is as if some poor man's hands were emptied of pennies and filled with gold. It is as when the morning takes the night away from us. It is as when health drives out sickness, or hope dispossesses us of despair. The loss is only for the sake of larger and finer gain. We lose the pessimistic theories of a wrecked creation, a ruined race, total depravity, an angry God, blight, curse, endless and hopeless pain—that is all. We have left with us a grander God, a nobler man, a higher religion, a completer revelation, a more helpful Jesus, and eternal hope. Should I escape from an underground cavern, full of deadly damps and noisome creatures, up into God's free air, where His free winds blew on my face and the bright heavens arched a green and smiling earth, would it be altogether reasonable for me to sit down and bewail my "loss?" I should as soon think of doing so in the one case as in the other.

And yet the fear of many is not altogether strange. Sentiment and tender memories gather about the religion of father and mother and childhood, as vines and mosses overgrow an old ruin. The new home may be unspeakably better, yet we do not blame the immigrant when he drops a tear over the recollection of his fatherland. Yet had all men always stayed in fatherland, we should all have been barbarians still. Remember the old, then, if you will; but, if our hopes of God's Kingdom are ever to come true, new Abrahams must ever hear the new calls of God and set out for the new promised land.

Let us, then, note some of the main points of that theology that is to follow orthodoxy.

In the first place, religion will remain. It is infidelity, not faith—whether found outside of the church or in—which fears that religion is in danger. If religion *can* die, it *ought* to die. That is, if it is no part of the essential and eternal nature of

things, then it is something that is not necessary and can be spared. But it is essential and eternal. It consists in the relation between man and the power that lives and works in and through the universe. So long, then, as the universe lasts and there is a man in it, so long religion must endure. Theology is only somebody's theory of this relation. The theories may change; and, so far as they are incorrect or incomplete, they not only must but ought to change in the presence of larger knowledge. But this larger and truer knowledge of man and the universe cannot degrade theology or make it worse, unless the universe itself is essentially bad. If it is good, then the truth about it must be better than anybody's mistakes. So it is only infidelity, or lack of faith in God, that can really be afraid of finding out what is true. And since the universe is infinite and we are God's finite children, slowly growing, slowly finding out more and more about it, each new advance cannot fail to bring us nearer to the ever-lifting and ever-enlarging vision of the truth, which, being infinite, can never be wholly known. But, in the very nature of things, all new knowledge must issue in a nobler, higher, better religion. The only thing that truth can take away from us is a mistake; and the more mistakes we lose the richer we are. People forget this when they continually charge the preachers of the new revelation with doing nothing but telling "what they do not believe." Every truth-born denial is, and must be, a larger affirmation. Let people spend at least a part of their time in noting what is asserted.

Not only does religion remain, but God remains. Here again let it be fearlessly, though reverently, said that if God could be disproved He ought to be. They little honor Him who are afraid to have the grounds of their belief looked at. Do religious people really fear that it is all a mistake, that the universe is a sham and will not bear investigation? If God is not, surely we ought to know it. If God is, a sincere and serious looking for Him is what all really religious people ought to approve. Paul speaks, not without approbation, of those who are "feeling after God, if haply they may find Him who is *not far from every one of us.*" And the proudest result of modern knowledge is the bringing of God nearer to us than ever before in all the past.

Modern science, so greatly feared, has, for the first time in the world's history, demonstrated the utter inadequacy of the ma-

terialistic theory, as an explanation of the universe. So we are justified in thinking of the universe as spirit and life all through. There is no longer any "dead" matter; all is thrilling with the one life. We no longer ask, "Where is God?" any more than I ask, "In what part of my body am I?" I am all in all; at the point of my pen when I write, in my hand when I stretch it out to help. As I am all in all parts of my body, so is God all and in all the universe. Never was God so near to us before; for natural forces are only His present working, and natural laws are only, so to speak, His habits, unchangeable only because He is all-wise. And since personality, intelligence and consciousness exist in man, and since the cause must be at least adequate to the effect, we know that God must be *as much as* personal, intelligent and conscious. What higher form of being may exist we do not know. God, then, is in the mightiest and most distant star; and equally He is in the grain of dust the wind whirls through its tiny orbit in the streets; He is in each blade of grass, and He is in the love and pity of the human heart. And, more than all these, He incloses them all in His infinite arms. He is so near that we lose Him; as a little child, lost in some corner of St. Peter's, might be asking for the Cathedral; or as a bird, borne on swift winds, might be seeking after the air.

Instead, then, of its being true that our modern knowledge is taking God away from us, it is, for the first time in history, giving us a thought of God worthy to match the newly discovered boundlessness of things.

Then, again, for the first time in the history of human thought, we have a conception of man that is worthy, inspiring and hopeful. A race once perfect in innocence, but now fallen and ruined; a race become morally incapable of all good; a race doomed to endless despair, except in the case of "the few that be saved," an "elect" company chosen to illustrate God's grace; a race living in age-long rejection of divine truth and goodness, and so drifting down the hopeless rapids to the abyss; such is the picture presented to us in all the old creeds. But now what? A race starting, indeed, on the border line of the animal world, but with what a history and what an outlook! Along a pathway of struggle and tears and blood, ever up and on, sloughing off the animal, climbing to brain and heart and conscience, until figures like Buddha and Jesus stand up out of the darkness! Legislators

and singers and artists and discoverers and inventors and scientists and teachers and martyrs and witnesses, a long line of the great and the good, increasing with every age, testify not the fall but the magnificent ascent of the race! From what low beginnings come, until we have at last the right to cry, "Now are we sons of God; and it does not yet appear what we shall be!" In face of a history like this, I do not envy the man who can sneer at Darwinism as irreligious and find more "piety" in a theory that makes us all "children of hell." With a past like this behind us, what is there we may not aspire to in the future? A perfect "kingdom of God" becomes a perfectly reasonable dream. Every new truth discovered is just so much more known of God; and every new and higher adjustment of the individual or social life to the higher truths is one more step in the eternal ascent of religion toward God.

And Jesus? Is He lost to the religious heart of the world? Rather is He, for the first time, found. On the old theory, He is part of a supernatural irruption into the world's natural order. In some exceptional, incomprehensible way He is God, He is man, He is both, He is neither. As God, His supposed suffering we cannot think of as real. And His "example" cannot help us who, on that theory, are not "divine," and so are not like him. What good is an example beyond our sphere and out of our reach? But now even the old churches are beginning to talk of Him as only "a manifestation of God in the sphere of humanity," and to waive questions as to the Trinity. Yes, we can join them in this. Only we must look on all men and women as manifestations of God, so far as they are good and true. So it comes to be a question of degree only, and no longer one of kind. God is incarnate in all things good and fair—in flowers and mountains, as well as in the beauty and grandeur of human character.

Looking at Jesus, then, as thus incarnating God in a purely natural way, and so as a natural outgrowth of "what is in man," He becomes to us no longer a symbol of a lost world, but a magnificent inspiration, as showing what man is capable of. Now He is an example and a hope. So He becomes "Son of God" and "our elder brother," as He never could be before.

Neither, once more, is the Bible lost to a man who is capable of seeing the grander revelation of God. The critical scholar rejects no claim that the Bible ever makes. It nowhere claims

to be infallible. This is only a claim, made on behalf of certain theories about it, by certain men who have proved themselves to be very far from infallible. So that now the free and fearless student is no longer troubled by any supposed necessity of "explaining" mistakes, of "reconciling" contradictions, or of "apologizing" for imperfect moral teachings. These are "difficulties" with which men have saddled the Bible, but which are no part of it.

All truth now is only so much "revelation." The truth in the Bible is "divine" truth; and so is the truth of any other book. As all our light is sunlight—whether it comes to us through the medium of a wood-fire, of gas, of electricity, or of a gem dug up from the earth—so is all truth from God, the one source of all light. The Bible then becomes the natural product of the religious nature of man, reflecting its different stages of growth, and so, full of instruction and inspiration for those who know how to use it.

And the Church? Is that to fade away? Rather is it to become grander than ever before. Men naturally organize themselves about any great human interest, for the carrying out of purposes which cannot be so well attained alone. So we have art associations, scientific societies, governments and educational institutions. Now, since religion is a natural interest of man, the one thing of supreme importance, religious organization is the most natural thing in the world. The first churches were purely natural, human associations of those who wished to lead a special kind of religious life, and to help each other in attaining their common aims.

Of course, the type of church, its particular aims and methods, these will always depend on the prevailing theory that is held concerning God, concerning man, concerning the relations which actually exist between them, and concerning what ought to be done to correct and perfect those relations. For all churches exist to help men into better relations with God. This means teaching the truth of those relations and urging motives for right action.

It will easily be seen, then, that the field and need for such association are as permanent as human life. The foundation of the Church then is eternal—based in the nature and needs of man. It will also be easily seen that the nearer we come to an apprehension of the truth of things, the nobler and grander must

the Church become. And, further, it will be seen that, so long as the Church works on a false theory, so long and so far its labor must be wasted.

And, lastly, the outlook for humanity, both in this world and in the future, was never so hopeful as it is in the light of the new knowledge of the modern world. We have the means in our own hands for making this old earth a paradise. And, as finite children of the infinite God, we may believe that we shall find death only another birth.

After Orthodoxy, then, is it darkness and despair—a being “without God and without hope in the world?” Rather do the pessimism and despair of Orthodoxy fade away, as the darkness before a rising sun, and leave us in a world containing a nobler religion, a grander God, a more hopeful man, a more helpful Jesus, a more comprehensive Bible, a better Church and a more inspiring destiny.

MINOT J. SAVAGE.







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THE GREAT SIBERIAN RAILWAY.

BY M. MIKHAILOFF.

THE immense and sparsely populated country of Siberia was for a long time merely an accidental adjunct of the Russian Empire. Its sole importance to the latter lay in the fact that it supplied valuable furs and precious metals. In spite of its enormous extent, its fertility and its various natural resources, it attracted very few Russians who possessed land in their own country. The population consequently increased but slowly.

The first emigrants to Siberia were men who were at variance with the conditions of life in their native country, and were obliged to leave it either of their own free will, or otherwise. To the majority of Russians, Siberia remained an inhospitable land, and its very name called up no other thought than that of cold, exile and dreary drudgery. Time, however, slowly but surely effected an improvement in the relations between Siberia and the mother country. On the one hand, the increasing population of Russia in Europe required more room, and this was to be found in the uninhabited parts of Siberia. On the other hand, the propagation of more exact information about its natural wealth and great fertility soon modified public opinion, and what had seemed but a land of exile began to exercise the allurements of a land of promise.

At that time the community of interests between Russia proper

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and its colony became daily more distinctly felt, and Siberia began to be of more vital importance to the former. Side by side with this slow economical evolution, a radical change took place, in the middle of this century, in the views of the governing bodies concerning Russia's political interests in Siberia. Simultaneously with the annexation of the Amur, Primorsk and Usuri territories, and the opening of Japan to foreigners, Russia firmly established herself on the shores of the Pacific and took steps to consolidate her power there. The time had now come when the Government had to face the main obstacles which prevented closer intercourse between the two countries, retarded the solution of Russia's political problems in Asia and stood in the way of the normal development of the region. These obstacles were time, distance and the vast extent of Siberia.

The only way to overcome these obstacles was by the construction of a railway throughout the whole extent of Siberia. This idea was first mooted about 1850, but the Russian Government for a long time hesitated to undertake the execution of this project, through apprehension of the immense expense it would entail. However, the present Minister of Finance, M. Witte, had the requisite faith in Russian financial resources. Being appointed Minister of Ways and Communications at the beginning of 1892, he rapidly conducted surveys of the railway line; and then, becoming Minister of Finance at the end of the same year, he insisted on the immediate construction of the great Siberian Railway.

According to the original plan, the direction of the Siberian Railway was to be as follows:

	Kilos.
From Chelyabinsk to Omsk, West Siberian Railway.....	1,415
From Omsk to Irkutsk Central Siberian Railway	1,828
From Irkutsk to Missoyaga, Baikal Railway	318
From Missoyaga to Stretensk, Transbaikial Railway	1,076
From Stretensk to Khabarovka, Amur Railway	2,132
From Khabarovka to Vladivostok, Usuri Railway	764

Some time later, two very important changes were made in this original scheme.

In consequence of the great technical difficulties presented by the Baikal line, and in order to accelerate the construction of a continuous railway through Siberia, it was decided to make a straight line from Irkutsk to Lake Baikal. The train was to cross the lake on special ice-breakers, similar to those in use between Lake Huron and Lake Michigan in America. In consequence of

even greater difficulties presented by the Amur line, permission to construct and exploit a railway in Manchuria, connecting the Baikal line with Vladivostok, was obtained by the Russo-Chinese Bank from the Chinese Government. Thus the estimated length of the Siberian Railway was reduced by about 550 kilometres. In March, 1898, the Chinese Government permitted the construction of a branch to Port Arthur and Ta-lien-wan, and in this way the Siberian Railway acquired two outlets to the Pacific, of which one is free from ice all the year round.

Though the project of constructing the Amur Railway was now left in abeyance, yet the junction of Vladivostok with Khabarovka was effected, and thus Russia will soon have both an uninterrupted railway route through Manchuria and a combined railway and waterway in the direction of Irkutsk, Stretensk, Shilka, Amur, Khabarovka, Vladivostok. The construction of the railway is very rapidly advancing, and the West Siberian, Central Siberian and Usuri lines actually are completed and opened for traffic. On the other portions, work is being carried on very energetically.

Let us now glance at this country, of which so little is known, and consider the present and prospective results of the construction of the railway. Siberia occupies 5,000,000 English square miles in the northern part of Asia. Its natural features are very varied. The western and northern parts of this enormous country consist of a level plain: in the north, the lifeless swamps (tundra) merge into a large tract of virgin forest. Further south, this is succeeded by rich steppes, which resemble the pampas, and extend to the mountains which occupy the southern and eastern part of Siberia.

The polar tundra zone occupies all the space north of the sixty-fourth degree of latitude. It is a swampy plain covered with moss and bush and frozen during the greater part of the year. Its soil never thaws to a greater depth than one foot, and consists of alternate layers of frozen earth or pure ice. Anything approaching civilized life is out of the question in this desolate land. Its sole inhabitants are a few nomadic tribes, who eke out a living by fishing, hunting and the breeding of reindeer.

The region between the fifty-seventh and the sixty-fourth degrees is covered with thick virgin forest, consisting of ancient cedars, larches, pines and other species of firs. Further south we find, in addition to these, birch, poplar, aspen and even linden

trees; a great quantity of berry-bearing and other bushes increase the variety of plants, and hops and other climbers winding round the trees remind one of the virgin forests of America. In this vast region, with its boundless forest wealth, habitable spots are chiefly found on the banks of the different rivers.

To the south of this forest tract, we find a cultivated belt of land, very spacious in the west and much resembling a steppe. It extends as far as the mountains which stretch along the south of Siberia. The steppes of Western Siberia have the appearance of plains, covered with luxurious vegetation and birch groves. The soil is rich and fertile, and tends to promote the development of agriculture and settled life. In these steppes, there are large water basins like Lake Chany, surrounded by smaller lakes.

The Siberian mountains extend along the southern border of Siberia and then occupy its whole eastern part. They are remarkable for their beautiful views. Many picturesque spots in the Altai Mountains and Semiretchensk might be compared with those of Switzerland, and the Irtysh flowing through the mountains resembles the Rhine.

Siberia extends from the Arctic Circle right away to the steppes of Central Asia, and therefore presents many varieties of climate. There are the perpetual frost of the lifeless tundra deserts, the tropical heat of Central Asia, the genial climate of the favored spots at the foot of the Altai Mountains, the balmy air in the oases of the Chui Valley and Lake Issik-Kul and the striking southern vegetation of the banks of Amur. Owing to those climatic variations, we meet with the most startling changes in natural features, and an amazing variety of flora and fauna.

Siberia possesses four great river basins, which are equal to those of the largest American rivers. Three of them—Obi, Yenisei and Lena, with their numerous tributaries—greatly facilitate the trade of the interior, and the fourth river, the Amur, facilitates intercourse between Central Siberia and the Pacific.

The population of Siberia consists of very various elements. After the bloody and rapid conquest of Siberia, it became for some time an El Dorado for hunters and gold diggers. Like the Spaniards in America, these were attracted by the thirst for gain, and they treated the natives with the most barbarous cruelty and plundered in the most irrational manner the natural treasures of the country. Some time later these rough and ready

pioneers were succeeded by exiles. These were but few in number at first, but latterly there were as many as 18,000 to 20,000 yearly. The introduction of this element was of sinister import for Siberia. It was forced to accept criminals, who had been driven forth from their own country and who, hardened in their wickedness, could not but have a contaminating influence on the people they came among. Fortunately for Siberia, at the same time with this artificial colonization, a natural colonization was advancing, for men who had been unfortunate in their native land were attracted by the free life of Siberia and made their way thither in small but steady numbers. From these men, who had proved themselves enterprising and of great physical and mental vigor, the present population of Siberia has been evolved. It embodies all the best characteristics of the daring adventurers and *conquistadores* who first subdued it; of the exiles and emigrants, who went there in such numbers, and of the Cossacks and peasantry, whom the Government induced to settle there by the offer of large subsidies, hoping thereby to promote the development of agriculture. The unaided struggle with stern Nature called all their hardier qualities into play. The result is a vigorous, enterprising type, not unlike that which we meet with in the United States, Canada and Australia.

The Russian population of Siberia moved farther and farther eastward from the Ural Mountains through the southern part of Siberia; at present it occupies a broad, unbroken belt of land, which narrows down toward Lake Baikal. Small branches are found on the banks of the chief rivers, the Obi, the Yenisei, the Lena and the Usuri, and extend from the basin of the last to the shores of the Bay of Peter the Great. Besides this, little Russian communities are scattered about in different places.

The indigenous Mongol, Finnish and Tartar tribes of Siberia, which occupy immense tracts, are much smaller in number than the Russian population, whom they surround on all sides. Immediately beyond the Ural and north of the region entirely occupied by Russians, there lives the tribe of Voguls. Further north and northeast we find Siberian Tartars, Ostyaks, Samoyedes, Tunguses, Yakuts, Yukahirs, Koryaks, Tchukchis, Kamchadales and Guiliaks. With the exception of the Tartars, who are partly settled, these are all nomadic tribes, and are engaged in hunting, fishing and cattle raising. In the extreme north, rein-

deer breeding is carried on. South of the region occupied by Russians, there are settled Siberian Tartars, Kirghizes, Altayans, Kalmuks, Soyots and Buriats, who live only by cattle breeding and agriculture. Some of these elements of the Siberian population such as Tchuktchis, Guiliaks, Kamchadales, who are not amenable to the influences of civilization, are very scant in number, and will most likely die out altogether; others, such as Kirghizes and Buriats, on the contrary, are important ethnographical unities, and give promise of increased vitality.

The mineral wealth of Siberia, particularly in its eastern part, is fabulous; its extent is far from being finally determined, but it is certain that its treasures are almost inexhaustible. The area of its auriferous regions is much larger than that of the celebrated gold mines of California, Australia and Africa taken together. Beginning from the Alatau Mountains, of which both slopes are very rich in gold, this auriferous region extends eastward along the northern slope of the Saiansk Mountains in an almost continuous broad strip. Then it continues across both slopes of the Stanovoi and Yablonoi Mountains right away to the extreme east of Siberia. The extensive gold deposits of the Yenisei, Olekma, Vitim, and many other river systems, constitute, as it were, an immense addition to the chief gold area. Up to the present, gold has almost exclusively been obtained from sand. Mining of gold ores is carried on in the Yenisei, Altai and Transbaikal district, but only to a very small extent, owing to the difficulty of working and the lack of mechanical appliances.

In many parts there are lodes of copper, silver and lead. Those found on the branches of the Saiansk and Alatau Mountains, in the district of Nertchinsk and the Kirgiz steppe are particularly remarkable. The quantity of metal contained in the ores varies greatly. Silver, lead and copper mining reached a high point of development last century, but within the past twenty-five years this industry has begun to fall off, chiefly owing to the rise in the price of labor.

Iron and coal exist in great quantities throughout the whole extent of Siberia, from the borders of the Government of Orenburg to the mouth of the Lena, to Kamtchatka, the Island of Sagalien and the frontier of Korea. At the present time, coal is worked only in the Kuznetsk basin, on the Island of Sagalien and in the Kirgiz steppes. It is also proposed to exploit the

coal beds recently discovered in the southern part of the Primorsk province. These have been surveyed and found to be very rich, and to contain some quantity of anthracite. Contiguous veins of coal and iron were found in some places, foundries were formed, but these have been in anything but a flourishing condition until quite lately, owing to the small demand for their output and their remoteness from the markets.

In Western Siberia, common salt is extracted from the self-depositing lakes, which occur in considerable numbers in the southern portion of the steppe region lying between the forty-seventh and fifty-fifth degrees of north latitude and the sixty-third and seventy-third degrees of east longitude (from Paris), which was once the bottom of a sea basin. In the northern portion of this salt basin, which embraces the Barabinsk and Kouloundinsk steppes, the salt lakes always contain a greater or less amount of other salts besides common salt. There are many lakes which contain rich layers of glauber salt only. In Eastern Siberia there are very rich beds of rock salt, but the best salt springs and layers are found in thinly inhabited districts, so that transport to the markets is very expensive, owing to the want of proper means of communication.

Besides all this mineral wealth, tin, mercury and sulphur are found in the Transbaikal territory; naphtha on the Sagalien Island and many kinds of precious stones, such as lapis-lazuli, topaz, beryl, aqua-marina, etc., in the Transbaikal territory.

In the basin of the Yenisei, large deposits of graphite are found. From experiments made in America, this seems to excel the Ceylon variety in purity.

Siberia has long been famous for its fur-bearing animals and the teeming wealth of its rivers and lakes. After agriculture and cattle breeding, fishing and hunting are the chief pursuits of the inhabitants. The shooting and trapping of squirrels is at present the main object of the chase. In the northern part of Eastern Siberia, where the slaughter of fur-bearing animals has not been quite so wholesale as in Western Siberia, more valuable fur-bearing animals, such as the marten, ermine, sable, fox and arctic fox, are caught. Beavers, which formerly existed in Kamtchatka, are now very rare, but the fur industries in the waters washing the Russian shores of the Pacific are much more important at present. Among the most important is the seal in-

dustry, which is specially developed on the Commandorskie and Pribyloff Islands, the former belonging to Russia, the latter to America. From 1871 to 1891, 730,539 seal skins came into the market from Russian territory alone. Besides seals, the northern and eastern waters of Russia are very rich in sea calves, whales, sea lions and other marine animals.

The supply of fish in Siberia, and particularly in the rivers falling into the Pacific and Northern Oceans, is almost inexhaustible. The Sea of Okhotsk and the Sea of Japan abound in fish. The more valuable species of fish, kinds such as sturgeon and salmon, are so plentiful that while making their periodical progress from the seas to the rivers, they force each other on to the bank, whenever the stream happens to be shallow. Capital is so scarce, means of communication so scant, and the natives know so little of fish curing, that only so much fish has been consumed hitherto as was required locally, the remainder being sent to Japan by Japanese traders.

Notwithstanding the immense wealth of Siberia, manufacturing industry and trade have not been able to develop themselves to a corresponding extent, owing to the thinness of the population and the absence of cheap and suitable means of communication. Consequently, though there have been repeated attempts on the part of the Government and private individuals to establish industry on a large scale in Siberia, manufactories and works have been started there only with the greatest difficulty, and only such have succeeded as served to meet the modest wants of a small local population or produced an article of such value that it could bear the cost of carriage to a great distance.

Such was the general condition of the country at the time when the construction of the great Siberian Railway heralded the dawn of a new era.

Though the line will not be finished till 1902, some instances have already come to light which prove what a great civilizing effect it will have in future. Among others, we may note the rapid increase in the population. As we have already mentioned, the Russian Government long ago took various measures to attract pure Russian elements to Siberia. At present, the Russian Government deems it very necessary to consolidate Russian national feeling there in view of a possible invasion of the region by the yellow race in the near future. The Government has,

therefore, taken this matter under its direct control, propagating exact information about Siberia, publishing special maps on a large scale, preparing and adapting sections of land for the settlement of immigrants by the help of local Government agents. Such places as still remain uninhabited, owing to their wild character, are carefully explored. There is yet but little land available for colonization, and which could be granted to newcomers without encroaching on the reserves of the old inhabitants, whether Russian or indigenous; and the greater part of these lands is already occupied.

Therefore, the Government has now permitted the occupation of tracts less suitable for culture, which have hitherto been waste land, as, for instance, the well-known Barabinsk steppe, which suffers from a lack of good water and is infested with insects that torment the inhabitants. Further, with a view to extending and enlarging the area for the reception of immigrants, forests are being cut down, drainage systems planned and wells sunk for the purpose of obtaining good water. In order to ensure the future prosperity of the immigrants, the Government is taking measures of every description to preserve the forests and natural riches in those parts intended for settlements. It furnishes material assistance and provides medical aid for immigrants who are usually of the poorer classes, and it has set aside a special fund for their benefit. In this way, regions which till quite lately were endless steppes, such as we find in Western Siberia, or dark, impassable forests, as in Eastern Siberia, even now, when the railway is far from being completed, already show a great animation. In many places along the line, settlements with a population of 8,000 or 9,000 have already sprung up, such as the settlement of Novonikolaevsk, near the bridge across the Obi, the station of Taiga at the beginning of the Tomsk branch, and the stations of Niman and Krasnaya-rietchka on the Usuri line. The following table shows the annual number of immigrants:

In	Men.	In	Men.
1887.....	25,137	1894.....	72,224
1888.....	35,848	1895.....	120,000
1889.....	40,195	1896.....	201,622
1890.....	48,776	1897.....	84,978
1891.....	87,432	1898.....	175,000
1892.....	92,146		
1893.....	64,321	Total.....	1,047,679

The Siberian Railway has brought into the country not only

a new population, but new institutions and new culture. It was difficult for the new arrivals from Russia to adjust themselves to the legal forms which already existed. This fact prompted the Government to extend to Siberia the statutes of the Emperor Alexander II., relating to juries and the appointment of justices of the peace. The great importance of this reform can only be realized by Siberians, who, thanks to it, will really obtain speedy and equitable and clement justice, but who were previously tried in courts of an administrative character. In a short time this reform was followed by the long-wished-for abolition of transportation of criminals.

Simultaneously with the increase of population in the districts through which the Siberian Railway passes, and in proportion as it was opened to traffic, all kinds of industries, which already existed there, began to develop. It now seemed possible to export goods to the Russian and foreign markets, which could not be sent there under the former conditions of transport. The greatest improvement hitherto has been apparent in agriculture, which, as already stated, constitutes almost the sole occupation of the civilized inhabitants. Thanks to the railway, Siberian corn has found its way to foreign markets. Indeed, since the opening of the West Siberian line, the railway authorities have sometimes been unable to send off all the consignments of corn in proper time. These were often stored in large quantities along the line. In 1898, there were 6,500 wagon loads of corn stored in this way; 240 wagons were added daily, and the railway could only send off 120 wagons. The export to Russia of tallow, skins, wool and frozen meat has increased enormously of late years. This is one result of the development of cattle breeding in those districts traversed by the railway. Another is the increased activity in the butter-making industry, especially in the Province of Tobolsk. This industry has found a large market abroad, some 2,600,000 kilograms of Siberian butter having been exported in 1896.

Of course, these facts show only the small beginning of the great revolution which will be effected by the railway in all branches of Siberian economical life, in agriculture and cattle breeding, manufactures and trade. In the mining industry, we might say that at present attention is only given to the working of gold. Such a state of affairs is abnormal, for besides gold

there are immense stores of other mineral wealth. The construction of a railway near rich seams of coal, iron, copper and other minerals will give an impulse to the working of them; for, on one hand, the railway itself will require some of the productions of mining industry; on the other, it will make it possible to largely extend the market for them, and thus will bring about a better organization of existing mining enterprises.

The construction of the Great Siberian Railway has even now begun to produce a marked effect on Siberian trade, which formerly was carried on entirely by monopolists. In each district or town there was a local capitalist, who laid in a stock of goods at the fairs of Nijni-Novgorod, or elsewhere, and then fixed his own prices according to the means of his customers, and competition was non-existent. An enterprising man, who had neither capital nor credit, could not compete with these monopolists, because of the absence of good means of communication. This abnormal state of affairs is already improving. The railway which has connected Siberia with centres of production has rendered travelling cheaper and quicker, and made capital circulate more freely. People of small means are now enabled to make long journeys for the purchase of stock, and they can enter into direct communication with the producers and wholesale merchants in large centres. The trade of Siberia has become more democratic, and increasing competition has effected a change in its character.

Notwithstanding the small population, the uniformity of occupation, the poverty of the inhabitants and the absence of important industrial centres along the line, the traffic on the portions of the railway already opened has exceeded all expectations. Instead of the former three pairs of trains each day, as originally intended, the managers have been obliged to send off five pairs daily. These convey consignments of raw materials, particularly grain, and are sent to the markets of Russia and Western Europe. Purely local loads sent from one part of Siberia to another are small in quantity, for, owing to the uniformity of occupation in Western and Central Siberia, large exchange of goods is unnecessary, and the country people can supply their own modest wants. The influence of the railway on the export of Siberian goods to the adjacent countries of Asia is so far also very insignificant. But, of course, this state of affairs is only temporary, and may be

explained by the fact that the railway is not yet finished, and that Siberia is only beginning to emerge from very primitive conditions. With the termination of the railway and the influx of population and capital to the country, not only will the trade of the interior be developed, but Siberia will also supply the countries of Eastern Asia with manufactured goods.

One of the inevitable results, in conjunction with the influx of immigrants and capital, will be a greater division of labor, so necessary to the economical development of these dominions. In dependence on the natural and economical conditions, the population of each locality will devote their attention to one or many defined industries, and the railway will assure the sale of their goods either abroad or in other parts of Siberia.

As far as we can judge at present, Siberia will in future be divided into the following industrial regions:

(1.) The agricultural region, extending along the railway line from the Ural to Lake Baikal. The products of this region, which are principally grain, will be sent abroad through Russia in Europe and also to Eastern Siberia and Turkestan. The project of a branch line to Turkestan has already been discussed by the Administration, and its construction is merely a question of time. This branch line would indirectly be very advantageous to the whole Empire, for Siberian corn could be sent over it to Turkestan, and the inhabitants of that country would then devote their entire energies to the cultivation of the cotton plant.

(2.) Two cattle breeding regions, in Transbaikalia, and in the steppes of Western Siberia, south of the agricultural region.

(3.) The forest region, occupying the immense forests north of the agricultural region.

(4.) The fishing centres, along the shores of the Pacific and near the mouths of large rivers.

(5.) The mining and manufacturing region, which coincides with the basin of the Amur, and to which we may add the territory situated northeast of it and the Island of Sagalien. Owing to its mountainous character and the comparative absence of land suitable for agricultural purposes, the cultivation of cereals is not likely to be carried on here on a large scale, more especially as countries round about—Central and Western Siberia, Manchuria, Korea, Japan, China, India and America—are already well supplied with grain. We may presume that gold mining

will for a long time remain one of the chief occupations of the inhabitants of this region. On the other hand, the abundance of coal and iron in this region—both such powerful aids to economical development—sufficiently guarantees the rise of the manufacturing industry at no very distant date. In the Amur territory, there will doubtless be a rapid growth of factories to supply the large demand for cotton goods in the neighboring countries of Manchuria and Korea. These factories will draw their supply of raw material from Russian Turkestan, China, Korea, India and North America. The importation of woollen stuffs to China and Japan, where no sheep breeding is carried on, is increasing yearly. It would be greatly to the advantage of the Amur manufactories to participate in this industry, as they could procure large quantities of cheap wool from Transbaikalia and Mongolia. Finally, the climate and soil of the Amur territory are both favorable for the cultivation of the sugar beet, tobacco, flax and hemp, the manufactured product of which may also find a market in the countries round about.

In the economical awakening of Siberia, and particularly of its richest part—the basin of the Amur—an important rôle will doubtless be played by the United States, which is the nearest civilized neighbor, with whom Russia can have no serious misunderstandings. The trade of North America with Vladivostok has hitherto not been very extensive, and has been confined to the importation of small quantities of flour, other foodstuffs, machinery, agricultural implements, leather, etc., from San Francisco. Owing to the absence of economical life in Siberia, nothing else, of course, was to be expected. But the small volume of trade up to the present time is no indication of what future years will bring about. In fact, an improvement has already been made, and American factories have supplied various materials, locomotives and rails particularly, for the Manchurian railway.

The Manchurian railway at present consists only of a single line, but the management has had the track made broad enough to admit of a double line, and its construction will follow in due course. For the construction of this second line 192,000,000 kilograms of rails will be required. Then, besides the amount of rails necessary for the smaller yearly repairs on the Manchurian and Siberian lines, and the proposed branches of the latter, 960,000,000 kilograms of rails will be required in ten years' time

for a thorough repair of these railways. At the same time, a gradual renewal of the rolling stock will be necessary. At the rail, engine and car-building works of the United States work is as well done as in England, and at the same time much more quickly and cheaply; it is therefore certain that the United States will have many opportunities of supplying the Siberian and Manchurian railways with rails and rolling stock. In general, machinery and mechanical industries of America will find a large market in all parts of Siberia for their productions, such as machinery necessary for new manufactories and workshops, and for various mining industries, agricultural implements and appliances for the equipment of fishing and other vessels. It must be mentioned here that the Russian Government, in order to promote the economical development of Siberia, has sanctioned the importation, duty-free until 1909, of all plants necessary for the Siberian and Ural mining industry, through all her frontiers. Besides this, no customs dues are to be levied until 1903 upon fishing nets and machinery necessary for the different manufacturing and mechanical establishments of Siberia, which may be imported through the mouths of Siberian rivers.

Among other important articles exported from the United States, the following may find a market in the districts traversed by the Siberian railways: In Manchuria, cotton goods and sugar and steel and iron ware, which, as contracted between the Chinese Government and the company constructing the Manchurian railway, will be subject only to the ordinary Chinese customs duties when brought to Manchuria *via* Dalny; in Siberia, chemical goods, soap, fruit, hops, watches, musical instruments, cycles, typewriters, tinware, ready-made clothing and last, but not least, raw cotton for the factories, which, as stated above, will certainly spring up in the Amoor territory. Siberian productions which may find a market in the United States are hides, wool and especially coal.

It is not only the coal-fields of Siberia, but likewise all the rich stores of natural wealth, that are awaiting the advent of energetic and enterprising men. To such the Russian epithet "gold bottom," as applied to Siberia, will prove no misnomer. These vast treasures are lying idle because of the absence of capital and enterprise. In this respect Siberia offers a wide and important field of action to the capitalists of North America,

who are famous for the breadth of their views and their energy. Every serious enterprise in Siberia in which American capital will be invested will be welcomed by the Russian Government.

The Siberian Railway will be an important factor in the trade of the world, as a means of transit between Europe and the Far East. It is true that, in this respect, it has rivals in the sea route through the Suez Canal, and the combined sea and land route through North America. Yet the Siberian Railway has on its side an advantage, which is most important in our day, and which is indicated in the old saw, "time is money." With the completion of this work, Port Arthur will be connected with St. Petersburg by a railway of 5,850 English miles, with Berlin of 6,350 English miles, with Paris of 7,100 English miles and with London of 7,300 English miles. With the quick trains on the European system, these distances could be covered in from eight to ten days (in five and a half days by the Nord Express). But even if we take the present speed of the West Siberian trains (twenty-two versts an hour), it follows that only eighteen days are necessary for the journey from Western Europe to Port Arthur. This speed can easily be increased to twenty-five versts an hour. Then the journey from London to the Far East will take the following time by the rival routes :

	To Yokohama.	To Shanghai.	To Hongkong.
<i>Via Siberian Railway.....</i>	18 days.	17 days.	20 days.
<i>Via Suez Canal.....</i>	34 days.	28 days.	25 days.
<i>Via America.....</i>	25 days.	31 days.	33 days.

This great advantage possessed by the Siberian Railway will cause an important revolution in the communications between Europe and the Far East. Firstly, the mails, for which speed is so essential, will be sent by this railway, and secondly, the greater part of the passenger traffic will come to it. It is true, that some apprehension is felt about the fatiguing effect of a long railway journey on the passengers, but in the special Siberian trains everything is done that can conduce to comfort and amusement. There are a library, bath rooms, and even cars fitted up for gymnastics. Of course, the railway journey is not so pleasant as the voyage on one of the excellent ocean steamers, when the weather is fine. But, first of all, the Chinese Sea and the Indian Ocean are never calm except in March and April, and, secondly, there is for two whole weeks no escape from the intense tropical heat when coming through the Suez Canal. The Canadian route,

on the other hand, involves a double transfer from ship to train. We must also bear in mind the fact that the Siberian route will be the cheapest as well as the most rapid one. At present the journey from Paris or London to the ports of China and Japan, by the transoceanic route, costs, first-class, from 1,800 to 1,840 francs, including food. But owing to the very low fares charged for long distances in the Russian Empire, the overland journey will cost in all only from 800 to 950 francs—that is, only about half the cost of the route by Suez or America.

With the goods traffic, things will be different; for most commodities, the cost of transport is more important than speed; therefore, as far as all heavy merchandise is concerned, the railway cannot compete with the sea route. But, in spite of this, we may anticipate that the greater part of valuable goods from Russia, or Europe, to the Far East will be sent by railway, as, with a tariff of half a cent per English mile, per ton, the transport by land would only be slightly dearer than by sea, not to speak of the possibility of reducing the land journey to twenty-five or thirty days, whereas, by sea, at present, goods from Moscow to Vladivostok are forty-five days in transit. Goods which suffer from sea-damp and tropical heat will also be sent by the Siberian Railway.

The Manchurian railway will have at its own disposal steamers running between the *termini* of the Siberian Railway and the chief ports in the Far East, which will also tend to attract passengers and goods to the Siberian line.

The Siberian Railway will greatly consolidate Russia's position on the shores of the Pacific, facilitating the transport of important military forces thither at any time.

The outlay of the immense sum of four hundred million roubles for the construction of the railway obliges Russia to do her utmost to recompense herself for this outlay by developing the economical forces of Siberia and attracting as much traffic as possible to the railway. Therefore, from the moment when the railway is completed, Russia's principal task in the Far East will be, not the encouragement of political and territorial aggrandizement, but a ceaseless effort to promote peace and tranquillity, those main factors which will enable the Siberian Railway to play its economical part as the vital artery of Siberia and all the Old World.

MIKHAILOFF.

JAPAN AND RUSSIA IN THE FAR EAST.

BY JAMES MURDOCH.

AMONG the many strange developments in the history of the last three or four decades, the rise of Japan to the position of something like a great Power must be set down as one of the most remarkable. Doubtless, when the history of the period comes to be written calmly and dispassionately, and with a full command of materials, this achievement of the erstwhile hermit nation will be ranked with the unification of Italy and the formation of the new German Empire, and Okubo and Kido, with the younger men who followed them and carried on their work—Ito, Inouye, Mutsu, Okuma, Yamagata and Matsugata—will be credited with finding satisfactory solutions for problems quite as difficult and quite as complex as those that Cavour and Bismarck had to confront. In some respects the problems of the Japanese statesmen seemed much harder than those that had to be dealt with in Italy and Central Europe in the sixties. For in Japan it was not merely a matter of stripping a number of petty potentates of some or all of their powers, and of welding their subjects into one strongly compacted nation with all the institutions of a free people, for which the intelligent among these subjects had been longing for years. Here it was a case of passing from feudalism to modern industrialism, where competition is the regulating force, and where caste has no privileges. It was a transition from the despotism of some two hundred and sixty petty local princes, controlled in some ways by the still more crushing despotism of the Shogunate, to self-government and representative institutions, with powers and responsibilities quite as full as in most European States. And, so far from the people expressing any longing for these representative institutions, the very leaders of the national movement at first knew little or nothing about them, or even about their ex-

istence in foreign lands. In the early sixties, we find Kido and Ito in disguise frequenting the house of an American citizen (the first Japanese naturalized in the United States), and eagerly questioning him about the system of government of the great Republic. It was Kido who presided in the first national deliberative assembly in 1869, and it is needless to say that Ito is the father of the present Japanese Constitution.

On the other hand, the makers of modern Japan had factors in their favor on which neither Cavour nor Bismarck could count in their efforts. In the first place, there was no religious problem to be dealt with in Japan; for the Japanese is an indifferentist in religion, and extremely tolerant of all beliefs, provided their profession does not militate against the independence and political interests of the country. In the second place, the apostles of the new order, from contact with foreign agencies, knew far more than their opponents did; and the superiority in knowledge and prowess evinced by the men of Satsuma and Choshu was overwhelming; and so, backed up as they were by the powerful and progressively inclined clans of Hizen and of Tosa, after they had subverted the power of the Shogunate, they found themselves all-powerful.

Besides all this, in favor of the reformers there was a circumstance still more important. In Italy King Victor Emmanuel counted for something, and in Germany the King of Prussia counted for a very great deal. But in neither of these cases did the royal title carry with it anything like the moral authority that attached to the semi-divine name of the Mikado in Japan. Now, in accomplishing the overthrow of the Shogunate, the men of Choshu and Satsuma had ostensibly made common cause with the ignorant and anti-foreign court nobles, who were bitterly opposed to all intercourse with the outside world. But once the Tokugawa power was crushed, the reformers soon made it clear to their allies that the exclusion policy on which their minds were bent was impracticable, and that the only course open to the country was the adoption of the very policy of international intercourse pursued by the Shogunate which had so excited their hate. In spite of themselves, the most bigoted exclusionists all of a sudden found themselves committed to liberal ideas. The Emperor himself, then sixteen years old, went to the Council of State, and before the nobles took an oath promising that "a de-

liberative assembly should be formed; that all measures should be decided by public opinion; that the uncivilized customs of former times should be broken through; that the impartiality and justice displayed in the workings of nature should be adopted as the basis of action, and that intellect and learning should be sought for throughout the world, in order to establish the foundations of the Empire." The extent to which this declaration of the youthful sovereign facilitated the work of the makers of modern Japan is simply incalculable.

It was in 1868 that this famous declaration was made, and the policy therein outlined has now been in operation for nearly a third of a century. With what precise measure of success it has been carried out it is not exactly easy to say. Certainly, some of the greatest men in Japan entertain no very optimistic views on the matter. Speaking to a representative of one of the Tokyo daily newspapers a short time ago, Marquis Ito very gravely asked whether, with the exception of her army and her navy, Japan has brought to creditable completion any one of the enterprises undertaken by her during the *Meiji* era. Of course, it is highly probable that, at the bottom of his heart, the Marquis is not nearly so pessimistic as his tone indicates him to be; the query was doubtless put with the view of stirring his countrymen to fresh efforts. But, in truth, any one fairly conversant with modern Japanese history must admit that modern Japan has been built up in pretty much the same fashion as that in which a Japanese erects his house. In the first place, piles are driven to support the beams on which the uprights are reared, and then the roof is put on, and the walls and the interior details are finally finished off, often in a very leisurely and sometimes in a very flimsy manner. Provision for the maintenance of order and for the security of personal property, and for a few of the other more essential elements of social stability, were made; and then the Japanese statesmen threw their main energies into the task of providing the country with an army and a navy that would make the nation not merely safe but also formidable, and so respected; and as to the success that has attended Japan's statesmen in putting on what may be regarded as the national roof, there is not much room for doubt.

However, when we turn to the progress made in the internal economy of the Empire, it must be admitted that the state of

things there is not nearly so satisfactory as it might be. As regards population, Japan has more inhabitants than two of the great Powers of Europe—more than four of them if the British and French colonial possessions be left out of account. Yet, the total national wealth of this country of 44,000,000 inhabitants is not so very much greater than that of the small Kingdom of the Netherlands, with its population of 5,000,000. Lately, three estimates of the national wealth of Japan have been made by native statisticians. The highest of these sets down the national belongings at \$7,500,000,000, the lowest at some \$4,000,000,000, while the latest, and possibly the most trustworthy, one gives \$5,600,000,000 as the approximate figure. (Some years ago the Dutch national wealth was valued at \$4,000,000,000.) And as regards the gross annual earnings of the Japanese people, the comparison is not very much more satisfactory; for the last statistician referred to estimates these at no more than \$825,000,000. For 1899, the foreign trade of Japan amounts to just \$5 per head of the population. Of course, since the Revolution of 1868 there has undoubtedly been a very considerable increase of wealth in the country. Old industries have been expanded, and new and unheard-of industries have been set on foot and developed. But this development has been in comparatively few directions, and in several cases there seems to be ground for questioning the soundness of some of the most considerable of these enterprises. At present in Japan in the spinning industry there are some 1,050,000 spindles at work, and some of the companies have just paid extremely handsome dividends. But a year or less ago a good many of these concerns were in a bad way; several of them paid no dividends at all, while others actually got into the bankruptcy court. And foreign experts who have been through some of these establishments assert that their reserve funds are insufficient, and that what they allow for wear and tear of machinery is glaringly inadequate. Many of the recently established enterprises suffer from a sad dearth of capital, and indeed the great problem in Japan is how to effect the introduction of capital from abroad.

But, besides a lack of capital, there is a lack of something quite as important. The great captain of industry has not yet appeared in Japan in anything like the numbers the development of the national resources demands; while even the few able and enterprising native capitalists find their efforts checked by a

woeful dearth of lieutenants capable of executing their projects. The greatest of the few millionaires has in his service as an adviser one of the shrewdest and most capable business men in the Far East. Time and again, this long-headed Scotchman has laid before his principal projects that promised a sure return of thirty, forty and even fifty per cent. on the money invested. And, time and again, his chief, on going through the facts and figures put before him, has said: "All that you represent is perfectly correct. But yet there is one fatal objection to undertaking the enterprise: Where are we to get the men to carry it through?" On account of this two-fold lack of capital and of capable managers, the industry and commerce of the country do not expand at anything like the rate one would naturally expect. Such enterprises as the Formosan Railway (with a Government guarantee of six per cent.) and the Seoul-Fusan Railway cannot be proceeded with, while the valuable concessions obtained in China by the Shimonoseki Treaty remain almost entirely unexploited. And another circumstance militates yet more strongly against the growth of Japanese commerce. While there are not a few merchants in the country whose word is as good as their bond, yet it has to be confessed that the average Japanese trader's standard of commercial morality is anything but a high one. However, this unfortunate fact admits of explanation, if not of excuse; and there seems to be ground for believing that, with lapse of time and the teachings of bitter experience, the old maxim that "Honesty is the best policy" will be appreciated at something like its real value. This phase of the situation has been dwelt on at some length; for, in the case of a struggle with Russia, hostilities will not be confined to one campaign or even to two. In the end, the affair will come to be a question of staying power and of national resources. And it is in this matter of national resources that Japan's ultimate weakness lies.

To revert to our house-building simile, the walls and the interior furnishings of the national structure are not particularly sound in one or two other respects. The state of communications leaves much to be desired. Complaints about the vagaries of the postal and telegraph services are both loud and frequent. In such a progressive country as Japan one would expect the express trains on the main Government line to make a better record than three hundred and seventy-six miles in sixteen or seventeen hours.

Furthermore, from the flimsy fashion of its construction, portions of the line in question get washed away, or at least so badly damaged as to impede the traffic for days, three or four times every year. Nowhere in Japan are the roads macadamized; in the metropolis itself, with the exception of the avenues in front of the Imperial Palace, the streets become quagmires or paddy fields when it rains, and dust clouds when a dry wind blows. Much has been written about the electric tramways of Japan. As a matter of fact, Nagoya has about one mile and Kioto some three miles of them.

With respect to education, matters are far from being as they should be. There are some 60,000 elementary school teachers in Japan, but 30,000 more are wanted, and cannot be found. Nor is this any matter for astonishment when the average pay is some twelve or fifteen (American) cents *per diem*, and when a jinrikisha puller makes twenty-five (American) cents easily. In mere attendance at elementary schools, Japan (with some sixty-seven per cent. of her school population) is ahead of Russia, the Balkan States and the whole of southern Europe; twenty per cent. behind Austria-Hungary, and much more in the rear of all the other central and northern European countries. In provision for higher and university education, she is behind not only the whole of Europe (comparing as she does unfavorably with such hopeless countries as Portugal and Roumania), but even all the debt-ridden Republics of South America, except Brazil and Paraguay. And from top to bottom, with a stray exception here and there, the instruction given is more noted for its inefficiency than for anything else. From the scope of this indictment, however, naval, military and medical education must be emphatically excluded.

Yet, unsatisfactory and in a manner depressing, at first view, as all this is, it ceases to be so very disquieting when one takes a calm and dispassionate survey of the nation's history and achievements during the last thirty years. The simple fact is that the revolution of 1868 and the course it committed the country to, demanded that new efforts and enterprises should be made in scores of directions. For every one of these, money was necessary; and so the tax upon the national resources was enormous. As a consequence, as time went on, the Government saw that it must throw its main efforts upon vital essentials, and leave less important undertakings in a more or less unsatisfactory con-

dition. The main and most urgent concern was to get the national roof on; under its sheltering protection the walls might be finished off at leisure. Now that Japanese statesmen have all but brought the object of their chief concern to a successful completion, it is not unnatural to conclude that they will presently address themselves vigorously to putting the internal economy of the country into a more efficient condition than it is in at present.

That Japan has had to make great efforts and great sacrifices to provide herself with her splendid army and navy, does not admit of the least question. One instance, although in itself trifling, as regards the \$5,000,000 or \$6,000,000 it brought into the treasury, will serve to illustrate this proposition. In 1892-93 Marquis (then Count) Ito found himself confronted by a hostile majority in the Lower House, who, by refusing supplies, seemed likely to interfere seriously with the Government's programme of naval expansion. The difficulty was got over by the issue of an Imperial Rescript, stating that the Emperor gave up ten per cent. of the Civil List for the following six years, and ordering all Government officials to surrender the same percentage of their salaries for the same time, to be devoted to the construction of warships. Every official at first obeyed cheerfully; but, as time went on, although there were no open expressions of discontent, there was much secret grumbling among the middle and lower ranks of the public servants. Many of these found it hard to live on their salaries at the best of times, and when a man drawing some five dollars per month was called upon to hand over fifty cents of that sum, as indeed happened, his financial situation became very serious. Many of the ablest and most capable officials exerted themselves to find employment elsewhere, and the men who took their places were not, as a rule, very noted for ability. There is little doubt that the measure in question resulted in impairing the efficiency of the Civil Service of the country. But it accomplished the end it aimed at, and it was on the whole a well-considered step.

Since the conclusion of the war with China, there has been a great expansion of Japan's armaments. What this expansion amounts to may perhaps be best gathered by glancing at the official classification of the ships in the Japanese fleet, issued some short time ago by the Minister of Marine, and observing the position in it held by the vessels with which Japan annihilated the sea power of China. Leaving out smaller craft, we find the present Japanese

Navy classified as first and second class battleships, and first, second and third class cruisers. In the war of 1894-95, Japan had only one small battleship, which now stands at the very bottom of her list. The "Fuso" is now some two and twenty years of age; and, with her tonnage of 3,700, she makes a poor appearance alongside the four monsters of from 12,500 to 15,000 tons that now appear as the list of first-class battleships. Even alongside the other vessel in the second class, the "Chinyen," of 7,400 tons, captured from the Chinese at Wei-hai-wei, she looks diminutive. But in speed there is not much to choose between these two, both steaming about thirteen knots, and being a pair of veritable lame-ducks in comparison with the four new first-class battleships, which can accomplish eighteen or nineteen knots.

In 1895 Japan possessed none of the four first-class cruisers (of some 9,800 tons) now entered in the official list. The brunt of the strife at the battle of the Yalu fell upon six of the nine second-class cruisers now in the navy, three new ones—the "Takasago," the "Kasagi" and the "Chitose" having been built since then. In addition to that, the torpedo flotilla has been greatly augmented, while of the score of torpedo-destroyers included in the ship-building programme (twelve built or building in England, four in France and four in Germany), more than half are already in Japanese waters, and the others will soon arrive.

From this it will appear that the naval strength of the country in 1895 is only a fraction of what it will be early this summer, shortly after the time of the projected grand naval manœuvres. The addition of the captured Chinese battleship, "Chinyen," of 7,400 tons, does not count for very much, but the four new first-class battleships (probably the "Asahi" will be here by midsummer), of a gross tonnage of close on 55,000, and a gross complement of 2,681 men, add immeasurably to the sea power of Japan. Two of these—"Fuji" (12,450) and "Yashima" (12,140)—are almost exact reproductions of the British "Royal Sovereign," while the "Shikishima" and the "Asahi," of about 15,000 tons each, are improved "Majestics." Besides these four, two other battleships of the same type as the "Shikishima" are building in England—the "Hatsuse" at Elswick, and an unnamed vessel at Barrow, but the "Hatsuse" was not to be handed over until March, 1900, and the other ship a good deal later on.

Four of the six new first-class cruisers included in the ship-

building programme have either already arrived, or will arrive in summer. And in every respect these constitute a formidable increase to Japan's naval strength, for it is more than probable that they themselves could give a good account of the whole fleet possessed by Japan at the time of the late war, if pitted against it. Ranging from 9,400 to 9,875 tons, they are a trifle larger than the United States' "Brooklyn" (9,215 tons), and fully as powerful fighting machines. They have about the same speed as she, the "Asama," for example, at her trials doing 20.37 knots with natural and 22.07 with forced draught. The "Brooklyn" carries a heavier armament, having eight 8-inch against the "Asama's" four 8-inch guns, although against the "Brooklyn's" twelve 5-inch the Japanese cruiser carries fourteen 6-inch guns. As regards protection, the advantage is with the Japanese ships; for against the "Brooklyn's" belt of 3 inches, the "Asama" has one of 7 inches of Harveyized steel. The four Japanese cruisers are likewise protected in their gun positions by 6 inches of the same material, a fact which gives them a considerable advantage over the Russian "Rurik" (10,923 tons) and "Rossia" (12,130 tons), whose batteries have practically no protection. As the "Rossia" steams twenty and the "Rurik" only eighteen knots, against them the "Asama" and her consorts should show to advantage, in spite of the circumstance that these two Russian vessels have slightly stronger secondary batteries.

Even as regards second-class cruisers, the addition of three new vessels to the six that fought at the Yalu is no inconsiderable item. Of these the "Takasago" (4,160 tons), built at Elswick, has a speed of twenty-four knots, and an armament of two 8-inch, ten 4.7-inch, twelve 12-pounders, six 2½-pounder quick-firers and five torpedo tubes. The two American-built vessels—the "Kasagi" at Philadelphia, and the "Chitose" at San Francisco—are slightly larger, but slightly slower, the tonnage of the former being 4,978 and of the latter 4,836, with a speed of nearly twenty-three knots.

Of smaller craft, the official list gives five third-class cruisers, ten coast-defense ships, two first-class and fifteen second-class gunboats, with four despatch vessels and a torpedo depot ship. Besides the destroyers already alluded to, other vessels below second-class cruiser rank are being constructed; but, as they will not be available by summer, there is no need to enter into particulars about them. By that date the Japanese navy will have a tonnage of

something between 210,000 and 220,000 tons, against the Russian of 85,000 to 90,000 (including the "Petropavlovsk"), unless, as will doubtless be the case, more Russian ships be sent to the East.

This expansion of the Japanese naval force is certainly a remarkable one. But what, perhaps, is equally noteworthy is the phenomenal development of her mercantile marine. In 1893, exclusive of native craft, Japan had a tonnage of 155,000 tons. At present she has between 600,000 and 650,000 tons of merchant shipping. This is to a great extent the result of substantial Government subsidies. In 1894-95, the country had to make considerable efforts to provide herself with a fleet of fifty-one transports. A fleet of twice as many vessels is now readily available.

When we turn to the matter of her land forces, we find that since 1894 Japan has been far from idle. At the beginning of that year, the Japanese army on a peace footing consisted of 69,000 officers and men. After the war with China, a programme of army expansion was laid down, in terms of which the Japanese land forces were ultimately to amount to 145,000 men on a peace footing, and between 530,000 and 540,000 men on a war footing. What progress has been made with that programme may be inferred from the fact that, at the end of 1898, there were 120,800 men with the colors, besides 4,520 students in the military schools, while the first reserve numbered over 115,000 and the second 75,000 men. Now, of course, these figures have been very considerably increased, and even at present on a war footing the army may be safely placed at not less than 360,000 men of all arms.

It is by no means uninteresting to note some of the details of this expansion programme. In 1894, besides the Imperial Guards and Yezo militia, the Japanese army consisted of six divisions. The headquarters of these were at (from north to south) Sendai, Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima (all in the main island) and at Kumamoto in Kiushiu. With the exception of the last, all these places are on the Pacific or inland sea littoral—facing away from Siberia, that is. Now the Yezo militia has been abolished and a seventh division has been formed in the Hokkaido, while five more are being established at Marugame in Shikoku, at Kokura near the Straits of Shimonoseki, at Fukuchiyama, at Kanazawa and at Hirosaki—all on the coast of the Sea of Japan. That is, *five of the new divisions directly front Korea or Siberia*. Japan has evidently made up her mind to make her back door secure. Her

Pacific Ocean and Inland Sea approaches are so strongly fortified that any invasion from these quarters is impossible. At the time of the war with China her weak point was at Tsuruga, on the Japan Sea, almost directly behind Osaka and Kioto, the second and third cities in the Empire, and the chief seats of her nascent manufactures. With Tsuruga Bay fortified as it now is, and flanked by army divisions at Fukuchiyama on the west and at Kanazawa on the east (now with railway communication), any hostile landing at that point is effectually provided against.

In view of all this, it will be readily conceded that, to revert to our figure of speech, in their efforts to provide the national structure with a sound and thoroughly weather-proof roof, Japanese statesmen have been phenomenally successful. That an ordinary nation of 44,000,000 inhabitants should have accomplished so much should not perhaps afford any great matter for surprise. But, as already pointed out, although having the population of a first-class Power, Japan, as regards wealth and resources, is not so very much ahead of the small Kingdom of the Netherlands, or of Scotland—if, indeed, she be ahead of the latter at all. Naturally enough, then, this effort has taxed her very severely, and it is only the consummate ability of her rulers and certain exceptional circumstances that have enabled her to accomplish it.

By a certain authority the Japanese have been characterized as “artistic and all that, but muddle-pated in the matter of business.” Doubtless, the criticism is not without point, for in his transactions the average Japanese trader gives very few indications of the possession of any considerable financial capacity. But the management of the National Treasury has all along been in the hands of no mere average men. Under its successive ministers—Okuma, Matsugata and Watanabe—the Department of Finance has been exceedingly well administered. Lately, it is true, certain of its minor measures have evoked a good deal of adverse criticism, but these are but petty blemishes in a sound twenty years’ record. In 1887 the national debt stood at yen 307,000,000; seven years later (just before the outbreak of the Chinese war in 1894) it had been reduced to yen 283,500,000. Besides, at that date there was an accumulated surplus of yen 23,439,000 (say \$11,700,000) in the Treasury. It was to this accumulated surplus that the Government first had recourse at the opening of hostilities. As they progressed, domestic loans to the amount of \$58,400,000 were raised,

and as these loans have not been refunded, and as other small liabilities have been incurred, Japan's national debt (without including the £10,000,000 English loan) stands at some \$207,000,000, with annual charges of \$11,400,000, or some 25 cents per head of the population.

Out of the war with China, Japan netted a very large sum of money. Including the money spent in the reduction of Formosa, down to March 31, 1896, the total cost of the hostilities with China amounted to almost exactly \$100,000,000. (This amount, it may be remarked, included \$3,500,000 for rewards, and some \$2,800,000 for the expenses of the Formosan Government, for arsenal construction and for a submarine cable to Formosa.) Together with the \$22,500,000 received for the retrocession of the Liautung Peninsula, the Chinese indemnity brought into the national purse a total of \$182,500,000. Thus, Japan's direct monetary gain was as much as \$82,500,000. Of this total of \$182,500,000, only about \$40,000,000 were employed to defray the actual expenses of the war. Between \$28,000,000 and \$29,000,000 have been devoted to army expansion, of which about \$24,000,000 will have been expended by the end of this year. No less a sum than \$69,600,000 has been apportioned for the development of the navy, of which over \$50,000,000 has already been disbursed. In addition, \$15,000,000 have been set aside for the maintenance of warships. As regards the disposal of the remainder of the indemnity, the main items are \$10,000,000 presented to the Emperor, \$6,000,000 spent on Japan's white elephant, Formosa, \$5,000,000 as a fund to provide against the disasters of nature, and \$5,000,000 as an educational fund. In reality, these last two sums constitute a war reserve, for it is only the interest accruing from their investment that is devoted to the purposes specified.

It thus appears that, including the \$15,000,000 set apart for the maintenance of warships, Japan has a war reserve of \$25,000,000. Besides, in the event of an early outbreak of hostilities, the late London loan of (nominally) £10,000,000 would be available. However, as the flotation of that loan was not attended with the measure of success that might have been expected, that sum of £10,000,000 represents no more than \$43,000,000 or \$44,000,000. Then the unexpended portion of the amount devoted to army and navy expansion could also be utilized, while the Budget for the next year shows an estimated surplus of about \$23,000,000 in the

ordinary accounts. Thus, in the event of war, the immediate financial resources of the Government would be ample for the prosecution of one campaign at least.

To speak generally, in the event of no occurrence to disturb the ordinary course of affairs, the national finances of Japan are thoroughly sound. It is true that the results of the flotation of the loan in England might readily convey a very different impression. But these results are not difficult to explain. The shortly preceding or simultaneous issue of Chinese and Russian loans may have had something to do with the matter. But not nearly so much as Japanese financiers assert. In the case of the Chinese loan, security was offered. As security for her obligations, Japan steadfastly refused to pledge anything but the national credit. Now, the average investor, not so very mistakenly, has no high ideas of the credit of the ordinary Japanese, and this, doubtless, made him look somewhat askance at the investment. But the credit of the Japanese Government is a very different thing indeed from the credit of the average Japanese business man. So far, the Government has been most punctilious in the discharge of all its financial obligations, and there are no apparent grounds for believing that there is to be any change in its traditions in this respect. But between the financial record of the Japanese Treasury and that of the merchant, the British investor did not trouble to distinguish. Furthermore, the Japanese authorities were not without blame in the matter. From the finicking finance of the preceding year—parliamentary squabbles over a slight increase of the land tax, the raising of post and telegraph rates, and the imposition of a few petty taxes that brought in no revenue to compensate for the vexation they caused—the impression got abroad that the Government was terribly put to it to make ends meet. How incorrect that impression was may be inferred from recent developments. In 1895 the *saké* tax brought in \$7,800,000; since its augmentation it fully provides the \$27,000,000 or \$28,000,000 necessary to defray the ordinary annual expenditure on the army and navy. It is quite true that, when the new army divisions are fully established and all the new ships are added to the navy, the expenses of these two services will be quickly increased. But the returns of the *saké* tax bid fair to increase even more quickly, and it is seriously proposed to raise the rate of the excise. Then, with the recovery of her tariff autonomy, the returns of Japan's

customs are rapidly growing in amount. An indication of the true position is afforded by the Budget estimates for next year. The ordinary revenue is therein set down at \$96,500,000; the ordinary expenditure at something over \$73,000,000. Of course, it is perfectly true that for more than the \$23,000,000 surplus even Japan could readily find profitable employment. For the walls of the national house are still in a most unfinished and most unsatisfactory state. For example, for some years down to 1896, the annual losses from inundation were over \$30,000,000; in that year they mounted up to \$68,000,000, or \$19,000,000 in excess of the total revenue for 1895-96. And most of this loss is preventable. Then, as already remarked, education is in a chaotic state, and communications are still very defective, while if Japanese judicial officials are ever to command that respect and confidence from foreigners that they ought to command, the sum of \$2,000,000 annually appropriated to the service of the Ministry of Justice must be very much augmented. And these are only a few of the many matters in the internal economy of the country that urgently need to be taken in hand in real earnest. But perhaps the time for dealing with such affairs in any thorough-going and resolute manner is not just yet. On the mainland of the continent across the water, events are in progress that will continue to claim Japan's keenest attention and probably the exercise of her best energies. For there interests of vital importance to her are gravely involved.

These interests are, of course, more immediately of a political nature. But, besides purely political interests, others of even more serious ultimate importance are at stake. For her economic fabric bids fair to be placed in great jeopardy. It is not, perhaps, very generally recognized that at no very distant date Japan will have to face a population question. In 1872 the population of the islands was officially returned at a little over 33,000,000. It now stands at some 44,000,000 (exclusive of Formosa), or an increase of thirty-three per cent. in twenty-eight years. Possibly, however, it has not been quite so much as the figures indicate, for no census, such as is periodically made in Occidental countries, has hitherto been taken in Japan. The returns are based on the registration system of the country, and that, although yet not quite exhaustive, is now much more complete than it was in 1872. But, granting all that, from the returns of the excess of births over deaths, it ap-

pears that some 400,000 fresh mouths have yearly to be provided for. Now, if it be borne in mind that no more than fourteen per cent. of the 112,000 square miles of old Japan are under cultivation, and that this extent can be added to only with the greatest difficulty, it will readily be conceded that 400,000 fresh mouths yearly added to the odd 43,000,000 these 16,000 square miles have to support, afford substantial grounds for apprehension. Yezo has now just about as many inhabitants as Philadelphia had at the last census, and it will never be able to carry as many as New York and Brooklyn contain at present. The addition of Formosa to the Empire affords no appreciable alleviation to the congestion of the population, for the Japanese succumbs to the diseases of a tropical climate even more quickly than the Caucasian. At this date it is doubtful if there be even 5,000 Japanese settlers in the new possession. Nor does emigration tend to solve the difficulty to any remarkable extent. At present there are not 75,000 Japanese in foreign countries, even including the soldiers Lord Charles Beresford imagines to have been smuggled into Korea under the guise of coolies and merchants. Now, Japan has been in the past, still is mainly, and must be for years, an agricultural country. Hitherto, as a rule, she has managed to raise most of her foodstuffs, and even to export rice to the amount of some \$3,000,000 annually. But in 1897 she had to import foodstuffs to the value of \$23,000,000. It is true that as an offset she exported the usual \$3,000,000 worth of cereals in that year; but still she was \$20,000,000 to the bad in her food bill. This is small compared with the British deficit of £170,000,000 for the same year; but when it is stated that \$20,000,000 represented one-ninth of the total foreign trade of Japan (an agricultural, and not, like Great Britain, a manufacturing country), the circumstance looks somewhat serious. Still more serious would such an incident prove, if Japan had, as she will have a few years hence, a few extra million mouths to feed when her harvest failures occur.

An escape from this menace of a congested population can be found only in one or other or both of two directions. In the first place, Japan may, as she will undoubtedly endeavor to do, borrow a leaf from the economic history of England, and throw her energies into the development of her nascent manufactures. But for any very greatly increased volume of products a foreign market must be found, and there, of course, competition has to be

faced. Even on the fairest of footings, Japanese manufacturers will for long achieve no very brilliant success in such competition, and with a differential tariff against them they would have no chance of success whatsoever. Korea and northern China promise to prove one of their very best future markets; if, however, these districts pass under the rule of the Muscovite, the promise will have but a scanty fulfilment. But, even in the most favorable circumstances, it is extremely questionable whether any possible expansion of her manufactures will ever in itself supply a satisfactory solution of Japan's population question when it becomes really pressing. It seems imperatively necessary that over-sea territories should be found to receive the overflow of her rapidly increasing surplus subjects. And it is only in the Peninsula across the Straits of Tsushima that such territory can be found. How many inhabitants there are in the 80,000 square miles of Korea is not exactly known, the estimates varying from 6,000,000 to 15,000,000, the true figure, perhaps, lying midway between these extremes. Anyhow, the Peninsula may safely be expected to be equal to the support of another 8,000,000 or 10,000,000 souls. Her soil is not infertile, great tracts of it being said to be well suited for sericulture, while she is supposed to be rich in mineral resources. Even as things now stand, she annually exports as much rice as Japan does, and beans to the value of \$1,000,000; and with good government these exports could be multiplied enormously. But good government Korea never will have, so long as she suffers from what is termed her "independence." The course of events has pretty conclusively shown that the Koreans are not capable of governing themselves, and that the figment of "independence" is soon destined to be swept into the limbo of obsolete expressions. About that there is not very much room to doubt; as to whether her destiny is to be counted as a Russian province, or an appanage of Japan, there will in all likelihood be some very keen debate, in which even the *ultima ratio regum* may be invoked as the final and conclusive argument.

For if, as has been shown, Japan is vitally concerned about getting seated in the Peninsula, Russia is concerned about keeping the islanders out of all political control of it. Already they hold one side of the Korean Straits—the Island of Tsushima is strongly fortified—and if they were to establish a strong naval base on the southern coast of the Peninsula, at Masampho or else-

where, they would have full command of the sea communications between Port Arthur and Vladivostok. And with the whole of Korea in Japanese hands, the overland connections between the two Russian bases would never be safe.

Thus, apart from all questions of national prestige, or of wounded national *amour propre*, the decision of the ultimate fate of the moribund Empire of Korea can scarcely fail to cause Japan to direct her keenest attention to the actions of her rival for supremacy in the northeastern Pacific. But questions of national prestige and of wounded national pride are also acutely involved. The average Japanese primary school teacher, who has to contrive to make ends meet on three or four dollars per month, is not exactly the sort of man that can be expected to take any very wide view of the national economic necessities. Yet, in 1896-97, several of these at least were making a point of impressing on the minds of their charges of eight or ten years of age the indispensable necessity of their "growing up to be strong enough to chastise Russia." For this, it is fair to say, they were rebuked by their superiors; yet the circumstance is by no means without its significance. The average Japanese is exceedingly anxious to express in a practical form his gratitude for the "good advice" tendered by Russia and her allies in April, 1895, in consequence of which Japan had to withdraw from the Liautung Peninsula. That advice had also the effect of reviving the well-nigh dead recollection of Enomoto's negotiations at St. Petersburg in 1876, when, in exchange for Sagalien, Japan acquired the Kurile Islands. Furthermore, the ill-will against Russia excited by her intervention was not diminished by the subsequent march of events in Korea.

In the summer of 1895 Japanese influence at Seöul was paramount. While he was Minister there, Count Inouye was undoubtedly by far the most powerful man in the Peninsula, and Inouye honestly tried to exercise all the great power he wielded for the best interests of the little kingdom. The administration was fundamentally reformed, codes of law were being drafted with the advice of Japanese experts, the finances were being put upon a sound basis (Japan advancing a loan of yen 3,000,000), and the army organized and trained by Japanese officers. It was just at this time that the following conversation between a member of the Japanese Diet, who had gone to Seoul, and the Russian representative there was reported in the Tokyo press:

"Mr. Shiba: The latest newspapers from Europe contain a statement that your country intends to acquire in the East a port open during all seasons of the year. May I ask you whether there is any truth in that report?

"Mr. Waeber: There is no truth in that. Such statements may perhaps be found in English papers. The English are very cunning. They always say bad things about us in their papers, and thereby inflict no small injury upon Russia. The story that Russia intends to obtain such a port is a canard manufactured by the English. Russia does not pursue an aggressive policy. You know that she had not invaded any country during the past ten years. You may conclude from this that Russia has no ambition either to make any conquest or to obtain a port in these waters."

In the summer of 1895 Russian influence did not count for very much in Korea, but still it was even then at work below the surface. On Inouye's return, Miura succeeded to the post of Japanese Minister, and on October 8, 1895 (five weeks after his arrival), the Korean Queen was murdered. This terrible outrage was a deadly blow to the Japanese power in the Peninsula. Why Miura was so bitterly opposed to the Queen is not precisely known; for rejecting the counsel of Inouye (impressed upon him again and again) to make a friend of the ablest Korean in the Kingdom his reasons must have been very strong. At all events, on the dead body of the Queen a letter to the Court of St. Petersburg was found requesting it not to transfer Mr. Waeber, its representative in Seoul, to another post, as it proposed to do. Then on February 11, 1896, the King and the Crown Prince carried out a project that had been maturing for some time, and took up their quarters in the Russian Legation. Here they remained until February 20, 1897, and during this year, of course, Russian influence in Seoul gathered force apace. The sixty or seventy Japanese advisers previously in the service of the Korean Government either withdrew or were discharged, and all the reforms set on foot in 1895 were practically nullified. Naturally, all this caused uneasiness in Japan, uneasiness all the greater because of the false position she had been placed in by the *coup* of October 8, 1895. However, what could be done she did, and in June, 1896, the Lobanov-Yamagata Convention, defining the attitude of the two Powers toward Korea, was signed at St. Petersburg. However, the language of this document was somewhat vague; at all events it did not suffice to prevent the Muscovites from sending officers to organize the Korean troops at Seoul, and from a bold attempt to get the management of the Korean finances into their

hands by procuring the appointment of Adviser to the Treasury and of Superintendent of Customs for a Russian official. The document published in the Tokyo journals as a copy of the agreement under which the services of Mr. Alexieff were secured for these positions was in many ways a remarkable one. His services were merely lent to Korea by Russia; the latter paid his normal salary, which Korea supplemented by an honorarium of \$1,500 *per annum*. The period of his engagement was to be unlimited, and, in the event of his withdrawal, no national other than a Korean or a Russian was to be appointed to the office. However, on his arrival in Seoul, M. Alexieff did not find it all smooth sailing. Some time before, Mr. McLeavy Brown, a British subject, had been installed in these very positions, and as Mr. Brown's contract had a good many years to run, he refused to take notice of dismissal from the Korean Government; and, as a matter of fact, he is still in these posts to-day. However, the Russian official did act for some short time in his capacity of Financial Adviser. Meanwhile, Japanese diplomacy had been at work to get the vagueness of the Lobanov-Yamagata Convention rectified, and on April 25, 1898, the Nissi-Rosen Protocol was signed, whose three short articles are worthy of full quotation:

"Art. I. The Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia definitively recognize the sovereignty and entire independence of Korea, and mutually engage to refrain from all direct interference in the internal affairs of that country.

"Art. II. Desiring to avoid every possible cause of misunderstanding in the future, the Imperial Governments of Japan and Russia mutually engage, in case Korea should apply to Japan or to Russia for advice and assistance, not to take any measure in the nomination of military instructors and financial advisers, without having previously come to a mutual agreement on the subject.

"Art. III. In view of the large development of Japanese commercial and industrial enterprise in Korea, as well as the considerable number of Japanese subjects resident in that country, the Imperial Russian Government will not impede the development of the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.

"Done at Tokyo, in duplicate, this 25th day of April, 1898."

Meanwhile, there had been happenings which at their occurrence greatly puzzled the journalists of the Far East, but which subsequent developments readily accounted for. Toward the end of 1897, Russia had asked for the exclusive concession of some land on Deer Island, which had been previously staked off as a site for a foreign settlement, and the request had been met by

shuffling and evasion. About the same time, the Korean interpreter to the Russian Legation had been set upon and nearly done to death by some of his own countrymen. Besides, there were other indications that the Koreans were becoming very restive under Muscovite domination. But all this did not prepare observers to expect what seemed to be M. de Speyer's extraordinary action in sending his famous despatch of March 7, 1898, to the Korean Foreign Office. The following translation of that document is from the Seoul *Independent*:

"Recently I have been informed that there exists a deplorable condition of affairs in Seoul; many idlers among your people, claiming to be gifted politicians, create disturbance by opposing Russian interests. This state of affairs naturally causes great surprise to my Imperial Sovereign, the Emperor of Russia. At the request of your Imperial Sovereign and your Government, the Russian Government had sent military instructors to drill the soldiers and to guard the palace, and an Adviser for your Finance Department. This action on the part of my Government plainly indicates Russia's intention of helping your country as a neighbor and her desire to strengthen your independence. But your Government did not seem to appreciate the importance of Russia's action at the time, and now your Government freely prevents Russia from accomplishing the advantages and beneficial results for your country which she intended. The present attitude of your Government is so plain that Russia cannot endure this condition much longer. Therefore my Emperor has graciously ordered me to report fully to your Emperor and inquire of your Government definitely whether Korea still desires to be benefited by Russia's help or not, and if the military instructors and Finance Adviser are not considered necessary by your Emperor and your Government, my Government will make some other necessary arrangements according to the circumstances, but your Government must maintain your independence in the future according to its ability. I am awaiting your reply and hope it will be received within twenty-four hours, and I further request Your Excellency to report to your Emperor that I desire to obtain an audience with him for the purpose of informing him of the instructions I have received from my Imperial Sovereign concerning this matter."

Five days later, M. de Speyer received a reply, and from it, to the amazement of everybody, invertebrate Korea appeared to have taken up a strong attitude. The despatch in question was long and rambling, but the pith of it is contained in the two following paragraphs:

"Through your Sovereign's kind motives and your Government's friendly disposition, our military and financial affairs have made much progress. Both the Adviser and instructors diligently and conscientiously discharged their duties, so that the Imperial Guard has been trained satisfactorily and the financial condition of the country placed on a systematic basis. These are all due to the unceasing efforts of your Government and we will never forget your magnanimous spirit.

"Our Government has decided that we will continue to manage our affairs according to the methods which your officials have so kindly introduced, though we must place the controlling power of these departments in the hands of our own countrymen. We will not employ any foreign military instructors or advisers. This decision was arrived at by the unanimous wishes of the old statesmen, the present Government and the people at large; also through the enlightenment and independent spirit which your Government has so diligently inculcated among us. I am sure that your Imperial Sovereign and your Government will be glad to know that our people have become so progressive and enlightened as to desire to maintain their own sovereignty."

The reply of M. de Speyer to this was delightfully sarcastic toward the close. (To understand the opening sentences of his despatch, it must be premised that the Korean Foreign Minister had stated that the Emperor of Korea proposed to "send an envoy to your capital who will carry the personal messages of gratitude from our Emperor to your Sovereign.") The following is the Russian Minister's communication:

"Sir: I wish to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 12th inst., in which communication you have intimated to me that your Government intends to send an ambassador to St. Petersburg. I have just been instructed by my Imperial Sovereign to inform you that the sending of the envoy is not at all necessary, and the Russian Government does not care to receive any message of thanks. Russia only desires to extend her friendliness; but she never cares to force it upon any one. Your Government asked us to send military instructors and a finance adviser and we complied. But now your Government considers that Russian officials are no longer needed, and you state that Korea can manage her own affairs without aid from Russia. Russia only congratulates Korea upon having made such progress in so short a time that she is able to maintain her independence unassisted by foreign instructors and advisers.

"I have already instructed our military officers and Finance Adviser to discontinue their duties in the Korean service.

March 17th, 1898.

"A. DE SPEYER."

Doubtless, Japan's attitude toward the Russian interpretation of the Lobanov-Yamagata Convention, and the approaching agreement on the matter of the Nissi-Rosen Protocol, went a long way to account for this, at first, seemingly inexplicable development in Seoul. But other events of even more startling import were in progress elsewhere, and in all likelihood they had not a little to do with Russia's withdrawal from all open interference with Korean politics for the time being.

On October 18, 1897, it was telegraphed that the Russian fleet had entered Port Arthur with the intention of wintering there. And then, just about the date of signing of the Nissi-Rosen Con-

vention (April 24, 1898), it became known in Japan that the rumors of a convention between Russia and China, in terms of which Port Arthur, Talien-wan and adjacent territory were to be "leased" to the former, were only too well founded, such a convention having been actually signed at Peking on the preceding 27th of March—ten days after the withdrawal of the Russian officers and Financial Adviser from the service of Korea.

Of course, in Japan the ferment caused by this intelligence was intense. The capture of Port Arthur by Japanese troops in 1894 had amazed the world, and the Japanese looked upon that fortress as one of the proudest trophies of the war. At the peace negotiations their minds were resolutely bent upon retaining it. So, when Russia and her allies requested them to retrocede it with the whole Liautung Peninsula to China, the three Powers were asking of Japan a very great deal indeed. However, as the request preferred or the advice proffered (with a backing of forty-seven war vessels) was in the interests of the Peace of the Far East, Japan complied with it as gracefully as she could, and returned to her vanquished enemy the strongest fortress and the best dock-yard in the Far East. This was in April, 1895, and in 1898, within three years from that date, the legitimate booty won for Japan by the prowess of her soldiers had been appropriated by Russia, through the tortuous devices of her diplomats, and the phrase, the "Peace of the Far East," had proved to be nothing but a more extended and expansive fashion of spelling the name of the Muscovite! Naturally enough, there was a violent explosion of popular feeling in Japan. By the masses an immediate war with Russia would have been welcomed, while even some of the less cautious and far-seeing of her statesmen were in no mood to pause to count the ultimate cost of such a struggle. But in the midst of the ferment the ministers in power never for a moment lost their coolness and calmness. Japanese troops still held Wei-hai-wei, and, in terms of the Shimonoseki Treaty, were to hold it until the whole of the indemnity was paid. China had signified her intention of liquidating the whole of that in May. Many publicists and some of her statesmen argued that the Russian occupation of Port Arthur fully justified Japan in keeping her garrison in Wei-hai-wei, even after every cent of the indemnity had been received. But the Tokyo Cabinet did not take that view. Negotiations between Great Britain, China and Japan were set

on foot; and in May the last \$50,000,000 of the indemnity was handed over, the Japanese troops evacuated Wei-hai-wei, and, on July 1, by a convention between China and Great Britain, that port, together with the adjacent waters, was leased to the latter for so long a period as Russia shall retain Port Arthur.

Russia's negotiations at Pekin go a long way to explain the somewhat mysterious cessation of her activity in the Korean Peninsula in March, 1898. With the acquisition of Port Arthur as a naval base, there was no immediate need for her to push her interests aggressively in what Tokyo journals insist upon calling the Japanese sphere of influence. Although her diplomats in Seoul and Pekin ventured to carry things with a high hand—seemingly even to the verge of recklessness—yet the great Northern Power was far from eager for war. Her ends could be compassed by surer and less costly means than that. What she needed before all things was time to strengthen her naval and military position in the Far East. At that time it is doubtful whether she had as many as 75,000 troops in the whole of eastern Siberia, and a concentration of 60,000 of these would have been very difficult. Granted the command of the sea, Japan could have thrown double that number against Vladivostok. It is true that the struggle for the command of the sea would have been a more equal one, although it must be remembered that while Japan had ample docking facilities for the speedy repair of her ships damaged in action, Russia in that respect was seriously handicapped before her acquisition of Port Arthur. Once seated there, the task of most immediate importance to Russia was to make her position there an impregnable one. For the last two years, a great deal of energy has been devoted to this purpose. Much money has already been spent on the strengthening of the fortress, and in the naval budget for next year a further sum of \$2,000,000 is to be expended on the fortifications of Port Arthur and Vladivostok. Into the former, stores and munitions have been pouring in a continuous stream; it is now strongly garrisoned; and the next assailant that ventures to attack the place will find it a good deal more than difficult to emulate the Japanese feat of November 21, 1894. In all likelihood Port Arthur is destined to become the most important of all the naval stations of Russia. The station on the Moorman coast in Lapland will never probably be of very much value, while in the Baltic and the Black Sea alike the Russian

fleets are seriously shut in and hampered. From Port Arthur alone is there free and ready egress to the open ocean at all seasons of the year. This circumstance in itself makes it easy to understand why Russia proposes to add so greatly to the strength of her Pacific fleet. At present, *vis-à-vis* to Japan, that fleet is decidedly weak. Her three battleships would be no match for the "Fuji," the "Yashima" and the "Shikishima." The "Petrovlovsk," of 10,960 tons, and the "Navarin," of 10,200 tons, steam only sixteen knots against the eighteen or nineteen knots of the Japanese line-of-battle ships, while the "Lissoi Veliky," of 8,880 tons, is no faster. As regards first-class cruisers, the Japanese "Tokiwa" and "Asama" are fully a match for the "Rossia" and the "Rurik," and the "Azuma" and "Yakumo" (sister ships to the "Asama"), expected here by the end of June, will go a long way toward offsetting the much older, slower and smaller "Vladimir Monomakh," "Dmitri Donskoi," "Pamiat Azova" and "Admiral Nakhimoff." As regards second-class cruisers and smaller ships, the superiority of Japan is simply overwhelming, as indicated by the comparative total tonnages already given. But, if the report be true that Russia is to send several of the eight battleships and six first-class cruisers now in hand to the Far East, the disparity will cease to be on her side.

Russia is not waiting for the completion of her great railway to reduce her military inferiority in the East. In 1898 and the four preceding years, 58,000 troops were despatched to that quarter by the vessels of the volunteer fleet, while only 20,000 returned, and lately the rate of despatch has been greatly increased. At present, a trustworthy authority puts the number of Russian troops of all arms in eastern Siberia and Manchuria at nearly 110,000 men. In addition, there is a large immigration of settlers and of laborers for the construction of the railways in Manchuria. These are being pushed on vigorously; Port Arthur is already connected with Mukden, and altogether over 500 miles of track have been completed. It is only the heavy tunnelling through the Chingan and Klite Amon ranges that will defer the opening of the whole system till 1902. Thus, if all this be taken into account, it will readily appear that Russia, in temporarily effacing herself in Korea and so avoiding friction with Japan there, was the very reverse of ill-advised. Of late, however, signs of renewed activity in the Peninsula on her part have not been wanting alto-

gether. Several of her subjects have applied for seemingly harmless concessions; and, in view of the opening of the new port of Masampo—one of the finest harbors in the world—a large extent of ground was purchased there by Russians, on behalf of the Russian Government, it is believed. Thereupon, some Japanese subjects quietly bought the foreshore of these lots, and, in spite of Russian representations to the Korean Government, these Japanese purchasers have got their title-deeds. There was a good deal of excitement over the incident, but a war over the Masampo foreshore question is not a very likely contingency. Another possible indication of renewed Russian activity in Korea is the appointment of M. Pavloff as representative at Seoul. It was M. Pavloff that negotiated the Port Arthur lease-convention, and it was he who carried things with such a high hand at Peking in the matter of railway concessions. He is seemingly an able and a resolute man, strongly bent upon a vigorous forward policy. At the same time, there are rumors of an attempt on the part of Korea to obtain a loan of yen 5,000,000 or yen 7,000,000 from Russia on the pledge of her northern provinces, but these rumors may be like a good many others that we hear—unfounded.

One thing, however, is certain, and that is that the present Japanese Cabinet, while by no means eager for war, will not tamely submit to any infraction of the terms of the Nissi-Rosen Protocol. That document is Japan's charter for the peaceful, economic and industrial conquest of Korea which she evidently contemplates. The energy with which she has been pushing this purpose and the development of her commercial interests in the little Empire have of late been very remarkable, and stand forth in marked contrast to the apathy with which she has regarded most of the commercial advantages in China acquired by the Treaty of Shimonoseki. So long as she remains free to develop her legitimate interests in Korea, so long as the Nissi-Rosen Protocol is observed, Japan will be satisfied. The average Japanese is, indeed, very prone to be swayed by emotion, even by that spurious emotion called sentimentality. But hitherto the foreign policy of the nation has been conducted by the cold clear light of reason, and the statesmen at the head of affairs will not be likely to engage in armed strife without the amplest justification for so doing.

JAMES MURDOCH.

THE POWERS AND THE PARTITION OF CHINA.

BY THE REV. GILBERT REID, D. D., PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CHINA, PEKING.

THE unusual attention given to Chinese affairs for two years past has been largely due to affairs in China which are foreign as well as Chinese. The scramble of European Powers has shifted from Constantinople to Peking, and into this scramble Japan and the United States have entered. The destiny of China seems to depend upon action taken in London, Berlin, St. Petersburg, Paris and Tokyo. The future of Europe and America, and the question of the new "balance of power," depends on action taken in Peking. After all, in an unexpected way, one-fourth of the human race as concentrated in China must be reckoned with in making the map of the world.

The attitude of the great Powers to China is only partially indicated through the voice of the people, the press and public debate, and has scarcely been enunciated through the Governments. China is thus in the dark as to what others want or intend to do, and we are all more or less puzzled in proportion to our degree of solicitude for her welfare.

For two years the writer, in a campaign for the International Institute of China, has been brought in contact with influential and thinking men in as many as ten countries, and especially with those most deeply interested in, or responsible for, the character of the relations which the West will hold with the Far East. Necessarily, it is in many cases impossible to give an authorized statement of acting ministers, but we can give impressions and our grounds for certain beliefs, which may help to explain the real situation.

I. GREAT BRITAIN.—Every British Government, until the present, has been in favor of maintaining the integrity of China.

Parties have been agreed on this matter. So long as Great Britain was the predominant Power in China, this policy was unmodified. With the growing advance of other Powers, and especially with the increasing influence of Russia at the capital of China, the present Salisbury Government drifted into a policy of passivity. Instead of insisting on maintaining the integrity of China, it excused itself from that task, and insisted on maintaining British interests, whatever became of China. The strong position sustained in the speeches of Sir Michael Hicks-Beach in the early part of 1898 for the "open door," was relinquished for the new theory of "spheres of interest," as enunciated by the Rt. Hon. A. J. Balfour, and as illustrated by the agreement made with Russia concerning spheres of railway and mining concessions. All the time, however, the Government has declared that the open door is not closed, and plainly shows a desire to have China kept intact.

The "open door" policy, or that of "equality of opportunity," is, no doubt, the preference of the British people. The burdens of a world-wide empire drive out ambition for further territory and political responsibilities in China.

At the same time, there has been a strong, active, persistent agitation for "spheres of influence," or more particularly for a British sphere of influence in the Yang-tse Valley. Not merely statesmen of the Opposition, but men on the same side of the House with the Government, have advocated these ideas. Several times the defense of the "open door" has been left to members of the Cabinet. The claim has been that there is no longer an open door, that the Government has weakened, that British interests are imperilled, that British influence has declined, and that the only hope for Great Britain is to "ear-mark" the Yang-tse Valley. The undercurrent is suspicion of Russia and the conviction that Russia has already practically taken possession of Manchuria, while Germany holds sway in Shantung. Very few openly declare for the partition of China, but their arguments, if carried out, would drift that way. In any case, China's wishes or rights are utterly ignored. This agitation, and its support by the London press, has tended to weaken British reputation in China.

Lord Charles Beresford came back from his commercial investigations in China with two propositions for maintaining the open door—the one military, namely, drilling Chinese troops for the defense of the Yang-tse Valley; and the other political, namely, a

combination of Great Britain, Germany, Japan and the United States, as antagonistic to Russia and France. Both of these propositions failed to secure the support of the British Government, and Lord Charles Beresford has, therefore, joined with the critics of the Government, and in doing so has drifted into the idea that the open door was closed, and that Great Britain should make sure of some special sphere, before all should be lost to her.

Nevertheless, the critics of the policy of the Government have latterly a slight impression that, if it is too late to argue for an "open door," it may also be too late to argue for a "sphere of influence." The agitation for a particular sphere has aroused other nations to make claims of their own. The result is such an intermingling of interests that division into separate spheres would be harder to effect than the maintenance of competition everywhere. For Great Britain to secure a sphere of her own would require one of three things. One way would be to secure it by agreement with China, but China would not, or could not, make such an agreement and retain even the semblance of sovereignty. Another way would be by agreement with other rival Powers; but, in attempting this, all that the British desire would not be granted, while other Powers would secure more in the way of recognized spheres than they now seem to aim at. A third way would be for Great Britain to consult neither China nor the other Powers, but to establish herself suddenly in the part that she seeks for her own; but this she cannot do without numerous complications with China and the Powers, and, furthermore, she has too much on her hands elsewhere to attempt such a colossal venture as an independent demarcation of her own sphere. Therefore, as the British already have interests outside the Yang-tse Valley, and other Powers have interests within the Yang-tse Valley, there comes the chance to China to be left unmolested.

II. RUSSIA.—The suspicion that the British hold toward the Russians with reference to China is about equalled by Russian suspicion of Great Britain. British suspicion arises from an ignorance of what the Russians really think or intend to do. Russian suspicion arises from the open declarations and threatening propositions of the British public and its free press.

Nine out of ten persons in the United Kingdom believe that Russia wants to take possession of the whole of China, or at least of Peking and all North China. Our personal conviction to the

contrary has always been received with surprise as a strange hallucination. The ground for this conviction can be briefly stated.

Russia is more of an Oriental nation than any other European Power. There is much in common between Russia and China. They are both conservative and autocratic in government. The proximity of territory and partial homogeneity of race would naturally lead these two nations to sympathize with each other, especially if others sought to intrude. Russia, as the stronger of the two, might have an ambition to dominate her neighbor, as she has dominated vast tracts and different tribes in northern Asia; but the international relations of both Russia and China forbid this. Russia knows that if she advances into China, other Powers will do the same. The subjection of the whole of China to Russia is a very different thing to the complex partition of China. The former is impossible; the latter to Russian eyes is undesirable. In Asia, Russia prefers a peaceful neighbor like China to her two European rivals, Germany and Great Britain—both intensely military and much wealthier than herself. The Slavic sympathies are more with the Mongolian than with the Teutonic or Anglo-Saxon, in anything that pertains to China.

There are those who praise highly the foresightedness of Russian diplomacy. It is a common idea that Russia forms a definite plan, and works for its execution, slowly but with determination, through years, and even into centuries. My own impression is quite different. The Russians are not long-headed either in commerce or diplomacy. They rather have a supreme belief in Providence as a destiny leading their race and their Czar to ever-expanding spheres of domination. They design nothing, for Providence is leading them on.

An essential factor in the political attitude of Russia is the Czar. He has already given proof of his peaceful intents, not only in world-wide problems, but specifically in China. He has announced to the world that Talien-wan is open to the trade of all nations, but few Englishmen and Americans have given even meagre praise to his published declaration and peaceful policy.

There is a small faction in Russia, led by Prince Oukhtomsky, which is positively friendly to China. In frequent conversations with this gentlemen, we were struck with his intense and intelligent interest in the welfare of China. His paper, the *Viedomosti*, is noted both for its antagonism to the British and its defense of

the Chinese. After hearing our plan for an International Institute at Peking, he had three editorials prepared in its advocacy, one being entitled in English "A Helping Hand to China."

The opponents of Russia generally close the door of discussion by the statement, "Russia has already taken possession of Manchuria." Facts, however, do not support this charge. Manchuria is still under Manchu rule, and the people pay taxes to China, not to Russia. There is even less interference in internal affairs than China complains of in other parts of China from other countries. Nothing has been done to frustrate the work of either Protestant or Catholic missionaries. The port of Newchwang is still an open port, and it is yet to be proved that foreign trade in Manchuria has been hampered by Russia. Russia, quite sensibly, has wanted an ice-free port, and the opportunity to improve the industrial development of her own extensive domain. She now seeks to become something of a commercial nation, and to extend commercial relations with the United States on the one side and with England on the other. She also aspires to predominant influence in Chinese affairs, as other nations do, and the time will come, perhaps, when education and missions, as well as commerce and diplomacy, will form a part of Russian enterprise.

All this is other than the scheme to dismember China. And yet the dismemberment of China is very much "in the air." Russia, therefore, is preparing and strengthening her position. Let any other nation seize a portion of Chinese territory, then Russia will at once seize Manchuria and Mongolia to march on to Peking. Russia, even more than many Englishmen, would prefer to have China held together.

III. FRANCE.—For many years France and Great Britain were joined in the effort to open up China. Latterly, France and Russia have been joined, and this last alliance has aroused the suspicion of the British. The chief influence of France in China has been missionary rather than commercial, and this fact tends to restrain any personal desires for Chinese dismemberment. From the beginning of treaty relations with China, all Catholic missions have been regarded as under the French protectorate. The only exception has been the case of Germany during the last decade. The special favor accorded to France has been increased within the last year by China's recognition of the official status of Catholic missionaries and the right of the French Minister at Peking to inter-

fere and protect. This, therefore, gives scope for French influence in every province of China, and also in Mongolia and Manchuria. France knows very well that, if China were to be dismembered, her influence in the missionary line would be curtailed. She, therefore, prefers to keep China intact and have influence everywhere in China.

In even the commercial line France does not care to be limited to a few provinces along the Tonquin border. She has a French "settlement" in Shanghai and Tientsin, and a "concession" in Hankow. She is the largest investor in the railroad to be built between Hankow and Peking. She has also great political influence at Peking. To divide China would not serve the interests of France.

IV. GERMANY.—The other leading European Power concerned in the future of China is Germany. The occasion for the rise of German influence in China was the massacre of two German Catholic missionaries in the Province of Shantung. One-third of that province is a German diocese. The protection of the Catholic mission within that section was transferred from France to Germany ten years ago. In addition, Germany has influence in a commercial way by securing as an outcome of the missionary difficulties the port of Kiao-chow, and certain railroad and mining concessions throughout the province. This is the German "sphere of interest," which may lead to actual possession. Such a result would not, however, be for the best interests of Germany. Germany has Protestant missions in the south where France would rule if China were to be dismembered. German merchants are also given wide scope for trade at all the treaty ports and through the natives far into the interior. A few high-handed officers or irresponsible adventurers may boast of making Shantung a German possession; but the German Government and German merchants would fare better by being friendly and true to China and by exerting influence over the whole of China. The danger to be faced is from the massacre of more Germans, which would cause Germany to ignore Chinese rule and proceed to rule for herself. In fact, I regard this as the greatest danger to the preservation of China. The Chinese in Shantung are turbulent, and, through the aggressiveness of the Germans, most hostile to foreigners, and especially to the Germans.

V. THE UNITED STATES.—Different from the influence of the

European Powers in China is that of the United States. While the equal of any of the Powers, this advancing Republic, the predominant Power on the American continent, has maintained from the year 1842 a friendly attitude to China. Even with the cry for expansion and her presence in Asiatic waters, she has displayed no inclination to participate in the dismemberment of China. Certain Americans are inclined to unite with the British in some definite China policy, while others look with favor on closer relations with Russia, but the National Government, in so far as it has a policy, puts forth no positive action either to divide China or maintain her integrity, but seeks to protect American interests as guaranteed by treaties. Naturally, this policy, like that of the British Government, is more allied to an "open door," with equality of opportunity, but there is no readiness to resist the aggressions of other Powers, so long as American trade is not hampered nor American citizens molested. It is, therefore, possible for the United States to maintain equally friendly relations with China, with Great Britain, with Russia, or any other Power, if nothing is done to eliminate China as a treaty-making Power, or to make sections of China partial to some one country in rights, privileges and opportunities. If China is not to be dismembered, there is no need for the United States to interfere, but if dismemberment is to be undertaken, the very existence of extensive American interests, commercial and missionary, and the fact that for over half a century the United States has had in Eastern Asia diplomatic relations equally with others, will require that the United States be not only consulted, but given an equal share in the distribution of new opportunities.

The average American has less respect for the Chinese as a race than have most of the European peoples. This is probably owing to the greater acquaintance on the part of Americans with Chinese laborers than with the better class Chinese, and to American legislation on the Chinese question. We hear much of the obligation of the Chinese to observe the treaties, but very little of American obligation in relation to China. In consequence there is striking unconcern as to the welfare of the Chinese or the permanence of the Chinese Empire. Very few realize the danger to American interests of allowing the dismemberment of China. The downfall of the Chinese Government is thought of as something similar to the displacement of Indian rule by British

domination, whereas China would be parcelled out among different nations, and would not be like one people under one foreign rule.

Any change of American sentiment in the direction of recognizing the importance of keeping China intact has been largely brought about by an increased conviction that, legitimately, the United States must enter into movements that affect the world, and more particularly by the ambition to expand American trade throughout the whole of China. The sense of fair play, furthermore, is shocked by such a colossal programme as that of trying to divide a great and ancient Empire among outside nations, mutually jealous and relying for supremacy on skill in warfare.

VI. JAPAN.—In any question that concerns China, Japan must have a part. As Japan is the neighbor of China, this is to be expected, and as she is the recognized equal of Christian nations, this is her right. To prevent the further aggressions of Europe, and especially of Russia, all the people of Japan may be said to be in favor of defending China and strengthening her independence. The end of China might be the beginning of the downfall of Japan. As Oriental nations, they stand or fall together. The question of the "open door" was hardly thought of when Japan vanquished China on sea and land, but when Russia, France and Germany proceeded to interfere in the result, and later on to make demands for privileges for themselves, which China could not resist, then Japan reversed her course and sided with China. An alliance, formal or informal, is inevitable.

Thus, through mutual jealousies of the nations, China may be held together. All seek their own interests first, from what some would term patriotic motives, and yet this very self-interest is dependent on the preservation of China. A scramble for conquest, possessions, sovereignty, in China would endanger the peace of the whole world. Even a struggle for established spheres of influence, with Chinese authority weakened more and more, would not only be treacherous to China but provoke such discord, animosities, riots and resentments as to make the loss and trouble of the participants greater than the gain and honor. Each nation, while anxious for more influence, is opposed to the increased influence of any other nation. The whole territory of China presents so many opportunities for foreign enterprise that all prefer competition to exclusiveness and dismemberment.

GILBERT REID.

THE AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA.

BY THE RIGHT HONORABLE SIR CHARLES W. DILKE, BART., M. P.

WHEN Mr. Choate wrote to Lord Salisbury to ask British concurrence in a proposed line of policy in China, he stated that:

"The President has strong reason to believe that the Governments of both Russia and Germany will co-operate in such an understanding as is here proposed."

It is not quite clear what that understanding was. The passage of the despatch which immediately preceded that which I have quoted began with a most important statement as to American policy in China. This was followed by an expression of a desire for support in the effort to obtain, from each of the Powers claiming spheres of influence, a declaration in favor of an international policy of the "open door," as contrasted with a selfish policy of preference for "nationals"—that is, subjects or citizens. At the moment of writing, I have not seen the actual text of the Russian and German replies. I hear from those who have read them that the German answer is satisfactory but general, and the Russian guarded and far from clear. What I do not know is how far any of the Powers have responded to what appears to me to be the gist of the American despatch, instead of confining their reply to the proposed declaration as to the "open door."

A more pregnant but less obvious portion of the American policy revealed in the despatches which began to be written in September, lies in the expressed hesitation of the Government of the United States to "recognize" "the exclusive rights" of any Power within any part of the Chinese Empire, and its acceptance, as the policy ultimately in view and now to be "hastened," of "united action of the Powers at Peking to promote administrative reforms, so greatly needed for strengthening the Imperial Gov-

ernment and maintaining the integrity of China in which it" ("my Government") "believes the whole Western world is alike concerned."

This is a far more important pronouncement than anything which merely concerns the "open door." It has attracted less attention than the proposed declarations of disinterestedness. It is not, however, novel as an expression of policy by distinguished Americans, though it has never previously been so frankly adopted as a national policy by the President and Secretary of State and Ambassadors of the Republic. In 1867 the same policy was proclaimed by an American, Mr. Anson Burlingame, at one time a Senator, at another time American Minister in China, and ultimately first Chinese Ambassador to Europe, who came to us with a legation composed of representatives of all the Powers, serving with the consent of their various countries. Mr. Burlingame's policy was exactly that now adopted on behalf of the United States. It was preached by him with the leave of the United States Government, which at one time he represented, and whose service he left for that of China, in which he shortly died. The policy was a wise one when taught by Mr. Burlingame in London in 1868; it was premature. The question that must now be asked with regard to it is not whether it is wise, for we shall agree upon that score, but whether the United States "mean business" about it, and are prepared to push it with their great influence—an influence to which the reception of their despatches testifies, if indeed testimony were needed.

It ought to be a portion of the policy, if that policy be seriously intended, that the United States should be strongly represented in China. At Peking there must be a Minister of high authority who will take the lead in pressing the enlightened and trading views of our Governments and of the Powers who will concur with them, and, on the Coast, a Commodore who will use the naval power of the United States, in conjunction with the British Admiral on the station, in suppressing piracy and lawlessness on the West River, the Yang-tse and other inland waters where British trade and the trade of the United States are, and in an increasing degree will be, done. The United States are now showing their power, as a manufacturing and exporting nation, to hold their own in markets far more distant from their shores than those of China. Rivals we must be in trade; but we have, both of us,

everything to gain by making ours a friendly rivalry, and by co-operating in maintaining order throughout China, and in asking, as a return, for the regularization of inland duties and for the extension of the Imperial Customs system to financial matters which are at present outside its control.

We must recognize the fact that, although other countries may yield to the views put forward by the United States and supported by ourselves, they are not friendly to them. There was a most interesting debate in the French Chamber on the 27th of March, in which several of the leading speakers discussed the colonial policy of France and Germany, making as it were common cause with Germany in the matter, and explaining that it is a policy which is intended to enable Europe to face the future development of the United States. The speakers pointed out (to use the words of M. Raiberti, the Radical Deputy of Nice) that England has under her sceptre a world; that Russia has absorbed all northern Asia; that, in face of what the British and Russian Powers and the United States already are, France and Germany are forced to establish themselves outside Europe, and "to be extra-European if they are to live."

"The old nations of Europe feel that its worn-out frame has no longer the strength to carry their future. They cross the frontiers of Europe and go to new continents to search for life. The European Powers with limited population and territory are threatened with extinction or with lapse into the position of States of the second order, when considered in comparison with such extraordinary agglomerations as the United States, if they do not themselves constitute outside of Europe their empires of the future. The only means to create an equilibrium with the United States and with Greater Britain is to create a Greater France and a Greater Germany."

We in the United Kingdom do not seek to be alone or to be first in China as a whole, or even in the Yang-tse Valley. Some English speakers have, for party reasons, asserted that we have obtained a separate and individual control of the Yang-tse Valley, which in fact has not been granted to us, and which the majority of our statesmen and of our people do not desire. What they wish is that the vast population of that region, doing already a large trade with foreign countries, and likely to do a rapidly increasing trade with them in the future, shall be accessible to the enterprise of the world. We know that we shall have in that territory the growing competition of the United States and that

of Germany, possibly also that of Japan, but we are content to take our chance, and are content also to let America, if she chooses, take the lead, or act equally with us, in insisting that the future of these territories shall not be marred by piracy, brigandage and rapacious inland taxation. The aims of Russia in the north, of Germany in one Chinese province at least, and of France in the south, are different; but the action of the United States, which has virtually arrested for the moment the selfish action on the part of France and Germany, will, if continued, be strong enough, in conjunction with our own, to check for good the process of disintegration and of division which had commenced.

Let no American hater of militarism fear that this language points to alliance in view of war. The Government of the United States is not asked by the British Government to pull chestnuts out of the fire for us, or to offend Russian customers for our benefit. The impulse on this occasion has come from Washington, and our Foreign Office, though unable to resist the national feeling here, is not enthusiastic about the American new departure which our people welcome. In the debate of the 9th of June last, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs declared that the United States were hostile to a policy of concert of the Powers at Peking in favor of reform. We have advanced since that day, for the policy which Mr. Broderick told us was repudiated is now avowed as the aim of the Republic. Resolutely keep the lead in the policy of reform; give an earnest of your desire for co-operation by offering to assist in the complete opening of the rivers to the trade of the world, and rest assured that, with less risk to peace than a policy of abstention involves, American action will be crowned with a full measure of success.

CHARLES W. DILKE.

WHY ENGLAND SHOULD STOP THE WAR.

BY JEAN DE BLOCH.

ON what reasonable grounds can England be asked to stop the war, now that its tide has turned in her favor? Would it be wise, or even moral, to leave open a question which might probably cause bloodshed again, and which can now be settled satisfactorily once for all? The present conflict was not of England's seeking. It took her statesmen and generals completely by surprise; and, for several months after the first shot was fired, she sustained a series of checks so serious that many mistook them for disaster. To retire now from the struggle before paralyzing the forces which would fain renew it, would be at once to act contrary to the instinct of self-preservation and to violate the fundamental principles of ethics. Thousands of England's bravest sons have lost their lives on the parched battle-fields of South 'Africa; scores of thousands have undergone privations and sufferings of a heart-harrowing character; and, while holocausts were being offered up to Moloch, nearly all Europe looked on with positive delight, piously desecrating the finger of a no longer inscrutable Providence in this condign chastisement of "selfish Albion." Now, however, that the Boers are losing ground, England is asked to sheathe her sword and submit the future of her African Empire to the judgment of those very people who gloried in her fancied downfall. The idea is grotesque. But even were it only altruistic, why should England be called upon to take a step which is hurtful to her vital interests—to make a sacrifice from which every other Power would most certainly recoil?

Those are the principal pleas for prosecuting the war to the bitter end which are urged by the Imperialist party in Great Britain; and their arguments are, I frankly admit, capable of being very effectively put. Indeed, so much may be truly and

tellingly said in favor of that view, that I should never dream of entering the lists to uphold the opposite one, were it not that I am so keenly conscious of the vast possibilities of the ethical side of the Anglo-Saxon character, from which have been drawn those wonder-working forces that alone could have built up the greatest Empire of history, the most perfect political fabric known to time and space. And it is to the ethical sentiment, so profound and so widespread among English-speaking peoples, that I chiefly appeal. For therein lies the strength of the race. England's best and most thriving colonies are held together and linked to the mother-country by purely moral ties, not by an army and a fleet. Canada could have seceded yesterday; Australia can separate to-morrow; yet they are to the full as loyal as the men of Kent or Northumberland. What other State has ever held colonies on this tenure? And is it wise to make a new departure and to conquer future colonists with heavy artillery and quick-firing rifles?

Even in matters of foreign policy, England stands on a higher level than any other great world Power, and for this reason much more is expected of her.

The heroic example of an appeal to arbitration under a set of conditions peculiarly galling to national self-love, and of dignified compliance with the terms of an award the details of which appeared to lend themselves to criticism, was first given by Great Britain. The occasion was the tension caused between that country and the United States of America, after the War of Secession, by the "Alabama" question. In that dispute England was assuredly in the wrong, as nations are from time to time. But she frankly owned it, which is more than any other State has ever yet done; and she consented to atone for the harm she had inflicted, which is a still more difficult feat. By this act, she informally inaugurated a system for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, which contains within it the promise of the only millennium attainable by the human race. None of the many and marvellous mechanical inventions which mark the progress of the nineteenth century will prove such a boon to civilization as this self-humiliation of an entire people in the higher interests of the whole world.

Another and much more arduous feat of political morality accomplished by Great Britain was the conclusion of peace with the Boers after the signal victory gained by the latter at Majuba

Hill. Nothing like it is known to history, nor can the heroism underlying the act be easily exaggerated. The English forces had been cut to pieces. The Boers were triumphant and hopeful. Great Britain was ready to wash out the "blot on her 'scutcheon'" in the blood of the Boers. Reinforcements were on their way to the Cape. A chance presented itself of treading out the embers of hostility which might once more burst into flame. In a word, every consideration of "honor" and self-interest seemed to call for the carrying on of the war. But the English people, choosing the better part, made peace with the enemy and transformed the struggle into an honorable competition in the domain of civilization. Magnanimity of this kind in foreign politics is seldom gauged aright and is never appreciated; if displayed in war, it is absolutely certain to be misunderstood. The magnanimity which refuses to change defeat into victory must of necessity be mistaken for weakness; and weakness, even when only fancied, is always a political danger and sometimes a material loss. Yet England could afford to neglect all such considerations of worldly wisdom, and she did so after Majuba Hill. This event constitutes the high-water mark of political morality.

But all British civilization tends in the same direction. There may be—*nay*, there must be—back eddies; the present war movement is one of them; but none the less the main current of British civilization is set steadily toward peace. The admirable attitude of Lord Pauncefote at The Hague Conference is a convincing proof of this. No other Power was more thoroughly in earnest in this matter of turning swords into ploughshares than those of the English tongue; none was willing to go further than England and the United States in the direction of arbitration. The English-speaking peoples, looking all the consequences fully in the face, declared their readiness to do the right thing, come what might; and if the work of the Conference proved ultimately less complete than it might have been, the fault certainly is not theirs. Nor are these conclusions weakened by the present war. It was neither sought for nor foreseen by the British Government; and if the latter circumstance bespeaks a lack of foresight, the former is a proof of good intentions. Belief in the possibility of a pacific settlement prevailed to the last. When the negotiations grew stagnant, some British troops were despatched to the Cape for the purpose of showing the Boers that England was in

earnest, and with the hope of expediting an agreement. The Boers, however, taking time by the forelock, declared war.

And that is by no means all that impartial spectators find to say in explanation of a war which they refuse to justify. When hostilities broke out, few people in or out of England believed very firmly in the wisdom of submitting the issues between the two States to arbitration. England's relations to the Transvaal Republic (with the Orange Free State she had had no quarrel) were from an international point of view extremely vague. The lay mind set them down as those of a suzerain to a protected Power; the trained legal intellect polished away the differences or sharpened the distinctions, but none attempted to reason away the broad, governing fact that Great Britain was invested with a right to veto all treaties made by the Transvaal Government with foreign States. And this circumstance was generally held to place the Boer Republic in a position toward Great Britain which excluded arbitration as effectually as it would have been eliminated had a dispute arisen between France and Madagascar.

Moreover, even had it been otherwise—and later on the matter did appear in a very different light—The Hague Conference could not be confidently appealed to, because the resolutions passed by that assembly had not yet been formally ratified by Great Britain. And thus for a time hostilities between the two peoples assumed the form, not of a war *en règle*, but of a rising in rebellion of quasi-subjects. Color was imparted to this view on the one hand by a certain much-discussed passage in the Speech from the Throne of Her Majesty the Queen, and on the other by the length of time allowed to elapse before the British Government officially notified to the other Powers the fact that war had been declared, and thus implicitly admitted that the Boers were on a footing of complete equality as belligerents. This recognition ruined the legal argument against arbitration. And the ratification of the resolutions of The Hague Conference which has followed since then, has destroyed the plea of inopportunity. Now, therefore, the time has come to appeal to the people of England to advance one step further in the direction of political morality. It is an interesting fact that the material interests of a people run parallel with the lines of its moral obligations; but it very seldom happens that the connection between the two is quite so visible as in the present case. England cannot compass her aims

by means of arms. War was always a clumsy, expensive and cruel means of trying issues between States and peoples. But heretofore it has been, at least generally, an efficient means of cutting, if not undoing, many a Gordian knot. At present, it has ceased to be even this, and it has become merely the embodiment of cruelty of the worst kind—a cruelty which is bereft of such redeeming features as finality could impart. The result of wars can no longer be decisive, because the defense, however numerically weak, will enjoy such an initial advantage over the attack as to be practically equal to it. Therefore, the belligerents can bleed each other *à blanc*, to the very verge of complete collapse, but neither will be able to crush the other and itself escape without vital hurt. This fact, and I venture to think that I have proved it to be the main fact in all future wars, causes the line of England's moral duty visibly to coincide with that of her material interests. I say nothing now of the future necessity of the two races living side by side in South Africa on the principle of "give and take." I pass over in silence the powerful argument against the war which the comparative statistics of births and deaths in the Transvaal supply, whence it appears that the future is to the more prolific race of the Boers. I rely solely on the fact that, weak as the Boers are numerically, they are enabled by the most modern weapons to hold their own while defending their country against invasion, and they will do so with such results as to render the entire upshot of the war utterly indecisive. If that be true, do not the material interests of England, no less than the ethical mission which Great Britain is accomplishing in the world, point to the necessity of sheathing the sword?

From the point of view of traditional politics, the present moment seems, I am well aware, extremely inopportune for an appeal to the people of England to forego the vast advantages which seem to await their army in South Africa, and to turn their thoughts peaceward. But it only seems inopportune. The surrender of General Cronje was undoubtedly a most important triumph in itself, and it also contained the promise of the very best throughout the war that British strategy can effect. But the very best that strategy, British or foreign, can accomplish in guerilla warfare is relatively very little indeed, and it was attained when the British forces entered Bloemfontein. That success was the high-water mark of the spring tide. But from the moment

the invasion of the Transvaal proper begins, and European troops venture into the heart of the South African Switzerland, every hill and hollow of which may be transformed into an impregnable fortress, the fortune of war will necessarily change once more, and the gloomy outlook of last December and January will dash high hopes and evoke dread fears anew. This is not prophecy but logic; not clairvoyance but insight. Smokeless powder, quick-firing rifles and artillery, and the scientific construction of entrenchments can be utilized by a clever people to such purpose that a determined force of defenders may successfully hold its own against an invading army eight times larger than itself.

But in the Transvaal the conditions will be exceptionally favorable to the Boers and correspondingly adverse to the British, who will forfeit even such advantages as superior artillery, tactical training and iron discipline have heretofore conferred upon them. The country is barren, and supplies must therefore be drawn from the distant base, with which a very long line of communications must be continuously kept open. The land is further rugged, hilly, abounding in narrow passes like those of Spain, Caucasus, Bosnia, the Island of Crete, which were for a long time successfully defended against armies of many thousands, most of whom now lie buried in the soil they invaded. Even if the Boers lacked the inborn shrewdness which characterizes all their military and political movements, necessity alone would compel them to break up their forces into a number of little bands, whose aim and object it would be to harass the British rear, cut off supplies and above all seriously damage the railway line or lines on which the invading army must mainly rely. Now, these objects would not be difficult of accomplishment. It needs so little in these days of destructive explosives to blow up a bridge, a station, a tunnel, and to cause an obstruction in a few minutes which cannot be repaired in less than a month! And there will be but one available railway line from base to front, so that if that can be rendered impassable, the termination of the war will have been put off indefinitely and time will have been enlisted on the side of the defenders, and time exposes England to the danger of foreign complications.

I wish it to be clearly understood that I do not for a moment suppose that the Boers will dispute every mile of territory. On the contrary, they will imitate the Russians in 1812 and retire before the invader for a time. But, as their guerilla warfare is

scientific, they will do what the Russians never did, and they will do it under favorable conditions which the subjects of Alexander I. never enjoyed. Besides the constant attacks on the rear and the frequent attempts to cut the long line of communications, which will force the British troops to split up into small parties, the Boers will judiciously choose a small number of positions on the line of the British advance, which, strong by nature, may be rendered impregnable by art. These they will fortify with all the elaborate efficiency guaranteed by modern military science. In the neighborhood they will store up the needful supplies of provisions and ammunition, and then they will calmly await the arrival of the enemy. If the Boers pitch upon one or two such strong positions in the fastnesses of the Transvaal at places which the enemy cannot possibly turn, the problem of successful defense is solved. No mere advantage in numbers such as Great Britain could secure would equalize the chances of the belligerents, and the invading army, or as much of it as survived, would find itself in a no-thoroughfare.

To many readers this forecast will seem too darkly colored to represent the probabilities of the case with fidelity. But the ordinary civilian who has never given his attention to military matters is necessarily incapable of gauging accurately the radical revolution effected in warfare by the improved weapons of to-day, and him I can only refer to my work on "The Future of War," in which all the problems of warfare in their contemporary forms are clearly formulated and exhaustively discussed. Among specialists, too, who have a right to be listened to with respect, there are some who think that my sketch of the difficulties in the way of the British army in South Africa is overdrawn. My reply to them is as follows: The *data* on which I base my judgment are facts admitted by all military experts. They are the only constant, unchanging factors of the problem, wherefore I take them, and them only, into account. In concrete warfare there are, I admit, other factors, which can never be foreseen beforehand because they are mainly accidental. These one can never allow for. Thus it is always possible that political considerations may cause a military plan of campaign to be modified or even seriously changed to the disadvantage of the belligerent altering it. This happened at the very beginning of the war, when General Buller planned the relief of Ladysmith instead of invading the Orange

Free State, and it may happen on the other side if the Boers shape their defense less in harmony with military needs and advantages than in conformity with the desire of their allies, the Orange Staters, whose motives may be wholly political. Any one of these new factors may render the most careful calculations meaningless, just as a magnetic storm may make the most accurate chronometer untrustworthy. But, in both cases, the disturbance is of a merely transitory nature, and the theory remains unaffected. It is absolutely true that the Boers can render the invasion of their country abortive.

But, over and above considerations of a material order, there are moral duties and obligations which the British race cannot afford to shirk. The vast British Empire may be aptly described as a political fabric cemented by morality, instead of being held together by the fear of fire and sword. And this marvellous creation can be maintained in the present only by the means by which it was built up in the past. The white races under the sway of the Queen are all free. If they are subjects of Her Majesty, instead of being citizens of the United States or members of a republic of their own, the reason is that this is their own will. The element of force, of coercion, is wholly absent. Is it wise, at the outset of the twentieth century, to return to the specious maxims which wrought such dire disaster when George the Third was King? I am well aware that there is another way of putting the case, and that this other formula is much more flattering to the self-love of the English people, whose enthusiasm can always be evoked by the assurance that they are fighting for equal rights. But I prefer to pay them the compliment of frank speech and undiluted truth; and I again ask, Is it wise, even politically, to drive unwilling subjects into the political penfold at the point of the sword and to create an Ireland in South Africa?

Could anything half so calamitous occur, if England, referring the issues at stake to a Court of Arbitration, were to undertake to abide by its award? Most assuredly not—not even on the supposition that the *status quo ante* were proclaimed. For even then these two propositions would be absolutely true. In South Africa, as in every other part of the globe, the higher of two competing types of civilization must inevitably oust or absorb the lower, and in this case the pastoral phasis, represented by the Boers, would necessarily and speedily disappear before the industrial imported

by the British. The second certainty is that in South Africa the hegemony will ultimately belong to that one of the two races which proves the most prolific. And this race is the Dutch. Whether the Transvaal be conquered or peace be concluded on the *status quo ante*, those two unalterable facts will have to be reckoned with, and one of these tells in favor of the British, while the other weighs on the side of the Boers.

Nor should we forget the moral effect, as widespread as it would be intense, which the peaceful solution of the struggle, even at this stage, would produce upon the world at large and the Boers in particular. It would be the death knell of Chauvinism throughout the globe and of many of the worst social evils engendered by Chauvinism and its allies—militarism, the “rage of numbers” and the lavishing of labor and money on unproductive undertakings, which, in times of peace as in times of war, constitute the most effectual barriers ever yet raised against the advance of civilization. England would command and receive the moral support of all true friends of peace and civilization throughout the world, which, little though it may seem from a material point of view, is one of those national *imponderabilia* which no people can afford to make light of. The two races could then live in peace and friendship side by side, and the Anglo-Saxon element might fully rely upon the most favorable conditions for deploying those splendid advantages in the peaceful competition for supremacy which a higher civilization, broader humanitarian views and a secular political education have bestowed.

In conclusion I would venture to direct public attention to the beneficent results which the downfall of militarism, thus inaugurated by Great Britain, would unquestionably produce in the social order of things. The nineteenth century has accomplished as much for the well-being of the masses as science effected for the mere mechanism of human comfort. It has brought forth societies for the care of the blind, for the treatment of incurables, the succor of the poor and the sick, the relief of indigent old age, the education of the young and innocent, the improvement of the depraved, the housing and healing of the insane, the curing of the habitual drunkard, the defense of the poor and the helpless—in a word, there is no domain of life in which public and private enterprise has not set itself to work with excellent effect. The result is the gradual levelling upward of the masses. But what

has heretofore been accomplished in this respect is but a raindrop to the ocean, when compared with what still remains to be done by the civilizing influences now at work.

But all those beneficent influences are paralyzed by want of the funds necessary to carry on the good work. And the funds are lacking because of the untold sums of money absorbed every year by militarism, which, like some mythical monster, lives and thrives on the life-blood of the masses. Now I ask, Is it really better to spend these millions of millions upon expedients for the speedy massacre *en masse* of men who only want to live and work for themselves and their families, than to invest them in humanizing the wild beasts of the social penfold, in relieving human sufferings and making mankind more amenable to the subtle influences of morality and art? Socialistic reformers who desire to see the taxes used in thus benefiting the entire community have been frequently scoffed at as Utopians. But which is the more fantastic scheme of the two—the spending of the money for the improvement of the masses, or its investment in the purchase of arms and ammunition for annihilating them?

Questions like these cannot be long hidden from the common people, nor until they have been rightly solved can socialistic agitation of a disquieting character be entirely suppressed. If such agitation is less to be feared in England than elsewhere, it is because heretofore England has adopted a line of action opposed to militarism and free from most of its characteristic evils. To continue the war will be to retrace her steps and follow in the wake of the military Powers of the Continent. And the attempt to maintain a great land army and the most powerful fleet in the world will bring forth curious effects not dreamt of in the philosophy of Jingoism.

Look at the question from any and every point of view, the conclusion is forced upon the unbiased outsider that England has everything to gain and nothing to lose by silencing the war trumpets and submitting the dispute to arbitration. Material interests, political prestige and moral obligations all point to one and the same line of action.

JEAN DE BLOCH.

THE ORIGIN OF THE NEGRO RACE.

BY SIR HENRY M. STANLEY.

THE indefinite extension of time which we must allow to cover the numberless migrations of families, tribes and sub-tribes from Asia to Africa, the natural overlapping of one by the other which must necessarily have occurred, and the consequent mixture of types from this and countless other causes, make it impossible to unravel the tangle of humanity that was formed in Egypt, the threshold of the Dark Continent, in the earliest ages.

Discoveries have lately been made in Egypt by Flinders Petrie, De Morgan and Amelineau, and in South Africa near the Buffalo River by Dr. Hillier, which go to prove that, though the old Egyptian kingdom may have been founded between six and seven thousand years ago, this lapse of time is but insignificant compared to that between to-day and that far-reaching date in the neolithic age when the first human family entered Egypt.

Before stating my theory as to the origin of the negro race, I should like to lead the reader in a general way from that period just preceding the legendary and historic period down to the present condition of negro types found in Africa. At the outset I frankly confess my agreement with those *savants* who give an Asiatic origin to man, because, first of all, the very earliest records, monumental or written, prove the influence of Asia on Africa, while there seems to be nothing to exhibit African influence on Asia. On the sculptures of Egyptian monuments, on the face of the Sphynx, in the features of the most ancient mummies, and in those of Egyptian wooden and stone statues, I see the Afro-Asiatic type as clearly as I see it in the faces of the fellaheen and nobles of the present day.

Down to the fifth century before Christ, Egypt was commonly believed to belong to Asia; but though since that period she has

been admitted to belong to Africa, because of her river and the land formed by it, moderns as well as the ancients have persisted in acting on the supposition that she is Asiatic. Before the later Asiatics crowded into Egypt, there was, no doubt, an earlier race which we distinguish by the term African, because we find comparatively little of that type in other continents; but it is clear that, whatever proportion of it sought refuge in the interior of Africa, enough individuals were left to make an indelible impression on the newcomers, and form a separate race, which on account of its peculiar character came to be known as Egyptian. From the time when this new race founded the kingdom, formulated its severe religion, and distinguished itself by its aloofness from other peoples, there appears to have been a perpetual struggle as to whether Asiatic or African blood should predominate; and ancient writers were as much puzzled as moderns are as to what continent the old Egyptian race was originally derived from.

Leaving the primitive African out for the present, let me say that we must go back to pre-Aryan times to find the ancestry of those early Asiatics who, entering Egypt, originated the peculiar Egyptian race. These people are commonly called Turanians, and they have been variously described as "dusky, dark, black, black-skinned, and their hair as varying from coarse, straight, black hair," to "curly," "crinkly" and "woolly." The centre of this race appears to have been in the neighborhood of Accad, where, it has been found, a King Sargon reigned about 3800, B. C.

Sixteen hundred miles to the northeast there was developed in process of time a different race altogether, of light complexion, with blue or gray eyes, and "blood brown" and light hair. It was called "Arya," which means the noble or ruling race. Finding its habitat near the Hindoo Koosh too limited, it spread itself westward over the Iranic plateau, and across the Tigris into the Euphrates Valley.

At what early date the Turanians near Accad first felt the pressure of the Aryan multitudes, history makes no mention; but when the Aryans, still expanding, reached the Indus about 2000, B. C., they found India peopled by a Turanian population. Therefore, by inference we may assume that, if the Indian peninsula from the Himalaya to the Deccan was already so well filled at 2000, B. C., Egypt, lying much nearer and smaller, must have been occupied some thousands of years previous.

In the Mahabharata, the Aryan epic written about 1500, B. C., we find earnest invocations to the gods against the Turanians, and such allusion to their appearance as to leave no doubt of their color. The gods are implored to give the Aryans power over the "black-skinned" Dasyus, the black inhabitants of Himavat (Himalaya) and the "Black Cudra of the Ganges."

We cannot dogmatize upon the true date when the Turanian centre at Accad was pierced by the Aryan wedge; but it is natural to suppose that, as the Aryans were advancing from the East, the alarmed Turanians would take the direction furthest from the pressure. By the traces they left behind them we know that some fled to Egypt and to Southern Arabia, along the shore of the Persian Gulf, and others to the Armenian mountains—the southern shore of the Black Sea toward the Caucasus on one hand and the Bosphorus on the other—and so northward to Hyperborean climes in the tracks of a still earlier type of man.

Long continued research by Egyptologists has fixed the age of Menes at about 5000, B. C., or 3000 years earlier than the Aryan descent upon India. As the consolidation of tribes into a nation would require 500 years at least, we must add about that number of years to the age of Menes to find the beginning of the people who consolidated themselves into national strength.

On the Asiatic continent there are still abundant evidences of the color of early man. In the Dravidian Hill tribes, in Eastern Assam, the Malacca peninsula, Perak, Cochin China, the Andaman, Sandal and Nicobar Islands, we find from a host of authorities that it was black, and that some of the people had decidedly woolly hair, others kinky or frizzly hair, others straight and coal black. A still earlier man may be represented by the Negrillos—the Ainus, the Esquimaux and the Lapps.

On the African continent may be found their congeners in the pure negroes and the pigmies.

Logan, a prolific writer upon Asiatic ethnology, appears to be convinced that early man's first home was in Africa. Sir Wm. Flower believed that he originated in Southern India and, spreading east and west, peopled Melanesia and Africa. Allen derived the African negroes from Asia. Professor Seeley claimed that the negro race occupied a belt of land extending from Africa to Melanesia, which has since been submerged. De Quatrefages' theory was that man originated in tertiary times in Northern Asia,

that the glacial period caused a great migration, but that the greatest mass of primitive humanity grouped itself in the Central Asiatic highlands, whence the three fundamental types, physical and linguistic, arose. The black race, he thought, appeared first in Southern Asia between the highlands and the sea.

The earliest writers, such as Herodotus, Aristotle, Pliny and Pomponius Mela mention the countries which were peopled by the Asiatic blacks. Thus, at the eastern extremity of the Black Sea, Herodotus relates that he found the Colchians were "black-skinned," with "woolly black hair," and conjectured therefrom that they were of an Egyptian race. By inference we learn that the Egyptians or some of them were of that type, "black and woolly haired," but, in his description of the troops under the Persian banner, he draws a distinction between the Eastern and Western Ethiopians. The first, he says, had "straight, black hair," while that of the latter was "quite woolly."

When the Aryans finally extended their conquests to Egypt, we may reasonably suppose that, however few or many of the primitive people had already started on their wanderings into unknown Africa, the shock of the Aryan advent must have then given those remaining a stronger impulse to scatter inland. It is clear from the tributes illustrated on the Theban monuments, that some of these fugitives from Egypt had prospered in the African interior; and it is just as clear from the brilliancy of their painted portraits in the tombs near Karnak, that the prisoners brought from Inner Africa resembled the average brown and black woolly-haired African of to-day. As early at 2500, B. C., Sankhara invaded Ophir and Punt (Somali Land) and brought much booty therefrom. In 2400, B. C., Osirtasen I. repeated the expedition. In 1600, B. C., Thothmes III. returned victorious from Punt; and in 1322, B. C., the great Sesostriis inscribed his exploits in Ethiopia on the monuments. The Ethiopians built cities of renown, and grew into a proud and conquering nation, having at an early period found that across the Red Sea their Turanian congeners were settled in Southern Arabia, with whom they established a valuable trade. The ruins of Meroë, their ancient capital, between Berber and Khartoum, rival those of Egypt. The effect of these on Diodorus was such that he ascribed to the Ethiopians the origin of Egyptian religion and art! A prince of Ethiopia—the famous Memnon—lent aid to Troy in the

thirteenth century before Christ. An army under Shishak, of Ethiopia, invaded Palestine with 1,200 chariots and 60,000 horsemen. Zerah, an Ethiopian, had started to fight Asa, King of Judah, with "a thousand thousand" men. Tirhakah, the "Melek Cush," King of the Ethiopians, defeated Sennacherib.

In the reign of Psammetichus I., successor of Tirhakah, 240,000 Egyptian soldiers affronted by their king emigrated to Ethiopia and were allotted lands in the region of the Automolii, probably near the modern Senaar. Until the seventh century, A. D., Ethiopia experienced the ups and downs of Egypt; but at this period the fanatic Arabs, unable to conquer the people of Abyssinia (Ethiopia), succeeded in isolating them, with the rest of the African continent to the south, from the civilized world.

It will thus be seen that another barrier, no less rigid and strong than the first, was raised against the African race.

The severe and exclusive Egyptians by their occupation of Egypt had blocked the return of the primitive settlers in Africa, at the northeastern end; the 1,500-mile wide Sahara and the Mediterranean Sea prevented communication with the progressive nations of Europe; the Atlantic and Indian Oceans separated them from all mankind on the west, south and east. The Straits of Babel Mandeb had, however, afforded Ethiopia means of communication with the people of Arabia, the Sabæans and the Jews, and the Ethiopians had profited in culture and wealth; but the fanatical Arabs closed even this passage to the outside world.

This is what makes Africa the best place in which to study primitive man, as he must have been in Asia, Europe and America, before history was conceived.

It is only, in fact, within the last thirty years that civilization can be said to have obtained a sure footing in the interior, and that we have been enabled to take note of the effects of certainly 7,000 years of in-breeding, consequent upon the long segregation of the black people within their impassable boundaries.

To-day, the descendants of the primitive Africans are to be found south of the twentieth degree of north latitude; and, despite the thousands of years during which they have been imprisoned within the continent, they have retained in a remarkable degree the physical characteristics of their primeval progenitors. The dwarfish tribes who captured the five Nasamonian explorers in the fifth century, B. C., near the Niger, are still represented by

the pigmy Wambutti and the Akkas of the Congo forest, the Batwa of the Central Congo plains, the Akoas and Obongos of the Gaboon, and the Bushmen of South Africa.

What the pigmies' average height may have originally been it is difficult to state; but, by comparing the old Egyptian sculpture of a pigmy as he stands by an ordinary man of the past with a photograph of a modern pigmy and a modern man of the average height, it does not appear that the pigmy has improved in stature. The circumstances of his surroundings are much the same to-day as they must have been in the past. He is still the wild, shy man of the woods or desert, as he is represented to have been in the times of his earliest discoverers. He lives the same precarious existence, in earth burrows, or diminutive huts, preying on insects, ground game and mud fish, or on what he can steal from his taller neighbors. In central or southern Africa his presence has been a nuisance to the tillers of the soil, as well as to shepherds and herdsmen, and it has been resented continually, and prompt vengeance taken on him for his depredations. While his neighborhood has affected some of the taller tribes, as we may see in the dwarfish individuals found among them, his tribe seems not to have been affected at all; from which we may infer that when his sisters were made captive they met different treatment from that which he dealt to his captives. Here and there among the East and West Coast tribes, we meet with traces of a long residence of the pigmies near them. To-day the pigmies may not be found within hundreds of miles of them, but the clayey complexion, tufted hair and low stature are unmistakable proofs that at one time female pigmies have cohabited with males of the taller race.

The pure negroes are in a great majority over all other races in Africa, and are almost as much scattered over the continent as we believe the Turanians were over the world; but, wherever located, they are easily recognizable among their colored congeners.

That the reader may not be wearied with African names, it is best to divide Africa into divisions.

The first, beginning from the west, includes the Niger basin and its outskirts. The most prominent peoples in it are the Haussa, Yorubas, Fantis, Mandingoes, Wangara, Kanuri and Baghermis. These generally are of average height, but vary greatly in complexion, from dead black to dingy yellow. The darker are more often found along the coast, those on the desert

border are much mixed with Berbers and Afro-Semites from the east. The masses in the interior, though distinctly negro in complexion and physical character, possess considerable aptitudes for progress, as if long ago a higher race had impregnated them.

The second division comprises all that vast territory extending to the Nile from the fifteenth degree of east longitude, and southerly along the line of Nile waters and westward of the lake region down to the Zambesi River. The best known of these tribes are the Shilluks, Dinkas, Nuba, Niam-Niam, Mabodé, Azangé, Baris and the Congo tribes, such as the Manyema, Bakongo, Bateke, By-yanzi, Balunda, Balua and the Zambesi-Marotse, and others. In this division, the number of sub-tribes is immense. Except on the Nile shores, scarcely any of these tribes would be called black by an expert in African color, but rather a varying brown, between a light bronze and a brown verging on blackness. They are all, however, pure negro in type and are probably the finest specimens of unmixed negro humanity in Africa, being well developed and of great muscular strength. Few of these peoples in the central region have shown such advance in native manufactures as may be seen in Nigeria, but capacity for improvement is evinced by the beautiful brass and iron ornaments and weapons of the Mabodé and By-yanzi, by the hut architecture and domestic utensils of the Monbuttu, the grass cloths of the Bateke and the trading shrewdness and enterprise of the By-yanzi.

If we proceed now to the eastern division, which stretches from the Jub River to the Limpopo, and take a depth inland of about 300 miles, we find another set of negro tribes remarkably like those met in the second division, of good height, well set, and admirably muscular. Where the land is low, as in the immediate hinterland, the climate is hot and moist and the tribes are of a livid black, but immediately the highlands are reached the complexion lightens and the physique of the people improves. Many of the children, as in Ugogo and Unyamwezi, are almost fair in comparison with their parents. Nearer the coast land, many individuals among the tribes exhibit the effect of contact with a low-statured race.

The eastern sea fringe is occupied by a very mixed race, wherein may be traced repeated blendings with migrants from foreign stocks. It requires no great discernment to perceive that the indigenous peoples have freely mixed with Somalis, Gallas, Abyssinians, Arabs, East Indians and perhaps Jews, Sabæans and

Phoenicians. The complexion of the people is of all shades from deep black to light olive, and the hair also proves the effects of foreign blood, though, as the foreigners were not in such numbers as to form a permanent race, there is a continued tendency toward reversion.

The most interesting division is the eastern central, which lies between the lakes and the eastern division; because, without doubt, it marks the highway of the warrior tribes which advanced in repeated waves toward the south, absorbed whole tribes of the autochthonous peoples blended with them, and formed a superior and victorious negroid race. It is easy to trace the march of this race through the ordinary negro tribes, by the physical superiority, the taller stature, the courage, discipline, organization and warring propensities of its descendants. The traditions of the natives also guide us as to the direction whence their ancestors came.

In my opinion, two streams of migrants flowed from the base of the Abyssinian Mountains—one from the direction of Senaar and Fazogl, and the other from Shoa. On approaching the Victoria Nile, the first crossed into Unyoro, and thence south between the lakes; the second advanced by way of Turkan and Kavirondo and overspread what is called the Great Rift Valley. It is clear that the first stream was the largest, because all trace of the second seems to be lost about the sixth degree of south latitude, while the course of the other is perceptible among the Kafirs at the Cape and the Zulus of Natal.

Before the conquering march of this host, the primitive peoples fled into the places of refuge which lay on either side of the route, such as the islands in the lakes, the higher slopes of Ruwenzori, and Mfumbiro mountains, the Congo forest, and other out-of-the-way resorts. It is among the descendants of these refugees that one may find customs and habits reminding us of the fish-eaters (the Ichthyophagi), the "Cave Dwellers," and the nomadic "Blemmyes" of Arabia. These tribes are always subordinate to the descendants of the conquerors who settled and occupied the lands, and who are to-day known as Wanyoro, Waganda, Wanyambu, Waha, Wafipa, Wangoni, Matabele, Zulu, etc.

Some of these are more negroid than others. They all have the woolly hair and many among them are as negroid in feature as the purest negro; but the majority still retain points in their physiognomies which stamp them as descendants of the old Ethi-

opian stock, which has fertilized this belt of African humanity.

The Wanyambu further south than the Waganda, and the Wanyankori also, exhibit as close an affinity with the Abyssinians as the Wanyoro. In their lengthy limbs and their slender build, as well as in their refined features and small hands, they prove their descent. Among various tribes further south, such as the Wakaranga and Wanyamwezi, the Watusi herdsmen again maintain the tradition; and, though surrounded by powerful negro tribes, they refuse to be contaminated by intermarriage with them, and strike the traveller at once by their tall, slender, elegant figures, expressive eyes and delicate features. But for the hair, they might be taken for a tribe of Bishari lately imported into this region.

As we proceed south, we enter a region where the negro blood and type predominate, but a few hundred miles beyond it we pick up the trail of the Ethiopian again in the Wangoni country, only to lose it, however, beyond their boundary. Across the Zambesi in the Matabele country, we recognize the type once more, and behold the familiar features of Waha, Wakeréwé and Waganda, whenever an Indaba is held. Beyond the Matabele are the Zulus, who resemble very strongly the best class of Waganda.

In Cape Colony, the extremity of Africa, where humanity has whirled about considerably and formed curious mixtures, we see the Hottentots, Griquas, Namaquas and Korannas, a type formed by the average negro blended with the primitive "earth diggers" or Bushmen, when the Bushmen were not so few or so much despised as they are to-day. This breed is not so tall as the negro of the central regions, nor so dwarfish as the Bushmen. They have the clayey complexion and high cheek bones of the latter, as well as their tufted hair, but the muscular development and build of the true negro.

As regards North Africa, it is unnecessary to go into details respecting the Berber stock, which is the ancient "Barberi" of the Romans. The basic stock was, no doubt, that which peopled Egypt in the pre-historic age; but as its area was much larger, and as it formed itself into several independent tribes and nations, it was more exposed to the influence of the many European and Asiatic nations which in the course of time formed colonies, of which Dido's colony is an example. Among them, Greeks, Phoenicians, Goths, Gauls, Romans, Celtiberians, Arabs, Jews, French and Spaniards have left their traces freely on the mass of

the peoples now found there, while the negro blood has not been wanting to give color and picturesqueness to their physiognomies.

Darwin says in his "Descent of Man:" "Although the existing races of men differ in many respects, as in color, hair, shape of skull, proportions of the body, etc., yet, if their whole organization be taken into consideration, they are found to resemble each other closely in a multitude of points."

No traveller who has penetrated Africa, with an open mind, can refrain from agreeing with this. I have endeavored to show the effects on the Africans of more than 7,000 years of in-breeding, to which they were compelled by their peculiar environments, and the rigid natural and artificial barriers raised against them, by which the original type of African has been perpetuated by repetition. When this fact first dawns on the traveller, he is moved by an emotion as great as that which affects him when gazing on the mummy of Sesostris after it lay entombed for thirty-three centuries. He has viewed the physiognomies of his own pre-historic ancestors, who occupied Asia hundreds of centuries before Menes and Ninus existed; and if he has been led by his thought to trace the fortunes of those pre-historic dark men, conquerors of the African, who elected to wander through Asia and Europe, he will begin to realize what his own cave-dwelling ancestry, who were contemporaries of the mammoth and the lion, were like.

There is no need to seek for traces of a submerged continent to locate the home of the first woolly-haired negro, or the clay-colored Bushmen and darker pigmy. Asia is of sufficient amplitude, provided we allow time enough and take into consideration its varieties of climate, for the strange divergences in the human races to have taken place within it. The continent that exhibits the almond-eyed Mongolian, the blue-eyed Circassian, the deep, black Gondas and Bhillas, the dark Paharias, the dwarfish Aeta, the hook-nosed Jew, and the short-nosed Tartar, could surely, in the very earliest ages of man, have produced such contrasts as the woolly-haired negro, and the silken-haired Aryan. But in all my travels I have seen nothing more wonderful than this, that, in whatever disguise I have found man, something in him seems to justify the belief that "we are all the children of one Father."

HENRY M. STANLEY.

SCIENCE AND THE GOVERNMENT.

BY PROFESSOR SIMON NEWCOMB, LL.D., UNITED STATES NAVY.

It has sometimes been said that no other Government has so large and able a body of scientific experts in its employ as ours. To discuss in an exhaustive way the correctness of this statement would require a careful study of the systems adopted by other countries, especially France and Germany, in the administration of their public works. We should be met at the outset by the question whether the graduates of the Government technical schools of France and the men employed in Germany on public works of various kinds are to be included in the comparison. Whatever conclusion we might reach on this point, it may be conceded that no Government is more alive than our own to the public advantages which accrue from the applications of science to the arts of life, or has adopted a broader and wiser policy in promoting such applications.

Granting all this, there is a converse proposition on which it is not easy to reach an equally satisfactory conclusion. Notwithstanding the liberality of our policy in promoting scientific research, there is no Government less alive than our own to the advantages which it might derive from the advice and assistance of that large body of scientific experts who are not in Government employ. We fail to recognize the fact that questions of great practical importance are continually arising which cannot be dealt with in the most satisfactory way by the organized machinery of a Government bureau.

Our failure in this respect can be best seen by contrasting it with a class of cases in which nothing can be said against our wisdom in dealing with them. From time to time important questions of public and international law arise in which the best legal talent that the Government can command is necessary to the protection of its interests. In such cases we never hesitate to go outside the public service and call for assistance upon the

ablest jurists of the country. We no more than any other Government would have thought of conducting our cases before courts of arbitration without calling in some addition to the ordinary machinery of our Department of Justice.

The same exigency arises in the application of scientific method to the administration of those great public works which the development of our country constantly imposes upon the general Government. Here is required, from time to time, a knowledge of details which we cannot always expect to be at the command of a Government officer, no matter what may be his qualifications. The question then arises, where and how we shall obtain the results of the widest knowledge and the latest researches.

The reasons why the knowledge and experience of a Government officer are not always adequate to the problems which may come before him are obvious. Whatever his abilities, he is in some sort a subordinate, and the general ideas of discipline inseparable from the public service impede his action and prevent his full responsibility from being publicly recognized. He always has a chief who, in the eye of the law, is the really responsible head to whom the Executive and Congress look for authoritative views. As a general rule the scientific official is nearly, or quite, unknown as an exponent of those views. His proper functions are to do what he is told, to apply his experience to the case before him, and to give his chief the benefit of his attainments. If his opinions happen, for the moment, to be opposed to the popular view, he may get himself or his chief into difficulty by trying to give them effect. The larger the measure of worldly wisdom with which nature has endowed him, the feebler will be his attempts to become a factor in directing the policy of the department with which he is connected. In any case, his studies are likely to be confined to the limited field embraced in the round of his official duties; and thus it may happen that, how great soever his influence, he will not always be the best counsellor on questions lying outside the routine of those duties. Such being the case, why should not the Government call upon the best scientific talent of the country for advice and assistance just as it calls upon the best legal talent when need arises for it?

One answer is not far to seek. The men of the highest judicial

talent are publicly well known and easy to reach. No one in authority has any serious difficulty in learning who they are. But the public knows little of the standing of professors in the scientific world, or of the nature of the questions with which they are conversant. The result is that, if the system of calling in such men were adopted, any professor of chemistry of sufficiently good address, especially one who was accustomed to appearing before courts of law as an expert, might be called in as the best chemist, and any fine old gentleman who had published a brilliant essay on a new theory of the universe might be selected as an astronomer. In this respect other Governments are probably no better off than our own. It is said that some fifty years ago the British Admiralty had printed a few copies of an important work for presentation to some foreigners who, from their prominence in the scientific world, were best entitled to be honored with the gift. Professor Airy, the Astronomer Royal, was requested to make a selection of the names. A few days after he had sent in his list he was informed by the Secretary of the Admiralty that "my lords" were struck by the number of unknown names included; and that they wished to make an inquiry on the subject. Airy asked the Secretary for some specifications as to the names referred to.

"Well, as an example," said the Secretary, "here is the name of Professor C. F. Gauss, of Göttingen. Who is he?"

"Gauss is one of the greatest mathematicians of the age, and stands among the two or three most eminent masters in physical astronomy now living. Who else do you wish to know about?"

"No one else; that will do," replied the Secretary.

It is the principal object of the present paper to show that this difficulty, formidable though it may appear at a distance, vanishes when we come to grapple with it. In every civilized country there are organized bodies of men of science and learning, at least one of which is recognized as having a national character. The importance which has been played by these bodies in the progress of the age cannot be overestimated. Modern science, properly so called, commenced with the foundation of the Academy of Sciences of France by Colbert, and the charter of the Royal Society of London by King Charles II. In the beginning the organizers of these societies had no distinctly utilitarian end in view. They were moved only by an enlightened appre-

ciation of the lustre that would be thrown upon their respective countries by the progress of science and learning. We cannot suppose that they had any anticipation of what the measures they adopted would lead to in future generations. The benefits of attrition between men of like and yet slightly diverse minds were doubtless appreciated, but could not have been estimated at their full value. As we may trace back a race of animals to its progenitors, so may we trace all our applications of electricity and heat to the men who, in France, England and Italy, came together for mutual help and sympathy in the study of nature during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

From the beginning these men were animated by an *esprit de corps* of which the world at large has taken little account, but which has been an important factor in the result. One who by long and patient study discovers truths that seem to him interesting and important, is naturally desirous of making them known to his fellow-men without respect to any personal advantage that might accrue to himself. Disinterestedness of motive has been the pivot on which the policy of the bodies in question has very generally turned. In the beginning the French Academy adopted a regulation prohibiting its members from using for their personal advantages discoveries made with the co-operation of the Academy. Although other societies have not gone so far as this, their general policy has wisely been directed to the general enlightenment of mankind and the promotion of its best interests, rather than to that of the personal interests of its members.

One of the most striking features of this spirit during the two centuries in question has been the separation of the functions of the investigator and discoverer from those of the inventor. The Galileos, Newtons, Herschels and Faradays of science; the men but for whom the nineteenth century would have been like the eighteenth, and that, like the seventeenth, did not reap or attempt to reap any pecuniary advantage from their works. While they may not have gone so far as the eminent mathematician who is said to have thanked Heaven that he cultivated a science that could not be prostituted to any useful purpose, it is certain that they were quite willing to leave to others the functions of determining in what way their discoveries could be applied to practical ends. This policy was essential to the highest success of their work. If they had not been guided by it; if they had always

been on the alert for discovering something admitting of practical application, their work would have been wanting in that breadth and fulness which was necessary to its ultimate usefulness. Many a pearl now of great price would have been thrown into the dust heap because the finder would not have seen its value. What prospect could Volta and Galvani have seen of benefits being derived from their experiments on the movements of the legs of a frog when certain metals were brought into contact with the muscles of these animals?

In pointing out the value of the work of the investigator we by no means belittle the functions of the inventor. The world justly holds in honorable remembrance the names of the men who have applied to practical uses the discoveries made by the investigators. Their functions were clearly necessary to the result. The pecuniary rewards which they reaped were so small when compared with the good they have done that a mathematician might rank them among the infinitesimal quantities. Yet, we should not forget that the Watts, the Stephenson and the Morses never made any addition to our knowledge of the laws of heat, steam or electricity. What they did was to take the knowledge gained by others and apply it to practical uses. We cannot say that they have got more than their due share of public credit, but we may fairly say that the public has not always been sufficiently alive to the very different functions of the class of men who form the scientific academies and societies of the world.

It is perhaps from a consciousness of the distinction between these two classes that the world has always refused to award its highest appreciation to mere utility. Witness the very different estimation in which we hold the useful negro and the useless Indian. The sentiment of reverence for pure philosophy was even stronger in early ages than at the present time. The contempt of the ancient philosophers for useful applications of knowledge was none too strongly expressed by the sentiment of the mathematician whom we have quoted. The encouragement given to men of science and learning by the founders of the national scientific societies of Europe was based much more upon a consciousness of the honor that they would do to their respective countries than on any hope of useful results from their labors. At the same time it was evident that these men might be of great benefit to the State. The latter had from time to time

serious need of broader views than those commonly taken by professional inventors. And thus Governments fell into the habit of consulting the members of their academies, either individually or collectively, on all questions in which their knowledge would be of benefit to the State.

One object of the present paper is to review what our Government has done in this direction. Its course has not been marked by any lack of appreciation either of the practical or æsthetic value of scientific research. Its policy in supporting scientific bureaus and promoting their work has perhaps been broader and more liberal than that of any other Government. It has never counted the mere dollars and cents of income and outgo in estimating the value of knowledge. It has clearly seen that possible permanent benefits to future generations, the value of which could not be estimated at the present time, must be taken into consideration.

What it has wanted is a knowledge of the best method of promoting the application of scientific principles to public works. It has relied too much upon its own officers and employees, and does not appreciate the advantages to be derived from associations like the Paris Academy and Royal Society of London. Abstractly every one knows that the question whether a ship shall be safely navigated to her port or be cast away on the rocks may turn upon the presence or absence of a very little knowledge on the part of her captain. But the public does not perceive that the same thing is true at every step which we take in the development of our resources. Cases are frequently arising in which the ordinary routine of Government work cannot be relied upon to secure the best results.

A single illustration from contemporary history will show what I mean better than generalities. In 1882 Congress made an appropriation for improving the water supply of Washington by extending an aqueduct under the city. It entrusted the entire work to its officers. The latter knew that under the soil on which the city was erected there existed a layer of solid rock, of sufficient hardness and consistency to serve for the walls of the proposed aqueduct. Accordingly the latter was hewn at a great depth through the rock and carried to a reservoir several miles away.

Nothing could be said against the professional capacity of the

engineers who conceived and executed this plan. They carried on the work with that economy and on those sound business principles which characterize the operations of our Government engineers. They knew everything that an engineer could reasonably be expected to know. Yet they did not know that the rock through which they were hewing their aqueduct, firm though it appeared on inspection, would ultimately disintegrate under the action of water. The inevitable result would be that, in a few months or a few years, the rock in which the aqueduct was cut would be reduced to a mass of sand.

Had the Government been in the habit of consulting scientific experts who were not professional engineers, on every question of science that might arise, this knowledge would have been gained before the aqueduct was projected. The liability of some hard and solid rocks to disintegrate is well known to geologists. The services of one of these men would have cost little, and a very little study would have brought out the fact that the rock in question was of this class. For want of this study a large sum, perhaps a million of dollars or more, has been wasted on the work, and now, after the lapse of seventeen years, it is uncertain whether the aqueduct will ever be made use of.

We cannot say that the doings of our Government have uniformly been of this unsatisfactory character. When the Civil War burst upon us, the need of supplementing the professional attainments of Government officers by those of scientific men whose services were at command led to the formation of a scientific commission, to which various questions were from time to time referred. The organization of this commission was, we believe, somewhat informal. Indeed, we do not know to what extent it has been recognized in the history of the war. Among its members were Professor A. D. Bache, Superintendent of the Coast Survey; Professor Joseph Henry, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and Rear-Admiral C. H. Davis, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau of Navigation in the Navy Department. The usefulness of the commission suggested its being enlarged into a permanent organization similar to the academies of science of Europe. Thus arose our National Academy of Sciences, which was chartered by act of Congress in 1863. Its membership was at first limited to fifty; but the restriction of numbers was repealed by a supplementary act of Congress. The Academy was

required to hold an annual meeting at such place in the United States as might be designated, and, whenever called upon by any department of the Government, to "investigate, examine, experiment and report upon any subject of science or art." The actual expense of the work performed was to be paid by the Government, but the Academy was to receive no compensation whatever for any services thus rendered.

This body labors under the great disadvantage of having its membership scattered over the entire country instead of being concentrated at the Capital, as is the case with the national academies of Europe. It is true that in England the fellows of the Royal Society reside in every part of Great Britain; but the great bulk of the membership is found in London and its immediate neighborhood. Still, our Academy has done enough for the Government to demonstrate the great value of its services. Twice in its history it has been called into council on questions of capital importance. One of these questions concerned the surveys of the public domain; the other the proper measures to be taken for the preservation of our forests. It will take but a cursory glance at these two questions to show the weak points in our system which such a body is needed to strengthen.

Explorations of our territories, carried on by parties which may be designated as semi-official, have been undertaken through the whole period of our national history. Such enterprises were formerly directed to some particular regions, or toward the attainment of some special end, and had no permanence in their organization. The explorer completed his journey and returned home to report what he had seen and learned.

About thirty years ago surveys and explorations having a greater or less permanence of character began to be undertaken. Among these enterprises the survey of Professor F. V. Hayden soon became the best known. The head of the survey combined a respectable position in the scientific world with tireless energy and great enthusiasm. He spent his summers in work in the field and his winters in rousing Congress to a sense of the importance of what he was doing and of the desirableness of larger appropriations for his work. He was so successful in these efforts that his organization grew apace and soon developed into the Geological Survey of the Territories.

Contemporaneously with this survey grew up another, under

the War Department. The latter needed a survey specially prosecuted for military purposes. In some features it was necessarily different from a purely geological survey. At the same time it was very evident that a party executing a survey for military purposes could very easily include in its scope all the requirements for a complete geographical and geological exploration. Congress responded to an appeal on this basis, as it did to the appeals of Hayden, and thus arose the Geographical Survey of the Territories, which was carried on by the Chief of Engineers of the Army, under the personal direction of Lieutenant Wheeler.

Besides these two permanent surveys, others somewhat temporary in character were executed. One was that of Clarence King, which was confined to the region near the fortieth parallel. Another was that of Major J. W. Powell, which was specially devoted to the great Cañon of the Colorado. The field-work of this survey was speedily completed, but the preparation and publication of the results extended through several years.

Leaving out of consideration these more or less temporary enterprises, we had the curious spectacle of the Government supporting two independent surveys of the same region for almost the same purpose, neither of which had any official knowledge of the work of the other. Both were vigorously engaged in making a map of Colorado; both mapped down the lines of communication, the one for military purposes, the other for civil purposes. We can hardly suppose that there was any great and essential difference between the two. Both had the requirements of agriculture and the investigation of the mineral resources in view. The two parties sometimes mounted their theodolites on the same mountains, triangulated the same regions, came to Washington in the winter, prepared maps showing the progress of their work in the same region, and submitted them to Congress in support of increased grants of money. The Hayden Survey finally had the pleasure of publishing a complete atlas of Colorado, and the Wheeler Survey of issuing a number of maps of the same territory about the same time. Both were proceeding with undiminished vigor to extend their work over other territories.

It would not be just to say that this state of things illustrated the incapacity of Congress to deal with a disputed administrative question. We cannot suppose that Congress failed to see the difficulty and was not fully capable of grappling with it. What it

really illustrates is the repugnance of Congress to the adoption of decisive measures of any sort for the settlement of a disputed administrative question. Infant bureaus are its infant children. They may quarrel with each other and eat up the paternal substance; but the parent cannot make up his mind to starve them outright. They must be fed and nurtured with the hope that, at some time in the distant future, they will grow so wise as to live together in harmony.

But in the present case, as the years passed away, there was no prospect of such a happy consummation, even in the remote future. Both surveys were determined to carry through their entire work. The one unofficially reviled the political methods of the other; the latter retorted with equally unofficial reflections on the scientific incapacity of its rival. If one showed finer maps, the other showed how economical it was to get up a less artistic map.

Various attempts were made to devise some plan of reconciliation or some system by which the two surveys should not duplicate each other's work. But it does not seem that anything came of these efforts. Then it was that Mr. A. S. Hewitt, of New York, a member of the Committee on Appropriations, be-thought himself that the Government had at its command a body which could deal with the question in an intelligent way, without being affected by parental sympathy for either infant. This was the National Academy of Sciences. The committee accepted his view, and, in accordance therewith, a clause was inserted in the Sundry Civil Bill of June 30, 1878, requiring the Academy at its next meeting to take the matter into consideration, and "report to Congress as soon thereafter as may be practicable, a plan for surveying and mapping the territory of the United States on such general system as will, in their judgment, secure the best results at the least possible cost."

Several of the older and more conservative members of the Academy held that the proposed report did not come within the proper sphere of that body. The question of a plan for surveying the territories of the United States, it was claimed, was not one of either literature, science or art, but of public administration, which it was the duty of Congress to deal with. Referring such a question to the Academy was drawing the latter into the arena of political discussion to an extent that would be detri-

mental to its future standing and usefulness. But it was quite evident, on the other hand, that the Academy, a creature of Congress, could not well join issue with the latter on the question of its proper functions. Moreover, an opportunity of rendering a great service to the Government should not be lost for so slight a reason. The membership included not only men connected with both surveys, but many others acquainted with every aspect of the case, and able to take a broad view of the whole question.

As might have been expected under the circumstances, the report of the committee was radical, drastic and comprehensive. - All the work of surveying and mapping the territories was considered as a whole; and it was to be prosecuted under a single department. The co-operating bureaus would thus be placed in close communication with each other, and their proper limits defined by superior authority. The interior work of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, the Geological and Geographical Survey of the Territories, the surveys of the Land Office, and the preparation of maps of the whole region were all to be carried out as parts of one and the same general plan.

Such a proposal was too radical to receive the immediate and unqualified assent of Congress. The most powerful and active opposition came from the Surveyors-General of the Land Office, who succeeded in having their own department dropped from the scheme. The Coast and Geodetic Survey, while raising no strong objection to the change, did not actively favor it. From a purely official point of view the army survey made the most vigorous fight against extinction. But it was unsuccessful, and the two rival surveys were both wiped out and replaced by the Geological Survey of the public domain.

If the success of an organization is to be measured by the amount of public support which it has received; by the constant extension of its work and influence, and by the gradual dying out of all opposition, then must the plan be considered a brilliant success. In this connection it must be remarked that the Academy is in no way responsible for the extension of the Geological Survey into the States. Its plan was in terms limited to the national domain. The membership of the Academy was so cautious and conservative that it may well be doubted whether a plan for extending the survey into the States would have met with its approval. Whatever view we may entertain on this question, it

is certain that the extension by Congress, on its own motion, of the plan devised by the Academy cannot be regarded as anything but a compliment to the work of this body.

A question of even greater importance than that of surveying the public domain is that of the administration of the forest land under control of the general Government. Our forest administration is principally under control of the Interior Department. Heads of that department have long met with insuperable difficulty in protecting the public interests vested in the forests against the encroachment of private parties. Mining companies, ostensibly cutting timber for their use, were really lumber companies selling it for their own private purposes. Pretended settlers entitled to the use of the timber were really the agents of corporations. Regulations for the protection of the forests against depredation were found incapable of enforcement. These depredations increased with the growth of population, until, a few years ago, we were confronted with the prospect of the entire destruction of all the timber worth cutting from the public lands.

In 1896 Secretary Hoke Smith called upon the National Academy of Sciences for a report on the subject. In his letter to the President of the Academy he said:

"My predecessors in office for the last twenty years have vainly called attention to the inadequacy and confusion of existing laws relating to the public timber lands and consequent absence of an intelligent policy in their administration, resulting in such conditions as may, if not speedily stopped, prevent a proper development of a large portion of our country; and because the evil grows more and more as the years go by, I am impelled to emphasize the importance of the question by calling upon you for the opinion and advice of that body of scientists which is officially empowered to act in such cases as this."

The Academy commission devoted more than a year to an extensive investigation of the whole subject. Its report included not only a study of the conditions in our own country, but of the policies adopted by foreign countries, especially Germany, and their results. But no sooner did Congress begin to act on the report by enacting the legislation recommended in it, than its conclusions were violently attacked. Such a result was both right and natural. For the same reason that the Anglo-Saxon race find it wise that the conclusions of one legislative body should

be independently examined and reviewed by a second, it is always fitting that any proposals on so complicated a question as this should be put to the test of the closest examination and criticism before being accepted. The question whether the criticisms originated with men who were profiting by the lax system in vogue might well arise, but need not be considered.

In the discussion which followed, the interests of the public were at a disadvantage. The assailants wielded great political power in their respective States. They had against them only the moral force behind a report made by men of the highest authority, who had no personal end in view. For a time it seemed as if they would be successful and the Academy would suffer rather than gain in the opinion of the Government by the report it had made. But the moral force behind the report was such that, in the long run, some of the severest critics saw their error, and the most essential features of the plan were carried into effect by legislation and executive action. The Interior Department, the Geological Survey and the Department of Agriculture are all prosecuting different branches of the work with harmony and success, a consummation in strong contrast with the state of things which formerly prevailed.

The need of such expert knowledge as can be supplied by men who are foremost in every branch of research is one that must constantly grow with the complexity of the problems that face our Government. The problems associated with the initiation of new public works, especially those which involve the application of some new principle, the administration of the national domain, irrigation and the public health are examples. The smallness of the money cost of such knowledge is perhaps one reason why its importance is overlooked. We naturally are inclined to measure value by cost. It would not be surprising if the sums expended a few years ago in bombarding the sky to bring down rain should far exceed the annual average cost of all the expert assistance the Government would ever need for a generation to come.

SIMON NEWCOMB.

THE GENESIS OF "AMERICANISM."

BY J. ST. CLAIR ETHERIDGE.

THE NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for March contained an article from the pen of Mgr. Péchenard, the rector of the Catholic University of Paris, on "The End of Americanism in France." Those who have read with interest this *oraison funèbre* will desire to hear the story of the genesis of Americanism; for, as Mgr. Péchenard remarks, "Americanism has had a history." Such a supplement to an article on the passing of the newest heresy is needful; for, even at this late date, the people of America know little or nothing about a movement which is regarded as one of the most deplorable incidents in the history of the Catholic Church in recent times. The literature of Americanism is almost entirely in a foreign language, and Americanism itself was unheard of in the United States until the moment when the news of its condemnation was cabled from Rome.

To the term "Americanism" two widely different meanings have been attached—one political, the other religious. Political Americanism was first brought into prominence forty years ago by Father Hecker, the founder of the Paulist Congregation. It maintains that Catholics accept with the fullest frankness and loyalty the Constitution of the United States as suited in every way to the Church in America, and also that the principles which the Church stands for are of vital importance to the great Republic of the West. Father Hecker realized that the Church in America presented, at least to the superficial glance, a foreign aspect. "It is not natural with us," he wrote before his conversion; "hence, it does not meet our wants, nor does it fully understand and sympathize with the experiences and dispositions of our people."*

* "Life of Father Hecker," by the Rev. Walter Elliot, page 137.

However, upon a closer acquaintance with the Catholic religion, he discovered the wonderful harmony which exists between the principles that underlie the Constitution of the United States and those which are bound up with the charter of the Church. And when, after many struggles and wanderings, he became a Catholic and entered the priesthood, mindful of his own difficulties, he lost no opportunity of showing his countrymen that America is the congenial home of the Church, and that the Church is the most efficient ally of democracy. Political Americanism, then, simply means that every good Catholic in America should also be a good citizen, that every loyal member of the Church should also be a loyal member of the Commonwealth. It promotes every movement that aims at uplifting the masses politically and socially, and seeks to leaven with the principles of Christianity all the relations of life, public and private. Without abating a jot or tittle of Catholic doctrine, it strives to break down the barriers of bigotry, and to unite Catholics with their non-Catholic fellow citizens in every cause that makes for the welfare of the people. Without sacrificing an essential of Catholic organization, it adapts the external methods of the Church to the needs of the times, and of a people gathered from every land under the sun and chanting the creeds of a hundred denominations. Americanism, in this sense of the term, far from being condemned by Leo XIII., was approved and blessed by him. It is only the embodiment of the principles laid down in his memorable letter to the French people, exhorting the Catholics of France to identify themselves with the nation.

Religious Americanism is that body of crude heretical opinions lately condemned at Rome and contained—so Mgr. Péchenard and his school allege—in the same biography of Father Hecker in which political Americanism is also set forth. Father Hecker and they who sanctioned his principles and methods, it is charged, would minimize Catholic doctrine in order to gain adherents to the Church. They would exalt natural qualities of character, but at the expense of supernatural virtues. They would give to the individual a liberty of thought and action incompatible with the scope of ecclesiastical authority. They would advocate the absolute separation of Church and State in all countries and in all circumstances. They would even lay down false principles of piety, and regard as out of date the great religious orders, depre-

ciating the moral value of the vows which hold these vast spiritual organizations together. From the "Life of Father Hecker," by the Rev. W. Elliot, or rather from a French adaptation of that work, M. l'Abbé Charles Maignen extracted the opinions which we have rehearsed and labelled them "Americanism." By what process these errors were obtained from the biography of Father Hecker; by what right they received the name of Americanism; for what motives they were foisted upon Catholics of America, and by what men all this was done, we now proceed to set forth.

M. l'Abbé G. Peries, formerly a Professor in the Catholic University of Washington, is the Coryphæus of Americanism. Four years ago, M. Peries was removed from the University for causes which do not here concern us. The following letter addressed by him to Bishop Hortsman, who laid it before the Board of Trustees of the University on the occasion of the dismissal of the Professor, explains itself and throws light upon the origin of Americanism:

"I do not want any scandal, but I must warn you that if something is made against me, the country at large, and the Roman competent congregation will know what has been the spirit of this house, and I will do that, not in view of the mean revenge, but for the interests of the Church.

"I hope, nevertheless, that nothing such will be necessary, and that I will not be obliged for the honor of my name, and the defense of my interests, to enter a struggle which would prove disadvantageous for several, and for the great aim we have in view in this institution.

"G. Peries.

"Please do not lose my documents. I can want them again."

This letter, as it stands, is an extract from the Minutes of the Twentieth Meeting of the Board of Trustees of the Catholic University of America, April 18, 1896.*

On his return to France, M. Peries straightway began his work of reprisal. In the threatening letter which he had addressed to Bishop Hortsman, he had declared his intention of making an exposure—the interests of the Church demanded it—unless he were retained in his position at the University; and so, for more than two years, he conducted a campaign of calumny against the Church in America, and indeed against America itself, with all its institutions, social and political. He was meantime joined by the fanatic of the movement, M. l'Abbé Maignen, who, in a book entitled "*Le Père Hecker—Est il un Sainte?*" formulated the errors at present known under the name of Amer-

* *The New Era*, June 17, 1899.

icanism, and ascribed them to Father Hecker and other Americans.

M. Maignen's views of America, characteristic of the school to which he belongs, will be new to the readers of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW; indeed, the possibility of such views being held by any man in his senses will be a revelation to people who speak the English language. He assures us that America, as a nation, "is not even in swaddling clothes, it has yet to be born." "Hostile races are meeting and clashing within the walls of the American continent, like Esau and Jacob in their mother's womb; * * * nobody knows or can know what will come out of the chaos" (p. 171). Americans are little better than Bedouins: "You live in the midst of upturn populations of immigrants, who wander over the vast American continent without finding a place of rest" (p. 214). His heart goes out to an anonymous friend who writes: "You cannot understand how we suffer at finding ourselves so far from *la belle France* among this greedy people" (p. 284). The two latter passages have been omitted by M. Maignen in the English translation of his book. They, doubtless, belong to the class of sentences to which Mgr. Satolli referred in his letter to the author: "I believe the English version has done well in softening that vivacity not easily separable from the French language. I notice, moreover, that certain passages have been modified for the better."

M. Maignen does not approve of the Parliament of Religions. He is shocked at the iniquity of those Catholics who took part in proceedings which were opened by a recital of the *Pater Noster* according to the Protestant formula. In that formula, "which" is used instead of "who" in the opening words of the prayer, and M. Maignen gravely informs his readers that "'which' is a pronoun applied to animals and things, not persons" (p. 220). This learned note is also omitted in the English version of the book.

It would be interesting to reproduce in full M. Maignen's views on things American—on the race war which is about to break forth in the United States, "violent and irresistible," and on the golden staircase built by George Gould; and on another staircase, each step of which is to cost 14,000 francs, and on President McKinley as an incendiary. All these details would be valuable from the psychological point of view, and would prepare us for M. Maignen's methods of controversy; but we must regretfully pass them over.

M. Maignen, as a critic and theologian, is an adept in all the devices of the heresy hunter. He puts upon the rack the thoughts of the simple priest whom he is pursuing, and strives to extort from them by hook or crook matter for the condemnation of the Inquisition. He subjects to the solvent of syllogisms the meditations of a truly sacerdotal heart; and, with the help of scholastic distinction and subdistinction, he proves that such views are not to be found in Mgr. Satolli's abstruse metaphysical treatises, nor in the tomes of mediæval theology in the midst of which his life is passed. He wrenches passages from their context and bases upon them charges that are refuted in the very chapters from which the sentences are torn. He attributes to American prelates every vagary of liberalism which appears in obscure European journals, and, with unsurpassed insolence and impudence, he calls upon them to disavow articles which they have never heard of. He places in violent juxtaposition with a discourse of Archbishop Keane, as orthodox as the canons of the Council of Trent, a heretical article in the *Contemporary Review*, and, with an audacity that is truly ludicrous, makes one of the most pious prelates of the American Church speak the language of Welhausen and Harnack! Worst of all, M. Maignen has been repeatedly convicted of downright dishonesty. He accuses Father Hecker—a priest known to all as a man of exalted piety—of lacking in the fundamental devotion of the Catholic religion, and when from pages of surpassing beauty a score of thrilling tributes to the Incarnate Word are quoted to him as words of the man whom he assails, he is reduced to savage but impotent silence. Again, in order to establish Father Hecker's lack of reverence to the Crucified, he counts the number of times the name of Jesus occurs in his biography, and triumphantly asserts that "the Adorable Name is not pronounced perhaps five times in this volume of almost five hundred pages." A critic, suppressing his disgust for such senile logic, points out that the Sacred Name is found in the book not five but thirty times*—more frequently than in many standard works of Catholic devotion. To this instance of dishonesty we must add a case of falsification so flagrant as to throw serious discredit on M. Maignen's entire work. One of the "proofs" which he brings to show Father Hecker's lack of piety is as follows: "The only reproach recorded in

* *La Vie Catholique*, Oct. 27, 1899.

Father Hecker's life is one which he addressed to a young priest who wanted more time for prayer, and him he advised to go and 'suck his thumbs' out of America" (p. 142). Turning now to the biography of Father Hecker (p. 407), we find this account of the incident referred to:

"The following anecdote of his missionary days shows Fr. Hecker's contempt for lazy devotion. Once when upon a mission a young priest, just returned from Rome where he had made his studies, expressed his desire to go back to Italy as soon as possible, saying, 'I find no time here to pray.' Father Hecker felt indignant, for it did not seem to him that the young man was very much occupied. 'Don't be such a baby,' said he. 'Look around and see how much there is to be done here. Is it not better to make some return to God—here in your own country—for what He has done for you, rather than to be sucking your thumbs abroad? What kind of piety do you call that?'"

And yet this book, the classic of Americanism, is dedicated by its author to Jesus and Mary, and even attributed to them as their work. Never in the annals of controversy has such a book borne such a dedication. It is now plain why the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris refused his imprimatur to this volume, and why the work finally saw the light only when, in contravention of the rules of the Index,* a Roman firm was added to the French publishers and Father Lepidi, a Dominican monk, gave permission to print it.

To the question, Are the opinions which have been condemned under the name of Americanism contained in the biography of Father Hecker? it must be said that whoever reads the book not in the spirit of the partisan theologian, but in the simple good faith of the man who wrote it, will find in it nothing even remotely opposed to Catholic teaching. With the methods, however, which M. Maignen employs, the most orthodox Catholic work may be made to yield every heresy from Gnosticism to Jansenism. *The New York Freeman's Journal* (March 4, 1899) draws attention to the fact that the fundamental error attributed to Father Hecker, obedience to a subjective guide rather than to the Church, would astonish no one more than Father Hecker himself. "A reference to Father Hecker's original writings," says the *Freeman's Journal*, "shows that he taught the very opposite of the error attributed to him. * * * We knew Father Hecker well, and we know that to him the voice of the Church was the

* *The Times*, Sept. 15, 1899.

voice of God." And what is true of this error is true of every other erroneous opinion alleged to have been found in the book. For instance, M. Maignen asserts that Father Hecker intended to introduce a new theory of spiritual direction, while, in the very biography from which he argues, the author explicitly states on this point: "It need hardly be said that Father Hecker did not claim to have any new doctrine; there can be none, and he knew it."* Again, M. Maignen charges Father Hecker with scorning the passive virtues, but in the same breath he is forced to confess that Father Hecker's "best inspirations and his finest pages are those from which radiates, with a singular intensity, the mild but powerful glow of the passive virtues."† Similarly, the liberty of individual action, in which the French theologian can see only a subversion of authority, *The Month*, the English Jesuit magazine, takes as evidence of a remarkable breadth of thought.‡ No unbiased reader can fail to see that what Father Hecker understood by individual action is simply that bold and self-reliant personal initiative which, in the military life, marks the American soldier and makes of him a thinking bayonet.

It has been said that the translation of Father Hecker's biography upon which M. Maignen brought his syllogisms to bear is responsible for some of the errors referred to; but we are inclined to agree with l'Abbé Naudet, a distinguished French priest, who writes (in "*Justice Sociale*") : "If Americanism is a body of doctrine, we confess having found it in the books of Abbé Maignen, and in diverse articles published in '*La Vérité*,' but we have not seen it elsewhere—not even in the French adaptation of the '*Life of Father Hecker*.'"

Another book which forms a picturesque contribution to the campaign of Americanism, and illustrates the fanaticism that runs through the entire movement, is "*L'Americanisme et la Conjuración Antichrétienne, par M. l'Abbé Henri Delassus*." M. Delassus, scorning the petty calumnies of M. Maignen, sets himself to demonstrate that Cardinal Gibbons, Archbishop Ireland and other American prelates are in collusion with Jews and Freemasons to hasten the triumph of Antichrist and the overthrow of the Church. The book is brilliant with such gems of knowledge as that Disraeli was Prime Minister of England for forty

* "*Life of Father Hecker*," p. 302.

† "*Le Père Hecker*," p. 103.

‡ *The Month*, July, 1883.

years, and that England spends vast sums annually in fostering disloyalty and discontent in France. It is beneath notice.

A more important factor in the movement we are considering is the "*Civiltà Cattolica*," the principal organ of the Jesuits. This Italian journal has done immense harm to the best interests of religion by the narrowness and intolerance of its views. Its bigotry, political and theological, its truculent methods of controversy, and its impatience of liberty and progress in every form are contributing much to alienate the intellectual element of Europe from the Church. It was the "*Civiltà Cattolica*" which, more than any other European journal, rendered possible the greatest hoax of the nineteenth century. It may be necessary to remind American readers that, a few years ago, Leo Taxil, a pretended convert to Catholicity, made revelations of Freemasonry which were so absurd that only the most rabid credulity and fanaticism could swallow them. A mythical young lady named Diana Vaughan was the medium of the exposure. Having been initiated into the secrets of the Masonic sects at an early age, and having had several interviews with the devil himself at Charleston, South Carolina, she was eminently qualified to unveil the mysteries of an organization which was devoted to the worship of his Satanic Majesty. During three years, in a series of articles which showed the hand of the keen theologian, the "*Civiltà Cattolica*" popularized the revelations of Leo Taxil, and proclaimed as implicit a faith in Diana Vaughan as those good men of the Delassus type who were making mementoes daily for her in their masses. Even after Diana had announced that she had been married to the devil and had found him young and handsome, the "*Civiltà Cattolica*" never wavered in its gullibility; Diana Vaughan's revelations were "precious publications which were unequalled for exactness and usefulness." From this it may easily be gleaned what part the Jesuit journal was prepared to play in Americanism. Men who believed that at Charleston the devil regularly appeared, horns and tail and all, and that the beautiful Southern city was "the sovereign centre of Satan worship," could easily convince themselves that America itself was the seat of any or every grotesque heresy.

The "*Civiltà Cattolica*" has always been the enemy of democracy and of democratic institutions, and hence of America and of all the principles which America represents. Only a few

years ago, in an article entitled "*La Scuola dei Equivoci*," and aimed at America, it proved with enthymemes of matchless cogency that the very idea of a democracy is a contradiction in terms; and in the latest issue which lies before us, it ridicules the loyalty of American Catholics to the Stars and Stripes.

The fanaticism and Americophobia which we have seen at work in France and Italy were also active in Canada. In the hands of M. Jules P. Tardivel, "*La Vérité*" of Quebec vied with "*La Vérité*" of Paris in bigotry and bitterness. To M. Tardivel belongs the unique distinction of having demonstrated that Diana Vaughan was a creature of flesh and blood. At a time when every wag in Europe knew that Diana Vaughan had no existence outside the imagination of Leo Taxil, and when every man of judgment was wondering at the gullibility and fanaticism of so many Catholics, M. Tardivel assumed the rôle of detective and swooped down upon the Hôtel Mirabeau, Rue de la Paix, Paris. To obviate any possibility of deception, he took with him a friend and an official of the Civil Court of Paris. An investigation of the registry led to the discovery that Diana Vaughan had sojourned for a whole week at the hostelry, and had eaten and drunk like other people. M. Tardivel had a *procès verbal* drawn up at once, which, when duly signed and sealed, should convince the world that Diana Vaughan was not a simple myth. During the three years which have elapsed since his visit to the Hôtel Mirabeau, M. Tardivel has changed but little. Americanism is his new Diana Vaughan. The title of his book, which has appeared quite recently, and which contains his contributions to the literature of Americanism, is "*La Situation Religieuse aux États Unis*."

M. Tardivel's chief qualification for his rôle of controversialist is, like that of his allies, hatred of America. The American Government, he tells us, is built upon an unsound principle (p. 129); it is the eldest daughter of Freemasonry (p. 130), and its people are atheistic in spite of the President's proclamation establishing Thanksgiving Day (p. 131). Blasphemy and other violations of God's commandments are protected by our laws (p. 133). Even the English language, "which, somewhat modernized, *i. e.*, corrupted, is generally spoken in America, is the vehicle of materialism, for it is in English that there arises from all this vast territory the blasphemous concert in honor of the golden calf, the idol of the American people" (pp. 217 and

218). The public schools engender crime and nurture ignorance (p. 71); indeed, "the public school is an engine of hell" (p. 162). Nowhere are there so many fervent adepts of the world cursed by Christ as in the United States of North America (p. 141).

The entire book is a foul and contemptible calumny on America. As one reads it, one is forced to ask, Why is it that all the men who "discovered" Americanism, and then clamored for its condemnation, are, without exception, slanderers of America?

The man who has most recently made his voice heard in the one-sided controversy on Americanism is Mgr. Péchenard. He comes to bear witness to "the happy frame of mind" in which his countrymen have been put by the passing of Americanism. As might be expected, in one holding his position, his sympathies lie with the titled *réfractaires*, who cannot but be pleased with the orthodoxy of his article in this REVIEW. But certain it is that now, more than ever before, the friends of the University of Paris will mourn the loss of Mgr. d'Hulst, the predecessor of the present rector, who would never have suffered that great seat of learning to become the ally of men who attempted to blacken the fair name of the American Church.

To this list may be added the names of three others more familiar to the public—Cardinal Mazzella, Cardinal Satolli and the Rev. David Fleming.

Cardinal Mazzella, a Neapolitan Jesuit, has, since his elevation to the Sacred College, devoted his life to advancing the interests of his Order. He is the mouthpiece of the "*Civiltà Cattolica*" and the executive of its policy.

Cardinal Satolli is well known in America as the first Apostolic Delegate to the United States. It was during his sojourn at Washington that, in some unaccountable way, he meddled in the affairs of the Catholic University, throwing the weight of his influence against the American members of the faculty, and in favor of the foreign element which was then led by Professors Schroeder and Peries. He eventually obtained from the Pope the letter demanding the resignation of Bishop Keane. Since his return to Rome, he has maintained an attitude of sullen hostility to America and everything American.

Father Fleming is a Franciscan monk, and he was the friend and co-laborer of Dr. St. George Mivart. He was formerly highly respected at Rome as an exemplar of large-mindedness. Recently,

however, in obedience to the edict of his Order, he has become the exponent of English reactionary views, and he is rapidly atoning by his zeal in his new cause for his theological escapades of former years.

These three men engineered the condemnation of Americanism at Rome. They made M. Maignen's theses their own and led the Roman Curia to take cognizance of them.

Such are the principal factors in the genesis of Americanism—the men who labored to fasten the charge of heresy upon American Catholics. They are typical representatives of a composite school of thought which is a standing menace to the peace of the Church. They execrate America with a blind fierceness that would be incredible to us did we not have ocular evidence of it, and their hatred of America is only an expression of their hatred of democracy. They are the ecclesiastical allies of all the political *réactionnaires* of the Old World, who would fain blot out from the continent of Europe every vestige of democracy—the theological scribes of all who chivalrously and foolishly cling to lost causes and *régimes* of olden days. So unreasoning is their detestation of republican institutions that M. Maignen, the leading spirit among them, openly resisted the Pope's call to the Catholics of France to rally to the Republic. M. Maignen's conduct was on that occasion so insubordinate that Mgr. Ferrata, the Papal representative at Paris, closed the doors of the embassy against him. Thus is it that these Grand Inquisitors of the American Church hate democracy more than they love the Pope. They hunted down Father Hecker because he was guilty of the unpardonable sin of believing that the future belongs to democracy, and that democracy will understand and cherish the Catholic Church. Therefore it is that Father Hecker, and they who think with him, must at all costs be branded as heretics, for a charge of heresy is always the shortest and easiest way of disposing of a man.

The result of the agitation inaugurated by these men was to put before the world a body of doctrines which were utterly at variance with elementary Catholic principles, and which, if actualized, would be pernicious to the Catholic religion. Such was the furore caused by Americanism in France and Italy that, in the interests of the faith, the Sovereign Pontiff was obliged to take cognizance of the opinions labelled with that name, and to

condemn them wherever they might be found. This he did in the famous document addressed to Cardinal Gibbons.

This letter, hailed by the enemies of America as a triumph, is in reality the only bright page in the history of Americanism. As we read it we feel that we have passed from the atmosphere of sordid strife, where men with motives live and squabble, into the august presence of one of the greatest Pontiffs of the Church. Every line of the document breathes respect for the Church in America, and of that Church no member, be he bishop, priest or layman, is censured or condemned. "Certain opinions concerning the methods of Christian life," "which are sometimes included under the name Americanism," and "which have been brought in" (by some persons not named), are false and dangerous and to be repudiated—such is the sum and substance of Leo's decision. The Pope not only carefully guards himself against imputing to American Catholics the errors sometimes included under the name Americanism, but even signifies his incredulity that such errors are held by Americans. "If, indeed, by that word (Americanism) is meant qualities of mind which distinguish the people of America as other nations are distinguished, and in so far as the expression applies to the constitution of your States and laws, there is not, assuredly, the smallest reason for us to think it should be rejected. But if it is used not only to describe but also to justify the errors we have already pointed out, what doubt can there be that our venerable brethren, the Bishops of America, will be the first to reject and condemn it as injurious to themselves and the whole nation?"

And promptly came from the American Hierarchy the disavowals for which the Pope looked. The press announced from day to day that five archbishops and their suffragan bishops, representing some of the greatest Sees of America, while condemning what the Pope condemned, respectfully defended the American Church against the imputation of heresy. Americanism, they wrote, as synonymous with false doctrine, was unknown in the land. These prelates are Cardinal Gibbons, of Baltimore; Archbishop Williams, of Boston; Archbishop Ireland, of St. Paul; Archbishop Riordan, of San Francisco, and Archbishop Kain, of St. Louis. To these may be added Archbishop Ryan, of Philadelphia, and his bishops, who informed his Holiness that scarcely any among the souls committed to their care held the false prin-

ciples so justly condemned. From Chicago and Dubuque came no reply, the archbishops of these provinces being then ill. The archdiocese of Santa Fé was vacant. The Archbishops of Portland, Cincinnati and New Orleans did very little more than acknowledge with reverence the receipt of the Pontiff's letter. Out of the fourteen archdioceses of America two only—those of Milwaukee and New York—reported the presence of Americanism. This had been expected. The letter from the ecclesiastical province of Milwaukee represented the views of four German bishops; and, although the friends of these prelates defend their action on the ground that not one of the good pious men had ever read the "Life of Father Hecker," it should by no means be overlooked that Milwaukee is the pet preserve of Cahenslyism—it is a Fatherland itself against the influx of American ideas. As to miniature American Germany, more carefully barred than the New York, it is said with much show of reason that had there not been of old serious friction between that See and those of Baltimore and St. Paul, Archbishop Corrigan might not have so suddenly detected the smell of heresy. This is rendered probable by the fact that the "Life of Father Hecker," from which the heresy was supposed to have been extracted, actually bore the imprimatur of Archbishop Corrigan himself. Be this as it may, it is now more than an open secret that the letter which his Grace of New York sent to Rome in the name of his suffragans did not represent the views of some at least of the bishops whose signatures it bore.

And here we must call attention to a glaring instance of the bad faith of the enemies of America. The "*Civiltà Cattolica*" and all the journals that take their cue from the Jesuit organ published the two letters which alone reported the existence of heresy in the American Church, as also the letters which courteously acknowledged the receipt of the Roman letter; but they sedulously excluded from their pages the letters of the archbishops who protested that the condemned doctrines were unknown in America. The "*Civiltà Cattolica*," which alone seems to have had access to the replies sent by the American Hierarchy, has not given to the public the letters on Americanism forwarded to Rome from five of the chief centres of the Catholic religion in the United States. It has never alluded even to the reply of Cardinal Gibbons, to whom the Papal document had been addressed. And

while it suppresses the testimony of bishops whose names would carry weight in every part of the world, and whose evidence would at once clear the American Church of the suspicion of heresy, while it ignores the chorus of repudiation of the Catholic press of America—a protest so spontaneous and universal that the bishops of Milwaukee raised against the Catholic journalists of the country the cry of Jansenism—it continues, together with its satellites, to cry out from Rome and other European centres that the errors condemned by the Pope actually found a home in America.

Mgr. Péchenard also still holds that American Catholics are guilty, first, of “a certain bending in the matter of dogmatic affirmation;” secondly, of “a separatist tendency with respect to the central ecclesiastical authority,” and third, of “a minimizing in the practices of the Christian and especially the religious life.”

These are grave accusations; but it will be observed that he does not offer a particle of evidence in support of any of them. He does not name a single book or discourse which could form the basis of the charge that American Catholics are guilty of tampering with the doctrines of the Church. He does not mention a solitary instance which would indicate a “separatist tendency” in the Church in America. It is one of Mgr. Péchenard’s fellow countrymen—M. Brunetière, a man whose testimony is unquestioned in two continents—who recently wrote of the American Church: “No other Church adheres with more absolute fidelity to Rome or pays more strict attention to all her observances.” The American Episcopate, it is observed, has always avoided extremes; its members have not had to do penance for Gallicanism, nor have they been laughed at for having made an act of faith in Diana Vaughan.

As to the third accusation which Mgr. Péchenard makes, the indictment would be intelligible if only some example had been given of the alleged “minimizing in the practices of Christian life.” If Mgr. Péchenard means that there are wanting in America certain devotions which the *Propagateur de Saint Joseph* has been for years offering to a certain class of French minds—devotions which are exposing the Church in France to ridicule—then there is room for this criticism; but if he means that American Catholics detract in any way from the sound Catholic devotions approved by the Church, then his accusation is in every

respect like the rest. The piety of American Catholics is as far above suspicion as their orthodoxy; although neither their piety nor their orthodoxy dispenses them from protesting before the world against insults put upon their Church.

Mgr. Péchenard assures us that Americanism is dead in France. Indeed, the publication of the Pope's letter was an event of much greater importance for France than for America. The Archbishop of Paris made it the subject of a pastoral which, however, was disfigured by the lamentable assertion that certain Catholics in America substituted the natural for the supernatural virtues. Similarly, the Bishops of Nancy, Annecy and Beauvais used the utmost diligence in circulating the Pontifical letter among their clergy. It is a relief to know that these bishops have succeeded in strangling Americanism in their dioceses. In the United States, except in New York and Milwaukee, the Papal document was received with an unbroken calm which has excited much surprise in Europe. Indeed, the nonchalance with which the condemnation of Americanism was received in America has been the source of some disappointment and misunderstanding among the heresy hunters of Europe. Thus Mgr. Péchenard draws attention to the fact that Archbishop Ireland, during his sojourn last year in France, nowhere discussed Americanism, and intimates that the prelate's silence was an avowal of guilt. It is said, however, that the dignitary whom Mgr. Péchenard attacks is a practical man, and that he has but little admiration for the mythological heroes of the Valhalla who pass their days in hewing down shadows. Those who have read the well-founded statement that at Rome Mgr. Ireland was congratulated by the Sovereign Pontiff and leading Cardinals for having correctly interpreted the Pope's letter, will find a more obvious reason for the disdainful silence of the Archbishop of St. Paul.

In Europe, Americanism was cradled as well as entombed; in America, it was unknown until it was condemned. In Europe, for some time to come, the dead heresy will doubtless be taken as seriously as Gallicanism and Jansenism; in America, it has already become only a memory, except for the curious few who take an interest in myths of the Diana Vaughan type.

J. ST. CLAIR ETHERIDGE.

A NEGLECTED AMERICAN POET.*

BY MONTGOMERY SCHUYLER.

GEORGE ALFRED TOWNSEND is aware of my desire, after a personal acquaintance with him begun in a newspaper office a full third of a century ago, of making and publishing a review of his work in verse. He has helped me with material which otherwise would scarcely have been accessible to me. And he has made one request, or suggestion, in return, which I am sorry to find impracticable. This is that, whatever I might be moved to say about his literature, I should treat it by itself, and leave on one side the journalism through which he is so much more widely known.

It is impossible to treat his work in verse as quite apart from his work on the press, what he hoped might endure from what he was quite content to see perish after it had served its fugitive turn and boiled the diurnal pot. The two cannot be disjoined. Mr. Townsend's journalism and his literature have rubbed off on each other. Nobody who has followed his newspaper work will be disposed to deny to its author a very high degree of poetical sensibility, and a power of poetical expression often manifested in irrelevant, as well as in merely wasteful, ways. I remember he reported the trial of Tilton against Beecher, in the course of which some old love-letters came to be read, and noted the effect with which the reading fell upon the plaintiff in the suit, who had been one of the parties to the correspondence. According to my distant memory, the notation was something like this: "How like the fog bells on familiar coasts,

*"Poems." By George Alfred Townsend. Washington, D. C.; Rhodes and Ralph, 1870.

"Tales of the Chesapeake." By George Alfred Townsend ("Gath"). New York: American News Company, 1880.

"Bohemian Days." By George Alfred Townsend ("Gath"). H. Campbell & Co., New York, 1880.

"Poetical Addresses of George Alfred Townsend." Published by E. F. Bonaventure & Co., New York, 1881.

"Poems of Men and Events." By George Alfred Townsend. Gapland Edition. E. F. Bonaventure & Co., New York, 1899.

whence one must steer, though homesick," and so forth. Fancy coming upon such a figure in a newspaper report of a sensational trial in this present year of grace. Thus did poetry rub off on newspaper work. And that the converse has happened, and how and how far it has happened, it seems desirable to show, in the interest of the poetry itself. Mr. Townsend seems to me a genuine poet, who comes as near to being spokesman in verse for his own generation as any one our country has produced, a faithful interpreter of what it is that the general, promiscuous mass of the American people "wishes to say." The work itself seems to me, at its best, to have done something of the same service for the workman's countrymen as Kipling has done for his countrymen of Greater Britain. That, while the one spokesman is world-famous, as he deserves to be, the other should be so extensively unknown in his true capacity that this article may be, to a majority of its readers, perhaps the first announcement that there is such a poet at all—this strikes me as absurd. And, evidently, there must be some other explanation of it than that the American people does not desire to be spoken for, or would not know when it was spoken for, if pains had been taken to bring the fact to its attention.

In the first place, it may or may not be characteristically "journalistic," but it seems to be the fact, that Townsend's poems have never been, properly speaking, "published." A glance over the titles makes this plain. The "Poems" of 1870, containing perhaps the most careful and deliberate of his work in verse, was set forth by a firm of which I never heard until I saw its name on the title-page, and the book itself has been so long out of print that it was only by much rummaging in second-hand book shops that I was able to procure a copy for the present purpose. The other volumes on the list were issued in forms and ways that seemed to label them as ephemera, excepting only the latest. This is a handsome and goodly volume, which constitutes, we find, the author's own poetical "claim." But the title, "Poems of Men and Events," does not define the claim, and gives the notion of something, or of a collection of somethings, rather "light and occasional" than "more serious and deliberate." And then, also, the make-up of the book, the pictures of the author's parents and of his birth-place and of his dwelling-place, and even of the tomb he has built for himself, presuppose a personal interest in the writer on the part of the reader, and seem to amount to an express

renunciation of the wider public, to warn the "general reader," as it were, that the book is not meant for the like of him.

Besides, printing, in these days, by no means wholly constitutes "publication." That involves printing under such conditions as shall induce or compel "noticing." This is especially essential to any real publication of the poems of a newspaper man. "The small peccary band" are by no means given to hailing with delight the efforts of one of their own number in ways more ambitious than the regular employments of the herd, and there is strong and general disbelief, in strictly "literary" circles, that any literary good can come out of the newspaper Nazareth.

But, granting and allowing for the particular ineptitude which Mr. Townsend has shown for "publication" as distinct from publicity, and for the scepticism of the Brahmans, one has to own that there is much in the work itself to justify this scepticism. "Although the newspapers have been my bulrushes, holding me up," says the author, in his prose preface, by one of those quaint and happy images that occur to him so readily, "Poesy has been Pharaoh's daughter, raising me." But something more than the poetic impulse is needed for the production of poetry, and that is the poetic art. It is the patient clarification and elaboration of the poetic material. What Emerson said about Thoreau, and might often have said about himself, we have often to say about Townsend: "The thyme and marjoram are not yet honey." Even to good prose a higher elaboration is essential than the conditions of the newspaper admit. There is a curious letter from Philip Francis in Burke's "Correspondence," curious, among other things, for the light it may shed upon the "Junius" controversy, though I have never seen it cited in connection with that controversy. The arrogant, schoolmasterly tone which the lesser man takes to the greater would have been the height of insolence viewed in the light of the respective "public forms" of the two writers; but supposing Francis to have been conscious of a great, though anonymous, literary success, it becomes quite intelligible. "Once for all," comments the putative author of "Junius" upon the manuscript of the "Reflections," "once for all, I wish you would let me teach you to write English. To me, who am to read everything you write, it would be a great comfort, and to you no sort of disparagement. Why will you not allow yourself to be persuaded that polish is material to preservation?" The fact that

Burke has come down to us "sustained by his matter," while the dust settles upon the forgotten controversies which "Junius" fancied would be kept in memory by his style, does not affect the soundness of the proposition. And, if even this degree of "polish" is incompatible with the methods of the newspaper, especially with the methods of so particularly profuse an improvisatore for the newspaper as Mr. Townsend, much more, of course, is the higher degree of it that is "material" to the production of durable verse. The "journalistic" method of work has been described somewhere by Carlyle: "No carpenter ever made a mathematically right angle in the world; but every carpenter knows when it is right enough, and does not botch his job and lose his wages by trying to get it too right." The poetic method is that which has been so memorably described by Tennyson:

"Old poets, fostered under friendlier skies,
Old Virgil, who would write ten lines, they say,
At dawn, and lavish all the golden day
To make them wealthier in his readers' eyes;
And you, old popular Horace, you the wise
Adviser of the nine-years-pondered lay."

For a journalist to undertake literature, most of all for him to undertake poetry, is to undertake to keep these two methods apart, to pass from one to the other. And that is perhaps one of the chief reasons why, with so many young men joining the press, as they used to do in this country more than as they do now, because they felt or fancied in themselves a vocation to literature, so little literature has been produced by journalists, and why the men who have kept and fulfilled their literary aspirations have, for the most part, found it necessary to cut loose from what Mr. Townsend himself calls "the daily domineerer." It requires almost a miracle of intellectual balance and moral firmness to keep clear of the temptation to "make copy" when you set out to make literature. Perhaps the most conspicuously successful example of resistance to this temptation is that of Mr. Andrew Lang, who still, at fifty-odd, seems to keep his journalism and his literature well apart. On his journalistic side, Mr. Lang may be described, as Thackeray described himself under the figure of Pendennis, as a hack naturally fast in pace and brilliant in action; and to pass from even such hack-work as his to the sonnet on the *Odyssey* is a feat, quite and far away Mr. Lang's high-

water mark though the sonnet on the *Odyssey* be. It may, indeed, almost be said that the professional producer of ephemera who desires also to produce something more than ephemera must take to himself the saying of Spinoza, to whom Mr. Townsend has addressed two admiring sonnets, that he "will earn his living with his hands and keep his brains for himself."

It can by no means be said of the latest volume of Townsend's poems that it always observes this distinction. And it is noticeable that the poems in which it is most carefully observed are not the latest; are more apt to be the earliest. In fact, the most careful and elaborate work, that in which the writer's craftsmanship comes uniformly nearest to artistry, is, as has been suggested already, the first volume, the "Poems" of 1870. "Finished to the finger-nail," as is much of the verse in "*Tales of the Chesapeake*," and at least the "*Little Grisette*" in the "*Bohemian Days*," the poet seems to show a progressive carelessness respecting form. It is true that there is a corresponding gain in substance, in the evidence of experience, but this, though it be a compensation, is scarcely to be pleaded as an offset. The iron has entered his soul. Much of this impression is doubtless due to the circumstances in which this latest volume was issued, to the temptation to which the poet has yielded of "making copy." The poetical idea is very seldom absent—that is to say, an interesting idea that of itself suggests embodiment in verse rather than in prose—but the author seems satisfied with a rougher and readier notation of it than would have satisfied him once. There are, among the hundred and twenty-odd "*Poems of Men and Events*," scarcely a dozen that the reader would be content to miss, but there are scarcely more than that, of the newer work, that could not and should not have been made better. If, on almost every page, there is some vivid felicity of imagery or expression, there are few pages that are not marred by some blemish. Rhythm and even grammar are disregarded by the running pen, until sometimes one would be tempted to say that the author had no ear for the music of verse, if there were not sure presently to occur some line or lines that made that supposition untenable, and threw the reader back upon the impregnable ground of the vicar of Wakefield, that the picture would have been better if the painter had taken more pains. A year's work with a file, how much good it would have done this volume;—if the author, to use his own better image, had patiently clarified his work,

"And purred away its sediment."

But he seems to show an ineptitude for self-criticism, or an impatience of it, equal to his ineptitude in respect to "publication." That this should be shown in his selection of his own works was to be expected. Poets are almost foredoomed to failure in this, almost sure to be guided by other than critical considerations, largely by a fatuous fondness for their latest born, even though Benjamin should turn out deformed or perverse. The most unfriendly critic of Mr. Swinburne could not have made a less favorable selection than the poet's own. Almost the only satisfactory abridgment of a poet's work by himself is that of Matthew Arnold, and it is open to anybody to say that that is because in this case the critical faculty tends to overpower the creative, and that if the selection had not been so good, the poetry might have been better. In any case, it seems that Townsend's poems stand in need of being edited as well as of being published.

Thus far, I seem to have been dealing in nothing but negatives; but when such a poet as Mr. Townsend, to my sense, is, in question, it seems needful to clear away the impediments and obstructions which have prevented his more general recognition, if we would reconcile his poetical performance with the appreciation of the American public. Of course, you cannot "prove" poetry. You can only show it. And the lover of poetry has only to glance over the pages of this latest volume, better as, I admit and insist, the poet might have made it, to come upon lines and phrases which only a poet could have written. Here is one, from the lines upon "Gail Hamilton's" book on Blaine:

"This book it also is thy tomb;
Two women watched it, one to doom,
A light of Marys fills its gloom."

And here, from the verses on Gibbon:

"The vast procession of mankind,
Like some great circus seemed,
In his kaleidoscopic mind
Metempsychosed or dreamed."

Or, in a more conventional and academic strain, these concluding lines from a sonnet to John Sherman:

"And seem to talk to Nestor in his calm,
When Homer knew him in the vale of years."

And here is the last verse from the poem "At Ayr," marred as it is by the rhyme which is rhyme only to the eye. While "letters" undoubtedly rhymes to "debtors," "belles-lettres" as certainly does not, any more than "*la belle alliance*" rhymes to "defiance," as it purports to do in the sonnet on Byron. Of course, I quote the verse, not for the blemish, but in spite of it, and because it both recalls Burns, being even, by design or luck, in the metre of the "Epistle to a Young Friend," and characterizes the American as well as the Scottish bard:

"Great babe! who haled thy Scottish sect
And put its saints thy debtors,
And made thy wayside dialect
A language of belles-lettres!
I do not kneel, but bow thy due,
Ent'ring thy hut's low portal;
The unsevere see Nature through
The joyous troll immortal."

But if these felicities are frequent in the later poems, they are seldom long sustained; and to see what the poet can do and has done upon the continuous high level of artistic workmanship proper and indispensable to lasting verse, one has to revert to the earlier, almost to the earliest. It was at the funeral of James Buchanan in 1868, which I attended as the "representative" of my newspaper, and Mr. Townsend in his capacity of free lance, that he borrowed a buggy and drove me about the sweet and cheerful Pennsylvanian country that surrounds "Wheatlands" and quaint, steep-gabled, pleasant old Lancaster, and recited to me a poem then still, I think, unprinted. When I came into possession the other day of the "Poems" of 1870, and for the first time found the poem in print, after recent study of the alternating amenities and asperities of the later verse, the reader can imagine the mixture of curiosity and trepidation with which I turned to it first, and the delight of finding that it had not shrunk, but lived up to and filled out the vague impression of it that had abided with me for thirty-one years. The reader shall judge for himself whether my admiration was misplaced. The title of the poem is "Paul on the Hellespont":

"From Japhet, when Shem was a yeoman,
And Canaan reviled,
Till to-day, when the world is all Roman,
And Judah a wild,

By the verge of this sea
There was never a beggar like me.

"The Kings of all Asia beside me
 Arise in their might;
Their banners and galleys deride me,
 Their camps blaze with light;
I am footsore and tried,
And the ferry is stormy and wide.

"My purse it is rent like my raiment;
 My soldiers are two;
For the ferryman, Heaven be his payment!
 My tent, Heaven's blue!
But the conquests we seek
Are the glorified lands of the Greek.

"They are wisest and purest of races,
 The Lords of the Arts.
Like the statues of gods are their faces;
 We aim at their hearts;
All our art is a cross,
And our gospel but sorrow and loss.

"But our tongues they are laden with wonder;
 Our pains shall be sweet;
Lord Christ, who has walked on the thunder,
 Will buoy our feet;
On the mountain of Mars
We shall plead by our stake with His scars.

"Where the marbles of Phidias whiten
 The temples of Jove,
The image they ravished shall brighten
 The isles with His love;
All their lore be His shame,
And the Cæsars shall rule in His name.

"To His birthplace shall stroll for His glory
 Philosophy hoar;
Architecture shall sculpture His story
 And plant, to adore,
In the Parthenon's eaves
The cross that was set between thieves.

"My brethren, perhaps in that vision,
 On earth, as in bliss,
The Gentiles may place, for this mission,
 Our faces by His!
Oh! I weary to wait.
Lo! a sail. Let us pass o'er the strait."

It is difficult—to me it is impossible—to make a formula that will include the whole body of Mr. Townsend's poetic work. The

difficulty of the critic is the same as that which the articulator in Dickens encountered in the presence of the unassorted and unassortable osseous remains which he dismissed in despair as "human varrious." This is a poetical "various," in which the variety comes too near to miscellany to admit of an easy classification. The title of this article designates the most important, in quantity and perhaps upon the whole in quality, of his poetical performance. He is not only an American poet, but if I had the courage of my perceptions I should not hesitate to change the indefinite to the definite article and to call him the American poet of the generation which grew up with the new national self-consciousness developed by the Civil War. "The competition is not exacting." In the previous generation the aspiration of our singers was that of Keats, to "be numbered with the English poets," and so, in the measure of their success, they were. In spite of the poems on slavery and of the "Hiawatha," Longfellow remained a scholar and gentleman quite after the English pattern. In spite of the poems on slavery, and even of the noble Harvard ode, Lowell, except in his dialect verse, remained the same, or at most a gentleman and scholar of Greater Britain. If one cannot say the same of Whittier, that is because he would have made the impression upon the cultivated and conventional Briton of a "dissenting minister." The Americanism of Emerson is not more clear than the aloofness and ethereality that kept him from being the real spokesman of his people. As for Walt Whitman, who expressed for the poetical methods of all these an equal and lofty contempt, and who proceeded to celebrate "these States" by the modes of cataloguing and ejaculation, it takes less courage now than it would have taken ten, or, still more, twenty years ago, to say that in Walt's own poetical method there was not only a huge deal of laziness and conceit, but also an appreciable element of "foxiness" bordering on fraudulency. As no poet is less consciously imitative than Townsend, it is all the more interesting to note coincidences between him and his predecessors. The long poem, "Palos," in this latest volume, must recall Lowell to many readers. In detail the resemblance is sometimes startling:

"For no new world Columbus sought;
Embargoed Ind he hoped to clutch;
His aptness grasped the spheroid thought
And knew extremes did somewhere touch.

"There is a mean amidst extremes,
 There is a halfway happiness;
 Between the continents he dreams
 The lost Atlantis lay to bless."

If this be Lowell, we have to own that it is Lowell at very near his very best. The prefatory poem, again, the "Birthday Thoughts," recalls Emerson in its Orphic curtness, and what reader would hesitate to identify the Sage of Concord in such a passage as this?—

"Flowing from Lionel's brain cells
 And from the menstruum of the wells;
 Earth's drip from out her cavern chasm
 And waste of parent protoplasm,
 The saturation of life's plant
 And spill of Pluto's adamant."

Let me repeat that I have not the least notion that Lowell was present to Mr. Townsend's consciousness, or even to his "sub-consciousness," when he was writing "Palos," or Emerson when he was writing "Yertes's Spring." I cite the coincidences to show how difficult, from the critical formulist's point of view, this poetical "various" is. For, if we are going to construe resemblances into imitations, conscious or unconscious, what are we to make of still another stop which is drawn out of the poetical organ in "The First Hunger," which I suppose most readers would ascribe, without much hesitation, to Mr. Kipling?—

"The apples are water, dearest,
 The dates are only sweet;
 There is no flesh in the juice of the grape,
 Nor life in the berry we eat!
 In the blood of the kid we have slain,
 In our new and terrible greed,
 Lie the gristle and marrow we need,—
 In the pitiful yield of the grain,—
 The barley that beards the wild rain,
 The corn that the crow contests,
 The milk in the white wheat's breasts,—
 Behold my red hands as I speak,
 And the curse of the sweat on my cheek!"

And yet it is on the one hand in the last degree improbable that Mr. Kipling ever saw these lines, and certain, on the other, that they were published the year he was born. Nevertheless, this last parallel, unlike the others we have been noting, instead of being a mere superficial or casual resemblance, does denote a real

analogy. That insistent and compelling rhythm which makes the audience, whether of the barrack-room or the music hall or the library or the cloister, "sit up" when the Greater Briton strikes up "'is bloomin' lyre," has sent his verses round the world, while the American has not yet found what can be called a hearing at home. This seizing tunefulness of the younger poet is a gift which the elder does not share in any eminent degree. There is no help for that. But also Kipling shows the constant attention to form, the want of which in Townsend we have been deploring. This difference seems to vindicate the wisdom of the one in breaking loose at the earliest moment from "the daily domineerer," while his continued servitude to it has been visited upon the other. Townsend's own

"Dear, far convenient Day,
With bread and heart, and love and work concurring,"

never comes unless it is made to come. But in the qualities of alertness and aliveness and impressibleness, there is by no means so much to choose, while the general attitude of the two poets toward life is very much the same. There is this necessary and national difference, that the audacities of the American are and seem much less like defiances than those of the Briton. There are huge temerities in Townsend, as may be seen in "The Politicians' Christmas, A. D. 1," and in passages of "Palos," though they are directed rather toward theological than toward sexual conventions; but there is seldom evidence of the intention of startling the reader. We call Kipling "American" partly for his temerities, but he is doubtless more conscious of them as temerities than he would be if he were by birth an American. An Englishman, even a Greater Briton, has always the consciousness of his caste, and if he ignores it, he does so in cold blood. The British Brahman who becomes a Bohemian becomes an Adullamite, whereas the luckier American has no caste to abandon or convention to defy. It is his birthright that the assertion of equality, even that familiarity, does not involve disrespect. American nativity is a freemasonry which might almost take for a national motto the old Masonic verse:

"We meet upon the Level and we part upon the Square."

The nationality, which is in one case an "imperialism," is as intense in the one as in the other. Townsend is as devout a

believer in the "manifest destiny" of the United States as Kipling in that of the British Empire. In neither case can an excessive scrupulosity as to means go with this outreaching spirit. In "Irving at Burr's Trial," we find Townsend condoning and even pooh-poohing "The Crime of Aaron Burr," in his attempt at Southwestern empire, just as we might expect to find Kipling condoning and even pooh-poohing any little irregularities that Mr. Cecil Rhodes might find it convenient to commit, at the expense of Boers or "natives," in the extension of British South Africa.

This same poem is an example of a large and important part of Mr. Townsend's poetical work. No man has explored more faithfully the annals of the colonies and of the early Republic in search of merely human traits. No wonder that such a quest should lead the searcher into the byways rather than along the highways of history, that his work of this kind in newspaper prose should have been disparaged as "historic gossip." Never mind. It is more to the purpose that he should have attained and become able to impart a more vivid view of our historical "worthies" and unworthies than I, at least, know where else to find, from the strife of Dutch and Swedes for the possession of the Delaware in the seventeenth century down to our own day. All these things, various as is the effectiveness with which they are presented, sometimes with brilliant success, sometimes with flat failure, are presented in the poetic form of "views," in the poetic-journalistic form of kodak-views, and not in the historical form of documented and verifiable "estimates." But how realized and realizable are the best-taken and best-developed of the views, from the little picture of "Far Virginia," in the year of "Blenheim's Victory" and of Mary Washington's birth in "Mary Washington," to the Roentgen-ray psychology of "Ulysses S. Grant, March 4, 1869,"—the soliloquy of the simple, dazed soldier confronting the Presidency and staring into the unknown. Even "Salt River," the legendary destination of defeated candidates for the Presidency, is, not photographed this time, but poetized, and populated with the shades of the defeated and departed, from the victor of Saratoga,

"The oldest exile on the silent tides,"

down to

"Young McClellan, Hamlet of the crowd,"

until it recalls the banks of Acheron and the spectral bodies of

magnanimous heroes besieging the squalid ferryman. One abatement, it seems, there may be to be made from the trustworthiness of the historical camera, and that by reason of the personality of the operator, as a native of the "Eastern Shore" and inheritor of its prejudices against the Virginian politicians of the young century. But this does not affect the vividness of the presentation, as in this sketch of "Monroe, the Last Virginia Chief":

"He was a politician's flower, raised from a common weed,
Fitted for no enterprise in life but following to lead;
To watch the great and imitate, to listen and succeed.

* * * * *

"His Western States he never loved marched o'er his mountain's bar,
On roads he vetoed, to his forts made for defensive war:
Free millions flout o'er Africa the faint Monrovia star."

The unquestioning belief in the future of one's country which does not tend to cultivate political scrupulosity, no more tends to cultivate appreciation, or even tolerance, of political criticism or of political critics. Everything is for the best in the best of all possible worlds, and whoever prophesies evil or points out dangers might better be engaged in helping on "the movement." In "Palos" our poet sings, not very poetically:

"It is the Public Spirit's token
To wish all things constructive well."

And is not that an expression of the general American spirit, and especially of the spirit of the West, which the poet takes to be specifically the American spirit? In the poem on Burr, already cited, he makes Irving prophesy:

"Yon golden West will govern, in its prime,
With mildness known not to old colonies
Ripped from the civil wars and Bible-cracked."

But the most elaborate and the most striking expression of this phase of the American spirit is the poem which ought to be called "Bohemian and Sadducee."

"The Editor and Writer met in Twilight's lonely lane,
Bohemian and Sadducee enforced to meet again;
'When next we walk, successful friend! the darkness will be deep,'
Said the Bohemian; 'Tell me, now, what have you done to keep?'"

" 'My self-esteem, my spotless work, my influence austere!
I edited the Higher Thought, the economic seer!
Never to error did I stoop, and when the State must fall,
Let History consult my files; I did predict it all.'"

* * * * *

"'One drop,' the old Bohemian said, 'within its channel strong,
I mingle in the mighty tide and with it move along.
I have no other creed than this, no power of my own:
Flow, beauteous river! Not in thee have ever I thrown a stone!'

"From Twilight lane they parted last, the years were growing dark;
Neither upon the century left more than finger-mark.
'Silentium!' was the epitaph upon the scolding man,
But all the bands of music play past the Bohemian."

If this be immensely characteristic of the poet, is it not as characteristic of the people whose spokesman he aspires to be? The belief, unquestioning and impatient of question, in the United States of America, which rises to the level and so often takes the place of a religious faith, is in the blood of all of us. I know no more eloquent expression than Townsend at his best has given to it, and none so concrete and popular. Nor is his optimism attained by blinking unpleasant facts. Like all the rest of us, he glories in the career of Lincoln as the most typically American thing we have yet done. Everybody remembers Lowell's eulogy in the Harvard Ode. But that sculptural figure was not Lincoln "in his habit as he lived." In "Wild Cat Junction," one of the poems I most miss from this latest volume, Townsend has shown that the ideal Lincoln can be kept in spite of the most unshrinking realism. No Western novelist has given so awful a picture of the crudity and squalor of the prairie environment in which Lincoln was reared. The realism is so unshrinking that I shrink from reproducing it, but I must give the last and not the toughest verse of it to show over what it is that his idealism has triumphed:

"Corn-dodgers dipped in maple juice he ate with thankfulness;
An ox-steak when the preacher came the family to bless;
Rye coffee, with molasses sweet (he never used a fork,
But with his knife, ten months a year, poked down the salted pork).

"Still, like old Bunyan's vision, seen o'er Bedford Prison's gate,
He saw out of this poverty the highways of the State;
The pilgrimage of Christendom from bondage to the light,
And Slavery's pack fall from the back of lands that seek the right.

"Husks filled his belly, but he saw his father's house afar.
A shepherd on a lonely moor, he watched the Master's star.
And not by dainty hands in kid the shackles fell to rust,
But warty, horny, were the palms that made the nation just.

"Still, in his homely Hoosier phrase, he talked the armies on.
The same old puckered face looked out, Columbus-like, for dawn.
We waited for some courtly Christ to draw the sting from death,
And, lo, the promised man arose in lowly Nazareth!"

It seems to me that this portrait is worthier of the national Pantheon than any ideal figure that has been made, or that is likely to be made. And years later, the artist, in a poem, "Commander Lincoln," read before the Society of the Army of the Potomac, took up the theme again, and in a more oratorical strain pointed the moral for Lincoln's country of Lincoln's career:

"Deep the wells of humble childhood, cool the springs beside the hut,
Millions more as poor as Lincoln see the door he has not shut.
Not till wealth has made its canker every poor white's cabin through
Shall the Great Republic wither, or the infidel subdue!

"Stand around your great commander, lay aside your little fears!
Every Lincoln carries freedom's car along a hundred years.
And when next the call for soldiers rolls along the golden belt,
Look to see a mightier column rise and march, prevail and melt!"

Is not that what the American people "wish to say"? Has any one else said it for them more impressively or more memorably? Is not the author of these lines as near to being a national spokesman in verse as any in this generation of his countrymen? Whether or not the reader agrees that this thesis is made out by the citations that have been given, I do not see how the attentive and considerate reader can fail to agree that Townsend's verse deserves more attention and consideration than it has received; and to diffuse that belief as widely as possible is the object of these citations and remarks. I can quite imagine such a reader demurring that the adjective of my title has been better made out than the substantive, the Americanism of the poet than his specifically poetical power, and even adding, if he be of a sarcastic turn, that fine lines do not make fine poems, and that the most eloquent stump speeches in verse do not make a great poet. The epithet is not mine, and in any case is not of a scientific exactness. What I claim for Mr. Townsend is that he is an interesting and remarkable poet. But it is also true that he has shown the capacity to deal with themes more deeply and broadly human than those of politics or even of patriotism, and to give them artistic expression. Not to speak of earlier work, "Her First Glasses" and "In Rama," in the present volume, seem to me sufficiently to show it. The former is almost too intimate to be quoted here. It will recall Cowper's "My Mary" to reading readers, but it seems to me of an even more poignant pathos, which even the quaint and homely adverbial use of "some" does not seem to blunt, seems al-

most to sharpen. "In Rama" is a threnody which gives a personal expression to a sentiment as general as humanity:

"A little face there was,
When all her pains were done,
Beside that face I loved:
They said it was a son.
A son to me—how strange—
Who never was a man;
But lived, from change to change,
A boy, as I began."

Our poet's best work, most feeling and most artistic, in that description suffused with sentiment which is the staple of the poetry of the English language in the nineteenth century, is doubtless that which he has done in the poems descriptive and reminiscent of the region of his birth and boyhood, the "Eastern Shore." I wish he had retained the pretty "Chester River":

"Wise is the wild duck winging straight to thee,
River of summer! from the cold Arctic sea,
Coming, like his fathers for centuries, to seek
The sweet, salt pastures of the far Chesapeake."

But he has retained the "Land of Pocomoke" and "Old St. Mary's," and these furnish a test of his quality in this kind. Here are two verses from the former:

"Is it Snow Hill that greets me back
To this old loamy cul-de-sac?
Spread on the level river shore,
Beneath the bending willow trees
And speckled trunks of sycamore,
All moist with airs of rival seas?
Are these old men who gravely bow,
As if a stranger all awoke,
The same who heard my parents' vow—
Ah, well! in simpler days than now—
To love and serve by Pocomoke?"

* * * * *

"When we have raged our little part,
And weary out of strife and art,
Oh! could we bring to these still shores
The peace they have who harbor here,
And rest upon our echoing oars,
And float adown this tranquil sphere,
Then might yon stars shine down on me,
With all the hope those lovers spoke,
Who walked these tranquil streets I see
And thought God's love nowhere so free,
Nor life so good, as Pocomoke."

The poem on "Old St. Mary's," the colonial capital of Maryland, is in the same strain of tender reminiscence. But I must be allowed to quote a passage from it, because it seems to me, as a matter of artistic workmanship, in its musical expression of melancholy, quite the summit of its author's attainment:

"Lo! all composed, the soft horizons lie
 Afloat upon the blueness of their coves,
 And sometimes in the mirage does the sky
 Seem to continue the dependent groves,
 And draw in the canoe that careless roves
 Among the stars repeated round the bow.
 Far off the larger sails go down the world,
 For nothing worldly sees St. Mary's now;
 The ancient windmills all their sails have furled,
 The standards of the Lords of Baltimore,
 And they, the Lords, have passed to their repose;
 And nothing sounds upon the pebbly shore
 Except thy hidden bell, Saint Inigo's."

But if this elegiac, this idyllic strain, is heard too rarely here, the elegies and the idylls are themselves but episodes in this hurly-burly of "Men and Events." Tyrtæus sometimes chose the Dorian mood,

"The Dorian mood,
 Of flutes and soft recorders;"

but the Dorian mood is not Tyrtæan. Our journalistic "*doyen*" is also a journalistic Tyrtæus. The avid curiosity, the vivid glances of insight, the ready, so often too ready, phrase that attests the curiosity and reproduces the vision seen by flashlight, the invincible optimism, the "youthful, vehement, exultant and progressive nationality," these are the dominant strains in this pell-mell of poetic work. Our "*doyen*," by rights and precedents a melancholy and discouraged "sage," appears in these pages as the bugler boy at the head of the column. The twinkling guidon is sometimes hidden in the whiffs of dust. The bugle notes are often jangled in the jolting of the trot, but audible above the "drums and tramlings" of the procession, always giving out, in blithe and cheery tones, the marching orders of the day. Doubtless it is "journalistic," but I think it is fine, and I am sure it is American.

MONTGOMERY SCHUYLER.

"THE SHADOWY WATERS."

BY W. B. YEATS.

PERSONS.

FORGAEL.

AIBRIC.

DECTORA.

SAILORS.

THE SCENE.

The deck of a galley in the heroic age. The tiller, which comes through the bulwark, is to the left hand. One looks along the deck toward the high forecastle, which is partly hidden by a great square sail. The sail is drawn in toward the stern at the left side; and is high enough above the deck at the right side to show a little of the deck beyond and of the forecastle. Three rows of hounds, the first dark, the second red and then white with red ears make a conventional pattern upon the sail. The sea is hidden in mist, and there is no light except where the moon makes a vague brightness in the mist.

Forgael is sleeping upon skins a few yards forward of the tiller. He has a silver lily worked upon the breast of his garment. A small harp lies beside him. Aibric and two sailors stand about the tiller. One of the sailors is steering.

THE HELMSMAN.

His face has never gladdened since he came
Out of that island where the fool o' the wood
Played on his harp.

THE OTHER SAILOR.

And I would be as sad
But that the wind changed; for I followed him
And heard the music in the wind, and saw
A red hound running from a silver arrow.
I drew my sword to fling it in a pool;
I have forgotten wherefore.

THE HELMSMAN.

The red hound
Was Forgael's courage that the music killed.

THE OTHER SAILOR.

How many moons have died from the full moon
When something, half a lamb and half a goat,
Walked on the waters and bid Forgael seek
His heart's desire where the world dwindles out?

THE HELMSMAN.

Nine moons.

THE OTHER SAILOR.

And from the harping of the fool?

THE HELMSMAN.

Three moons.

THE OTHER SAILOR.

It were best to kill him, and choose out
Another leader, and turn home again.

THE HELMSMAN.

I had killed him long ago, but that the fool
Gave him his harp.

THE OTHER SAILOR.

Now that he is asleep,
He cannot wake the god that hides in it.

(The two sailors go nearer to Forgael and half draw their swords.)

AIBRIC.

And whom will you make leader? Who will make
A path among these waves and weigh the wind?
Not I, nor Maine there, nor Duach's son.
Be patient yet awhile; for this ninth moon,
Being the moon of birth, may end our doubt.

(Forgael rises. The two sailors hurry past him, and disappear beyond the sail. Forgael takes the tiller.)

FORGAEL.

So these would have killed Forgael while asleep
Because a god has made him wise with dreams ;
And you, my Aibric, who have been a King
And spoken in the Council, and heard tales
That druids write on yew and apple wood,
Are doubtful like these pullers of the oar !

AIBRIC.

Although I doubt your wisdom, do not doubt
The greatness of my love. Did I not rule
A fruitful land under the Aibhlin hills?
And when you came to scorn our little wars
And praise a war among the endless seas,
Did I not follow with a score of ships?
And now they are all gone, I follow still.

FORGAEL.

But would turn home again.

AIBRIC.

No man had doubts
When we rowed north, singing above the oars,
And harried Alban towns, and overthrew
The women slingers on the narrow bridge,
And passed the Northern Hebrides, and took
Armlets of gold or shields with golden nails
From hilly Lochlann ; but our sail has passed
Even the wandering islands of the gods,
And hears the roar of the streams where druids say
Time and the world and all things dwindle out.

FORGAEL.

Do you remember, Aibric, how you bore
A captive woman from the narrow bridge,
And, though you loved her, gave her up to me?

AIBRIC.

I thought she loved you, and I thought her love
Would overcome your sorrow and your dreams.
But you grew weary of her.

FORGAEL.

When I hold

A woman in my arms, she sinks away
As though the waters had flowed up between;
And yet, there is a love that the gods give,
When Ængus and his Edaine wake from sleep
And gaze on one another through our eyes,
And turn brief longing and deceiving hope
And bodily tenderness to the soft fire
That shall burn time when times have ebbed away.
The fool foretold me I would find this love
Among those streams, or on their cloudy edge.

AIBRIC.

No man or woman has loved otherwise
Than in brief longing and deceiving hope
And bodily tenderness; and he who longs
For happier love but finds unhappiness,
And falls among the dreams the drowsy gods
Breathe on the burnished mirror of the world
And then smooth out with ivory hands and sigh.
Forgael, seek out content, where other men
Have found delight, in the resounding oars,
In day out-living battle, on the breast
Of some mild woman, or in children's ways.

FORGAEL.

The fool that came out of the wintry wood
Taught me wise music, and gave me this old harp;
And were all dreams, it would not weigh in the hand.

AIBRIC.

It was a fool that gave it, and may be
Out of mere wantonness to lure a sail
Among the waters that no pilot knows.

FORGAEL.

I have good pilots, Aibric; when men die
They are changed and as gray birds fly out to sea,
And I have heard them call from wind to wind
How all that die are borne about the world

In the cold streams, and wake to their desire,
It may be, before the winds of birth have waked;
Upon clear nights they leave the upper air
And fly among the foam.

A SAILOR.

(Running from the forecastle.)

Thrust down the helm,
For I have seen a ship hid in the fog.
Look! there she lies under a flapping sail.

FORGAEL.

(To Aibric.)

Give me the helm: call hither those who lie
Upon the rowers' benches underneath,
And bid them hide in shadow of the sail,
Or crowd behind the bulwark, that we seem
A trading galley in her helmsman's eyes.

(Aibric goes toward the forecastle.)

It may be now that I can go my way
And no man kill me; for some wind has blown
A galley from the Lochlann seas; her flag
Is folding and unfolding, and in its folds
Her raven flutters. Rob him of his food
Or be his food, I follow the gray wings,
And need no more of life till the white wings
Of Ængus' birds gleam in their apple boughs.

(Two sailors come creeping along the right bulwark.)

THE FOREMOST OF THE TWO SAILORS.

It were better to pass by, because the gods
Make galleys out of wind that change to wind
When one has leapt on board.

THE HINDERMOST OF THE TWO SAILORS.

No, for I have hope
Forgael may find his heart's desire on board
And turn his galley about and bring me home.

(Two more sailors come creeping along the right bulwark.)

THE FOREMOST OF THE TWO SAILORS.

I swore but yesterday if the Red God
Would end this peaceful life that rots the bones,
None should escape my sword: I would send all
To mind his cows and swine by the Red Lake.

THE HINDERMOST OF THE TWO SAILORS.

He has heard me and not you. Nine days ago
I promised him that none should escape my sword
But women and jugglers and players on the harp.

THE FOREMOST OF THE TWO SAILORS.

He has heard me because I promised all.

(There are sailors now along the whole bulwark and sailors in the shadow of the sail.)

FORGAEL.

Bend lower lest your battle axes glimmer.
The tide narrows between, and one old man
Nods by the helm, and nearer to the sail
A woman lies among embroideries.
Near by, but in the shadow of the sail,
A boy and girl hold one another's hands;
Their hair mingles on some stringed instrument,
And a string murmurs as though Time were dead
Or a god hid them under the shadow of wings.
When you are aboard the Lochlann galley, lash
Bulwark to bulwark, and square her sail by ours.
Now rush upon her and find out what prey
Best pleases you.

(The sailors climb over the bulwarks beyond the sail. Forgael is left alone.)

A VOICE ON THE OTHER SHIP.

Armed men have come upon us.

ANOTHER VOICE.

Wake all below.

A MORE DISTANT VOICE.

Why have you broken our sleep?

THE FIRST VOICE.

Armed men have come upon us. O! I am slain.

(There is a sound of fighting.)

FORGAEL.

A gray bird has flown by. He has flown upward.
He hovers above the mast and waits his kind;
When all gather they will fly upon their way.
I shall find out if I have lost the way
Among these misty waters. Two! Now four!
Now four together! I shall hear their words
If I go nearer to the windward side,
For there are sudden voices in my ears.

(He goes to the right bulwark.)

Two hover there together, and one says,
"How light we are now we are changed to birds!"
And the other answers, "Maybe we shall find
Our hearts' desire now that we are so light."
And then one asks another how he died,
And says, "A sword blade pierced me in my sleep."
And now they all wheel suddenly and fly
To the other side and higher in the air.

(He crosses over to the other bulwark.)

They are still waiting; and a laggard comes,
And crying, "I have fled to my beloved
In the waste air. I will wander by his side
Among the windy meadows of the dawn,"
They have flown away together. We are nearly
A quarter of the heavens from our right way.

(He goes to the helm. The sailors return with Dectora, who is crowned and has a rose embroidered upon the breast of her garment.)

FORGAEL.

I linger while the birds are on the wing,
Because the unambitious that hate the gods
Believe that gold and women taken in war
Are better than the woods where no love fades
From its first sighs and laughter before the sleep,
Whose shadow is the sleep that comes with love,
Ends Time and Change.

A SAILOR.

We bring you this great queen.
I spared her handmaid, too; but half way hither
She caught this blade out of my belt and died.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

She offers great rewards if we turn east
And bring her to her kingdom and her people.

FORGAEL.

My way is west. She seems both young and shapely.
Give her to Aibric, if he will. I wait
For an immortal woman as I think.

(He goes nearer to Dectora.)

THE SAILOR WHO HAD FIRST SPOKEN.

I left her living, thinking that I had found
Your heart's desire and the end of all our trouble;
But now I will kill her.

FORGAEL.

(Motions him away and looks for a long time at Dectora.)

All comes to an end;
The harvest's in; the granary doors are shut;
And I am old as Time, because I know
All that Time knows. Speak to me, Queen. O speak!
I wait your words as the dead wait the living.

DECTORA.

If you would serve me, as your word and voice
Have bid me hope, sail to the Lochlann shore
And bring me to my people. I promised these
So much of wealth as may befit their rank;
I promise you a hundred drinking bowls,
A hundred shields of brass, a hundred swords,
A hundred oxen and a hundred sheep,
And more, if you will war against the Danes
In Southern Lochlann.

FORGAEL.

I would not obey
Any that lived, and I have brought my galley
Where I had heard no feet but the gods' came.
Have the winds blown you among these empty waters?

DECTORA.

I have come hither because I hoped to come
Where gods are brooding in a mountainous place
That murmurs with holy woods, and win their help
To conquer among the countries of the north.
I have found nothing but these empty waters.
I have turned homewards.

FORGAEL.

In the eyes o' the gods,
War laden galleys, and armies on white roads,
And unforgotten names, and the cold stars
That have built all are dust on a moth's wing.
These are their lures, but they have set their hearts
On tears and laughter; they have lured you hither
And lured me hither that you might be my love.
Ængus looks on you when I look: he waits
Till his Edaine, no more a silver fly
Among the winds, looks under your pale eyelids.

DECTORA.

(To the sailors.)

Is it your will that I, who am a queen

And have been wooed by the twelve kings of the earth,
Become a stranger's leman; and that you,
Who might have flocks and herds and many thralls,
Be pullers of the oar until you die?

A SAILOR.

She bids us follow her.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

I have grown weary
Of following Forgael's dream from wind to wind.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Give me a hundred sheep.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Give me a house
Well sheltered from the winds, and fruitful fields,
And a strong galley.

DECTORA.

I give you all as much.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

And will you swear never to be avenged
For those among your people that are dead?

DECTORA.

I swear it, though I gladly would lie down
With some you have killed and die; for when I left
My foster mother's garden in the south
I ceased to be a woman, being a queen.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

And will you swear it by the sun and moon?

DECTORA.

I swear it.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Let every man draw out his sword
And gather round him, that no god may know
The hand that wounds.

(Forgael has taken the harp in his hands and is leaning against the bulwark. The sailors draw their swords, and come toward him. Forgael plays slowly and faintly.)

A SAILOR.

A white bird beats his wings
Against my face and eyes.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Mine too are beaten.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

I am half blinded.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

I am half blinded, too.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

I am afraid of the harp.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

O! Wings on wings!

DECTORA.

He has thrown a druid dream upon the air.
Strike quickly; it will fade out when you strike.

A SAILOR.

I am afraid of his low laughing harp.

(Forgael changes the air.)

DECTORA.

(Looking over the bulwark in a half dream.)

I shall be home now in a little while,
Hearing the harpers play, the pine wood crackle,
The handmaids laugh and whisper in the door.

A SAILOR.

Who said we had a skin of yellow ale?

ANOTHER SAILOR.

I said the ale was brown.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

(Who has gone into the other ship.)

I have found the ale,
I had thrown it down behind this coil of rope.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Forgael can die to-morrow. Come to the ale.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Come to the ale: for he can die to-morrow.

(They go on to the other ship.)

AIBRIC.

(Who lingers looking at Dectora.)

She will say something in a little while,
'And I shall laugh with joy.

A VOICE ON THE OTHER SHIP.

Come hither, Aibric,
'And tell me a love story while I drink.

AIBRIC.

Ah, well, they are calling me—they are calling me.

(He goes forward and into the other ship.)

FORGAEL.

How little and reedy a sound awakes a god
To cry his folding cry.

*(He changes the tune again; Dectora leans against the bulwark
as if very sleepy and gradually sinks down on the deck.)*

DECTORA.

(As if in sleep.)

There is some man
That I would bid my people put to death.
I think he lives in Lochlann. No, not there;
'Among the Hebrides.

FORGAEL.

When she awakens,
The years that have gone over her from the hour
When she dreamed first of love, shall flicker out
'And leave her dreaming. When I looked on her,
I grew as old as Time, and she grows young
'As the ageless birds of Ængus, or the birds
The white fool makes at morning out of foam;
For love is a-weaving when a woman's heart
Grows young and a man's heart grows old in a twinkling.

(He changes the air.)

Her eyelids tremble and the white foam fades;
The stars would hurl their crowns among the foam
Were they but lifted up.

DECTORA.

(Slowly waking.)

The red hound is fled.
Why did you say that I have followed him
For these nine years? O! Arrow upon arrow!
My eyes are troubled by the silver arrows;
Ah, they have pierced his heart!

(She wakes.)

I have slept long,
I fought twelve battles dressed in golden armor.
I have forgot it all. How soon dreams fade!
I will drink out of the stream. The stream is gone
Before I dropped asleep, a kingfisher
Shook the pale apple blossom over it;
'And now the waves are crying in my ears,
'And a cold wind is blowing in my hair.

FORGAEL.

(Going over to her.)

A hound that had lain hid in the red rushes
 Breathed out a druid vapor, and crumbled away
 The grass and the blue shadow on the stream
 And the pale blossom; but I woke instead
 The winds and waters to be your home forever;
 And overturned the demon with a sound
 I had woven of the sleep that is in pools
 Among great trees, and in the wings of owls,
 And under lovers' eyelids.

(He stoops and holds the harp toward her.)

Bend your head
 And lean your lips devoutly to this harp,
 For he who gave it called it Ængus' harp
 And said it was mightier than the sun and moon,
 Or than the shivering casting net of the stars.

(She takes the harp in her hands and kisses it.)

DECTORA.

O, Ængus of the herds, watch over me.
 I sat beside my foster mother, and now
 I am caught in woven nets of enchantment. Look!
 I have wet this braid of hair with tears while asleep.

FORGAEL.

(Standing upright beside her.)

He watches over none but faithful lovers.
 Edaine came out of Midher hill, and lay
 Beside young Ængus in his tower of glass,
 Where time is drowned in odor-laden winds
 And druid moons, and murmuring of boughs,
 And sleepy boughs, and boughs where apples made
 Of opal and ruby and pale chrysolite
 Awake unsleeping fires; and wove seven strings,
 Sweet with all music, out of his long hair,
 Because her hands had been made wild by love;

And when one changed her to a silver fly,
He made a harp with druid apple-wood
That she among her winds might know he wept;
And from that hour, he has watched over none
But faithful lovers.

DECTORA.

(Half rising.)

Whither have you come,
Beseeching hands and more beseeching eyes?
I have been waiting you. A moment since
My foster mother sang in an old rhyme
That my true love would come in a ship of pearl
Under a silken sail and silver yard,
And bring me where the children of Ængus wind
In happy dances, under a windy moon;
But these waste waters and wind-beaten sails
Are wiser witchcraft, for our peace awakes
In one another's arms.

(He has taken her in his arms.)

FORGAEL.

Ængus has seen
His well-beloved through a mortal's eyes;
And she, no longer blown among the winds,
Is laughing through a mortal's eyes.

DECTORA.

(Peering out over the waters.)

O look!

A red-eared hound follows a hornless deer.
There! There! They have gone quickly, for already
The cloudy waters and the glimmering winds
Have covered them.

FORGAEL.

Where did they vanish away?

DECTORA.

Where the moon makes a cloudy light in the mist.

FORGAEL.

(Going to the tiller.)

The pale hound and the deer wander forever
Among the winds and waters; and when they pass
The mountain of the gods, the unappeasable gods
Cover their faces with their hair and weep.
They lure us to the streams where the world ends.

DECTORA.

All dies among those streams.

FORGAEL.

The fool has made
These messengers to lure men to his peace,
Where true love wanders among the holy woods.

DECTORA.

What were true love among the rush of his streams?
The gods weave nets, and take us in their nets,
And none knows wherefore; but the heart's desire
Is this poor body that reddens and grows pale.

(She goes toward him.)

FORGAEL.

The fool, who has made the wisdom that men write
Upon thin boards of yew and apple-wood,
And all that prophesying images
Made of dim gold rave out in secret tombs,
Has told me that the undying send their eagles
To snatch alive out of the streams all lovers
That have gone thither to look for the loud streams,
Folding their hearts' desire to their glad hearts.

DECTORA.

The love I know is hidden in these hands
That I would mix with yours, and in this hair
That I would shed like twilight over you.

FORGAEL.

The love of all under the light of the sun
Is but brief longing, and deceiving hope,

'And bodily tenderness; but love is made
Imperishable fire under the boughs
Of chrysoberyl and beryl and chrysolite
'And chrysoprase and ruby and sardonyx.

DECTORA.

Where are these boughs? Where are the holy woods
That can change love to imperishable fire?
O! I would break this net the gods have woven
Of voices and of dreams. O heart, be still!
O why is love so crazy that it longs
To drown in its own image?

FORGAEL.

Even that sleep
That comes with love, comes murmuring of an hour
When earth and heaven have been folded up;
And languors that awake in mingling hands
And mingling hair fall from the fiery boughs,
To lead us to the streams where the world ends.

*(Aibric and some of the sailors come from the other ship over
the bulwark beyond the sail, and gather in the dimness beyond the
sail.)*

AIBRIC.

Give me your swords.

A SAILOR.

They are always quarrelling.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

It is the brown ale does it.

AIBRIC.

Give me your swords.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

We will not quarrel, now that all is well
'And we go home.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Come, Aibric; end your tale
Of golden armed Aolan and the queen
That lives among the woods of the dark hounds.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

And tell how Mananan sacked Murias
Under the waves, and took a thousand women
When the dark hounds were loosed.

ANOTHER SAILOR.

Come to the ale.

(They go into the other ship.)

DECTORA.

(Going toward the sail.)

I have begun remembering my dreams.
I have commanded men in dreams. Beloved,
We will go call these sailors, and escape
The nets the gods have woven and our own hearts,
And, hurrying homeward, fall upon some land
And rule together under a canopy.

FORGAEL.

All that know love among the winds of the world
Have found it like the froth upon the ale.

DECTORA.

We will find out valleys and woods and meadows
To wander in; you have loved many women,
It may be, and have grown weary of love.
But I am new to love.

FORGAEL.

Go among these
That have known love among the winds of the world
And tell its story over their brown ale.

DECTORA.

(Going a little nearer to the sail.)

Love was not made for darkness and the winds
That blow when heaven and earth are withering,

For love is kind and happy. O come with me!
 Look on this body and this heavy hair;
 A stream has told me they are beautiful.
 The gods hate happiness and weave their nets
 Out of their hatred.

FORGAEL.

My beloved, farewell.
 Seek Aibric on the Lochlann galley, and tell him
 That Forgael has followed the gray birds alone,
 And bid him to your country.

DECTORA.

I should wander
 Amid the darkness, now that all my stars
 Have fallen and my sun and moon gone out.

FORGAEL.

I think that there is love in Aibric's eyes;
 I know he will obey you; and if your eyes
 Should look upon his eyes with love unto the end,
 That would be happiest, for there is none
 So worthy among men.

DECTORA.

I follow you,
 Whether among the cold winds of the dead,
 Or among winds that move in the meadows and woods.
 I have cut the cords that held this galley to ours.
 She is already fading, as though the gods
 Had woven her of wind.

(She throws herself at Forgael's feet.)

Life withers out.
 I hide you with my hair, that we may gaze
 Upon this world no longer.

(The harp begins to murmur of itself.)

FORGAEL.

The harp cries out.
 It has begun to cry out to the eagles.

THE END.

THE FUTURE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD.

BY CHARLES SYDNEY CLARK.

AMONG the most peculiar products of our system of government are the military forces which, while locally known as State Troops, National Guard, Volunteer Militia, Militia, and Volunteer Guard, are generally known, as a whole, as the "National Guard." This mass of forces is confessedly not a part of the Regular Army, nor, although it is composed wholly of volunteers, is it a Volunteer Army. Nor is it the United States "Militia" of the Constitution and Revised Statutes, for it is not organized, officered, drilled or equipped in the manner provided by statute; it is not a United States force; and never has been, and never will be, called into the service of the United States as "Militia." Within two years, the legal advisers of the Government have advised the President that his authority to call out the National Guard for service, as "Militia," must be questioned, and that it would be prudent for him to obtain authority from Congress to organize a Volunteer Army.

What, then, is the status of the National Guard? It is a *new* force, the existence of which was never contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, or the Congress which enacted the "Militia" law, but which is, nevertheless, the "well-organized militia" which Washington contemplated. The assumption that the Guard is a new force at once removes the difficulties in the way of "reorganizing the Militia," with which Presidents, Committees of Congress, statesmen and lawyers have labored for a century. For, if it be a new force, it is not impossible for Congress to create an entirely new Volunteer Army which shall be the Guard reorganized and modified, to provide for the support thereof, and to make laws for its government and regulation.

There is not only law but ample precedent for such action. The

States themselves have, from time to time, disbanded independent military organizations or reorganized them as companies and battalions of the State Troops. And these independent organizations stood in precisely the same relation to the States as that in which the Guard stands to the nation. From time to time, also, bills have been introduced into Congress providing for the establishment of new naval and military forces. Such were the Volunteer Acts of 1861 and 1898, the United States Naval Auxiliary Naval Force Bill of 1898, all of which became laws, and the Cutting, Hawley, Frye and other so-called "Militia" bills.

Congress having clearly a right to organize such a new military force, and there being at hand to serve as the nucleus of that force an existing army of citizen-soldiers consisting of nearly 125,000 officers and men, shall we not avail ourselves of this splendid raw material without further fruitless discussion as to whether it is or is not "Militia?" The answer of both professional and citizen soldiers is that we should, but not until the faults of the National Guard are eradicated. These faults are known, and there is little dispute as to the causes from which flow the result that the Guard is not as efficient as it should be.

These causes may be briefly stated as follows: That the National Guard is not national in fact as well as in name; that it is not provided with means sufficient for its support in a state of efficiency; that it depends for support chiefly upon the forced or voluntary contributions of its members; that enlisted men are allowed by law a voice and vote in the election of officers and in civil organizations which control the military organizations; that service is rendered onerous and expensive to men of small means and officers are required, to the prejudice of good order and discipline, to solicit and enforce payment of dues, fines and assessments, and thus render themselves obnoxious to the men they command; that the force, as a whole, is never properly provided with equipment, tentage, ammunition, military stores or horses; that no facilities for theoretical instruction are provided by the Government; that the lack of guarantee that they will not be required to serve in foreign countries deters men having business interests requiring personal attention, or having dependent relatives, from enlisting; that a lack of diversity in drills, and of field exercises and manœuvres, causes enlisted men to become weary of doing duty; that inspections are not made in a proper

manner and are not thorough; that men are accepted as recruits who are not physically able to bear the hardships of battle and campaign; that Light Artillery has not been able to secure proper ordnance, mounts, draught horses or practice, and that no Heavy Artillery has been organized except in Massachusetts and New York; that the appointment on Governors' Staffs of men distinguished only for social or political prominence has committed the highly important duties of the "General Staff" to men unacquainted with those duties; that in many States officers have been commissioned without examination; that officers and non-commissioned officers of the Army have not been detailed to specific National Guard organizations as instructors; and that the Guard as a whole has been almost entirely without the benefit of the direction, instruction or encouragement of the Regular Army of the United States.

This review of the causes for the inefficiency of the Guard enables us at once to suggest the reformatory measures which should be adopted.

I. The National Guard of the several States and Territories should be re-established and reorganized by Congress as a national force under the name and style of the "National Volunteer Reserve;" and its direction, control and maintenance should be assumed by the National Government.

There can be little doubt as to the entire feasibility of such action. In the case of the Auxiliary Naval Force, action was taken in 1898 very similar to that which is here proposed in connection with the National Guard. It was directed that, with the consent of the Governor and Legislature of a State, the naval forces of that State might be incorporated with and be enlisted in the newly organized body. In like manner, the National Guard of any State might be incorporated with and enlisted in the National Volunteer Reserve.

The effect of such a law would no doubt be the same as in States where similar State laws have been enacted. Organizations worth retention would soon be found in the Volunteer Reserve, while those organized with no expectation of performing service for the State or nation would soon disappear. That such a law is desired and that its passage would be approved by a vast majority of the citizens cannot be doubted.

But it is quite true that such a reorganization as that proposed

could not be effected without considerable difficulty. It is obvious that if the control is transferred to the nation the Government must own the barracks or military posts in which the new national force is quartered, and there would seem to be almost insuperable difficulties in the way of a transfer of the military property of States, counties, municipalities and individual organizations to the Government. Moreover, to separate the National Guard from its military homes would be to destroy it, and the nation, if it acquires the Guard, must acquire the armories.

The cost of the property it would be necessary to acquire would be great, but no greater than a nation of 77,000,000 people can afford. Were the price of this property \$50,000,000, the interest charges would not exceed in all probability \$1,500,000 *per annum*. An equally large sum is now expended annually by the States in so-called "general military appropriations." And it is almost impossible to believe that, were the States relieved from expending this large amount, they would object to the imposition of a special tax calling for the payment of two cents *per capita*, or less, a year. A tax of five cents *per capita* on the population of the United States, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the Philippines would produce an annual revenue of \$4,150,000, sufficient to pay interest upon an investment of \$50,000,000, and furnish \$2,650,000 to be applied for the support of a Volunteer force.

Another possible difficulty might be that the Guard itself might object to reorganization. This must be seriously doubted. Since the beginning of the movement which resulted in the "New National Guard," it has been the firm belief, both of the members and of citizens, that the Guard was organized and maintained to furnish the nation with a volunteer reserve force. Public opinion, therefore, demanded in 1898 that the Guard should instantly enter the volunteer service, and the Guard complied without hesitation. And it has now come to pass that a record of "no United States service" causes a Guard regiment to be regarded with distrust if not dislike.

That conditions would be imposed by the Guard, as conditions precedent to their re-enlistment in a new force, must be expected, and it is likely that some of these conditions would be formulated as follows:

- (1.) That each State should be made a separate Military District, commanded by an officer of the Volunteer Reserve from that

district, appointed by the Secretary of War; that each geographical section of the country should be an Army Corps District, and that each Army Corps District should be commanded by a general officer of the Army; that units should be organized as provided for in the statutes for the Army, but with additional Battalion Staff officers, musicians and Hospital Corps men; that increase of strength should be effected by recruiting, not by consolidation of existing organizations; and that present organizations should not be disbanded unless notably inefficient, the present designation of organizations being retained as far as possible.

(2.) That line officers should retain their present rank until discharge, resignation or death, and that their successors should be promoted under the same system of lineal promotion prescribed for the Army; but that no officer should be promoted until he had passed an examination before a Board of Examination, or produced evidence that he had attended the sessions of a military school of instruction for a prescribed period. Line officers of the lowest grade, but no other officers, should be elected. No person should be eligible to election who has not served at least three years in the National Guard or Volunteer Reserve, or one year in the Army or Volunteer Army, in time of war.

II. Congress should provide so liberally for the support of the National Volunteer Reserve that the civil organizations of the National Guard could be abolished, and that all officers and men should receive pay for services performed by them, in peace as well as during active service.

General Schofield has said that in presenting any plan for the modification of the National Guard the first and indispensable step is to "dispel the illusion that it can be done cheaply." Competent and careful officers have estimated that the smallest sum for which an effective Volunteer Reservist can be armed, equipped, drilled, disciplined and maintained for five years is \$500. But the average sum per man allowed in recent years by State and National Government was \$24, or a total in five years of \$120. The Guard could not have existed upon such a meagre appropriation, had it not long ago devised a plan whereby it was enabled to force its officers and men to make up the deficiency, both in appropriations for purely military expenses and for other expenses which had to be met in order to attain popularity.

The system of organizing civil associations, the membership

of which was identical with that of the military company or regiment, was devised. These civil organizations levied dues and fines and occasional assessments. From these dues, fines and assessments deficiencies were made good. State laws in many places make payment of dues and fines compulsory. This system, while effective, is unmilitary and destructive of discipline. It places enlisted men on an absolute equality with officers in civil meetings, allows them to dictate the policy of the company, elect disbursing officers, control expenditure of funds and in meetings freely criticise the acts of superiors; it obliges officers to see that the revenue of the company is collected, and makes them debt-collectors, compelled to sacrifice all dignity in demanding and enforcing payment; it compels officers and men to pay a tax and, in case men do not pay, compels officers to make up the deficiency, rather than discharge enlisted men who are out of employment or unable to pay; it sometimes results in the selection of officers who are able to "support the position," rather than of officers distinguished for ability or soldierly qualities.*

The Guard can never become an effective Reserve until these civil associations, with all their machinery and exactions, are abolished and the Guard put upon a strictly military basis. This could be done were the means to pay all lawful and necessary expenses provided by the Government, and were officers and men paid a small sum for their services, regiments, troops and batteries being allowed to deduct from such pay fines for delinquencies, and turn these fines over to their respective disbursing officers. The pay need not be large in amount, and it is not proposed that this peace-pay should be allowed in time of war. The allowance of such pay would in every way elevate and stimulate the Guard. It is not that the Guard desires, or needs so much, the amount paid; but the payment would be regarded by officers and men as evidence of the appreciation of their services.

By deducting from the pay any fines for delinquency, the tendency of enlisted men to absent themselves from drills without good cause could be corrected. Absences are now frequently excused upon the theory that a man makes nothing by attendance and is often caused great loss. But if a man is paid for attendance and can suffer loss only if absent, he cannot complain if the sum

* These observations do not apply to several wealthy and self-supporting organizations in New York City, Massachusetts and the South.

due him is withheld. Were peace-pay allowed, each officer and man would have on pay day a sum to his credit against which could be charged the cost of military property lost or ruined while in his possession. This is not the case at present. Thousands of articles of uniform and equipment are annually lost or ruined, and the loss is usually borne by the unhappy officers, who often replace new missing articles with second-hand articles.

Bad as it is, the system of civil organizations is founded on a sound principle—that of no taxation without representation. Under the present system of payment of the expenses of the Guard, each soldier is a partner with the people, and naturally asks a partner's rights. It is perfectly just that he should have them. But it is preposterous that such principles should be at the very basis of a military system. There can be no proper discipline, no subordination or respect for superiors, in an organization in which the commanding officer and the private are business partners in the business of carrying on that organization.

III. The National Guard, reorganized as a National Volunteer Reserve, should be composed of Permanent Forces, stationed at schools of instruction, and the Active Reserve stationed at armories; and facilities for obtaining practical and theoretical instruction should be provided by the Government at schools of instruction, and staff colleges, through instruction by officers of the Army detailed to specific organizations, and through field service and manœuvres.

The Secretary of War should establish, in each military district, at a post or fort of the United States, a School of Instruction for officers and non-commissioned officers. To each school should be attached a corps of instructors detailed from among the officers or retired officers of the Army, or Volunteers. The officers at such schools, together with members of the Reserve specially enlisted for the purpose, should form a Permanent Corps at each school.

Appointment as a student at a School of Instruction should be made a reward of merit. The Adjutant-General of a Military District should annually publish in General Orders the names of officers and men appointed students for the ensuing year, adding commendation of the manner in which the appointees have performed their duties. No person should be appointed who has not been enlisted or commissioned for at least one year, and the

preference should be given to those with the longest service to their credit. After accepting appointments, students should be entitled to wear on the sleeve of the uniform coat the coat-of-arms of the United States or some other distinguishing badge. Students and members of the Permanent Corps at each school should, while in attendance, receive the same pay as officers and men of the Army; provided that they should be paid for each day of actual attendance, not by the month or week. Men of the permanent force should remain permanently at the fort or post, but students should not be required to attend continuously.

Staff Colleges may be considered a necessity. The staff officers of the Guard have generally been considered less efficient than those of the Line on account of lack of facilities for practical training in service. A Staff College should, therefore, be established at the Headquarters of each Military District, or at designated Military Posts of the Army in each Department. All staff officers of brigades, divisions and Army Corps of the Reserve should be required to attend at a Staff College for a stated period in each year.

All officers of the Army at present acting as Instructors in Schools or Military Colleges, and such other officers as the Secretary of War may detail, should be detailed to duty with the re-organized Guard, as instructors and officers. It is the experience of National Guard and Volunteer officers that the time spent in instructing boys in "Military Academies" or cadet organizations has been time wasted. The best results can be obtained by assigning officers to duty with specified organizations, not with the Headquarters of a State or District. Officers of the Army can acquire a knowledge of the special needs and temperament of volunteers only by taking an active part in the drills, instruction and social life of specific organizations.

Officers of the Army detailed to regiments of the Reserve, and appointed by the colonels thereof upon regimental staffs, would obtain an intimate knowledge of their regiments and would have authority to make suggestions, correct faults and instruct officers and men. There should therefore be attached to the staff of each regiment of the Reserve an officer, or retired officer, of the Army designated "Inspector," and with rank and pay during service with the Reserve of one grade higher than his Army grade.

Such Inspector should preside at Schools of Instruction and

Boards of Examination, should give to the officers of the regiment in council his criticisms of drills and the condition of books and papers, and should be permitted to suggest any drills, lectures or courses of instruction which in his judgment are necessary. He should have quarters assigned to him in the armory of the regiment to which he is detailed. He should be assisted by non-commissioned officers of the Army designated "Sergeant Instructors" and attached to the non-commissioned staff. These should serve as armorers and janitors of armories.

There should be little difficulty in doing away with the present system of Camps of Instruction and substituting therefor practice marches and field manoeuvres. The drill schedule might, with advantage, include, in May, out-door drills on Saturday afternoons, by company, companies marching to and from drill-ground; in June, practice marches from Friday afternoon to Monday morning, by battalion; in July, practice marches of one week by regiment; in September or October, field exercises by brigade.

Practice marches would not only be of great practical value in familiarizing officers and men with road-marching, but would also, by familiarizing the people with the soldiery, aid recruiting and foster a spirit of pride in our Volunteer Reserve. It is an almost invariable experience that, when a body of troops, Regular or Volunteer, marches through outlying country districts in this country, their march soon becomes a sort of triumphal progress, and that recruiting in those districts is stimulated.

IV. The National Guard reorganized as a Volunteer Reserve should not be required to perform military service without the boundaries of the United States; nor should any Army Corps be required to perform service without the Army Corps District in which it is raised.

Members of the National Guard are business men and professional men dependent upon civil occupations for their livelihood and that of their families. It is wholly unreasonable to expect them to sacrifice their business interests, and inflict hardships upon their creditors and families by abandoning business to go with their organizations to different points in America or foreign countries. A citizen-soldier has never been required or expected in any land, at any time, to do this; but here a member of the National Guard is goaded by a perverted public sentiment into doing something which common sense tells him is wrong.

Many citizens feel deeply the injustice of the present system of transforming the National Guard into United States Volunteers, and if members of the Guard they take out their discharges as soon as they can do so with honor; if not in the Guard, they decline to enlist, and a struggle to obtain recruits is constantly in progress. There should be no difficulty in obtaining a million men as recruits from a male population of militia ages which in 1890 was 13,230,168, and is now much larger. As it is, only one recruit for 2,566 inhabitants is obtained annually for the Guard, and the recent war has shown that in seventy-five cases out of a hundred the recruit thus obtained is not one who will be accepted by an Army surgeon. If we are to have a National Volunteer Reserve, we must obtain recruits, and if we are unable to induce citizens desirable as recruits to enlist if the nature of the contract we ask them to make is not to their liking, we can do only one thing—namely, offer a contract which they will make.

V. The National Guard system of drill and instruction should be so modified that the interest of the enlisted man in his work shall be increased, and that officers and men may familiarize themselves with the duties that they may be required to perform in the field in the time of war.

The National Guardsman of the present day is much more efficient when in State service than when in the service of the United States. And this is so because in time of peace he comprehends why he receives an order, and he obeys it understandingly. The drill programme, the ceremonies, the rifle practice, the camp duty are, like the laws of the Medes and Persians, unchangeable. Every duty is prescribed in orders with minute exactness. But when the Guardsman becomes a Volunteer, the conditions are different. The soldier must obey blindly, without knowing or asking reasons for orders; he must be prepared to do things he has not been warned he is to do; he must drill and fight with men he never saw, and obey orders he does not understand. He does not do so cheerfully, for a volunteer is a "thinking bayonet," and his hesitancy is a bad fault. But he is not as much to blame as the system which has made him what he is, a victim of "the eternal fours right."

The system of instruction adopted generally in the Guard is one which is monotonous and uninteresting.

At the beginning of each drill season the average company

goes back to the A B C of drill, and, no matter how many experienced men may be in the ranks, becomes for the time being a recruit squad. Evening after evening, week after week, is devoted to drill in the manual of arms, and simple movements; and three months pass before extended order drill or battalion drills are taken up. But there is little instruction in the duties of guards and sentinels; none whatever, except in rare instances, in pitching or striking tents, or cooking. The marching is all done on a smooth armory floor. Few captains can spare time for setting-up drill or physical exercise drill. When summer comes and organizations go to camp, little difference is made in the drill programme.

Many States permit recruits to go to camp, and they must be instructed. Accordingly, the company drills and battalion drills, in close and extended order, are resumed. Guard duty now receives much attention, and there are guard mounts and dress parades every day. But the course of instruction is otherwise much the same as when the men are in armories in winter. The result is that men who have drilled year after year become wearied and disgusted; and only a strong sense of duty forces them to attend drills and camp regularly. They are eager and willing to learn something new. There are few Guardsmen who do not wish to know how to pitch and strike wall and conical tents, draw rations and cook them, march on the road with advance and rear guards, throw out outposts and pickets, and construct hasty entrenchments. But they are seldom permitted to know much about these subjects. Even rifle practice is frowned upon.

Evening drills should be restricted to such drills as are necessary in order to give recruits, squads of recruits and the company a thorough knowledge of elementary principles. In weather when out-door marching is possible without acute discomfort, the company or battalion should be marched four or five miles in the open air, in order that the men may be taught to have on hand their campaign outfit, may learn to march carrying loads properly adjusted, and may be relieved from the monotony of continual drill in a large room. Every evening drill should include (1.) fifteen minutes of physical exercise drill, without blouses, caps or braces (if drill be held in an armory); (2.) fifteen minutes of drill in aiming and position, and the loadings and firings. Battalion and regimental drills in armories should not be

attempted. Even in the largest armories, there is not sufficient room to exercise an entire battalion of four companies of about one hundred each. The proper distances and intervals cannot be preserved, and officers and men become accustomed to make errors, which they are required and ordered to make in armories to conform to circumstances.

In good weather there should be a "march out" at least once a month, companies first marching out one by one, and subsequently battalions and the regiment. In spring and summer, when ordinarily there is little work in armories, organizations in cities and towns should take turns in performing the ceremony of evening parade on Saturday afternoons in some suitable place, thus providing a spectacle which would please and interest both the public and the men, and make a "demonstration" of strength and efficiency. A parade in a park or boulevard at sunset on Saturday could be witnessed by nearly all workingmen, and would be considered by them a concession to the demand, perhaps a just one, that the State or Government should do something to make life pleasant for the poorer class.

Battle exercises and manœuvres on a large scale should be attempted more frequently, troops marching to and from the ground, and remaining out of the armory at least two days, subsisting themselves in the same manner as when on the march in the field. It is on these occasions that battalion drills and regimental drills should occur, varied ground being used, and full campaign equipment being carried.

"To have men walk once or twice a year over a range and fire one shot at each halt, consumes time and ammunition without teaching them anything," General Wingate remarks. The same is true of taking men to a range once or twice a year and ordering them to fire ten shots at targets at known distances. And it is absurd to say that any distance is "unknown" on a range where those who shoot are familiar with every stake, tree and landmark. But as Guardsmen or Reservists must of necessity practice on ranges, the conditions of shooting in battle should be simulated as far as possible. If, as General Wingate suggests, a canvas target simulating men advancing were mounted on wheels and drawn toward the firing point, on a railway, by a wire rope, those firing would really fire "at unknown distances," as in war, and would learn to adjust sights quickly and aim properly.

VI. Inspections should be made quarterly, without more than forty-eight hours' notice, by a disinterested officer of the Army.

Inspection in the National Guard has hitherto, in a majority of the States, been made by an officer of the State or Brigade staff, who has given timely notice of his intention to inspect. At once, every officer, however apathetic at any other time, has bestirred himself; ascertained the whereabouts of missing men, and urged them to be present; inspected uniforms and equipments and had them put in order; replaced missing articles, and put in order company books and papers. The inspector comes and finds the organization in a better state than it has been in at any time during the year, or is likely to be at any time until his next appearance. He musters the men and counts them, makes a rapid and perfunctory examination of uniforms, arms and equipments, glances at books and papers, verifies the property accounts and is satisfied.

Such an inspection necessarily fails entirely to reveal the actual state of an organization as it is for twelve months in the year. Nor do the inspections frequently made in camp by Army officers enable them to ascertain all they desire to know regarding an organization. Both at camp and at annual inspection an organization is "on its good behavior." It has been warned it will be watched and inspected, and acts accordingly.

Not more than forty-eight hours' notice of intention to inspect should be given; and, upon service of notice by a proper officer, commanding officers should be required to deliver immediately to such officer the books and papers of the organization, in order that no changes may be made therein previous to inspection.

The work of inspection should be divided up in the following manner: In winter, at the armory, there should be inspection of quarters, property, books, papers and accounts, examination of officers sent up for examination, and medical examination of recruits; in spring, at a rifle range, inspection of small-arms practice, of drills in school of the soldier and company, and of campaign uniform and equipment; in summer, in the field, inspection of drills in school of battalion, of evolutions of regiment and extended order on varied ground, of guard and outpost duty, and proficiency in cooking, pitching and striking camp, sanitary precautions, etc.; in autumn, in the field, inspection of marching

in a march of five hours, with formation as in an enemy's country, of proficiency in entrenching, and provisioning of troops in the field.

A regiment should be graded not according to its ability to produce one hundred per cent. of its men at inspection, or to present those men clean and well-disciplined, but according to (1.) the condition of books, papers, quarters and uniforms; (2.) drill of officers and men; (3.) proficiency in small-arms practice, and (4.) proficiency in cooking and duties of the soldier in the field.

VII. The Light Artillery of the Guard should be reorganized as machine-gun Artillery and regiments of the infantry should be reorganized as Garrison or Heavy Artillery.

Now that it has been conclusively shown by Lieutenant John H. Parker, U. S. A., that machine guns may successfully participate in a charge on a well-fortified position held by a superior force of veteran troops armed with modern rifles, in the words of Lieutenant Parker, "a new arm of the service is created." While this statement is true, as far as the Army is concerned, it is not quite correct. For the National Guard has for many years evinced a decided preference for machine guns, and many batteries have been wholly or partially armed with these weapons. The "new arm of the service" has already been created in the Guard, and should be maintained.

While, in order to render a National Guard battery effective, large sums must necessarily be expended for guns, equipment and horse-hire, it is a question whether the results obtained would justify the expenditure. On the other hand, "machine-gun sections" of "Gatling batteries" have become remarkably proficient.

If the Volunteer Army is to become an Army for national defense, its first and most important duty will be to man sea-coast fortifications, where at present the entire United States force of artillery is not sufficiently large to furnish one relief of the three which would be required for the batteries in time of war, nor even large enough to keep the guns and other property in good order and repair. The duties of the Army Heavy Artillery will in war devolve almost immediately upon the Volunteer Artillery. But gunnery is a science, and the care and use of modern high-power, large-calibre guns require a skill which cannot be acquired in a week or a month. Volunteer artillerists should therefore be secured, organized and trained without delay. The

lead of Massachusetts and New York in this respect should be followed.

VIII. The Military Staffs of Civil Governors should be abolished and their duties should be performed by staffs of Military District Commanders of the Volunteer Reserve.

Much of the inefficiency of the Guard has been charged to the fact that the responsible duties of Staff Departments have been committed to men appointed from civil life for political rather than military reasons, and whose term of office was that of the appointing Governor, and who consequently could never acquire a thorough knowledge of their duties.

Remedies for other defects have been suggested, and it remains only to urge the need for immediate action. The Secretary of War has already called attention in his annual report to the fact that the law requires the reduction of the Army to its former strength during the next year. If such reduction is made the nation will be facing a most serious problem: that of defending home territory, pacifying and holding outlying possessions, and upholding the national prestige of the United States as "a great Power," with a handful of soldiery—with one Army Corps.

A demand for organization of an effective Volunteer Reserve will then unquestionably be made. Is it not well to anticipate that demand, and at the same time to guard against the natural and justifiable objections of the National Guard to being superseded or disbanded, by beginning at once the work of transforming the Guard, the material at hand, into an effective Reserve? No question before the people deserves more earnest consideration, and more energetic action by the Congress, than this.

CHARLES SYDNEY CLARK.

THE BRITISH VOLUNTEER SYSTEM.

BY THE RT. HON. EARL BROWLOW, FORMERLY UNDER-SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR WAR.

THE early years of this century found England in the possession of a large body of volunteers. They were not a part of the permanent military organization of the country, but were raised in a hurry, and for a special purpose, and were only intended to meet a sudden emergency. At that period, Napoleon I. had massed a great army at Boulogne in sight of the British coast; but the British cruisers held the Channel, and day after day and month after month passed, until the naval battle of Trafalgar put an end forever to his ambitious dream of the conquest of England. It was to meet this contingency that the Volunteers of 1803 were raised, and the danger having been averted, they were disbanded and never brought together again.

With the organization and efficiency of this force, this article is in no way concerned, and it is only mentioned here to explain that volunteering for defense of the country is no new idea, but that the volunteers of 1803 have no relation to those of 1858. They served their purpose; they came together to the number of 463,000 men, and when the emergency ceased, they died out and disappeared.

They seem to have incurred at that time a certain amount of "chaff" on account of their somewhat crude ideas of military duties, and it is said that one regiment having repeatedly pointed out to Mr. Pitt that they only volunteered to repel invasion, and were on no account to be sent out of the country, he replied that he would promise not to send them away "except in the case of invasion."

There is, however, one volunteer corps—the Honorable Artillery Company of the City of London—which is quite excep-

tional. It dates from the time of Henry VII., at which period it wore a picturesque dress, had nothing to do, and "did it very well;" and it consists of artillery, cavalry and infantry. It is not a "company" in the military sense, but has many of the attributes of the City of London companies, and has property and funds of its own.

This ancient corps has its counterpart in the Honorable Artillery Company of Boston in the United States, the members of which some time ago visited London and received a cordial welcome as a link between the Old and the New Worlds.

Until 1858, the Honorable Artillery Company was the only old-established Volunteer Corps. At that time, the country was thirsting for peace and rest. The Crimean War had disclosed a state of military disorganization in the army which had caused misery and disaster to the troops during the war, and it was felt that only the bravery and pluck of the officers and men had saved the country from actual defeat; but when peace with Russia had been obtained, no time was given for reorganization. The Indian mutiny, following on the heels of the Crimean War, called forth all the resources of the Empire; but, when tranquillity was again restored, the public mind once more turned to the contemplation of army reform.

The opportunity seemed favorable. The Emperor of the French was in close alliance with England, and we were at peace with all European nations. There was no cloud upon the political horizon, and there seemed every prospect that this happy condition of things would be lasting.

At that moment, a bolt from the blue—as far-reaching as it was unexpected—spread dismay throughout Europe. On January 14th, 1858, an Italian, named Felice Orsini, attempted the life of the Emperor Napoleon III. by throwing a bomb under the carriage containing the Emperor and Empress as it was drawing up at the door of the opera house; and although the intended victims escaped unhurt, the missile spread destruction all round the spot where the outrage was committed.

It soon became known that the would-be assassin had hatched his conspiracy and manufactured his bombs in England; and, in the excitement that ran like wildfire through the French army, a hundred French colonels signed a petition to the Emperor, praying him to put himself at their head and lead them against

“Perfidious Albion.” It was not certain whether the Emperor would be able to resist the pressure thus put upon him, and the ugly fact of a possible invasion of our coasts stared us in the face. It was felt that our army—most of which was abroad—was inadequate to cope with the large forces which were at the disposal of France, if they should once gain a footing on our shores, and excitement little short of panic ensued.

The people of England demanded arms that they might at least make a stubborn resistance, and the volunteer force of Great Britain sprang into life.

In its infancy its constitution was hardly worthy to be called “organization.” A large number of enthusiastic civilians of all classes enrolled themselves under officers who, for the most part, had little or no military training, and drilled and equipped themselves in isolated companies. All worked with an energy which only determination, coupled with a grave sense of danger, could inspire. Drill went on in every town in England and Scotland; rifle butts were hastily erected, and the first rudiments of shooting were taught by sergeant-instructors from the regular army. But in spite of all this activity the volunteer army was a mere “crowd of men with muskets,” without transport, without battalion formation, and with only one suit of clothes apiece; and with such a force the only rôle assigned to them was to rush to meet the enemy, to line the hedges and walls in inclosed country; to worry and annoy the invaders in every possible way, and to die fighting to the last in order that the regular army and the militia might gain time to assemble and make their dispositions for defense. The action of the French *franc-tireurs* in the Franco-Prussian War shows how much may be done by such means. While matters were in this state, the scare which had created the volunteer force came to an end as suddenly as it had arisen. Napoleon III., loyal to his alliance with England, succeeded in quieting his excitable colonels, and the danger of immediate invasion was averted.

The volunteers now entered upon the most critical period of their whole history. The officers of the regular army looked upon them as almost useless, and either gave them good-natured but half-hearted support, or advocated their being disbanded altogether; for the British officers of that day believed only in long-service troops, drilled with all the precision of machines;

controlled when in barracks with an iron discipline, and perfect in parade movements. The country would not hear of conscription; the army would not hear of short service. So for years nothing was done to reorganize the army, and the volunteers were left to live or die in an atmosphere of neglect or ridicule.

A slight advance was made by the scattered companies being formed into provisional battalions for purposes of drill, and being given a retired officer or militia officer as adjutant; and as they marched through the streets headed by the band, a crowd of street urchins ran beside them shouting such ribald cries as "Who shot the dog?" "How are yer poor feet?" and (to the mounted officers), "How much an hour for yer horse, gov'nor?" And when the battalion had reached its drill ground and deployed into line, the gamins formed line opposite to them, waiting, like the French line at Fontenoy, for the English to fire first. Then, as the rattle of the locks proclaimed the volley which terminated the "platoon" exercise, they fell down with shrieks and groans, and writhed in simulated agony of death on the battlefield, while the lookers on shouted with laughter at the performance.

When the parade was dismissed each individual volunteer went home in a storm of chaff, and the clever pencil of John Leech made fun of them in "Punch." How they survived this ordeal seems now a miracle; but survive it they did, and set to work with a will to increase their efficiency.

It is obvious that an armed man—whether regular soldier or volunteer—is of little value for fighting purposes, unless he can shoot fairly well with a rifle; and the volunteers, recognizing this fact, proceeded at once to establish a shooting organization throughout the country. The centre and head of this organization was, and is, the National Rifle Association, which held its meetings at Wimbledon until they were transferred to Bisley.

In every county or district, an association was formed under "Wimbledon Rules," which held its meetings once a year, and battalion and company meetings also offered a chance of winning prizes to those who were not sufficiently expert in the use of the rifle to compete at Wimbledon. Thus an inducement was given to every volunteer to practice rifle shooting, in addition to the class firing ordered by the volunteer regulations.

The artillery have an association of their own called the

National Artillery Association, which is quite separate from the National Rifle Association, and holds its meetings at Shoeburyness. It works on strictly military lines, and forms a camp where the mounting and dismounting of heavy guns, etc., as well as target practice, is a part of the regular training.

This, briefly, is the organization which, with some alterations and improvements, has continued to the present day.

The first meeting at Wimbledon opened on July 2, 1860, when Queen Victoria fired the first shot, with a rifle fixed in a rest and laid by the most experienced rifle-shot of the day, and the "bull's-eye" flag went up amidst the cheers of a large crowd of spectators. To promote shooting at moving objects, a life-sized stag made of iron was mounted on a small railway, and ran down an incline on one side of the range, and nearly to the top of the incline on the other side, on the principle of a switchback railway, the shot having to be fired between two white posts, thirty yards apart. Sir Edwin Landseer, the celebrated animal painter, drew the stag life-size, and this splendid sketch and the "Queen's" target are preserved by the National Rifle Association as their two most valued treasures.

In the year 1883 a team of the American National Guard came over to England to shoot against an English volunteer team. At the beginning of the match, the visitors gained a considerable lead; but at the long ranges the English team not only wiped out their loss, but succeeded in securing a hard-fought victory. In the evening both teams dined with the president of the National Rifle Association, on which occasion there were present Her Royal Highness the Duchess of Teck, the Duke of Teck, and the Hon. J. R. Lowell, the Minister of the United States in England. After dinner the rule of the association that no speeches are to be made was so far relaxed as to allow of the health of the American team being proposed by the president; and Mr. Lowell, in returning thanks for his countrymen, made one of those short and happy speeches which did so much to promote a cordial feeling between the two nations. He said on this occasion: "May God grant that in all rifle competitions between the two nations, all the rifles may always be pointed the same way"—a sentiment cordially echoed at the present day on both sides of the Atlantic.

Englishmen noted with interest during the late war of the

United States with Spain, the readiness with which volunteers came forward in large numbers and at very short notice to serve their country. English volunteers in particular observed with admiration their cheerful endurance of thirst, hunger and privations of all sorts, in occasional circumstances of peculiar hardship.

That they should show courage in the field was taken for granted; but that with such short training, and in spite of hasty and, in certain cases, inadequate equipment, these citizen soldiers should develop such splendid qualities of discipline, self-restraint and self-reliance was the subject of much and hearty praise among English military critics.

The system pursued by the National Rifle Association has worked well, and although it is described as "pot-hunting" by those who wish to decry it, it has produced many first-rate shots, and may fairly claim to have carried out the object for which it was formed.

It would be impossible in the limited space of a magazine article, and would be tedious to the general reader, to treat in detail of the improvements in organization which have been carried out, from time to time, in the volunteer force; but a few words on the present state of the force may not be out of place.

The battalions are now united into brigades, commanded by brigadiers who have most of them served in the regular army, assisted by brigade majors, who are all retired officers, and a sufficient staff. These brigades assemble yearly in camp, and when at Aldershot or any other military centre come under military law, and take part in field days with the regular troops. The men learn all the duties of camp life; to pitch and strike tents, to cook and to make themselves at home in camp. A hearty and cheerful spirit animates all ranks, and the men look upon the annual training in camp in the light of a holiday, and are cheerfully prepared to perform readily all the various duties in return for the change of scene and work, and amusement and relaxation after the parades are over for the day.

As to their fighting qualities, it can only be said that they have never been tested, but there is no reason to believe that they would fight with less pluck and determination than any other men of the Anglo-Saxon race. In case of emergency, they would fight in their own country for all they hold most dear, and history has proved over and over again that men fighting under these cir-

cumstances are not to be despised, even by the best-disciplined and most highly trained troops. As regards "discipline," that word which may mean so much or so little, it must be remembered that the average volunteer lives a disciplined life. He is not a raw boy taken from the ploughshare, nor is he a young man of fast habits who has got into some minor scrape; but he is a respectable tradesman or superior mechanic, who has a character to lose, and I have myself seen a man, when brought up for judgment in camp, tremble and turn pale at the thought of being dismissed from the service, or sent out of camp in disgrace, which, when not camped with regular troops, is the only punishment the commanding officer has power to inflict.

Such a man returns to his native town or village with a mark against him. He gets "chaffed" by the men, and—what is more important—is despised by the women. It is known that he has failed to acquit himself with credit in a duty which he has voluntarily undertaken to perform, and he has to bear the consequences.

From want of experience a volunteer sentry will, from time to time, present arms to a showy uniform, and a smart non-commissioned officer of cavalry in full uniform will receive greater honor than a general in a blue coat; but this comes from want of knowledge of details, and not from want of discipline.

A simple and practical form of drill has been introduced, which is far better suited to the volunteers than the slow, antiquated drill of thirty years ago. It is easily and rapidly acquired, and thus time is available for the teaching of outpost duty, advance and rear guards, and many other details of which in their infancy the volunteers were profoundly ignorant. The officers of the new school now at the head of the army, who no longer cling to old traditions because they were good enough in their youth, recognize that modern weapons have altered the conditions of warfare, and have long ago discarded the drill of the time of the Duke of Wellington, who for many years opposed the introduction of the percussion musket because he said "the men would fire away their ammunition too quickly." The volunteers are now recognized as an integral part of the defenses of the country, and in consequence panic from fear of invasion is now unknown. The necessity for conscription, which is hateful to the country, and now only exists in a very mild and

modified form in the militia ballot act, which is never carried out, has been averted, and it is therefore fair to claim that the volunteers carry out in an adequate measure the purpose for which they were raised, and England sleeps the sounder for the knowledge that the manhood of the population is armed for her defense.

There is, however, another important advantage which has been gained for the country. In old days the average villager had no idea of the duties of a soldier, whose occupation was described as "being shot at for a shilling a day," and a story is told of a mother parting from her son, who had enlisted, saying to the recruiting sergeant: "How many hours a day will the poor lad have to fight, Mr. Soldier?" The idea existed that the soldier's time was divided between fighting and debauchery, and the enlistment of a son was looked upon as a family disgrace. Many villagers never saw troops under arms in their whole lives, and the soldier and civilian were as much separated as if they were different races. This feeling is growing less and less yearly, and there is every hope that it will die out in the near future. This improvement is partly owing to amelioration in the condition of the soldiers, and the care shown for their welfare by the authorities in modern days; but it is also due to the fact that civilians are now able to give some attention to, and gain practical knowledge of, military affairs by means of volunteering. They wear a uniform, and are proud of it; they come into contact with regular troops in military centres, and make friends with the men and learn from them the details of military life. Tommy Atkins is delighted to make friends with the volunteer, and the volunteer takes a military pride in "chumming" with Tommy Atkins, and thus they gain a mutual respect and regard for each other.

The days are long passed when the volunteers were alternately inflated by exaggerated praise or depressed by scorn and ridicule. They have taken their place as auxiliary to the regular army, anxious only to prepare themselves for the duties which would be assigned to them in case of emergency, and desiring to act up to their motto of "Defense, not defiance."

BROWNLOW.

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THE ISSUE IN THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN.

BY W. J. BRYAN.

The issue presented in the campaign of 1900 is the issue between plutocracy and democracy. All the questions under discussion will, in their last analysis, disclose the conflict between the dollar and the man—a conflict as old as the human race, and one which will continue as long as the human race endures.

The struggle for American independence was a culmination of the protest of the people living in America against measures which subordinated their rights to the interests of English traders. The correspondence between Lord Howe and Benjamin Franklin, about the time of the signing of the Declaration of Independence, shows that the main object of England's colonial policy was to control American trade.

In June, 1776, the former addressed a letter to Franklin, from which the following extract is taken:

"But if the deep-rooted prejudices of America and the necessity of preventing her trade from passing into foreign channels must keep us still a divided people, I shall, from every public, as well as private, motive, most heartily lament that this is not the moment wherein those great objects of my ambition are to be attained, and that I am to be longer deprived of an opportunity to assure you, personally, of the regard with which I am, etc."

To this letter Franklin immediately replied:

"The well-founded esteem and, permit me to say, affection, which I shall always have for your Lordship make it painful to me to see you engaged in conducting a war, the great ground of which (as described in your letter) is 'the necessity of preventing the American trade from passing into foreign channels.' To me it seems that neither the obtaining nor retaining any trade, how valuable soever, is an object for which men may justly spill each other's blood; that the true and sure means of extending and securing commerce are the goodness and cheapness of commodities; and that the profits of no trade can ever be equal to the expense of compelling it and holding it by fleets and armies. I consider this war against us, therefore, as both unjust and unwise; and I am persuaded that cool and dispassionate posterity will condemn to infamy those who advised it; and that even success will not save from some degree of dishonor those who voluntarily engaged to conduct it."*

The Declaration of Independence set before the world four great truths which were declared to be self-evident: first, that all men are created equal; second, that they are endowed with inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness; third, that governments are instituted among men to secure these rights; fourth, that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

Upon these four pillars, quarried from the mountain of eternal truth, all free government must forever rest.

Then followed the War of the Revolution, with its sacrifices and its sacred memories, with its trials and its triumphs, establishing a government dedicated to liberty.

But before a generation had passed, wealth, represented by Hamilton, began to assert itself, and contempt for the rights of man and distrust of the people themselves began to be manifest. Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence, undertook the task of arousing the friends of human rights and civil liberty, and he led them to victory in 1800. The impetus given to American Democracy by its first success in the forum of politics carried it through several Presidential terms.

During Jackson's administration another battle was fought between the capitalistic classes and the people at large. The National Bank marshalled an almost irresistible army of financiers, business men, newspapers and politicians in defense of a gigantic monopoly.

Jackson sounded the alarm, rallied the hosts of Democracy,

* This correspondence can be found in the third volume of a work entitled, "Modern British Essayists," published by Carey & Hart, of Philadelphia, in 1857.

and, in a contest seldom, if ever, equalled in bitterness, won the second peaceful victory for human rights against inhuman greed.

Jackson is generally spoken of as a warrior rather than as a political philosopher. His courage and perseverance have been praised more than his logic or his rhetoric; and yet what orator or statesman has more clearly defined the purpose and scope of government than he?

In the message which accompanied his veto of the National Bank Act he said:

"It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of wealth, cannot be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the law undertakes to add to these natural and just advantages artificial distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to complain of the injustice of their government. There are no necessary evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rain, shower its favors alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an unqualified blessing."

Benton, in estimating the work of Jackson, said that in overthrowing the bank conspiracy he saved America, as Cicero saved Rome by overthrowing the conspiracy of Catiline. No one can read the history of the country from 1845 to 1860 without recognizing the impending struggle between slavery, as an institution, and the abolition of slavery. Every important measure brought before Congress was scrutinized, and its possible bearing on the slavery question was considered, by both friends and opponents.

In 1858 Abraham Lincoln made a speech which attracted public attention to him as the leader of the anti-slavery sentiment. Taking from the Bible one of its strongest passages, he applied it to the question then paramount:

"'A house divided against itself cannot stand.' I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved; I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other."

In 1859 Lincoln wrote a letter to the Republicans of Boston,

who were celebrating the birthday of Thomas Jefferson. (Think of it, Republicans celebrating the birthday of Jefferson!) In that letter he paid to Jefferson a high tribute. In the same letter, Lincoln, in discussing the relation which should exist between the man and the dollar, said that the Republicans were "both for the man and the dollar, but, in case of conflict, the man before the dollar." Man, the handiwork of God, comes first; the dollar, the handiwork of man, comes afterwards.

During his first administration Lincoln pointed out the attempt, then in its beginning, to place money, the thing accumulated, above the individual by whose toil it was accumulated, and warned his countrymen that the exaltation of matter and the degradation of man threatened the very existence of the Republic. Here are his words:

"Monarchy itself is sometimes hinted at as a possible refuge from the power of the people. In my present position, I could scarcely be justified were I to omit raising a warning voice against this approach of returning despotism. It is not needed nor fitting here that a general argument should be made in favor of popular institutions, but there is one point, with its connections, not so hackneyed as most others, to which I ask a brief attention. It is the effort to place capital on an equal footing with, if not above, labor in the structure of government."

I have quoted at length from these eminent authorities in order to convince the reader that those who, at this time, speak out against the methods and purposes of plutocracy are not sounding new and groundless alarms, but are merely reiterating the warnings which have been necessary during each successive generation.

For many years after the close of the Civil War the Republicans held undisputed control of the federal government, and an appeal to the prejudices and passions aroused by that great conflict was sufficient answer to any criticism or complaint coming from the party out of power. During this period class legislation became the order of the day, and wealth not only sought favors from the government, but secured exemption from just burdens. When war taxes were to be reduced, the taxes bearing upon the rich were taken off first. When the income tax was repealed, Senator Sherman, of Ohio, placed his protest on record in the following language:

"I hope that, after full discussion, nobody will vote for striking

out the income tax. It seems to me to be one of the plainest propositions in the world. Put before the people of the United States the question whether the property of this country cannot stand a tax of \$20,000,000, when the consumption of the people stands a tax of \$300,000,000, and I think they will quickly answer it. The property-holders of the country came here and demanded the repeal of the only tax that bears upon their property, when we have to tax everything, the food of the poor, the clothing of the poor, and all classes of our people \$300,000,000."

High duties were placed upon the necessities of life on the ground that infant industries required assistance, with the result that the owners of the aided industries grew rich, while home-owning decreased and tenancy increased among the consumers.

Railroads were constructed upon a plan which permitted watered stock, fictitious capitalization and the over issue of bonds, with the result that the patrons of the roads became the victims of extortionate rates and the manipulators of the roads became suddenly and enormously rich.

Under the euphonious plea that public credit would be strengthened thereby, the terms of government contracts were altered in the interest of the bondholders. Then, in 1873, a change was made in the standard money, a change so indefensible that nearly every public man denied any knowledge of the purpose of the act. For twenty-three years following the passage of that act every party pledged itself to restore the double standard, but the financiers succeeded in controlling the dominant party and thus maintained the gold standard in spite of popular protest.

In 1896 the Democrats refused to be any longer parties to the duplicity, and took an open and unequivocal position in favor of the immediate restoration of bimetallism by the independent action of this country at the present legal ratio. This positive and definite platform was necessary because of the cunningly devised evasions and ambiguities which had been written into the platforms of the two leading parties. The Republican leaders, on the other hand, continued their policy of deception, and held out to the Republican bimetallists of the West the delusive hope of an international agreement, while they openly promised the Eastern believers in monometallism that the gold standard would be maintained *until an international agreement could be secured*, and secretly assured them that that meant forever.

After the election the administration adopted a double standard method of dealing with the subject. A commission was sent

to Europe to plead for international bimetallism, while a gold standard Secretary of the Treasury was openly at work in this country defending monometallism. In 1896 the money question occupied by far the greater portion of public attention. Since 1896 the same sordid doctrine that manifested itself in the gold standard has manifested itself in several new ways, and to-day three questions contest for primacy—the money question, the trust question, and imperialism. There are several other questions of scarcely less importance, but the lines of division upon these run practically parallel with the lines which separate the people upon the three greater ones. If a man opposes the gold standard, trusts and imperialism—all three—the chances are a hundred to one that he is in favor of arbitration, the income tax and the election of United States Senators by a direct vote of the people, and is opposed to government by injunction and the black-list. If a man favors the gold standard, the trusts and imperialism—all three—the chances are equally great that he regards the demand for arbitration as an impertinence, defends government by injunction and the black-list, views the income tax as “a discouragement to thrift,” and will oppose the election of Senators by the people as soon as he learns that it will lessen the influence of corporations in the Senate. When a person is with the Democrats on one or two of these questions, but not on all, his position on the subordinate questions is not so easily calculated.

The human mind is consistent, but time is required for the application of fundamental principles to all these questions.

Since these secondary questions must, therefore, be settled by the same persons and along the same lines as the primary ones, I shall confine this article to the three questions which I have already described as being most important at this time.

The Republicans have dealt with all three questions during the present administration in a manner which they would not have been willing to outline in 1896. This refusal to take the people into their confidence is in itself an evidence that they are either conscious that their policies are not good for the people, or that they distrust the capacity of the people for self-government. If they believed their policies to be good, and if they also believed the people capable of understanding their own interests, they would not hesitate to set forth their plan of action on each subject.

Having taken another step toward the gold standard, and hav-

ing provided for the substitution of bank notes for greenbacks, they now declare the money question settled; but they have in reserve the withdrawal of the legal tender function from the silver dollar and the establishment of the branch bank, neither of which they now discuss, but both of which they will attempt as soon as they think it safe to do so.

The contest between monometallism and bimetallism is a world-wide contest—a contest which must go on until silver is once more a money metal equal with gold, or until the gold standard becomes universal. He takes a very narrow view of the subject who considers merely the present volume of money in this country. It is true that we have largely increased our supply of gold in the last three years (the Republicans neither promised nor expected the increase), but the action of England in placing India upon the gold standard is likely to cause a drain on the gold supply of the United States and of European countries. The gold blanket must now be stretched to cover nearly three hundred million people in Southern Asia, and China has yet to be considered. After six thousand years of search and saving, the total volume of gold and silver money is about eight billions, nearly equally divided between the two metals.

Upon this basis of metallic money rests a large volume of paper money, and upon the various forms of money rests the world's indebtedness.

Those advocates of the gold standard who know the real purpose and scope of the gold standard scheme desire to contract the basic money to one-half its present volume. This would enormously enhance the value of each dollar, represented by money, notes and bonds, and would enormously oppress the producers of wealth. We cannot afford to throw the influence of this nation upon the side of the gold standard, unless we are prepared to accept universal gold monometallism with all that that means. The increased production of gold during the last few years will act as a parachute to retard the fall in prices, but there is no assurance that it will be sufficient to enable us to dispense with silver as a standard money.

If any one is tempted to listen to the new arguments in favor of the gold standard—presented by men who advocated that standard for twenty-five years before the new gold fields were discovered—let him take a pencil and paper and estimate, first,

the annual product, then subtract from that sum the amount annually used in the arts, the amount necessary to cover the shrinkage in volume of gold coin from loss and abrasion, and the amount necessary to keep pace with the annual increase in population and business, and then see how much he has left to apply to the retirement of the uncovered paper and the four billions of silver coin. Only a few years ago Prof. Edward Suess, of the Vienna University, issued a pamphlet giving his reasons for believing that, at that time, nearly the entire annual output of the gold mines was consumed in the arts.

Those who say that bimetallism may be necessary one year and the gold standard defensible the next year are either very ignorant of the subject themselves or they underestimate the intelligence of those to whom they address the argument.

In March, 1896, the English Parliament by a unanimous vote pledged the English government to aid in restoring the par of exchange between gold and silver.

If the Republican platform was honest in 1896, bimetallism was desirable at that time, because 13,500,000 voters supported candidates pledged to bimetallism, differing only as to the means of securing it.

In November, 1898, two years after the last Presidential election, and two weeks after the last Congressional election, Secretary of State Hay wrote a letter to Lord Aldenham, for many years a director of the Bank of England, saying that the President and a majority of his Cabinet still believed in the great desirability of an international agreement.

A still later argument in favor of bimetallism can be found in Section 14 of the Currency Law recently enacted. It specifically declares that the law is not intended to place an obstacle in the way of international bimetallism. The only way to destroy the force of the bimetallic argument contained in the Republican platform, in Secretary Hay's letter and in Section 14 of the Currency Law, is to say that they were all intended to deceive the public. But, while such a defense would strengthen the gold standard argument, it would place the Republican leaders in a position which they would scarcely desire to occupy.

It is needless to discuss the ratio, since there is no division of sentiment among those who are actually trying to secure bimetallism. There is a positive, earnest and active force behind the

present legal ratio of sixteen to one; there is no positive, earnest or active force behind any other ratio. Neither is it any longer necessary to discuss international bimetallism. The contest upon this question must be between those who believe in the gold standard on the one side and, on the other side, those who believe in a financial policy made by the American people for themselves.

Mr. Carlisle, in his speech in 1878, divided the people into two classes. In one class he placed those described by him as "the idle holders of idle capital," and in the other "the struggling masses."

When the money question is fully understood, the struggling masses and those who sympathize with them will support the double standard, and the money-owning and bond-holding classes and those who sympathize with them will favor the gold standard.

Those who favor the gold standard, as a rule, favor national bank notes as against greenbacks, while those who oppose the gold standard, as a rule, believe that the issue of paper money is a function of government and should not be delegated to national banks. A currency issued and controlled by banks, and secured by government bonds, creates a paper-money trust and must, if it is to be permanent, rest upon a perpetual and increasing national debt.

The trust question is more easily understood than the money question. The appreciation of money is slow, while the rise in the price of trust-made articles is sufficiently rapid to attract attention.

When prices fall a little each year, the friends of a rising dollar talk about over-production, improved machinery, etc.; but when prices rise rapidly and the trusts declare large dividends, the connection between cause and effect is so direct and obvious that only those blinded by partizanship can fail to see it.

The trust question was in the campaign of 1896, and the menace of the trust was then pointed out, but the warning was unheeded. Now the heavy hand of monopoly is laid upon so many that there is a growing protest against a system which permits a few men to control each branch of industry, fix the rate of wages, the price of raw materials and the price of the finished product. Until four years ago no Republican of prominence defended the trusts; now, the Republican leaders speak of the trusts in guarded terms.

The Ohio platform recently adopted demands that "*so-called* trusts shall be *so regulated* from time to time and *so restricted* as to guarantee immunity from *hurtful* monopoly." The word "*hurtful*" is as broad as charity, and enables the trust defender to shield every trust behind the plea that it is not hurtful.

A monopoly is not hurtful *to those who operate it*, and, if they can control the government, they will be sure to decide that it is not hurtful to any one.

The recent action of the barb wire trust illustrates several phases of this question. It shows that a monopoly *can* raise prices when it desires to do so; and it also shows that a monopoly *will* raise prices when it can. It shows how an artificial rise in price will lessen consumption and thus decrease the demand for labor; it shows how a monopoly can shut down factories to work off the stock, throwing upon the laborer the burden of maintaining prices (in this case twelve factories were shut down and six thousand two hundred men thrown out of employment); it shows how even the stockholders may be victimized if the manager desires to speculate in stock; and it further shows how those in charge of a great monopoly may, in the future, bring great wealth to political friends by disclosing intended raids on the stock market and thus earn legislative favors. The ordinary forms of bribery sink into insignificance when compared with this new and more dangerous method. That this is no idle fear is evident from the testimony taken by the Senate committee which investigated official speculation in sugar stock. That monopolies contribute to campaign funds is also shown by the testimony taken by another Senate committee. A few great monopolies could without loss to themselves make on the stock market enough to supply a campaign fund as enormous as that used by the Republican party in 1896.

On the trust question, as on the money question, the line is drawn between those who believe that money is the only thing to be considered and those who believe that the people have rights which should be respected.

If one asks for the annihilation of private monopolies, he is confronted with the statement that they are a part of our industrial system and have come to stay. If one suggests restrictions upon corporations, he will be told that the government cannot interfere with the way a man uses his money. The difference between the natural man of flesh and blood and the corporate man

created by law is overlooked by those who can see nothing higher than the dollar argument.

The God-made men do not differ greatly in size or strength, they labor under similar conditions as to life and health, and they are subject to the same moral restraints. Competition between them, therefore, is reasonably equal and fair. But corporations differ in size, in strength and in longevity; and, having no life beyond the grave, have neither the fear of future punishment nor the hope of future reward to restrain them. Competition, therefore, between the natural man and the great corporation may be grossly unequal and unfair.

The line must be drawn at the point where the corporation seeks to establish a monopoly and deprive individuals or smaller corporations of the right to compete. In other words, the legislation necessary at this time must be directed against private monopoly in whatever form it appears. Those who desire to protect society from the evil results of the trust must take the position that a private monopoly is indefensible and intolerable. The power to control the price of anything which the people need cannot safely be intrusted to any private individual or association of individuals, because selfishness is universal and the temptation to use such a power for personal advantage is too great.

As soon as any private monopoly is admitted to be good, the question degenerates into a comparison of the character and conduct of those who stand at the head of the monopolies. To defend a private monopoly on the ground that the monopolist in charge is a benevolent and well-meaning man, kind to his employees and generous with his earnings, is like defending a despotism on the ground that the despot is occasionally kind-hearted and sometimes uses his unlimited power for the benefit of his subjects.

The Republican party cannot be relied upon to deal with the trust question. The sympathies of those who control the policies of the Republican party are entirely with organized wealth in its contest against the masses. An evidence of this is to be found in the fact that the trusts have grown more rapidly under the present administration than in all the previous history of the country. This remarkable growth shows that, at this time, the trust magnates neither fear the enforcement of the present law nor the enactment of new and more stringent laws.

Another evidence that the Republican party will not deal

effectively with the trust question is to be found in the fact that the leaders of that party have no plan of action. When they are called upon to say anything on the subject they confine themselves to generalities and protest that it is not a political question. If ambiguity is proof of either lack of knowledge or lack of sincerity, the Republicans can be convicted either of not knowing what to do or of not desiring to do it.

While the inspiring cause of monopoly is to be found in a selfish desire to enjoy the fruits of monopoly, several things have contributed to its growth and success. First, a constant fall in prices has led people who have invested money in plants to seek in combination a protection against loss upon their investments. The Republicans do not propose to take away this incentive to the organization of trusts. Second, railroad discriminations have sometimes given to a favored corporation an immense advantage over less fortunate competitors.* The Republican party is making no effort to remedy this evil.

The high tariff has been a bulwark to the trusts. Foreign competition was first excluded and then domestic competition was destroyed by combination, but the Republican party is not only not trying to reform the tariff in the interest of the people, but it boasts of the Dingley law as a panacea for all economic ills.

While State legislatures can do much, Congressional action is necessary to complete the destruction of the trusts. A State can prevent the creation of a monopoly within its borders and can also exclude a foreign monopoly. But this remedy is not sufficient; for, if a monopoly really exists and is prevented from doing business in any State, the people of that State will be deprived of the use of that particular article until it can be produced within the State. Instead of shutting a monopoly out of one State and leaving it forty-four States to do business in, we should shut it up in the State of its origin and take the other forty-four away from it. This can be done by an act of Congress making it necessary for a corporation, organized in any State, to take out a license from the federal government before doing business outside of that State, the license not to interfere, however, with regulations imposed by other States. Such a license, granted only upon evidence that there is no water in the stock of the corporation, and that it has not attempted and is not attempting to monopolize any

* A number of these discriminations are mentioned in Lloyd's "Wealth Against Commonwealth."

branch of business or the production of any article of merchandise, would compel the dissolution of existing monopolies and prevent the creation of new ones.

The Democratic party is better able to undertake this work now than it was a few years ago, because all the trust magnates have left the party. The Republican party is less able than ever before to make a successful war against the trusts, because its numbers among its membership all the trust magnates it ever had, and in addition to them it has all the Democratic party formerly had.

The Philippine question is even plainer than the trust question, and those who will be benefited by an imperial policy are even less in number than those who may be led to believe that they would share in the benefits of a gold standard or of a private monopoly. Here again the Republicans dare not outline their policy. When the present Congress was elected, in 1898, the treaty of peace had not yet been signed. No definite issue was before the country, and the people could not sit in judgment upon the purposes of the administration.

When the treaty was ratified, in February following, it was expressly declared by several Republican Senators that the ratification of the treaty did not determine the policy of the government, but merely concluded the war with Spain. The McEnery resolution, adopted by the votes of Republican Senators, declared that it was the sense of the Senate that the Philippine Islands should never become an integral part of the United States, but left the policy open for future consideration. The resolution was as follows:

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That by the ratification of the treaty of peace with Spain, it is not intended to incorporate the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands into citizenship of the United States, nor is it intended to permanently annex said islands as an integral part of the territory of the United States; but it is the intention of the United States to establish on said Islands a government suitable to the wants and conditions of the inhabitants of said islands, to prepare them for local self-government, and in due time to make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of citizens of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands."

The nearest approach to a plan which has received any considerable support among the Republicans is that outlined in the Spooner Bill, which provides that:

"When all insurrection against the sovereignty and authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, acquired from Spain by the treaty concluded at Paris on the tenth day of December, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, shall have been completely suppressed by the military and naval forces of the United States, all military, civil and judicial powers necessary to govern the said islands shall, until otherwise provided by Congress, be vested in such person and persons, and shall be exercised in such manner as the President of the United States shall direct for maintaining and protecting the inhabitants of said islands in the free enjoyment of their liberty, property and religion."

But this is far from definite. It means that, when the war is over (no one knows when that will be), the President is to do something (no one knows what), and is to keep at it (no one knows how long); and that then Congress is to take some action (the nature of which no one can guess). Why this evasion? There can be but one reason for it, that the Republican leaders have decided upon a policy which they are not willing to outline, because they dare not risk the judgment of the American people in an open contest between the doctrine that governments rest upon force and the doctrine that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.

If the Filipino is to be under our domination, he must be either citizen or subject. If he is to be a citizen, it must be with a view to participating ultimately in our government and in the making of our laws. Not only is this idea negatived by the McEnergy resolution, but it is openly repudiated by every Republican leader who has discussed the subject. If the Filipino is to be a subject, our form of government must be entirely changed. A republic can have no subjects. The doctrine that a people can be kept in a state of perpetual vassalage, owing allegiance to the flag, but having no voice in the government, is entirely at variance with the principles upon which this government has been founded. An imperial policy nullifies every principle set forth in the Declaration of Independence.

The Porto Rican tariff law illustrates this new doctrine. The flag is separated from the Constitution, and the Porto Ricans are notified that they must obey the laws made for them and pay the taxes levied upon them, and yet have no share in our Bill of Rights or in the guarantees of our Constitution. No monarch or tyrant in all history exercised more despotic power than the Republicans now claim for the President and Congress.

The theory that our race is divinely appointed to seize by force or purchase at auction groups of "inferior people," and govern them, with benevolent purposes avowed and with trade advantages on the side, carries us back to the creed of kings and to the gospel of force.

Lincoln condemned this doctrine with characteristic vigor in a speech made in 1858. He said that it was the old argument employed to defend kingcraft from the beginning of history; that "kings always bestride the necks of the people, not because they *desire* to do so, but because *the people are better off for being ridden.*"

Those who advocate an imperial policy usually assert that the Filipinos are incapable of self-government. It might be a sufficient answer to quote the resolution of Congress declaring that "the Cubans are and of right ought to be free," and the report made by Admiral Dewey declaring that the Filipinos are far more capable of self-government than the Cubans. But there is even a broader answer that may be made. Clay, in his defense of the people of South America, said:

"It is the doctrine of thrones, that man is too ignorant to govern himself. Their partisans assert his incapacity, in reference to all nations; if they cannot command universal assent to the proposition, it is then demanded to particular nations; and our pride and our presumption too often make converts of us. I contend that it is to arraign the dispositions of Providence Himself to suppose that He has created beings incapable of governing themselves, and to be trampled on by kings."

There are degrees of intelligence; some people can and do govern themselves better than others, and it is possible that the people living near the equator will never, owing to climatic conditions, reach the governmental standards of the temperate zone. But it is absurd to say that God would create the Filipinos and then leave them for thousands of years helpless, until Spain found them and threw her protecting arms around them; and it is equally absurd to say that Spain could sell to us the right to act as guardians of a people whom she governed by force.

The purpose behind the imperial policy is the extension of trade. Franklin, in the letter above quoted, denies that the securing or holding of trade is a cause for which men may justly spill each other's blood. The man who says that an imperial policy will pay must be prepared to place a pecuniary value upon

the soldiers who have already lost their lives in the Philippines or have become insane from the effects of the climate, and upon the soldiers who will be sacrificed in future wars of conquest. The Republican party, which boasts that it sprang into existence in the defense of human rights, now coolly calculates the value of human life measured by Oriental trade.

Abraham Lincoln wrote the following letter to Mrs. Bixby, of Boston:

"Executive Mansion, Washington, Nov. 21st, 1864.

"Dear Madam—

"I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant-General of Massachusetts, that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how weak and fruitless must be any words of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from tendering to you the consolation which may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save. I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and the lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom. Yours, very sincerely and respectfully,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN."

No more beautiful expression of sympathy can be found in literature. Compare it with the sordid consolation which an imperialist would extend to a sorrowing mother, assuring her that the trade purchased by her son's blood would be worth all that it cost!

It will be noticed that Franklin also denied that trade could be profitably purchased and held by fleets and armies. History supports his contention. A nation never makes a profit out of a forcible extension of trade. Such a policy is defended by the few who make a great deal out of the trade, while the expenses of the war are borne by the taxpayers. There is no doubt that an imperial policy will be advantageous to army contractors, and to owners of ships who rent their vessels to the United States to carry live soldiers to the Philippine Islands and to bring dead soldiers back; and it may be advantageous to carpet-bag governors and to those who can secure good paying positions in the army, but it will be a constant drain upon the wealth producers. The amount already spent upon a war of conquest in a single year would almost construct the Nicaragua Canal; or, if used for the reclamation of arid lands in the West, it would furnish homes

for more American citizens than would go to the Philippine Islands in a thousand years.

If an imperial policy is indorsed by the people, a large standing army will always be necessary. The same influences which lead to a war of conquest in the Philippines will lead to wars of conquest elsewhere, and an immense military establishment will not only become a permanent burden upon the people, but will prove a menace to the Republic.

One of the great objections to imperialism is that it destroys our proud pre-eminence among the nations. When the doctrine of self-government is abandoned, the United States will cease to be a moral factor in the world's progress. We cannot preach the doctrine that governments come up from the people, and, at the same time, practice the doctrine that governments rest upon brute force. We cannot set a high and honorable example for the emulation of mankind while we roam the world like beasts of prey seeking whom we may devour.

John Quincy Adams asks the question, "What has America done for mankind?" and he answers it thus:

"America, with the same voice which spoke herself into existence as a nation, proclaimed to mankind the inextinguishable rights of human nature, and the only lawful foundations of government. America, in the assembly of nations, since her admission among them, has invariably, though often fruitlessly, held forth to them the hand of honest friendship, of equal freedom, of generous reciprocity. She has uniformly spoken among them, though often to heedless and to disdainful ears, the language of equal liberty, equal justice, and equal rights."

Not only does she give to the world an example of enlightened self-government, but, according to Adams, "wherever the standard of independence or freedom has been or shall be unfurled there will her heart, her benediction and her prayers be."

But how can she pray for those who unfurl the banner of liberty in Europe or in South Africa if she wars against those who unfurl the banner of liberty in the Orient?

While the Republican party has been evading a direct issue and trying to unload its mistakes upon Providence, the Democrats have urged a plain and simple remedy, viz., that we treat the Filipinos as we have promised to treat the Cubans. The Bacon resolution, which was defeated by the vote of the Vice-President just after the treaty was ratified, was supported by nearly every

Democrat in the Senate, and was indorsed by a Democratic caucus in the House. It read as follows:

"Resolved, further, that the United States hereby disclaim any disposition or intention to exercise permanent sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said islands, and assert their determination, when a stable and independent government shall have been erected therein, entitled in the judgment of the government of the United States to recognition as such, to transfer to said government, upon terms which shall be reasonable and just, all rights secured under the cession by Spain, and to thereupon leave the government and control of the islands to their people."

Had this resolution been accepted by the Republicans at the time it was introduced, and acted upon by the administration, not a drop of blood would have been shed at Manila. Hostilities can be terminated at any moment by a declaration of this nation's purpose: first, to establish a stable government; second, to give the Filipinos their independence; third, to give them protection from outside interference while they work out their destiny. Such a declaration would be in harmony with American principles, American traditions and American interests. Such protection would be valuable to the Filipinos and inexpensive to us, just as protection to the South American republics has been of vital importance to them, while it has imposed no burden upon us.

The Bates treaty, negotiated by the administration last summer, provides that the United States shall protect the Sultan of Sulu from foreign interference. It ought to be as easy to protect a republic as to stand sponsor for a despot.

Surely, the rapid development of plutocracy during the last few years will arouse the people to the dangers which threaten our Republic. The warning voice of history cannot longer be disregarded. No nation has ever travelled so far, in the same space of time, from democracy to plutocracy as has this nation during the last ten years. Foreign influence, described by Washington as "one of the most baneful foes of republican government," has been felt as never before. Fortunes have been made more suddenly than ever before. Wealth has been concentrated in the hands of a few more rapidly than ever before. Corporate capital exerts an influence over government more potent than ever before. Money is more freely used than ever before to corrupt elections.

What is to be the end? Can any thoughtful person believe that these conditions promise well for a republic? Are we not following in the footsteps of Rome, as described by Froude?

"To make money, money by any means, lawful or unlawful, became the universal passion. Money! The cry was still money! Money was the one thought, from the highest Senator to the poorest wretch who sold his vote in the Comitia."

Again, he says:

"The proud privilege of Roman citizenship was still jealously reserved to Rome itself, and to a few favored towns and colonies; and a mere subject could maintain no rights against a member of the haughty oligarchy which controlled the civilized world. Such, generally, the Roman republic had become, or was tending to become, in the years which followed the fall of Carthage, B. C., 146. Public spirit in the masses was dead, or sleeping; the commonwealth was a plutocracy."

If it is said that we are prosperous and that we live under the reign of law, let the reader review the lecture delivered by Dr. John Lord, a Connecticut scholar, on Rome in the days of Marcus Aurelius. After describing the conditions which existed when "about two thousand people owned the whole civilized world," he says:

"But I cannot enumerate the evils which co-existed with all the boasted prosperity of the empire, and which were preparing the way for ruin—evils so disgraceful and universal that Christianity made no impression at all on society at large and did not modify a law or remove a single object of scandal."

And again:

"Is there nothing to be considered but external glories which appeal to the senses alone? Shall our eyes be diverted from the operation of moral law and the inevitable consequences of its violation? Shall we blind ourselves to the future condition of our families and our country in our estimate of happiness? Shall we ignore, in the dazzling life of a few favored extortioners, monopolists and successful gamblers, all that Christianity points out as the hope and solace and glory of mankind?"

Instead of regarding the recent assault upon constitutional government—the attempted overthrow of American principles—as a matter of destiny, we may rather consider it as the last plague, the slaying of the first-born, which will end the bondage of the American people, and bring deliverance from the Pharaohs who are enthroning Mammon and debasing mankind.

W. J. BRYAN.

AUSTRALIAN FEDERATION AND ITS BASIS.

BY EDMUND BARTON.

The Constitution under which it is proposed to unite the Australian Colonies establishes a federation under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. It is more democratic than the Constitution of the United States, and not only more democratic, but more federal, than the Constitution of the Dominion of Canada. Let me make a few comparisons. It is a constitution markedly of the British type, in that it operates not only by way of constitutional government, but by way of responsible government. The Federal Ministry are liable to be displaced at any moment by the vote of one House, the House of Representatives: and the overwhelming power of its vote is assured by giving over to it the control of the purse-strings. The Senate has a veto, of course; but, as we shall see, that veto may be rendered ineffective in the case of continued disagreement between the two houses.

Of the sixteen federations of the world, fourteen recognize the principle of equal representation in one of the two chambers of the National Legislature. I hold the opinion that the federal idea naturally suggests such a condition; and that, apart from academic arguments, federalists may well demand it, in view of the fact that its maintenance has secured so fair a balance in the federal evolution. It will amuse American readers to be told that Australian provincialists daily, and through great numbers of their speakers, insisted that the War of Secession was entirely traceable to the existence of equal representation in the United States Senate. One of the strangest incidents of this contention is that it was most loudly asserted by the men who professed academic superiority. Was their fault an ignorance, or an ignoring, of history? In the

Australian Federation, original States will have equal representation in the Senate.

The plan of the Australian Constitution will probably not surprise an American; yet, if it were largely different, it would surprise an Englishman. One of the striking sayings which marked the debates of the Convention which met at Adelaide in 1897 for the purpose of framing the Constitution was an utterance by Sir Richard Baker, shortly before his appointment to the Chairmanship of Committees. He said of the idea of implanting Responsible Government in a Federal Constitution: "Either Federation will kill Responsible Government, or Responsible Government will kill Federation." Sir Richard Baker supports the new Constitution. We may infer that he does not believe that either Responsible Government or Federation has received its death blow. A problem which appeared to a strong and learned constitutionalist to be insoluble at the outset has probably been solved, and in such a way that we shall see the mainspring of a federation, the principle which aims at blending the voice of the people and that of the States, preserved, while no jot is lost of those strong principles which, among men of British race, are now considered indispensable to their instruments of self-government.

Now, the Constitution of the United States provides that "all bills for raising revenue must originate in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur in amendments as in other bills." Under the Australian Constitution, not only must revenue-raising bills originate in the House of Representatives, but appropriation bills also must begin there, and the power of amendment in the case of money bills is emphatically denied to the Senate. There is a power to suggest amendments by message; such a power would perhaps exist, without express authority in the Constitution; but it is impossible to mistake the sternness with which the Australian charter declares and conserves the power of the people to decide questions of taxation and expenditure, through the House which represents the voting power according to its numerical value.

I have said that the Constitution is attacked on the ground that original States are equally represented in the Senate, and that the Senate will thus be the stronger of the two houses. How would American citizens appraise the power of a Senate which cannot originate or amend either a revenue or an expenditure bill? It will

require more than a personal assurance to make one of them believe that a Senate so pent is still, to quote the adversary, "the dominant House."

Although the United States Senate represents the States in the light of their equal contractual capacity, Americans have not told the world that it fails to represent the people of the States. Ours, however, is a case in which, "in the grips," citizenship rules according to numbers, and not according to States. It will be said that the rule of numbers will destroy the separate life of States; this is delicate ground. Are States to prevail in their numbers, irrespective of citizenship majorities? Are citizens to prevail in their numbers, irrespective of the future interests and existence of States? If either of these things were true, there could be no federation. The quarrel that our anti-Federalists raise is in the assertion that one, the latter of these propositions, is essential. It is cloaked by the assertion that it means majority rule; but the majority of the States and the majority of the people must both be reckoned with. If we fail as to one, we approach unification; if we fail as to the other, we draw nearer to a form of union which proclaims its weakness in every step. Surely, the true solution of a difficulty of this kind is one which enables the machine of government to continue its work, while it is made clear that the vital force of the equally represented States is not exercised in vain. While it is made certain that the will of the majority will prevail, it is also made certain that arguments must be heard. There is only one ultimate tribunal; to ignore that would have been to ignore the popular force which impelled the union of the colonies. But it is possible to recognize this in all its strength, and still to ensure that the minority is to have the fullest opportunity to offer to a reasoning community the supreme influence of argument on behalf of State interests.

As I have mentioned, the operation of responsible government is secured by making the House of Representatives the real custodian of the purse. There is further security in a provision which will be of interest to Americans. After the first general election, no Minister of State is to hold office for a longer period than three months, unless he has become a member of one or other of the houses. In the insistence on the principle of continuous responsibility lies the main difference between the Australian Constitution and that of the United States.

The power of the national or collective voice will be greater in Australia than it is in America. The power of the individual States will be greater than it is in Canada. But these two powers will not be allowed to continue in a condition of deadlock. If the two houses differ twice upon the same bill, then, if it has originated in the House of Representatives, the two houses may be dissolved simultaneously. If afterwards the difference continues, the Governor-General, with the advice of his ministers, may order a joint sitting, in which all the members, whether of the Senate or the House of Representatives, may deliberate together, and must vote together on the bill as last proposed by the House of Representatives, and on amendments made therein by one House, and not agreed to by the other. Any amendments affirmed by an absolute majority of the combined strength of the houses are to be taken as having been carried; and if the bill, together with any amendments so carried, is affirmed by an absolute majority, it is to be taken as passed by both houses, and it is to be presented to the Governor-General for assent. How effective this provision will be as to money bills, which have been the usual subjects of deadlocks under the several local constitutions, will appear from two facts; first, that it can only be called into action when the bill on which the difference arises has originated in the House of Representatives; secondly, that, as money bills must not be amended in the Senate, a final determination must be upon the precise form in which the House of Representatives chooses to leave the bill. Inasmuch as the House of Representatives is to contain as nearly as possible two members for every one in the Senate, there is little doubt that the cases will be few indeed in which the will of that house will not prevail at a joint sitting. Personally, I doubt if we shall ever reach a joint sitting, because the power to dissolve both houses simultaneously is, in itself, so drastic that, in all probability, its exercise will be avoided by reasonable concession.

But the people have yet further security for the absolutism of their self-government. Instead of being elected by the several Legislatures, as in the United States, senators are to be directly chosen by the people. They will each represent the whole of the State which elects them; while, in the House of Representatives, the members will be representatives of districts. The voters for each house will be the same persons, the difference being that, in voting for senators, each State is to be one entire electorate, and

will have equal representation without respect of number; while, in voting for the House of Representatives, each State will be represented in electoral divisions, purely according to the numbers of inhabitants. There is one broad fact which secures that each house will be popularly representative. This is that the franchise will be the same for the electors to each chamber.

Until a franchise, to operate uniformly throughout the Commonwealth, is made by the Federal Parliament, the suffrage will be in each State that which exists in elections to its lower chamber, which, in most of these colonies, is called the Legislative Assembly. The Federal Parliament, however, has no power to make a restrictive suffrage for Federal elections. It cannot by any law prevent any adult person, who has or acquires a right to vote at elections for the Legislative Assembly of a State, from voting at elections for either house of the Federal Parliament. Now, there is one colony, namely South Australia, which already gives the suffrage to women, as well as to men. It will follow that the federal franchise law must, in order to be uniform, extend the suffrage for the Australian Parliament to women in all the States. The conditions of membership of either of the Federal houses are:

1. The attainment of the age of twenty-one years;
2. The qualification of an elector for the House of Representatives;
3. A three years' residence within the limits of the Federal Commonwealth;
4. The being a British subject, either natural born or for five years naturalized.

It will be of interest next to state the principal powers of legislation which the Federal Parliament is to possess. There are thirty-nine of these, of which the principal are: Trade and commerce with other countries, and among the States; taxation, but so as not to discriminate between States, or parts of States; bounties on production or export, which must be uniform throughout the Commonwealth; borrowing on the credit of the Commonwealth; posts, telegraphs, telephones and the like; defence; light-houses, light-ships, beacons and buoys; naturalization and aliens; immigration and emigration; influx of criminals; the people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws; external affairs; the acquisition, with the consent of a State, of any railways of the

State on terms arranged; railway construction and extension in any State, with the consent of that State; conciliation and arbitration in industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State; invalid and old-age pensions; marriage; divorce and matrimonial causes, and, in relation thereto, parental rights, and the custody and guardianship of infants.

Among the remaining powers may be mentioned quarantine, currency and coinage, banking, insurance, weights and measures, bills of exchange and promissory notes, bankruptcy, copyrights, patents and trade marks, and company laws.

The Parliament may declare by law the powers, privileges and immunities of each house, and of the members and committees; and, until so declared, they are to be as in the House of Commons in the United Kingdom.

I shall be thought to have enumerated legislative powers of pretty wide range. Will there be any restriction on their exercise, so long as the authority given is not exceeded? In my view little, if any. Under the instructions issued to the Governors of the various Australian Colonies in the past, there are few subjects on which a Colonial Governor is required to reserve bills for the Royal assent, instead of giving the assent himself; and, in case of such reservation, instances of withholding the Queen's assent have been rare. It is unlikely that the Governor-General of the Australian Commonwealth will be instructed to reserve any class of bills, unless, perhaps, such as may appear to be inconsistent with the treaty obligations of the British Crown, or bills of unusual importance affecting the royal prerogative, or the rights of property of British subjects not living within the Commonwealth, or prejudicing the commercial interests of other parts of the Empire; and experience renders it probable that, even in such cases, the self-governing powers of the Federal Parliament will be restricted as little as possible.

The Governor-General will be an imperial officer. He will reign without ruling; for he will be guided by the advice of his responsible ministers, except in the very limited instances in which his instructions may direct an independent course; and we may be sure that these instances will be as few as they are to-day in Canada.

The Australian Parliament, however, must act within the limits assigned by the Constitution. I mean that it will not be

able to decide for itself whether any law which it passes is constitutional or not. It is laid down that "every power of the Parliament of a Colony which has become or becomes a State shall, unless it is by this Constitution exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State, continue as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, or as at the admission or establishment of the State, as the case may be."

State laws on subjects of concurrent jurisdiction will, of course, continue in force, except to the extent of the exercise by the Federal Commonwealth of its legislative powers, subject to the powers of alteration and repeal resident in the individual State; but when a State law is inconsistent with a Federal law the latter is to prevail, and the former is to be invalid to the extent of the inconsistency.

The Constitution is to be guarded by a Federal High Court, which is to consist of a Chief Justice, and not less than two other judges, and other courts may be invested with federal jurisdiction. Judges are to be appointed and removed by the Governor-General in Council, but must not be removed, except on an address from both houses of the Federal Parliament in the same session, and on the ground of proved misbehavior or incapacity.

The original jurisdiction of the High Court embraces matters arising under any treaty, or affecting representatives of other countries; or in which the Commonwealth, or a person suing or being sued on its behalf, is a party; or between States or residents of different States; or between a State and a resident of another State; or in which a writ of mandamus or prohibition or an injunction is sought against an officer of the Commonwealth: and original jurisdiction may be conferred on the High Court in any matter arising under the Constitution, or involving its interpretation, or arising under any laws made by the Federal Parliament, or in cases of admiralty or maritime jurisdiction, or cases relating to the same subject-matter claimed under the laws of different States. The High Court is also to have a wide appellate jurisdiction, whether as to the subjects of its own original jurisdiction, or as to appeals from any other federal court, or from any State court from which an appeal at present lies to the Privy Council. The High Court will also decide appeals, from the Interstate Commission, but on questions of law only. There is a saving of the

Queen's prerogative to grant special leave of appeal from the High Court to the Privy Council, subject to any future Federal laws limiting the matters in which such leave may be asked; and the general appeal to the Privy Council is expressly restricted, so as to exclude matters involving the interpretation of the Federal Constitution or of the constitution of a State, unless the matter involves public interests of some part of the Empire, other than the Commonwealth or any of the States.

It is clearly intended that the Federal High Court shall be a tribunal charged with most important duties, in the maintenance of the balance of the Constitution. It is well that its independence is sufficiently secured; for, in time, occasions will of necessity arise in which it must decide conflicts between laws of the Commonwealth and laws of the several States; for all Americans know that, in a constitution delegating to the National Parliament, not only certain exclusive powers, but many others which are for distinction called concurrent, the latter class of powers, touching as they do a number of questions upon which individual States have already legislated, and that with much variety, cannot possibly be exercised without occasional controversies as to the extent to which local laws are displaced by Federal laws. There are strong hopes that the Commonwealth will find within it judicial capacity equal to the occasion. It can be said with confidence that the judicial career and conduct in these colonies up to now have been such as to give good grounds for this expectation, and for the bold assertion, conveyed by the provision I have quoted, that the people who have made this Constitution are fit to be, through their judges, the final expositors of its meaning.

Adhering to the order observed in the instrument itself, it may here be said that the manner in which the Constitution deals with questions of finance and trade has been a subject of bitter controversy. In each of these colonies, the principal sources of revenue are the customs and excise, and it was clearly necessary to hand over to the central body, with the control of inter-state free-trade, the receipt of this revenue and the making of future tariffs. With six different tariffs operating not only upon external but also upon internal trade, there has, of course, grown up an apparent difference in the rates of consumption per head. It is an actual difference in the rates of consumption of dutiable articles. But here the difficulty arises, well known to American readers, of de-

termining the total rate of consumption when plain *data* exist for ascertaining the rate as to articles imported, while there are few or no *data* as to articles internally produced. It will be seen that this difficulty led to many of the misapprehensions of the opponents of the bill as to its financial provisions. The chief of these provisions are as follows: As soon as the Constitution takes effect, the collection and control of all customs and excise duties will pass to the Federal Government, but the proceeds of these duties will be far more than sufficient for any probable purposes of the Commonwealth. A Federal tariff must be passed within two years from the establishment of the Constitution, and, on its passage, trade and intercourse among the States, whether by land, river or sea, are to be forever free. Until the first Federal tariff is passed, the Commonwealth is to credit to each State the revenues collected therein by the Commonwealth. It is to debit to each State, first, whatever the Commonwealth spends in that State for keeping up, as at the time of transfer, any department transferred from the State to the Commonwealth; and, secondly, it is to debit to each State its proportion *per capita* of all other expenditure of the Commonwealth. The resultant balance is to be paid each month to the State. But this system will also go on, with a slight change, during the five years following the passage of the first tariff. As the enactment of the tariff brings with it inter-state free-trade, it is provided that, during the five years following the enactment, customs duties chargeable on goods imported into a State, and afterwards passing into another State for consumption, shall be taken to have been collected not in the former, but in the latter, State; and the same consideration is to apply to excise duties paid on goods produced or manufactured in a State, and afterwards passing into another State for consumption. With this deviation, the crediting of revenue, the debiting of expenditure, and the payment of balances to each State will proceed, for the five-year period, just as they are to be carried on for the period preceding the making of the first tariff. When the five years shall have elapsed, the Parliament will have collected the necessary *data* as to the operation of inter-state free-trade, and the consequent changes in the commercial and financial conditions of the several States; and it will then be more clearly apparent in what degree the consumption, per head, of dutiable articles has approximated in different parts of the Commonwealth. The Commonwealth is

then charged to provide, on such basis as it deems fair, for the monthly payment to the several States of all surplus revenues of the Commonwealth.

But is the expenditure of the Commonwealth to be unrestricted? No. A clause which is to operate for ten years after the establishment of the Commonwealth, and afterwards until the Parliament makes other provision, deals with the net revenue of the Commonwealth from customs and excise, and provides that, out of this, the Commonwealth may not spend more than one-fourth, and must return the balance to the several States, subject, of course, to the financial provisions I have outlined. If, however, a certain other provision is acted upon, a deduction may be made from the balance payable to any State. This will occur if the Commonwealth takes over any part of the public debts of the States. If it does, the interest paid by the Commonwealth on such proportion of debt will be deducted from the balance payable to that State. It is wisely provided that the Commonwealth may take over from the States either the whole of their public debts, as existing at the establishment of the Constitution, or a *per capita* proportion. Such debts, or any part of them, may be converted, renewed or consolidated. It is the general hope that this enactment may be turned to account at a very early stage in the life of the Commonwealth, with the result that the superior credit of the Commonwealth will much reduce the interest as the process of renewal and conversion goes on.

The requirement that the Commonwealth must not retain for its own expenditure more than one-fourth of the net customs and excise revenue has been the butt of bitter attack. Passed at the instance of Sir Edward Braddon, the Premier of Tasmania, it has been vituperated in New South Wales under the name of "Braddon Blot." Its object was to afford some security against extravagance on the part of the Commonwealth, and consequently some guarantee of a return to the States substantial enough to prevent any severe dislocation of their finances; but because the restriction of the Commonwealth to the expenditure of one-fourth makes it necessary that the remaining three-fourths should be distributed among the States, it has been asserted that the Commonwealth will be obliged to raise an enormous customs revenue, amounting in every case to four dollars as against every dollar which it may require. The fact that the Commonwealth is not bound to raise

all of its revenue from customs and excise has been studiously ignored; and altogether, no clause has been more deftly used by the opponents of federation to terrify its friends than has this one. American readers will require no argument as to the position which has been taken up, because they know, as many Australians have not yet realized, that it is the same people who make local and Federal legislators and tariffs; and it is only those who have not yet entered into a federation who can possibly entertain the apprehension that the effect of their united efforts of self-government will be tantamount to their domination by a foreign power.

The seat of government of the Commonwealth is to be determined by the Parliament. It must be within territory granted to or acquired by the Commonwealth, in which it is to be vested. In short, it will be Federal territory, and the Federal Parliament will have the exclusive power to make laws for its government, and to determine the extent of its representation in either house of that Parliament. It is to be within the State of New South Wales; and, in return for that concession, it is to be distant not less than one hundred miles from Sydney, the State capital. The area is not to be less than one hundred square miles. Any Crown lands which it may contain—probably a considerable area—are to be granted by the State to the Commonwealth without payment. The Parliament is to sit at Melbourne, until it meets at the seat of government. It will be seen that the law as to the seat of government will follow that of the United States rather than that of Canada, inasmuch as the area containing the capital will be exclusively under the federation and not under the jurisdiction of any State. There can be very little doubt that the representatives of New South Wales in the federation will lose little time in urging the early choice of this territory. As the Legislatures of the several States sit generally in the winter, and as a member of a State Legislature is not excluded from sitting in the Federal Parliament, if elected, it is probable that convenience will be on the side of summer sessions. In that prospect, it is likely that the area chosen will be at a sufficient altitude to give the advantage of a good summer climate; and, happily, several such areas are open for choice in New South Wales.

The Constitution can be altered much more easily than that of the United States. A bill for the purpose must first, in

ordinary cases, be passed by an absolute majority in each house. It is afterwards to be submitted in each State to the electors qualified to vote for the election of members in the House of Representatives. This is to be done not less than two nor more than six months after the passage of the bill through both houses. If, however, an amendment passed by an absolute majority of one house fails to pass the other, or is passed with an amendment as to which the two houses differ, and if after an interval of three months, a similar difference occurs, the amendment may be submitted to the popular vote, just as if it had secured an absolute majority in both houses. In order to become law, the amendment must, at the referendum, secure a majority of the electors who vote, and it must also secure majorities in a majority of the States. The difficulty which will exist because in South Australia women as well as men have a vote is met by prescribing that, until there is a uniform suffrage throughout the Commonwealth, only half the electors voting for and against the amendment may be counted in any State in which adult suffrage prevails. If an amendment would lessen the proportionate representation of any State in either house, or would alter the limits of a State directly or indirectly, it is not to become law until it receives the approval of a majority of the electors voting in the State affected.

I have endeavored, in giving a summary of the provisions of this Constitution, to discharge the duty in such a way as to enable American readers to see clearly the points in which it differs from the Constitution of the United States and from that of Canada.

In this interesting labor it may be thought that I have left out some matters which would have been useful to observers across the ocean, but I believe that I have given the real substance and meaning of the instrument. The struggle for federation has lasted between eight and nine years, if we leave out of account the good work of many who advocated it before it became a tangible public question. In the actual labor of the struggle it has been my duty to take as active a part as any man, but it is unquestionable that it was the mind and the hand of the late Sir Henry Parkes which first gave practical direction to popular feeling and reason on the question of questions, and all Australians will hold his memory dear for the gift he strove so hard to win for them. Full of years, he passed away in 1896. He did not live to share or see

the labors of the elected convention of fifty men, who, representing five colonies, framed the Constitution in 1897 and 1898. Would that we had had his help in the battles which have ensued.

I believe this Constitution will be found a well-considered instrument of government, adapting the best conclusions of liberal statesmanship to the difficult problems presented by the necessity of preserving the force of federalism in the government of an aggregation of democratic States. As was the case with the Constitution of the United States, its enemies will attack it for many a day; but I have no fear either as to its strength against attack or as to its fitness for its appointed work in the hands of a free people, of keen insight and active reason.

EDMUND BARTON.

WILL EDUCATION SOLVE THE RACE PROBLEM?

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The race problem is again occupying a large place in the public attention. The renewed focusing of interest on it arises from two causes—first, the conditions at the South growing out of the rape and lynching evils; second, the disquisitions of Professor Booker T. Washington and other thinkers on the problem, maintaining that education will solve it. The educational argument opens an interesting field for thought and investigation. Let us consider it briefly under the following heads:

I. Will education solve the race problem? That is, will it bring about such an advance on the part of the negro as will adapt him fully to his environments and make him a worthy integer in our national life, if he is allowed fully to enter that life, by the breaking down of the race prejudice and antipathy against him?

II. If education will not accomplish the desired advance, what are the causes which prevent such a result?

I.

There are reasons for fearing that the hope for the solution of the race problem through education is based upon inadequate grounds. One of the most vital factors in the problem is the negro's tendency to immorality and crime. This tendency in the colored race is of fundamental importance in any consideration of the problem, because, if it continues, it means, instead of the hoped-for growth, permanent decay and degeneracy in every particular. No race can make a true advance which has not beneath its feet the firm foundation of the moral idea. The tendency is of fundamental importance, further, because, if it continues to develop, the gulf between the races will grow ever wider and the

friction ever more intense, thereby rendering the proposed solution more difficult.

How is the tendency being affected by education?

It is necessary to use the *ante-bellum* conditions as an aid in tracing tendencies among the colored race. Two things are reasonably certain about those conditions. The first is that, previous to the war, the negro was not educated. In most of the Southern States there were laws prohibiting education among the slaves. Such occurrences as the Nat Turner rebellion, in 1831, tended to the rigid enforcement of the laws, and it is safe to say that practically the entire negro race was illiterate. The second is that, previous to the war, the negro was not more criminal than other men. The slaves were noted for their docile and peaceable natures. Petty misdemeanors were usually their worst offenses. There were surprisingly few crimes against the person among them. So far as the writer can ascertain, there was only one case of the negro's crime against womanhood during all the days of slavery, while his fidelity and simple discharge of duty during the Civil War, when the whites were away fighting against his liberty, have challenged the admiration of the world.

Starting with these conditions, the changes which have come about may be traced. After the war, the education of the negro began and advanced rapidly; but side by side with it has gone his increase in crime and immorality in even greater ratio. Measured by the proportion of negro criminals to the entire negro population, the race grew more criminal between 1870 and 1880 by as much as twenty-five per cent.* this despite the fact that illiteracy decreased by over ten per cent.† During the decade from 1880 to 1890, the negroes grew more criminal by thirty-three and a third per cent.; yet illiteracy decreased during that decade by over eighteen per cent. So by the census of 1890, twenty-five years from their emancipation in the South, we are confronted with the fact that the race, though constituting less than twelve per cent. of the population of this country, furnished thirty per cent. of all the crime of the country, including thirty-

* Stated thus because the Census of 1870 is faulty as regards facts pertaining to the negro. The seeming increase, from the Census, was larger than twenty-five per cent., but on account of the errors in the Census of 1870, the comparisons between it and that of 1880 make the negro's growth in crime for the decade appear too large. (See Census of 1880, Vol. I., p. 33.)

† Unless otherwise specified, all statistics are from the United States Census.

seven per cent. of all homicides, fifty-seven per cent. of all female homicides, and forty per cent. of all assaults. This in the face of the fact that over \$100,000,000 had been spent on their education in twenty-five years,* and that illiteracy among them had decreased by forty-two per cent.† Though there are as yet no census reports covering the period, any one who has been observant of criminal records in recent years must conclude that the increase in the proportion of negro criminals has gone on from 1890 to the present time. Especially has this been true of the negro's horrible crime against female virtue. When Henry Smith was burned at Paris, Texas, in 1893, for mutilating and murdering a little white girl of four years old, it was predicted by Bishop Haygood, of Georgia, and other observers, that the restraining influence of that terrible example, coupled with the efforts of the good negroes to prevent them, would stop these shocking crimes. Since then, however, despite all that has been done, they have increased with alarming rapidity, until, during the few weeks following the Sam Hose burning in Georgia recently, it is not extreme to say that there were more outrages and attempts at outrage than in the two preceding years combined. The papers were laden almost daily with accounts of one, two, and sometimes three of these crimes, within or near the borders of Georgia, followed by the swift and awful vengeance of the whites; and some are committed, followed by the usual punishment, news of which never reaches the papers. The worst spirit seemed to have taken possession of the vicious elements of the negroes. There were several of these crimes committed by negro boys, little more than children; an organized band of negroes bound together by oath for outrage was discovered near Bainbridge, in Georgia; while it was reported from Little Rock, Arkansas, that one brute, in the very prodigality of wantonness, committed five of these crimes in one day before he could be apprehended.

Now, it might be thought by some that, as the majority of the race live in the South, the criminal record of the negro arises, in part, from discrimination against them by the Southern courts. But this cannot be true, for the same tendencies prevail in the

* From estimates by Dr. Mayo, of Boston, substantiated by estimates by the National Commissioner of Education.

† These figures do not include the very large number of domestic larcenies and other small offenses for which the negroes are not punished at law, on account of the forbearance of the whites.

North where the objection cannot be urged. In Pennsylvania, for instance, in 1894, the proportion of male negro criminals to the entire number of criminals was 16.61 per cent., that of the females 34.61 per cent., and yet the negroes compose only 2.16 per cent. of the population of Pennsylvania.*

The negro's growth in sexual immorality goes on like his growth in crime. The report of the health office of the District of Columbia† shows that, while the percentage of illegitimate to the total number of births decreased among the whites during the decade, 1884 to 1894, from 3.60 per cent. to 2.56 per cent. (28.8 per cent. decrease), it increased among the negroes from 19.02 per cent. to 26.46 per cent. (39 per cent. increase), and stood in 1894 at over ten times that of the whites. Like conditions prevail in other localities. And even these figures, it is thought, do not adequately indicate the extent of the sexual sin of the negro, for it is the common belief among the whites, especially in the South, that the idea of chastity is scarcely known to the vast lower strata of the race.

As a further illustration of tendencies, let us turn to the conditions in the North alone, where the negro has had his liberty for some generations longer than in the South, where he is far better educated, and is freest to follow his natural bent, by reason of at least a partial absence of the idea of negro inferiority which holds him in check in the South. It is held by the advocates of the educational solution that, if the negro is but given the opportunity, he will grow and improve in all respects. It may also be thought by some that it is too early to reach a judgment as to these tendencies in the South, since the negro has had but a short time there since slavery to demonstrate what he will do. The record of the negro in the North, now, meets both of these conditions, and should shed, therefore, a valuable light on what may be expected of him in the future. Turning to the North, we will find that the evil tendencies prevail there in even greater degree than in the South. The number of negro criminals in the North is much larger, in proportion to the negro population in those States, than in the South. In the North Atlantic States, there were, in 1890, 7,547 negro criminals to the million of negro population; in the South Atlantic States, there were only 2,716

* Annual reports State Board of Charities and Lunacy, 1886 and 1894.

† 1894, p. 152.

to the million. Now, the proportion of illiteracy among the Northern negroes is but 21.71 per cent., whereas it is 60 per cent. for those of the South. It is apparent, therefore, that the negroes of the North, despite the advantageous conditions there, are almost three times as criminal as those of the South, although they are also about three times as well educated.

Going a step further in the investigation, we will find, not only that the negro is more criminal in the North than in the South, but that, dividing the South into groups of States, he is most criminal in the States where he is best educated. Grouping South Carolina, Mississippi and Louisiana, we find that the average negro illiteracy is 65.70 per cent. The number of negro criminals to the million of negro population in those States is 1,600. Grouping Texas, Tennessee, Maryland and West Virginia, the average negro illiteracy is only 50.31 per cent. The number of negro criminals to the million of negro population in those States is 4,120. So we see that in the group of States where the negro's literacy is 15 per cent. higher than in the other group, his criminal record is two and one-half times as high.

Let us notice here, too, that in the three States where their crime is least (Mississippi, Louisiana and South Carolina), the negro population is densest. They constitute 56 per cent. of the population of those States; while in the States where their crime is greatest, the negro population is sparsest. They constitute but 20 per cent. of the population of Texas, Maryland, Tennessee and West Virginia.

It is a noticeable fact, also, that in the three States where his criminal record and educational development are lowest and his population densest, there has been the least advance on the part of the negro away from his simple *ante-bellum* life. The conditions on the plantations of Mississippi, Louisiana and South Carolina are more nearly as they were before the war than in the other Southern States. The small farm system has not grown up there so much as it has elsewhere. Great plantations, with overseers and large groups of negro laborers, are more the predominating type than elsewhere in the Southern country.

Compare the two extremes. In the three Southern States, where the negro has made the least advance, and where, according to all of our accepted standards (education, worldly condition, etc.), his status is the worst, he furnishes but 1,600 criminals to the

million of his population; whereas, in the North Atlantic States, where his condition, according to our standards, is the best, he furnishes 7,547 criminals to the million of his population. The illiteracy of the negro in the States where he furnishes only 1,600 criminals to the million of his population is 65.70 per cent.; while his illiteracy in the North, where he furnishes 7,547 to the million, is only 21.71 per cent.

Another significant fact bearing on these considerations of the negro's crime is that, looking at the race as a whole, the element which is educated is more criminal than the element which is illiterate. Only 42 per cent. of the entire colored population can read and write, whereas 46 per cent. of the negro criminals can read and write.

Now, the point is well taken that we should not expect too much of the negro, in view of the fact that he has only recently emerged from slavery. But, in the light of all the conditions, this fact does not satisfactorily account for the negro's moral decline. To argue that the low moral status of the slaves accounts for the present ethical condition of the negro, overlooks the startling increase in *crime* since the war, although there was little criminality among the slaves. Further, the negro has not stood still at what may be granted to have been a low moral status during slavery, but has since rapidly declined ethically. It is also true that his *ante-bellum* sexual immorality took the form of concubinage, while in *post-bellum* days it is the more pernicious system of prostitution for gain. So we have the right, on account of the fact that these evil tendencies are growing ever stronger, not only in the South, but more so in the North, where the negro has been free for several generations and has had every advantage, to ask ourselves the questions what these things mean, how far they are to go, and how long our civilization can stand the strain which they bring about. The constantly recurring epidemics of rape and lynching, and the numerous race riots and incipient wars force these questions upon us. Optimistic though we be, we cannot overlook the fact that there have been a dozen times, within the past year or two, when the least indiscreet act on either side might have precipitated a race war in the locality affected, involving the burning of towns and the shedding of much blood.

The consideration in this article, however, is not how much

blame is to be attached to the negro for these things, but what effect our remedies are having. Though the foregoing statistics, like all other statistics, are liable to the criticism of a lack of absolute finality as indicators of conditions and tendencies, still there must be some strong element of truth in them when they are so decisive; and, judging from them, the educational work for the negroes does not seem to be realizing the expectations based upon it. Education may not be the cause of these evils, as some go so far as to claim; but the facts seem to warrant the conclusion that it is not checking them and therefore is not solving the problem.

II.

If we accept the foregoing facts, one or two inductions can be made from them: either that the negro has received the wrong sort of education, or that there are causes which prevent the beneficial effects which usually arise from education from prevailing in his case.

The movement for industrial education, with that great and good man, Booker T. Washington, as its chief champion, has arisen as a result of a widespread, though not specifically expressed, opinion that the first of the above conclusions is true.

While industrial education may be the best present policy and worthy for that reason of support, pending the final solution of the problem, there are reasons for fearing that its effect on the ethical condition of the negro—the vital element of the problem—will not be sufficiently marked to compass the needed reform. It has been the policy in the past educational efforts among the negroes to lay especial emphasis on the development of moral ideals; and it is difficult to see how efforts looking to moral advancement, in connection with industrial training, are to be more efficacious than have been the efforts looking to moral advancement in connection with academic and collegiate education up to the present time. In addition to this, it is by no means certain that the movement for industrial education will eventually prevail over and in large part replace the old system. In fact, it is being viewed with a skeptical, if not unfriendly, eye by a large element of the colored race, composed principally of the partisans of the old system; and it is being opposed by another element, composed of those who have had implanted in their minds the idea

of immediate equality with the whites, engendered for the most part during the carpet-bag régime, and who do not seem willing to wait for any process of growth. As illustrations of this opposition, Mr. Washington was denounced by some of the delegates to the recent Negro Convention at Chicago; and a book containing criticisms of him and his policies has also been published. But, granting that it will ultimately prevail, we must still realize that the industrial education cannot reach, directly or indirectly, for long generations at least, the mass of the negro race. And how it is to elevate this vast body of people, now seemingly far more weak, criminal and immoral than at the close of the war, and with these tendencies growing ever stronger, would be difficult of demonstration.

These considerations warrant our taking up the second possible induction. Before considering it, let us note certain parallel tendencies to the ones before examined, which may give us further light.

There are some indications that, in connection with the seeming ethical degeneracy discussed, there has set in a physical deterioration among the negroes equally marked. It is claimed by some students of the question that it is capable of scientific demonstration that the negro is weakening perceptibly in his physical manhood year after year.* The death rate of the negroes in cities is nearly double that of the whites. The ravages of pulmonary, venereal and other diseases among them is something distressing. And while there are few direct comparative vital statistics for the rural districts, that the same conditions prevail there, more or less, as in the cities, may be inferred from the fact that the colored race is increasing far more slowly than the white. The whites outstripped them nearly twofold in the South during the decade from 1880 to 1890, and there was practically no immigration to the South and no migration of negroes away to change the value of the comparison. Had not the whites been weakened by the war, it is possible that the difference might have been even greater.

Parallel with the greater ethical decay in the North, the tendency to physical degeneracy there also seems to be more marked than in the South, as illustrated by the fact, deducible from statistics from several States North and South, that, while

* See, for instance, F. M. Hoffman's "Race Traits and Tendencies of the American Negro."

the birth rate is greater than the death rate by about two to one in the South, it is actually less than the death rate in the North. That is to say, the race is not sustaining itself in the Northern States.

There are also some indications that the negro is degenerating as regards thrift and industry. Such students of the problem as Mr. Hoffman and Mr. Bruce have reached this conclusion. The complaints so frequently heard about the "triflingness" of the younger generations of negroes may be indications of this tendency toward lessened industrial efficiency; while the School Commissioner of Georgia states in his last annual report (1898, p. 10) that, upon careful investigation, he had found that ninety per cent. of the property owned by negroes in Georgia was acquired by ex-slaves. This fact is rendered the more significant when it is remembered that the ex-slaves constitute less than twenty per cent. of the negro population of Georgia (Census of 1890). The commissioner says further: "Most of the property owned by the negroes was acquired prior to 1890. Very little has been added to the tax books since. The younger class, or the educated class, does not seem to be adding much to the property-holding of the race."

Do not these apparently well defined tendencies toward decay among the negroes, despite the educational efforts in their behalf, point to the conclusion that there are causes which prevent the beneficial effects usually arising from education from prevailing in their case? Is this an unreasonable conclusion, in the light of the nature of the negro and the conditions surrounding him here? In our educational work for him have we not overlooked, more or less, the real nature of racial advancement? The true civilizing process is not a sudden and artificial development from without, but a gradual and harmonious growth from within. Plato's dwellers in the cave could not be suddenly transferred from their accustomed darkness to the dazzling light on the outside. The African cannot be lifted to the plane of the Anglo-Saxon by the use of either logarithms and Greek roots or formulæ for cultivating a field or constructing a pair of shoes. The Anglo-Saxon has reached his present high civilization after a long and laborious struggle upward. Through a series of well defined steps, he has risen from barbarism to his present plane. The system in which he now dwells is the logical outcome of all

that has gone before, and consequently the white man of to-day is thoroughly suited to his environment. Now, it is reasonable to think that, since Anglo-Saxon civilization is thus the culmination of a series of steps, all the steps must be taken before it can safely be reached. To suddenly introduce another race, therefore, to any step near the top before it has taken the preceding steps in the series, and then to attempt to hurry it over the other steps in the hope of having it reach and occupy the culminating one, must be a hopeless undertaking. The evolutionary process cannot be supplanted by artificial stimulants. Should we wonder, then, that our educational efforts in behalf of the negro seem to have failed of their intended purpose? Nay, more—does not the history of races show that the effort on the part of a superior people to lift up inferiors at a single stroke not only fails but establishes conditions which lead to the actual destruction of the weaker race? And is not this the largest element in the cause of the seeming failure of the educational movement among the negroes?

Here is a question that we must face, however distasteful it may be. The fact—illustrated by the conditions in Mississippi, Louisiana, and South Carolina, where the colored population is densest and where the status of the negro has not changed since the war so much as in the remainder of the country—the fact that the more the negroes live to themselves and the nearer they remain to the simple life which formerly characterized them, the better they are, while the more they scatter as a race and the closer they come into contact with our civilization and the more they endeavor to take it on, the worse they become, lends pertinence to the query. There is historical justification for the statement of the principle that a weak race, which is unassimilable in its nature, when brought suddenly into contact with the higher civilization of a strong race, unconsciously destroys itself. When a weak race which is assimilable comes into contact with a stronger the former is absorbed, as illustrated by the familiar history of the Anglo-Saxon. When the weaker race is unassimilable, however, it has not been the custom of the stronger to exterminate the weaker *vi et armis*, but rather to subordinate it. So that the ultimate extinction of the weaker peoples, where they have touched the stronger historic nations, would indicate that the weaker gradually died out of their own accord. A reason for

this phenomenon might be found in the ethical effects upon a race of this subordination—the recognized hopelessness of its position, the aimlessness of life arising from removal of incentive to effort, etc.—and the wasting effects of a struggle, involving a complete change of habit, to take on, through imitation, a civilization for which it was not prepared. The disappearance of the Turanian peoples of Europe after the Aryan invasion (their only modern representatives being the Lapps and Finns of the far North, who were protected from contact with the invaders and their customs by the snow and ice of their Northern home, and the Basques of the Pyrenees, who had a protection in their mountain walls) suggests that then as now the weaker was destroyed by the struggle to adopt the new customs of the stronger, in conjunction with the ethical effects before mentioned. In modern times, the principle has been illustrated by the natives of South America and the West Indian islands, who sadly degenerated as a result of their contact with Spanish civilization; in some of the islands—as San Domingo—even disappearing in the end entirely.

As better authenticated illustrations of the principle, we may note the following examples. The natives of Tasmania, as a result of their contact with the English, suffered total extinction in a few years. Dr. Strong, a student of these racial phenomena, remarks that the death of the race was caused “by the attempts to civilize them.”* It was not caused by any movement for extermination, as the policy of the whites in dealing with the natives was most humane. Mr. Calder, one of the chief authorities on the Tasmanians, estimates that a total of 500 far exceeds the number of blacks killed by the whites.† The natives simply destroyed themselves.

The same results have supervened among the Maories of New Zealand, an originally strong and highly intellectual race, since they came into contact with European civilization. Degeneracy, leading to ultimate extinction, began among them as soon as they came under the influence of the new-comers. There was a decrease in their population during the fourteen years preceding 1858 of 19.42 per cent.; and in the fourteen years following 1858, of 32.29 per cent. of the remainder.‡ The Maories them-

* See Darwin's “Descent of Man,” p. 187.

† “Native Tribes of Tasmania.”

‡ “Observations on the Aboriginal Inhabitants of New Zealand,” by Mr. F. D. Fenton. Published by the British Government.

selves "attributed their decadence, in some measure, to the introduction of new food and clothing, and the attendant change of habit"—in other words, to their efforts to become civilized.

"It is evident," says Mr. Darwin, "from many statements in the life of Bishop Patteson, that the Melanesians of the New Hebrides and neighboring archipelagoes suffered to an extraordinary degree in health, and perished in large numbers, when they were removed to New Zealand, Norfolk Islands, and other salubrious places, in order to be educated as missionaries"—that is, to be civilized.

The same tendencies to decay and death began among the natives of the Sandwich Islands upon the advent of European civilization to their shores. This vital decay progressed rapidly up to the taking of the first Census in 1832; and for the forty years immediately following that Census, the remnant of natives decreased by 68 per cent. !—only 51,531 remaining of the 300,000 originally on the islands. Dating from the arrival of missionaries in 1819, "there was a rapid change in almost all the habits of the natives, and they soon became 'the most civilized (!) of the Pacific Islanders.' " * Their degeneracy is still going rapidly forward. The native death rate for Honolulu per thousand in 1893 was 29.5; in 1894, 33.6. The European rate for Honolulu in 1893 was 17.7; for 1894, 16.8. The people who are thus miserably perishing, as a result of their contact with a higher civilization, were originally a strong and in many ways an admirable race. Mr. Featherman describes them, at the time the missionaries first visited the islands, as "the uncorrupted children of nature." They had a magnificent physical manhood, and were "open-hearted, generous, and hospitable to a fault." Since then, however, their physical strength and moral integrity have wasted rapidly away, and Mr. Bishop described them in 1888 as a hopelessly debauched and degenerate people.

Finally, a more striking and familiar example of the principle is at our very doors in the story of the American Indian—his metamorphosis from a sturdy, natural manhood into a weak, vicious, and besotted wretch, slowly withering up in the white heat of the civilization about him. It is an interesting and striking fact, too, that there is an exact parallelism between the recent histories of the Indians and the negroes, in that the Indian

tribes which have touched the whites closely have degenerated far more than those which have not. Mr. Hoffman shows that four tribes which have not come into close contact with the whites have retained a high standard of morality, that chastity is the rule among them, that venereal diseases are rare, and that they are increasing numerically; while, in the case of seven tribes which touch intimately the higher civilization about them, morality is scarcely known, venereal diseases are "excessively prevalent," and the population is rapidly decreasing.*

Do not these facts demonstrate that the weaker races imitate most what is bad and profit little by what is good in the higher civilization, and consequently that the principle of the unconscious self-destruction of a weaker people in contact with a stronger is tenable? We take these savages from their simple life and their low plane of evolution, and attempt to give them an enlightenment for which the stronger races have prepared themselves through ages of growth. This we call "The White Man's Burden," but it seems rather to mean the Black Man's Death. These weaker races are brought into contact with all the allurements, temptations and dangers, the terrible strain of this civilization, without having grown into the strength which would enable them to safeguard themselves against the dangers, to eschew the bad and use merely the good in the higher forms. Like little children in a tropical garden, they eat all fruit merely because it looks pretty or tastes sweet, not knowing that deep in its dangerous heart lies the poison which destroys. It is like taking a strong stimulant. It exhilarates and buoys up for the time; but, all the while, it is quietly eating out the very vitals of its victim.

We have now to face the momentous question of whether this principle is not the one which has been behind the history of the American negro for the past thirty years. Are there not ethnological tendencies that lie deeper than all of our surface discussions? We have given the negro Latin and Greek and looking-glasses and steam engines, and have observed as a result a seeming advance; but below the surface it appears that there has been going on this ethical and even physical decay. The manifestations of racial degeneracy, according to Mr. Darwin and other authorities, are lessened fertility and the prevalence of venereal and other diseases, caused by immorality and resulting in a large

* Hoffman's "Tendencies," p. 325.

infant mortality. Judging from the declining rate of racial increase, the conclusively-proven abnormal infant mortality and prevalence of venereal diseases, these manifestations seem to be strongly of force within the colored race. Are there not grounds, therefore, for thinking that the negroes are simply not able to take on this civilization in the true meaning of that term? Have they reached a stage of development which demands or which can support this higher status? Are they not merely taking the weapons of our civilization and unconsciously turning them upon themselves? If they remain in their present environment, should we be much surprised to see the vast body of the race presenting in the future a parallel history to that of the Indian? The negro has undergone a greater change in habit of life within a few decades than has the Anglo-Saxon in a thousand years. Leaving out of consideration the undoubted racial effects which a sudden change of habitat, a transition from a warm to a colder climate, has upon uncivilized peoples, should we feel surprised if evil, even fatal, results supervene from the shock of this rude and sudden arresting of the orderly development of a race—this turning of its life into new and dangerous channels?

The theory here suggested is not invalidated by the advance of individual negroes. We must not confuse the rapid development of exceptional individuals with the evolution of a race. Picked individuals, strengthened often in mental vigor by infusions of white blood, may grow rapidly; but the evolution of the race comes slowly—a part of each new element of strength being transmitted by the laws of heredity from father to son and on to succeeding generations; and so, slowly and painfully, a race advances. It is not a matter of decades, but of centuries. The negro race as a whole, however, may go forward higher yet in outward forms, but still deep down beneath these things may lie the tendencies which give color to the fear that they are a decaying people.

Now, it might be thought that, because these tendencies seem to have developed only since emancipation, they arise simply as a result of the inclination toward license which comes as a natural result of sudden liberty, and that the tide will turn. The sudden liberation of the negro doubtless hastened the development of these tendencies, but it scarcely accounts for their existence. If we could believe that the pendulum had swung to its limit on one side and was destined now to swing back, there would be grounds

for an optimistic outlook in many respects. Unfortunately, such a hope is discounted, however, by the fact that there has been no such swing back in the North, but that, as a result of the negro's longer freedom there, these evil tendencies have grown steadily stronger and become more clearly defined. The same thing is true of the West India Islands, where the negro was fully emancipated in 1838. To believe that these evil tendencies are merely temporary, and will be corrected in the future, would be to ignore the history of all the weak races which have perished as a result of their contact with superiors. When once the cold hand of degeneracy is laid upon a people, it seems as remorseless and unyielding as the hand of death. In the case of the Tasmanians before referred to, every effort was made to save them, but, despite good treatment and all advantageous conditions, the race slowly but surely died out. The same has been true of the natives of Australia. Mr. Sutherland, in his able work on "The Origin and Growth of the Moral Instinct," says (p. 120):

"The colony of Victoria was not occupied at all by white men till 1835; and the early founders had among their articles of association most humane rules in regard to the blacks, rules which were strictly carried out. . . . The authorities appointed five protectors of aborigines, who lived among the blacks and reported once a year as to their condition, and who were especially commissioned to report on any outrage committed by white men. . . . Yet the aborigines of Victoria are practically a vanished race."

Just when this tearing-down process within the colored race began is unknown. We understand little about the workings of these ethnological tendencies, and consequently cannot say what subtle, though unseen, forces may have been at work during slavery, preparing the way for the manifest decline when the conditions were ripe for it to set in. That the tendencies seem to have been delayed in manifesting themselves in the case of the negro might be accounted for on the ground that his physical well being was carefully guarded during slavery, while his ethical side was protected by his peculiar situation. He was isolated from temptation and danger, in large measure, by his peculiarly subordinate position, his simple life, and the rigid restraints upon him.

Are not these, then, things which all wise and earnest thinkers on this vexed problem should keep in mind with their other facts and theories, educational and otherwise? Must not the theory

here suggested be included as a trial factor in any equation for the solution of the race problem? We cannot say finally that it lies in the realm of truth; but it would scarcely be the part of wisdom to ignore the facts upon which it is predicated. Nor does the theory necessarily mean despair of the negro race as a race. The question is not, What of the race? but, What of the race *under its present strange and abnormal environment*? There are many elements of strength in the negro's nature. The rare sense of humor and the homely wit of the old-time negroes are signs of latent capabilities; while, for intuitive knowledge of human nature and rugged native eloquence, they are scarcely surpassed by any race. The negroes in their unalloyed nature are hard workers and are faithful to a trust. It is possibly true, too, that they are the best natured people on earth; and this is by no means the smallest element in the foundation of racial greatness. What the negro would do if he were removed from the environment which seems to be sapping his racial life, it is impossible to say; but an optimistic hope for him would find strong foundations.

What the final solution will be, time alone can tell. We can only wait, watch and hope. In the mean time, as before remarked, Mr. Washington's plans appear to be the best tentative policy, and are worthy of all support. His industrial idea is a recognition of the significance of the evolutionary process in racial development. The question is, however, whether even industrial education goes back far enough, and whether the temptations and dangers which environ the negro here will not prevail over his weakness before his judgment to choose and his strength to overcome have developed. If time and further experience demonstrate the applicability to the negro of the theory here presented, we will then be confronted with the question of what action philanthropy as well as civil policy calls for. If the present relationship between the whites and blacks points to the permanent degeneracy and ultimate racial death of the negroes, it will become our duty to save this simple-minded and in many respects worthy people, who are not here through any choice of their own, who served our fathers faithfully and well, and who in many ways contributed to the upbuilding and wealth of our country. If racial contact is seen to prove disastrous to the weaker, then segregation must be effected. It will then be no longer a question,

of what can, but what must, be done. The enlightened conscience of humanity would see it so. Nothing is impossible to this age and this people. We have spent over \$5,000,000,000 in bringing the problem up to its present stage of uncertainty—we might say chaos; we could spend a few millions more in carrying it out to a wise, just and humane solution. No plan for picking up the negro race *en masse* and moving them from the country, or to some isolated portion of it, is practicable. But by establishing conditions elsewhere which would invite the negro there, and then assisting him to go, the problem might be solved. As many foreigners as there are members in the colored race have come to this country within the past few decades, on account of the inviting conditions here. It is possible, therefore, for the negroes to go elsewhere if conditions invited them there. All of the negroes would not go, nor is it needful that they should do so. The old negroes are rapidly passing over to a country which lies much nearer our shores than Africa or the islands at our Southern doors. But by granting any government assistance on the age-limit plan, a sufficient number of the negroes could and would go to ease the present strain in this country on the one hand, and to insure them a racial future on the other.

Until the solution of the problem is found, the whites have a great responsibility on their shoulders in the presence of this simple-minded, impressionable and imitative people. The best elements of both races must co-operate in every legitimate way to better existing conditions, to devise ways and means for wisely lifting the negro up. The dealings of the Anglo-American with the Afro-American must be characterized by sympathy, tolerance, justice and absolute fairness. The influence of the self-seeking politician must be destroyed, and in our strength and wisdom we must lead this weaker people's steps aright, giving them examples of honesty, sincerity and righteousness, not of duplicity, chicanery and injustice.

JOHN ROACH STRATON.

THE MEETING OF THE OLYMPIAN GAMES.

BY BARON PIERRE DE COUBERTIN.

The Olympian Games of ancient times brought the Greek world together every four years in the beautiful valley of Olympia, to contemplate a spectacle the uniformity of which seems to have constituted an additional charm in the eyes of the spectators. On starting, they knew beforehand almost exactly what they were going to see, and they delighted in the knowledge. In this respect, the inclination of the modern world is entirely different: our contemporaries take pleasure in variety and novelty, and for two reasons—first, because the facility and rapidity of our means of transport have intensified their curiosity; and, second, because, as the duration of their existence has not been prolonged in proportion to the number of objects soliciting their attention, they have not the leisure to see the same things twice.

When, nearly ten years ago, I conceived the plan of reviving the Olympian Games in a modern form, it was necessary for me to observe this tendency and take it into account. To-day, as in former times, the Olympian Games respond to a natural and healthy inclination of humanity: in all times and in all countries, if young men are active and in good health, they will be fond of manly games and competitions in which they display their strength and agility, and, incited by the instinct of emulation, they will desire to contend, in the name of their country, against young men of other lands. But, as regards the arrangement of these periodical festivals, the situation has changed, and the sole means of insuring their success and of rendering them as splendid and brilliant as possible consists in giving them a great variety of aspect.

This is the reason why the International Congress which met in Paris in June, 1894, decided, at my request, that each of the

new Olympiads should be celebrated in a different city of the world, and why Athens was chosen as the scene of the first Olympian meeting in 1896, and Paris as that of the second, four years later. Personally, I cannot repress a strong desire that the third Olympian Games, those of 1904, should take place at New York; then the distinctly cosmopolitan character of my enterprise will be clearly shown.

As concerns variety, I have good reason to rejoice; for nothing will resemble the festivals at Athens in 1896 less than those at Paris in 1900. We have not been drawn into the error of constructing a cardboard Stadium to reproduce that of Pericles, with the hill of Montmartre in the background to replace the Acropolis on its rock. This would have been ridiculous and paltry. We began by considering with good reason that there was no need to trouble ourselves about the preparation of amusements and special festivities, because the Exposition in itself would constitute a permanent festival full of attractions, and hence the organizing committee need only be engaged with the technical part of the sport in question. It happened that at Athens this point had been rather neglected, because the committee was also engaged with the interests of the spectators, and had to take measures for their amusement, for the decoration of the sights and monuments, and for the preparation of attractions of all kinds, in order to bring spectators together in as large numbers as possible and to detain them. Now the same anxiety does not exist, and the interests of the athletes predominate above all else.

I.

The Olympian organization created by the Congress of 1894 is very simple. It consists in an International Committee, of which I have the honor to be President, which numbers about twenty members belonging to the chief nationalities of Europe and America. These include, for example, Prince Serge Beliossel-sky for Russia, Lord Ampthill for England, Count Brunetta d'Usseaux for Italy, Commandant Balck for Sweden, Baron de Tuyl for Holland, Professor William M. Sloane, of the University of Columbia, for the United States, etc. The whole business of the International Committee consists in promoting the celebration of the Games, and in deciding in what country they shall take place. This being done, the International Committee leaves the

immediate preparations for the Games to the sub-committee appointed for that purpose, contenting itself with seconding this sub-committee and supporting it abroad with all its influence. The committee which organized the Olympian Games at Athens in 1896 was not nominated by the government, but by the Crown Prince, who presided over it. That of 1900 has been appointed by the French Government, and is placed under the direction of a Delegate General, who is M. Merillon, a former deputy, now a magistrate, a most distinguished, agreeable and competent man. A statement of the plans for the preparation of the different competitions may interest my readers.

There are ten sections. The first comprises Athletic Sports and Games; the second, Gymnastics; the third, Fencing; the fourth, Shooting; the fifth, Equestrian Sports; the sixth, Cycling; the seventh, Motor Car Racing; the eighth, Aquatic Sports; the ninth, Firemen's Drill; the tenth, Ballooning. It might be objected to this classification that it comprises neither Alpine Climbing nor Skating; that, on the other hand, Firemen's Drill is not sport, and that balloons and the art of guiding them are still in their infancy. But it is impossible to obtain a faultless classification, or to contrive that all kinds of sport without exception should be seen at the same meeting. If, as has been suggested, Sweden should some day organize Olympian Winter Games in ice and snow, they will include Tobogganing, Snow-shoes and Skis, but they will be forced to exclude Cricket, Football and Foot Races. It is an amusing paradox to consider that, in order to render the Olympian Games complete, one would have to go to St. Moritz in the Swiss Engadine, where sun and snow agree all the winter so well that men skate in flannel slippers, and women open their parasols when going for a sleigh-ride. There, indeed, one might, if forced to do so, combine summer sports with those of winter.

Meanwhile, it is a question of spring in Paris, and the restrictions imposed by the place and climate must not be forgotten. On the other hand, the programme as it stands is sufficiently complete to provide most interesting competitions. Thus, the first section comprises athletic sports, foot races, jumping, etc., and games. The distances of the foot races are those of the French championships, in which the best English runners have taken part on several occasions within the last ten years. That is to say,

the distances are very nearly the same. If the "100 yards" has become with us 100 metres, and the "one mile" 1,500 metres (instead of 1609, the exact equivalent of the mile), the hurdle race corresponds exactly to the English distance; the hurdles are of the same height, and they are arranged in the same manner. As to the running competitions, the long and high jumps, pole-vaulting, and putting the weight, they are performed in identically the same fashion. The games entered as international are Football (Rugby and Association), Hockey, Cricket, Lawn Tennis, Croquet and Golf; there will also be a match at Bowls. All these games are played in France. There are others, such as Baseball, La Crosse, etc., of which exhibitions only can be given, as they are not played in France. For example, if the Americans resident in Paris succeed in forming a baseball team to play another team from America, this contest will receive the patronage and support of the Committee of the Exposition, which perhaps will give a prize; but it will necessarily retain an American—that is to say, a purely national—character.

Gymnastics are only open to foreign gymnasts as individuals. Gymnastic societies will not be invited to compete in groups, but only to send their best gymnasts to take part in the international championship, which will be individual. Several gymnastic festivals reserved for French societies only will take place during the course of the Exposition. This is a prudent decision; in adhering to it, no attempt has been made to exclude certain nations whilst admitting others, but the aim has been to avoid trouble and dispute. Gymnastic societies, to whatever country they belong, always behave in a more or less martial fashion; they march in military order, preceded by their national flag. After the troubled circumstances of late years, it would be a delicate affair to unite the flags of recent opponents upon the field of contest.

Fencing includes, of course, matches with foils, with sabres, and with swords. One can foresee a fine contest, in which the French and Italian schools will be opposed, and will establish in a sensational manner their respective merits. Boxing will, of course, be subdivided into English and French boxing, it being impossible to combine the two methods, as has been sufficiently proved by the recent match which took place in Paris between Charlemont, our best French boxing champion, and Driscoll, a second-rate English boxer. The contest will, no doubt, give rise

to some difficulty with regard to the rules to be observed, for these are not yet drawn up with all the clearness desirable.

Then follow the Equestrian and Aquatic sports, *i. e.*, polo, and rowing, sailing and swimming matches. There had been some question of having an equestrian competition in the real sense of the term, but the difficulties of transporting valuable horses, especially during Exposition time, are so great that the idea has been abandoned. There will be target-shooting, pigeon-shooting, archery, and shooting with the cross-bow and with firearms. For cyclists there will be a whole week of track-racing, preceded by a sensational twenty-four hours' race. Lastly, the seventh, ninth and tenth sections will include motor-car races, competitions of sappers and firemen, free balloon races, and trials of carrier-pigeons. All this is doubtless interesting; only it is not pure sport, and for that reason I shall pass it over in this paper.

II.

To judge by the series of letters I have received for many months, American athletes appear to be desirous of participating in large numbers in the Olympian Games on the banks of the Seine; and, as the opportunity of imparting information is afforded me by the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW, I wish to take advantage of it by replying as far as possible to all the questions that I have been asked. These questions are generally the following: What will the competitions consist of? Who will organize them? When and where will they take place? Will they be reserved for amateurs? As to the first question I have already given an explanation. On the second, there is only one word to add—the business of preparing the competitions of 1900 has been assigned to the most competent individuals and societies. For a time the directors of the Exposition appeared to be wanting in interest for sport. Thereupon, a private committee was formed with the object of organizing the Olympian Games, since the Exposition seemed on the point of renouncing them. Last spring, or rather later, the point was reconsidered, and it was decided that sporting competitions should form part of the Exposition in some way or other.

But the Directors, not having the necessary competence, appealed to the societies. This appeal was answered, and with striking unanimity; offers were made to assist the Official Organiz-

ing Committee presided over by M. Merillon. Thus the Paris Polo Club, presided over by Vicomte de la Rochefoucauld, has undertaken the preparation of polo matches; the Society for the Encouragement of Fencing, of which M. de Villeneuve is the devoted director, is empowered to arrange the fencing contests; athletic sports are entrusted to the care of the French Athletic Union, which is not only the most important in France, but also is connected by treaty with the celebrated Amateur Athletic Association of England. Lawn Tennis is directed by the Société de l'Île de Puteaux, founded by M. de Janzé. This suffices to show that, in all branches of sport, care has been taken to enlist competent aid, and this is certainly not an insignificant detail. In how many circumstances have not these very athletic competitions failed, for want of competence in those by whom they were arranged?

At the request of my American friends, I made it a special point that the athletic sports should take place toward the middle of July. In this way the athletes of the American universities, on their arrival in Europe, can take part in the English championships, which take place on the first Saturday in July, and thence travel to the Continent to take part in those of Paris. The gymnastic championship will also be held in July. For fencing, the period chosen is from May 15th to June 15th. The polo matches will take place in succession from June 1st to June 20th. The cycling will take place in September, about the 8th; the rowing matches in June, the swimming in July; generally speaking, the competitions, with the exception of football, which is a winter game, will be held between May 15th and September 15th. This is, doubtless, too long a period; it would have been better for the whole to take place in the space of six weeks, but the Commissary-General of the Exposition insisted on the duration being prolonged as much as possible, and his desire was acceded to.

Just as the competitions will not all take place at the same date, they will not all be held at the same place. Vincennes had been first chosen as capable of uniting them all; but although possessing a wood which almost rivals that of Boulogne situated on the other side of Paris, just at the other extremity, Vincennes does not offer the conditions indispensable to certain sports. It is perfectly adapted for athletic sports, gymnastics, cycling and lawn tennis; a cycling track of fine dimensions is already in

course of construction; there will be tracks for the foot races and good tennis grounds. But it is wanting in space for golf, shooting and polo; as for the lakes, there can be no question of having the rowing, still less the sailing, matches upon them. It is therefore almost decided that the shooting will take place at Satory, near Versailles, in the ordinary exercising ground of the troops garrisoned in Paris; that the polo matches will be played on the Polo Club ground in the Bois de Boulogne; that the rowing matches will take place at Courbevoie, and the sailing matches at Meulan, two pretty spots in the neighborhood of Paris, where the Seine is wide and straight. As for the golf matches, in order to find good links one will have to go to Compiègne, an hour's railway journey from Paris. The Society of Sport at Compiègne has made links which would satisfy the wishes of the most exacting players.

There still remains the most important question—that of amateurism. As different countries have not the same definition of an amateur, one can imagine the difficulties that arise when it is proposed to include representatives of all nations in the same competition. In regard to this point, the conditions are not the same for all branches of sport. The gentlemen who shoot pigeons or who take part in a yacht race look forward to gaining cash prizes, and are not disqualified on that account. In fencing, there are no professionals, strictly speaking, but, on the other hand, professors fence with amateurs; and until of late years all the matches have shown both to be in equal numbers, and no prizes of any kind were ever given—they fought for honor alone. Personally, convinced as I am that amateurism is one of the first conditions of the progress and prosperity of sport, I have never ceased to work for it; and when in 1894 I proposed to revive the Olympian Games, it was with the idea that they would always be reserved to amateurs alone. This time, however, a slightly different theory has prevailed. It was decided that if it was necessary to reserve the first rank for pure amateurs, and in all cases to guard against any person suspected of the slightest taint of professionalism slipping in amongst them, it would be right to have classes for professionals also. There will, therefore, be special competitions for professionals, but the line of demarcation between amateurs and professionals will be strictly laid down and closely adhered to.

The motive which, perhaps, has chiefly influenced this decision is as follows: We are at the beginning of a new century, and the Paris Exposition is certainly a unique, almost an exceptional, occasion for attracting and bringing together representatives of foreign nations of all classes. It is, therefore, a matter of importance to establish records which will be a sort of athletic starting-point for the twentieth century. The amateurs and professionals, without intermingling in the least, will be able to see each other at work, and comparisons advantageous to sport will be the result. I do not say that I am a convert to this way of thinking; it is not my own, and I shall do all in my power that the following Olympian Games may revert to the true theory of amateurism, which declares the uselessness of the professional and desires his disappearance. But I am now explaining another view of the question, which is not without interest, and which, besides, may be accepted, since, by maintaining an absolute separation between amateurs and professionals, it prevents the former from losing their quality of amateurs by commingling with the latter. The direct and personal interests of amateurs will thus be protected and safeguarded in 1900, and that is the important point.

III.

By giving these details, I hope I have sufficiently characterized the competitions of the Exposition of 1900; it may be seen that it will be above all a sporting manifestation of great interest. The fact of the coincidence of the Exposition has the advantage of relieving the organizers of all other anxiety. It is certain that there will be no lack of spectators, and it is certain, also, that foreign athletes will not find their stay in Paris tedious, and that they will carry away a pleasant remembrance of it. On this head it may be, perhaps, as well to remark that the exaggerated statements of the expenses visitors will incur are without foundation. Paris is one of those cities which possess the greatest number of hotels, even in proportion to the enormous number of foreigners who visit it on an occasion of this kind; they are of all descriptions; there are many of those modest, picturesque and comfortable hotels such as are never seen in the New World; in view of the Exposition others will be added to those which already exist. All this constitutes a guarantee that competition will prevent the

prices from being raised beyond reasonable limits. But I could not too strongly recommend the teams who wish to take part in the athletic competitions to intrust the care of preparing and engaging lodgings and making the necessary arrangements for food, etc., only to managers speaking French well, and accustomed to life in Paris or French life in general. Not only, by acting thus, will the team effect a great saving of expense, but they will have the chance of being more comfortably lodged and much better served. It is unnecessary to mention that the sporting societies, and especially the French Athletic Union, which has its offices in Paris, at 229 rue St. Honoré, will take pleasure in assisting foreigners who are coming in any way in their power.

They are coming, by all appearance, in very large numbers. In the course of last summer I visited several European towns, in order to make arrangements with the members of our International Olympian Committee, and I found everywhere a strong desire to send representatives of all kinds of sport to compete in Paris. What struck me during this journey was the astonishing progress made by sport in the last ten years. Anglo-Saxons have some trouble in getting used to the idea that other nations can devote themselves to athleticism, and that successfully. I can understand this, and the feeling is certainly excusable, for they are those who, especially for the last fifty years, have best understood and practiced bodily exercises; but if this honor is incontestably theirs, it does not follow that young men of other races, with blood and muscles like their own, should not be worthy of walking in their footsteps.

The countries that surprised me the most in this rapid advance are Germany and Sweden. Berlin is really on the way to becoming a great sporting centre. I visited with interest the rowing clubs which succeed each other along the banks of the Spree, at the gates of the capital; they are rich and prosperous. It is to be noted that the Emperor takes great interest in rowing; from his private purse he has built a club for the students at the Berlin colleges, and he has founded imperial regattas, for which he gives important prizes every year, and which he often presides over in person. I should be much surprised, after what I have seen, if Germany has not a very fine sporting future before her. She already builds and manufactures boats and all kinds of sporting articles, and this industry seems very prosperous, a proof that it finds a market in

Germany herself, for certainly neither the English nor the French purchase sporting implements from her. As for Sweden, the progress of sport was impeded for a long time by the rather exorbitant pretensions of the famous Swedish Gymnastics, which, having cured numbers of invalids and strengthened countless children, laid claim to suffice also for young men, and to supply for them the place of manly games and exercises of strength. This is, of course, not the case, and the fact that, by the action of the Crown Prince and representatives of gymnastics, with Major Balck at their head, all kinds of sport are more and more practiced, indicates clearly that no system of gymnastics, however complete and scientific it may be, can supply the place of their beneficent action. There are notably two establishments at Stockholm, *Tattersall* and *Idrottspacken*, which include all kinds of sport, from riding to skating, in conditions absolutely worthy of the finest American clubs of New York, Chicago or Boston.

At Vienna, in Austria, an athletic club has been recently opened in the celebrated Prater; the building, which is very elegant, is surrounded by football and lawn tennis grounds and tracks for cycling and foot-races. Lastly, even at St. Petersburg, where they are backward in this respect, a movement in favor of physical exercises is noticeable. It is thus clear that sport is gradually spreading over the whole world, and taking the place of unhealthy amusements and evil pleasures in the lives of young men. This fact will rejoice all true friends of youth and progress. Doubtless, one can discern and regret certain abuses. These may be found in everything; but when one compares the abuses which sport causes with those to which it puts an end, one cannot refrain from singing its praises and laboring for its propagation.

It is for this very purpose that I have revived the Olympian Games, and all that I have said here encourages me in this task. It has enemies, like every other free and living work, but it has also stanch friends who are of great assistance. It is to these that I appeal to prepare from this time onwards the celebration in America of the Olympian Games of 1904, in the persuasion that they will be a great success, and that they will draw across the ocean qualified representatives of all the sporting societies of the world, for a manifestation which will be both worthy of the noble and ancient Olympian past and of the glorious future of the great American Republic.

PIERRE DE COUBERTIN.

HOW ENGLAND SHOULD TREAT THE VANQUISHED BOERS.

BY SIR SIDNEY SHIPPARD, K.C.M.G., D.C.L., FORMERLY ADMINISTRATOR OF BRITISH BECHUANALAND AND ONE OF THE JUDGES OF THE SUPREME COURT, CAPE OF GOOD HOPE.

MUCH has been written on the history of the past and on the present in South Africa, but as yet there have been comparatively few attempts to forecast the best permanent arrangements to follow upon the conclusion of the present hostilities. I have been honored by a request to contribute to the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW a statement of my opinions on this complicated question. I gladly avail myself of the opportunity of submitting my views to the consideration of American readers, but I need hardly say that mine is not a prophetic soul. So far from being able to foretell the future of South Africa, I cannot even predict the probable duration of the present war. My belief is that the struggle in the Transvaal will be long, obstinate and sanguinary; that, unlike their more civilized and better informed brethren in the Orange Free State, large numbers of the Transvaal Boers will hold out to the very last; that even after their capital is taken they will carry on a guerilla war in the mountainous country to the northeast of Pretoria; that they will make desperate efforts to conquer southern Rhodesia, and even to cross the Zambesi; and, failing that, that they will endeavor to find a way of escape through the Bechuanaland Protectorate into German or Portuguese territory. I sincerely hope that I may prove to be mistaken in this estimate of the probable action of the Transvaal Boers. When the right moment comes, no efforts should be spared to induce them to accept the position of British subjects on terms which, in due time, will secure to them not only freedom and justice, but adequate representation and responsible government;

but the history of past struggles between the English and the Dutch, and my own knowledge of the Boers' character, their intense love of liberty for themselves, with the right and power of domination over all others, their strong and deep religious faith, their ardent patriotism, their dogged tenacity, their courage in defensive warfare, their fatalism, their ignorance and their ferocity, all make me think that they will hold out stubbornly, at any rate so long as they can obtain supplies, contraband of war, and the aid of Continental mercenaries by way of Delagoa Bay and certain other points on the eastern seaboard.

The Franco-Dutch race in the Transvaal would prove an invaluable acquisition to the forces of the British Empire if their confidence and loyalty could be secured by fair means. How this most desirable consummation is to be reached is a question which would demand a long and elaborate answer. No more difficult problem could be submitted to any British statesman than how to secure the good will, respect and fidelity of the Transvaal Boers after the conquest of their territory. Unfortunately, we have still a long way to go before we can arrive at the point where we may hope even to begin the task of finding a satisfactory solution.

As regards the final results of the military operations, no loyal Englishman has ever entertained a moment's doubt. No matter what the cost and loss, the conquest of the Boer Republics must be achieved. The Republican Governments are bound to disappear, and the territories of the two States, together with Swaziland, will form part of Her Majesty's dominions. Any other settlement, any surrender or compromise which would leave a nucleus for future political intrigues in South Africa, or a fulcrum for any European Power hostile to England, would evoke a storm of indignation, an outburst of disgust and fury in this country and throughout the British Empire, that no English Ministry could possibly survive. It may be safely added that no conceivable Ministry in this country would seriously contemplate at the present day any such repetition of imbecility, in view of the increased knowledge of South African affairs now possessed by the British public. Throughout Great and Greater Britain the vast majority of men of all shades of political opinion are agreed on the policy which must be pursued, so far as the extinction of the Dutch Republics is concerned. The half-measures by which

the evil day might have been postponed before the Boer invasion of British territories are no longer possible, and it is well for the cause of freedom and civilization in South Africa that this is so. It is well that the heart of the Pharaoh of Pretoria was hardened at the right moment.

There are well-meaning people even in England who are still laboring under delusions with regard to the justice and necessity of our struggle against the forces of darkness in South Africa; but even they must see that the "Majuba Magnanimity" farce will not bear repetition. The very small minority of Pro-Boer or "Stop-the-War" fanatics in this country are a negligible quantity. Their theories are unsound. Their allegations of fact are based upon imagination. Their contentions will not bear argument. Their proposals, if acted upon, would involve the loss of South Africa and of all our other colonies, together with our Indian Empire. The greatest civilizing Power in the world, the most potent agency for diffusing the blessings of peace throughout the dark places of the earth, would be destroyed. Why these presumably sincere visionaries so persistently advocate a policy which, if pursued to its logical and inevitable conclusion, must ultimately leave the dismembered corpse of the British Empire for the vultures of the European Continent to gorge at leisure, they best know. Sane and sober-minded Englishmen, at home and in the colonies, are not prepared to perform the "happy despatch" at the bidding of these gentlemen.

Whatever the duration of the war, there must be a transitional period before the territories of the two Republics can be brought under a regular administration as part of Her Majesty's dominions. During the interregnum, martial law—which is only another name for the will of the commanding officer—must necessarily prevail throughout the disturbed districts and the conquered territories. Martial law under British officers is always administered with fairness, and justice is tempered with mercy. The aid of competent legal advisers whenever available is duly sought, and if in a hostile or unsettled country a British court-martial errs at all, it is usually on the side of undue leniency. The brutal methods and sanguinary sentences of French and German military tribunals are repugnant to the gentle and chivalrous British officer. Martial law in South Africa would not necessarily interfere with the action of the ordinary tribunals in civil cases

nor even in criminal cases between civilians; and a judicious commanding officer, of course, would take care to preserve as much of the existing machinery of government as he could consistently with allegiance to the Queen and a loyal acceptance of the new *régime*. The happy results of this policy are already to some extent manifest in the Orange territory. Even there, however, there are already signs that the English besetting error of undue generosity to the vanquished is bearing evil fruit.

The true medium between extreme severity and weak indulgence may at times be hard to find, but in the interests of order and good government the perpetrators of outrages against the rules of civilized warfare ought not to go unpunished, any more than sufferers for loyalty should go without due compensation. If this be true even in conquered territories, *à fortiori* it applies to the cases of those Dutch inhabitants of the Cape Colony and Natal who have risen in rebellion against Her Majesty's Government, and have raided, plundered and wrecked the property of their loyal neighbors. These men are absolutely without excuse, and should be dealt with as ordinary criminals on charges of treason, murder, theft, housebreaking, arson, or malicious injury to property, as the case may be; the possession of loot or stolen goods being in all cases sufficient proof of guilt.

It is obvious that trial by jury in the disturbed districts, or anywhere in the Cape Colony or Natal, would be a mere farce in the present state of public feeling throughout South Africa. Acquittal or condemnation would be a foregone conclusion in all cases, according as the jury happened to be pro-Boer or anti-Boer. Verdicts must be unanimous, and the ends of justice could always be frustrated, either by packing a jury or by taking care that one irreconcilable at least should be secured. Under the circumstances, the only safe and just course would be for the Imperial Government to appoint a judicial commission to try rebels without a jury, and also to take evidence and frame a report on all claims for compensation. Such a commission might be appointed with the sanction of an Imperial Act of Parliament if necessary, and might be proclaimed by Her Majesty's High Commissioner in South Africa, with the concurrence of the Cape and Natal Ministries, respectively. If either the Bond Ministry at the Cape, or the Cape or Natal Supreme Courts, raised legal difficulties on constitutional grounds, such obstruction might,

I think, be got rid of by the proclamation of martial law throughout the Cape Colony and Natal, and this is a course which, under present circumstances, I should strongly recommend. It would remove many legal and technical difficulties, it would give confidence to the loyalists, and it would be a terror to evil-doers. The case of the loyal farmers of the Cape Colony and Natal, whose property has been destroyed in many instances by their disloyal neighbors, is a peculiarly hard one, and I cannot imagine a more unjust and suicidal policy for any Government to pursue than to leave these men and their families destitute, in order to gain a cheap reputation for magnanimity by letting rebels, murderers, burglars and thieves go off scot free. Rebels and robbers should in all cases be made to pay in purse or person or in both, as the case may be; and the excuse that in their innocence they were beguiled by Mr. Krüger's wicked emissaries ought not to be too lightly admitted. These men had no just cause of complaint against Her Majesty's Government, and even if, instead of having all the political power in their own hands and enjoying perfect liberty, they had had political grievances, they would still have been without excuse for availing themselves of a state of war in order to steal or destroy the goods of their next-door neighbors.

I should deprecate any idea of inflicting capital punishment for treason or rebellion in South Africa, though the Roman-Dutch Law, the common law of all South Africa, decrees the penalty of death in all such cases. In this, as in many other respects, the example set by Mr. Krüger himself furnishes useful lessons. Whatever his faults may be, it must be imputed to him for righteousness that, save in forcing on this war, he has not shown himself hitherto to be bloodthirsty. On the contrary, he has repeatedly restrained the truculence of his followers. When Dr. Jameson and the officers of his ill-starred expedition were confined in Pretoria gaol, one commandant after another urged the President to allow the burghers to drag the prisoners out into the square and put them to death. Mr. Krüger knew that they had surrendered on a promise that the lives of all the party should be spared, and he steadily refused to yield to very great pressure. Again, when the four leaders of the reform movement in Johannesburg were placed on their trial for high treason at Pretoria, before a "hanging" judge specially imported from Bloemfontein for the purpose, and after the prisoners had been denied

the benefit of the new treason law with its milder penalties, only intended for Transvaal burghers, and had been sentenced to death under the old Roman-Dutch Law as embodied in the Criminal Code of Philip II., Mr. Krüger in the last resort shrank from bloodguiltiness, and only screwed £100,000 out of the four prisoners by way of ransom instead of hanging them. Again, when the members of the Johannesburg Reform Committee had been sentenced to imprisonment with hard labor at Pretoria, Mr. Krüger took ransom for them at the rate of £2,000 apiece. All this must, I say, be counted to him for righteousness, comparatively speaking. These cases afford an indication of the measures of punishment deemed adequate in cases of alleged treason, rebellion or sedition by the Dutch themselves, and might afford a useful guide to courts passing sentence on prisoners convicted of similar offenses in the Cape Colony and Natal.

On the other hand, though strictly just and legal, it might not be expedient to reduce a large number of Dutch families to indigence by a total confiscation of landed property or by excessive fines. The measure of punishment may be safely left to the discretion of the court, provided the court or judicial commission be above suspicion in respect of integrity and impartiality, and be empowered to sit with assessors, but without a jury.

With regard to compensation to be awarded to loyalists in respect of losses sustained during and in consequence of the war, much time, labor and patience will be required to frame a complete and satisfactory report on which Her Majesty's Government might rely. The damage done by the ignorant, malicious and semi-savage Boers up to date has been enormous, and we are not even near the end of the war yet. They seem to have taken a fiendish delight in blowing up bridges, wrecking railway lines, destroying telegraphs, houses and private property of all kinds, and generally in uprooting every trace of the civilization of which they are unworthy. Their deeds of vandalism recall the excesses of the *Commune* of Paris or the *sansculottes* of the French Revolution. Of course, the plea of military necessity may be urged in excuse for the destruction of bridges, railways and telegraphs; but gutting farmhouses, insulting women, killing children in women's laagers, or wantonly destroying the personal property of non-combatants, is not a military necessity any more than firing on a hospital or an ambulance, or committing murder under cover

of a white flag. Crime should be punished in war as in peace, and I see no reason why a criminal should escape the just penalty of his misdeeds merely because he happens to be a Dutchman. The due punishment of criminal offenses should therefore be one of the first cares of the Imperial authorities, both during the continuance and after the conclusion of hostilities, and no amnesty should be proclaimed until all wrongs have been redressed and all just claims satisfied.

The question of compensation is a wide one. In my opinion a clear distinction should be drawn between the infliction of punishment and the recovery of compensation. Where it can be shown that an offender has enriched himself by the plunder of loyalists, the penalty should include a fine sufficiently heavy to deprive him of all the benefit of his crime and of something more into the bargain. But the proceeds of all fines, whether derived from money paid or from the sale of land or other property, should be paid into a general fund to be applied to the compensation of loyal sufferers or to war expenses, at the discretion of Her Majesty's Government. The payment of compensation should, however, be independent of the recovery of any such fines or penalties. It is quite clear that the total value of all the property owned by the rebels, even if it were expedient to reduce them and their families to utter destitution, would not nearly suffice to make good the damage they have done, especially if the cost of bridges, railways and telegraphs destroyed were taken into account. The war is an Imperial war, waged for the salvation of the British Empire, as well as for the preservation of the South African Colonies, and it would be a grievous wrong if the loyalists who happened to be living at or near the scene of hostilities were to be reduced to penury through no fault of their own. It seems, then, certain that provision will have to be made in the first instance by the Imperial Government for the payment of compensation to loyalists for losses incurred through the war, though in the final adjustment of liabilities the loss must, as far as possible, be made to fall on those by whom it was occasioned. The British taxpayer may have to find the money in the first instance, but only as an advance to be ultimately refunded by the Transvaal and Orange territories. In strict justice, a certain portion of the debt should be made to fall on the members of the 'Afrikander Bond in the Cape Colony, and this might to some

extent be effected by leaving the Cape Government to make good all damage to their railways and telegraphs without assistance from the Imperial Government, and by debiting the Cape Government with the amount of all compensation to Cape loyalists, and crediting them with all fines recovered from Cape rebels.

The case of the Natal loyalists is peculiarly hard, and on every account Natal deserves exceptionally favorable consideration. There is no getting over the fact that the Bond Ministry of the Cape, while professing the lip-service of loyalty, allowed enormous stocks of warlike material to pass over the Cape railways into the Republics for the avowed purpose of making war against the British Government in the Cape Colony and Natal. There is no denying the notorious fact that the Bond Ministry studiously left places like Mafeking, Vryburg, Kimberley, De Aar and Naauwpoort absolutely undefended, and even refused to allow arms, troops and ammunition to be forwarded to Kimberley for defensive purposes, when they must have known that war was impending. It is impossible to deny that but for the De Beers Company at Kimberley and the British South Africa Company at Mafeking both those places must have fallen long ago. That they were enabled to hold out so long was no thanks to the Bond Ministry at Cape Town; nor is it possible to avoid the conclusion that the final success of the Boers in their efforts to drive the English out of South Africa would have rejoiced the hearts of many in the Cape Colony besides the members of the Afrikaner Bond.

In Natal, on the other hand, the attitude of the Government and of the entire people, with the exception of the Dutch rebels in the north, left nothing to be desired. As regards gallantry in the field, honors are divided between the loyalists of the Cape Colony and those of Natal. Both have done splendid service to the Empire; but in the final settlement after the conclusion of hostilities Natal will, as already observed, be entitled to special consideration on many accounts.

In the number of the *Nineteenth Century* for last December, under the heading "South African Problems and Lessons," I stated very briefly the principal points of such a final settlement as I would recommend after the war, and in the main I still adhere to the views and opinions which I then expressed. Much water has flowed under the bridges since that time. The magni-

tude of the task before the British army has been better realized by the public, though I doubt whether it is even yet sufficiently grasped by those who have never seen South Africa. However prolonged the struggle, however terrible the losses still to be endured, there can be no turning back. The reactionary forces of barbarism, even though backed by all the swashbucklers of the European Continent, must be subdued. England must win this fight or relinquish her foremost place in the vanguard of civilization. She must save South Africa or lose her Empire. And loss of Empire would mean for us starvation. The teeming millions in these little islands of the North Sea could not even be fed, were we to lose the command of the ocean and the possession of our colonies. For the Boers of South Africa, the struggle is one partly of sentiment and partly of love of dominating and tyrannizing over others. For us it is a question of life or death, and we shall act accordingly. Altruism is all very well in private life as an exhibition of Christian virtue, but in struggles for existence between States, in what is called the higher politics, enlightened selfishness is and must be the only true guide. A statesman's first duty is to safeguard the interests of his own country, and if this cannot be done without hurting the feelings of others, *tant pis pour les autres*. Boer sentiment within the limits of right and justice toward others is no doubt entitled to respect, but when the Boer turns housebreaker it is time to provide him with handcuffs. We cannot afford to let him turn us out of our own house, neither can we leave him at liberty to summon other housebreakers to his aid. The lesson of self-preservation as the supreme political duty has been taught us by our friends, the Germans, and it shall go hard but we will better the instruction. Our first care must always be to keep our navy in a state of perfect efficiency, able at any time to vanquish the strongest combination of hostile navies likely to be brought against us; and if in view of the increase of the navies of Russia, Germany and France it becomes necessary for us to double or treble our present naval force, we must double it or treble it, as the case may be. The life of the British Empire depends on its navy. As regards the army, this war has taught us invaluable lessons. We know now that for us conscription is as unnecessary as it would be detrimental to our manufacturing and mercantile interests. All we need to do is to keep up a standing army for the colonies and India, with all the requisites for

mobility and offensive action; while for the defense of the Empire otherwise we need only see to it that our boys shall be well drilled and instructed in all manly and warlike exercises, especially riding and rifle-shooting. They will spring to arms fast enough when the motherland is threatened. Our soldiers are all volunteers, and we now know what boundless resources we possess in our colonies and what manner of men are the sons of Britain across the seas. One effect of this war will be to make the Anglo-Saxons the greatest military Power in the world, while strengthening their command of the seas.

Whatever form of government be introduced at first into the conquered territories of the Transvaal and the Orange districts, it is certain that a considerable military force must be kept there for some time. The pacification of a country torn by what is, from some points of view, almost a civil war can only be effected by force and by a gradual process. I am much mistaken if our troops will be enabled to leave South Africa in so short a time as many people in England seem to fancy. The work of administration will become impossible unless supported by forces strong enough to prevent, or at any rate punish, any future attempts at insurrection. The object to be kept in view should be the substitution of Colonial for Imperial troops as soon as possible. A large proportion of the Canadian, Australasian and other volunteer forces will, in all probability, elect to settle permanently in South Africa, and any such wish or intention on their part should be cordially welcomed and encouraged in every possible way by Her Majesty's Government, and also by the British South Africa Company. Land grants should be made to them on the most favorable terms, and every facility should be afforded to enable them to prospect for minerals, in addition to engaging in agricultural and pastoral pursuits. The climate is perfect, the wealth of the country is still unknown, notwithstanding the millions already extracted from the diamond and gold mines hitherto opened. The Transvaal and Rhodesia possess undeveloped mineral wealth as yet undreamed of, save by the few who know those countries well and keep their knowledge to themselves. The influx of these splendid young colonists who are now fighting under the British flag will be a blessing to South Africa and a gain to the whole Empire. If they can be induced to settle in sufficient numbers in South Africa, they will in time change the whole face of the

country. They will completely redress the political balance by counteracting the preponderance of the Boer vote, and they will introduce enlightenment, reform and fresh energy into every department of the State and every branch of social life. In time they may even civilize the Boers to some extent. Arrangements ought to be made to enable them to bring out to South Africa any members of their families who might be willing to join them; and even apart from this, committees of ladies should be formed in England and elsewhere, in conjunction with religious bodies of various denominations, for the purpose of sending out, under safe escort and to the care of reliable guardians, as many well-educated young ladies of British birth as might care to go out, after a preliminary training in nursing the sick, teaching, cooking, sewing or such other arts of domestic economy as might be found necessary. All arrangements for their safety and comfort could be made by local committees, and in the event of their getting married others might doubtless be found to take their places from time to time. In this way a sure foundation might be laid for a race of colonists in South Africa second to none in the world. The number of girls who remain unmarried and without sufficient objects in life in England is appalling, and I would beg to commend this suggestion to the serious consideration of philanthropic ladies who take a sincere interest in the welfare and happiness of their sex, and at the same time are willing to promote emigration in its best form.

I may here briefly recapitulate the principal points in such a settlement as I would recommend on the conclusion of hostilities, bearing in mind the duty of dealing justly both by the loyal Colonists of the Cape Colony and Natal and also by the Boers, the necessity of rendering impossible any repetition of attempts at a Boer conquest of South Africa with foreign aid, and the desirability of conciliating our Dutch fellow-subjects by all fair means and gradually reconciling them to their lot as British citizens.

With regard to territorial limits, I am of opinion that the best plan would be to establish in Southeastern Africa one great colony, to be called Natal, comprising Swaziland, the Transvaal and the Orange territory. If the necessary understanding could be arrived at with the Cape Colony, Griqualand East and Pondoland should be added to Natal, the St. John's or Umzimvubu River to be the boundary.

No effort should in my opinion be made to force on a federation of the South African Colonies. Federation, if it comes, must be spontaneous; but, as regards the rich southeastern portion of South Africa, Her Majesty's Government will have, when the war is over, such an opportunity as seldom occurs in the history of any Empire or any people. They will have *tabula rasa, carte blanche*, a sort of virgin page on which to write what they will. It is indeed a golden opportunity, and on the use made of it may depend not only the destiny of South Africa, but the fate of the British Empire.

The advantages of uniting the present colony of Natal and the Transvaal and Orange territory in one great colony would, I think, be very great. It would have an excellent seaboard. It would be a fair political and commercial counterpoise to the Cape Colony. An appeal court for all South Africa below the Zambesi might at once be established at Cape Town, with rights of ultimate appeal to the Privy Council. The Cape University system might be extended over all South Africa. The postal and telegraph systems would be uniform and could be worked from one centre. Due provision would be made, of course, for extradition and for the reciprocal enforcement of legal process. Union as between the great Eastern and Western Colonies for defensive purposes could be easily arranged. The laws of Natal and of the two extinct Republics would have to be examined and compared, and a law commission should be appointed to draft a series of consolidating enactments applicable to the entire territory. These enactments, of course, would have to be submitted to the present Natal Legislature, whose consent would be a condition precedent to any such arrangement; but, as regards the conquered territories, legislation should be by proclamation, pending the establishment of a limited form of representative government. Full parliamentary institutions with responsible government could not be safely introduced until all danger of disturbances shall have been finally removed. The task of simplifying, assimilating and consolidating the laws would not be so difficult in reality as would seem likely at first sight. The Roman-Dutch Law is the common law of all South Africa. Special laws where necessary could be expressly limited to certain localities. Mercantile laws could be assimilated as far as possible to those of England, as has been done in the Cape Colony. Mining laws could be so drawn as to

be applicable to the whole territory. The criminal law would in the main be similar to that of the Cape Colony, which is a not infelicitous mixture of Roman-Dutch and English law. English would be the official language, but all laws and proclamations would have to be published in Dutch as well as English, and due provision would have to be made for interpretation in all courts of justice. The language question would present no insuperable difficulties, as most officials in South Africa understand both languages; and in any sound educational system to be hereafter introduced into the Transvaal and Orange districts, the teaching of English should be made a condition *sine quâ non* in all cases in which a Government grant in aid might be applied for.

As regards the choice of a new capital, I should be inclined to suggest the formation of a new city in a high and healthy situation as near the western side of the Drakensberg as possible; but if that be thought too great an undertaking the best existing position would, on the whole, be Johannesburg.

Municipalities for large towns and village management boards for small ones should be established as soon as possible.

Monopolies should be abolished without compensation. Free trade should be adopted. There are no manufactures or industries worth protecting. All customs dues for revenue purposes would be levied at the coast, as at present in the Cape Colony. Inland custom houses would not be required. An excise should be imposed and rigorously enforced. Equal rights should be secured to all white men; equal justice for all men, white or black.

The supply of liquor to natives should be absolutely prohibited. As regards land, the South African system of registration of title and government survey is perfect. Land commissions could be appointed, of course, wherever necessary.

There is a wide difference between the late actual administration of government in the Orange Free State and that in the Transvaal. In the Orange territory, the late government may be described as honest, fair and even liberal. It would therefore be desirable to make as few changes as possible in that part of the country; the oath of allegiance being required, of course, from all officials. A firm, just and conciliatory policy, steadily pursued with due regard and consideration for the natural feelings and sentiments of the respectable inhabitants of the Orange dis-

tricts, and the prospect of representative institutions, and, ultimately, of responsible government will do much to reconcile all but the hopelessly irreconcilable to a change which, after all, will prove to them a blessing in disguise. Leniency, however, must not be carried too far at first. No crimes or offenses should be condoned, and the rights of all claimants for compensation should be duly considered and strictly enforced. In a conquered territory there is no danger that British officers will show excessive severity. It is quite the other way. Much harm may be, and often is, done by mistaken kindness. Justice should in all cases come before generosity.

In the Transvaal many drastic changes will be necessary which it is needless for me to specify in detail. The Uitlanders' legitimate grievances will need prompt and complete redress, and the whole Augean stable of corruption will have to be swept out with an unsparing hand. Indeed, the reforms needed may be summarized briefly as the substitution in the government of the country of honesty for dishonesty, of purity for corruption, of justice for injustice, and of freedom for slavery.

As regards that weightiest of questions, the financial settlement—the crucial test of all sound government—it may be necessary for Great Britain to provide cash in the first instance; but, as already remarked, the burden must be made to fall in due course on the two extinct republics, and especially on the Transvaal. That this will heavily tax the resources of the Transvaal is certain. The gold-mining industry in particular will have to a great extent to meet the cost of striking off its shackles, but it is well able to support it. English shareholders will probably face their liabilities under the circumstances with resignation. The foreign shareholders who are so largely interested in Transvaal gold mines will grumble; but they can hardly expect much sympathy from us. The almost universal Anglophobia on the European Continent throughout the present war has occasioned equal surprise and regret in England. Our foreign foes rejoice at our misfortunes, minimize our successes and exhaust their extensive vocabularies of vituperation in writing and speaking about us. Their malice is only surpassed by their ignorance of the real merits of the case they so glibly discuss. If their support of the Boers should culminate in pecuniary loss to themselves, they will have no right to blame us for the result.

England is in the proud position of needing no foreign alliance. She fears no foe, no combination of foes. Her own sons can protect her. Her fixed policy is to avoid the entanglements of any alliance with foreign States. Englishmen well know who are their real enemies and what their relative strength is. Not even with the United States of America will Great Britain ever seek alliance; but the British value the sympathy and appreciation of their kinsmen across the Atlantic far more than the good opinion of all other nations put together. The moral support of American citizens of British descent is most highly esteemed in England by all classes. The present deplorable struggle in South Africa, in which so many of England's best and bravest have already perished, is the war of freedom, justice and equality before the law, against the powers of darkness, and we feel sure that the verdict of enlightened American citizens will be as just and impartial as the future judgment of history.

SIDNEY SHIPPARD.

MODERN PERSIAN LITERATURE.

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THROUGH the medium of Omar Khayyām and his inspired interpreter, Edward Fitzgerald, a peculiar interest has of late been aroused, on either side of the Atlantic, in Persian Thought and Literature. The object of the present article is to offer to those amateurs whose acquaintance with Modern Persian Literature is confined to translation a brief survey of its rise and of its present status in the kingdom of the Shah.

It is curious to note how universal the opinion is, among the uninitiated, that the Persians do not possess a Literature in the accepted sense of the term. This popular misconception is, no doubt, partly due to the fact that those who have undertaken to clothe the Persian Muse in English dress have confined their choice to a limited number of poets, and have produced fresh versions of the poems of Sādi Hāfiz and Omar in large numbers, to the almost entire neglect of the other great singers of Iran. After all, it is the scholar who must be the first means of introducing a foreign poet into a new language; and Persian, for a long time, suffered from a marked neglect at the hands of Orientalists. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which produced many notable Oriental scholars—especially in Hebrew and Arabic—Persian was merely regarded as a side-study, and hardly taken seriously; almost the only Europeans who turned their attention to that language were resident diplomatists in India and travellers in Persia. Although many of these obtained a fair knowledge of Persian, they merely learnt it for official or practical purposes; and in acquiring it, under the guidance of natives, they probably seldom read anything beyond a few of the best-known classics, without inquiring into, or even hearing of, any Literature be-

yond. The interest of scholars in Persia was, however, at length aroused by the "discovery" of the sacred books of the Zoroastrians, and the decipherment of the Achemedian Inscriptions. And it was through this new interest in Persia that, at the beginning of the present century, Persian began to be studied for its own sake, and assumed an important place in the list of Oriental studies.

In 642 A. D. the Persians suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Arabs at the battle of Nahāvand, and, with the fall of Merv, in 651, the fate of the old Zoroastrian State was decided. The overwhelming progress of the arms of the Arabs was only equalled by the rapid dissemination of their creed and language. Wherever the conquering Arab established himself, there, too, sprang into practice his new religion and his old language. In Persia, with the suddenness of magic, Ormuzd and Ahriman were changed for Allāh and Satan, and the solar for the lunar year. Such was, at any rate, the case to all outward appearance, and, so long as the Kalifate remained in the hands of the powerful house of Omayya, the language of Persia seems to have relapsed into silence, and her national spirit into obscurity. For a period of about one hundred and fifty years we find no trace of a national literature, nor have we any means of forming a precise notion of the language spoken by the Persians during that time. As far as documentary evidence is concerned, we pass directly from the old Parsī of the "Fire Worshipping Guebres" to the modern Persian, with its predominant element of Arabic words and expressions—an essentially Mohammedan language.

So long as the Central Government in Baghdad made its authority to be felt throughout the Eastern conquests of Islam, which extended from the Persian Gulf to the frontiers of Chinese Turkestan, the language and culture of the Kalif were predominant in every province. It must, however, be admitted that the Court of Baghdad owed more than half its brilliancy to the Persians themselves; it was conducted on lines closely imitative of the late Sassanids court at Ctesiphon, and though the Arabs, at the period of their emigration from the deserts of Arabia, possessed a rich and powerful language, together with an innate taste for poetry, they had but a small degree of culture. Moreover, wherever the Arabs carried their arms, they were on the look-out for men of genius and learning among the conquered,

and, having found them, would send them to Baghdad to add lustre to the literary circle gathered round the Kalif. And thus the very circumstances which retarded the growth of a national Persian Literature were those which conduced to the intellectual brilliancy of the Kalif's court.

In the middle of the eighth century the Umayyads fell and gave way to the House of Abbās, whose power in her Eastern Provinces was never firmly established, and became weaker every year. And thus, at the beginning of the ninth century, we meet with the establishment of semi-independent dynasties in the East and Northeast of Persia.

The first poem composed in the modern Persian language, which has come down to us, is a short ode, by a certain Abbās, in honor of the arrival in Merv, in 809, of Mámūn, the son of the famous Hārūn al-Rashīd. It is most probable, however, that very little encouragement was given to the development of the new language by Governors who were anxious to keep in favor with the central authority. All the business of state, even in the most outlying provinces, was at this time conducted in Arabic, and if any intellectual Persian felt the "itch of the pen," he doubtless found it answered his purpose better in every way to write in Arabic. In the case of prose compositions this was certainly the case. With Mohammedanism—an outward profession of which was almost universally enforced—the Persians found themselves obliged to adopt into their spoken language Arabic terminology, and to employ in their writing the Arabic alphabet. In adopting this latter they, however, went from bad to less bad; for, unsuitable as that alphabet is for conveying the sounds of any other language, it was at least an improvement on the alphabet it superseded, which was limited, confused and in every sense unpractical.

Now, a learned Persian of this period, on whatever subject he might wish to write, had three distinct incentives for composing in Arabic: firstly, that being an exceedingly difficult language, fame would accrue to him for having mastered it; secondly, a knowledge of Arabic implied an intimate acquaintance with the Koran, which, in its turn, was a guarantee of piety; thirdly, he would win favor in high quarters. Such, doubtless, were among the causes which led all the early Persian *prosateurs* to write in Arabic, and it is a notable fact—and one often overlooked—that

many Persian authors, whose works have been translated from Arabic into European languages, have wrongly attained celebrity as Arabs. Avicenna (died 1037), to quote one example out of many, was a Persian bred and born, but as he wrote exclusively in Arabic, he is not always recognized as such.

Let us now turn to Persian Literature proper. Though we hear incidentally of one or two poets who wrote in Persian during the first half of the tenth century, it is not until we reach the establishment of the national Samanid dynasty in Central Asia that we find any real development in this direction. As the founder of this new school we may take the blind poet Rūdagi, who died about 950 of our era. He and his followers wrote, indeed, in Persian, but their vocabulary was surcharged with Arabic words, and their style was in pure imitation of Arabic poetry. The rulers of the national dynasty, who were yearly becoming more independent of the Kalif, naturally spared no effort to encourage the growth of a national literature.

Great as was the encouragement given by the Samanids to letters, the fame of their court was cast into comparative shade by the brilliancy of the Court of Ghazna. Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna, the second of his line, who reigned from 998 to 1030, was not only a glorious general, but the greatest early patron of Persian Literature. He is said to have assembled at his court no less than four hundred poets, of whom one was elected to the post of "King of the Poets," or Poet Laureate,—an office that has continued to exist at the Court of Persia to the present day.

The compositions of these poets consisted mainly of occasional odes and panegyrics, with here and there a lyric in praise of some imaginary beauty. They took as their models the two principal forms of poetical composition of the Arabs, namely the *Kasida* and the *Ghazal*. These two styles are almost identical in form and in order of rhyme; but, while the former usually exceeds twenty-five couplets, the latter seldom exceeds twelve, and has this distinct characteristic that the poet always introduces his *nom de plume* into the last couplet. With regard to subject, the *Kasida* corresponds to the Greek *Idyllium* or our elegy, while the *Ghazal* corresponds to our ode or lyric. The rules of metre are as strict as those of the classical languages, while their variety is far greater. In both the above mentioned forms the rhyme is on one and the same sound throughout each separate poem, and it is

essential that the first two half-couplets should rhyme together, and after that every second half couplet.

Perhaps this method may be best explained by an attempt to render into English one or two Persian *Ghazals*. In a *Ghazal*, the sense of each couplet is complete in itself, and seldom has any direct connection with what precedes or follows it. The following is a rendering of one of Hâfiz's most beautiful odes. The running rhyme is preserved, and the metre adopted is as follows:

- u - - - | - u - - - | - u - - - | - u - - - .

Now from out the graceful cypress doth the patient bulbul cry:
 "From the rose's face be distant ever more the evil eye!"
 Though the Zealot hopeful be of Houries and of Palaces,
 My Belov'd my Hourie is, the Tavern is my palace high.
 On account of Separation from thee no complaint I make,
 Only after Separation can our Union Joy supply.
 And if others do derive their pleasures from the Dance and Song,
 My chief source of Joy and Pleasure, is my Lover's grief and sigh.
 To the harp's sound drink the wine; but be not sad, and if some one
 Say to thee, "Oh, Drink no wine," say, "There's a Pardoner in the Sky!"
 Hâfiz, why dost thou of Grief at Separation make Complaint?
 There is Light in Darkness; Union, Separation doth imply.

The following ode is taken from the works of the greatest mystic poet of Persia, Jalâl ud-Dîn Rûmî, who died in 1273:

From all the world 'twas thee alone I chose,
 Wilt thou from grieving give me no repose?
 My heart is as a pen within thy hand,
 Thou canst of both my grief and joy dispose.
 Save what thou wilt, what desire have I?
 Thou mak'st to grow from me, now thorn, now rose.
 If thou wouldst have me thus, lo! thus I am;
 If otherwise, thy will I'll not oppose.
 And in the vat where souls their color take,
 Who am I, what shall Love or Hate disclose?

The following ode from the pen of Irâki, who lived in the thirteenth century, may serve to exemplify the manner in which the real rhyme is sometimes thrown back into the body of the verse. The beauty of the Persian original is so striking that it may not be out of place to give a transcription of it:

u - - - | u - - - | u - - - | u - - -

1. Ba fuz 'ishk-i-tu jânânî, namibinam, namibinam
 Dîlam râ fuz tu jânânî, namibinam, namibinam.
2. Zi khûd sabri ve ârâmî, namityâbam, namityâbam,
 Zi tu lutfi ve ahsânî, namibinam, namibinam.
3. Zi râyi lutf binumâ râ, ki dardî râ ki mandrâm
 Ba fuz râyi tu darmânî, namibinam, namibinam.
4. Baqr, ay dâst, dâst-i-man, ki dar daryâ'î ufâddam
 Ki ânra hich pâyânâm namibinam, namibinam.

5. *Zi rāh-i-lutf u dildāri biyā sāmān-i-kār-i-man*
Ki khād rā bi tu sāmānī namibīnam, namibīnam.
6. *Irākī rā bā dargāhāt rāhī binumā ki dar 'ālam*
Chu ā sar-gashīā hayrānī, namibīnam, namibīnam.

Translation:—

1. Beloved, aught but Love of thee, I cannot see, I cannot see,
 And in my heart aught else but thee, I cannot see, I cannot see.
2. Within myself or peace or rest, I cannot find, I cannot find,
 Pity or kindness meant for me, I cannot see, I cannot see.
3. Out of thy mercy let me see thy face, to heal my malady
 For any other cure for me, I cannot see, I cannot see.
4. Beloved take my hand in thine, for I have fallen in a sea
 Of which the shore, if shore there be, I cannot see, I cannot see.
5. By way of pity and of love, come thou and settle my affairs,
 For means of succor without thee, I cannot see, I cannot see.
6. To poor Irākī show the road that leads to thee, for in this world
 A mortal more distressed than he, I cannot see, I cannot see.

Among the earliest Arab poetry we find not only *Kasīdas* describing the wild life of the desert, but also *Ghazals* of remarkable beauty. Antara, one of the most famous pre-Islamic poets, was the author of many charming lyrics. The following little extract from one of these may give the reader an idea of Bedouin hyperbole. A warrior thus sings to his lady:

"Nor did I forget thee while spears fell around where I stood,
 And the points of the White Indian blades were all wet with my blood;
 And fain I had kissed the bright swords of my enemies vile,
 For they flashed like thy teeth when thy lips go apart in a smile!"

It was at the court of the great Sultan Mahmūd, above mentioned, that Firdausī flourished, the Homer of Iran and author of the great Persian national epic, the "*Shah Nāma*," or "*Book of Kings*." Without being the actual founder of the epic style in Persian, Firdausī was one of the earliest and by far the greatest of its exponents. The poet form adopted for narrative verse in Persian is technically known as *Mathnavi*, i. e., the double (rhyme), so called because each half-couplet rhymed, and, unlike the Arabic *Kasīda* and *Ghazal*, the rhyme varied in every couplet.

Now, the epic was essentially Persian in origin and growth, and quite foreign to Arabic poetry, as was also the *Rubāy*, which had its origin about the same period, as the mouthpiece of a new school of thought. Although, as has been already observed, the Persians were quick to adopt the religion and language of their conquerors, their national spirit was not of the sort to die out, or be obliterated by the new spirit of Islam. In fact, it may be affirmed that the Persian, in thus readily acquiescing in the new order of things which was imposed upon him, allowed his national

sentiments and instincts to suffer far less damage than would have been the case had he offered a protracted outward opposition to Mohammedanism. Moreover, if Persia was quick to accept Islam, she was equally quick to set her own stamp upon the new religion.

Firdausi's great Epic was a reaction in favor of the old order, but one executed under the very auspices of Mohammedanism. The poet put into verse the old legendary history of Iran, and brought his narrative down, through historical times, to the defeat of the last Sassanian king at the hands of the Arabs. He took his materials from what he could find of the old books of the Zoroastrians, and from the legendary tales of public storytellers. The example set by Firdausi was soon followed by many poets, who sought for inspiration in his verse, and took for their subjects those episodes which had received only brief treatment at the hands of the master: none of them, however, approached him in genius and power.

In his old age, Firdausi, moved perhaps by a religious sentiment, wrote a romantic poem entitled "Yūsuf and Zulaykhā"—also in the *Mathnavi* form—which told of the loves of Joseph and the wife of Potiphar, basing his narrative on that version of the Bible story which Mohammed had incorporated into the Koran. In this style of composition, however, he was surpassed by his later imitators, and Nizāmi (died in 1203), who composed five famous romantic poems, holds the undisputed field as the greatest master of the romantic school. The last great representative of this school was Jāmī, who lived in the fifteenth century, and who may be regarded as the last poet of the classic period.

It is not within the scope of this article to deal with the engrossing subject of Persian mysticism, known as Sufism. The "mystic" movement in Mohammedanism began in the eighth century, and although it was in the first place an essentially orthodox movement, it took rapid growth in the direction of free-thought and heterodoxy when transplanted to Persian soil. The first great exponent of Sufism, in its fully developed form, was Abū Saīd ibn Abi l-Khayr, who was born in Khorasan in 968, and who died in 1049. He was the first to compose that style of epigrammatic quatrain with which readers of Omar are now so familiar. The quatrain, therefore, was even more than the epic, an original Persian product, both in form and spirit.

Thus we see that there are four principal types of poetical

composition used by the Persians; namely, the *Kasīda*, the *Ghazal*, the *Mathnavi* and the *Rubāy*. Of these, the two former were borrowed from the Arabic, while the two latter were of Persian invention. Most of the earlier poets confined themselves to one of these styles, but in later times a single poet would try his skill at all of them, as did notably Sādi and Jami. The collected *Kasīdas*, *Ghazals* and *Rubāys* of a poet are called his *Divān*, and in manuscripts they are usually placed in this order, each style being, in its turn, arranged alphabetically according to the rhyme. One cannot, however, speak of the *Divān* of Firdausi or of Omar, because they confined themselves to one style and did not write *Ghazals*. If a poet wrote romances and ornate prose as well as the other styles, his collected works then receive the name of *Kulliyāt*, or "Complete Works."

Few, probably, among the reading public who are interested in Omar have any conception of the state of the book-market, or of the manner in which literature is diffused, in Persia. Some may picture to themselves a state of affairs similar to that in Europe, with a certain admixture of Oriental slowness and lack of method; while others may suppose that Persia can boast of no book-market at all, beyond the casual buying and selling of manuscripts.

Now, in some parts of the East, printing, bookselling and journalism have—especially during the last ten or twenty years—been developed to a comparatively high degree. Both Constantinople* and Cairo possess excellent printing presses, which are responsible for numberless books and journals; nor are these two capitals the only Oriental towns which boast of a printing press. Nevertheless, Persia is at the present day entirely dependent upon lithography for her native production of books and journals—which are very rare. At the beginning of the present century a press with movable types was set up in Tabriz, at which a certain number of books were printed. The effort, however, met with no encouragement, and had shortly afterwards to be abandoned. The unpopularity of type-printing in Persia is due to two principal causes; firstly, the straightness of the lines offends a Persian's artistic sense; and, secondly, in printed books the *character* of the letters is entirely lost. The same cause which leads a Persian to esteem so highly great calligraphers, makes him deplore all absence

* The first book printed in Constantinople bears the date of 1719.

of character in a type-printed book. What most delights him is a well-written manuscript, and he takes the same delight in the copyist's work as we take in the touch of an old master. Failing this, he contents himself with a lithograph, which is usually the fac-simile of the writing of some fairly good scribe, and has, at any rate, a human element about it.

It is hard for us to credit the vast amount of attention that is paid to calligraphy in the East, where men of learning devote years to its acquirement, and their best days to making artistic copies of classical works. Although this art is dying out to a certain extent, owing to the cheapness of lithography, a man may even to this day in Persia become as famous for his writing as a poet for his verses.

In every big bazaar a certain number of shops are set apart for the sale of books. In these one finds the bookseller—in his long, dark, outer mantle and his high, black, lamb's-skin hat—seated on the floor, surrounded by his little stock-in-trade. The front of his shop is open, like a butcher's, while his books are either arranged in shelves against the three walls, or in heaps upon the floor. His collection usually consists of lithograph editions of Korans, school-books, favorite poets and historians, but the assortment is limited. Besides these, hidden away in a corner, he often has one or two manuscripts which he has either bought as a speculation or is trying to dispose of for a friend.

The number of standard works that have been lithographed in Persia is comparatively small, and a great many important compositions—both poetry and prose—to this day exist only in manuscript. Many Persian classics owe their release from this state of relative oblivion to the efforts of Indians and Europeans. It will, doubtless, surprise some to hear that the works of many Persian poets who enjoy celebrity among their own countrymen have been neither lithographed nor printed.

The ordinary family library consists of a copy of the Koran, in Arabic, the works of one or two poets, a dictionary and a book of general history. Large libraries are rare. Books are not kept, as with us, in an upright position, but lying on their sides, one above the other, with their backs to the wall, while the title of the book, when indicated at all, is written across the front edge.

During the present century Persia has produced three poets of a high order of genius, Kāāni of Shīraz, Yaghmā of Khorasan

and Mirza Serūsh of Ispahan, all of whom, in clearness of diction and elegance of style, fall very little short of Hafiz and Sādi. In fact, so great was Kāāni's command of language, and so musical his ear, that some of his poems surpass in charm anything else in Persian literature. Besides these real poets, Persia has produced and continues to produce numberless poetasters, whose chief aim is to imitate as closely as possible the classic standard, and who care little or nothing for originality in either thought or treatment. Every Persian is more or less of a poet, and has a natural instinct for rhyme; perhaps no language lends itself more readily to versification. Apropos of the readiness of Persians in *extempore* verse, countless tales are told of men and women who composed verses, quatrains and even *Ghazals* just before their death. Very well known are the lines composed by the popular minister of Fath Ali Shah, when the executioners suddenly came and told him that his master—who feared his minister's extreme popularity—had ordered him to be put to death at once: "Such is the way of the world; first it covers one with honors, then it smothers one with thorns. Fate, the Juggler, many tricks of this sort loves to use."

The actual state of Persian literature cannot be called flourishing. Its latest development is in the direction of popular plays, chiefly comedies: but, though they offer interesting specimens of modern colloquial Persian, they are merely translations from the Turkish of Trans-Caucasia, and do not, therefore, represent any literary activity in Persia.

If education has become more general in Persia than formerly, it is certainly less serious: if one can find more people who know how to read and write than would have been possible in former times, on the other hand one rarely encounters serious study of any branch of science, unless it be in the direction of philosophical speculation.

E. DENISON ROSS.

WHAT HAS BECOME OF HELL?

BY THE REV. GEORGE WOLFE SHINN, D. D.

This title has been selected, not because of any leaning it may have towards sensationalism, but simply because it states precisely the purpose of this inquiry.

There has been a remarkable change of late years in religious teaching with reference to future punishment. Whereas formerly, in theological papers, in sermons and in books of instruction, much was said about hell, now it is but rarely mentioned. In fact, by many an accredited teacher it is not mentioned at all. It is pertinent to ask, therefore, What has become of hell?

We still use the word "hell" in the Apostles' Creed, but we are always careful to explain that there it does not mean the place of punishment, but simply the place of departed spirits; that it has no reference to their condition as happy or unhappy, but simply refers to the separation of soul and body, and to the residence of the soul in an intermediate state or place until the resurrection day. We are not concerned with that use of the word in this inquiry. We have started out to find what has become of hell as a place of punishment. We hear very little about it except in the profanity of the day. We do not hear of it in the pulpit, nor see any reference to it in the religious press, nor in the modern theological book, nor is it often brought up in religious conversation. It is tabooed by the pulpit generally. When, under stress, the preacher has to refer to it, he may adopt the euphemistic method of one who spoke of "the place which could not be named in the presence of cultured people."

It was not always thus, as we may learn by taking up almost any book of sermons delivered fifty years ago, or by reading the diaries kept by people who lived in the days of our grand-parents, or by perusing the history of religious controversies. In a day

not very long past men argued with each other concerning the place and concerning the people who were on their way thither. Some of us are not too old to remember the terrible appeals made by the revivalists to flee from the wrath to come, and so to escape the pains of hell. The stories which have been handed down to us concerning the great revival movements in this country show that the prominent theme, which was repeated again and again in every possible way, was how to escape from hell.

We know, for example, that so superb a thinker as Jonathan Edwards, the author of "The Freedom of the Will," was also a revivalist of the most intense type, and that he had such power in portraying the dangers of the impenitent that men screamed out during his sermons.

If we go back further, we find that religious literature is full of allusions to hell. We need hardly refer to Milton's *Paradise Lost*, and to Dante's *Divina Comedia*. The theology of the Middle Ages was so full of it that men have sometimes thought hell was a creation of that period.

Still further back, in patristic literature, we find it in large profusion. St. Polycarp said to the pro-consul, "With fire which burns for an hour or so and is extinguished, thou dost threaten me; but dost thou not know of the fire of the future judgment and of the eternal punishment reserved for the ungodly?" St. Augustine took pains to refute the opinions of those who thought that the torments of hell would only be purgatorial, and therefore only of limited duration. St. Chrysostom described the miseries of the future of the lost. With the exception of Origen and a few of his followers, there was an outspoken belief in hell by all the Fathers.

When we turn to the Sacred Scriptures, we certainly discover the recognition of hell in those writings. Unhappily, in our English Bible the word "hell" is made the equivalent of four other words—Sheol, Gehenna, Tartarus and Hades. It is going over ground very familiar to many to say that "Sheol," the Hebrew word in the Old Testament, usually refers, in an indefinite way, to the grave or the place or condition of the dead. "Hades," the Greek word in the New Testament, has a similar meaning, with perhaps a clearer recognition of continuing life under new conditions. It is the word "Gehenna," also translated hell, upon which so much depends. The name "Gehenna" was taken from

the Hebrew word by which the valley of Hinnom was known. That was the valley near Jerusalem where the great sanitary fires, kept up day and night, consumed the refuse of the city and the bodies of unclean beasts, and sometimes the bodies of criminals. From being the name of a locality near the city, the word was adopted to refer to that place or condition in the unseen world where punishment would be meted out to the impenitent. And so we find the word used in such passages as St. Matthew v., 22, "shall be in danger of the Gehenna of fire;" St. Matthew v., 29, "and not that thy whole body shall be cast into Gehenna;" St. Mark ix., 43, "into Gehenna, into the fire that shall never be quenched;" St. Matthew x., 28, "Fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in Gehenna."

We are not seeking for explanations now, nor are we considering the nature of future punishment nor the character of those who are to be punished hereafter. We are simply trying to establish the fact that there is an unbroken chain of testimony to the belief in the existence of hell down to a comparatively recent time. That fact is surely well established. As a fact it cannot be contradicted. Even Origen, under whose arms every heretic seeks refuge now, believed in hell. But he thought it was not to be eternal. He looked for a final restoration. Origen is never to be cited as denying future retribution, but as only disbelieving in the eternity of torment.

The belief in hell as a place or condition of punishment, with varying explanations as to the nature and continuance of that punishment, has been the belief of Christian people from the beginning of Christianity to our own day.

Now, almost suddenly, certainly with remarkable unanimity, men have well nigh ceased to talk about it. Whereas they once said much about it, now they say but little; some, indeed, nothing at all. It has ceased to be urged as a motive for good living in this life, and men are not told to prepare themselves here to avoid it there in the future. In other words, there has been, if not an actual denial of hell, a very thorough change of emphasis.

What has become of hell? Here is surely a very notable change in theology at the close of the nineteenth century. How did it come about? It is claimed by some friends of the late Henry Ward Beecher that he did more than any other man in this country to change the style of thinking of many preachers

and of many laymen who admired him. If he did not begin the change, he certainly helped on the revulsion from the old doctrines which had been preached, and he dealt some very effective blows at the narrow theology which had been accepted by many as orthodoxy.

The movement, however, for the dissolution of hell began much earlier in this country. The Universalist body came into existence here as early as 1770, as the antagonists of the intense views which were held by the old Calvinists. Universalism has gradually pervaded the country, and has done much to tincture the thought of the religious world. Crude and ignorant as were many of the efforts of the first Universalists, they directed their blows at one point, and they made their impression.

Perhaps, however, nothing has had so widespread an influence in this direction over intelligent minds in America as Canon Farrar's book on "Eternal Hope." It found a sympathetic audience prepared for it in different parts of the land, and in different grades of society, and the views expressed in it were very readily adopted. It was in vain that replies were made, and that Dr. Pusey issued his book entitled, "What Is of Faith?" Evidently, many in the religious world wanted to get rid of hell.

A very curious compromise was attempted by some who could not quite accept Farrar and retain their old orthodoxy. The compromise is in the suggestion of a second probation. That is, if one has not had a fair and full chance to know the truth here, he will have a second chance in the other world.

Believers in a second probation retained their belief in a place of punishment. One antagonist of this view of a probation after death says that to him it seems to be groping for "a new probation, not for the culprit but for the Judge, as if they were apprehensive that, according to their scheme, He would not do the exactly right and infinitely kind and merciful thing the first time." They would give Him a chance to do better later on.

Now, although this is a "smart" way of replying to views of another side, it does not by any means sweep away the foundations on which some build up a belief that the future (before the final judgment) brings not only a growth in goodness for some, but a growth towards goodness for others.

It is very curious how Purgatory, formerly condemned as one of the errors of Romanism, is now adopted in other forms by the

ultra Protestant. Substitute such an expression as "The soul will be trained by the bitterness of experience, past and present, warned by judgments yet to be fulfilled, in clearer light beholding things in better perspective"—substitute this sentence for "Purgatory," and do you not have the same thing? Purgatory may carry with it gross materialistic conceptions of purifying fires, but the essential thought is the same as that contained in the expressed hope that somehow, when men in another world see what sin is, and how it harms them and dishonors God, they will want to have it purged and done away, and so will welcome the purifying pains. But even if we adopt this view of reparation in a future life, we do not get rid of retribution. Nor do we by such a view necessarily get rid of eternal punishment. May there not be some incorrigible ones left over after the last chance of reparation is offered? And if there are any, then we are back again to the old thought of an eternal rebellion, and hence an eternal penalty.

The usual plan, however, for obliterating hell has been to explain away the language in which the doctrine of eternal suffering is supposed to be set forth. There can be no doubt that figurative language is used. It has been simply impossible to set forth the truths of religion without the use of figurative language. Happiness is described under the figure of living in a beautiful city, the City of God. The opposite of the happiness of heaven is the misery of hell. To express this, fire is used as the dominant figure. Fire is a symbol of painfulness, hence of punishment. Then, to render fire more horrible, another destructive agent is added—the suffocating fumes of brimstone; and, to express the acme of punishment, we have the figure of fire and brimstone, and we are told of the lake of fire and brimstone where the smoke of torment continually ascends. When such expressions are used, are we dealing with material facts? Is there a city whose streets are paved with gold and whose gates are of pearl? Is there a lake whose waves are liquid fire? The language is figurative. If figurative in one case, it is figurative in both.

But the figurative language of Scripture has been added to by the efforts of men who have tried to deter their fellow-men from vice by elaborating the horrors of hell. So we have been told of red-hot gridirons, attended by shrieking demons who have kept the gridirons well filled with broiling victims. We have heard of huge cauldrons full of boiling lead and brimstone, to be poured

over new comers as the ceremony of welcoming them to the society of the lost. We have heard of a pestilential atmosphere laden with concentrated diseases, and men driven by demons to breathe this disease-laden air. We have heard of horned and cloven-footed demons, goading their victims around circles, up and down steep heights, onward and onward, simply for the gratification of their hatred and to add to the sorrows of the lost. We have been told of the great chorus of dreadful shrieks that issued from prisons into which special victims have been driven for special enormities.

What ingenuity men have used to describe the life lived by men in hell! As an illustration of how the materialistic views of hell were kept before the people some centuries ago, think of that strange fresco in an old parish church in England. It is a sample of many like adornments which were once common. Over the chancel arch, where it is continually in sight, is a picture representing the doom of the lost. Some very agile demons with pitchforks are shoving poor wretches, men and women, down the throat of an awful monster. The doomed victims do not seem to like it, but the monster does. His appetite is insatiable and he has room for them all in his capacious maw. A nice thing to look at every Sunday! Weather stains mercifully obliterated the worst of it after a while and would have got rid of it all, but along came the restorer, the ecclesiologist, and he brought it back in all its hideousness.

Figurative language has been taken literally, translated into the grossest materialism, and then added to until its very extravagance suggested revolt. But when the revolt came, those who would get rid of the materialistic views of hell have so completely explained away all the figurative language in which reference is made to hell in the Scriptures that nothing is left. Or, to state it in other words, because they objected to the views held, they have tried to deny the reality back of even the figurative terms in which that reality was set forth.

Another effort has been made to relieve some of the awfulness associated with the idea of hell by making explanations of the words "eternal," "everlasting," and whatever seems to imply the changeless condition of the sufferings of the lost. One of the most ingenious is that which requires us to observe that "eternal" is not always the attribute but the result. Thus "eternal redemption"

means a redemption eternal in its results. The act of redemption was accomplished on the Cross in a day; the results are eternal. Sodom and Gomorrah are spoken of as the prey of eternal fire, yet the fire does not continue. It is the result of the fire which is spoken of.

Again, much is said of eternity as relating to this age, this aeon, and it has the idea of completing a circle; but there may be, according to some who hold this view, other circles beyond. This is an aeon, and eternity has reference to this period over which the gleam of revelation is thrown. There may be aeons and eternities and eternities beyond.

Then the philosophers come along and tell us that we know nothing at all of time when we get beyond the present material facts. Time is the succession of events. When we get out of the region of material things there is no time. And here comes that old monastic story to illustrate what the philosophers mean. The monk, delighted with the singing of the birds one summer morning, roused himself upon thinking he had lost a few moments in an unaccustomed enjoyment, and discovered that he had been listening a thousand years. And so the philosopher says that such expressions as "everlasting," "eternal," are to be regarded as the blue haze which ends our view as we look over the horizon. Everything shades off into this vaporous nothing and ends there; that is, so far as we know. We are carried thus far, and then we are told that that is the end of time.

One of the most ingenious and earnest efforts in the way of explanation of what is involved in the doctrine of hell is called "conditional immortality." The leading idea is that all men are capable of survival in their spiritual nature, but that not all will survive eternally. Some may cease to be, after the death of the body; others may live after death and be punished for a while, but they are finally resolved into nothingness. Men who do not possess the sanctifying, renewing, immortal Spirit must perish, either at death or some time after death. According to this view, immortality is a special gift to those who are united to Christ by faith. All those souls not brought into union with Him lose their power, and eventually lose all conscious individuality. That is, they cease to be.

The doctrine of conditional immortality makes it necessary to deny the natural immortality of the human soul. This is a most

important point; for, if the soul may cease to be, then eternal death means a dissolution which continues eternally. It is boldly declared by those who hold this view that the Scriptures speak nowhere of immortality apart from Christ; that there is no permanent life except for the believer.

There are many things connected with this doctrine of conditional immortality which would make almost any one wish he could accept it.

These various theories—denials, explanations and the like—indicate a most unsettled condition of Christian eschatology at the close of this nineteenth century. There is no agreement among Christian people on these points; but, on the contrary, there is great divergence of view, as is very evident in sermons and newspapers, in trials for heresy and in the discussions of ordinary people. It is most seen in the uncertain sounds which proceed from the pulpit, and in the almost entire cessation of the appeal to fear. Appeals to fear now! How seldom are men warned of the judgment to come! Hell has lost its terrors. What has become of hell?

The appeals to fear have well nigh ceased, and yet there is no fact which we are so compelled to see as the fact of retribution. The law of retribution works in our present life. We become aware of it in our earliest infancy, and we never become developed in character until we have learned to fear that which is evil and to shun the consequences of sin. There is a sense of righteousness in all men, and all men know that unrighteousness brings punishment. It is fair to assume that what holds good in the present life, that what is a part of man's very structure here, will continue hereafter. We may give up entirely the notion of a material hell, but we cannot give up the doctrine of retribution. Suffering must follow sin, and therefore to appeal to fear is not only legitimate, but it is in accordance with the structure of man's nature. Let us grant that the descriptions of hell are figurative. Let us admit that men have blundered in accepting as literal what was intended to be figurative. Let us grant that there is no material lake of torment. Yet, after all, is there not something back of the imagery? Is there not something real—so real that men may well strive to escape it? Can it be well with him who passes hence in his sins?

If we are asked for reasons for believing in future retribution,

we need not dwell upon the thought of Divine sovereignty showing its detestation of sin by punishment. That view has been brought out with frightful distinctness in Puritan theology. Rather let us call attention to the fact which forces itself upon the notice of even the least thinking of men. It is this: *Men are condemned by themselves.* They must recognize at some period that they prepared themselves for their own place, and for their own condition. A rather grotesque illustration of this point is suggested by a once popular preacher. It is the story of a man who got into the wrong boat. He was a prize fighter, and, rushing in a hurry to embark on an excursion boat, got into one filled with a company of enthusiastic Methodist people bound for a camp meeting. When the boat started he found out his mistake, and offered the captain all the money he had if he would land him somewhere. He was out of place. His character did not accord with that around him. He was a most unhappy man.

Feeble as the illustration is, it suggests that each man is making his own future along the lines of his own character. Now if this be so, it is perfectly legitimate to appeal to fear. There is, however, such a tone of uncertainty about this matter of retribution that people almost gain the impression that religious teachers are trifling with them. The dread of speaking out boldly causes many a sermon to lose its point. The preacher seems afraid to say what he believes, or appears to be in great doubt whether, after all, it makes any difference how people live. Some lay people have great reluctance to hearing anything about hell or retribution of any kind. It is a distasteful topic. Awhile ago a clergyman was requested to resign his parish because of a difference between his vestrymen and himself upon this subject. He warned his hearers in some sermons that unrepented sin must be punished in another world. His vestrymen informed him that they did not believe in hell any longer, and they seemed to think they had abolished it by ceasing to believe in it. But, however distasteful it is to men, as there is such a thing as retribution it must be set forth. There is no need of falling into the error of those who delighted in describing the doom of the lost; nor into the error of others who mistake what is figurative for what is literal. There is no need of allowing the imagination to run riot over the mysteries of the future. In a straightforward fashion, they who believe in retribution must declare the difference between the righteous and the wicked.

The pulpit is losing some of its power because it so seldom appeals to healthy fear. It has been taken for granted that men could always be reached by appeals to their better nature. The fact has been overlooked that the better nature is often hidden from sight by the encrustation of worldliness and sin. The consciences of men must be aroused, and the most effectual quickening of conscience is through the dread of the judgment to come.

It is not for any of us to explain the thousand difficulties that spring up just as soon as we think of the separation of men by character in the world now unseen. It is not well to discuss them in the pulpit, for we have so little to help us in the formation of opinions. The contention is that, as there is future retribution, so men must be warned against it now, and that an appeal must be made again and again to the motive of fear.

It is this failure to appeal to fear which accounts in part for the decline of interest in personal religion by so many. It is the seeming willingness of so many Christian people to give up all reference to retribution that is making it difficult for some to know what course to pursue. We may talk as we will about the evanescent nature of fear, and we may talk about its being an inferior motive, but in all other things in life it is appealed to. Take it out of life, and chaos comes in ordinary matters. Because it has been taken out of religion—out of the religion of our time—there has been the weakening of the force of religion. If we had perfectly normal beings to deal with—and that is a modern way of saying, if we were all without sin—then might there be no reference to fear, but an appeal to everything high and holy within us. We have to do with beings who are sinful and who must be led up to the higher motives by the exercise of the lower.

What, then, has become of hell? It has not been obliterated. It cannot be obliterated. Retribution exists as an awful fact back of all figurative language. Men in our day have overlooked retribution in seeking to get rid of materialistic notions concerning hell. The time has come to recall the awful fact of retribution. But it must be done discreetly, and always with those exceptions in mind which so greatly modify it. There are allowances to be made when we consider the working out of retribution as it pertains to the future. First of all, it cannot include children in its penalty, inasmuch as not inherited sin but wilful sin is punished, and children are irresponsible. And here we read one of the

reasons why there has been such revolt against the doctrine of retribution. It has been taught that men are to be condemned for original sin. One of the thirty-nine articles of the Anglican and American Churches has a clause which has often been misunderstood in favor of such teaching. "It deserveth God's wrath and damnation." What? Not the being who has come into this inheritance of sin, but original sin itself. Certainly, God hates sin. But there came One in our nature who was without sin. He came to be the Lamb without spot, who, by the sacrifice of Himself once made, should take away the sins of the world.

Here, then, on one hand, is a universal fact, the infection of sin in every human being; and sin deserves God's wrath and damnation. On the other hand, is another fact as universal, that Christ has tasted death for every man; that He died that He might pay the penalty for every man. Does not one fact over-balance the other? If so, there can be no wrath or damnation now for the infection of our nature. Punishable sin is the conscious violation of law.

Then, in the next place, in thinking of future retribution we must always think of the large number of people who are as irresponsible as the veriest infants. They may have intelligence enough for the purposes of daily life, but no more. The religious nature, existing somewhere in every human being, finds but imperfect modes of manifestation, or is altogether hidden. We are not speaking of idiots or of the insane, but of many people who, while belonging to neither of these classes, are no more responsible than children are. We cannot think of their being consigned to penalty in the other world.

Then, as we think of future retribution, we come to the great bulk of those who have never had the opportunity to hear the Gospel—the vast multitude of the heathen. Are they all condemned for the infection of their nature, if Christ died for them? Are they all condemned for rejecting a Gospel of which they have never heard? What of the heathen, then, in the life to come? We can know very little about their future condition, except that they will be judged righteously according to a standard which they themselves must admit to be just.

Part of the perplexity with reference to the heathen arises from two errors—first, thinking of them as all equally condemned to perdition, and then thinking of eternal happiness as alike for

all the saved. Since the sacrifice of Christ, the heathen stand as all other men. They come within the merits of that sacrifice, although they are unconscious of the fact. If they are condemned, it will not be because of original sin, but because they have not lived up to their own laws.

When a correct view is taken of responsibility—responsibility according to knowledge—it relieves the doctrine of retribution considerably, inasmuch as it narrows down the number of the lost to those who consciously and wilfully reject the offer of salvation.

When, besides all this, we take a correct view of future bliss and of future woe, we find still more relief. It cannot be that all the redeemed in the future will be equally happy, and that all the lost will be equally wretched; for there are varying degrees of capacity. There must be an immeasurable distance, for example, between the saintly martyr, whose whole life was a conflict and whose death came as a happy release—an immeasurable distance between his experiences in the eternal kingdom and those of a little child, whose coming into life and whose departure hence were on the same day. There must be infinite grades of happiness there, as there must be vast differences between those who are driven into outer darkness.

And what of those who are driven from the presence of the Lord? What are their experiences? How long does their expulsion last? Is it forever and forever? Or is there some limit? If they learn obedience through their sufferings, will their sufferings end? And is there in some far-off future some final restoration, so that the last vestige of rebellion shall be removed?

What answers shall be given to these questions? No man can answer them, except to express the hope that somehow the justice of God may be satisfied, and the sinner's rebellion cease. But we know nothing clearly upon these points. We do know that there is retribution for sin—for sin unrepented of and unforgiven. Whether that retribution continue for one year, or for a thousand years, or for eternity, it is not material to decide. He who dies in sin passes on to be judged for the deeds done in the body. Having rejected the offers of mercy here, he must meet penalty there. The man who dies impenitent and unforgiven finds his retribution.

Judgment, like the gift of life, is immediate. It is not to be looked for only in the future. It is now. Future judgment is

no arbitrary act. It is not something which springs from laws to be set in motion hereafter. It is the working out of laws under which we are now living. If we sin wilfully now, we must suffer for it. If we pass hence with a load of unrepented and unforgiven sin, judgment must surely follow us wherever we go. But it is not a new judgment; only a continuation of a judgment begun here; something inseparable from sin. Why should we fear to speak of a judgment to come when we know that a judgment has already come? True, the present judgment is not in every instance that which brings bitter anguish, but it is just as real as if men groaned in agony. It is a separation from goodness; a loss of spiritual power; a falling below the ideal. When men's eyes are opened, they may see that the loss of what they might have been, and their degradation through sin, is indeed the visitation of penalty. Judgment consists quite largely in deprivation. Such a judgment has begun here, and it points to the awful issues of the future, when the day of earthly probation shall have ended.

GEORGE WOLFE SHINN.

CHARTER NEEDS OF A GREAT CITY.

BY BIRD S. COLER, COMPTROLLER OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK.

Two years of experiment with the charter of Greater New York disclosed imperfections in the original work sufficient to justify the appointment of a commission to prepare amendments; and the revision to be made, it is expected, will in the end amount to a complete reconstruction of the organic law of the consolidated city. The charter that is to be amended, or repealed by the enactment of a new one, is the work of able and experienced men, who were united in a determination to provide for the enlarged municipality which it brought into existence the best local government that could be devised. That they failed of complete success does not detract from their ability or integrity.

A perfect charter for a great city has not yet been drawn, and in America we have not passed beyond the stage of experiment in the proper government of our larger municipalities. Much of the time of the Legislatures of a majority of the States has in recent years been occupied in the work of making and amending city charters. In many cases, notably New York, this is merely evidence of meddlesome political activity; but, on the whole, we are making progress, and intelligent public opinion has been aroused to the fact that new conditions must be met, new problems solved, and that old methods must yield to the knowledge gained by practical, and often expensive, experience. Charters and charter laws must be kept abreast of the times, must be made to conform to modern and progressive conditions in business, financial and industrial affairs, or the development of cities will be greatly retarded.

Without hesitation or fear of contradiction, I class brevity and simplicity as the chief essentials of good charters for our greater cities. Too many laws and too little public and political

honesty are directly responsible for most of the bad government that has damaged and disgraced American cities. The charter, or permit from a State government to the people of urban communities to form themselves into a corporation to take, hold, develop and operate public utilities and conduct the public business for the benefit of all citizens, should be so carefully drawn that no essential section would be susceptible of conflicting interpretations; and every right and power conveyed by the act should be stated so clearly that doubt or misunderstanding as to local authority would be impossible. Brevity and simplicity should be the rule in every section, but the duties, powers and responsibilities of all officers should be clearly defined.

In theory, the chief purpose of a city charter is to enable the citizens of a particular community to manage their public affairs, conduct their corporate business and develop their resources and public utilities in their own way, free from unnecessary restrictions or harmful interruptions by the higher power of State government. This theory is not yet a reality in any great city in the United States; and, until it is, we shall not have perfect municipal government. To-day, the greatest charter need of American cities is home rule in fact rather than theory. Two governments cannot exist in a municipality without conflict. When the powers and duties of local officers have been fixed, these officers should be permitted to exercise discretion in the management of the purely business affairs of a city, the remedy of prompt removal by frequent elections remaining always in the hands of the people.

City government does not imply law-making in the general sense of the term, the duties of the corporation being confined to the protection of life and property, the preservation of the public health, the promotion of education and of public comfort. All other functions of municipal administration are limited to the management of the public business, which may be classed under the two general heads of taxation and expenditure. It is apparent, therefore, that when a State has created the machinery for city government constant tinkering with it is certain to cause perpetual confusion. The power to regulate the affairs of a municipality that is vested in local officers should not be exercised by the State, except under unusual conditions or in extraordinary circumstances. Charters must be amended from time to time, but the custom of State Legislatures making special laws for private or corporate

interests from year to year, directing the operation of departments and creating irresponsible commissions to usurp the powers of city officers, will in the end nullify every effort to establish intelligent and economical municipal government.

Many grave problems are involved in the proper management of the affairs of great cities, and in recent years there has been much study of the general subject. The intelligent development of the resources and utilities that are the common property of the people is now recognized as a matter of more importance than changes in the routine of taxation and expenditure. Municipal ownership of public utilities has been accepted as a correct principle; but the possibilities of the system cannot be realized without charter powers that conform to modern conditions. The old plan of incorporating in every city charter certain arbitrary financial restrictions, which are in most cases supplemented by constitutional safeguards, was an error on the side of caution to begin with, and to-day the system is as much out of date as the stage coach and the horse car.

Legislatures have too often attempted to make one general plan of municipal government fit every city in a State, without regard to the geographical or industrial conditions of the cities. A charter that might be well nigh perfect for an interior town of limited population might, on the other hand, prove to be a crushing legal incubus upon a seaboard city or a great metropolis. With few exceptions, State constitutions limit the borrowing capacity of cities to a fixed proportion of the assessed value of taxable property, and no classification or exception of obligations is made. Under this system the public property, no matter how valuable, is not available as an asset, nor is it negotiable as security for a loan. The property owned by the city of New York is worth, roughly estimated, \$500,000,000; yet, under constitutional and charter provisions, the municipality cannot borrow a cent upon this security, the limit of indebtedness being fixed at ten per cent. of the assessed value of taxable real estate. The city cannot tax its own property, and it is therefore forced into the unbusiness-like and apparently contradictory position of growing richer and poorer at the same time. Every time the municipality acquires real estate for any purpose, its borrowing capacity is reduced by an amount equal to ten per cent. of the assessed value of the land acquired, its income from taxation is reduced, and the property,

no matter how valuable it may be, at once becomes worthless as an available asset. No private business could long exist under such a system of restriction.

To continue with New York as an illustration of the charter needs of great cities, nearly one-fourth of the gross funded debt of the city was incurred for the development of two great public utilities, water works and docks, both of which are profitable investments. The revenue derived from the water-front property that has been improved by the city is large enough to meet the interest on the bonds issued to pay for the work, and to provide a sinking fund that will retire the securities as they fall due. This will leave the city in possession of a most valuable property free of debt and yielding a large net revenue that may then be applied to the reduction of taxation. But, under existing constitutional and charter restrictions, every dollar of debt incurred to develop this paying property is a charge against the borrowing capacity of the city and, therefore, a check upon other public improvements. Substantially the same condition of facts exists in the Department of Water Supply, the receipts from the sale of water being more than enough to pay interest on the bonds issued to build the plant. The financial ability of the city to carry on general public work is restricted by the issue of bonds for the purpose of developing into paying properties two public utilities. In the case of these two properties, the taxpayers are merely sureties for the payment of the bonds. They pay neither principal nor interest, because the property improved earns both; but for twenty years the borrowing capacity of the city is restricted by obligations that are mere formalities.

For the building of the underground rapid-transit railroad the city is amply secured against interest and principal of the bonds issued, and at the end of fifty years it will own the property free of cost to the taxpayers; but for all that period the sum of \$35,000,000 must stand charged against the borrowing capacity, or the available assets of the corporation. When the bonds have been retired and the road is the unencumbered property of the city, its only available value as an asset will be the net revenue that may be earned. If the property should possess the market value of \$100,000,000, under existing restrictions the municipality could not in any way utilize it as a pledge for loans to develop other public utilities.

The original purpose of these extraordinary safeguards was, doubtless, a wise and necessary one, because they would unquestionably prevent a city from rushing into bankruptcy; but, for a great and progressive municipality that would conduct its affairs according to tried methods of business, the system is a huge stumbling block in the path of material progress. If the people of the city of New York should vote unanimously to extend municipal ownership to all public or semi-public utilities, a new system of finance would have to be devised before the mandate could be obeyed. Should the municipality acquire by purchase street railroads and lighting plants to the value of \$300,000,000, that amount of property would be withdrawn from taxation and the borrowing capacity of the city would be reduced by \$30,000,000. If bonds could be legally issued for the amount of property mentioned, it is doubtful if the investment would ever earn enough to pay interest on the loan and replace the loss in taxes.

The time is not far distant when the charters of all the larger cities of the United States will be amended or entirely reconstructed, to accord with advanced knowledge of municipal government. This work provides a broad field for the exercise of political wisdom. The new charters must be adapted to the special needs of cities, and not constructed on a general plan in which unnecessary financial restrictions will hamper development. Limitations of borrowing capacity must be retained and the credit of every municipality amply safeguarded in the fundamental law; but a plan must be devised to separate, in the debt account, profitable investments from obligations incurred for current expenses and miscellaneous improvements. Municipal ownership of public utilities must remain a mere academic principle or sound political theory, if cities are not permitted to develop public property in a businesslike way. A debt incurred to convert public property into a paying investment is never a burden upon taxpayers, and that fact must be recognized in the making of new charters.

Base a city charter upon a sound financial system, and the work of providing for good government is half done. The feature next in importance is proper recognition of the fact that, in the conduct of municipal business, there must be organization and discipline, and that full responsibility must be the penalty of power. There is no reason to fear centralization in city government; and, without a responsible head to plan and direct, the

public business will fall into confusion and neglect. A Mayor should have enough power over subordinates to justify the city in holding him to full responsibility for their acts. A better method of compelling the appointment of good men has not been devised.

The chief officers of a city, those in control of large departments, ought to be elected by the people for short terms with the privilege of re-election. The appropriation of money for current expenses, the authorization of bonds and the approval of plans and contracts for large expenditures should never rest in a Board, Commission or Committee controlled by appointed officers. The chief financial officer, if responsible for payments and expenditures, should have veto power over them, and there should be no board or divided authority at the head of any department.

The complete realization of home rule for cities is supposed to include a legislative branch of government, and Aldermen and Councilmen have existed long enough to become a popular tradition. That a nominal legislative body can serve any useful purpose in a correct system of municipal administration is an open question, with good argument on either side; but it is, unfortunately, a matter of history that the record of such bodies in recent years has done more than anything else to discredit their official existence. With few exceptions, the system of government that has prevailed in American cities has relegated the law-making or ordinance-making branch to a position of minor importance. As a rule, such bodies have had no control of expenditures; and where they have had authority over public property and franchises they have too often made the rights of the people a means to corrupt personal gain, thereby discrediting the system which is responsible for their existence. There have been various experiments with so-called Municipal Assemblies, and the results have in no case been satisfactory. To abolish the representative branch of city government outright would involve a general re-distribution of duties, powers and responsibilities among other departments; but the result of the present system is, in nearly every case, the only plausible excuse for constant State interference in local affairs.

Municipal Legislatures do not legislate, and the statement of that fact briefly sums up the story of their failures. One corrupt Board of Aldermen will discredit the system for a generation, but there are many minor details in the management of business

affairs of a municipality that may be entrusted to an elective Assembly, under proper charter provisions and restrictions. Such bodies must have more power or less, and the results of recent experiments indicate that in future they should be restricted to routine matters and details that cannot affect the general system of administration. If their powers are increased, the change should carry with it pay and the possibility of civic distinction that would induce the best citizens to seek the office of Alderman or Councilman. In any event, the charters of cities should so clearly define the powers and duties of the legislative branch of government that corruption and obstruction would be rendered impossible.

Other imperative charter needs of great cities are improved systems of taxation and the elimination of complicated laws and ordinances—in other words, brevity and simplicity. To-day, every head of a department in New York, and possibly in other large cities, violates the law and commits a misdemeanor at least once a week, not because such officers are ignorant or corrupt, but for the reason that charter provisions are incompatible with practical business methods of administration. There are too many laws; and far too often the laws are not understood until interpreted by the highest court of a State after vexatious and expensive litigation.

A charter that will admit of honest, intelligent and progressive city government must decree, clearly and positively, the duties and powers of every officer to be elected or appointed. Then it should prohibit, absolutely, interference with purely local affairs by a State Legislature. It should not admit the possibility of a private or corporate interest going beyond the local authorities for special privileges or exemptions.

BIRD S. COLER.

CECIL RHODES'S FUTURE.

BY PRINCESS CATHERINE RADZIWIŁŁ.

IN the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW for last March appeared an article headed "The Responsibility of Cecil Rhodes," and signed "A British Officer." This signature might have been avoided with advantage, unless it was used as a further proof of the incapacity of certain British officers, who, whilst absolutely ignorant of the various details of the South African question, seem to take a certain amount of pride in parading their want of knowledge, and opposing it to the experience of people who, having lived in the country all their lives, know its roads and its kopjes, as well as the character of its inhabitants and the intricacies of its politics.

Mr. Rhodes has just left England; he left it under a sort of a cloud, and it is the fashion just now to abuse him and his conduct during the war. It was the military authorities (previous to Lord Roberts's arrival in South Africa) who started this attack, in the hope of thus screening their own mistakes. But an attack, if it is to be successful, must be substantiated by some kind of facts, or else it misses its aim and becomes a libel.

Of such a nature is the article the responsibility of which is assumed by "a British Officer." In the first place, it accuses Mr. Rhodes of having deliberately and wilfully misled the British nation by his solemn assurance that there would be no war. But, even admitting that this were true, was Mr. Rhodes the only source of information which the British nation had? More than that, how could the assurances of a private individual affect the decision of the nation? It was not his place to do anything but express his ideas and conviction, and they were based on his confidence in the strength of the British army. There were other people who knew the great extent of the armaments of the Boers,

or, at least, who ought to have known it, and whose business it was to know it. Mr. Rhodes was neither the High Commissioner nor an Intelligence Officer; he was the head of one of the largest financial concerns in the world, and it was his duty not to create a panic amongst his shareholders. When he said he thought there would be no war, he was not speaking to the Government; in fact, he had no authority to speak to the Government, who, we have for it Mr. Chamberlain's own words, had kept systematically aloof from him since the Jameson raid and never consulted him in anything concerning South Africa. How can one, in face of such facts, say that it was the words of Mr. Rhodes which misled the nation! The nation, I repeat it again, had other sources of information, besides Mr. Rhodes's words, on which to base its judgments and opinions. It had responsible people in South Africa, whose duty it was to warn it of what was going on in the Transvaal. Why does the British Officer, who treats Mr. Rhodes as if he were the only authority in South Africa, not speak of the intelligence officers, who, under false names, and in very badly made clothes, bought in Cape Town, went up to the Transvaal in the firm conviction that the Boers would not know them under their disguises, and came back, after having seen just what the Boers chose to show them, imbued with the conviction that the war would be a simple walkover? Why does he forget that Sir Alfred Milner refused to listen to those who told him that the Transvaal Government was arming, and was not even aware of the amount of ammunition imported by them through the Cape Colony until his attention was called to it by the Progressive party, of which Mr. Rhodes is not the official but the real leader? Mr. Rhodes could not mislead the Government, because he had neither the authority nor the right to speak to the Government. If he had had such a right as is asserted by his accusers, there would not have been the necessity of having either a High Commissioner or an Intelligence Department in the Colony.

As for the argument that the Boers could not have declared war earlier, on account of the impossibility of their moving in their country during the winter months, it only shows that the writer has never been in that country, where fresh grass grows after each rainfall all through the winter, if not abundantly, at least in sufficient quantity to feed the hardened and long-suffering Boer ponies.

The second charge that the British Officer brings against Mr. Rhodes is that he interfered disastrously with the general conduct of the war. This is a very grave charge to bring against a man, and I wonder how it can be made in such a frivolous way. Mr. Rhodes went to Kimberley, not for reasons "at present unknown," but because not only his own but especially his shareholders' interests lay in Kimberley, because he was responsible to these shareholders, because it was only due to his energy and that of the other directors of De Beers that the town was able to defend itself. The correspondence between the Mayor of Kimberley and Mr. Schreiner, recently published, proves with what obstinacy the Cape Government refused to help the Diamond City, or even to recognize that it was in danger. It was De Beers who armed the town, who laid in provisions and ammunition. It was Mr. Rhodes who raised a mounted corps, who helped Colonel Harris, another director of De Beers, to organize his volunteers; it was Mr. Rhodes who opened soup kitchens, who helped with his purse the poor who could not find work, and with his words of encouragement those who were employed in the defense of the place. It was Mr. Rhodes who, later on, when the shells of the 100-pounder gun worked destruction in the town, opened his mines to the women and children who had not been able to get away before the beginning of the siege. Without Mr. Rhodes, Kimberley would have fallen, if only because it would not have been provided with sufficient ammunition or food. And it is this man who is accused of having disastrously interfered with the conduct of the war! But Mr. Rhodes has had nothing to do with the conduct of the war beyond defending his own property and that of his shareholders, or expressing his opinion as to Colonel Kekewich's peculiarities. Besides, it does not argue in favor of General Buller's independence or love for his country to affirm, as a British Officer does, that he abandoned the "only sound plan of campaign" at Mr. Rhodes's bidding. It gives to the latter an importance far greater than he admits himself to have, and to the former a want of firmness and judgment not only unworthy of, but even dangerous in, a Commander in Chief.

The fact is that the military authorities have one aim only, that of screening the mistakes of their subordinates. They bring monstrous charges against Mr. Rhodes in order to prevent the public from judging their own errors. It is to be hoped that the

public will not base its opinion on such one-sided articles as that which emanates from a "British Officer," but will look further ahead, and ask why Colonel Kekewich did not communicate to the population of Kimberley Cronje's offer to let the women and children go out of the town; why again, later on, he launched against Mr. Rhodes the accusation of having wished to surrender—an accusation which, when asked to do so, he could substantiate only by saying that, as Mr. Rhodes had called together a meeting of the civil defenders of the town, he (Colonel Kekewich) had concluded it was to propose to them to surrender to the Boers.

Mr. Rhodes has always had enemies. He would not be the great man he is if it were not so, and indeed some of them but add to his fame. However, one can be a man's enemy and yet prove just to him; it is justice which the friends of Mr. Rhodes claim for him, and in doing so they serve the interests of their country, because England has got nothing greater in South Africa than the "Colossus," as he is familiarly called; and, in defending him, she defends her own interests in the land of the Southern Cross.

It is all very well now for the Jingoese to scream over the prey they have not yet got, to vow vengeance and destruction against the Boers, and to hurl stones at Mr. Rhodes. It is all very well for earnest people who look at the war with all the sentimentality inherent in John Bull, and the narrow-mindedness of Non-conformist consciences, to preach magnanimity and indulgence. But those who have not been influenced by Jingoism, or who know that religion has got nothing to do with politics, are very well aware that, when matters come to a settlement, that settlement must be founded on strict imperial lines, without either sentimental magnanimity or harsh measures of retaliation such as some Colonials clamor for. Firmness and the pursuit of a line of policy tending to affirm England's supremacy over the whole of South Africa is the aim the Government ought to have in view and the principle from which it ought never to swerve, or else the present trouble will begin over again in ten years, and England cannot afford to incur such a risk. In this task of pacifying the country and at the same time imbuing the Dutch population with the conviction that England's supremacy must never be disputed again, the Government have not got a more powerful auxiliary than Mr. Rhodes, who was the first to start the imperial idea in

South Africa, who gave the Empire a kingdom, and in destroying whom one would destroy English prestige, which, whatever his enemies may say, is embodied in him. Governors come and go; the claims of the mother country, though recognized, are often not admitted; and, rightly or wrongly, since Majuba a strong feeling of distrust against the Government at home exists amongst a certain class of Colonials. Mr. Rhodes alone is always there. It is he who changed the gloomy wilderness of the past into a settled country, who opened it to the life of people and, it may be said, created South Africa. He worked these mines over the possession of two nations which are fighting now; he joined the country to the civilized world by means of railways and telegraphs; he felled forests, drained swamps, built factories, founded villages and settlements, brought in colonists, put down robbers, defended settlers against Matabele or Basuto raids, maintained the peace necessary for the welfare of the vast territory he had conquered, and introduced the rule of law and justice into it. It is through him that South Africa has lived, grown and flourished; and whatever some people in England may say or do, they will never wipe out the memory of these great deeds, they will never succeed in effacing that man's name from the annals of the land which he has brought before the notice of the world and given to his own country. It is very easy for a "British Officer" to say, or rather to insinuate, that he put the safety of Kimberley before everything else; but Kimberley, for Mr. Rhodes, represented the thousands, aye, the millions, of people who had believed in him and his genius; who had trusted him with their fortunes, and whom he felt called upon to protect and to defend, because he knew nobody else would do it. Whatever one may say of him, one cannot accuse Mr. Rhodes of not having realized what the fall of Kimberley or the collapse of De Beers would have meant to the whole of the civilized world; the ruin it would have involved, the hearts it would have broken, the lives it would have destroyed; and it is no wonder that he refused to assume this stupendous responsibility and preferred to run the risk of offending Colonel Kekewich.

I have spoken of the immense position Mr. Rhodes has made for himself in South Africa. I will now go further and say that, in spite of the animosity displayed by the Bond against him, he is still the favorite of a certain class of peaceful Dutch farmers,

who have kept a lurking sort of tenderness for him that they dare not show openly, but which they cherish in their hearts, just as they hide his photographs in a secret recess of their drawers. Farmers of this class, who are outwardly under the control but inwardly independent of the Bond, know very well that Mr. Rhodes is their best friend, and that he will always help them, because in helping them he will work for the good of the country. The one great mistake which is always made in South African affairs is the failure to differentiate between the Bond, who will never accept English rule or supremacy, and the reasonable part of the Dutch population, who only want to live peacefully, and who deplore the race hatred as much as we do. They see the situation as it really is, not with the eyes of the Jingoës of their party. The latter insist that the present war has been brought about by English desire for the possession of the Transvaal gold fields. They are absolutely wrong in this pretense, as well as when they imagine that the securing of funds for needy British citizens, by acts of Parliament and secret service grants, with substantial personal bonuses, is the final ambition of Mr. Rhodes. Absurd as they are, those opinions are professed by the rank and file of the Bond party, though not shared by a considerable part of the Dutch population—a fact which alone would be sufficient to prove that the words Dutch and Bond are not synonymous.

To explain fully Mr. Rhodes's power in South Africa, it would be necessary to look back on the growth of the Imperial policy as applied to the Transvaal, but that would lead us too far. It is sufficient to say that he undoubtedly contributed to its expansion by developing Rhodesia, running a telegraph wire from the Cape to Cairo, negotiating a railway, and tracing a thin red line almost unbroken from North to South of Africa. It was then that he became the idol of Imperial England, which has proved itself now so ungrateful to him; and it was then that Mr. Chamberlain began to watch his flowing tide, whilst at the same time giving his attention to the Transvaal policy. The external relations of the Transvaal were controlled by England, which was responsible for its security from attack; but the disquieting symptom in the general situation was that Krüger required an extensive police force—extensive, inasmuch as his internal policy was irritating to people unaccustomed to oppression. The undercurrents of communication with Germany which have played such an impor-

tant part in Transvaal politics were taken as one with Germany's recent history and her colonial ambitions in Africa. Krüger's armaments were known to be immensely in excess of his internal requirements, and his burghers, who must not be confused with the Cape Dutch, openly talked of war with England at the favorable moment. The taxation was enormous, and the revenues were materially devoted to arming and intrigue. Any British Governor or Consul who, years ago, failed to read the writing on the wall must have been diplomatically insane. The chief difficulty of the Imperial Cabinet was to convince the nation of their danger, and one of the reasons why the Bond so bitterly hate Mr. Rhodes, and why England ought to support him, is that he saw that, under the profession of great loyalty, the aim of the Afrikaner policy was to disguise its real ambition. This policy was largely successful, played as it was for all it was worth through the medium of Mr. Labouchere, Dr. Clark, and even Mr. John Morley. A curious illustration of this fact is the following incident which was related to me by a member of the Cape Legislative Assembly. He was talking to a rich farmer, a member of the Bond, in one of the districts where most of the inhabitants have joined the Boers. The farmer was repeatedly affirming the loyalty of the Afrikaners in general and himself in particular to the English Crown, when suddenly as the conversation drifted on to the battle of Spytfontein, which had just been fought, he confidentially remarked: "There is just one point I am a little uneasy about; I am afraid the Boers have not enough cannons!"

Such men hate Mr. Rhodes, not because he betrayed them, as they say, when he raided Krüger, but because he is a great Englishman and a still greater Imperialist; and public opinion in England ought never in judging him to lose sight of this fact. But, curious to say, at the same time this Imperialism, which is well known and everywhere accepted in South Africa, gives Mr. Rhodes a certain popularity amongst the Dutch whose social policy and hatred of the English are incongruous. While professing their hatred of England, they hail with delight the marriage of one of their daughters to an Englishman, boast of the connection, and tell you with a feeling of pride, when they can do so, "This is my daughter; she is married to an Englishman"; and there seems to be something omitted when they say so, such as: "And there is therefore nothing for you to despise, inasmuch

as she is your national equal." It has always seemed to me (of course, I may be mistaken) that the principal reasons of the race hatred are: (1) the English look down on the Dutch, who in turn hate them for doing so; so much is this the case that, while it is among the Dutch themselves a half compliment to remind a man that he is an Englishman, it is a half insult to tell another that he is a Dutchman; (2) the English opinion of the native; this was the originating cause of the Transvaal and Free State Republics, and without it there would be no war to-day; (3) the religious gulf between the two races. The language question is probably another factor, but I do not think it is a material one. The position of nominal subordination to England accounts for a peculiar feature of this hatred, in that it is directed against the English as a nation and not as individuals. This explains why Mr. Rhodes is still popular amongst some Dutch, just as it explains why, although these Dutch are hostile to Great Britain, they would yet fight with her against a European nation that would try to assume a footing in South Africa. I am sure that, if only Mr. Rhodes were allowed a free hand, one of the chief results of the war would be the early disappearance of race hatred. It is not lightly that I make this statement, and I was certainly of the opposite opinion six months ago, but I have since convinced myself that I was wrong. The Dutchman of South Africa, and in this word I also include the Transvaal Boer, will always submit when he once fully recognizes the superior strength of his master. When convinced of it, the Boers will accept the inevitable, and, in making the best of it, probably discover all the advantages to be derived in time from the new conditions in which they find themselves placed. It is for this reason that I firmly believe that a really Imperial settlement, such as the one Mr. Rhodes came over to England to advocate and urge on the Government, would mean a consolidated and highly prosperous South Africa.

What would his rôle be in case this dream of his, a united South Africa under the British flag, came to be realized, which we must all hope will happen soon? It is difficult to foresee. The man is so great that if God granted to him that fulfilment of his hopes, possibilities would be opened to him which his own energy and tact alone would limit. The English would bow down to him, as to the man who first brought under their notice this new accession of power for their country, and the Afrikanders would

give way to the secret leaning they have always had toward him. His chief difficulties would be the existence of the Jingoës of both the South African League and the Bond, and one of his greatest problems would be to win back the moderate Dutch to true allegiance to the English Crown. It would not be so difficult as it at first seems. The Boers love an idol. Remove Mr. Hofmeyr's influence by proving to them that he had not their interests so much at heart as they imagined, destroy the glamour of the Transvaal, and what is left but Mr. Rhodes, the only real power in South Africa, the only man whose personal influence over his fellow creatures will withstand any kind of attack? Men like the Schreiners, Moltenos, Merrimans, and all the present Bond leaders, are but tinsel statesmen to the Afrikanders. They are of themselves. But Rhodes, the Imperialist, the man in whom thousands of people in England as well as over the whole world believe is the magician they will yet follow, and statesmen in England ought not to overlook this fact nor intrench themselves behind the Raid to condemn a man whose help they cannot afford to lose in the settlement of affairs in South Africa.

Apart from these considerations, Mr. Rhodes has got another important asset in his favor; that is, the present position in which the Bond is placed. It can only exist as a paramount factor in the Cape Parliament, and cannot afford to play a losing game. Once its power is broken its end is not far distant. Mr. Hofmeyr has built its organization on almost personal lines; he has no possible successor amongst the men of his party, and several of its rank and file have been only elected by very narrow majorities, which may easily dwindle into minorities if too many rebels are disfranchised, as undoubtedly will be the case after the war is over. For the present they have the upper hand, and they try to keep it in stirring up public opinion against Mr. Rhodes by saying that he is the creator of the present race hatred of the English which prevails amongst them; but that is only an excuse, as the feeling existed long before Mr. Rhodes was born. It founded the Transvaal sixty years ago, and it has caused the present trouble.

The reason of the Bond's animosity against Mr. Rhodes is that they thought they had converted him to their way of thinking, and they have never been able to forgive him for having left them in that belief, and omitted to take them into his confi-

dence at the time of the Jameson raid. But years go on, and in time when Mr. Hofmeyr will have been removed from the sphere of African politics, which must necessarily occur, the Bond itself, if it still exists, will look with more lenient eyes on the "Colossus" and not hold back to the bitter end, as it now says it will do.

The Dutch both in the Cape Colony and in the Transvaal, coming more and more in contact with the English, will naturally turn to Mr. Rhodes for at least material, if not political, support. He has so identified himself with South Africa that no one living in it will ever dream of turning in its needs toward any one else. Governors only represent a distant authority; besides, they are changed. Mr. Rhodes is always there, and, as all are aware, never fails to redress, if he can do so, the wrongs of those who come to him in their need.

As for the Bond, it is doomed to languish and disappear. It is more than probable that the Cape Progressives will win the next election by a small majority. Mr. Rhodes will then be obliged, whether he likes it or not, and whether the Government at home likes it or not, to assume the Premiership. And public opinion in England ought not to forget this, or to attack in such an unjustifiable way as the "British Officer" of the NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW does, a man who, very soon, perhaps, will become a responsible Minister of the Crown, and the representative of Imperialism in South Africa—the representative of an intelligent Imperialism, an Imperialism backed and supported by all the different parties in the country, an Imperialism which shall give itself the task of peacefully absorbing the Dutch into the English element, inducing the former to work in conjunction with the latter for the establishment of a new policy on purely Imperial lines. And one must not object that this would be impossible on account of the Jameson raid. The last word has not yet been spoken with regard to the raid, and perhaps time will show that Mr. Rhodes was in this sad business just as generous as he was imprudent, just as ready as he ever is, when he thinks it necessary for his country's welfare, to sacrifice his person in order to screen its prestige—even when that prestige is embodied in the person of Mr. Chamberlain, who is always as willing to disavow anything or anybody he believes to be compromising to himself, as he is forgetful of services rendered to him in the past.

When once the Progressive party has succeeded in command-

ing a majority, be it ever so small, in both Houses of the Cape Parliament, this majority is bound to increase steadily. It will include financial intelligence, the key to the outer world. The Bond will never be able to withstand this long, especially once they have lost their secret service funds, the absence of which will help more than anything else to bring to reason the Dutch farmer, who, after all, is not more disinterested than the rest of the world, and he will not grudge any longer his support to the power under whose rule he sees his way to prosperity. Once a group of these Dutch go over to the English side, and recognize the advantages of Imperialism, the spell of the Bond will be broken, the more easily because one of the greatest factors in Cape politics, which, strange to say, has been much overlooked, will have disappeared, too. I mean President Krüger, who up to now has dragooned the Bond (and this for years has meant the Government). Krüger hated the British, and persecuted Mr. Rhodes openly; he required his followers to do likewise, which they did without hesitating, and they have shown themselves as disloyal to Imperialism as it has been judicious for them to be. Their loyalty was in the interest of rebellion, and that was all Krüger expected of them, until the fateful day when he was ready and England was not. But once his influence is removed, nothing will be left for the Afrikaner but to accept the situation, and recognize Mr. Rhodes in his true light, that of the greatest Imperialist of his time, and they will naturally expect him to help them in their difficulties. He will be, and he is, the only man in South Africa capable of enforcing a reasonable settlement, in which the rights of every private individual will be respected, but at the same time where there will be no maudlin attempt to patch up peace and buy loyalty by Imperial concessions. One must have a clean slate, clean to the best interests of Imperialism. In a country like South Africa, with only a million whites, there is no need for five cantankerous states; there has been already too much of home rule and race hatred; the sections must be politically united.

People in England make the great mistake of judging the situation from a general point of view; they have but one great interest at heart, namely, the settlement of the question according to their ideas. They ignore Cape politics, and they will not admit that these politics are also a factor which must not be disregarded.

In the Cape Colony, and especially in Natal, they make precisely the same mistake, though, from the opposite point of view, and they will insist on the settlement being made according to their own local opinions. This unexpressed but very real conflict is bound to have an influence on the course of events, and an unfavorable one, too. It is to be hoped that the Government will show itself wiser than either its friends or its foes, and, whilst giving satisfaction to the just claims of loyal colonists, will try also not to overlook the political side of the question at the Cape, or the men who are bound up with it, and in whose hands the fate of the country will have to be left, more or less, in the future.

When I said "the men," I ought to have said "the man." Mr. Rhodes is the only one who can in assuming power really wield it, independently of political parties, or of ministers with whom he may be obliged to associate and work. The English public must not mistake on that point; the English Government must not think, as I believe it is led to do, that the prestige of Mr. Rhodes is as much shaken in South Africa as it is in London, where he was only made much of whilst people hoped to make money through him and did so. The inhabitants of South Africa know what they owe to the Colossus. They are well aware that his generosity has always helped those who applied to it, that his ambitions have never been for himself, that his work was always entered into for the good of his country or the benefits of civilization in general. They know that it is to his big mind alone that is due the great idea and principle of an Imperial Government gathering round it and under its rule the whole of South Africa, uniting its two white races, protecting its black and colored ones, and giving to this great Dark Continent the benefit of its justice and its laws, the shield of its flag and the respect of the world, which, while it envies and bitterly attacks England and its politics, yet bows before its power and might.

The time for writing in detail the history of the siege of Kimberley has not yet come. Besides, it would not do to touch upon certain incidents of it. But whoever has been there and gone through these weary months of anxiety, distress and privations of all kinds, whoever has been locked up in the Diamond City, far away from all he or she loved and cared for in this world, bears witness to Mr. Rhodes's admirable conduct during that interminable siege, to his kindness and thoughtfulness for others. His

presence there sustained the courage of all the inhabitants, who felt themselves safe whilst he was sharing their dangers, caring for their sick and wounded, always ready to do all he could for the welfare of his beloved Kimberley. He found work for the natives locked up in the compounds; he manufactured shells; his own resources, as well as those of De Beers, were devoted to the benefit of the besieged town, and in comparison with those services, what are the few small quarrels he may or may not have had with Colonel Kekewich?

I quite understand that the military authorities did not agree with Mr. Rhodes, whose vast mind could not grasp all the red tape which up to now has been paramount in all the war operations. They would not forgive the Colossus his independence, the iron will with which he swept away every obstacle which came in his path. But, at the same time, this dislike ought not to have taken the form of attacks such as that in the *NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW*. They do not argue well, either for their authors or for those who inspired them. I will say more—they overreach themselves, and, instead of harming Mr. Rhodes, simply destroy the prestige of those in whose hands the supreme command of the army lay, and whose paramount duty was to exercise that command, and not to allow a private individual to interfere with “the only sound plan of campaign,” if the abandonment of Kimberley to its fate meant such a thing.

The “British Officer” speaks of the responsibilities of Cecil Rhodes. He may be sure of one thing, and that is, that whatever these responsibilities are, there is not a single one the Colossus will refuse to assume, or will not accept with the same courage with which he submitted to all the consequences of the Jameson raid. He will be, and he ought to be, proud of having had the foresight to prepare Kimberley in time for the eventual possibility of a siege. He ought to be proud of having helped to defend this “greatest commercial asset in the world, Her Majesty’s flag,” as he said himself. And he ought especially to be proud of having won the affection, respect and gratitude of those amongst whom he came to take his place when danger threatened them, and whose anxieties and privations he shared. This affection, respect and gratitude will follow him wherever he goes, and help him to win further laurels in South Africa, in that country to which he belongs, if not by birth, at least by the work of his whole life.

A great future awaits him there, greater than the one Mr. Chamberlain has marked out for himself, and obstinately denied to his friend of by-gone days, perhaps his accomplice in far-fetched and far-seeking schemes. When this war is over, when commercial peace and prosperity are restored to South Africa, when the political life of the country begins again, the world will see that it will fall to Mr. Rhodes to direct the destinies of the new Empire over which Queen Victoria will preside. He will again, by the very force of circumstances, become the leading and paramount power in it; his genius will urge him on to it; the thousands of people who believe now, and will later on believe in him, will carry him to the zenith of political influence. All the small, petty souls who are so glad, at this present juncture, to attack and slander a greatness they cannot even realize—these envious, jealous people will have long been forgotten, whereas Cecil Rhodes's name will force itself to the notice of the entire civilized world, just as much as his railway will attract that of the world of commerce. His great idea, the development and expansion of the North, will make its way as quickly as the engine which will carry, through the wildernesses of Africa to the shores of the Mediterranean, the fame of the man whose ambitions for his country surpassed in immensity the new kingdom he had given her. People will then remember that this giant amongst men was also as kind-hearted as he was colossal, as full of courage as he was of faith in the mission he knew and felt the Almighty had given to him to fulfil. England will then hail him as one of her greatest heroes; South Africa will be proud of him as one of the greatest statesmen the world has produced; foreign nations will submit to his genius, sovereigns will recognize it, and when for the first time he shall travel over that railway which he called into existence, and look back on the past years so full of trouble and anxiety, so embittered by the suspicions, enmity and distrust of his many foes, so saddened by the defection and treachery of his so-called friends, he will then only perhaps realize his own greatness, and feel proud of having won at last the hard battle he had to fight against a prejudiced mob that ever was, and ever will be, an illustration of the untruth of the old Latin saying, "*Vox populi vox Dei*," because it only worships success, and, like most women, wants to see strength in the hands of those who govern it.

CATHERINE RADZIWIŁŁ.

BRITISH AND RUSSIAN DIPLOMACY.

BY A DIPLOMAT.

THE mad rush of the European Powers for new territories and markets in Africa and Asia is the dominant feature of their external activity in the latter half of our century. In Africa, Great Britain, favored by a start of nearly a hundred years and a matchless capacity for colonial enterprise, has kept ahead of every other nation. To-day the Boers are checking her plans, but as success in her present struggle is a question of life or death to her, we must be prepared to see her eventually win and carry out her scheme of a transcontinental empire or entirely collapse. To state the problem in this way is to solve it. In giving satisfaction to her highest commercial and military ambitions, the monumental creation she has undertaken will allow her to disregard the parallel exertions of competitors, even if crowned with a practical success equal to her own, the possibility of which is more than doubtful. In Asia, Great Britain has developed a career of conquest even more brilliant, distinguished from her achievements in Africa by political and military difficulties, the overcoming of which has been a triumph of the Anglo-Saxon genius worthy of our highest admiration, and by a wealth of gorgeous episode which appeals to the imagination like the chapters of a romance. But in Asia the establishments of England, her possessions and commercial interests, have encountered, within the last twenty years, dangers and obstacles more serious than those with which she is beset in Africa.

It were idle to deny that the feeling of confidence, crossed by temporary annoyance only, experienced by Great Britain in meditating on her destiny in Africa, must make way for one of preoccupation and uneasiness when she considers her position in Asia. English military and commercial circles, the former represented by the

highest authorities, like Lord Wolseley and Lord Roberts, have joined in sounding a note of alarm and in reasoning with the too numerous class of stubborn Englishmen who, in the blindness of their pride and ignorance, are confident that Great Britain will, somehow, always rise superior to the occasion, as she has so far done, and who will not admit the necessity for any change in her institutions and methods. The cause of this disturbance among thinking and observant Englishmen is the enormous place Russia has occupied, within the space of a hundred years, as a political factor in the world. No event in modern history is comparable in importance to the internal and external development of Russia and its expansion in every direction. No other country, not even Germany, has more reason than Great Britain to view with apprehension this mighty phenomenon. The direct contact which the Muscovite advance in Asia has established between Anglo-Saxon dominion and the great Slav Empire must deeply influence the destiny of the British people and the fate of the world.

The prediction of Napoleon, "*L'Europe sera républicaine ou Cosaque*," seems to be gaining plausibility, even in an extended sense, for the march of modern events may very well be interpreted to mean that the political problem of the world is getting gradually reduced to three or four, or at the outside five, factors—Great Britain, Russia, the United States, possibly Germany, and, if the yellow race awakens from its torpor in time, China. The force which would bring about this situation is that of the numerical strength of States. In this direction the possibilities of the three first named Powers are infinite, but those of Germany, although good as far as actual increase of population is concerned, are threatened by emigration and denationalization. The advantages of civilization cannot fail to acquire uniformity and international balance through a continuous process of endosmosis and exosmosis and owing to the universal character of science and arts. It does not seem unreasonable to say, then, that numbers will govern the world and determine the future grouping of humanity. The principle of nationalities, which is the only obstacle in the way of a simplification of the present political divisions of the world, is one whose career, although successful in the southeast of Europe, does not warrant the expectation of a failure of the policy of expansion through the absorption of inferior or weak races which suggests itself to-day to the great Powers.

Who is the optimistic politician who can predict anything but extinction to Holland, Belgium, Denmark and Norway and Sweden? And having foreseen this reduction of European factors, why should he stop at that point and go no further? Supposing, then, that the rollers of American, British, German, Russian and Chinese supremacy have crushed political and ethnical distinctions into five uniform masses, there are but two alternatives left: eternal peace on the basis of a federation of these five masses, or, what seems less probable, a further process of simplification, and again eternal peace on the basis of a fusion of the five into one government—Muscovite, in all likelihood, for her youth and strong rule are chances in favor of the survival of Russia? Universal federation will mean universal brotherhood in a restricted sense; universal fusion will mean universal brotherhood in an absolute sense; and what is considered as the highest dream of humanity will have been realized at the expense of principles which, with more than usual inconsistency, we cherish to-day to the point of staking our lives for them, although they mean, in the form of patriotism and national competitions, the prolongation of universal strife and hatred.

But, abandoning the deceptive mirages of speculation and going back to sober realities, I repeat that the meeting in Asia of Great Britain and Russia is fraught with tremendous consequences. It is the clashing of two great dreams, two plans for what is Cæsarism on a gigantic scale. What are the conditions of the struggle?

After centuries of insular isolation, determining a peculiar orientation of ideas and a special cast of institutions, England has suddenly dropped into the condition of a continental Power. In running up against Russia in the neighborhood of India, practically on the frontier of India, in colliding with Russia in China and Persia, she does not come into contact with a detached portion of the Russian Power, represented by a colony or an isolated group of interests, but with the whole mass of the Russian Empire, which, having enjoyed the privilege of expanding continuously, forms one uninterrupted stretch of territory. Thus, England's superiority as a naval power, so decisive in her relations to Germany and France, who are both vulnerable to her attacks on their colonies, is of no avail against Russia, who, on the contrary, confronts her British rival with overwhelming military re-

sources and superior facilities of communication. In this way Russia is the mistress of the situation in the East. To this cause is principally due the eclipse of British influence in Turkey, China and Persia. In the great crisis which the new conditions of international life have created for England, she has been at a material disadvantage, which she is loath to meet with any change in her institutions; and yet she has lamentably failed in diplomacy, the only weapon left to her for securing compensation and balancing the chances of the struggle. It is a fact that, on every occasion, British statesmanship and diplomacy have been outwitted by Slav astuteness, which has secured a further advantage to Russia in the East.

It will be interesting to compare Russian with British diplomacy, to bring to light their respective methods, their merits and modes of action.

That part of statesmanship called diplomacy is the art employed by governments in their dealings with one another, or against one another, to obtain the most for the least, to secure, over and above such conditions as are guaranteed by natural law or by treaties or by the possession of superior power, advantages which may be won by resourcefulness in bargaining and skill in finesse, reinforced by unscrupulousness when necessary. This is not the official definition, I know, but the sole or even principal object of diplomacy is not, as some maintain, the defense of the members of a State in their rights and interests. This task is the routine and drudgery of diplomacy. It is performed mechanically, as it were, and without serious hitches, under the tutelar wing of international law—unless, indeed, one party is very inferior to the other in civilization, in which case the restraints of right and law are conveniently ignored. In its vital and essential aspects, what I must be pardoned for calling its higher flights, diplomacy is still to-day, as it has been from the time of its origin during the struggle of the Italian republics with the transalpine Powers down to Talleyrand and Bismarck, the art of deceiving and overreaching. If, as has been asserted, the American Commonwealth enjoys the privilege of possessing a diplomacy which has never stooped to the tortuous ways employed by others, it is not, as is implied, because the exercise of the craft can be, if its adepts be so minded or educated, directed solely by principles of directness, frankness and tact. It is because, until lately,

the United States has not been implicated in international politics, and its action abroad has been limited to the consideration of its commercial or social interests, whose defense is a task which can be performed in the light of day. By inaugurating an imperial policy and annexing the Philippines, the United States has plunged into the field of international rivalry and will soon feel the necessity of adopting the occult weapons of other Powers.

Diplomacy may achieve its ends, if they are frank and honest, through the instrumentality of a man like Franklin, who was guided throughout his foreign career by truth and common sense. Many a diplomatist reaches a venerable age in his profession without having practised it otherwise than in the form of learned discussions with Secretaries of State and references to texts and jurisprudence or appearances at stately balls and dinners. But even these must admit that, at least potentially, every diplomatist contains an agent committed to cunning and unscrupulousness, whose calling must find him ready to accomplish, when national interest claims it from him, acts which in private life would be considered immoral or criminal. If it were necessary to adduce proofs in support of the view given here of diplomacy, the disposal of secret funds, sometimes enormous, by most diplomatic agents, and the scandals connected with the activity of military attachés in different capitals, could be quoted as conclusive ones. Politics are governed by a special code of ethics—that which is contained in the maxim, “the end justifies the means;” and, although nations keep up the comedy of virtuous pretenses, they subscribe to acts of injustice or fraud performed in their behalf and secretly condone them. It is quite as much as humanity can do to create in its midst a sincere feeling of reprobation against private villainy. This is not stated as an apology for vice, but to show that the ethics of humanity, like everything else in the world, are a relative and conventional quantity, and that we will always find our infirm nature ready to seek relief from the restraints of conscience in the reservation of spheres of action where our primitive instincts can have full play. With nations it is the field of politics; with individuals it is the field of love. If, for instance, the strewing of a battlefield with thousands of human corpses in the name of national interest is a meritorious and even glorious action, while, on the contrary, the wilful destruction of one man by another in the name of private interest is condemned and

punished as a crime, why should the practices of diplomacy entail reprobation and odium, though the same practices in private life be destructive of reputation?

Diplomacy is essentially a game of observation and cleverness; one in which patience and caution alternate with boldness and promptness of action; in which intelligent management neutralizes the disadvantages of a naturally unfavorable situation, or even snatches victory out of the conditions of defeat; in other words, it is a game of poker, but poker in which peeping and other questionable devices are liberally practised. It follows that success in diplomatic enterprises depends mainly on agility and suppleness of thought, on elasticity of political conscience, on the powers of adaptability and assimilation, and not on any of the transcendent qualities of mind and character, which are too unwieldy and heavy to be of much use on the quicksands of international politics, where, indeed, they are likely to do more harm than good unless allied with great address. They will provoke admiration and esteem, but they will seldom lead to practical success.

Among the qualities indispensable to a good diplomatist, the most important are knowledge of human nature and skill in putting that knowledge to account. Psychology is the source of inspiration of diplomacy. An intelligent and, when occasion demands, unscrupulous use of the insight psychology gives into the workings of the brain and soul, is the triumph of diplomacy. Personal attractions and social accomplishments are among its most powerful adjuncts.

The golden age of diplomacy was in the time of absolute monarchs or ministers, when the action of States depended not on definitely fixed conceptions of national interest, but on the ideas and passions of one man; when kings were governed by fair favorites, and these in turn by lieutenants of the body guard; when a witty word or timely compliment turned the political scales, and when golden weights restored them to their former balance. To-day, the opportunities of diplomacy have considerably decreased. Scientific conceptions of the nature of the State have, in most cases, transferred its centre of gravity from the sovereign to the nation. Closely defined and rationally elaborated commercial and political ideals have taken the place of the fumbling, empirical and dishonest methods of the past. The mutual relations of most of the modern States are governed by fixed

rules, which act, as it were, automatically and leave little room for the display of diplomatic talent. International negotiations are reduced to-day, in American and European capitals, to the solution of mathematical equations from which personal factors are nearly entirely eliminated, and in which hard facts and figures provided by statistics are opposed to one another by men responsible to public opinion, so that the possibility of one party's gaining a marked advantage over the other is very small indeed. Mutual concessions, "give and take," are the principles on which they are conducted. The discussions are carried on with the help of specialists, commercial, technical and military, so that often only a nominal direction is left to the diplomatic agent.

But, although in America and Europe the possibilities of diplomacy have narrowed down to the maintenance of mutual good will between nations, or the conclusion or prevention of alliances by appeals made to reason, national interest or national feeling, in Asia a wide field of action exists for the higher arts of the craft. There, European Governments meet the native authorities and one another on the ground of stealth, duplicity, treachery and corruption. There, local conditions of weakness and putrefaction foster unclean ambitions in the foreign breast, and have established between the European Powers a deadly rivalry which has recourse to every means suggested by unscrupulousness. In a general way, the greater the corruption in a country, the weaker and more degraded the character of its people, the greater is the sway of diplomacy. Secrecy and the prohibition of discussion relating to public affairs, such as exists in autocratic countries, provide it with additional chances. Turkey, China, Persia and all the other countries which make up the East, represent, with the exception of reformed Japan, the promised land of the diplomatist. There, humanity offers the Mephisto, disguised in embroidered uniform and cocked hat, an unusually abundant crop of weaknesses and vices to trade on. The diplomatist develops into perfection and dominates most in the midst of ignorance, degradation and corruption.

The knowledge of the inner workings of diplomacy and of the qualities it exacts from its adepts, as shown above, will help to explain the superiority of the Russian over the Briton in this particular branch of political activity.

A citizen of Great Britain is brought up as a boy in an at-

mosphere of intense physical culture, which is the best preservative against mean instincts. It gives rise among the young, through the early opposition of characters and ambitions under sound pedagogic tuition, to a code of moral precepts of which manliness, with all its component attributes of truthfulness, fairness, personal dignity and pride, is the most prominent. As a grown-up man, he lives in an atmosphere of political liberty, administrative legality and honesty, and varied opportunity for success in life, which leaves no room for the exercise of any of those human impulses which entail a diminution of self-respect or an attempt on the weaknesses of others. These conditions of life stamp the minds and hearts of the British with an indelible mark of uprightness and a conception of duty to self and one another based on a high appreciation of humanity. As a consequence, they are unbending, unobservant, slow to read the character of others. They are loath to admit evil, and superior to the utilization of the opportunities which the accidental revelation of human frailty may offer them. Their nature is simple and their organization muscular, not nervous. Sport is their god. Science, art, love, do not play in their existence the same rôle as in that of other races. In an absolute sense, it is difficult to deny that they achieve morally and socially a very high, perhaps the highest, type of humanity; but in the exercise of diplomacy their qualities turn to their disadvantage. Land an Englishman on the diplomatic stage, and, nine times in ten, he is bound to play his part poorly, though animated by the greatest good will. I say "animated by good will" because, like every other country, indeed more than any other country, Great Britain, notwithstanding the individual character of her citizens, entertains and carries out a policy of covetousness leading to the spoliation of others.

Owing to a process of self-deception rarely practised by Englishmen in private life, but for which their intense and blind patriotism is a frequent occasion, this policy is approved of readily by the community on the plea of the civilizing mission of Great Britain. The agent entrusted with its application gives it his whole heart and soul, and even condescends to dabble in the black art of diplomacy for its furtherance; but in this work he is handicapped by constitutional stiffness of mind and character. It is easier for him to be brutal and cruel than to be mean, cunning and false. His nature is to hew his way through difficulties, and not

to slip past them or dig his way under them. His natural distaste for trickery appears in the clumsiness with which he resorts to it. When he has struck a bargain for the purchase of a conscience, he carries out the terms with a bad grace expressive of high contempt for the degraded object of his designs, and he destroys in that way half of the effect of seduction. The maintenance of British rule in India is supposed to be a masterpiece of human skill, and, indeed, the machinery of government England has established there works admirably to-day. But it is founded more on principles of force and administrative efficiency than on principles of policy. By her contempt for the natives expressed in acts of brutality and impatience, by her inability to enter into their prejudices and to flatter their weaknesses, by her arrogant assumption of superiority of race upon every occasion, she destroys the effects of an otherwise beneficent, and in some ways skilful, rule, and keeps up a ferment of hatred among all classes, which has once already brought the Indian Empire within an inch of destruction, and justifies the opinion that another outbreak is possible and may be fraught with more terrible consequences. If it be true that this attitude forms deliberately part of her policy, as being a dangerous but the only means of dealing successfully with Orientals, how is it that Russia maintains her authority in Asia more firmly, to all appearances, by acting on opposite lines? All the successes of Great Britain are due to the unique advantages of her geographical position, to brutal force and timely luck intervening, in the shape of an unexpected combination of events, to maintain her threatened fortunes, none to foresight, sagacity or a deeply meditated plan of action. She has always dropped into situations unawares, turning them, "*après coup*" to account, thanks to her massive doggedness and pluck, but feeling rather surprised at the favorable turn of events. Her African policy alone in its last phase is the result of a well-defined conception of the future, but then what blindness, what carelessness and unpreparedness in the execution!

With his education and disposition, an Englishman is rarely a success socially except among his congeners. He is wanting in the art of conversation, graceful manners and flattery, what the French sum up in the expressions "*entregent*" and "*savoir-vivre*." When he appeals to womankind, it is as a fine physical specimen of humanity, tall, muscular, sporty, and on his cheeks the color

of the beef on which he is fed, deepened by exposure to the sun—an enviable form of attraction, assuredly, and one which is enhanced by the special charm emanating from its combination with the very awkwardness of the individual. But, as it takes two to quarrel, it takes two to get on, and the average Englishman is muscle-plated against the seduction of woman, as such. He is distant, cold and haughty, and disliked in proportion, and, it must be added, secretly respected in proportion. Consequently, if by any chance he combines foreign blandishments with his manly insular accomplishments and condescends to meet non-British humanity on terms of equality, he becomes the rage, for then he realizes a type which is full of novelty, and he appeals to that unlovely disposition of man to prize secretly, as a favor, any departure from frigidity on the part of the reserved and indifferent.

Several instances, taken from recent history, will show the clumsiness of English diplomacy. In the Armenian question—one in which humane purpose was allowed to have claims on the attention of the British Government to the extent of becoming the spring of intense official action—an initial mistake, according to the politician—Lord Rosebery and, after him, Lord Salisbury adopted methods whose failure any but an English statesman could have foreseen. It was they who, entertaining an object estimable in itself, but blemished by the introduction of feelings of spite and vengeance against Turkey for past grievances, pandered to hysterical agitation and transformed what was, no doubt, a harrowing episode of suffering, though such as exists in many countries, into an appalling tragedy, thus wrecking the existence of the people they were championing, who better advised might have steered out of their difficulties, and utterly ruining the prestige of the English name in the East—nay, holding it up to the anathemas of their very *protégés*. Continuing a policy of empty threats and intimidation, practised since the eighties, in place of the tactics formerly pursued at Constantinople, indulging on every occasion in a wanton display of contempt and provocation, for which Sir Philip Curry was an admirably chosen instrument as Ambassador at Constantinople, the English played with amazing naïveté into the hands of the Russians, and finally found themselves obliged to beat an ignominious retreat. It will take some time for the Irishman who acts to-day as British Ambassador at Constantinople, with a mission to inaugurate a more sensible

policy, to repair the effect of the blunders dictated to his predecessor by the Foreign Office.

In China and Persia, the decline of British supremacy and the corresponding increase of Russian influence—for it is always England or Russia in those parts—speak as eloquently of the inefficiency of Her Gracious Majesty's diplomacy.

The success of British exertions to achieve popularity in the United States, or rather to improve what was a desperate situation, is due more to accident than superior art. Without the Spanish war and the opportunity it afforded to England to render the States an immense service, we would probably still be witnessing, on this side of the Atlantic, the state of mind which resulted in the famous message of President Cleveland in the matter of the Venezuelan frontier. The brutal temper of British statesmanship broke out on the occasion of this war, as on so many others. The United States had to be gained over to Great Britain; therefore, it was natural and fit for her, apart from moral considerations, to proclaim her sympathy with the champions of Cuban independence. But in the name of what necessity, unless it be that of satisfying an irresistible inclination for blundering, did Lord Salisbury insult Spain by publicly ranking her with the degenerate and dying Powers, however true this might be in reality? Would it not have been better to have left those words unsaid than to say them, and then try to make amends by declaring, as Lord Salisbury did in a recent speech, that Spain, with industry and perseverance, had still a happy future before her?

I pass now to the Russian diplomacy. The Russian is differently equipped for the exercise of diplomatic duties. As a member of the Slav race, he is endowed with a natural flexibility of character which is wonderful and enables him to adapt himself to any circumstances. At school, his education is not as healthy, either morally or physically, as that of the Englishman, and it is more directed toward the improvement of the mind than of the body and soul. At home, he is familiarized with a state of society whose principal traits are subserviency to political power, mental and moral restraint in the wrong sense, and a complete dependency on official patronage for success in life. As a result, the Russian enters the competition of life restricted to the fields of functionarism and militarism, naturally prepared for and educated to artfulness. These defects carry along with them their qualities. He

possesses all the external graces which the Englishman lacks, or he can adorn himself with them at will, which is the same thing for practical purposes. He shines in society with all the advantages derived from wit, versatility of manner and mind, the desire and the talent to please. Superior to the Frenchman, who is shallow, blinded by offensive conceit and always on personal exhibition for the sake of *gloriole*, he is armed with deep purpose, tact and penetration. Thus, he has in his make the elements of the diplomatist *par excellence*. His reputation as such is absolutely justified. The Russian diplomatic service is one of the most formidable machines in existence, comparable in many respects to the Jesuit organization. It exhibits the same deeply planned and unswerving purpose, the same discipline, the same merciless elimination of worthless elements, the same spirit of sacrifice, the same resourcefulness. The Russian Government knows exactly what it wants, forms plans for a distant future and carries them out with a steadfastness and tenacity of purpose to be secured only by the conditions of autocracy. From its agents it demands success, and does not care how it is obtained. The practice of Russian diplomatic agents in places where it pays to do so, as in the East and in the Balkan countries and maybe others, is to inquire not only into the political conditions of the State, but also into the workings of Society, written with a capital S. There is no household of importance into which his curiosity does not throw a searching glance. Domestic troubles, the relations of husband to wife, the morality of both, a loss at cards, the amount owing to the butcher—all these items of information and many others are greedily collected, some by the agent himself, the greater part by his subordinates, whose mission it is to be watchful and report everything they see and hear. This information is classified, docketed and combined so as to be turned to account for political purposes at a favorable moment. How far unscrupulousness of method is carried by these arch-diplomatists it is unnecessary to specify. Recent events in China and in the Balkan peninsula are sufficiently eloquent.

The result of such an organization is evident. Russia triumphs everywhere. Her interests in Turkey are as important as those of England, and though she is in a far better position than her rival to carry out threats she has recourse to this means only in the last extremity, always preferring the insinuating and unctuous

methods of diplomacy which spare pride and vanity, the two deepest motives of humanity. It is wonderful to watch her tactics in the East, where she knows that success is a question mainly depending on the art of ingratiating. With admirable skill she lays herself out to win the good graces, not only of persons in actual power, but of any and every individual whom a jerk in the balance of imperial favor may some day invest with important functions—that is to say, everybody. She neglects no one, and is "*aux petits soins*" with every native to whom her caresses and flatteries are all the more delightful because the European world is generally so contemptuous, indifferent or brutal to him. She follows the careers of native officials with jealous attention, recommends and pushes those who show the dispositions that suit her, puts obstacles in the way of the others. Not only does she excel in taking advantage of opportunities, but she is unsurpassable in the art of creating them. In a word, she is masterful in the highest degree and proportionately successful.

This comparison between Great Britain and Russia in the walks of diplomacy has not been undertaken to give expression to a preference for the former or criticism of the latter. Neither is its object to censure the methods of diplomacy or to approve of them. It is simply a statement of facts, meant to serve as a contribution to the comprehension of the political action of States in the busy and complicated struggle which secretly rages between them, until it breaks out into the flames of war.

Before concluding, I should like to correct the impression which may possibly be derived from the foregoing pages as to the personal character of diplomatists. Outsiders should not forget that the diplomatist is a dual personality. He is an official and, as such, a machine, acting according to the laws of movement and not according to those of the human heart and conscience. Details lose their importance in the magnitude of his object, just as the miseries of war are overlooked by a statesman working for the greatness of his country. But he is also a private individual, and, in this capacity, he may be, and generally is, a gentleman and a human being, endowed with sensibilities often sharpened by the necessity of a reaction from the turpitude of official work. Family and social life is to him what a plunge in a clear stream is to the miner after the accomplishment of some grimy task in the bowels of the earth.

A DIPLOMAT.

ANTAGONISM OF ENGLAND AND RUSSIA.

BY DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

The fated moment seems at hand when the rivalry of England and Russia will be subjected to the stern arbitrament of war, and when the God of Battles will decide which of the two Imperial competitors is the stronger. Despite the Russian Emperor's desire for peace and the restraining influences exercised in high places, too many critical questions have reached maturity at the same moment to leave much room for hope in the diplomatic appeasement of conflicting interests. The Persian Gulf question in itself might be composed; that relating to Herat might be held over, and Russia's high-handed proceedings at Talien-wan might be tolerated a little longer; but when taken together they constitute an attack on the British position in Asia to which Britons should be mad to show themselves indifferent.

That a conflict between England and Russia in Asia is inevitable has been clear for the last sixty years. The British have done nothing to provoke or justify the aggressive schemes which Russia has long cherished, and which her military men to-day think they can realize, and they have allowed Russia to reach unmolested the Afghan frontier and to absorb northern China. But their forbearance, far from moderating the animosity and hostile schemes of Russia, has served only to inflame them, and to inspire Russian military authorities with the ridiculously mistaken idea that the British Nation is afraid to oppose them. One of these gentlemen has allowed himself to give expression to the opinion that England is in decay and helpless, and he concludes with the following self-satisfied prediction:

"When the Russian avalanche, rolling from the height of the Pamirs, or elsewhere, shall fall on India with an elemental force, all will be over with the British domination in that vast Empire of the Far East. And, as a matter of fact, it may be asked, How will Eng-

land, which has had so much difficulty in overcoming the different insurrections of the badly-armed and half-starved Hindus, attempt to repulse a Russian army of invasion, composed of two or three hundred thousand men—troops of elite—and susceptible of being increased to one million?"

This quotation represents the practically unanimous opinion of Russian officers, who, forgetful of Alma, Inkerman and Sebastopol, infer from a misunderstanding of the causes of the delay in crushing the Boers that "the English army will always be beaten when fighting an European army." These unflattering opinions have passed from the mess-room to the cabinets of the civil departments at St. Petersburg; for it is only on the assumption that the Russian Government has come to the conclusion that it may treat England as a *quantité négligeable* that its late proceedings at Teheran and Moukden can be explained. Something is known by the public as to the concessions extracted from the Shah; but it is currently believed in the best-informed circles that, on the occasion of his approaching visit to Russia, a treaty will be signed placing him in a state of open dependence on that Power. Severe as will be that shock to British equanimity and prestige, I question whether in true importance it will not be surpassed by the imminent and perhaps already accomplished seizure of the northern section of the British-built railway to Moukden.

The preliminary point which it is desirable to make clear is that Russia, in an inexcusable and wanton manner, has at the present time offered Great Britain more than one affront which that nation should be justified in regarding as a challenge. In Persia, where she had the chance of coming to a friendly arrangement with England, she has preferred to act in defiance of the right of England to have a voice in the fate of a kingdom of whose independence England is one of the guarantors by the Treaty of Paris. In Manchuria she has torn up British rights with the same effrontery with which her engineers talk of tearing up the British-built railway, if they have not already done so. There is consequently no room left for hope of an amicable arrangement with Russia. She is bent on injuring Great Britain to the full extent of her power and opportunities, from the Caucasus to Corea. She is preparing for the operations of open war by manœuvres aiming at British humiliation, and at the lowering of British prestige; while her press and politicians are fanning the public animosity toward England to a flame with stories of

the ease and immense recompense that must attend a Russian invasion of India. No one who reads the Russian papers, or studies the several works by Russian officers that have recently appeared on the subject of the invasion of India, can doubt any longer that a hostile collision between England and Russia is inevitable. Nor can there be any uncertainty that, at this very moment, Russia has offered and is offering sufficient justification for a *casus belli*. The practical question alone remains: Shall England pick up the challenge that Russia has thrown in her face?

The reply to that important question can only be given after a more careful consideration of the relative importance of the questions at issue, and of the British interests imperiled. But it must be remembered that war itself, just as much as preparation for war, is a matter of insurance. An avowed and implacable enemy, aiming at England's overthrow, can only be brought to reason by the confession of superior force; and the employment of that force becomes legitimate and even necessary as soon as it is made clear that the other side will develop a strength that may give it in time the moral certitude of success. It seems to me that Anglo-Russian rivalry has reached this stage, and that every year which now passes will strengthen Russia's position and chances of victory, while England's will proportionally diminish. But at this moment there is still time to nip the danger in the bud, and by a vigorous effort to relegate Russia's dreams of Asiatic dominion to the stage they held in the days of the Cossack Irmak and Peter the Great. The Crimean War stopped Russia in the Black Sea for thirty years, and with wiser statesmen would have done more; and a war now would not only save India for another half-century from external attack and avert the dissolution of China, but it would also eliminate a dangerous factor from the complicated and menacing problem raised by Continental hostility to England. It is made clearer every day that the British Empire has become a mark of envy to the rest of Europe, and that that empire can be preserved only by the strong right arm of military power. The special grounds of rivalry and quarrel with Russia would justify England in bringing the question to a clear and speedy issue, from the result of which would flow, in all probability, a simplification of the major problem in England's favor, as well as the immediate relief of British anxieties on the score of India and China.

How great those anxieties are is well known to every one responsible for the defence of India, and for the maintenance of British rights in China. Within the last few months, Russia has taken various steps of a menacing character, while circumstances have obliged Great Britain to remain passive. In the form of "experimental mobilizations," Russia has placed a considerable armed force at several points along the Afghan frontier, from Termez on the Oxus to Kushk in the neighborhood of Herat. If this step stood alone, it would be an unfriendly act; but its significance is greatly increased by the recent acquisition from Bokhara of several districts along the Oxus where Russia is about to establish settlements for colonists and ex-soldiers from Europe. At the Persian end of the frontier she has prepared another unpleasant surprise for us in an arrangement that practically means the cession of the important province of Khorassan by Persia, and that will be published to the world on the occasion of the Shah's European visit. The main object of the Russians in reducing Khorassan to the same level as Bokhara and Manchuria, is to obtain possession of the short, direct route for a railway to Meshed. This passes direct from the Russian town of Askabad to Kuchan, whence Meshed is accessible by an easy valley; and between Meshed and Herat lies one of the great high roads of Asia. The acquisition of this shorter and improved route from the Caspian base to Afghanistan will give Russia an immensely increased striking power at Herat. Fortunately, two years at the most favorable estimate will be necessary for the construction of the Kuchan-Meshed line; but the pass between Askabad and Kuchan has been leveled and prepared for the laying of the rails, which could be accomplished in a few weeks. Russia has been long preparing for this move; but, now that it is on the point of being taken, it is doubtful if British authorities have made up their minds as to the best counter-move.

The Russian movements in the region round Herat bring the question of that far-famed fortress into prominence, and with it the whole subject of British Afghan policy. It is quite clear that Russia aims at encircling that place from the north and west, so that at the right moment it will drop into her lap without an effort. But, if General Kuropatkin gets his way, the Russian military party will precipitate events by seizing "the key of India" with the force now collected in the Murghab and Kushk valleys.

At any moment the country may, therefore, receive the startling intelligence that there has been a repetition of the Penjdeh incident, and that Herat has been seized by a *coup de main*, for which one of the border fights that have been frequent along the Maimena-Andkoi frontier will be pleaded as an excuse. In whatever form it may present itself, the Herat problem is almost ripe for solution. Is it to be solved by a tame acquiescence in the cleverness and celerity with which Russia will grasp it, or by a firm and positive notification at St. Petersburg that its seizure will be met by a declaration of war? If the latter step is to be taken with the idea of averting war, not an hour should be lost, for so intoxicated are Russian soldiers with a belief in their own superiority that, despite their Peace Emperor, the Rubicon may at any moment be crossed.

The question of Herat stands by itself, and also as part of the larger question of British Afghan policy. In the former aspect, Great Britain has the right to say to Russia that she cannot allow Herat to be turned into a formidable fortress and base for the invasion of India, and that she will fight Russia wherever she can until Russia evacuates it. England could do that in complete indifference to Afghanistan or to the part its prince and people might play in the struggle. But England need not deprive herself of the advantage which the co-operation of the Afghans will provide in defending their own territory against Russian aggression. The Herat question, then, is only the most prominent part of that relating to Afghanistan, which England is bound by her own repeated declarations to defend against unprovoked aggression. This obligation is, of course, dependent on the readiness and intention of the government of Afghanistan to contribute toward the defence of its own country, for it would not be to England's interests to place a British army where it would be exposed to any risk from the defection or duplicity of the Afghans. The essential point in British policy depends on the wishes and views of the Ameer, with whom it would seem that long ere this a common line of action should have been defined and agreed upon by British statesmen. Nothing of the sort, however, has been done lest it might give umbrage to Russia, the only enemy threatening any danger to either India or Afghanistan; and, in consequence, everything is left undecided and unsettled. The Ameer was more far-seeing than Great Britain. In

1887, he wrote the Indian Government a letter asking them certain important questions as to what he should do in the event of Russia's violating his frontier or raising disturbances among the Turkoman tribes along the borders. He repeated the same inquiries later on, but to neither communication has he ever received a reply! Of course, the ruler of Afghanistan could not be expected to know that the British Empire, with all its extraordinary power and success, has never possessed a consistent and continuous foreign policy. It has flourished on a hap-hazard, hand-to-mouth system, which will no longer answer in an age of keen international rivalry. Neither in Afghanistan nor in any other sphere of her responsibilities can England prudently defer the formation of her plans to the hour of combat. In Afghanistan, since the termination of the labors of the boundary commission, the Indian Government has sat with arms folded, intending thereby to show Russia, on the one hand, what an inoffensive and innocent institution it was, and, on the other, to convince the Ameer that it had no designs on his territory. This negation of policy, like the old "masterly inactivity," leaves everything uncertain till the hour of crisis, when those whom wisdom would have secured for England as friends may be driven into the opposite camp by the precipitancy of her measures and the imperative tone of her demands.

The Ameer has taken Great Britain a little into his confidence through the important political statement published by Sir Acquin Martin. There are many important points in this document, and it shows that the reticent policy of the Indian Government does not command the approval of the astute ruler at Cabul. The Afghan prince betrays no leaning toward Russia, and a very remarkable sympathy with England in South Africa, declaring, with true Oriental hyperbole, that "England's troubles are always my troubles." There is more solid satisfaction in his bold definition of the incompatibility between Russia and Islam. The Mussulmans, he declares, hate her; Russia holds insecurely the Mussulman countries she has conquered; and, above all, "We Afghans prefer death to being enslaved and having our women and children taken by the Russians." There is no doubt that in those sentences the Ameer speaks his true mind. He has one aim—the independence of his country against Russia, in the first place, but also against England, should a blunder of policy lead that country

to threaten it. But he has also an ambition, and that is to head Islam against Russia for the recovery of those Mussulman countries which she has but half conquered. England's policy should, to a large extent, be based on an appreciation of the Ameer's wishes. Unfortunately, his words make it quite clear that the attempt has not even been made to understand them in matters about which he is specially qualified to give sound advice. On the other hand, Great Britain seems to have ruffled his serenity with some useless and therefore silly questions about his armaments; and the Ameer at once came to the conclusion that the British Government was beginning to be suspicious of his loyalty. This is ominous, and no effort should be spared to remove this impression. The Afghan who thinks himself suspected lashes himself into the mood to justify suspicion, and the alienated friend of to-day is apt to become the enemy of to-morrow.

With the Russian knocking at the gates of Herat and Balkh, the time has come to define and agree upon the lines of common action between India and Afghanistan. The defence of Afghanistan cannot be successfully accomplished by the Afghans alone; but if the co-operation of England is to be made valuable for them and safe for herself, it must not be forced on them. What is done must be done with the prior assent and good-will of the Ameer; otherwise Great Britain will find herself in the position of the invader against whom all the Afghans would unite. The views of the Ameer can only be ascertained by personal intercommunication; and, if the Ameer's health will not admit of his visiting Lord Curzon in India, then he should be invited to receive some high British official as a special envoy at Cabul. The points to be agreed upon relate to the defence of Herat, and to its preparation to stand a siege before the commencement of a war; and, after hostilities have begun, to the movement of British troops into and across Afghanistan. But, at the same time, the Ameer should be encouraged in his own ambitious scheme of rousing Mohammedan Asia against the Russians. Such an object would appeal to the sympathy of all the tribes of Afghanistan and of the lands bordering on India, and a movement might be inaugurated among these warriors that would carry their thoughts and efforts in a direction opposite from India. If the Ameer can repeat Timour's exploit by being crowned Emperor of Central Asia at Samaracand, it is not the British policy to hold him back.

But, after all, it is in Manchuria that Russian rivalry has assumed its most menacing and insolent expression. The hold that Russia has laid on Manchuria is that of a conqueror. At the council of the Mongols, she has superseded the Emperor of China. She is only waiting the completion of the Siberian railway to place her Governor-General at Moukden. In Corea, she has made good her foothold, and hopes to oust the Japanese without having recourse to arms. In five years she has accomplished this marvellous success without any one interfering with her, and by making only one concession to all the diplomatic effort and ink expended between Downing Street and Peking. That concession—the recognition of Talien-wan as a free port—has already been nullified by the astute measure sanctioned by the Czar for the creation of a new Russian town to be named Dalny, a name signifying “the remote city.” Dalny is to be constructed so as to envelop Talien-wan, by which arrangement the goods landed in “the free treaty port of Talien-wan” can only reach the interior after paying toll at the Russian Customs barrier of Dalny. This little incident will show the utter hopelessness of any fair or equal arrangement with Russia. She denies, ignores or suppresses the rights of everybody else. The Northern Moukden railway, a British concession worked by British engineers, was a special object of Russian attack a few years ago at Peking, but Sir Claude Macdonald succeeded in upholding the letter of the deed, although only by changing the British concession into a Chinese railway. The other day, however, the Russian engineers engaged on the Russian line passing near Moukden to Port Arthur “discovered” the existence of this line, and resorted to some very high-handed proceedings, of which the British Foreign Office must in due course have been informed. The explanation now given is that this was one of the many Cossack excesses. To all these points of rivalry and contention the imminent revelation of Russia’s acquisitions in Khorassan will bring the climax.

For these reasons, I return to my original point and ask whether the fated moment has not arrived to put an end to the hitherto unchecked aggression of Russia by an appeal to arms, which sooner or later is inevitable. If the struggle must come, why should it not come now, when England is ready, and when the alliance of both Afghanistan and Japan is practically assured to her? Russia, despite all the vauntings of her officers, is not

a really formidable antagonist, as no doubt she will one day be. Her efforts cover too wide a surface, and her considerable army in the Liaoutung peninsula could be destroyed in its isolated position by the power which commanded the sea. The Ameer has detected the insecurity of her position in Central Asia, and, aware of Mussulman hatred, he realizes that the recent Russian butchery at Tashkent has gone far to inflame rather than to crush it. In the Far East, Japan is waiting on England's convenience, watching Russia's proceedings without making any useless protests, and biding her time while she completes the effectiveness of her army and navy. But she cannot go on waiting forever, and some of her statesmen may be led to think that even a bad division with Russia is better than to remain empty-handed as the ally of a torpid and indifferent England. To the loss of opportunities will follow that of allies, if Great Britain shows a tame submission to the affronts that Russia is now offering her throughout Asia.

Now is the moment to bring the rivalry of this determined and relentless enemy to an issue, and to have recourse to the remedy of war as an insurance against an inevitable and manifest danger being allowed to become too difficult and formidable. England is ready and Russia is not. Russia has the itching to clutch India without the power to do so; and if England is firm and resolute, and fights in a proper spirit and not in the silly, hyper-civilized manner she has pursued in South Africa, she can shatter the Asiatic dominion of the Czar to its base, and give the Russians something else to think of than the invasion of India for another hundred years. Of provocation there has been no lack, and fresh *casus belli* will be soon supplied, perhaps before these lines can appear in print. Before summarizing the operations that such a war would necessitate in order to bring it to a successful conclusion, there is one point that requires preliminary consideration, and that is the part which France would take in the struggle.

The relations between England and France are often strained, but there is no implacable rivalry and antipathy between them such as do and must exist between England and Russia. In fact, the distrust of France that has increased of late years among Englishmen is largely due to the apprehension that France had placed herself so completely under the thumb of Russia as to make it certain that she would play Russia's game against England

in Asia. The Dual Alliance, which, in its ostensible form, as a set-off to the Triple Alliance, excited no mistrust and seemed perfectly natural, became a menace to Great Britain when it was seen how subservient France had become to Russia. No one can say how far a responsible French Government will allow itself to be drawn into a quarrel with which, so far as it relates to Persia, the Indian frontier and Manchuria, it has no concern. But it is essentially a question for France herself to decide. Her attitude and what passes for French opinion could not possibly be more hostile to England than it has been since Fashoda, and it would be useless for England to attempt to disarm it. We must be prepared for the worst, the same time that we record the fact that, if France intervenes in an Anglo-Russian conflict, the quarrel will be of her own seeking and making. But the addition of France to Russia should not fill England with dismay. On her side, England would strictly confine the war, so far as France was concerned, to that element on which for two hundred years France has appeared at a disadvantage; and, although the bill might be heavier, the result of a collision between the British fleet and the Franco-Russian navies would not, unless British estimates are very much in error—and no one doubts England's willingness to take the risk—be very different from what it would be in the case of one Power instead of two. Against the heavier expenditure could be set the increased security that would arise from the elimination of two navies instead of one, which would leave Great Britain able to face with greater patience and complacency the growth of that of Germany.

The first phase of the war would be a naval one for the mastery of the seas in the Mediterranean, the Black, the Baltic and the waters of the Far East; while on the Atlantic England would close the French ports from Dunkirk to L'Orient. So far as the struggle would partake of the character of a great naval battle, the scene would be the Mediterranean, where the French have great faith in their fair-weather fleet. In the Far East, the English squadron, now reinforced by a second line-of-battle ship and by the two fine cruisers, the "Powerful" and "Terrible," would even without the powerful aid of the Japanese, sweep the Franco-Russian navies from the seas; and in this case it is exceedingly doubtful whether the relics of those fleets would long find shelter under the guns of Port Arthur. After a certain number of

months, the question of naval superiority would be placed beyond dispute, and that part of the hostile fleets which had escaped destruction would be locked up in a state of impotence in a comparatively limited number of harbors.

During this preliminary period, measures for the effective defence of India in the first place, and for supporting the Ameer in every way he may wish, would also be carried out. Assuming that the British operations on the Indian frontier would for some time be defensive, and that England's real attack on Russia would be made in other directions, it would not be necessary for England to send more than 50,000 troops to India. This would raise the European garrison to 110,000 men, half of whom could be sent to the frontier with 75,000 good native troops and at least 20,000 Imperial Service troops. All these men are now being armed with the magazine rifle, and no doubt the imperfections in the cavalry armament and the artillery will be promptly removed. From the 150,000 troops available, an army of 50,000 could be formed to guard the Khyber, and another of 100,000 for offensive operations from the Pishin Valley in the direction of Candahar and Herat. But in neither direction should the English troops enter Afghanistan without the Ameer's permission and good-will. It is quite possible that that permission would only be given with great reluctance in the case of Cabul, and it would be far better to let the Ameer take his own chance, if he wished it, in dealing single-handed with the Russians on the Oxus rather than to force British assistance upon him. England has, moreover, an admirable defensive position in the Khyber, and she could there await with confidence the attack of any army Russia could bring against her. On the southern frontier, the same passive attitude would not be possible, and the Ameer's assent would have to be obtained for an early advance to Candahar.

But, on the whole, British military plans would, so far as India was concerned, be mainly defensive. Great Britain should be ready to strike, but she should not go much out of her way to simplify for Russia the task of bringing an army of invasion across the five-hundred miles that separate Kushk from Chaman. In other directions, England should strive to inflict a maximum of damage on the enemy. It would go hard with England if Odessa and Batoum escaped ransom or reduction, and the new harbor of Sebastopol might be subjected to a searching test of

its merits. In Port Arthur and the garrison of the Liaoutung peninsula, Russia has given hostages to fortune of far greater value than even Herat. Who believes that that force could escape an English expedition of 50,000 men acting in conjunction with the half-million of soldiers with whom Japan is ready at the given signal to overrun Corea and Manchuria? Taking the available British army at 500,000 men, it would be divided in the following manner: 110,000 in India, 40,000 as a garrison for Egypt, 50,000 for operations in Manchuria, and another 50,000 for the Black Sea. There would remain 250,000 men for the decisive blow in the second year of the war. This should be struck at St. Petersburg itself, and the presence of that force in the Baltic would light such a fire from Finland to Poland as would give even the colossal army of the Czar all the employment of which it is capable. It is no secret that St. Petersburg lies exposed to a well-directed attack, because it would not be difficult to sever its communications with the interior, and Kronstadt, strong toward the sea in such degree as forts may be to ironclads, is no invulnerable defence for the Russian capital on the land side. In addition to the half-million troops possessed by Great Britain, she possesses 100,000 admirable Indian troops, including 20,000 of the finest light cavalry in the world.

I have said nothing about allies, because the British Empire must be prepared to stand alone against all comers; but an exception is made in the case of Japan, the one assured and efficient ally England possesses all the world over, firm and dignified in its patient attitude, but ready to act at England's signal. Yet the strong never fail to attract allies. The Ameer of Afghanistan has his finger on the pulse of Islam. He knows it throbs with hatred of the Russian. Would Turkey keep aloof from the movement under the Green Flag of the Prophet that promised her revenge and relief from suffocation? The participation of France in the struggle entails the alliance of Italy against her, and a more rapid clearing of the Mediterranean. The war could not be many weeks old before these alliances would pass into the sphere of accomplished facts. After its development by successes on the sea and at Port Arthur, there would be still more powerful European alliances at England's disposal. Finland would be a warning to Sweden and Norway, if Russian movements on the Mourman coast rendered any further warning necessary; and the

fine Scandinavian people would not be backward in participating in a movement that promised to dispel the danger of annexation, with which they are repeatedly threatened in a wanton and bullying spirit. Nor is it conceivable that Austria, which is tied to the Triple Alliance without gaining much benefit from it, could stand aloof when so favorable an occasion presented itself to relieve the pressure on her eastern borders, and to take part in a resuscitation of that kingdom of Poland, the downfall of which commenced her own deterioration.

Has the moment come for this historic and earth-shaking struggle? I say that the reckless and defiant proceedings of Russia leave England no honorable choice. England has tolerated acts on Russia's part within the last four years that have injured British prestige, discouraged the friends of England and given the Government of the Czar many material advantages. Russia is about to crown them all with an act that will filch away the most important province of Persia and with more than one affront in Manchuria. If Great Britain overlooks or condones these acts, the injury will be irremediable and the Russian Government will be justified in thinking that it has been granted *carte blanche*. But it is impossible for the British Government to remain forever passive in face of Russia's aggressions, and it is now time to put down its foot and warn Russia off. England has had more than enough of Russia's threats as to what is to be done in the direction of India, and the hour has come to bid the Muscovite Power to stand on her guard and do her worst. Now is the moment to expose the hollowness of her menaces and to expel her from the positions which she had seized, threatening the tranquillity of India and the integrity of China. So favorable an opportunity from every point of view as the morrow of the overthrow of the Boers will be to establish British security in the East may never recur, and the wave of enthusiasm that would pass through India as well as through the British Empire when it became known that England had decided to end the insolent pretensions and aggressions of Russia would electrify the world and leave no room for doubt as to the issue.

DEMETRIUS C. BOULGER.

GREAT BRITAIN IN ASIA.

BY THE RIGHT HON. SIR RICHARD TEMPLE, BART.

At a moment when the British Empire is gravely exercised by a war in the Antipodes, to result, as we hope, in a victorious issue and an honorable settlement, it is well to consider what its position is in Asia, and whether that is at all affected by our pre-occupations and avocations for the moment elsewhere.

If, in modern phrase, stock were to be taken of Great Britain's Asiatic belongings, the sum total would be magnificent, practically immense, exceeding effectively that of any other Power, of white or dark race, in that quarter of the globe. In the first place stands the Indian Empire, with an area of nearly two millions of square miles and a population of nearly three hundred millions of souls—figures which alone equal those of the Continent of Europe. But outside this Empire, and often in connection with it, there have grown, and are growing daily, various possessions and interests, forming, as it were, a vast chain of imperial affairs. Let these be momentarily recollected in geographical order.

From her base at Suez, Great Britain looks out on the Red Sea. She further extends her potential vision over that sea from Suakin, on the African side and in Egyptian territory. At Jedda, on the Arabian side, the gateway, so to speak, of Mecca, she has a dominating influence, and from ships under her flag or from her dominions are landed the pilgrims who travel by sea. At the very mouth of the Sea is the Island of Perim, merely a rock indeed, but one on which the British standard is flying. Just outside the mouth is the first-class fortress and coaling station of Aden, a volcanic formation often called the Gibraltar of the East. From this point the southeastern corner of Arabia, known to geographers as Arabia Felix, is dominated. It is not necessary here to recount how this position is supported by British control

over Socotra, commonly reckoned an African island, and over the opposite coast of Africa called Somalie. But enough has been said to show how Britain commands the Red Sea, one of the most important of her water highways on the face of the globe. The Royal Mail which passes weekly up and down this way, carrying dispatches for India, China and Australia, is probably the largest in the world.

Round the corner from Aden comes the sea approach to the Persian Gulf, a sea known to geographers as the Gulf of Oman, to poets as "Oman's green waters," and there lies Muscat, a place in the closest relations with Britain, as was recently and forcefully shown in a certain transaction with France. Inside the Persian Gulf are the two ports of Bender Abbas and Bushire, ports which though in Persian territory have heretofore been distinctly under British influence. Near the head of the Gulf is the island of Karak, once occupied by a British force. Heretofore, the maritime police of the Gulf, the suppression of piracy and the protection of the fisheries, pearl and other, have been managed by British warships. The Gulf has indeed been regarded by Anglo-Indian statesmen as a British lake. Into the head of the Gulf are discharged the united waters of the Euphrates and the Tigris, the confluence taking place above Basra or Bussorah, about a hundred miles from the coast. From the Gulf up to Bussorah the river is navigable for the ships of war, and the maritime control has been British also. In Persia itself, throughout the northern part of that kingdom, near the Caspian, Russia has asserted for herself a paramount position. But for the southern half of the kingdom Britain has a similar position fully as great, if she continues to assert it as well as she has hitherto done. Adjoining the Gulf is Beluchistan. A portion of that is Persian, but Beluchistan proper is British, and to that may be added Mekran, which carries on the coast line to near the mouths of the Indus.

North of this lies Afghanistan, which is under British protection, of which the boundaries, as against the coterminous Russian territory, have been marked off by British Commissioners meeting Russian Commissioners at the request of the Afghans, and which is under British suzerainty and within the Red Line. Yet further north rises the plateau of Pamir, mostly snow-clad, which has been divided between Britain and Russia.

Returning to India, we see Ceylon in equatorial latitudes and

commanding the entrance to the Bay of Bengal. Now that Burma and Tenasserim, with regions right up to the Chinese frontier, have been added to the Indian Empire, that great Bay is unquestionably a British lake. Onward from this Bay lies Siam, in which Britain has an equal interest with France, and for the independence of which there is a joint British and French guarantee. Heretofore it is the East to which attention has been directed. But now it will be the Far East to which thought must be turned.

The gateway of the Far East consists of the British possessions in and about the Strait of Malacca. Here is the fortified coaling station of Singapore, one of the keys of Asia, and second only to Aden in importance; by many, indeed, the two places might be deemed sisters in imperial importance. Thus the reader in imagination emerges on the Chinese waters and soon arrives at Hong Kong, a fortified island, with its strip of adjacent coast, commanding the mouth of one of the great rivers of China, a busy centre of Chinese commerce and a first-rate coaling station. Further north again is Shanghai, another centre of Chinese commerce, dominated by British merchants and virtually commanding the mouths of the Yangtse Kiang, the greatest of all Chinese rivers. Further north comes the Gulf of Pechili, which, branching from the China sea, runs right up towards Peking, and close underneath the southern shore of Manchuria. Near the mouth of this Gulf is the naval and military station of Wei-hai-Wei, which gives to Britain, in that vitally important Gulf, as good a position as that which she has in the Mediterranean.

Thus it will be seen how the southern and eastern portions of Asia, which are incomparably the richest and most populous, come to be either owned or controlled by Britain. The western and northern, and even the central portions, which are wholly inferior in fertility and in all resources—except mineral—may be owned or controlled by others. Of the sum total of European ocean-borne trade, the main bulk belongs to Britain; the remainder may be divided among other nations. Such, then, is the present British portion, as yet uniquely favorable. The immediate question is whether it is likely to be diminished or endangered by the general trend of events, by the conduct of other European Powers, or by anything consequent on the present war in the Antipodes.

An imaginative survey will remind the British reader of what the Persian ambassador in the days of Darius said, to the effect

that his master's rule extended so far north as to be frozen with perpetual frost, and so far south as to be glowing in perpetual heat.

Now, it is generally recognized that, whatever may be the conduct of the Continental press or the popular sentiment among the leading nationalities, the language and attitude of the several European Governments have been diplomatically correct. So far, no complaint on the British side has arisen. Nevertheless, certain movements have taken place, which may perhaps have been in previous contemplation, but which do affect some of the Asiatic interests of Britain as already described, and which have assumed particular activity since, say, the autumn of 1899. They synchronize, so to speak, with the fact of Britain's being much occupied in the Antipodes. The coincidence of time is, indeed, curiously suggestive.

As is well known, Russia has for some time past had a line of railway from the Caspian Sea eastward on to Bokhara and Samarcand; and to all that no objection could, under existing circumstances, be made. But from that line she has recently constructed a branch right up to a place named Kushk, on the Afghan frontier, near Herat, the capital of Western Afghanistan. She had technically and lawfully a right to do this. Nevertheless, her doing so was an unfriendly act towards Britain. It was not done for any sufficient commercial reason. The real object must have been to menace British interests and to disturb the minds of the Afghans. Still, whatever she might think, Britain could not so far remonstrate. But now Russia has sent, within the last few months, a body of troops to this place, Kushk, facing the line of British protectorate. As was doubtless anticipated, this move has caused much remark all over Asia. Thus this dispatch of troops was a still more unfriendly act, at which Britain may well take umbrage. It lays Russia open to the imputation of trying to profit (we hope quite vainly) by Britain's preoccupation in the Antipodes, and of doing that which she would hardly have ventured to do had Britain been wholly disengaged.

Again, Russia has long been known to have in contemplation some plan of railways in Persia. So long as that plan was confined to the northern half of that kingdom, Britain could hardly object, for no doubt Russian influence is preponderating there. But, as regards railways in the southern half, the arrangements

for them ought to be Britain's affair. Nevertheless, just at the present time, it is announced that Russia has obtained concessions from the Shah of Persia that would allow of railways being prolonged right down to the Persian Gulf. Here again is a direct menace to the British position in Asia. As usual, the precise facts as touching British interests are not, perhaps cannot be, made known to the public in Britain. Doubtless, there is some diplomatic correspondence going on; the limits of the concessions may not have been settled; probably Britain will have something serious to say to the Shah of Persia before the arrangement is concluded; and ultimately British interests may be vindicated. Meanwhile, it is well to take note of the disposition of Russia, as evinced by any such extensive attempt being made at such a time as the present. How the capital is to be found for these Persian railways, what trade or traffic there can be to pay the interest on the outlay, and who will defray the interest charges if the lines do not pay—these are questions for Russia to answer. It remains only to remark that, if she is from her own treasury to subsidize these railways should they prove unremunerative, she must have a political purpose. And that can only be to assert a political position in Southern Asia, inconvenient to the just and the long established interests of Britain.

Again, it is at this time that Germany has arranged with Turkey a concession for a railway from some point in Asia Minor to the basin of the Tigris and Euphrates, to Bagdad, at least, and perhaps onwards. This is a project which has been often mooted in Britain, but never undertaken, because the line did not seem likely to prove remunerative and because the communication by land did not appear able to compete with the existing communication by sea, and because there was no prospect of local or intermediate traffic to justify the outlay. These considerations apply equally to Germany, and, though banks are employed, there must be some state subsidy or support, substantial even though indirect. For such outlay from German resources—and it will come to that in some way or other—there must be a reason. That must be the extension of trade ultimately by political expansion; though the commercial profit to meet the German national expense can be, not at all in the present, but only in the remote future.

But expansion in this direction is approaching the British sphere too near to be pleasant. For, if a German line reaches

Bagdad, is it to be extended to Bussorah, of which the situation has been already described? If so, then is German influence to extend to the mouth of the joint river and to the coast of the Persian Gulf? This is, indeed, a grave question for Britain; inasmuch as any participation by a European Power in the control of the Persian Gulf is a distinct derogation from the British position as heretofore maintained in that quarter.

In the Far East, the consolidation of Japan, the settlement of her political constitution, the development of her forces by sea and land, are all favorable to British interests. In the Japanese Britain has a really friendly Power, on the eastern flank quite able to hold its own against Russia or other ambitious European Power.

The appearance of the United States of America in the Philippine Islands is convenient and apparently beneficial to British interests, and may serve in part as a counterpoise to any possible combination of Russia, France and Germany. Although Germany has in some instances acted excellently well with Britain, yet in the transactions following on the peace after the war between Japan and China she acted with France and Russia, while Britain withheld approbation.

Further, it is now understood that American diplomacy has secured the recognition by all the European Powers of the policy of the "open door" in China, implying that they all agree to keep all ports of which they may have the control within Chinese limits quite free, and without any duties, differential or other, levied against any one. If this really be secured, without any reservations or countervailing hindrances, it will be a boon to British interests. Indeed, it is the very thing for which British merchants throughout China have long been contending. Although they may obtain by far the largest commercial sphere of all—if China were to be partitioned out into spheres—they do not wish to have a sphere at all. For then they would have certain access to their own sphere only; in neighboring spheres they might be hindered; indeed, according to the heretofore established policy of other nations, they positively would be. They say in effect that British trade runs throughout all parts of China without exception; that, wherever British trade is, there is the sphere of Britain! Thus they will see in the general recognition of the "open door," by other nations, a blessed relief from disputes with

their European neighbors, and from embarrassments without end. This will be especially the case with British affairs in Manchuria, in which province Russia has so entirely superseded Chinese authority, in many respects, that she might easily, if so minded, oppose obstacles to long established British enterprises, commercial and industrial, in that quarter. Much trouble was apprehended in this respect, as British merchants in Manchuria were not likely to submit to the usual Russian procedure. But, if there is to be the "open door" in Manchuria, Britain may be glad, for really the prospect was almost too good to hope for.

There is, also, one particular trouble with France looming on the horizon of Southern China. Britain is establishing a through line of imperial communication from the Bay of Bengal to the Chinese waters on the Pacific Ocean; that is from Rangoon, at the mouth of the Irrawaddy of Burma, to Shanghai, near the mouth of the Yangtse Kiang of China. This route is to pass through Burmese railways to the borders of the Chinese province of Yunnan; negotiations are in progress with China for carrying on the line through Yunnan; thus the province of Czechuen would be reached, and then the lower course of the Yangtse Kiang, which would be controlled by gunboats from Shanghai. Whatever lines in China may be marked out by other Powers, this is *par excellence* the British line, and nobody knows this better than the French Government. The fact has been recognized by Russia, who gave Britain an agreement not to promote any railways near this line, in return for an agreement by Britain not to promote any railways in Manchuria. Nevertheless, France is striving to set up, as it were, a fence across this very line, just as she did across the line of British advance up the Nile at Fashoda. She is now asserting some shadowy rights in Yunnan; and she has recently, according to common report, been dispatching surveyors and other agents to search out the land in that quarter. All this on her part is incompatible with the maintenance of the British line. We are ready to respect whatever portions she may have acquired or may yet fairly acquire in China: but we expect her to do the same by us.

From this summary review of the British position in Asia, it is manifest that Britain from her imperial watchtower ought to be perpetually on the lookout to descry, discern, detect the beginning of future trouble. Transactions are undertaken by the

European Powers, who, though they be friendly in a national sense, are yet commercially and politically jealous of British predominance, and would rejoice at any reduction or weakening of the British position. Often such transactions may, to a cursory or short-sighted view, appear innocuous at first, and yet may ultimately lead to evil conjunctures and complications. Britain, looking far behind her to see how often in Asiatic history this has happened to her, should look far before her, to beware in time before matters have gone too far for retrieval.

Whether the present is a fitting time for other Powers to try any contests with Britain, is a question for them to determine. Britain is at the acme of her "puissance"; never has she displayed such resourcefulness as she has recently displayed in South Africa, and yet her resources are very far from exhaustion; indeed, they have not even yet been adequately called forth. She is still ready to meet any combination that could reasonably be anticipated, and if the present war shall be speedily terminated, then she will have forces available in a strength never before equalled in all her eventful history. She can afford to regard other nations quite complacently, whatever they may say, realizing what her rights are throughout the world and knowing well how to guard them.

RICHARD TEMPLE.

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